

POW/MIA POLICY AND PROCESS

HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO LEARN THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
MISSING SERVICEMEN

PART I OF II

NOVEMBER 5, 6, 7, AND 15, 1991

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POW/MIA POLICY AND PROCESS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Smith, McCain, Brown, Grassley, Kohl, Helms, Kassebaum, Reid, Robb, and Daschle.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome to the first set of hearings of the Select Committee. Our first witness is Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. He is under some time constraints and we are very appreciative of his taking the time to be here as a signal of his concern and of the administration's attachment of importance to this issue.

Senator Smith and I will make opening comments, since this is the first round of the Senate Select Committee, and then we will turn immediately to the Secretary's testimony and, subsequently, other colleagues, by prior agreement, will make their opening statements and we will place them in the record at the appropriate place without interruption.

I would like to take a moment to say something about the task that brings us here. Perhaps the best way to explain why we are here is to cite the case of a family from my own State of Massachusetts, a family that lost a son off the coast of Vietnam in 1968. No body was found, no one saw the sailor killed, he simply disappeared. I have met with that family on several occasions, right up until recent days. They are not an unusual POW/MIA family. They are basically very trusting people, patriotic people. They have always respected our Government and its institutions, but they have doubts.

They have told me of cryptic and frustrating conversations with officials of our Government, of missing medical records, of items disappearing from their son's file, and of reports from independent sources that their son has been sighted and that he is alive.

This family is not interested in national attention. They are interested in one item, the truth—if he is alive. They tell me we need your help, Senator. If he is not alive, we want to know what happened. That family and the other POW/MIA families obviously deserve the truth. They deserve to know, not just some, but everything that we know as a Government about what happened to their

loved ones, and they deserve our continued best efforts to obtain new information, through human and electronic intelligence, and through hard-nosed discussions with the governments of Southeast Asia, and through expanded contacts between Americans and the people who live in that part of the world.

Above all, they deserve a Government that not only says that the POW/MIA issue is the highest national priority, they deserve to be able to believe that we act every single day of our lives as if that is in fact the case. Now, the members of this committee are very well aware of the expectations that have been stirred up by the prospect of this investigation. There are those who may be looking for this committee to do the impossible, to bring back to life those who were truly lost, or to uncover some hidden file where all of the answers to all of the unanswered questions are secretly stored.

Others may expect this committee to run into a brick wall of obstructionism from the executive branch, or somehow become a tool for conspiracy mongers, witch hunters, and crackpots. We have other intentions. And I think that most Americans, including most POW/MIA families, have a more realistic expectation; they understand the difficulty of the task that we face and the uncertainty of the results. They do not expect us to perform miracles. They do not expect us to assume the role or to carry out the functions that can only be performed by the executive branch of Government.

They do expect us, however, to approach this job seriously, professionally, objectively, comprehensively, and immediately. They expect us to lay out in a way that all Americans can understand, without a lot of mumbo-jumbo about classified information, exactly where we stand on the POW/MIA issue today, in plain English. They want to know how many Americans are still unaccounted for, not just technically, but really unaccounted for, and who they are and what do we know about their cases.

They want to know whether we have a system in place that will respond quickly and effectively to any credible evidence that Americans are being held captive, and they want to know who determines that evidence, and how it is determined to be credible, and what the criteria are that are used. They want to know whether the level of resources we are devoting to the issue corresponds to its importance, and whether we are really treating it as a high national priority or as a slogan.

They want to know whether Vietnam is still withholding information about Americans from us and, if so, how do we know that and what can we do about it, and when will full cooperation be forthcoming. They want to see anyone who is out there who is toying with the hopes of MIA families by manufacturing evidence, doctoring photos, or intentionally spreading false rumors, thrown into jail. And they want to know whether they can trust what all of us tell them—all of us, as part of our Government.

We are here because almost 19 years after the formal termination of the war in Vietnam, a part of that war is still very much with us. Nineteen years after the official departure, the POW/MIA issue still haunts America, raising doubts about our Government, about our commitment, and about past actions taken or not taken. We are here because we are compelled to be here by the need to keep faith with our own values as individuals and our commitment

as a country, and because we have a duty to seek the answers and to make clear that we have done everything within our power to find those answers.

The POW/MIA issue is not a made-up issue. It is not something Congress sought out or gave life to. It is before us today precisely because it has a life of its own, and it has a life of its own for many reasons, because some believe in certain evidence that has yet to be put to the test, because not all communications have been handled as well as they might have been, because absent information to the contrary, it is impossible not to hold onto hope, because of complicated feelings about the war itself, because questions have not been answered. For a host of reasons, it is an issue with a life of its own. It is the subject now of the U.S. Senate Select Committee because families, friends, and fellow soldiers have refused to let their concerns die, and because they feel so strongly that there are legitimate unanswered questions.

The task of this committee, therefore, over the next year is clear. It is to prove to all concerned that we will leave no stone unturned, no question unasked, and no effort unexplored in order to try to resolve this issue. Some might ask what will make this different from prior efforts if, indeed, it can be. I am convinced that it already is different, and that everything about our effort will be different as we proceed from here.

First of all, it is the first formal U.S. Senate authorized investigation with appropriate investigative power and resources. Second, we begin with the advantage of building on the hard work of prior House and Senate inquiries. Third, we have already succeeded in working out ground rules with the Department of Defense that are different and which will produce significant cooperation, which many believe has been hard to come by or absent in the past.

I am assured by the Secretary of Defense and those working with him that documents and personnel will be made available and that we will work jointly and cooperatively to declassify significant amounts of information. That is also different than before. In addition, there is agreement today which has not existed previously that the entire POW/MIA process itself must open up significantly in order to diminish the potential for conspiracy theory or reality.

I appreciate Secretary Cheney's and Assistant Secretary Carl Ford's and Gen. John Vessey's commitment to letting America in on this process, and to advancing America's understanding of the issue. Nothing is more important than answering questions and putting this issue to rest than openness. But not only is the process different here at home, it is also different in Southeast Asia itself—different from any time in the past.

For the first time in the history of this inquiry we have American POW/MIA personnel permanently based in Vietnam itself. We have a new level of apparent cooperation from the Vietnamese, including document access, facilitated travel, and assignment of their own personnel to the effort. A new working relationship is taking shape that should permit our Government and this committee to verify Vietnamese actions and to measure the real meaning of their spoken promises. Nor are we limited to Vietnam alone.

In Cambodia and Laos, particularly in Laos, where so many of our questions reside and so much of our hope is placed, there are

signs of new openings, greater possibilities for cooperation and progress. And changes in the Soviet Union may answer other disturbing questions about interrogation or transfer. All of this is new, and all of it affords the committee a different scope of inquiry and opportunity than at any time before. During my last two trips to Vietnam to pursue the answers to this issue, the Vietnamese officials indicated their desire to resolve it as soon as possible. And for the first time, they have accepted the concept of helicopter support being made available for teams to follow up immediately on live sighting reports.

They have reiterated promises made to General Vessey regarding files and personnel availability to weave through their bureaucratic maze. They have agreed to allow travel and have again invited families and veterans, and other interested parties to travel in any part of the nation. None of us can say with certainty what these invitations or promises will bring, but they certainly bring an opportunity to put to test Vietnam's good will in this effort, and to guarantee to ourselves that we leave no stone unturned. But there is more that is different here. For the first time we will have a full examination of every aspect of the POW/MIA program. We will hear not just from policymakers in Washington, but we will hear for the first time in public from the people in the field, some of whom have been pursuing this issue for more than a decade of their own lives.

Unlike any other prior inquiry, we will review the chain of custody of the POW/MIA issue from the negotiations in Paris until the present. And we will try to understand this issue in ways that it has not been the subject of understanding previously, and with an approach which has not been applied previously. I want to emphasize that over the next few days we do not expect revelations. We are setting out on this inquiry and only setting out on it. We expect to build a foundation for all that follows over the course of the next year. We will establish the framework of this investigation in setting out the outlines, the positions, perceptions, and arguments of all interested parties.

I also want to emphasize that we will not operate this committee on a partisan basis. We are not seated along party lines. Our staff is not divided along party lines, and we do not approach this issue with party concerns in mind. It is needless to say a cliché, but I assure you that we believe that if there ever was an issue that was not Democrat or Republican, but American and purely American, it is this issue.

It is our hope that these hearings will serve to educate both the committee and the public about the current status of this process while allowing both the supporters and critics of that process to have their say. Much of the work of this committee will be done behind closed doors of research, of depositions, of interrogatories, and when there is a story to tell, when we have our facts together and our understanding together, we will proceed in public because clearly it must be said in public. I also hope that the hearings will serve as an invitation to anyone out there who may have legitimate information about this issue to come forward and to share it with us.

Finally, I just want to very quickly address the question of why, on a purely human level, this investigation is important and why it needs to be done. The journalist Cokie Roberts wrote an article recently which struck me, which I thought summarized it. She lost her father, a Congressman, in a plane crash 20 years ago and neither the body nor the plane were ever found.

In the article she wrote, she compared her feelings to those of families with relatives missing in Southeast Asia, and this is what she wrote. She said:

I know my father is not alive. I know that the most massive search ever conducted would have found that plane had it not sunk to the bottom of the sea. But still, I catch myself hesitating before changing the kitchen wallpaper, fearing that he will come home and think strangers are in the house. As silly as it seems, I every so often wonder if Daddy is alive in some remote Alaskan village, unaware of who he is. So the uncertainty will always lag at the back of my brain, but at least I have the satisfaction of knowing my country did everything it could.

It can do at least as much to find its soldiers. They, after all, went into danger at the Nation's demand and though it is important to know if some soldiers survived, it is just as important to identify those who died. Their families are entitled to the peace of certainty. They deserve to mourn without fear that their mourning somehow implies that they have abandoned hope. They are due the dignity of burying their dead.

The debt that America owes its POW/MIA families cannot be repaid with sympathy, medals, benefits or monuments. It must be repaid with answers and an effort to provide answers. The best and most complete answers it is in our mortal power to provide. That is the purpose of this week's hearings and that will be the purpose of this committee's work. Senator Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as the sponsor of Senate Resolution 82, which established this committee, I would sincerely like to thank my colleagues and the American people who supported this effort to try to resolve the POW/MIA issue. I would, of course, like to thank Secretary Cheney for leading the witnesses today as we commence 3 days of hearings on the fate of our missing service personnel. I also appreciate the forthcoming testimony of administration officials past and present, veterans' groups, families, and other concerned Americans who will provide the committee valuable insight as we begin. This is the beginning, to begin our investigation.

Also, I would like to thank Senator Kerry, the distinguished committee chairman, for extending his hand in nonpartisan cooperation and friendship as the committee begins its work. We are in this together and we will do whatever it takes to find the truth. As a member of Congress, I have taken two trips to Vietnam and one to Korea to try to account for missing service personnel. Since beginning my involvement in the issue some 7 years ago as a member of Congress, I have spoken to countless refugees, witnesses, Government officials, family members and veterans. I know firsthand that the issue of unaccounted-for U.S. personnel from past military conflicts continues to be a complex and very painful problem for many Americans.

With over 88,000 U.S. personnel still missing from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and other conflicts, this problem simply cannot go away, and it will never go away until the American public is satisfied that this Government has done everything that it can reasonably do to find these warriors, and that our Government has been forthcoming with all of the information that it has. And I would just point out that this morning's headline in the Washington Post, which basically reports friendly fire a pattern of delay, denial, military concealed facts from families of Gulf casualties—this is why we have this credibility gap on this issue.

I would have hoped that we would have learned something from the Vietnam conflict and not have to revisit this again. Why is this issue still with us? Obviously, the Communist governments in Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Pyongyang, Moscow, Beijing, could provide the answers on the fate of many of these men if they made the political decision to do so. However, the resolve to make them do so must come from Washington, D.C. The best way to alleviate the doubt and uncertainty of the American public is to get the truth.

In a recent Wall Street Journal poll, 69 percent of Americans surveyed said they believe that Americans are still being held against their will in Southeast Asia and three-quarters of those say our Government is not doing enough to get them out. That is the polls. I am also told that some 80 percent of active-duty military personnel believe that there are live Americans yet in Southeast Asia. President Bush, like Presidents before him, has called this issue one of the highest national priority and I believe that President Bush believes that it should be and is the highest national priority. But in spite of these statements, there are strong differences of opinion on this issue and there is much infighting, too much.

Congress fights with the executive branch on access to intelligence, and outside groups fight with each other on strategy, the League of Families criticizes members of Congress, Congress criticizes the League of Families, veterans' groups spar over their interests. We ought to be ashamed of ourselves. It can never be the highest national priority to find our missing men until we make it a priority to work together to find them.

Perhaps it is nobody's fault. Perhaps it is everybody's fault, but the fact remains we need to be together as a Nation on the matter of accounting for our missing men and women, if we are going to put it behind us once and for all.

This committee must be a catalyst to bring all of the information together in one database. The American people through their elected representatives need to know the same information as the executive branch. We need to march in locked step to the Communist governments and say, we are coming to you together to demand answers and this time we are a people united. We must stop the divisiveness if we are ever to determine the fate of our men. Senator Kerry and I hope that this committee can earn—earn the public's confidence once and for all.

Many of them ask why are we conducting this investigation; there have been 10 or 11 past investigations, some executive, some congressional. In my opinion, this is not the 12th investigation, it is the first and the last. It is also the most comprehensive. We need

to leave no lead uninvestigated. No stone unturned, as Senator Kerry said. Let me issue this challenge to all in the Government and any U.S. citizen or foreign national. If you believe you have information which may relate to missing American service personnel, bring it to this committee. As President Bush said this past August, if you have evidence, bring it forward.

While the other committees, commissions, and individuals that looked into this issue were well-intentioned, they were not all-encompassing. For example, the Montgomery Commission and the Woodcock Commission were conducted in the mid-1970's, long before the majority of boat people departed from Southeast Asia. Of course, those are refugees who provided a great deal of data. This committee intends to review that intelligence information, talk to some of those refugees, and examine the firsthand live sighting reports on American POW's from the war's end in 1973 until the present.

Over the next 13 months, this committee will focus first on the possibility of any live Americans still in Southeast Asia. Where are they, who are they, what happened to them, this is our priority. Make no mistake about it, live Americans. The issues of remains, crash sites, are all important, but it should be secondary to the matter of whether or not there are live Americans. During this week's hearings we will focus on where we are now and what can be done from here on, regarding the POW/MIA's. I believe we must look very closely at five areas. No. 1, information and intelligence, including more than 1,500 live sighting reports from our own Government, all available information from U.S. citizens, the reports on all other committee investigations and commissions, and the testimony and deposition of witnesses like Bobby Garwood, foreign nationals, refugees, former Government officials and family members.

To the intelligence community, I say this committee wants to know what you know, that is all. We want to know what you know and the American people are entitled to know that, and so is the Congress. During these hearings, I will extend an olive branch in one hand and ask for your cooperation. But in the other hand, I will have a club, and that is the subpoena power of this committee, and we will reluctantly use it if we have to.

No. 2, Vietnam. We need to challenge Vietnam to do more than just dribble out information and put the families on a rollercoaster ride. We need and hopefully we will get testimony from Vietnamese defectors, past and present Communist officials, and we need to test their credibility by taking them up on their offers to come look firsthand at their prisons and other locations where refugees say the POW's are or were being held.

No. 3, the Soviet Union. Recent news reports indicate there may be a Soviet connection with our American POW's and MIA's from the war in Vietnam. I would like to enter into the record an article from the L.A. Times Magazine of October 27, 1991 on the Soviet connection. In it, the author, Edward Tivnan, interviewed Soviet KGB and others, and reports that the Soviets were interrogating American POW's in Southeast Asia, both during and after the war, possibly as late as 1978. With the new spirit of openness in the Soviet Union, this is certainly an area that I and the committee

intend to pursue. We will also be looking at China and how they have cooperated on the issue.

No. 4, historical analysis centered mainly on the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. There are many unanswered questions around the signing of those accords. Laos was not a party to the signing, yet prisoners were taken and held there. Additionally, we must investigate why we accepted the Vietnamese list of American POW's, which was shorter than the list the U.S. provided. We must investigate the discrepancy cases, personnel known to have been alive at the time of capture. There has never been a thorough investigation of the Paris Peace Accords, and it is time.

And last and perhaps most importantly, we must start focusing attention on Laos. We lost more than 500 Americans in Laos. Only nine were returned, and those were through Vietnam and Operation Homecoming. Laos never signed the accords and it raises very crucial questions like, what happened to the men captured by the Pathet Lao? There is a misguided perception that Vietnam is the only country that owes us an accounting. General Vessey has done a fine job as the President's special emissary to Hanoi, has focused very well on Vietnam but, unfortunately, Laos has virtually been ignored, except for a few crash site investigations.

Vietnam is not the only nation that owes the United States an explanation. The Defense Intelligence Agency in 1977 said there was evidence that the Pathet Lao held American prisoners during the war. In the case of Laos, I believe there was important evidence in the intelligence community confirming the existence of POW's in Laos during the war. There were also Lao statements that they held POW's even after the accords, and I have a whole list of press clippings and declassified cables which support that position. This committee must determine what happened in Laos. Some answers to the fate of POW's are in Laos, but many clues to what happened are in the intelligence community here, I believe.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe we have to focus on these five points. Information, intelligence, the country of Vietnam, the country of the Soviet Union, the Paris Peace Accords, and Laos, if we are ever to see this issue resolved.

Let me close on this personal note. This has been a rollercoaster ride for those of us that have worked this issue, both in the Pentagon and in the Congress, and it has certainly been a rollercoaster ride for the family members. We have all taken our hits for it, and believe me, I am sensitive to that. Some have said quit, give it up, it is a no-win issue. I am a veteran of the Vietnam War, as several members of this committee are, and these are our comrades-in-arms too.

Capt. Red McDaniel, himself a former POW in Vietnam, said it best. I went to Vietnam prepared to fight, prepared to be wounded, prepared to be captured, even prepared to die, but I was not prepared to be abandoned. People have said there is no evidence about Americans left behind. Let me close by telling you what a Vietnam veteran once said to me, with tears in his eyes:

I am an American who does not want to go to his deathbed without doing everything possible to convince people who can do something about it that there live Americans held in captivity in Vietnam, long after 1973. My life has been turned upside down because of my providing this information, but I am doing this to make

sure my conscience is clear on this issue. What I am suffering now is nothing compared to what those Americans must still be going through in Vietnam. I am not the last American to leave Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, those words were spoken on August 2, 1991 by Robert Garwood, who came out of Vietnam in 1979. I am here today because I believe Robert Garwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SMITH

As the sponsor of Senate Resolution 82 which established this committee, I would like to sincerely thank my colleagues and the American people who supported this effort to resolve the POW/MIA issue. I would, of course, like to thank Secretary Cheney for leading the witnesses today as we commence 3 days of hearings on the fate of our missing American service personnel. I also appreciate the forthcoming testimony of administration officials—past and present, veterans groups, families and other concerned Americans who will provide the committee valuable insight as we begin our investigation.

Also, I would like to thank Senator John Kerry, the distinguished committee chairman, for extending his hand in nonpartisanship, cooperation, and friendship as the committee begins its work. We are in this together and will do whatever it takes to find the truth.

As a Member of Congress, I have taken two trips to Vietnam and one to Korea to try to account for missing service personnel. Since beginning my involvement in the issue 7 years ago, I have spoken to countless refugees, witnesses, government officials, family members, and veterans. I know first-hand that the issue of unaccounted for U.S. personnel from past military conflicts continues to be complex and painful for many Americans. With over 88,000 U.S. personnel still missing from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and other conflicts, this problem simply cannot go away. And it will never go away until the American public is satisfied that this government has done everything it reasonably can to find these lost warriors.

Why is this issue still with us? Obviously, the communist governments in Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing could provide the answers on the fate of many of these men, if they made the political decision to do so. However, the resolve to aggressively seek out these answers must come from Washington, DC.

The best way to alleviate the doubt and uncertainty of the American public is to get the truth. In a recent Wall Street Journal poll, 69% of those surveyed said they believe Americans are still being held in Southeast Asia, and three quarters of those say our government isn't doing enough to get them out. President Bush, like Presidents before him, has called this issue one of highest national priority, and I believe President Bush feels it should be the highest priority.

In spite of these statements, however, there are strong differences of opinion on this issue and there is much infighting. Congress fights with the executive branch on access to intelligence, outside groups fight with each other on strategy, the league of families criticizes some Members of Congress, veterans groups spar over their interests. *We ought to be ashamed of ourselves.* It cannot be the highest national priority to find our missing men until we make it a priority to work together to do it!

Perhaps it is nobody's fault, or perhaps it is everybody's fault. But the fact remains that we need to be together as a nation on the matter of accounting for our missing American personnel. If we are going to put it behind us once and for all, this committee needs to be a catalyst to bring all of the information together in one database. The American people, through their elected Representatives, need to know the same information as the executive branch. We need to march in lockstep to the communist governments and say: "We are coming to you together to demand answers, and this time we are a people united."

We must stop the divisiveness if we are ever to determine the fate of our POW's and MIA's. Senator Kerry and I hope that this committee can earn the public's confidence, once and for all.

Many have asked why we are conducting this investigation . . . that there have been 10 or 11 past investigations. In my opinion, this is not the twelfth investigation, it is the first and last. It is also the most comprehensive. We intend to leave no lead uninvestigated, no stone unturned. Let me issue this challenge to all in the government and any U.S. citizen or foreign national: If you believe you have infor-

mation which may relate to missing American service personnel, bring it to this committee. As President Bush said this past August, "if you have evidence, bring it forward."

While the other committees, commissions and individuals that looked into the POW/MIA matter were well-intentioned, their scope was not all encompassing. For example, the Montgomery Commission and the Woodcock Commission were conducted in the mid-1970's, long before the majority of boat people departed from Southeast Asia. Of course, those refugees have provided a great deal of data. This committee intends to review that intelligence information, talk to many of those refugees, and examine the first-hand live sighting reports on American POW's from the war's end in 1973 to the present.

Over the next 13 months, this committee will focus first on the possibility of any live Americans still in Southeast Asia—where are they? Who are they? What happened to them? This is our priority: live Americans. The issues of remains, crash sites, etc. are important, but should be secondary to the matter of live Americans.

During this week's hearings, we will focus on where we are now and what can be done from here regarding POW's and MIA's. We need to look closely at five areas:

1. *Information and intelligence:* Including more than 1,500 first-hand live sighting reports, from our own government; all available information from U.S. citizens; the reports on all other committee investigations and commissions; and the testimony and depositions of witnesses, like Bobby Garwood, foreign nationals, refugees, former government officials and family members.

To the intelligence community I say: this committee wants to know what you know, and the American people are entitled to know. During these hearings I will extend an olive branch in one hand, asking for cooperation. But, in the other hand I will have a club. That is the subpoena power of this committee, and we will reluctantly use it if we have to.

2. *Vietnam:* We need to challenge Vietnam to do more than just dribble out information and put the families on a roller coaster ride. We need, and hopefully will get, testimony from Vietnamese defectors, past and present communist officials, and we need to test their credibility by taking them up on their offers to come look first hand at their prisons and other locations where refugees say POW's are being held.

3. *The Soviet Union:* Recent news reports indicate that there may be a Soviet connection with our American POW's and MIA's from the war in Vietnam. I would like to enter into the record an article from the Los Angeles Times magazine of October 27, 1991 on the Soviet connection. In it, the author, Edward Tivnan, interviewed Soviet KGB and others and reports that the Soviets were interrogating American POW's in Southeast Asia both during and after the war, possibly as late as 1978. With a new spirit of openness in the Soviet union, this is certainly an area I and the committee intend to pursue. We will also be looking at China and how they have cooperated on the issue.

4. *Historical analysis, centered mainly on Paris Peace Accords of 1973:* There are many unanswered questions surrounding the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. Laos was not a party to the signing, yet prisoners were taken and held there. Additionally, we must investigate why we accepted the Vietnamese list of American POW's, which was shorter than the list the U.S. provided; and we must investigate the discrepancy cases—personnel known to have been alive at the time of capture. There has never been a thorough investigation of the Paris Peace Accords, and it is time.

5. And, perhaps most importantly, we must start focusing attention on Laos: we lost more than 500 Americans in Laos and only nine were returned, and they were held by the North Vietnamese. Laos never signed the peace accords and it raises more crucial questions: What happened to the men captured by the Pathet Lao?

There is a misguided perception that Vietnam is the only country that owes us an accounting. General Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi, has focused on Vietnam. Unfortunately, Laos has virtually been ignored except for a few crash site investigations. Vietnam is not the only nation that owes us an explanation.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, in 1977, said there was evidence that the Pathet Lao held American prisoners during the war. In the case of Laos, I believe there is important evidence in the intelligence community confirming the existence of POW's in Laos during the war.

There is important information which needs to be put on the record right now at the start of these hearings, and so I ask my colleagues and the Secretary to listen closely to just some of the facts I have collected in recent weeks.

Chronology: Reports of POW's in Laos

In 1968, Col. Soth Petrosy, then the permanent representative of the Pathet Lao in Vientiane, Laos, told a U.S. official that "pilots are generally kept near the area in which their plane is downed and therefore may be found throughout Laos from the south to the north."

In 1969, in a conversation with an MIA relative, Arthur Hesford, Soth Petrosy admitted that the Lao peoples liberation army had a list of prisoners missing in Laos, but that the list would not be made available while the bombing was going on. At that time, our U.S. Embassy in Laos confirmed that they had received the same information. Later that same year, another American, Ross Perot, was told by Soth Petrosy that they had "large numbers of prisoners." During this period, through our intelligence efforts, we obtained actual pictures of some of these POW's.

In May 1971, Petrosy again stated that the Pathet Lao were holding prisoners in various regions of Laos and that they were well treated. We then got hold of a November 1971 Pathet Lao document entitled "weekly bulletin containing photographs and details of American prisoners captured by the Pathet Lao."

In a 1972 interview, the Pathet Lao made a statement that "some tens of prisoners are presently being held." And in a subsequent interview, Petrosy stated "there are many American POW's held in liberated areas of Laos."

In April of that year, Petrosy stated that there were many U.S. POW's being held by the Pathet Lao, and that discussions concerning their return could begin when the U.S. ordered a total bombing halt. His exact quote was "we are willing to discuss the question of U.S. POW release if the American imperialists would order a total bombing halt and let alone the Laotians to solve their own internal problems. Soth said the POW's were detained in secure places inside various caves in northern Laos. He said, "although we regard them as criminals and air pirates, they are being treated humanely."

In an April 1972 interview with a Swedish correspondent, Prince Souphanouvong, who later became President of Laos when the Pathet Lao government was installed, stated:

"We have made public a concrete policy toward enemy soldiers or agents captured or giving themselves up, including GI's. All the American pilots engaged in bombings or toxic chemical sprays of Lao territory are considered criminals and enemies of the Lao people. But once captured, they have been treated in accordance with our humane policy. The question of enemy captives, including U.S. pilots, will be settled immediately after the U.S. stops its intervention and aggression in Laos first, and foremost, ends the bombing of Laos territory."

Some of the wives of the pilots came over and met with Petrosy, and he again told them that POW's downed in Laos were held in his country.

Then comes the Paris Peace Accords in early 1973. The lists turned over by the North Vietnamese included no information on the American POW's in Laos. Henry Kissinger had told a White House news conference that "American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi." The Pentagon reports that there are over 311 men missing in Laos as well as 6 prisoners. The New York Times reported that U.S. officials believe the number of prisoners in Laos is substantially higher.

Also in 1973:

The Defense Department reports that the North Vietnamese lists were incomplete because they did not include American servicemen known to have been captured in Laos.

The League of Families reports that everything they had been told led them to believe there would be a list of POW's in Laos.

Congressman Sonny Montgomery (D-Miss.), expresses concern that many of the 311 MIA's in Laos should have turned up as prisoners.

On January 31, the State Department says, "we firmly expect to have a list of POW's to cover Laos."

Still no list.

Then, on February 17, 1973, the communist Pathet Lao states that they will not free American prisoners of war until there is a cease-fire in Laos. Soth Petrosy told United Press International (UPI), "if they were captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos."

On February 22, the ceasefire agreement began. In the cease fire agreement, the Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao state "we take note of the declaration of the U.S. Government that it will contribute to healing the wounds of the war and to post-war reconstruction." As we now know, President Nixon had promised \$4.75 billion in a letter to the North Vietnamese.

And on March 2, President Nixon states that he accepts and supports the Laotian agreement.

On March 25, U.S. officials state they have been unable to learn anything on the fate of an undetermined number of American prisoners of war in Laos. According to UPI, concern is mounting that the communists plan to hold them back as pawns. U.S. sources state that a substantial number of the missing, perhaps as many as 100, may still be alive according to intelligence reports.

On March 26, the North Vietnamese tell us that our demand for the release of POW's captured in Laos is "beyond the jurisdiction of the agreement."

On March 27, Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation, stated "the Pathet Lao have assured us that the American POW's they hold will be released" and that the Pathet Lao said they "are making preparations for the release. It is for this reason that we are insisting that the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of prisoners take place with no relation to the POW's held by the Pathet Lao," said Tin, who, incidentally will be testifying here on Thursday.

Nine POW's were released in Hanoi during this time, who were shot down in Laos, but none of them were held by the Pathet Lao. The Defense Intelligence Agency later confirms this, stating "all of these (9) individuals were captured in Laos, but all were captured by North Vietnamese soldiers, not Pathet Lao. One of these nine, Ernie Brace, stated to the press on April 2, 1973, "the Pathet Lao never held me."

Then a week later, the Pentagon's spokesman on POW's states that there are no more live American soldiers in Indochina, and that "rumors that there were U.S. servicemen still held in Laotian prison camps do the families of the missing a disservice."

In May 1973, the head of our joint casualty resolution center states that there is "no indication" that any Americans listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia are alive.

Where these statements came from, when the Pathet Lao had repeatedly stated they were holding prisoners, and our intelligence had confirmed this, is beyond comprehension. In fact, the possibility of the Pathet Lao returning U.S. POW's under their signed agreement with the Lao Government ended up being wide open under the agreement through June 1974. And yet prior to this date, we were already trying to declare the POW's as dead.

It is now 1991, and we still have made little to no progress in Laos regarding an accounting of these men. The boat people poured out of Laos by the hundreds in the late 1970's telling us the men were still there, but we discounted the information. To this day, we are receiving information on alleged POW's still in Laos. And yet our side and the Lao have only reached agreements resulting in a few crash site excavations. We never even proposed regular meetings with the Lao on this issue until 10 years after the war.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe we must focus on these five points: Information and intelligence, the country of Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Paris Peace Accords, and the country of Laos, if we are ever to see this issue resolved.

Let me close on a personal note. This has been a roller coaster ride for those of us that have worked the issue in Congress and certainly for the family members. Some have said quit, give it up, it's a no-win issue. I am a veteran of the Vietnam war, as are several members of this committee. These are our comrades in arms. Capt. Red McDaniel, himself a former POW of the Vietnam war, said it best: "I went to Vietnam prepared to fight, prepared to be wounded, prepared to be captured, and even prepared to die . . . but I was not prepared to be abandoned."

People have said there's no evidence about Americans left behind. Let me close by telling you what a Vietnam veteran once said to me, with tears in his eyes: "I am an American who does not want to go to his deathbed without doing everything possible to convince people who can do something about it that there are live Americans held in captivity in Vietnam long after 1973. My life has been turned upside down because of my providing this information, but I am doing this to make sure my conscience is clear on this issue. What I am suffering now is nothing compared to what those Americans must still be going through in Vietnam . . . I am not the last American to leave Vietnam."

Mr. Chairman, those words were stated to me on August 2, 1991, by Robert Garwood, who came out of Vietnam in 1979. I am here today because I believe Robert Garwood.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Smith, and I also want to express my appreciation to you for your help in putting

the committee together over the last weeks, and in hiring what I think both of us consider to be a very professional and competent staff. Mr. Secretary, as per the agreement, we will come back from the openings to the rest of the committee. We are delighted that you are here. Thank you for taking the time and we welcome your prepared statement, and subsequently some questions. Thank you.

Before we begin I have prepared statements from Senators McCain, Daschle, and Kassebaum.

[The prepared statements of Senators McCain, Daschle, and Kassebaum follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, this Committee is tasked with examining the question of what has become of Americans who were lost in service to their country's defense, and if our Government has expended every effort to determine their fate and return them to the United States. There have been four previous congressional investigations of the POW/MIA issue, as well as several other hearings by congressional committees on one or more aspects of the question. None of these investigations have resolved these questions to the satisfaction of the American people.

I welcome this new opportunity to pursue answers that the families of our POW/MIA's have every right to expect, and that the American people demand. With fairness, patience and determination we may arrive at those answers. I am pleased to participate in this worthy effort as a member of this Committee. And, like the other members, I am eager to begin.

I do not know if there are Americans in captivity in Southeast Asia. Until I have conclusive evidence one way or another, I will proceed on the assumption that there are. I repeat: I assume that there are live POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia until we have the fullest possible accounting for them.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses in the hope that the information they provide us will greatly help the Committee make informed judgments about the questions we are investigating. I strongly recommend that the Committee pay particularly close attention to the testimony of Gen. John Vessey. He has labored mightily to produce the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA's. He is as decent and capable a public servant as has ever served this country. No one is in a better position to measure our progress toward a full accounting.

In the course of our investigations we are obligated to examine several general questions. First, to secure the answers we seek we will have to look further than our own Government. Most of the answers we seek are not in Washington. They are in Southeast Asia. The Committee must examine closely the level of cooperation we have received from those countries.

For most of the years since the end of the war that cooperation was either non-existent or minimal. Every so often a visiting American might receive a few sets of remains from Hanoi, which only tended to support credible evidence that Vietnam was warehousing American remains. In Laos, the progress of accounting for our missing servicemen has been so slow, the number of remains returned so few, that it has raised legitimate questions about the veracity of Lao officials on all the questions related to this issue.

What are the reasons for grudging or withheld cooperation? Why prevent timely investigations of live sighting reports? Why the past refusal to share archival and other information that has direct bearing on many unresolved cases? Why warehouse remains? Do they have motives for keeping live prisoners? What evidence is there of continued bad faith? These are but some of the many questions before this Committee.

But this Committee must also recognize evidence of increasing cooperation from the governments of IndoChina, and determine how best to encourage its continuation. Thanks to the diligence of General Vessey, we now have a permanent U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi. Thanks to his diplomacy, the personnel of that office have received unprecedented cooperation from the Vietnamese. They have conducted investigations of live sighting reports. They have had considerable access to Vietnam's war archives. During the 14th joint activity in Vietnam, concluded last August, one of our teams matched more documents to more POW/MIA cases than was achieved in all 13 of the previous iterations.

A Vietnamese official recently promised to provide our Hanoi office with information the U.S. has long sought on Vietnam's anti-aircraft operations during the war.

These records could prove enormously helpful in determining the fate of crew members of downed U.S. aircraft. On our part, the U.S. should continue supplying Hanoi with information we possess about our aircraft losses which may expedite the resolution of POW/MIA cases.

Certainly, much more cooperation from Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane is necessary before we are satisfied that they are now acting in good faith. But the expanded cooperation that was achieved in Vietnam through the industry and commitment of many talented U.S. officials is encouraging. And it serves to illustrate where the answers are, and how best we can learn them.

Second, this Committee must examine the practices of U.S. personnel charged with analyzing and acting on evidence of live Americans to ascertain whether they have thoroughly investigated such evidence.

A dedicated officer of unassailable heroism, Colonel Mike Peck, has alleged that there is in the U.S. Government a "mindset to debunk" live sighting reports. That charge must be addressed seriously. Many Americans are concerned that the Government has not acted on information concerning our POW/MIAs as expeditiously and as thoroughly as a national priority requires.

During the course of the Committee's review of those efforts, the Committee and the public may find some fault with the Government's follow-up of live sighting reports. If so, identification of those failings will be the first step toward correcting them and restoring public confidence.

If mistakes in Government policies and their implementation have impeded a fair resolution of this matter and contributed to the decline of public confidence, the Committee should recommend appropriate steps to remedy these mistakes, including operational and personnel changes if necessary.

As we examine possible mistakes made by U.S. officials, I hope we will also take note of their successes, and, more importantly, support those efforts which have proven successful.

Finally, as this Committee is obligated to review evidence of live Americans, so are we obligated to investigate the abundant evidence of hoaxes that have been perpetrated against POW/MIA families, the U.S. Government and the American people.

Literally thousands of scams have been conducted, most for profit, but some simply to prime the pump of public interest in the POW/MIA issue by fabricating or distorting evidence of live Americans. From foreign nationals who offer spurious information in exchange for residency in the U.S. to practiced con artists who bilk money from grieving families with the false promise of the subsequent release of their loved ones, all these criminals have plied their reprehensible trade from before the U.S. left Vietnam until the present.

Most, though not all, of the photographs that were released to the media last summer have been proven to be hoaxes. Some of those pictures were reported to be of Navy Lt. Daniel Borah. As it turns out, they are photographs of a 66 year old Eurasian living in Laos. He was approached in June 1990 by a stranger who claimed to be a rice trader and asked to pose for pictures. Those pictures, which I have copies of here, subsequently turned up in the U.S. media. Following their public dissemination, copies of the photos were made available to DIA.

Once DIA obtained the copies, U.S. officials traveled to Laos in search of the subject of the pictures. With the cooperation of Lao officials, the U.S. team managed to locate the individual, who they then interviewed, fingerprinted and photographed. I have copies of those photographs as well. As my colleagues can plainly see they are indeed pictures of the man who was reported to be Lt. Borah. They are also clearly pictures of an elderly Asian gentleman.

The individuals responsible for this hoax and others have brought great anguish to the families of our POW/MIAs. Anyone who trades false hopes and misery for money or publicity deserves to be punished to the fullest extent of the law. This Committee will provide a valuable service to the families and the country if we can hasten the day of reckoning for these criminals.

In closing, let me say that we have a great distance to travel before we resolve the uncertainties over the fate of our missing servicemen. The issue has painfully lingered in the hearts of us all. But this should not be a question that divides us. It should be the one question in our national affairs that firmly unites every single American. I think this Committee can help unite us, and I look forward to working with my colleagues toward that end.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DASCHLE

This week, the Committee convenes hearings that represent, I believe, a bitter-sweet victory for the family members, friends, and fellow veterans of the 2,273 Americans who remain unaccounted for following the Vietnam War. This year-long investigation is a positive response to the unanswered questions remaining today, almost 20 years after the war's end. I am looking forward to an investigation that is both comprehensive and responsive. I plan to see that the Committee is a constructive force that can bring some measure of peace to the thousands of family members who have anguished over the troubling questions and allegations about the government's handling of the issue and its efforts to bring our soldiers home.

The hearings we embark upon this week are remarkable in their scope, sincerity, and intentions. Never before has this type of in-depth investigation been conducted. I am certain there is no member of this Committee today that does not want this inquiry into the POW-MIA issue to be the last. We want to do this right. And I know that the Chairman of the Committee shares my view that the process should be as open and as comprehensive as possible.

I do not have a long, detailed statement at this point because I am entering this investigation with an open mind and genuine desire for the truth. I have not been involved in previous investigations and do not carry any preconceived notions of what we will find and where we will end up. I only know that we have agreed to investigate every aspect of this matter that is practicable. I look forward to hearing the detailed testimony of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. I am pleased that the veterans' groups will be testifying, as well as groups and individuals who have continued to press for a full accounting of the men who remain unaccounted for.

However, I am especially pleased that we have the family members here to give the Committee a firsthand account of how they feel they have been treated, what they believe about their husbands, fathers and brothers, and how this issue, in their minds, can be best addressed. Because if there is one group involved in this process that should command our attention, it is those families.

I thank everyone for their time and cooperation today, and I look forward to the upcoming year.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR KASSEBAUM

Mr. Chairman, we have a very difficult task before us. We have been established as a committee to help resolve the unanswered questions of the over 2,000 American servicemen who still remain unaccounted for from the Vietnam war. This is not the first time a congressional committee has tried to resolve this issue. But hopefully, Mr. Chairman, this committee will be successful in playing an important role in helping to answer the many outstanding questions and in helping to restore credibility and confidence among the American people in our government's efforts.

I know all of us believe very strongly that this committee must work on the assumption that there are live Americans in Southeast Asia. Any assumption less than that would not truly reflect the concerns of the POW/MIA families and the American people. Any assumption less than that would add no more confidence to a process already seriously doubted for its commitment.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, there are several questions that we must address in our efforts. First and foremost, we must look to the region, evaluate what efforts have been taken in the past and what efforts need to be pursued in order to have our American servicemen accounted for. We must also look at our process here at home and understand fully why it lost the confidence of the American people and what needs to be done in the future to restore that confidence. And, last Mr. Chairman, we must also look closely at those private groups that have been involved in profiteering from this issue at the expense of the emotional well being of the families involved.

In order to pursue our task properly, it is essential that we on this committee work together in a bipartisan and open manner. I believe we are prepared to do that. I also believe that the administration recognizes the importance of cooperation with us on this issue. Furthermore, it is critical that the private groups that have been involved with this issue approach our investigation openly and with a sense of confidence that we are here to work with them on this very tragic issue, not against them.

While there have been other congressional investigations over the years on POW-MIA's, I do believe that the time may be ripe for real progress. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Vietnam's strongest ally, the Soviet Union, may help us in our task to resolve this issue with the Vietnamese. General Vessey's efforts particu-

larly over the past year have resulted in real movement on POW's-MIA's. It is just a start, but certainly a positive one that we hope will continue and that this committee will be able to build on.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD CHENEY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity today to appear before the Select Committee to reaffirm the commitment of the U.S. Government, and especially the Department of Defense, to account as fully as possible for American prisoners of war and Americans missing in action, or otherwise unaccounted for.

Mr. Chairman, the committee meets at a time of increased public attention to the fate of our POW's and MIA's in Southeast Asia. I welcome and encourage the spotlight on this matter of the utmost national importance. I can think of no subject that stirs more emotion or generates more frustration and controversy than the subject of POW's and MIA's, especially those lost during the war in Southeast Asia.

The fact that there were thousands unaccounted for in previous wars does not make it any easier to accept the fact that nearly 19 years after active U.S. participation in the Vietnam War ended, we still do not have a full accounting of all of those lost in combat. Eight months ago, when we defeated Iraqi forces in the Gulf, we were able to account for all of our people, even those lost behind enemy lines. That achievement is one of the legacies of our concern for our missing in Indochina.

In turn, our success in the Gulf generated a renewed national attention and commitment to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those lost in Southeast Asia. Might I, on a side note to Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith, say in regard to the newspaper story this morning, Senator, that the reason there has been discussion of friendly fire is because the Department of Defense has been totally forthcoming on the subject. We have done a thorough job of investigating every single incident in which we took casualties in the Gulf, and we have identified those circumstances in which our people were tragically killed as a result of friendly fire. We have notified the families of the circumstances surrounding the death of those servicemen and women, and we made the information public. To my knowledge, that is the first time in history this Department of Defense or any other Government military department has gone to that extent to level with the American people.

We clearly would welcome any contributions that the committee may make in shedding additional light on this important issue. And I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that I support fully your efforts and that the Department of Defense will make any of its experts in the field available to the committee to address specific questions you may have. It is our intense desire to cooperate to the fullest extent possible. Accounting for our missing in Indochina remains a deeply personal commitment for the President and for me. I am the first Defense Secretary to come before Congress to testify exclusively on the subject of POW/MIA affairs.

This is an indication of the importance that I and the administration attach to this crucial issue. Under the President's leader-

ship, we have pressed harder than ever before to find answers to the difficult questions this search entails. Today, I can tell you that although many questions remain unanswered, the administration has made some significant breakthroughs in a number of important areas, some of them referred to by Senator Kerry. First, as a result of General Vessey's outstanding efforts as the Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs, we have opened an office in Hanoi, and are conducting in-country joint field operations. This has enabled us to carry out investigations on the scene, enhancing our ability to get the answers to the questions that we need.

Second, as shifts within the Communist world will open new avenues for our search, we have carried out the first joint investigations ever held within Cambodia, and worked for increased cooperation with officials in Laos. Third, to take advantage of the new information available to us, I have ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned full-time to augment our field staff. I have also authorized the creation of a new position in the senior Pentagon ranks of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. With the new staff of this office, our efforts will have been augmented by an addition of 102 personnel in the last few months.

The effort to account as fully as possible for POW's and MIA's is not an easy one. Our most urgent requirement is to determine whether any Americans remain captive in Southeast Asia, and if so, to return them to the United States. The issue of live prisoners has been at the forefront of our intelligence effort and our negotiations with the governments of Indochina. The governments of Indochina have consistently denied holding any Americans. We do not accept their denials as the last word. We intend to keep the pressure on. President Bush has pledged decisive action to return any American should such evidence be obtained. I make that pledge to you again today.

In recent months, questions have been raised regarding the Department's efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue. As this committee can well appreciate, no American official would spare any effort that might lead to the discovery of a single American prisoner of war. It is unthinkable that any American serviceman or woman would fail to come to the aid of a lost comrade. Anyone who knowingly withholds or conceals information that could lead to the recovery of a captured American serviceman would deserve the most severe punishment possible, but I must say, I have difficulty imagining why anyone would do such a thing. Everyone I know would be thrilled to learn that one of their comrades is still alive and that we have a chance to get them back.

In fact, countless men and women in uniform and in civilian life have devoted long hours, great skill, and high hopes to the search to account for Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia. As professionals, as members of the armed forces, many of who served during the Vietnam conflict, and as Americans, they have not needed to be told how important their mission is. They have had clear marching orders from the members of the administration, and the POW/MIA effort has our fullest support. I regret the burden that families have borne through these long years of uncertainty and loss, and I condemn the cruelty of the fast-buck opera-

tors who have played on their hopes and have contributed to their suffering. All Americans can be assured that the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action has the attention of the members of my Department, as well as our hearts. As you can well imagine, it is a subject that continues to haunt the men and women in uniform who served in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

We have a special obligation to those who gave of themselves in the service to the Nation, to their families, and to those who will be asked to serve in future conflicts to do everything in our power to obtain the fullest possible accounting.

Mr. Chairman, later today and in the weeks ahead, you will hear from a number of officials who are far more knowledgeable than I about the details of our procedures and about individual cases. I want to take this opportunity this morning to give you my perspective as Secretary of Defense on the overall progress of the issue of POW's and MIA's, and what we are doing to achieve the fullest possible accounting.

I would like to spend a few minutes, first of all, to explain how we approach the important issue of whether Americans remain captive in Indochina. To date, we have no conclusive evidence proving that Americans are being held against their will in Indochina. Nonetheless, the importance of this issue makes investigating live sighting reports our first priority.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has the primary responsibility for investigating and analyzing live sighting reports received by our teams in Southeast Asia. Reports come from many sources, but our investigators solicit potential sources of information from among the thousands of refugees leaving Vietnam, legal travelers who have recently been in the region, and others who may have been in a position to observe.

In many cases, individuals with information seek out our representatives in Bangkok. Regardless of how the information is received, the procedure for investigating them remains the same. Upon receipt, live sighting reports are examined to determine if the geographic location of the sighting, the time and circumstance of the sighting, and the details provided correlate to a known missing American. Related data is retrieved from DIA's extensive casualty source and camp files, and the information is compared to what is available in the report.

All files of losses or known incidents of capture or imprisonment in proximity to the location reported are reviewed for possible correlation, as are all files of all missing individuals whose time and location of loss generally relate to the given report. Based on these findings, a preliminary determination is made regarding whether descriptive details provided by the source correlate to any missing Americans. If the information is judged to possibly relate to a POW or MIA, it is actively pursued by all available means.

The full range of United States intelligence assets are used to collect information relating to reports of live sightings of Americans in Indochina. Continued collection efforts are taken until we are able to reach a conclusion about the report. A live sighting report continues to be pursued on the assumption that it is accurate until it has been determined that the evidence is clear and convincing that the individual described is not a POW, or unless an

analysis indicates that the report is clearly a fabrication. If either of these judgments is reached, DIA's analysis is then subject to the scrutiny of an interagency review panel before the report is considered resolved.

The panel consists of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Upon concurrence by the review panel, the remains in the DIA database where it is available for review by analysts working independently on other live sighting reports. Should the review panel not concur, the report is considered unresolved, and additional collection efforts and analysis are undertaken in order to resolve the questions remaining.

To date, the Department of Defense has received 1,519 firsthand live sighting reports. 1,037 of these reports have been correlated to Americans that have been accounted for, such as prisoners of war returned at Operation Homecoming, missionaries, or civilians jailed at various times for violations of Vietnamese codes. In fact, almost 300 of these resolved reports have been correlated to Private Robert Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979. Of the remaining reports, 373 have been determined to be fabrications, leaving 109 reports under active investigation—that is, 109 reports out of 1,519 original live sighting reports have not been resolved or accounted for. These reports are the focus of our analytical and collection efforts. We have a live sighting investigator now on the staff of our Hanoi office, and we will insist that he be granted free access by the Vietnamese to carry out his duties.

To date, we have not yet reached complete agreement with the Vietnamese on the modalities of investigating live sightings in Vietnam. We again raised this issue in a meeting in Hanoi last week, and it appears that there is still more work to be done before the Vietnamese grant permission for our investigator to travel freely. It is our intent to press this issue to the fullest until we are granted full and free access. I am sure General Vessey can provide you additional information.

As I noted earlier, investigating live sighting reports will continue to be our first priority. We will dedicate all resources necessary to support this vital requirement just as we have with the photographs that have appeared prominently in the media this past summer.

We will not be satisfied until we are absolutely certain that every last case that can be resolved is resolved. The organization of our POW/MIA effort is one of the most important ways we sharpen our focus on the issue. Later, during these hearings, Major General Christmas, the Pacific Command Director for Operations, will outline what we have done to focus and expand our field of investigation through a new joint task force in our Pacific command, but today, let me briefly describe the concept for the plan. We will apply the military assets and the personnel available in the U.S. Pacific Command to address the POW/MIA issue in much the same way that we organized ourselves to deal with, under Central Command, with the situation in the Persian Gulf last year.

Proceeding from a two-tiered approach, we will investigate discrepancy cases and last known alive cases on a full-time basis with

an expanded Hanoi office staff. We will continue to bring in teams of investigators from Hawaii to support the activities of the Hanoi office and to investigate systematically the cases within particular geographic regions. The joint task force approach, we believe, promises to bring a new intensity to our on-scene operations. We have the staff and the expertise available to move forward as quickly as the Indochinese governments will allow.

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and economic difficulties in China have been significant factors in changing attitudes and in opening new avenues for progress in POW/MIA affairs in Southeast Asia. These developments remove support from Southeast Asian Communist regimes, forcing them to seek cooperation from other sources, of economic assistance. They are turning to the West and especially to the United States. This has opened new opportunities for us in recent months in three countries; Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Let me say just a word about General Vessey's activities. Over the past year, the Vietnamese have demonstrated increasing levels of cooperation in resolving the fate of Americans missing in Indochina. General Vessey, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now, the special presidential emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA affairs, has been especially persistent in pushing for greater access. In April, he led an interagency delegation to meet with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. At that meeting, General Vessey and the Foreign Minister agreed to establish a POW/MIA office in Hanoi that would conduct in-country investigations of reported firsthand live sightings, research historical records, conduct forensic review of jointly or unilaterally recovered remains, and conduct advance planning and execute joint field operations.

On July 8 of this year, the U.S. POW/MIA office opened in Hanoi with an initial staff of five. Initially, we indicated that the office was temporary in order to provide time to assess its value. It is our judgment that so far, the office is a success, providing a ready point of contact with the Vietnamese and increasing communication between their officials and American POW/MIA specialists. We have indicated to the Vietnamese that we want to change its status to permanent. This will permit us to increase the staff and expand its operational role.

Since 1987, our efforts in Vietnam have focused on the investigation of 119 illustrative discrepancy cases which General Vessey presented the Vietnamese in 1987 and 1989. These are cases in which we believe the individuals survived his incident of loss and for whom the Vietnamese should be able to provide some information. In some cases, these individuals were listed as prisoners of war, but did not return at Operation Homecoming in 1973 when U.S. prisoners were repatriated by the Vietnamese. In other cases, these individuals were last known alive on the ground, or were in communication with friendly forces and in imminent danger of capture. We believe the Vietnamese should be able to provide additional information on the fate of these individuals, or to otherwise account for them.

These discrepancy cases represent individuals that, in our judgment, based upon the incident of loss, are among the most likely to still be alive. That is not to say that other individuals in other

cases could not also be alive, but rather in prioritizing our efforts, we selected the cases of individuals we believed the most likely were alive when they fell into the hands of the Vietnamese. Therefore, if we can resolve the discrepancy cases, and cases of individuals last known to have been alive, we will be able to shed important light on the question of whether or not Americans remain in captivity in Indochina. Sadly, to date, we have not been able to locate any live Americans. However, we have been able to reach the judgment that 56 of the individuals who comprise the 119 discrepancy cases provided to the Vietnamese are, in fact, dead.

In September, we completed the 14th joint United States/Vietnam field investigation of last known alive discrepancy cases. This joint investigation was our most ambitious effort to date, and Vietnam's preparations and cooperation were improvements over past field investigations. Of significance, the Vietnamese allowed our resident researcher access to contemporaneous wartime documents that address the specific incidents of several previously unaccounted-for Americans. As a result of these efforts, we believe that we may be able to confirm the death of several additional individuals. We are hopeful that the Vietnamese will provide access to similar records for other wartime military regions.

If I may, I would like to explain briefly how these investigations work. In all cases, our investigations begin with the assumption that a missing serviceman or civilian is alive. First, we identify the cases we would like to investigate jointly with the Vietnamese, as I have indicated previously. The DIA and Joint Casualty Resolution Center then prepare case files of information for presentation to Vietnam specialists. The records are detailed explanations of the incident of loss, biographic data, search and rescue efforts, and other information that will assist the Vietnamese and U.S. investigators in focusing on a particular case.

We then ask the Vietnamese to independently check their records to locate any information they may have in their records and archives, to locate eyewitnesses, if any, and military personnel or veterans who may have participated in the action, so that our teams may interview them. After the Vietnamese carry out these preliminary investigative activities, we send in our teams, consisting of records researchers, interviewers, and linguists to question witnesses and to examine documents. If we can locate the crash site, we may survey it. All of this information is compiled and a report is prepared and submitted to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis of the data received.

The information is then correlated to the information within our files, and analytic judgments reached. In some cases, we make a determination that further investigation is required that may involve further records research and witness interview, or may involve crash site survey and excavation. So far there have been 14 of these investigations since 1988, and another is scheduled to begin later this month. We go wherever the evidence leads and conduct as exhaustive an investigation as possible to determine the fate of the individual involved.

Vietnamese cooperation on these joint investigations has improved, but despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied

with Vietnam's performance. Vietnamese officials could do much more to assist our efforts. Too often, our office finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live sightings, improved helicopter transportation, and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled. Vietnam's foot-dragging on unilateral repatriation of remains is especially frustrating, especially if we ever hope to achieve the fullest possible accounting in a reasonable period of time, Vietnamese unilateral efforts, as well as their participation in joint activities will have to dramatically improve.

As I will discuss later in more detail, we intend to have the capability in hand to move as rapidly as possible, as cooperation by the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will permit. To date, we have accounted for only 22 sets of remains of the 119 discrepancy cases presented to the Vietnamese and jointly investigated. While we believe that we can confirm the death of an additional 35 unaccounted-for Americans since we started this process, we have not been able to account for them by the return of their remains. Obviously, results are slow in coming.

I want to support the statement by my colleague, Jim Baker, that the pace and scope of normalizing relations with Vietnam will depend upon the extent of cooperation by the Vietnamese on POW/MIA matters. The Department of Defense firmly supports the road map that describes the steps Vietnam must take and measures we will take in response before we will be ready to perform normalization of relations. I can assure you that we will be rigorous in our judgment about whether Vietnam is adequately complying. We will not be deterred from our goal of achieving the fullest possible accounting for our servicemen and civilians missing in action in Vietnam.

Some of the most vexing questions remaining from the Vietnam War relate to the unaccounted-for in Laos. Of the 528 Americans who remain unaccounted-for in Laos, 335 are in the category of POW or MIA, most of those in the MIA category. At Operation Homecoming, only nine Americans captured in Laos returned as POW's. It is important to realize that approximately three-quarters of the Americans unaccounted-for in Laos were lost in areas controlled by the People's Army of Vietnam. Despite that fact, we continue to press the Lao for answers regarding the fates of Americans who were captured by the Pathet Lao. Only one American held by the Pathet Lao, Emmet Kay, was released by them and returned from captivity. A second Pathet Lao prisoner, Dieter Dengler, did escape successfully.

Earlier this year, we conducted the first joint investigations of discrepancy cases involving Americans last known to be in Pathet Lao hands. Shortly thereafter, in May of this year, the U.S. and Laos agreed to an expanded plan for increased joint cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues for the rest of 1991. Activities agreed upon include a further joint investigation of discrepancy cases, small scale joint surveys and recoveries, and joint crash site excavations.

So far, we have conducted the first three activities under the expanded program in response to Lao humanitarian concerns. The

Department of Defense and U.S. Pacific Command have provided Title X humanitarian assistance to the Lao. The Department of Defense has furnished nearly 100 tons of excess medical supplies in three separate shipments over the past year.

Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has completed construction of a small five-room school house early this year in Savannakhet Province. Finally, during September, we conducted a medical civic action program exercise with the Lao, sending U.S. doctors, nurses, and medical technicians to assist the Lao in training their medical specialists in a remote northern village in which we would like to conduct POW/MIA investigations later this year or early next year. These humanitarian assistance projects will, hopefully, assist our investigators in obtaining Lao cooperation at the province and the village level.

While we have undertaken a year-round plan with the Lao, actual cooperation on the ground has not yet fully succeeded in implementing the promised schedules. For example, we have had to delay a field activity scheduled to start late this week until the Lao repair the helicopter that they had planned to dedicate to the mission.

The lack of helicopters continues to be the most pressing operational problem in Laos. The Soviet helicopters and the Lao inventory are dangerous and operationally degraded. Nonetheless, we continue to use them in joint operations in that country.

In the past, the Lao have rejected our proposals to let us fly U.S. military helicopters for casualty resolution efforts in that country. We have made alternative proposals, to include the lease-back of U.S.-made helicopters operated by commercial concerns in Laos. To date, the Lao have made no commitments on these overtures, but we are continuing to work with them to try to solve this problem.

We believe that Lao shortcomings are more a function of limited resources and capabilities than a lack of commitment. In fact, they have been very cooperative on urgent investigations such as the purported Borah photograph. We have two major field operations planned before the end of this year, and I am hopeful that implementation will continue to improve rapidly and enable both countries to get back on track.

As I said approximately three-quarters of the losses in Laos occurred in areas under the control of Vietnamese forces during the war. Accounting for Americans lost in such areas must be a trilateral effort between the Lao, the Vietnamese, and the United States. While field operations inside Laos will necessarily be bilateral U.S.-Lao activities, the success of such efforts will largely depend upon U.S.-Vietnam cooperation.

The historic records and documents required must come from the Vietnamese. Field cooperation on the border cases requires the assistance of both the Lao and the Vietnamese. We have proposed trilateral talks in December with the Lao and Vietnamese to develop a methodology for addressing these cases.

With respect to Cambodia, Phnom Penh has recently begun to cooperate with us in accounting for Americans missing in Cambodia. Since July, three investigative teams have traveled to Cambodia to follow up on the photographs alleged to be of live American

POW's. Their cooperation assisted our specialists in tracking down a number of what proved to be fraudulent photographs.

Since July, we have also conducted two technical meetings with the Cambodians, the first such activity since Phnom Penh fell in 1975. Phnom Penh officials have also unilaterally returned remains that we hope to be an American unaccounted for from the 1975 Mayaguez incident. We are hopeful that their cooperation will continue to improve.

As the committee is aware, there have been a number of photographs that have surfaced in the media and which have been identified by family members as MIA's from the Vietnam War. We take each identification seriously, and we will use our full resources to answer the questions raised by these photos.

I would like to briefly give you a status report. First of all, of course, is the case of Colonel Robertson of the U.S. Air Force and Lieutenant Commander Stevens of the Navy and Major Lundy of the U.S. Air Force. Our photographic experts have concluded that the picture said to depict Colonel Robertson, Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy, has been altered.

The handwriting on the altered photograph and the method of alteration are both similar to changes made to five other photographs said to be prisoners of war. The other five photographs are all fraudulent. We found the originals in Eastern Bloc magazines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

These other photographs do not show American prisoners of war. They depict a Soviet baker, military advisors, and workers. One of the sources of this photograph has also passed to our investigators fake POW photos in the past. To complicate the investigation, no one has claimed to have seen any of the individuals pictured.

Further, a second picture allegedly depicting Lieutenant Commander Stevens was provided by the same source that originally obtained the faked Borah photograph. Subsequent reporting from Sandia National Laboratories is inconclusive in that it fails to verify that this is Lieutenant Commander Stevens.

The associated reporting accompanying the three-person photo, except for limited biographic data which was widely circulated by POW/MIA activists in Southeast Asia, has also proven false. The identifications by the families are the only positive information we currently possess. We are continuing our investigation, however.

The information available to us strongly suggests that two of the individuals allegedly pictured perished at the time of their loss incidents. In the absence of additional reporting we may not be able to resolve this case.

A photograph taken in Laos surfaced earlier this year that was identified by family members as Lieut. Daniel Borah of the U.S. Navy. In addition, a nongovernment forensic anthropologist positively identified the person in the photo as Lieutenant Borah.

With the help of Laotian officials our investigators were able to locate the individual in the photograph, who turned out to be a 77-year-old Lao highland tribesman. The man was interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted. He identified himself in the photo, as did a second individual who also appeared in the picture.

Family members who want to see the tribesman for themselves will leave in a few days for Southeast Asia. They will be accompa-

nied by our investigator who first interviewed and photographed the man in Laos so they can satisfy themselves with respect to this case.

The case of Capt. Donald G. Carr, U.S. Army, is quite compelling because of the remarkable likeness between the 1989-90 photograph we obtained from retired Air Force Lieut. Col. Jack Bailey and Captain Carr's wedding picture taken several years before. In order to pursue this case, we need more current and precise information, particularly concerning the location of the individual in the photograph.

I personally met with Colonel Bailey on October 8 at the request of several Members of Congress, and during the meeting Colonel Bailey promised he would give our investigators access to his sources and introduce us to the individual who took the photograph. Accordingly, I despatched a Department of Defense team to accompany Colonel Bailey to Southeast Asia.

Unfortunately, after a week in Bangkok Colonel Bailey was unable to provide the access or the information that he had promised. After the team arrived in Bangkok, he also disclosed that the photograph, instead of having been taken in Laos as he previously indicated, may actually have been taken in Burma or Thailand. Despite this set-back we continue to apply all of our available resources to locating the individual pictured in the photograph.

I have already alluded to some of the recent experiences we have had with outright fraudulent claims. Let me elaborate to make it clear what we are up against and what the committee is up against. I know I join all of you in condemning the cruel action by some fast operators who play on the hopes of families and friends of POW's and MIA's. They doctor old pictures or forge documents only to make a quick buck.

The worst of these individuals traffic in reports obtained from unnamed sources in Southeast Asia, invite publicity to their claims of live Americans, promise great results, and often seek to raise money to keep their efforts going. It is also common practice for them to claim that their information is proof positive of Government ineptitude and cover-up. In the process they raise the expectations of the families desperate for any sign that a loved one is still alive. Unfortunately, when we investigate their claims we find no Americans, only unsubstantiated hearsay accounts and too often signs of deceit and fabrication.

In August, at the request of a Member of Congress, I agreed to provide an aircraft to take a Senate staff member and an individual purporting to have "hot" information on live Americans to Southeast Asia to follow up on his information. I was told in a meeting in my office that a particular source in Bangkok could tell us where live Americans are being held in Laos. I also provided several experts to go along on the trip, including a polygraph team.

This individual subsequently provided the Senate staffer with his source. The source was polygraphed and flunked. The only thing he apparently did not lie about was his name. The same person was also involved to some extent in the fake Borah photographs.

We must naturally pursue every lead that comes our way, but each time we rush to answer these false alarms our resources are diverted from solid leads and productive lines of inquiry. Individ-

uals who repeatedly provide false information, well-intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions.

In addition to our efforts in Indochina, we recognize there are 8,177 Americans unaccounted for from the Korean War and others missing as a result of Cold War incidents. Accounting for these men is also of concern. We will continue to press the appropriate Governments for the fullest possible accounting.

The North Koreans hold the answers to these 8,177 Americans, including 389 initially classified by their services as prisoners of war. Negotiations with the North Koreans on this subject have been conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission. The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in defense of freedom in Korea.

The North Koreans have proved unwilling to cooperate fully with the UNCMAC, preferring instead to have occasional discussions with our embassy officials in Beijing and to use congressional delegations to return a small number of American remains to U.S. control. With the help of Senator Smith, who has met with officials of the North Korean Government, both at the United Nations and Panmunjom, we are pursuing an alternative approach that holds promise for future cooperation.

In the past year we have made several approaches to the Soviets to investigate whether they possess information on Americans lost in Cold War aircraft incidents. In some of these cases our information suggests that crew members may have survived their incident of loss. The Soviets, however, have repeatedly denied any knowledge of the fates of these individuals.

In April, the Department of State sent a demarche to the Soviets regarding this issue. More recently, Secretary of State Baker raised the issue with his Soviet counterpart during the Moscow summit. The Soviets pledged at that time to make relevant KGB records available to our specialist. We have sent a second demarche requesting access to the promised records.

We have also raised the issue of Cold War losses with a delegation of Soviet and Russian veterans groups when they visited the Pentagon last month. With their help, we hope to raise the consciousness of other veterans and convince them that this is an issue of signal importance to the American people.

As this committee knows, the work is not easy. Hundreds of people in the Defense Department who want nothing more than to resolve this issue have devoted their careers to searching for answers to these questions. Congress has made its own contribution with investigations, special committees, and hundreds of hearings by the committees with responsibility for oversight of the POW/MIA issue. Some of the most knowledgeable Americans on the subject are right here in Congress on this committee, and their assistance continues to be invaluable.

However, there is probably always room to improve the job we do in pursuing leads. I am told that there were many gaps in the efforts in the late 1970's and early 1980's which led to the decision in 1985 and 1986 to increase the resources devoted to pursuing live sightings. The personnel increases that I have ordered this summer

were to make sure that new gaps do not appear as the level of overall effort increases.

Over the summer, to take full advantage of the new information available to us and increasing access being provided by the Governments in Indochina, I ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned to augment our efforts in the field together and process information. They will add manpower in four places: the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the Army Central Identification Laboratory, the DIA Special Office for POW's and MIA's, and the DIA's Stony Beach operation.

I authorized those increases this past July. Since then, contact with Vietnam has further improved, as has the cooperation by the authorities in Phnom Penh. Cooperation with the Government of Laos has consistently expanded in recent years to take advantage of the heightened activity.

We have authorized the creation of a new position in the Pentagon that I mentioned previously. This position will be set up under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and assigned a staff of 14, including three positions already in the office. The new deputy will serve as the principal assistant in all POW/MIA matters reporting directly to Paul Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

These two steps represent the assignment of 102 new positions in the Department to the important and difficult work of gathering new information, sorting out the facts, and working with the families. This brings total staff devoted exclusively to this issue in the Department of Defense to almost 240 people. If more people and resources are required, we will not hesitate to add them.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I look forward to working with you as we continue our progress in this important area. As you and the members of your committee travel to Southeast Asia, I would urge you to impress upon the governments of Vietnam and Laos and officials in Phnom Penh the need to do all they can to resolve this issue. The answers to the questions about Americans unaccounted for do not lie in the files of the Defense Department. The answers must come from the Governments of Indochina.

The families of POW's and MIA's have been and will continue to be our most important constituents. This Nation is committed to keeping the faith with every soldier, sailor, airman, Marine and civilian until the fullest possible accounting can be achieved. We owe them and their families nothing less. We will not rest until the job is done.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Cheney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee today to reaffirm the commitment of the U.S. Government—and especially the Department of Defense—to account as fully as possible for American prisoners of war and for Americans missing in action and otherwise unaccounted for.

Mr. Chairman, this committee meets at a time of increased public attention to the fate of our POW's and MIA's in Southeast Asia. I welcome and encourage this spotlight on a matter of the utmost national importance.

I can think of no subject that stirs more emotion, or generates more frustration and controversy than the subject of POW's and MIA's, especially those lost during our operations in Southeast Asia. The fact that there were thousands unaccounted for in previous wars does not make it any easier to accept the fact that 18 years after active U.S. participation in the Vietnam War ended, we still do not have a full accounting of all those lost in combat.

Eight months ago, when we defeated Iraqi forces in the Gulf, we were able to account for all of our people, even those lost behind enemy lines. That achievement is one of the legacies of our concern for our missing in Indochina. In turn, our success in the Gulf generated a renewed national attention and commitment to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those lost in Southeast Asia.

We welcome any contributions that this committee may make in shedding additional light on this important issue. I assure you of my full support for this Committee's efforts. The Department of Defense will make any of its experts in this field available to the Committee to address specific questions you may have.

Accounting for our missing in Indochina remains a deeply personal commitment for me and for President Bush. I am the first Defense Secretary to come before Congress to testify exclusively on the subject of POW-MIA affairs. This is an indication of the importance that I and the Administration attach to this critical issue.

Under the President's leadership, we have pressed harder than ever before to find answers to the difficult questions this search entails. Today, I can tell you that although many questions remain unanswered, the Administration has made significant breakthroughs in a number of important areas.

First, as a result of Gen. Jack Vessey's outstanding efforts as Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW-MIA Affairs, we have opened an office in Hanoi and are conducting in-country joint field operations. This has enabled us to carry out investigations on the scene, enhancing our ability to get the answers to our questions that we need.

Second, as shifts within the communist world have opened new avenues for our search, we have carried out the first joint investigations ever held within Cambodia and worked for increased cooperation with officials in Laos.

Third, to take advantage of the new information now available to us, I have ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned to augment our field staff. I have also authorized the creation of a new position within the senior Pentagon ranks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW-MIA Affairs. With the new staff for this office, our POW-MIA efforts will be augmented by an additional 102 persons.

The effort to account as fully as possible for our POW's and MIA's is not an easy one. Our most urgent requirement is to determine whether any Americans remain captive in Southeast Asia and if so, to return them to the United States. The issue of live prisoners has been at the forefront of our intelligence effort and in our negotiations with the governments of Indochina.

The governments of Indochina have consistently denied holding any Americans. We do not, and never will, accept their denials as the last word. We intend to keep the pressure on. President Bush has pledged decisive action to return any Americans, should such evidence be obtained. I make you that pledge again today.

In recent months, questions have been raised regarding the Department's efforts to resolve the POW-MIA issue. As this Committee can well appreciate, no American official would spare any effort that might lead to the discovery of a single American prisoner of war. It is unthinkable that any American servicemen or women would fail to come to the aid of a lost comrade. Anyone who knowingly withholds or conceals information that could lead to the recovery of a captured American serviceman would deserve the most severe punishment possible. But I must say I have difficulty imagining why anyone would do such a thing. Everyone I know would be thrilled to learn that one of our comrades is still alive and we have a chance to get him back.

In fact, countless men and women in uniform and in civilian life have devoted long hours, great skill, and high hopes in the search to account for Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia. As professionals, as members of the armed forces, many of whom served during the Vietnam conflict, and as Americans, they have not needed to be told how important their mission is. They've had clear marching orders from the members of this Administration: The POW-MIA effort has our fullest support.

I regret the burden that families have borne through these long years of uncertainty and loss. And I condemn the cruelty of fast operators who have preyed on their hopes and made them suffer.

All Americans can be assured that the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action has the efforts of the members of my Department as well as our hearts. As

you can well imagine, it is a subject that continues to haunt the men and women in uniform who served in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We have a special obligation to those who gave of themselves in the service of the Nation; to their families, and to those who will be asked to serve in future conflicts, to do everything in our power to obtain the fullest possible accounting.

Mr. Chairman, later today and in the weeks ahead, you will hear from a number of officials who are far more knowledgeable than I am about the details of our procedures and about individual cases. I want to take this opportunity this morning to give you my perspective as Secretary of Defense on the overall progress of the issue of POW-MIA's, and what we are doing to achieve the fullest possible accounting.

THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

I would like to spend a few minutes, first, to explain how we approach the important issue of whether Americans remain captive in Indochina. To date, we have no conclusive evidence proving that Americans are being held against their will in Indochina. Nonetheless, the importance of this issue makes investigating live-sighting reports our first priority.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has the primary responsibility for investigating and analyzing live sighting reports received by our teams in Southeast Asia. Reports come from many sources, but our investigators solicit potential sources of information from among the thousands of refugees leaving Vietnam, legal travelers who have recently visited the region and others who may have been in a position to observe. In many cases individuals with information seek out our representatives in Bangkok. Regardless of how the information is received, the procedure for investigating remains the same.

Upon receipt, live sighting reports are examined to determine if the geographic location of the sighting, the time and circumstance of the sighting, and the details provided correlate to a known missing American. Related data is retrieved from DIA's extensive casualty, source and camp files, and the information is compared to what is available in the report. All files of losses or known incidents of capture or imprisonment in proximity to the location reported are reviewed for possible correlation, as are all files of all missing individuals whose time or location of loss generally relate to the given report.

Based on these findings, a preliminary determination is made regarding whether descriptive details provided by the source correlate to any missing Americans. If the information is judged to possibly relate to a POW or MIA, it is actively pursued by all available means. The full range of United States intelligence assets are used to collect information relating to reports of live sightings of Americans in Indochina. Continued collection efforts are undertaken until we are able to reach a conclusion about the report.

A live-sighting report continues to be pursued, on the assumption that it is accurate, until it has been determined that the evidence is clear and convincing that the individual described is not a POW or unless analysis indicates that the report is clearly a fabrication. If either of these judgments are reached, DIA's analysis is then subjected to the scrutiny of an interagency review panel before the report is considered resolved. This panel consists of representatives from Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Upon concurrence by the review panel, the report remains in the DIA data base where it is available for review by analysts working independently on other live sighting reports. Should the review panel not concur, the report is considered unresolved and additional collection efforts and analysis are undertaken in order to resolve the questions remaining.

To date, the Department of Defense has received 1,519 firsthand live-sighting reports. 1,037 of these reports have been correlated to Americans who have been accounted for, such as Prisoner of War who returned at Operation Homecoming, missionaries, or civilians jailed at various times for violations of Vietnamese codes. In fact, almost 300 of these resolved reports have been correlated to Private Robert Garwood who returned from Vietnam in 1979. Of the remaining reports, 373 have been determined to be fabrications, leaving 109 reports under active investigation. These reports are the focus of our analytical and collection efforts.

We have a live-sighting investigator on the staff of our Hanoi Office and we will insist that he will be granted free access by the Vietnamese to carry out his duties. To date, we have not reached complete agreement with the Vietnamese on the modalities of investigating live-sightings in Vietnam. We again raised this issue in a meeting in Hanoi last week and it appears that there is still more work to be done before the Vietnamese grant permission for our investigator to travel freely. It is our intent to press the issue continually until granted full and free access.

As I noted earlier, investigating live-sightings reports will continue to be our first priority. We will dedicate all resources necessary to support this vital requirement just as we have with the photographs that have appeared prominently in the media this past summer. We will not be satisfied until we are absolutely certain that every last case that can be resolved is resolved.

Command and Control

The organization of our POW-MIA effort is one of the most important ways we sharpen our focus on the issue. Later during these hearings, Major General Christmas, the Pacific Command Director for Operations, will outline what we have done to focus and expand our field investigations through a new Joint Task Force in our Pacific Command. But today, let me briefly describe the concept for this plan.

We will apply the military assets and personnel available within the U.S. Pacific Command to address the POW/MIA issue in much the same way as we applied the assets of Central Command in Desert Storm to defeat the Iraqis. Proceeding from a two tiered approach, we will investigate discrepancy cases and last known alive cases on a full-time basis with an expanded Hanoi Office staff. We will continue to bring in teams of investigators from Hawaii to support the activities of the Hanoi Office and to investigate systematically the cases within particular geographic regions. The Joint Task Force approach promises to bring a new intensity to our on scene operations. We now have the staff and expertise available to move forward as quickly as the Indochinese governments will allow.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and economic difficulties in China have been significant factors in changing attitudes and opening new avenues for progress in POW-MIA affairs in Southeast Asia. These developments removed support from Southeast Asian Communist regimes, forcing them to seek cooperation from other sources of economic assistance. They are turning to the West and especially the United States. This has opened new opportunities in three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

VIETNAM

General Vessey's Activities

Over the past year, the Vietnamese have demonstrated increasing levels of cooperation in resolving the fates of Americans missing in Indochina. Gen. Jack Vessey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW-MIA Affairs, has been especially persistent in pushing for greater access.

In April, he led an interagency delegation to meet with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. At that meeting, General Vessey and the Foreign Minister agreed to establish a POW/MIA Office in Hanoi that would: conduct in-country investigations of reported first hand live-sightings; research historical records; conduct forensic review of jointly or unilaterally recovered remains; and conduct advance planning and execute joint field operations. On July 8, the U.S. POW/MIA Office opened in Hanoi with an initial staff of five. Initially, we indicated that the Office was temporary in order to provide time to assess its value. It is our judgement that so far, the Office is a success, providing a ready point of contact with the Vietnamese, and increasing communication between their officials and American POW/MIA specialists. We have indicated to the Vietnamese that we want to change its status to permanent. This will permit us to increase the staff and expand its operational role.

"Last Known Alive" Discrepancy Case Investigations

Since 1987, our efforts in Vietnam have focused on the investigation of 119 illustrative "discrepancy cases" which General Vessey presented to the Vietnamese in 1987 and 1988. These are cases in which we believe the individual survived his incident of loss and for whom the Vietnamese should be able to provide information. In some cases, these individuals were listed as Prisoners of War but did not return at Operation Homecoming in 1973, when U.S. Prisoners of War were repatriated by the Vietnamese. In other cases, these individuals were "last known alive" on the ground, or were in communication with friendly forces and imminent danger of capture. We believe the Vietnamese should be able to provide additional information on the fate of these individuals or otherwise account for them.

These "discrepancy cases" represent individuals that, in our judgement, based upon the incident of loss, are among the most likely to still be alive. That is not to say that other individuals in other cases could not be alive, but rather in prioritizing our efforts we selected the cases of individuals we believed most likely were

alive when they fell into the hands of the Vietnamese. Therefore, if we can resolve the discrepancy cases and cases of individuals "last known alive" we will be able to shed important light on the question of whether or not Americans remain in captivity in Indochina. Sadly, to date, we have not been able to locate any live Americans, however, we have been able to reach the judgement that 57 of the individuals who comprise the "discrepancy cases" provided to the Vietnamese are dead.

In September we completed the 14th Joint U.S.-Vietnam Field Investigation of last known alive "discrepancy cases." This joint investigation was our most ambitious effort to date, and Vietnam's preparations and cooperation were improvements over past field investigations. Of significance, the Vietnamese allowed our resident researcher access to contemporaneous wartime documents that addressed the specific incidents of several previously unaccounted for Americans. As a result of these efforts, we believe that we may be able to confirm the death of several additional individuals. We are hopeful that the Vietnamese will provide access to similar records for other wartime military regions.

Field Operations

If I may, I would like to explain briefly how these investigations work. In all cases, our investigations begin with the assumption that a missing serviceman or civilian is alive. First, we identify the cases we would like to investigate jointly with the Vietnamese. The DIA and Joint Casualty Resolution Center then prepare case files of information for presentation to Vietnam's specialists. The records are detailed explanations of the incident of loss, biographic data, search and rescue efforts, and other information that will assist the Vietnamese and U.S. investigators in focusing on a particular case.

We then ask the Vietnamese to independently check their records to locate any information they may have in their records and archives, locate eyewitnesses if any, and military personnel or veterans who may have participated in the action so that our teams may interview them. After the Vietnamese carry out these preliminary investigative activities, we send in our teams, consisting of records researchers, interviewers and linguists to question witnesses and examine documents. If we can locate the crash site, we may survey it.

All of this information is compiled and a report is prepared and submitted to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis of the data received. The information is then correlated to the information within our files and analytic judgements reached. In some cases, we make a determination that further investigation is required. That may involve further records research and witness interview, or it may involve crash site survey and excavation. So far, there have been 14 such investigations since 1988. Another is scheduled to begin later this month. We go wherever the evidence leads and conduct as an exhaustive investigation as possible to attempt to determine the fate of the individual involved.

Vietnamese cooperation on these joint investigations has improved. But despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance. Vietnamese officials could do much more to assist our efforts. Too often our office finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live-sightings, improved helicopter transportation, and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled. Vietnam's foot dragging on the unilateral repatriation of remains is especially frustrating. Certainly, if we ever hope to achieve the fullest possible accounting in a reasonable period of time, Vietnamese unilateral efforts as well as their participation in joint activities will have to dramatically improve. As I will discuss later in more detail, we intend to have the capability in hand to move as rapidly as cooperation by the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia will permit.

To date we have accounted for only 22 of the 119 discrepancy cases presented to the Vietnamese and jointly investigated. While we believe that we can confirm the death of an additional 35 unaccounted for Americans since we started this process, we have not been able to account for them by return of their remains. Obviously, results are slow in coming.

I support the statement by my colleague, Jim Baker, that the pace and scope of normalizing relations with Vietnam will depend upon the extent of cooperation by the Vietnamese on POW-MIA matters. The Department of Defense firmly supports the road map that describes the steps Vietnam must take and measures we will take in response before we will be ready to have full normalization of relations. I can assure you that we will be rigorous in our judgement about whether Vietnam is adequately complying. We will not be deterred from our goal of achieving the fullest possible accounting for our servicemen and civilians missing in action in Vietnam.

LAOS

Some of the most vexing questions remaining from the Vietnam war relate to the unaccounted for in Laos. Of the 528 Americans who remain unaccounted for in Laos, 335 are in the category POW or MIA. At Operation Homecoming, only 9 Americans captured in Laos returned as POW's. It is important to realize that approximately three quarters of the Americans unaccounted for in Laos were lost in areas controlled by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Despite that fact, we continue to press the Lao for answers regarding the fates of Americans who were captured by the Pathet Lao. Only one American held by the Pathet Lao, Emmet Kay, was released by them and returned from captivity. A second Pathet Lao prisoner, Dieter Dengler, escaped successfully.

Earlier this year, we conducted the first joint investigations of discrepancy cases involving Americans last known to be in Pathet Lao hands. Shortly thereafter, in May of this year, the U.S. and Lao agreed to an expanded plan for increased joint cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues for the rest of 1991. Activities agreed upon include further joint investigations of discrepancy cases, small scale joint surveys and recoveries and joint crash site excavations.

So far, we have conducted the first three activities under the expanded program. In response to Lao humanitarian concerns, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Pacific Command have provided Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance to the Lao. The Department of Defense has furnished to the Lao nearly 100 tons of excess medical supplies in three separate shipments over the past year. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed construction of a small 5 room schoolhouse earlier this year in Savannakhet Province.

Finally, during September we conducted a Medical Civic Action Program Exercise with the Lao, sending U.S. doctors, nurses, and medical technicians to assist the Lao in training their medical specialists in a remote northern village in which we would like to conduct POW/MIA investigations later this year or early next year. These humanitarian assistance projects will, hopefully, assist our investigators in obtaining Lao cooperation at the province and village level.

While we have undertaken a year-round plan with the Lao, actual cooperation on the ground has not yet fully succeeded in implementing the promised schedule. For example, we have had to delay a field activity scheduled to start late this week until the Lao repair the helicopter that they had planned to dedicate to the mission. The lack of helicopters continues to be the most pressing operational problem in Laos. The Soviet helicopters in the Lao inventory are dangerous and operationally degraded. Nonetheless, we have continued to use them on joint operations in that country. In the past, the Lao have rejected our proposals to fly U.S. military helicopters for casualty resolution efforts in their country. We have made alternative proposals, to include the lease back of U.S.-made helicopters operated by commercial concerns in Laos. To date the Lao have made no commitments on these overtures, but we are continuing to work with the Lao to solve this problem.

We believe that the Lao shortcomings are more a function of limited resources and capabilities than a lack of commitment. In fact, they have been very cooperative on urgent investigations such as the—purported Borah photograph. We have two major field operations planned before the end of this year, and I am hopeful that implementation will continue to improve rapidly and enable both countries to get back on track.

Lao-Vietnam Border Cases

As I said, approximately three quarters of the losses in Laos occurred in areas under the control of Vietnamese forces during the war. Accounting for Americans lost in such areas must be a trilateral effort between the Lao, Vietnamese, and U.S. While field operations inside Laos will necessarily be bilateral U.S.-Lao activities, the success of such efforts will largely depend upon U.S.-Vietnam cooperation. The historic records and documents required must come from the Vietnamese. Field cooperation on the border cases requires the assistance of both the Lao and the Vietnamese. We have proposed trilateral talks in December with the Lao and Vietnamese to develop a methodology for addressing these cases.

CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh has recently begun to cooperate with us in accounting for Americans missing in Cambodia. Since July, three investigative teams have traveled to Cambodia to follow-up on the photographs alleged to be of live American POW's. Their cooperation assisted our specialists in tracking down a number of what proved to be fraudulent photographs. Since July, we have also conducted two technical

meetings with the Cambodians, the first such activity since Phnom Penh fell in 1975. Phnom Penh officials have also unilaterally returned remains that we hope will prove to be an American unaccounted for from the 1975 Mayaguez incident. We are hopeful that their cooperation will continue to improve.

RECENT PHOTOGRAPHS

As the Committee is aware, there have been a number of photographs that have surfaced in the media, and which have been identified by family members as MIA's from the Vietnam war. We take each identification seriously, and will use our full resources to answer the questions raised by these photos. I would like to briefly give you a status report.

Col. John L. Robertson, USAF, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, USN and Maj. Albro Lundy, USAF

Our photographic experts have concluded that the picture said to depict Col. John Robertson, U.S. Air Force, Lt. Comdr. Larry Stevens, U.S. Navy, and Maj. Albro Lundy, Jr., U.S. Air Force, has been altered. The handwriting on the altered photograph and the method of alteration are both similar to changes made to five other photos said to be prisoners of war. We found the originals in Eastern-bloc magazines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. These other photographs do not show American prisoners of war, they depict a Soviet baker, military advisors, and workers. One of the sources of this photograph has also passed to our investigators faked POW photos in the past.

To complicate the investigation, no one has claimed to have seen any of the individuals pictured. Further, a second picture, allegedly depicting Lieutenant Commander Stevens was provided by the same source that originally obtained the faked "Borah" photograph. Subsequent reporting from Sandia National Laboratories fails to verify that this is Lieutenant Commander Stevens.

The associated reporting accompanying the three person photo, except for limited biographic data widely circulated by POW/MIA activists in Southeast Asia, has also proven false. The identifications by the families are the only positive information we possess. We are continuing our investigation, however, the information available to us strongly suggests that two of the individuals allegedly pictured perished at the time of their loss incidents. In the absence of additional reporting, we may not be able to resolve this case.

Lt. Daniel V. Borah, USN

A photograph taken in Laos surfaced earlier this year that was identified by family members as Lt. Daniel V. Borah, U.S. Navy. In addition, a nongovernment forensic anthropologist positively identified the person in the photo as Lieutenant Borah. With the help of Laotian officials our investigators were able to locate the individual who turned out to be a 77 year old Lao highland tribesman. The man was interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted. He identified himself in the photo, as did a second individual who also appeared in the picture. Family members who want to see the tribesman for themselves will leave in a few days for Southeast Asia. They will be accompanied by our investigator who first interviewed and photographed the man in Laos.

Capt. Donald G. Carr, U.S. Army

The case of Capt. Donald G. Carr, U.S. Army is quite compelling because of the remarkable likeness between the 1989-90 photograph we obtained from retired Air Force Lt. Col. Jack Bailey and CPT Carr's wedding picture. In order to pursue this case, we need more current and more precise information, particularly concerning the location of the individual in the photograph. I met with Colonel Bailey on October 8 at the request of several Members of Congress. During the meeting Colonel Bailey promised that he would give our investigators access to his subresources and introduce us to the individual who took the photograph.

Accordingly, I dispatched a Department of Defense team to accompany Colonel Bailey to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, after a week in Bangkok Colonel Bailey was unable to provide the access or information he had promised. After the team arrived in Bangkok, he also disclosed that the photograph—instead of having been taken in Laos as he previously indicated—may actually been taken in Burma or Thailand. Despite this setback, we continue to apply all our available resources to locating the individual pictured in the photograph.

POW/MIA FRAUD

I have already alluded to some of the recent experiences we have had with outright fraudulent claims. Let me elaborate to make it clear what we are up against. I know I join all of you in condemning the cruel actions by some fast operators who play on the hopes of families and friends of POW's and MIA's. They doctor old pictures or forge documents solely to make a quick buck. The worst of these individuals traffic in reports obtained from unnamed sources in Southeast Asia, invite publicity to their claims of live Americans, promise great results, and often seek to raise money to keep their efforts going. It is also common practice for them to claim that their information is proof positive of government ineptitude and cover-up. In the process, they raise the expectations of the families desperate for any sign that a loved one is still alive. Unfortunately, when we investigate their claims we find no Americans, only unsubstantiated hearsay accounts, and too often signs of deceit and fabrication.

Senate Staff Mission

In August, at the request of a Member of Congress, I agreed to provide an aircraft to take a Senate staff member and an individual purporting to have "hot" information on live Americans to Southeast Asia to follow-up his information. I also provided several experts to go along on the trip. This individual subsequently provided the Senate staffer with a source who failed a polygraph test. This same person was also involved to some extent in the fake photographs. We must naturally pursue every lead that comes our way. But, each time we rush to answer these false alarms, our resources are diverted from solid leads and productive lines of inquiry. Individuals who repeatedly provide false information, well intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions.

KOREA AND THE COLD WAR

In addition to our efforts in Indochina, we recognize that there are 8,177 Americans unaccounted for from the Korean War, and others missing as a result of Cold War incidents. Accounting for these men is also of concern. We will continue to press the appropriate governments for the fullest possible accounting.

The North Koreans hold the answers to these 8,177 Americans, including 389 initially classified by their services as prisoners of war. Negotiations with the North Koreans on this subject have been conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in defense of freedom in Korea. The North Koreans have proved unwilling to cooperate fully with the UNCMAC, preferring instead to have occasional discussions with our embassy officials in Beijing, and to use congressional delegations to return a small number of American remains to U.S. control. With the help of Senator Smith, who has met with officials of the North Korean Government both at the United Nations and Panmunjon, we are pursuing an alternative approach that holds promise for future cooperation.

In the past year, we have made several approaches to the Soviets to investigate whether they possess information on Americans lost in Cold War aircraft incidents. In some of these cases, our information suggests that crewmembers survived their incidents of loss. The Soviets, however, have repeatedly denied any knowledge of the fates of these individuals. In April, the Department of State sent a demarche to the Soviets regarding this issue. More recently, Secretary of State Baker raised the issue with his Soviet counterpart during the Moscow Summit. The Soviets pledged at that time to make relevant KGB records available to our specialists. We have sent a second demarche requesting access to the promised records. We have also raised the issue of Cold War losses with a delegation of Soviet and Russian veterans' groups when it visited my office last month. With their help, we hope to raise the consciousness of other veterans, and convince them that this issue is one of signal importance to the American people.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMITMENT

As this committee knows, the work is not easy. Hundreds of people in the Defense Department—who want nothing more than to resolve this issue—have devoted their careers to searching for answers to these questions. Congress has made its own contribution, with investigations, special committees, and hundreds of hearings by the committees with responsibility for oversight of the POW/MIA issue. Some of the most knowledgeable Americans on the subject are right here in Congress, and their assistance continues to be invaluable.

However, there is probably always room to improve the job we do in pursuing leads. I am told that there were many gaps in the efforts in the late 1970's and early 1980's which lead to the decision in 1985 and 1986 to increase the resources devoted to pursuing live sighting reports. The personnel increased that I ordered this summer were to make sure that new gaps do not appear as the level of overall effort increases.

Over the summer, to take full advantage of the new information available to us and increasing access being provided by the Governments in Indochina, I ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned to augment our efforts in the field to gather and process information. They will add manpower in four places—the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, the DIA's Special Office for POW's and MIA's, and DIA's Stony Beach operation.

I authorized those increases this past July. Since then, contact with Vietnam has further improved, as has the cooperation by the authorities in Phnom Penh. Cooperation with the Government of Laos has consistently expanded over the past years. To take advantage of the heightened activity, we have authorized the creation of a new position in the Pentagon Deputy Assistant 26 Secretary of Defense for POW-MIA Affairs.

This position will be set up under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and assigned a staff of 14, including three positions already in that office. The new deputy will serve as the principal assistant on all POW/MIA matters, reporting to Paul Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

These two steps represent the assignment of 102 new positions in the Department to the important and difficult work of gathering new information, sorting out the facts, and working with the families. This brings total staff devoted exclusively to this issue to almost 240. If more people and resources are required, we will not hesitate to add them.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you as we continue our progress in this important area. As you and the members of your committee travel to Southeast Asia, I urge you to impress upon the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and officials in Phnom Penh, the need to do all they can to resolve this issue. The answers to the questions about Americans unaccounted for do not lie in the files of the Defense Department. The answers must come from the governments of Indochina.

The families of POW's and MIA's have been, and will continue to be, our most important constituents. This Nation is committed to keeping the faith with every soldier, sailor, Marine, and civilian until the fullest possible accounting is achieved. We owe them and their families, nothing less. We will not rest until the job is done.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate the scope of that statement and the fact that you have come here today as the lead-off witness in this year-long effort. I think you have made an important statement, particularly with respect to the augmented efforts that are being made and also with respect to the fraud issue.

We will have a round of 5 minute questions because of the number of Members and the time frame, and hopefully we can get through that and perhaps even have a little time for follow-up afterward.

Let me lead off, if I may, Mr. Secretary, by going back to the article that Senator Smith cited and that all of us read this morning. I would say at the outset that I could not agree with you more about your statement about the Department's tackling the issue of friendly fire up front.

I can recall in a briefing we had during the course of the war that that was discussed, and I think I or somebody remarked that there was a singular break with the past in that I remember the case of a movie called *Friendly Fire* where it took a long period of time for one individual to learn. In this case, you have voluntarily stepped up and acknowledged that in fact that is how you accounted for a number of deaths in the course of the war. I thought it was

a moment of frankness and a departure from the past that was extraordinary, and I congratulate you for it.

The question that arises in the context of this issue—POW/MIA—is really the question about the communication process, I suppose. What is it that has happened, in your mind, that so many of our own citizens, particularly so many of the POW/MIA families feel that they are not getting the story?

I read from today's article, because there is a direct parallel in it. The article today said—and this is the reporter speaking, but this is what it said:

The Davila case was part of a pattern of delay or denial affecting nearly every family that lost a serviceman to friendly fire. The army in particular broke its own rules by concealing basic facts for months from the next of kin, and its efforts to postpone disclosure often led it to stretch the truth.

Some families, like the Davilas, never suspected. Others found out through news reports or enlisted friends of the dead men. Some heard only rumors and begged for details. Still others, including all of the marine families, learned informally that a friendly fire investigation was underway. All had to wait months for the final word.

Now, I understand why they would wait months for the final word, but what it suggests—and I understand the difficulties. I think everybody here does. It suggests that perhaps in the process of communication something has been lacking, that there is an adversarial response, or an unwillingness to communicate, or perhaps even a lack of ability to communicate the difficulties that are inherent in the process so people can understand it.

But my question to you is, having had time to review this, having augmented the staff, having made judgments about it, what is it in the process with the POW/MIA issue in Vietnam that has led so many families to feel as though they are in an adversarial state with their own Government?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I am not sure I can answer that question, certainly, on behalf of the families. I would assume you will have the opportunity later in your hearings to look specifically at their perception of it.

The problem, if you take the friendly fire incidents that are reported in the newspapers this morning that you referenced, is a very serious matter for any military organization to conclude that some of the casualties that were incurred as a result of military action were, in fact, the result of friendly fire. It is not a conclusion you draw lightly. And what was done in this case was a very thorough investigation, as I mentioned earlier, of every single incident where we did take casualties in an effort to ascertain the facts of the situation.

In some cases we are able to tell that casualties were the result of friendly fire because in this particular conflict only American forces were firing depleted uranium rounds from our M-1 tanks. The Iraqis had no similar munitions. And when a depleted uranium round hits an armored vehicle it leaves a distinctive signature. But it required going back and investigating and actually looking at the equipment in order to be able to confirm that.

I think the worst thing we could have done would have been to make a mistake or to go too quick with the allegation that, in fact, a casualty had resulted from friendly fire. So the fact that it takes a few months to get a full and complete accounting, I think, is just a normal, natural part of the process.

Now, from the standpoint of the families, there is never a good way to be informed that a family member is, in fact, a casualty. And it is even more difficult when you go through the uncertainty that existed for some of these families in not knowing precisely the circumstances that surrounded the death of a loved one.

All I can say is that as a Government, as a department, we are dedicated to the proposition of a full and complete accounting. That is what we have tried to provide in the case of Iraq. We take some pride in having gotten a full accounting of all the MIA's that were associated with the conflict in the Gulf.

With respect to how the department operated in previous administrations over the years that set a tone or a stage where families of POW's and MIA's in Southeast Asia believe the department was less than truthful, I am simply not responsible for; that was not on my watch.

But I can assure you we are dedicated in this administration to giving and achieving the full accounting to the families. That is a very important part of our responsibility and we take it very seriously.

Senator KERRY. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your candor in your responses to many of the points that you made, especially on the attempts that you made to confirm the validity of some of those photographs. And I personally know that you did take that upon yourself to check those out.

What, in your estimation, is the effect, do you see any effect on the morale of military personnel, active duty military personnel today, as a result of this kind of thing the investigation, the possibility that somebody may have been left? Apparently, it did not have any effect on the morale of the guys that served in the Gulf and the gals that served in the Gulf, but do you, given all the other factors and tremendous cutbacks that are coming down, which is a morale issue in itself, do you sense any morale problems as a result of this kind of things being bandied about?

Secretary CHENEY. Do you mean as a result of this investigation?

Senator SMITH. Not specifically this, but just the issue itself in the sense that there are still questions unanswered that have not been resolved.

Secretary CHENEY. I am sure that it probably is a factor in the minds of many of those who served and still serve in the military and who served in the war in Southeast Asia.

I would not describe it as an overall morale problem. I think morale in the military today is very good. But clearly when we ask young men and women to put on the uniform of the United States military and go in harm's way, I think it is with the unstated assumption and the expectation that no one would be left behind. And clearly, I think that is something that all Americans would like to be able to say about their Government, that there is no decision made by anyone to leave behind prisoners or missing in action in the war in Southeast Asia.

Senator SMITH. Just one final quick point and then I would yield.

What is, if you could characterize it in a sentence or two, what is your reaction or the reaction of your department to this commit-

tee? Do you feel, do you welcome it? Do you resent it? Give me some reaction of how you feel about it.

Secretary CHENEY. Well, I think the reaction of the department will be set by me and by my presence here today. I think I have indicated to everybody who works for me that we take this matter very seriously and that our mission is to cooperate with the committee, to benefit from whatever guidance and oversight you care to give us, that Congress has a very legitimate role to play in this area.

And so I would expect that those who work for me in the Department of Defense will understand by virtue of my presence here and my statements to the committee that I expect them to cooperate and have a very positive attitude about what should be a cooperative effort between the executive and the legislative branch to get the fullest possible accounting.

Senator SMITH. We appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much.

Let me just say to the members of the committee that the committee is going to operate on the basis of the first-come, first-served rule, so that everybody will have some predictability in their scheduling and know when they are going to come up for questions.

With that in mind, Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary Cheney, for coming here and cooperating with the committee and for your openness on this issue.

I would like to say at the outset that I have had an opportunity to pass on some information to you and I want you to know that I have been satisfied with your follow-up. Your response and follow-up has convinced me that this issue is at the top of your priority list.

If anyone would ask me if this issue is of the highest priority with Secretary Cheney, my answer would be an unequivocal yes.

And I appreciate not only the response several months ago from what I passed on to you, some leads that you followed-up on. But even very recently on a second instance, and I appreciate that very much.

Mr. Secretary, my question is whether or not it troubles you that people with information on possible live POW's are coming to Congress and the media with their information because they either do not trust or are not satisfied with the attention that it has gotten from the Defense Intelligence Agency. And that may be because the DIA has little credibility in their eyes.

Secretary CHENEY. Certainly, it would be a factor inhibiting our ability to carry out our assignment, our mission in getting the fullest possible accounting.

I am, of course, without knowing the specific case, or having had the opportunity to talk to the individual source, do not have any way of knowing whether their feeling of frustration is justified. But I can assure you, Senator, as I have in the cases you mentioned, that we want to take advantage of whatever information is out there. And that we will devote the resources of the department to follow-up on every single lead.

I would hope that one of the things that will emerge from this set of hearings would be a restoration of confidence, if you will, on

the part of those who may have information that we are very serious about this business in the Department of Defense and that if they do provide us with good information it will not get buried in the bureaucracy, but we will aggressively pursue it.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, see, I think that statement you just made, if it could be made more often, that you are aware that there might be some lack of credibility between people out there and your department and that you are willing to restore it and you see this committee as part of that process, or even without this committee, that you are willing to consider that, I think that is a major step.

And again, I think that you are to be commended for that open attitude.

Now while I did compliment you, and that is a sincere compliment, I think I want to also tell you, Mr. Secretary, that what ever problems are associated with the Government's handling of this issue are the result of people in the lower levels of the bureaucracy, some of whom have been working on this issue since almost day one. And this is not finger-pointing toward an individual, this is more a general comment toward groups of people.

It is my impression that they cannot seem to see the forest for the trees. Some of these people in the bowels of the bureaucracy, perhaps unwittingly, have come to constantly defend the proposition that we have left no one behind. So when a family member comes along with a photograph or with a number of discrepancies in their loved one's case, they might get a knee-jerk response or no response at all.

So considering this as background that I think is a legitimate analysis of the situation, maybe unconsciously developing over a long period of time, but still a real situation, I ask you this question: Whether you can honestly say that those in DOD below your level who have been responsible for this issue have pursued cases of potentially live POW's with the kind of vigor that reflects our national highest priority and that has been spelled out by several presidents so it, in fact, is our Nation's highest priority?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I am not foolish enough to think I know everything that goes on in the Department of Defense on a regular basis on this or any other issue.

It is a big place. My tenure there runs a little over 2-1/2 years out of the some 19 years that we are interested in. And I am confident after I have left, I will not have fixed all of the problems. But I think it should be clear that we do indeed treat this as a matter of highest national priority. And if we have individuals in the organization who have not conducted themselves accordingly, then I would expect that I would hear about it from their supervisors and that appropriate action would be taken.

I think the important thing for us, also though, is to remember that there are a great many individuals in the organization who are engaged and have been engaged for years in a very, very difficult and complex task, whose careers in many cases have been devoted in substantial part to dealing with this specific issue and who do an outstanding job and often do not receive enough thanks for it as well.

So in terms of agreeing that there may well have been times in the past when people coming to us did not receive the kind of treatment that they merited or their information was treated lightly, I would not by any means want to cast some kind of blanket condemnation on these very dedicated folks in the military and civilian side who worked very hard to try to resolve these issues.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have another question, but just let me close with a commentary on what he said.

I do not question what he said, but I guess I would leave out there the fact that maybe there was some dissatisfaction on the Secretary's part with the handling prior to the decision to put 102 additional employees in place. Or maybe those 102 additional employees would not have been put in place.

Secretary CHENEY. I think, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just respond that the basic impetus for that was the fact that we now have much more access and we have now opened the office in Hanoi and that we are getting cooperation from the Vietnamese and the Cambodians and the Laos for the first time. And that more resources are justified in terms of being able to work the cases and the information we now think we can generate.

Senator KERRY. Let me just say before I turn to Senator Kohl that, Mr. Secretary, I think we really look forward to hearing the testimony of some of those people that you have talked about. They have never spoken publicly before.

It struck me when I was in Vietnam, listening to some of them and also listening to General Vessey, that there is an extraordinary tale for Americans to hear about the depth of concern and commitment that many of these people have put in over the course of 13 years, 14 years, 15 years, and that their efforts shed a different light on the continuum of effort, if you will, than many people have become aware of. That is why the committee particularly wanted them to come back here, which I know is a great expense in terms of time as well as money. But we think it is very worthwhile. And I think their story is interesting.

Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, with your experience with the families of casualties of Operation Desert Storm, you have certainly seen many of the problems that develop when family members are not given all the information the Defense Department has about how their loved ones died.

I have a constituent who recently requested a report as she has requested reports now for the past 20 years on a brother who was missing in action from the war. And she gets back letters which give her part of the report, but the letter says we cannot give you additional information that does refer to her brother because the information is classified. Now that drives her up a wall, as you might imagine.

My question is after 20 years what is it about a report concerning her brother or others that has to be classified so that we leave them with such an incomplete feeling. They feel like you have information that would give them the kind of peace of mind, if nothing else, that they desire, but you just will not release it.

Secretary CHENEY. Well, Senator, I am not familiar, obviously, with the specific case you are talking about.

The current policy is that the families are to have complete access to everything in the files with the exception of information about sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

For obvious reasons there are or there is a need to protect the way in which we have in the past generated some of the information with respect to particular cases. I would expect this is an issue the committee may want to pursue in a closed-door session where we could have a more frank and open discussion on exactly what is in the files and what ultimately is releasable to the family members.

But with that one single exception, as far as I know, that is the limitation on information that is provided.

Senator KOHL. So are you suggesting that except in the rarest of cases it should not be necessary to leave these people with that feeling that you have important information relevant to the particular case that you are not going to release? Except in the rarest of cases, you are saying that should not be necessary?

Secretary CHENEY. I am saying that in my understanding of the way the system has operated in the past and continues to operate is that what is protected through the classification process is information about sources and methods. Traditionally that is where classification is applied and it is true in this case as well.

And again, I think this is a subject that the committee will want to pursue in executive session.

But without knowing the individual case, there is no effort on the part of the Department of Defense to cover up from family members or to keep from them knowledge about the status of their POW or MIA. That is not the purpose for applying the classification in this case. It is only to protect sources and methods.

Senator KERRY. If I could interrupt without taking away from your time at all, Senator, we have discussed this, Senator Smith and I and staff and others. And there is going to be a major effort by the committee to review that process.

But I must say, Mr. Secretary, that the committee wants to avoid becoming perceived as part of the problem. So the committee is determined to be very tough on the issue of what legitimately remains a source or a method of concern that could not somehow be transferred to at least a family.

In some cases we have learned information from the Vietnamese that our department is keeping classified, that we go over or a family goes over and actually gets it from the Vietnamese. And that has only lent to this perception that there is a gap between what our Government is willing to trust us with versus what is available to people in the open marketplace.

Senator McCARN. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment?

I do not know how many members of this committee are aware, but we did put in the DOD authorization bill and I believe it is holding in conference, a requirement that the Department of Defense disclose all relevant information to the public and to family members and anyone who is interested, the so-called truth bill.

And I think, I would hope, sincerely hope, that would resolve a lot of these questions that are being raised right now.

Secretary CHENEY. But if I may, Senator, I believe, and while we support the amendment that the Senator from Arizona has offered, I think it provides for retaining some classification of sources and methods, the same kind of provisions that apply with respect to Freedom of Information Act. There are good and legitimate reasons why there are certain things that should not be released.

It is no effort, again, to deny information to the families. But I think once the committee gets into it, you will find there is some justification for that. Obviously, we will be guided by the new amendment adopted by the Senate.

Senator KERRY. We are very aware of that. The committee is not one to put at risk someone who may still be alive in Vietnam who was a source clearly identifiable even 15 years or 20 years ago. And that would be dangerous and irresponsible for us. And we also do not want to reveal methods or sources that might still be part of an available structure or that would reveal things we do elsewhere. We are sensitive to that.

The key here is to find the ground that permits the committee to maintain credibility with the families and doubters sufficient to be able to give the answers that Senator Kohl, I think, feels ought to be forthcoming without that compromise. That requires us to re-establish a credibility that unfortunately for better or worse is not there now. And I think you know that. And I think you are committed to doing that.

I just want that process to be open and clear so that nobody doubts what we are doing, either.

Senator Kohl; I apologize.

Senator KOHL. Mr. Secretary, you were at the White House as President Ford's Chief of Staff when there were policy decision made on how to pursue the POW/MIA issue after the fall of Saigon.

Can you tell us how and what it was like to deal with this issue at that moment in history, what some of the pressures were and what options were available, and how you would evaluate the Ford Administration's actions at that time with respect to POW/MIA decisions?

Secretary CHENEY. You are asking me to go back, Senator, some 15 years or 16 years in an area that I did not have direct responsibility over as White House Chief of Staff. This would have been handled by the Defense Department through the NSC process.

At the time, of course, one of the problems that we were faced with was the Mayaguez incident during the Ford Administration. President Ford came in in August of 1974 after the return of the POW's, I think the general mood at the time was as it was in the entire country, a sense of relief that our prisoners were finally home.

The Mayaguez incident, of course, resulted in some additional loss of life as the President used troops to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez and there were indeed some MIA's not recovered from that operation, one of which now supposedly the Cambodians have provided, although we have not been able to confirm it yet, we do have one set of remains from that incident.

But I was not directly involved in setting policy at the time with respect to the question of POW's and MIA's. I am not sure I could

shed any light for you on how that was done or what the considerations were at the time.

Senator KOHL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kohl.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. I think your statement is one which is very illuminating and balanced. I think that you placed proper emphasis on the fact that Vietnamese cooperation is key to a successful resolution of this issue.

I think it is also important that you point out in your statement that we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance. You mention that to date we have not reached agreement, complete agreement with the Vietnamese on the modalities of investigating live sightings in Vietnam, which obviously is crucial for us to be able to get that issue resolved and also the continuing problem with the Laotian MIA/POW issue which obviously large numbers of Americans are still missing in action.

I think also, secondarily, and we will have further witnesses on this issue, is the compelling evidence or at least substantial evidence that the Vietnamese continue to warehouse remains of Americans. And something which none of us have been able to understand, but clearly apparent, is the case or at least there is substantial evidence in that direction.

I also think it is important that you point out the diversion of assets that have been used in hunting down these hoaxes which are being perpetrated in the most cruel fashion, not only on the American people, but their families. It is disgraceful and it is disgusting. And I hope that we will investigate whether there is some violation in law of this kind of behavior which we have ample proof are hoaxes which are absolutely perpetrated with either pecuniary gain or publicity in mind. And that makes it more difficult, clearly, for us to investigate those live sightings or photographs which may be legitimate.

On page 8 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, you said in fact almost 300 of these resolved reports have been correlated to Private Robert Garwood who returned from Vietnam in 1979. I am not sure I understand what that statement means.

Secretary CHENEY. It is my understanding, Senator, that of the 1,519 live sighting reports that have been analyzed, the total number of first-hand live sighting reports that we have, approximately 1,000 have been correlated to POW's who have been accounted for. Slightly fewer than 300 can be attributed to Garwood, who stayed in Vietnam from 1973 through 1979 and did not come home until 1979. It was sightings of him in South Vietnam that led to those additional, almost 300, reports.

In addition to that there were 370 some that were generally believed to be fabrications. Out of the total we end up with about 109 are still unresolved, unaccounted for. But of that 1,500, slightly less than 300 were attributed to sightings of Garwood while he was, in fact, still in Southeast Asia throughout the 1970's.

Senator McCAIN. And you are familiar with the case, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Garwood remaining in Vietnam?

Secretary CHENEY. Yes. After he returned, he was court martialed and given a dishonorable discharge.

Senator McCAIN. And the allegations concerning his behavior in Vietnam that he was involved in guarding American prisoners?

Secretary CHENEY. That was the allegation. I am not an expert in the case, Senator. You may want to talk to someone more knowledgeable than me about the specific circumstances of Mr. Garwood. I would be reluctant to go beyond what I have given my general knowledge of the matter.

Senator McCAIN. Is it true that when Private Garwood was first interviewed, he had said that he did not know of any live Americans?

Secretary CHENEY. I do not know that, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. Maybe you could provide that answer for the committee because there is a great deal of confusion about exactly what his statements were and were not stated.

Also if you could for the record, have your people give us an estimated cost of this trip that had to be made to Bangkok recently with a quote, "Senate staffer" and others. I think at some point we have an obligation to the American taxpayer as well as others.

And also could you give us a little bit more about that hot information that you had received that motivated you to have your staff fly to Bangkok?

[Information not received by press time.]

Secretary CHENEY. Yes. I was the one, Senator, who made that decision, to send out the team in both instances. I have done it now twice in the last 3 months where information was provided to me primarily from Congressional sources, in one case involving Lieutenant Colonel Bailey and the Carr photograph and the other case involving a report that there were Laotians in Bangkok prepared to identify a location in Laos where Americans were being held.

Both cases were brought to me as a result of contact from members of Congress. I was happy to devote resources to checking both of those reports out. I felt it was important to do so in a quick and timely fashion.

I will be happy to provide what the cost estimates are to the committee, but I think it is the kind of thing that is necessary in part to establish our credibility as a department, that we are serious about checking these out even when sometimes they may come from questionable sources. The sort of normal thing might be to brush it off, we cannot afford to do that. We have to operate on the assumption that they are valid reports about live Americans. And our obligation is to check them out every time we receive them.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate very much your emphasis on the absolute requirement for continued cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese government and I hope that one of the messages that is sent from this hearing is the commitment of Congress to demand that kind of cooperation which we feel is clearly humanitarian issue and one which is a requirement if we are to satisfy the American people. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Let me just say for the record that the Garwood role in this entire issue will be thoroughly reviewed by the committee.

Bobby Garwood will be deposed and most likely be a witness. And that entire situation will be part of the record here.

Senator HELMS.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, some of us came to Washington, in my case 19 years ago, with this as a top priority. Those were a little different times, the year I was elected. But this is the most encouraging morning I have had to hear the Secretary of Defense say the things that you have said.

And let me say, Mr. Chairman, that Dick Cheney has been unfailingly cooperative and gracious in assisting the Foreign Relations Committee in this investigation in prior times. He did it in ways that it is not appropriate to talk about in open session, as a matter of fact. And I am not going to forget that, Dick, because you have been open-handed and forthright from the very beginning. And he had his critics.

But I do not believe his critics know the whole story about this man. He has demonstrated a deep concern for the POW's and MIA's and I know of nobody who was more anxious for this committee to succeed than Dick Cheney. And I thank you, sir.

I have three quick questions. A lot of people in the intelligence community have indicated to me, and I am sure to others, that they have significant information about sensitive matters such as rescue missions that were purportedly aborted for political and diplomatic reasons and information about men left behind obtained through intercepts of enemy communications, et cetera.

My question is, will you be willing to assure these people that they will not be pressured or penalized if they do come forward with this information under appropriate safeguards?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I would be happy to see to it to the extent that I am able from the standpoint of the Department of Defense that there is no retribution against anyone who would provide information that is useful to the committee and during the course of your inquiry.

If something like that should happen, I would ask the committee to bring it to my attention.

Senator HELMS. Now you have assured this committee in your address and otherwise, previously, that this committee will have complete access to all types of intelligence relating to the POW/MIA question. I guess that means you are telling us that if problems arise in this area, we can come to you with a problem. Is that what you said this morning?

Secretary CHENEY. That is correct, Senator. And if the committee encounters difficulties or there is an area where a dispute arises about access to information, I would expect to be informed about it, to hear it from the Chairman or Ranking Member. And we will do everything we can to sort it out.

Senator HELMS. Very good. Now I was interested in Chuck Grassley's comments this morning.

I think it ought to be said for the record that this Senator, Chuck Grassley, from Iowa has served with valor far beyond the call of duty. I know that he spent hours and hours and hours over there

at the Pentagon. And he brought up the question of classified documents. And you have already said that you are going to declassify as much as you can within the constraints of intelligence that must be restrained.

One final question. I have been told and I am sure others have been told repeatedly that many covert military operations took place during the Vietnam War and that a lot of our men were lost in these covert operations. Their names have never been released. I have been told that the number may be as high as 2,500.

Would you be willing to work with the committee to work out procedures for identifying any of the MIA's who might have been associated with these covert operations?

Secretary CHENEY. We would be happy to do that, Senator, again within the constraints of having to treat the information in appropriate fashion.

To the best of my knowledge, unless the committee can inform me otherwise, we have a complete comprehensive list of all of the POW's, MIA's from the war in Southeast Asia, that there is no separate list, for example, of men who were lost on covert operations. I would be surprised if that is the case. Obviously, I stand ready to be corrected if the committee can point us in the right direction.

But the man I mentioned, for example, Emmet Kay who was returned by the Pathet Lao was, in fact, an employee of Air America, a civilian, presumably involved in covert operations at the time that he was shot down. To the best of my knowledge, there is no separate list of individuals that have not been made public and who participated in covert operations and are missing.

Senator HELMS. We will share information on that. I hope you are correct and I am sure you probably are.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have developed, I think, one of the most spectacularly successful records as Secretary of Defense of anyone in our country's history. And I think everyone on this committee deeply appreciates the kind of leadership you have added.

Frankly, the initiatives you have taken in this area, I think, will lead to a dramatic change in the confidence level the American people have especially important have been the followup with the Soviets, the in-country followup that you pushed, the openness in records at least the effort to move in that direction—and the added resources.

One does wonder what kind of retirement policy the Defense Department has when it plans a summer in Vietnam for the former Chief of Staff, but beyond giving him tough assignments I think that you are off to a great start in this area as well.

I had three things that I wanted to draw your attention to. One was a question. In your testimony you talked about the governments in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, denying that they had POW's or still had POW's or MIA's. Yet my recollection is that they had said that before Bobby Garwood was brought out. In other descriptions of those denials there has been a hint that they phrase

the denials in terms that suggest that they are not holding any POW's against their will or Americans against their will.

Do you recall the exact nature of their denials? And is there a possibility that they classify some Americans who served in our armed forces as non-POW's because they want to claim that they are there voluntarily?

Secretary CHENEY. I suppose that is possible, Senator. If someone is there voluntarily, then we would like to know, obviously, if it would let us close out one of these cases. But there is clearly a distinction to be made between someone who resides in the area voluntarily and someone who is held against their will as a prisoner of the government.

The governments have all denied that they hold any prisoners, any Americans as prisoner from the Vietnam conflict. As I indicated in my statement, we do not accept that as the final word. We continue to operate on the assumption that there may be Americans held alive and we function accordingly during the course of our investigations.

Senator BROWN. Do you know if their denials have gone to the point of denying that there are any Americans who may have served that are in country?

Secretary CHENEY. I do not, Senator. It would be an interesting avenue for you to approach.

Senator BROWN. I am wondering if, indeed, Garwood in their minds fit into a different category, if that is not an area that we might want to explore.

Secretary CHENEY. That is possible. I do not have information on that point. But I am sure it would be an interesting question to ask.

Senator BROWN. A couple of things that I wanted to draw your attention to.

In your testimony this morning you went through with some specificity about the process you all follow when reports come in: checking records, checking background, looking for when they were missing, and so on. One of the frustrations I have had communicated to me is that the reaction far too often in the Pentagon to reports of this kind is to spend our time looking through records here rather than doing an immediate follow up on the report in country.

Are you comfortable that you have changed the priorities to the point where you are able to do a quick response to investigate and follow up on leads that might be in Southeast Asia?

Secretary CHENEY. I am not totally comfortable, yet, Senator. I am sure General Vessey can shed some light on this area as well as our people on the ground out there.

We are clearly in a better position today than we have been before. Until we had the office open in Hanoi, we did not have anybody on the ground in Southeast Asia except occasionally for the kinds of surveys that were done after the 1987, 1988 identification of the discrepancy cases. We now are in a position with people on the ground in Hanoi, in the Hanoi office to follow up on these live sighting reports almost instantaneously.

We have not yet worked out the modalities for doing that with the Vietnamese. They still are basically insisting that we must provide them with a written request before we can go visit a particu-

lar site, to check out a particular sighting. We think that is unacceptable. We are continuing to work with them to resolve that so we do, in fact, have complete and unfettered access anyplace we want to go to check out these reports.

I would say the situation is better than it has been. I would describe it, though, as not yet good enough.

Senator BROWN. Are you optimistic you are going to be able to work out arrangements in Laos and Cambodia as well?

Secretary CHENEY. My sense of it is, and again I am not an expert in that part of the world, but the circumstances that have led to the tremendous changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are rippling across Southeast Asia as well, that it is clear that the Vietnamese want to significantly improve relations with the United States.

There has been a resolution of the Cambodian conflict, at least for the time being, with the signing last month of the new accords in Paris. Every indication we have is one basically of goodwill and willingness to cooperate and to proceed.

Our problem has been in translating those general kinds of understandings into specific agreements that actually are carried out on the ground and give us the kind of access we would like, but again General Vessey has played a leading role in moving this whole process forward, and I am sure he will be able to shed some light on the exact status of relationship at present.

I basically am optimistic. I feel we are closer than we have ever been to a full accounting on those who are still missing.

Senator BROWN. One last area that I know you have talked about that I would like to emphasize. Our office got involved in trying to get film that was available on a POW in the Department of Defense's records.

Lillian Bickel was the case in mind. It literally took us 18 months and the involvement of a variety of offices, followup with letters with requests, with demands, with calls, to get some pretty basic information that was available throughout the period of time. For 18 months a family member was denied access to information that was clearly relevant and did not jeopardize the security of this Nation.

I guess what I mean to suggest is in the past the Department has not been overwhelmingly responsive to family members, and I hope as a level of focus that your people will have developed a new attitude in that area.

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I do not know of the specific case you mention, but clearly 18 months would be unacceptable, and especially to answer inquiries from family members. If that kind of thing is happening, it should not happen, and I would hope that with the resources that have been assigned and the effort now that we can get a quick and appropriate turnaround time when we do receive legitimate requests from family members for information.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I know we are running up against the wall here in time. I think there are just two more rounds, if that is possible, or are we pressing?

Secretary CHENEY. I have a major time problem in terms of a noon commitment in Philadelphia.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Mr. Secretary, give me, if you could, a reason why any of these Governments would want to keep from the United States the fact that they may have Americans over there?

Secretary CHENEY. Senator, I do not have a good reason why they might, other than that they might believe they would derive some kind of political benefit out of it, or that American prisoners would constitute some kind of trading stock to effect the relationship in the future.

Senator REID. They are waiting a long time to do the trading, are they not?

Secretary CHENEY. I would think so, but again my job is to see to it that we put the resources on the problem to get the fullest possible accounting, and at this point no one can prove that there are no live Americans there. From time to time we get reports that require us to go check them out, and so we operate on the assumption that, indeed, that could be the case.

Senator REID. One last thing, and this is from your testimony of the 528 Americans who remain unaccounted for in Laos, 335 are in the category of POW or MIA. I do not understand the distinction—528, and we only have 335 that are POW's and MIA's.

Secretary CHENEY. The others would have been carried, Senator, as killed in action, body not recovered. In other words, there was good reason to believe we could account for them. We know what happened to them, but their remains were never recovered.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb, did you have one question, or a quick comment? I am sorry to short-change you.

Senator ROBB. I recognize the constraints on time, Mr. Secretary. Just one quick question. You mentioned in your statement individuals who repeatedly provide false information, well-intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions.

Senator McCain made some specific reference to this practice. Have you given any thought to ways that we might be able to discourage or penalize those who traffic in that kind of information, and who do so intentionally and with profit or some other ulterior motive in mind, other than a legitimate desire to respond to the concerns and the understandable and legitimate concerns of family members and others? Is there a way that we could do something institutionally, whereby the Department or the Congress could provide some disincentive to those who traffic in this kind of information?

Secretary CHENEY. I would think—I do not have any instantly available proposals, Senator, other than to have a group that has credibility such as a committee of the U.S. Senate, as you go through the process of your inquiry over the next year, when you find that kind of activity, to make public a prominent part of your findings, if you will, to publicize those efforts that clearly have been inappropriate, or been designed to take advantage of the suffering of the families, who were motivated by financial desires of some kind, and I would think probably that is the best place to start.

For us to do it as a Department, given the credibility problem we have had in the past on this issue, it is very difficult for us to stand up and say that a particular individual or group of individuals are

charlatans. It might sit well with the families, or sit better with the families and the public, if it came from the committee, after you have looked at all of this and said here are places where we think the Government has done right, and here are places where you have not gotten it right and you can improve on your performance, and this group over here are individuals who in the past have been disreputable in the conduct with respect to this operation. That might be very helpful.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I will respect the time constraints.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, out of deference to the Secretary's schedule, I will defer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Daschle. Mr. Secretary, if we could leave the record open so that those Senators with additional questions could submit them in writing, we promise not to overly burden you, but we would like to give them an opportunity to do that with respect to the fraud issue.

Before you do leave, Senator Smith and I and a number of others have discussed, and we are currently looking at language to create a special category of offense with respect to the knowing and wilful misleading of the Pentagon, Congress, or families with respect to this issue, and we are trying to come up with the appropriate language, and we think it is something that would quickly pass and probably we should consider.

I will also say that we are going to look very hard, and we look for your cooperation—Secretary Ford has already talked with us about this—at the fraud issue. There will be a specific inquiry of this committee into the issue of fraud and we will probably have a hearing in an effort, both to expose it as well as to deter it.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, let me just say, you have said today, and I think every member of the committee appreciates it, and I want to thank you for it publicly, that openness and a frank discussion of this is the key not only to establishing, or reestablishing the credibility of the Department, but also to resolving the issue.

I think your statement today has been a very important statement, and we appreciate enormously, again, your coming here, leading off this process. I think it has set the proper tone, and the proper priority for these proceedings, and I assure you the committee is very grateful to you for the time you have spent here.

Thank you.

Secretary CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now move to the second panel, General Vessey, and while you take your seat, if I could turn to my colleagues for their opening statements, in the case of the openings we will proceed in the order of seniority in which people are seated, and I will turn to Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Senator McCaIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief, because we are very interested in hearing from General Vessey.

We are tasked with examining the question of what has become of Americans who were lost in service to their country's defense and if our Government has expended every effort to determine their fate and return them to the United States.

There have been four previous congressional investigations of the POW/MIA issue as well as several other hearings by congressional committees on one or more aspects of the questions. None of these investigations have resolved these questions to the satisfaction of the American people. I welcome this new opportunity to pursue answers the families of our POW's and MIA's have every right to expect and that the American people demand. With fairness, patience, and determination we may arrive at those answers. I am pleased to participate in this worthy effort as a member of this committee.

I do not know if there are Americans in captivity in Southeast Asia. Until I have conclusive evidence one way or another, I will proceed on the assumption that there are. I repeat, I assume that there are live POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia until we have the fullest possible accounting for them.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I strongly recommend that the committee pay particularly close attention to the testimony of General John Vessey. He has labored mightily to produce the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA's. He is as decent and capable a public servant as has ever served this country. No one is in a better position to measure our progress toward a full accounting.

In the course of our investigation, we are obligated to examine several general questions, and I would ask that my complete statement be part of the record, Mr. Chairman, in order for the benefit of hearing from General Vessey, and time.

I will finally just say that we are obligated to review the evidence of live Americans. So are we obligated to investigate the abundant evidence of hoaxes that have been perpetrated against POW/MIA families. I was pleased to hear you just say that, Mr. Chairman.

You know, when you get a picture such as this, which was published in the newspaper all over America, and then you get a picture such as this, which identifies the individual as a 77-year-old Laotian of partial French blood, and this gets on the front page of the newspapers and this gets very little, there is something out of balance, and it seems to me that whoever did this knew full well that this individual was not a live American, and what we have done, Mr. Chairman, is not—it does not concern me as it does the family members.

We should not allow people to do this to the family members, and I think it is outrageous, and I hope that as you mention that part of our deliberations and our efforts will be to track down, if it is possible, the perpetrators of these kinds of hoaxes so that the

American families of those men who served their Nation with dedication and sacrifice are not subjected to this kind of thing.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear I am not saying that every photograph or every bit of evidence is false. I have no way of knowing that, and there may be evidence which is true, but when we do have evidence that there is clearly a hoax perpetrated such as those pictures that I just showed you, it cries out for action to stop this kind of thing in the future, because as I say, those family members deserve far better from American citizens, or foreign citizens, or whoever is perpetrating this, and I know that General Vessey shares my view.

Again, I ask that my full statement be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full statement will be made a part a part of the record, and I think we could not agree with you more, Senator. Senator Daschle.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. DASCHLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE SOUTH DAKOTA

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, I associate myself with the remarks made by Senator McCain. I could not have said it better. I had about a 30-minute opening statement. I am going to forego that in the interest of time, and the determination to hear our witnesses.

I would like unanimous consent to insert the statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be made a part of the record. All statements will be made a part of the record. Senator Reid.

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first would like to extend to you and Senator Smith my appreciation for the staff that you have assembled and are assembling. I think that we have the ability here to render a great service to the people of our country to put a final resolution to this controversy.

In addition to the staff that has been assembled, I think we have rare assets with this committee, having you and Senator Robb, combat veterans in Vietnam, and Senator McCain, who not only saw combat service there but as we all know spent years as a prisoner of war in Southeast Asia.

So I think that the staff, plus the members of this committee who have had on-the-ground experience there, I think it is going to give us the ability to see a lot of things that have not been seen to this point.

As I indicated, I am hopeful and I am confident that we need to resolve this issue, and we will. The Nation deserves an answer, the millions who served in Southeast Asia deserve it, and especially the families of those people who are not accounted for deserve it. If there are live prisoners of war, certainly we need to get to the bottom of this after all these years.

As Senator McCain indicated, I enter these hearings with an open mind. I do not know, and that is why I asked the question to

Secretary Cheney. I do not know if there are prisoners of war there. If there are not, we need to resolve that. If there are, we need to resolve that. I can better understand why the Governments of Southeast Asia would play games with those missing in action, but that still does not make it any more palatable.

The question of linkage between the POW/MIA issue and normalized relations with Vietnam has been discussed in recent weeks. I believe the linkage issue is important, and I listened intently at Secretary Cheney's statement where in Laos that Government there has supplied certain information to our country and as a result of that we have done certain things in Laos. I think there should be linkage.

Not only, as I indicated, do the families of those who served in Vietnam deserve this committee hearing and this attention that is being focused on these issues, but those who now serve today in our armed services deserve this issue to be resolved.

The issue of POW's and MIA's I believe is a moral factor in today's armed services. In effect, what will my country do to get me back if I am captured in some foreign conflict? One of the purposes of these hearings is to determine exactly what steps our country has taken to investigate the evidence that has developed. Secretary Cheney has outlined something that gives us hope and expectation.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I think that we have a lot of work to do in a short period of time, and I think a lot is expected of us, and I think that we should perform.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. Senator Grassley.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, in regard to what Vietnam might be doing or not doing in regard to a new attitude that they have, I think we have to wait and see whether their opening is real or whether it is rhetoric, and I do not want to accept their good will at face value. I want to watch what they do, and if they do something very positive, acknowledge it, but I do not want to make any judgment on what they say they will do.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of discontentment over the years out in the countryside over the way our Government has handled this issue. I have personally experienced the frustration felt by many of my own constituents over the years.

The principal problem is that they simply cannot get their questions answered. Eleven times the Government has looked into the situation, and eleven times people are still not satisfied. So why is it, and what is the purpose of this committee? Why in the world are we starting a twelfth investigation? What can possibly be learned that was not learned by the other eleven efforts?

The eleventh of these was concluded this past May. This was the inquiry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff. That inquiry, in which I had an opportunity to participate even though I was not a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee, concluded that the Government has mishandled the POW/MIA issue.

There is a fundamental reason why the eleventh inquiry is at odds with the first ten. It is a simple matter of oversight and information. Of those ten previously conducted, seven were done by the executive branch and three by congressional committees. The seven executive branch inquiries were not all thoroughly reviewed by Congress, and the three congressional inquiries were not based upon all pertinent data available to the U.S. Government on this issue. So for its part, Congress, which represents the people of this country, has not had the ability prior to this select committee to resolve this issue.

I feel strongly about this, because I spent four days at the Pentagon a year ago this past September with professional committee staff pouring over hundreds of live sighting reports, inclusive of raw intelligence data. We were told by DOD officials during that time period that I was over there that I apparently was the first Member of Congress to have gone through this information. Prior to that, Members of Congress and their staff had only reviewed summaries.

Now, the summaries represent the conclusions of each case, so how can a proper evaluation take place if all you evaluate are conclusions? What about the data and reports from which the conclusions were drawn?

At the end of my fourth day of sifting through these files I came away with two very definite impressions. First, there are major discrepancies and follow-up deficiencies in these reports. When you read the summaries, plus the live sighting reports and raw data, plus the casualty files, there are all kinds of inconsistencies, and illogical conclusions are drawn. So I would suggest to my colleagues on this committee that we get access to and review all of this data.

The second impression I had was we needed a lot more resources and manpower to review and evaluate these files than either I or the other three staffers had time for. It was at that point that I knew an entire committee was needed, and that is why I joined with Senator Smith to create this committee.

Now that the committee has been established, the question is, what will it take to resolve this issue? First, we have to have a new attitude. That goes for Congress, the executive, the media, everyone. John Locke, the philosopher, used the term "tabula rasa," when he called for a fresh approach to determining what the human mind is capable of knowing or not knowing. That translates roughly into blank slate. He said, in a sense, let us wipe the slate clean.

That is what we need here, Mr. Chairman. And now, as we go into this 1-year investigation, those who have preconceived notions, those who have biases, those who have agendas on this issue, should set them aside. This should include the public at large, which would do well to send a clear message to Vietnam and Laos that we do not seek retribution, that returning our men would beget goodwill from us.

Second, this committee needs access to information. This access should be full and complete. Let it be known that this committee

will not hesitate to pursue access to all pertinent data, and once this information is provided it must receive an unbiased and professional evaluation.

Finally, we must be prepared to say that we left boys behind, if that is what the evidence shows. We have said as a Government countless times in the past that there is no credible evidence to show that we left men behind. What if the evidence points to the contrary? Are we prepared to back it up?

Sometimes, as is human nature, people can get too close to a situation and not know it. Their judgment becomes clouded. They are unable to see the forest for the trees. Perhaps that is what has happened in this case. Perhaps this issue needs fresh blood and a new attitude. There is no reason to point fingers and demand accountability. Let us find out the truth and fix the system if it needs fixing.

As Leo Tolstoy once wrote about how we sometimes let truth elude us, he said, we often put too much faith in the system and we lose sight of the truth. Truth, he says, is like a lizard. The system is like the tail of that lizard. We grab at the tail, but the lizard sheds its tail in our hand and goes off to grow another tail, so we are left grasping the system, not the truth.

Perhaps that analogy is appropriate in this case. Perhaps we have defended a system that has assumed from the beginning that we left no one behind. That system pursues the discovery of bones and crash sites, but that same system cannot handle evidence to the contrary. When confronted with the possibility of live Americans still held captive, the system defends itself with knee-jerk denial.

I certainly do not know if this is the case, Mr. Chairman, but I expect that in the course of the next year we will find this out. Ultimately, we have to get answers for our constituents and for the public at large. If we fail to answer their questions, we will have a 13th and a 14th investigation, as many as it takes to get an answer. I, for one, want this committee to provide those answers, and we have about 1 year to do it, and I am glad that we are finally getting started.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I will not have an opening statement at this time. I am delighted to join you, and I approach this undertaking hoping that it will be objective. I approach it with a certain degree of skepticism, but I look forward to hearing from General Vessey. The Chairman: Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I would like my full statement to be made a part of the record.

I would just like to say, though, that I think the hearing has gotten off to a good start with Secretary Cheney's very forthright and thoughtful statement, one of the most comprehensive and dedi-

cated that I have heard on any subject, and I would also like to say, too, General Vessey has done a lot in this past year to help move this issue along in a very real way. I look forward to hearing his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Your full statement will be made a part of the record. Senator Kohl.

STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT KOHL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

Two weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I was in Wisconsin to dedicate a Vietnam Veterans Memorial. 18 years after the war ended, several thousand people gathered for the ceremony. All the money for the project was raised by veterans organizations and private individuals, and it was Vietnam veterans who had the final say about how their memorial would be designed.

I think we can learn something about the importance of the work of our committee here today from the design that they chose. There were three columns built of Wisconsin red granite. One column represented those killed in action, one column represented those who fought and made it home, and the third column was for the POW's and MIA's, fellow comrades whose fate remains a nagging question.

That third column was of the greatest importance to the audience that day. Ann Fischer, whose brother went to fight in Vietnam but whose fate is still unknown, shared with the crowd the enormous pain her family has experienced. She made a huge impression and evoked the strongest response in a day full of speeches.

With this committee, we will have an opportunity to do something for Ann Fischer, for her family, for all POW/MIA families, and for the American people. With these hearings we will begin a process aimed at three things. First, we need to investigate our Government's actions. Serious doubts exist about whether our Government has done everything possible to resolve the fate of the missing. These doubts need to be heard and explored.

Second, we need to help the American people and especially the families to understand the way POW/MIA cases are handled, and third, we need to do everything in our power to find out if there are still any live Americans left behind.

This is clearly a highly emotional subject. It is possible that startling revelations will occur, but this committee is united in wanting to find the truth, and that clearly will take some time. The subject is clearly too important to leap to any premature conclusions, and the report we will issue is too important to make on any grounds other than a rational, reasoned analysis of the facts, so I, like the other committee members, look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses, and I want to thank them for coming with us here today to share their information.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ann Fischer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANN FISCHER

Dear Chairman and members of the Committee: I regret that I cannot be at the hearings in person. Please accept the following as my testimony.

On January 8, 1968, my family was notified that my brother, Richard William Fischer, was missing in action. That notification was the start of the process by which my mother and I feel we have become victims at the hands of our government and its representatives.

The National League of Families was first formed with the hopes that a united voice would get our government's attention and get us, the families, the answers we felt we deserved. Those were as follows:

1. Information about our loved one's "incident." Many families were not informed of the nature of their loss because of "National Security."
2. What was being done to secure the release of our men.
3. What was being done to ensure their humane treatment as prisoners.

Until the Freedom of Information Act, little information could be obtained about our loved ones. Any information the least bit touchy was considered within the realm of "National Security" and not released.

At first we were told to tell no one of the status of our loved ones for fear of retaliation by the North Vietnamese, thus setting the stage for secrets and the shame and guilt felt if we strayed from this mandate. In fact, the League found the opposite to be true; the louder our voices, the better their treatment of the prisoners.

We continued to feel patronized by the military and our government. The League had a voice, but only if in agreement to stick to the "party line." Anyone criticizing the policies was cast out as a troublemaker and said to be giving misinformation. Also, anyone not in agreement with Ann Mills-Griffiths was said to be giving out misinformation and could not be trusted; Red McDaniels, Scott Barnes, and Bobby Garwood, to name a few. I also distinctly remember my gut response to Richard Childress the first time I heard him speak. I felt he could not be trusted and he was not telling us the truth. I continue to feel that way to this day.

Prior to homecoming, my mother and I were requested to look at an album filled with men's pictures that were known prisoners. Both Mom and I picked out the same picture. It was taken from the back and the man held himself in the same manner as my brother would. He was also wearing a two-piece rainsuit exactly like the one Mom had sent him. The Casualty Officer, I believe named Billy Branch, checked the number of the picture with a list and, though he did not verbalize into words what he discovered, his sharp intake of breath lead my mother to believe that this might be Richard, approximately 4 years after his disappearance. No confirmation or denial or explanation of this reaction was ever given us.

At a later viewing of his file by my mother and I, no record was made of us having seen these pictures. Subsequent questions regarding these pictures have brought out that they are "somewhere in the Pentagon" and no one knows the exact location of the pictures without having the identification number.

A letter accompanying the file sent to us contained the following:

Information Report 6029125770 dated 30 November 1970;

Information Report 6918562873 dated 11 December 1973;

Information Report 6918767074 dated 26 December 1974 provided with information deleted because it is classified for reasons of national security and therefore exempted from access or released by 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) and 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1).

Initial Denial Authority is Captain Raymond A. Vohden, USN, Principal Military Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for POW/MIA matters.

I believe that this may refer to what is known as the "Christmas Lists" and my brother could have been alive and his whereabouts known as late as December 12, 1974. But whatever it might reveal, this information was withheld from us due to "National Security." I wonder if we will ever find out.

While at the regional meeting at Scott Air Force Base in April 1989, my mother made another inquiry about these pictures. The Marine representative stated in no uncertain terms that rainsuits were standard issue, that everyone had one and that she did not send one to my brother. Ponchos were issued, but that is not what my mother sent to Richard. I remember the anger I felt toward that Marine when he called my mother a liar. On our return home, Mom checked with my cousin, whose place Richard took in "Mike Co" about the rainsuit. He clearly confirmed that at that time two piece rainsuits were not standard issue.

At the same meeting, a man from the State Department spoke to us. He told us of rescue plans waiting in a safe, they knew location of the prisoners and they were

awaiting word to go ahead. My feelings are this was told to us as a means of placating us. This was said as a means to reassure us that "everything was being done that could be done." Was this the canceled Delta Force mission?

The summer of 1990 my mother toured the lab in Hawaii. When there, she asked if they had the "fact sheet" on my brother. The League continued to tell us specific cases were taken with General Vessey on each visit to Vietnam. My mother's next question was would my brother's "fact sheet" ever get shown at any of these meetings. She was informed that it would not, unless his file contained pictures of him as a prisoner. And yet the closest thing we have seen to a picture has been "lost" in the Pentagon.

My reaction to this is one of anger. I feel that they have killed my brother again and they have written him off. I refuse to let this happen. I want answers. I want to know *why* they refuse to examine each case. I want to know *why* each and every live sighting has been declared fraudulent. Who is the DIA protecting? Who is the CIA, State Department, and National Security Council protecting? What benefits, other than notoriety, did Ann Mills-Griffiths get for being in her position? Why did she, as the League representative, act so obstructively in meetings with the Laotians and the Vietnamese? Why does the DIA continue to declare photos released as fraudulent when they were obtained for their own records? What is being done to secure the release of Donald Carr?

I have waited 23 years for word of my brother and his fellow prisoners. I believe that our government knows that our men are still alive. I believe that they want to forget our men, just as they have in the past. Let the record show that the Vietnam veterans will not allow this to happen. Let the record show that I will not let this happen. I will not let our government forget because I cannot forget.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Kohl. Senator Helms.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since this is the first time that we have met after all of our members have been appointed, I think it would be useful for us to at least take brief note regarding the direction which the POW/MIA committee should take.

Now, unless, Mr. Chairman, we have a clear agreement on the job to be done, it will never be done. The American people will once more feel that they have been cheated. Now, cheated may seem a rather harsh word, but that is the way the American people feel about it, general. Based upon the preliminary work done by Senator Grassley and me and by the work of his staff and the Foreign Relations Committee minority staff, I remain convinced that the American people and above all the families and friends of the POW/MIA's have not been given the full truth by their Government, and in a very real way Dick Cheney confirmed that this morning.

Therefore, I propose eight brief points to become the focus of our work on this committee.

Point 1, I think the committee should reanalyze all of the intelligence on POW/MIA's available for all wars, including World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Report presented, in my view, compelling evidence that U.S. POW/MIA's were left behind after every major war. Now, this contrasts with some assertions that have emanated from the Department of Defense in the past that not one—not one was left behind. I do not believe that, and I do not believe the American people believe it.

Now, if we do not reach a general consensus on the number of men abandoned, then the committee will be lost in the endless loop of the DOD approach that tries to knock down the evidence on every specific case, and that is why I said I was so encouraged by Dick Cheney's statement this morning. I think he is going to turn the situation around. As a matter of fact, he has already begun to do that.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and new evidence now available suggests that it may be possible to find out what happened to the POW/MIA's sent to the Soviet Union or kept behind by the Soviets in earlier wars.

As for POW/MIA's from the Vietnam War, the committee investigators should systematically perform a double team search of the files, looking for discrepancies between the raw evidence and the final resolution, and by this I mean that each file should be evaluated separately by two—not one, two teams.

Not everything that was done was faulty. I do not contend that. In the limited time that we had access to samples of files, we discovered that a large number appeared to have been resolved correctly. Nevertheless, the number with discrepancies was not only too high, but showed a bureaucratic insensitivity toward the dignity of the missing.

Point 2, the committee should focus its efforts on the possibility that some or even one of the POW/MIA's might still be living. The U.S. Government, in its discussions with Vietnam and other possible holders of POW/MIA's, has seemed too often to limit the topic to return of remains and visiting the crash sites. Of course, we want the remains returned to the family, and of course we want to get the history of crash sites, but the first priority should go to the living.

Point 3, the committee should review the identification of remains made by the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. Even though CILHI, as we initial it in the bureaucracy now appears to be using scientific methods, the staff has evidence that many identifications may have been falsified in the past and were performed unscientifically by unqualified technicians. We want to be careful about that from this point on.

Point 4, the committee should review all laws pertaining to the procedures for making a so-called "presumptive finding of death." The U.S. Government should be required to prove that an individual is dead, instead of requiring the next of kin to prove that he is alive. At present, the U.S. Government can declare a person dead after 1 year following the last information received on him, even if that information indicated that he was alive at that time.

Point 5, the committee should review the claims by family members who believe that unfair declarations of death were issued for their loved ones. The first four points would put these claims in proper perspective, I submit.

Point 6, the committee should review U.S. Government policy for relations with the next of kin. In particular, the committee should review all Department of Defense and Department of State directives concerning relations with the families and recommend changes where and if appropriate.

Point 7, the committee should review allegations that family members and persons interested in POW/MIA affairs have been deliberately harassed by the U.S. Government because they criticized or refused to accept U.S. Government policy.

Let me illustrate what I am talking about. A number of my own constituents in North Carolina have reported unusual scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service immediately after they became vocal on the POW/MIA issue. Now, that must not be allowed to happen.

The eighth and final point, Mr. Chairman, I think the committee should insist that effective cooperation on POW/MIA matters must be the No. 1 priority. Not No. 2, not No. 3, but No. 1 in dealing with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. For starters, neither country should get one dime from the United States taxpayers until we know the truth about POW/MIA's who never came back from those countries.

Now, I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a big order, but unless we have a specific plan, a clear road map, we will accomplish nothing in the few short months that we have.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Let me just address very quickly, this is the first public hearing of the committee, and the committee has been busy pulling together staff and seeking recommendations from all the members for the outline of this inquiry, and I want to assure the Senator that almost without exception every one of the points that he has suggested are within the framework of the outline put forward by a number of different members of the committee.

The one caveat I would say to the Senator is that a raw data intelligence review of all wars by this committee is really beyond our capacity especially if we try to include World War II and Korea in the time frame that we have with the resources we have, and I do not want to pull any wool over the Senator's eyes or pretend that somehow that can be done.

I do not want anybody to be misled here. It will be a gargantuan task to review the data of the Vietnam period alone with the current resource allocation, and I think what the committee has felt, at least in the judgments I have had in talking privately with members, is that we set out to do that task and prove the capacity to do it thoroughly with respect to Vietnam, and that hopefully would lay the groundwork or justification for the continuation in the other two.

But we have eight investigators that have been allocated to us, and it just—as Senator Grassley knows and others who have been over there—is an enormous undertaking, as it is. But I want to assure the Senator that every one of those priorities that he set out are indeed critical to our ability to do this job, and that there will be a review of the intelligence with respect to the POW/MIA's in Vietnam.

Senator HELMS. Well, I thank the Senator, if the Senator would yield, but I do not think we ought to dismiss the point that the Senator described as gargantuan. We can at least make a beginning and see where we stand and then make a determination of whether we want to continue on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that is fair. I think we can do that.

Senator HELMS. I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. General Vessey, thank you for being here. Thank you also for your repeated briefings, and availabilities to the members of the committee.

There is not a member of this committee who does not stand in awe of your service and commitment to this effort. You have really succeeded in breaking important ground, and I think everybody is anxious to hear your views and your testimony today. I think, as you and I have talked privately, I think it is important for you to speak with the candor that you have talked with us privately, and as we have all talked about it is critical to let the chips fall where they may.

I know you have some strongly-held views about this. There are few people who have dealt as much with the Vietnamese on this as you have, or who are as aware of the current state and the texture of this issue, and so we very much look forward to your testimony.

The rules of the committee state that all testimony, with a few exceptions, the Secretary of Defense being one of them, will be sworn, and so, general, I ask that you stand to be sworn, without, obviously, any doubts that you would do other than state the truth here, but that will be a matter of record for all witnesses, and so if I may ask your indulgence, if you would stand to be sworn.

General VESSEY. Well, I would say also, Senator, I was going to tell you the same thing no matter what.

The CHAIRMAN. We absolutely understand that, general. There is no question of that. But I do not want anybody subsequently who is sworn to say well, you did not swear him, and you did not swear her, and so we are going to do it for all concerned, and I know you understand that.

General VESSEY. Well, since I travel with my Bible in my briefcase, I will just take it out and use it.

[Witness sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, we look forward to your testimony. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, JR., USA (RET.), SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY FOR POW/MIA MATTERS

General VESSEY. I would just say, in the beginning, Senator, I have submitted a written statement and I want to tell you that in my word processor in my computer I have a lot of help, one to help me with my spelling and so forth, but it will not help me with fundamental goofs, and I want to apologize for putting the wrong name of the committee on the top of my statement, and I did it a long time ago, and I looked at the rest of the statement a lot, but I never looked back at that one, so the fault is purely mine and I sent it here by fax and it just got reproduced here, and I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. General, if you would do me a favor, first of all if you could pull the microphone a little closer and down, and secondly, before you begin your opening testimony I would like you just to share with Americans who are listening to these proceedings a little bit about your service and record, if you would.

General VESSEY. Well, as the Secretary said, I am the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I was Chairman from

1982 through 1985, and I spent 46 years in the uniform of our country and in fact we're coming up on the anniversary of my outfit going to war the first time, 49 years ago, in a couple of days here, and so I've been around for a while.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, this is a very modest man. I think that I would like to hear how you got your battlefield commission, and I think the American public should hear that. You are our lead witness, and I think they are entitled to hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. That is what I am trying to get at, and we are going to break through the shield of modesty if we can, general.

General VESSEY. Well, as you said, Senator, I did get a battlefield commission, and I always thought it was because they were probably scraping the bottom of the barrel about May of 1944 and looked around for some noncommissioned officers who might take the place—

Senator REID. Where was this, that you received this commission?

General VESSEY. In Italy, Senator Reid, at the Anzio beachhead. Senator MCCAIN. And your age at that time, general?

General VESSEY. 22.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you just share—you say you served in Vietnam?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duty posts in Vietnam?

General VESSEY. Well, I served with the 25th Division in 1966 and 1967, and then I went back.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank at the time?

General VESSEY. I was a lieutenant colonel, and then I went back in 1971 and 1972 at Laos, and took the job at Laos that was called Deputy Chief JUSMAGTHAI, which had expanded responsibilities at that time for coordinating U.S. support for military operations in Laos, and I was there until the cease fire was signed in 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. So how many years total service in Vietnam, general?

General VESSEY. Well, in Southeast Asia, 3, and 1 in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. 1 in Vietnam and three tours?

General VESSEY. 3 years in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. So it was fair to say that not only for your 49 years of service, and not only for the fact that you have worn a uniform—

General VESSEY. Only 46.

The CHAIRMAN. And not only for the fact that you have worn the uniform with distinction and obvious commitment, but also for your service in Vietnam, it is fair to say that you accepted this special envoy role appointment by the President on the POW/MIA with a special sense of personal commitment, I would say. Is that fair?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir. The people who are missing are my comrades, as they were comrades of many of the people on this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry to interrupt you with that, but I do think it is important for people to understand what you bring to

this beyond just being former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General VESSEY. Yes, sir, and in regard to telling the truth, I would tell you that I will tell you the truth insofar as I know it to be the truth, and since there's a lot of hazy information about this subject, I will tell you what my basis is for believing certain things are true insofar as I can possibly do that.

There are many things in my prepared statement that are very similar to what the Secretary said. On the other hand, there are some important points of emphasis, and I'd like to go through that prepared statement in general and I'll try to skip over the things in the interests of time that the Secretary covered.

Like the Secretary, I am pleased to be here, and I thank you for the opportunity to help the committee examine the important issues of the fates of our missing from the Vietnam War. Your letter asked me to appear at today's hearing and address the procedures for resolving live sightings, and I will tell you what I know of that matter. However, to put that issue in context, I believe it important for me to tell you about the salient points in the negotiations with the Vietnamese for the 4 years in which I have been involved.

In 1987, President Reagan asked me to take on the task of getting the negotiations with the Vietnamese Government on certain humanitarian matters moving, and I would say some very important progress had been made by initiatives of the Reagan administration in the early 1980's, but by late 1986 the progress had slowed seriously.

The President instructed me to seek agreements with the Vietnamese to resolve the fates of the remaining POW/MIA cases, and he recognized that we would not be able to resolve all of them, but he made it very clear that the U.S. Government goal was the fullest possible accounting for all those missing and unaccounted for, and as first priority within that goal I was to seek ways to shed as much light as possible on the issue of whether or not live Americans were continuing to be held by the Vietnamese Government, and if there were any that then we would take action to get them out.

And then as the next priority—but I would like to emphasize again the first priority. That is, it was live Americans was the first priority, and Senator Helms brought that up, and I will repeat that several times here, that our focus has been on finding out whether or not there were live Americans there, and as a lower priority recovering the recoverable remains of those servicemen who had been killed or died.

The President also instructed me to raise certain other humanitarian issues. I was to seek to release of the remaining reeducation camp detainees—that is, the South Vietnamese Government officials and military officers who were still in the so-called reeducation camps in Vietnam. At that time, we estimated that about 8,000 people were being held.

I was to attempt to get the Orderly Departure Program moving, and the Orderly Departure Program was the program that permits separated Vietnamese families to be reunited without having to

run the gauntlet of the pirates in the South China Sea, and I was also to propose getting the Amerasian children out of Vietnam.

I was also authorized to listen to Vietnam's humanitarian concerns to see if there were some which might be addressed within our legal, political, and policy constraints, but whatever was to be done on that matter was to be done solely for humanitarian reasons and was not in any way to be some sort of a trade for Vietnam's POW/MIA efforts.

When President Bush took office in 1989, he asked me to stay on in the job and he gave me the same general instructions, except he modified them based on the process that had been achieved by that time.

The instructions of the two Presidents led me to attend meetings with senior Vietnamese Government officials, including four trips to Hanoi leading U.S. delegations, and the agreements reached in those sessions led in turn to 18 sets of technical talks between the leaders of our casualty resolution activities and the officials of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons, and as Secretary Cheney said, the 18th round of those talks just took place in the last few days.

It also led to 14 sets of joint field investigations involving thousands of man-days of American and Vietnamese investigators on the ground, trying to find out what happened to our people. It led to two information-seeking talks trying to determine how to find the information Vietnamese archives might hold about the fates of missing Americans, and as the Secretary said, they led to the establishment of a U.S. office in Hanoi to further the search for our people and information about their fates.

As a result of my talks in Hanoi on issues other than POW/MIA, the Orderly Departure Program is working. About 200,000 Vietnamese families have been reunited thus far. About 60,000 Amerasian children and family members have been resettled in this country. All but about 100 of the reeducation camp detainees have been released, and we have a working program permitting those who want to leave Vietnam to come to this country.

During my trip to Hanoi last month, the Vietnamese Government agreed to a review of the remaining cases and looking forward to an early release of the remainder of those detainees. I would also add that considerable nongovernmental U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached Vietnamese people who needed the help.

Before I get into more detail on the POW/MIA issues, there are several background points and events which are important for an understanding of the total context of our interaction with the Vietnamese Government. First, the United States has quite consistently urged that the POW/MIA matter be approached as a humanitarian issue. We have regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the issue is not a requirement for discussing normalization of diplomatic relations.

We have, however, consistently said that the pace and scope of any normalization discussions will be affected by the level of Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues. Vietnam has accepted the POW/MIA matter as a humanitarian issue, and in fact I would add that the Vietnamese Government has not connect-

ed the level of U.S. humanitarian aid to their level of effort on POW/MIA.

The U.S. has consistently said that normalization of relations with Vietnam can only begin in the context of an acceptable settlement of the Cambodian conflict, and the acceptable settlement had a number of specific terms, but for the purposes of the hearing today we can summarize them as follows:

Complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Outside verification of that withdrawal.

Free elections in Cambodia.

Nonreturn to power of the Khmer Rouge.

Accepting and implementing the Cambodian solution sponsored by the Permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council. As you know, Vietnam announced its withdrawal of its forces in September 1989, and the Cambodian peace agreement was signed in Paris on October 23 of this year.

On April 9 of this year, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon presented the Vietnamese with a road map for normalization of relations. The document laid out a general list of events and activities and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and U.S. expectations for levels of POW/MIA cooperation, and then it laid out corresponding U.S. moves that would be made on the road to normalization.

The Vietnamese neither accepted nor rejected the road map, but their actions have generally been consistent with the road map, as have ours.

Now I would like to move on to a summary of the POW/MIA issues from my perspective, and this is certainly very general and short. The issue of potential live American prisoners was the highest priority for President Reagan, and it is the highest priority for President Bush, and it certainly has been the highest priority for the American effort that I have been associated with.

For that reason, in the 1987 negotiations we focused on a group of 70 compelling discrepancy cases, cases which we believe the Vietnamese should have had—about which they should have had information. For the most part, they were cases of people whom we believe were alive after the incident in which they were involved, and were captured or were about to be captured when we last knew of them.

The Vietnamese Government has maintained since the end of the war that it held no live prisoners. In the 1987 negotiations, I used examples of these compelling discrepancy cases to illustrate why many Americans believed that Vietnam still held live Americans despite their Government's contrary assertion.

The then Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, the Vietnamese negotiator, acknowledged the discrepancies in the examples that I had given, and he said that Vietnam would help resolve those cases. In June of 1988, the Vietnamese Government agreed to joint U.S.-Vietnamese investigations of the discrepancy cases.

In early fall of that year, we conducted our first joint investigations. In 1989, we added additional discrepancy cases to bring the total to 119, and we also raised 35—about 35, or maybe 36—discrepancy cases of people lost in Laos, in border areas which were under the control of Vietnamese military forces during the war.

It was my intention at that time to raise the cases of all those people we believed we had evidence to show were alive after their incident, whether it was a plane crash, or a ground battle, or whatever it was, but additional research has shown that we did not include them all. But nevertheless, our analysts thought we had most of the cases representing people who had the best chance of being alive, and it seemed to me that by giving our priority effort to the joint investigation of those cases, we would shed the most light on the question of live American prisoners.

The 119 cases have all been investigated at least once. Most of them have been investigated twice, some of them three times, some of them four times. As the Secretary pointed out, 22 of the cases have been resolved through having their remains returned and identified, and we agreed with the Vietnamese that there are four other cases where the servicemen are clearly dead and the remains will probably never be recovered.

In 31 additional cases, we and the Vietnamese agreed that the investigations have established that the servicemen are dead. The U.S. believes that the remains are probably recoverable, or may already have been recovered in most of these cases. 62 other cases are pending further investigation. However, it's my understanding that the fates in five of those cases were probably resolved during the last joint investigations.

In most of the remaining 57 cases, we have gathered evidence, but not enough to be conclusive. The evidence we have gathered points toward death in those cases where we have gathered evidence. In no case have we found new additional evidence which points toward servicemen being alive.

One other sort of evidence which is pointed toward the possibility of live Americans is the live sighting report. As the Secretary said, since 1975 about 1,500 first-hand live sighting reports have been received. Most of these came from Southeast Asian refugees.

And the Secretary went through the numbers, 1,361 having been determined to be resolved by our people, 1,009 correlated to people for whom we had other accounting. And he went through the Garwood business. 372 were judged to be fabrications. And there are about 100 live sighting reports still under investigation.

Resolving these cases and any future sightings is important. And for the past several years we have sought agreement on investigating live sightings. In the October 1990 negotiating session, Foreign Minister Thach agreed to cooperate to develop procedures for live sighting investigations. Indeed, since then the Vietnamese have cooperated with us in investigating a few different cases of alleged Americans which came up very quickly. In April of this year when we and the Vietnamese agreed to open an office in Hanoi we agreed that one of its missions would be investigating live sighting reports. As the Secretary said, we have not yet fully agreed on exact procedures to be followed. High officials of the Vietnamese government have told me as well as told Congressional delegations, including members of this committee, that if we have evidence of any live Americans anywhere in Vietnam, we will be permitted to go wherever needed to investigate the matter. We need mutually agreeable procedures to make that offer a reality.

During my October meeting Hanoi, Nguyen Manh Cam, the new Foreign Minister, agreed that their people would work with ours to refine the procedures. It was a subject to be raised in the technical talks of the last few days. It is my understanding that progress was made and what we need to do is march ahead and see if more progress needs to be made.

There are some additional salient points on the live prisoner issue. And this is sort of a summary of what we know.

We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigations that all Americans seen by U.S. prisoners of war who did return in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for as either returned POW's or through the return of remains or having been reported as died in captivity.

In the years since 1973 other than the 100 or so unresolved first-hand live sighting reports under investigation, we have gathered no other intelligence that has been reported to me, and I have searched for it, by technical means or by other means which indicates the Vietnamese are holding live prisoners or that there was another POW system other than the one in which our returned prisoners were held.

Now we also know that high Vietnamese government officials have maintained through the years that their government holds no live American prisoners. And that assertion was repeated to me last month by Vo Van Kiet, the new Prime Minister and by the new Foreign Minister, Nguyen Manh Cam.

I would just interject here that as the Secretary said that does not mean that there are not any. And what we have done and will continue to do is investigate through these particular things that we have accepted as ways to go, the live sighting reports and the discrepancy cases and any other information that comes up to find out whether or not that is the truth.

Now with the continuing investigations of the compelling discrepancy cases and with good procedures, and as I said earlier, I am not satisfied that we necessarily have good procedures yet, but we will continue to pursue that with the Vietnamese, for investigating live sighting reports. We will have in place the mechanism for shedding about as much light as can be shed on this live prisoner issue.

We cannot yet say for certain that the Vietnamese assertion that they are not holding live prisoners is correct. We can say that we unearthed no evidence to the contrary. We will have to continue to gather the facts and simply let the facts speak for themselves.

The United States also wants to recover and identify and return to the families for burial the recoverable remains of the servicemen killed during the war or those who died in captivity. And we have urged the Vietnamese government to recover and return remains. We have offered to work with them and provide technical assistance in the effort.

From 1973 to 1987 164 sets of remains were returned to the U.S. Of those 153 were identified and returned to their families. Since my first meeting in 1987 308 sets have been returned, of those 125 have been identified and returned to their families, 109 others could be the remains of Americans, but have not yet been identified as to whose remains. And many of those may never be identified.

fied. 72 have been determined to be the remains of Southeast Asian natives and 2 sets were not human remains.

We know we will not recover all the remains, but we intend to continue the effort to make an honest search for every one that might be found.

One of the knotty issues between the two governments is the issue that Senator McCain raised, that is the possibility that the Vietnamese government might be withholding the return of some remains already recovered. We know from intelligence gathered during the war and after the war that the Vietnamese government has a system for recovering the remains of Americans. We also have the testimony of a mortician who reported that he worked on 260 to 280 sets of American remains and saw about 400 boxes containing what he believed to be American remains.

Many of the remains which have been returned have shown signs of having been stored out of the ground for long periods. And when you talk to the defense intelligence people they can shed more light on this issue because that does not necessarily say that these were in a warehouse. But it does say, U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests that the Vietnamese government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains.

For those reasons, the U.S. lexicon has come to include the term, the warehouse. With those people involved in this issue you constantly hear the warehouses.

Now high officials of the Vietnamese government, including Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and the new Foreign Minister, Nguyen Manh Cam, have said they are not withholding remains. When the issue is raised, I must say, the Vietnamese officials also not only deny holding remains, but they ask me why would we—what we believe the reason would be for their holding remains.

Vietnamese officials also tell us that private Vietnamese citizens attempt to recover and hold American remains in the expectation of some sort of benefit. Recently, we recovered an identifiable set of remains from a refugee in a camp in the Philippines. And those remains, incidentally, also showed signs of storage out of the ground for some period.

Separating fact from speculation in this issue is difficult. The Vietnamese government could shed more light on the issue by telling us the results of their efforts to recover American remains. And I have so suggested that to the new Foreign Minister. He has agreed, as did his predecessor, to continue to try to recover and return remains as they become available.

Again, we will just have to continue to search for the facts and let the facts speak.

From the earliest joint investigation it became clear that access to Vietnamese historical records was very important to resolving many of the cases. When we raised this matter at first, the Vietnamese officials continually decried the poor state of their archives and belittled their potential value for resolving POW/MIA issues. In fact, Nguyen Co Thach said they had been eaten by termites. And I must say in his defense that when we've gotten into the records, we find that many of the records have, in fact, been eaten by termites.

But in 1990 then Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, agreed to information seeking meetings to find ways to get needed information out of Vietnamese records. Since those meetings access to information has continued to improve. And you probably saw the press announcement from Hanoi a few days ago that Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai announced release of some classified war records pertaining to fates of Americans.

One of the principle tasks of our Hanoi office is guiding research into Vietnamese records. For the first few months the operations of the office have confirmed our expectations that it will be particularly useful in the search for historical information.

As the committee also knows the Party Congress was held in June and it produced a number of personnel changes in the Vietnamese government including a new Prime Minister and a new Foreign Minister. I traveled to Hanoi in early October to meet with those two officials. The goals of the trip were to confirm that previous agreements for cooperation on humanitarian matters remained in effect and to reach agreements on accelerated cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues along the lines of the roadmap which had been given to the Vietnamese.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I briefed you and the Vice Chairman and Senator McCain when I returned as well as Mr. Solarz and members of the House that have an abiding interest in this issue.

I believe a summary of the results of the meeting should be in the record and in the public domain.

Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam pledged Vietnam's unconditional cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues. Both said Vietnam wanted to continue to treat the matter as a humanitarian issue not connected to political matters. Both repeated earlier denials of holding Americans, live American prisoners and withholding remains.

And then we reached specific agreements on the following points. We agreed to accelerate cooperation on resolving the discrepancy cases and to put in place the mechanisms, procedures, and physical facilities to pursue full as possible accounting for all missing Americans as long as that would go on.

And I would say that the Prime Minister repeated a number of times that they will continue to cooperate on this issue no matter what the state of our other relations is.

We agreed that Vietnam would conduct a prompt and diligent search for all historical records which may pertain to missing Americans. And we agreed that the U.S. would provide technical assistance for that search and would bear a share of the cost of that search.

Vietnam confirmed its agreement to continue to attempt to recover and return promptly remains of Americans missing from the war. The United States, we agreed, would continue to provide technical support in the recovery of remains and help facilitate their identification.

We agreed that Vietnam and the U.S. would seek cooperation with Laos and Cambodia to resolve the fates of Americans lost in the border areas of those countries. Vietnam agreed to review the cases of all remaining re-education camp detainees with a view to

early release of those detainees. The U.S. agreed in principle to accept those detainees and their immediate families consistent with the program we had established for earlier detainees.

Vietnam and the U.S. agreed to explore some sort of joint venture to provide improved helicopter support for our joint field investigations. And, Mr. Chairman, you are very familiar with this and I will certainly keep you informed as that moves along as I hope the Defense Department will.

Vietnam also agreed to improve support of the Hanoi office and to work with the office to refine live sighting investigation proceedings and procedures and to provide liaison with the office.

The U.S. agreed to continue to facilitate humanitarian assistance for the Vietnamese people. And I also agreed that I would recommend to the President that the temporary office be made permanent. I, indeed, did make that recommendation to the President and I reported in detail the other results of the meetings.

Needless to say, I also reported to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Secretary Baker announced at the Paris signing of the Cambodian agreement that we would take the first steps outlined in the roadmap. He also made it clear that progress on normalization would be gauged by Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that with the Vietnamese, my work with the Vietnamese, we reached the necessary agreements to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our missing, to shed as much light as can be shed on the live American prisoner issue, and to recover all the recoverable remains.

But I want to say that agreements are not action. And there is much work to be done, both by Vietnam and the United States. Cooperation, good will, honesty, understanding, and diligence are required from both sides. We received a pledge of unconditional cooperation from the highest levels of the Vietnamese government. They need to work with us and we need to work with them to make that pledge come true.

I think as you heard from the Secretary of Defense, you have a Secretary of Defense and I can tell you you have a Secretary of State and a President who are determined to get to the bottom of this issue. The roadmap is in place. We are seeing new levels of cooperation from Vietnam and it is my earnest hope that those levels of cooperation will continue to grow.

You are going to hear from a wide variety of people. Unfortunately, you will not hear from all of the people in the Joint Casualty Resolution Center or the Central Identification Laboratory or all the defense intelligence agency analysts. And I want to tell you that I have worked very closely with these people. They are all mortal human beings like you and me. And I disagree with many of them many times. And we argue and battle. But I want to tell you that they are all dedicated people.

And if you could see the field work that has been done with these people traveling by old Soviet helicopters, by dug out canoe, on foot, and into areas in Vietnam where no one has been since the battles were fought, trying to find evidence of what happened to our people, you too would have the same appreciation for their dedication that I have.

I am very pleased that this committee is shedding light on this issue. And I have great hope that by the time you have finished your work that the American people will have a good understanding of how difficult the issue is and what the facts really are.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Vessey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL VESSEY

Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to help the committee examine the important issue of the fates of our missing from the Vietnam War.

Your letter asked me to appear at today's hearing and address the procedures for resolving "live-sightings". I will tell you what I know of that matter; however, to put that issue in context, I believe it important for me to tell you about the salient points in the negotiations with the Vietnamese for the 4 years in which I have been involved.

In 1987, President Reagan asked me to take on the task of getting the negotiations with the Vietnamese Government on certain humanitarian matters moving. Some very important progress had been made, but in late 1986, progress had slowed seriously.

The President instructed me to seek agreements with the Vietnamese to resolve the fates of the remaining POW/MIA cases. He recognized that we would not be able to resolve all of them, but he made it very clear that our goal was the *fullest possible accounting*. As first priority within that goal, I was to seek ways to shed as much light as possible on the issue of whether or not live Americans were continuing to be held by the Vietnamese Government. We were also to seek the return of the recovered and recoverable remains of those servicemen who had been killed or died.

The President also instructed me to raise certain other humanitarian issues. I was to seek the release of the remaining reeducation camp detainees. At that time we estimated that about 8,000 people were being held. I was to attempt to get the orderly departure program moving and to propose getting the Amerasian children out of Vietnam. I was also authorized to listen to Vietnam's humanitarian concerns and to see if there were some which might be addressed within our legal, political and policy constraints, but whatever was to be done was to be done solely for humanitarian reasons and was not in any way to be some sort of trade for Vietnamese POW/MIA efforts.

When President Bush took office in 1989, he asked me to stay on in the job, and he gave me the same general instructions, modified to fit the progress which had been achieved by that time.

The instructions of the two Presidents led me to ten meetings with senior Vietnamese Government officials, including four trips to Hanoi for U.S. delegations. The agreements reached in those sessions led to:

(a) 18 sets of "technical talks" between leaders of U.S. casualty resolution activities and officials of the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons. The 18th round of talks took place in the last few days.

(b) 14 sets of joint field investigations, involving thousands of man-days of American and Vietnamese investigators trying to find what happened to our people.

(c) 2 "information seeking" talks trying to determine how to find the information Vietnamese archives might hold about the fates of missing Americans.

(d) The establishment of a U.S. office in Hanoi to further the search for our people and information pertaining to their fates.

As a result of my talks in Hanoi on issues other than POW/MIA:

(a) The Orderly Departure Program (ODP) is working. About 200,000 Vietnamese families have been reunited thus far.

(b) About 60,000 Amerasian children and family members have been resettled in this country.

(c) All but about 100 of the reeducation camp detainees have been released, and we have a working program permitting those who want to leave Vietnam to come to this country. During my trip to Hanoi last month, the Vietnamese Government agreed to a review of the cases of all remaining detainees looking toward an early release.

(d) Considerable nongovernmental U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached Vietnamese people.

Before I get into more detail on the POW/MIA issues, there are several background points and events which are important for an understanding of the total context of our interaction with the Vietnamese Government.

(a) First, the United States has quite consistently urged that the POW/MIA matter be approached as a humanitarian issue. We have regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the issue is not a requirement for discussing normalization of diplomatic relations. We have, however, consistently said that the "pace and scope" of any normalization discussions will be affected by the level of Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues. Vietnam has accepted the POW/MIA matter as a humanitarian issue. The Vietnamese Government has not connected the level of U.S. (primarily nongovernmental) humanitarian aid to their level of effort on POW/MIA.

(b) The U.S. has consistently said that normalization of relations with Vietnam can only begin in the context of an acceptable settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The "acceptable settlement" had a number of specific terms, but, for the purposes of the hearing today, we can summarize them as: complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces; outside verification of that withdrawal; free elections; non return to power of the Khmer Rouge; accepting and implementing the Cambodian solution sponsored by the Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council. Vietnam announced withdrawal of its forces in September 1989, and the Cambodian peace agreement was signed in Paris on October 23.

(c) On April 9, 1991, Assistant Secretary of State Solomon presented Vietnam with a "roadmap" for normalization of relations. The document laid out a general list of events and activities in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and U.S. expectations for levels of POW/MIA cooperation and corresponding U.S. moves on the road to normalization. The Vietnamese Government neither accepted nor rejected the "roadmap," but their actions have been generally consistent with the "roadmap," as have ours.

I would now like to move on to a summary of the POW/MIA issues from the perspective of the President's Emissary.

The issue of potential live American prisoners was the highest priority for President Reagan and is the highest priority for President Bush; and certainly has been the highest priority for the American effort. For that reason, in the 1987 negotiations we focused on a group of 70 compelling discrepancy cases, cases about which we believed the Vietnamese should have had information. For the most part, they were cases of people whom we believed were alive after the incident in which they were involved and here captured or about to be captured when we last knew of them. The Vietnamese Government had maintained since the end of the war that it held no live American prisoners. In the 1987 negotiations, I used examples of the compelling discrepancy cases to illustrate why many Americans believed that Vietnam held live Americans despite the Vietnamese Government's contrary assertion. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, the Vietnamese negotiator, acknowledged the discrepancies in the examples I had given. He said that Vietnam would help resolve those cases. In June 1988, the Vietnamese Government agreed to joint U.S./Vietnamese investigations of the discrepancy cases. In the early fall of the year, we conducted our first joint investigations. In 1989, we added additional discrepancy cases to bring the total to 119. We also raised about 35 discrepancy cases of people lost in Laos, in border areas under the control of Vietnamese military forces during the war. It was my intention at the time to raise the cases of all those people we believed we had evidence to show were alive after their incident—plane crash, or ground battle. Additional research has shown that we didn't include them all, but nevertheless our analysts thought we had most of the cases representing people who had the best chance of being alive. It seemed to me that by giving our priority effort to the joint investigation of these cases, we could shed the most light on the question of live American prisoners.

The 119 cases have all been investigated at least once, most of them have been investigated twice, and some of them three and four times. 22 of the cases have been resolved through having the remains returned and identified. We agree with the Vietnamese that for 4 other cases, the servicemen are dead, but the remains are unlikely to be recovered. In 31 additional cases, we and the Vietnamese agree that the investigations have established that the servicemen are dead. The U.S. believes that the remains are probably recoverable or have already been recovered in most of those cases. 62 cases are pending further investigation; however, I understand that the fates in 5 cases were probably resolved during the last joint investigation. In most of the remaining 57 cases, we have gathered evidence, but not enough to be conclusive. The evidence we've gathered points toward death in those cases. In no

case have we found new additional evidence which points toward the serviceman being alive.

One other sort of evidence which has pointed toward the possibility of live Americans is live-sighting reporting. Since 1975 about 1,500 first-hand live-sighting reports have been received. Most came from refugees. 1,361 of the reports have been resolved. 1,009 reports were correlated to individuals for whom we have an accounting, such as returned POW's, civilians jailed in Vietnam after the war, and some missionaries. 372 reports were judged to be fabrications. About 100 live-sighting reports are under investigation. Resolving these cases and any future sightings is important. For the past several years we have sought agreement on investigating live-sightings. In the October 1990 negotiating session, Foreign Minister Thach agreed to cooperate to develop procedures for live-sighting investigations. Indeed, since then the Vietnamese have cooperated with us in investigating two different cases of alleged Americans. In April of this year, when we and the Vietnamese agreed to open a U.S. office in Hanoi, we agreed that one of its missions would be investigating live-sighting reports. We have not yet fully agreed on the exact procedures to be followed. High officials of the government have told me as well as told congressional delegations that if we have evidence of any live Americans anywhere in Vietnam we will be permitted to go wherever needed to investigate the matter. We need mutually agreeable procedures to make that offer a reality. During my October meeting in Hanoi, Nguyen Manh Cam, the new Foreign Minister, agreed their people would work with ours to refine the procedures. It was a subject to be raised in the technical talks in the last few days.

There are some additional salient points on the live prisoner issue:

(a) We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigation that all Americans seen by U.S. POW's in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for as returned POW's, or through return of remains, or having been reported as died in captivity."

(b) In the years since 1973, other than the 100 or so unresolved first-hand live-sighting reports under investigations, we have gathered no other intelligence, by technical means or other means which indicates the Vietnamese are holding live prisoners or that there was another POW system other than the one in which our returned prisoners were held.

(c) High Vietnamese Government officials have maintained through the years that their government holds no live American POW's. That assertion was repeated to me last month by Vo Van Kiet, the new Prime Minister and by the new Foreign Minister.

With the continuing investigations of the compelling discrepancy cases and with good procedures for investigation live-sighting reports, we will have in place the mechanism for shedding about as much light as can be shed on the live prisoner issue. We cannot yet say for certain that the Vietnamese assertion that they are not holding live prisoners is correct. We can say that we have unearthed no evidence to the contrary. We will have to continue to gather facts and let the facts speak for themselves.

The United States wants to recover, identify, and return to the families for burial the recoverable remains of the servicemen killed during the war or died in captivity. We have urged the Vietnamese Government to recover and return remains, and we have offered to work with them and provide technical assistance in the effort. From 1973 to 1987, 164 sets of remains were returned to the U.S.; of those, 153 were identified and returned to their families. Since my first meeting in 1987, 308 sets of remains have been returned. Of those, 125 have been identified and returned to their families. 109 others could be remains of Americans, but have not been identified, and many may never be identified. 72 have been determined to be the remains of Southeast Asian natives, and 2 sets were not human remains. We know we will not recover all the remains, but we intend to continue the effort to make an honest search for every one that might be found.

One of the knotty issues between the two governments is the possibility that the Vietnamese Government might be withholding the return of some remains already recovered. We know from intelligence gathered during the war and after the war that the Vietnamese Government had a system for recovering the remains of Americans. We also have the testimony of a mortician who reported that he worked on 260 to 280 sets of American remains and saw about 400 boxes containing what he believed to be American remains. Many of the remains which have been returned have shown signs of having been stored out of the ground for long periods. U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests the Vietnamese Government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains. For those reasons, the U.S. lexicon has come to include the term "the warehouse." High offi-

cials of the Vietnamese Government, including Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet have said they are not withholding remains. When the issue is raised, Vietnamese officials not only deny holding remains, but ask what we believe their reason would be for holding the remains. Vietnamese officials also tell us that private Vietnamese citizens attempt to recover and hold American remains in the expectation of some sort of benefit. Recently we recovered an identifiable set of remains from a refugee in a camp in the Philippines. Those remains incidentally also showed signs of storage out of the ground. Separating fact from speculation in this issue is difficult. The Vietnamese Government could shed more light on the issue by telling us the results of their efforts to recover American remains. I have so suggested to the new foreign minister. He has agreed to continue to try to recover and return remains. Again, we will have to search for the facts and let the facts speak.

From the earliest joint investigation, it became clear that access to Vietnamese historical records was very important to resolving many of the cases. When we raised the matter, Vietnamese officials continually decried the poor state of their archives and belittled their potential value for resolving POW/MIA issues. In 1989, I suggested that the United States hire Vietnamese archivists to do the research to answer questions we would raise. In 1990, then Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach agreed to "information seeking" meetings to find ways to get needed information out of Vietnamese records. Since those meetings, access to information has continued to improve. A few days ago, Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai announced the release of some classified war records pertaining fates of Americans. One of the principal tasks for our Hanoi office is guiding research in Vietnamese records. The first few months of office operations have confirmed our expectation that the office will be particularly useful in the research for historical information.

As the committee knows, the Party Congress in June produced a number of personnel changes in the Vietnamese Government, including a new prime minister and a new foreign minister. I traveled to Hanoi in early October to meet with those two officials. The goals for the trip were to confirm that previous agreements for cooperation on humanitarian matters remained in effect and to reach agreements on accelerated cooperation in resolving POW/MIA issues along the lines of the roadmap. I briefed the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and Senator McCain when I returned, but I believe a summary of the results of the meetings should be in the Congressional Record and in the public domain.

Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and Foreign Ministers Nguyen Manh Cam pledged Vietnam's "unconditional cooperation" in resolving the POW/MIA issues. Both said Vietnam wanted to continue to treat the matter as a humanitarian issue not connected to political matters. Both repeated earlier denials of holding live American prisoners and withholding remains. We reached specific agreements on the following points:

(a) We agreed to accelerate cooperation on resolving the discrepancy cases and to put in place the mechanisms, procedures and physical facilities to pursue fullest possible accounting for all missing Americans.

(b) We agreed to conduct a prompt and diligent search for all historical records which may pertain to missing Americans. We agreed that the U.S. would provide technical assistance for the search and would bear a share of the cost of the search.

(c) Vietnam confirmed its agreement to continue to recover and return promptly remains of Americans missing from the war. The U.S. is to continue to provide technical support in the recovery of remains and help facilitate identification of the remains.

(d) We agreed that Vietnam and the U.S. would seek cooperation with Laos and Cambodia to resolve the fates of Americans lost in the border areas of those countries.

(e) Vietnam agreed to review the cases of all remaining reeducation camp detainees with a view to early release of those detainees. The U.S. agreed in principle to accept those detainees and their immediate families consistent with the program established for earlier detainees.

(f) Vietnam and the U.S. agreed to explore a joint venture to provide improved civilian helicopter support for the joint field investigations.

Vietnam also agreed to improve support of the Hanoi Office, to work with the office to refine live-sighting investigation proceedings, and to provide liaison with the office.

The U.S. agreed to continue to facilitate humanitarian assistance for the Vietnamese people. I also agreed that I would recommend to the President that the "temporary" Hanoi office be made permanent.

I did indeed make that recommendation to the President, and I reported in detail the results of the meetings. Needless to say, I also reported to the Secretary of State

and the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Baker announced at the Paris signing of the Cambodian agreement that we would take the first steps outlined in the roadmap. He also made it clear that progress on normalization would be gauged by Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues.

Mr. Chairman, I believe we have reached the necessary agreements to achieve fullest possible accounting of our missing, to shed as much light as can be shed on the live American prisoner issue, and to recover all the recoverable remains. Agreements alone aren't action. There is much work to be done by both Vietnam and the United States. Cooperation, goodwill, honesty, understanding and diligence are required from both sides. We have received a pledge of "unconditional cooperation" from the highest levels of the Vietnamese Government. They need to work with us and we with them to make that pledge come true.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

I think your last comment about you should see and Americans should see these sort of great lengths and dangers even that some people have gone to is precisely what the committee hopes to be able to show.

That is why we have asked some of them to come back here. And we look forward to their descriptions of precisely what they have gone through and do go through in that effort.

General, in the course of your years and we will do a 5-minute round here to try to move through this as rapidly as we can and then come back for a second if need be, have you ever run across any holding back from you, any restraint from you of anything that you have sought in an effort to try to resolve this issue within the Defense Department?

General VESSEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever come across any evidence yourself personally that has led you to believe with a certainty that someone was held alive in Vietnam?

General VESSEY. No, I have not. But I must tell you that I see all of this other evidence which says there may be somebody held.

The CHAIRMAN. Now with respect to the evidence that suggests someone may be held, could you share with the committee your description of perhaps some of the strongest of that kind of evidence?

General VESSEY. Well, I am sure that you may get into some of these with the people who are more familiar on the case by case basis.

But when I went through each of these 119 discrepancy cases and went through some others, some of the first ones that I laid out, for example, one was a picture of a naval officer, an aviator, and his picture had been on the front page of the Hanoi newspaper back in the 1960's at some time. And he was clearly identified and correctly identified by name. In the picture he was clearly standing between two Vietnamese military people.

He did not come back when the prisoners came back. His body had not been returned up until that time and no accounting had been given for him. And so it was a classic discrepancy case in contradistinction to the Vietnamese saying we hold no live prisoners. And it was the first one I introduced to Minister Thach at that time. And he, as I said in my statement, he acknowledged that in these and in the other examples I gave him, that those were clear discrepancy cases and we needed to find out what happened in the case of that particular officer.

His remains have since been returned and identified and given to his family.

Senator REID. I am sorry, I did not hear that.

General VESSEY. I said his remains have since been returned and identified and sent to his family.

The CHAIRMAN. And in that case there was somebody who was held, who was alive, who was known to be alive, who was not returned when others came back, but who subsequently we have found out to be dead. Is that accurate?

General VESSEY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what were the circumstances of that person being held, but not being returned? Did the person die before people were returned?

General VESSEY. The explanation that we got is he died before the people were returned.

The CHAIRMAN. Now with respect to the 119 or so discrepancy cases, I think there are a lot of questions that the committee needs to have a very precise sense of. And perhaps you are not going to be able to do all of that. And obviously we do not need to do that all in the hearing.

But I think it is important for the record to show how you have arrived at 119 discrepancy cases and whether you are satisfied that that really represents the only true discrepancies or whether there might be others that could fit into that category or perhaps have inadvertently been left out.

General VESSEY. Let me answer the back part of that question first.

Yes, there may well be others that could be left out and these were meant to be compelling discrepancy cases to show the Vietnamese why the Americans believe that they might be holding live prisoners in contrast to the statement that they were not and as samples of cases to shed light on this issue of whether or not they were holding live Americans.

That is, it was my belief that if we took the cases of those we thought had the best chance of being alive, that we would most quickly shed light on the issue of whether or not there were live American prisoners. But certainly anybody in that whole list of 2,273 might possibly be there.

But I think that as we go through this exercise and investigate these, we will know more.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say anybody in the 2,000 might, is that not actually perhaps possible, based upon evidence?

General VESSEY. Well, based on determinations, about half of those have been determined to be killed in action, body not recovered. And that is based on wartime sightings of what happened at the time. That his comrades thought that the person was killed.

And as we are finding out, even many of those, the ones that we thought had a chance of being alive were also killed even though we did not believe them to be killed at the time.

And so what I say to you is that all the wartime reporting is just in fact that. It is wartime reporting. And it was the best reports that could be gathered from the battlefield at the time. And we just have to look into the additional evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. In all of your dealings over the years you have had occasion to negotiate significantly, to get to know personally, to see the government opening up and so forth, have you come to

have a personal belief in your gut about whether or not the government, whether you perceive that the government of Vietnam might be holding somebody?

General VESSEY. I decided I should not have personal beliefs and gut feelings about this business, Senator. That the job was to set in place as best as I could the mechanism for finding the facts and let the facts speak for themselves.

And so there are some clear strong cases to be made at either end of the pole here on the issue of live prisoners and the issue of warehousing of remains, whatever it happens to be. And I have just drawn down sort of an opaque curtain and said, do not guess, find the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your conviction that a sufficient process is now in place to permit those answers?

General VESSEY. I think we have the agreements to find the answers if we get the action to follow the agreements.

I think the process is in place.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. General Vessey, thank you for your testimony and thank you for coming here today from the Midwest. The weather is a little better here, I guess.

General VESSEY. I moved more snow this past weekend than I have moved in the past 3 years combined. [Laughter.]

Senator SMITH. General, in 1987, not too long after you took your position from President Reagan, you made this statement before a House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Quote, "We have evidence that says we had people alive. They were in the hands of the Vietnamese authorities when the prisoners came back and they didn't come back. Their bodies didn't come back. Their remains have not been returned. And their whereabouts have not been explained by those same authorities."

You also mentioned that in your first meetings with the Vietnamese you went through glaring cases that begged for the return of a prisoner. How do you feel today? Do you stand by that statement still?

General VESSEY. Yes. The one thing I would correct is where I said we had, I have forgotten exactly how I said it in your statement, we had evidence to lead us to believe they might be in the hands of the Vietnamese when the prisoners came back.

That is what I would say today because of those 57 cases where we think we have resolved the fates, in fact the resolution has shown that they were not alive and in the hands of the Vietnamese at the time of the return of the prisoners. We believed we had evidence to show that they were alive at that time or might be alive at that time. That's the one correction I would make.

Other than that, yes, that statement is correct except to say that we have gone through these 119 discrepancy cases since that time with the Vietnamese cooperation and I would say that that cooperation has increased steadily through the years. It was pretty scanty to begin with.

And now in many of those cases have we found any additional evidence that the person might be alive.

Senator SMITH. Of the original 70, original 70 discrepancy cases that were provided to you, how many of those 70, original 70, have actually been resolved?

General VESSEY. I just have to take that for the record, Senator. I cannot tell you. I stopped discriminating inside the 119, so I cannot tell you.

[The material referred to follows:]

A total of 18 individuals from the original list of 70 have been resolved. They are:

Full name	Loss— RK	Service	Date	City— Orig
WILLIAMSON, DON IRA.....	03	F	65-07-07	VN
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD.....	04	N	65-10-31	VN
HANSON, ROBERT TAET JR.....	02	N	66-02-03	VN
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR.....	E4	A	66-04-26	VS
BAILEY, JOHN EDWARD.....	03	F	66-05-10	VN
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND.....	03	F	66-12-02	VN
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER.....	05	N	67-03-09	VN
KARINS, JOSEPH J JR.....	03	F	67-03-11	VN
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON.....	04	N	67-04-24	VN
POLLIN, GEORGE J.....	02	F	67-04-29	VN
BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON.....	03	F	67-05-27	VN
BUSCH, JON THOMAS.....	02	F	67-06-08	VN
FULLAM, WAYNE E.....	04	F	67-10-07	VN
DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR.....	04	F	67-11-18	VN
LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W.....	03	F	67-11-18	VN
JOHNS, VERNON Z.....	E3	A	68-02-03	VS
YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH.....	03	A	72-04-24	VS
COLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD.....	06	N	72-11-06	VN

Senator SMITH. Are you willing to provide the background on all of those cases to the committee for review, not just the summaries, but all of the discrepancy information?

General VESSEY. Well, I am not the holder of any information. But you heard the Secretary of Defense say that it is available to you. I do not have it. But to the people that you will talk to, do have it.

Senator SMITH. To the best of your knowledge, and I would be happy to take this also for the record if you are not sure, do you have any, are any live sighting reports that have been reported today, to date, do any of these live sighting reports refer specifically to any of those 70 discrepancy cases or any of those unresolved?

General VESSEY. I would have to take that for the record. I do not know that to be the case.

Senator REM. What was your question again?

[The material referred to follows:]

Many of these sightings are unresolved because the reports are still being investigated. Thus, it cannot be determined with certainty that any of the current unresolved sighting reports correlate to an MIA or to General Vessey's original list of 70. Nonetheless, as far as can be determined at this time, none correlate to any of the original 70 cases.

Senator SMITH. Do any of the current live sighting reports that we have from other sources, from refugees or from any other source, correlate specifically to any of the 70 discrepancy cases less those that were resolved?

General VESSEY. I think the answer is no, but I would just need, it needs more research than me just taking an off the cuff answer here right now.

Senator SMITH. Have you ever made any statements, or in your meetings with the Vietnamese have you ever implied to them or stated directly to them that we ought to go look and see if we can find some of these people who are listed in those discrepancy reports and that the American people would accept us finding prisoners? I think Senator Grassley referred to this, that there would not be any retribution. That if you have people, show them to us. We are not interested in retribution, we are interested in the men.

General VESSEY. Exactly. And I want to add something to what the Secretary said.

Someone asked the Secretary about persons not held in captivity. And I would add what Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet said to me in October of this year because I have quite consistently raised this issue of if there are people who are not in captivity but still have live Americans here that are here of their own free will and volition, we would like to have their families relieved to know that they are here. And certainly, if they want to come back there would be no retribution.

The Prime Minister said to me, as best I can recall his exact words, that we do not know of any live Americans. Not only do we not hold live American prisoners, but we do not know of any live Americans. He said, I believe our security apparatus would know if there were live Americans. And none have been reported.

Senator SMITH. I know my time has expired. Just one final quick question.

The Secretary of Defense in his testimony mentioned the need for tri-lateral talks that would involve Laos. Since they were not a party to the peace accord in Paris in 1973 and therefore some unanswered questions remain.

Do you in your situation where you are dealing with the Vietnamese almost exclusively, would you support that, being involved in that kind of a situation of tri-lateral talks?

General VESSEY. Yes, sir. In fact, that was one of the things I urged in the last session in Hanoi. And it was not a new issue.

Senator SMITH. What is the current strategy as you understand it to get those talks going?

General VESSEY. Well, it was an issue raised in the technical talks a few days ago. And the final report of those talks, I have not seen it yet and I am not sure that it is here completely.

And so we will have to look at that. But I also talked to Secretary Solomon who has suggested that perhaps I should go to Laos. I told the Vietnamese I would come back in about a month's time. But it will be a month and a half or something from the time I was there. And perhaps I should go to Laos and work on this particular issue, if it was not worked out in the technical talks.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, General Vessey.

First of all, let me thank you for your 5 years of work in this effort. And I commend you for your efforts to resolve these issues. I think my questioning would be a little bit along the lines of the

Chairman's questioning, what Senator Kerry wanted to focus on. But maybe mine would be just a little more focused than his.

My first question is to ask you to define what a discrepancy case is and what, if any, are the criteria for discrepancy cases? I would like an oral answer, but if that will not be complete, I would like to have you supplement it with any written response that you want to give.

General VESSEY. Let me use the definition I have used with the Vietnamese which is the one they believe and they have heard from me. And that is it is the case of an American, a missing American, for whom we believe we have evidence to show that he was alive at the time of the incident. That he survived the incident in which he was involved. That is, an airplane crash or a ground battle.

And further, that we have evidence that he was captured or about to be captured and did not come back when the prisoners came back. And whose remains have not been returned and for whom no other explanation has been offered for his fate.

Senator GRASSLEY. Who determines that a case is or is not a discrepancy case? And specifically, the second part of that is, who is in charge of the policy on discrepancy cases?

General VESSEY. Well, I do not believe there has been any really great formal mechanism for putting things into discrepancy cases. They were used initially, recognizing that there might be more discrepancy cases than we had.

If you really go back in the history of this thing and you will get it more accurately by the witnesses, when you go back into the post-1973 negotiations, there were a number of cases then, around 70 cases; that to my recollection that we believed should have come out who did not come out when the prisoners came out. And from that grew this sort of discrepancy case.

Now you will talk to some of the other Government witnesses who will give you a little more expanded definition of a discrepancy case. And it includes what I said, but also adds, or are cases about which the Vietnamese government should have information.

My recollection is that when that definition was built here, it included the cases of those who died in captivity from the south, the Vietnamese had reported that certain people had died in captivity or we had received reports from our own people that some people had died in captivity. And we believe that the Vietnamese should resolve those cases because the information ought to be readily available.

Senator GRASSLEY. Who today is in charge of whatever you want to call it, policy or not policy, but in charge of making determinations on these discrepancy cases?

General VESSEY. Well—

Senator GRASSLEY. Is there one person you can point to that is in charge?

General VESSEY. It comes under the head of Mr. Carl Ford who was sitting back here and is about to be one of your witnesses. And he can shed more light on that issue than I. But it belongs to the Secretary of Defense, obviously.

Senator GRASSLEY. Now a policy that you had nothing to do with, but in which you are part of an effort to get there—others here

might disagree with me—that in my opinion we have a steam roller moving through our administration that wants to establish ties with Vietnam, normalization you might call it.

And of course, one of the steps toward normalization of these relations is the remaining discrepancy cases to be resolved. So my question to you is, as chief negotiator with Vietnam on this issue, have you felt any undue pressure to resolve these cases and close the files on them?

General VESSEY. No. No, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. So there is no pressure?

General VESSEY. Certainly not from our Government. Now the Vietnamese government has quite consistently said, hey, you guys are not being realistic. We have gathered about all the evidence there is to gather here. But there is no one in our Government who has pressured any resolution of those cases.

Senator GRASSLEY. So once again, but put another way, there is no pressure on you that might influence your judgment about one case or another?

General VESSEY. What I have tried to do, Senator Grassley, is not be a judge in the cases. I do not want to be judge, jury, prosecutor, and what have you in this exercise. It seems to me it is very important to separate the duties here.

My job has been to build the relationships with Vietnam that would let the investigation go ahead. We have all sorts of other people who have examined these cases through the years and who know them backward and forward. And they can pick the cases of those who might have the best chance of being alive and ought to be included in the category of discrepancy cases.

So I have not selected any cases at all. I have reviewed the cases to make sure that I understand that they make sense and that I understand the arguments to be raised with the Vietnamese. But I have not selected cases. And I do not believe that I should pass on when cases have been resolved. I have not taken part in that exercise.

I think that the people who deal with that regularly need to be the judges there.

Senator GRASSLEY. One more question. And it will not require a long answer. I will not be done then, but I think I should stop at this point out of respect for my colleagues.

Let me just ask you, if this committee were to show, for instance, that a discrepancy case that has been resolved, a determination made that it is no longer on the list, and if we can show that it should not have been resolved on the merits, then on the merits it should remain open. Could we expect that the case would go back on the list of discrepancy cases?

General VESSEY. I am sure you could, Senator. But I would say to you that the only ones that our people have said have been completely resolved are those where the remains have been returned or those four cases where we have said, these people are dead and we are not going to recover the remains.

The rest, another 30-some, 31 or whatever it is, cases, we have said the fate is resolved. We believe the person to be dead. But we want the remains back and we are going to continue to search for

the remains or expect Vietnam to cooperate with us in returning those remains.

So the resolution insofar as I understand it for the U.S. Government is if the person is dead, we want the remains back if they are, in fact, recoverable. And we are going to make an honest effort to try and recover the remains.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grassley.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a follow up on what Senator Grassley was saying, very quickly. There are times that in these so-called discrepancy cases that the Vietnamese archives and information, then, is critical since sometimes we do not recover the remains. Is that right, General Vessey?

General Vessey. Exactly. You are exactly correct, Senator.

Senator McCain. Which brings me to, in your dealings with the Vietnamese which you have now had the pleasure of being involved in for over 5 years, I would ask your personal view as to whether you are optimistic or pessimistic or somewhere in between that the cooperation that the Vietnamese have committed to will be come reality. And I am just asking for a personal view on that.

General Vessey. I think it is becoming a reality and will continue to become a reality. I would also say that for us, I think we have learned that the answers are harder to find than we thought they were initially.

I personally thought, when President Reagan asked me to take on this job, I thought about 6 months of this and I would be back doing something else. But the answers are clearly harder to find than we thought they were. The Vietnamese archives, at least those that we have gotten into thus far are not as good as thought they were. The information is harder to find. It takes a more diligent search than we expected.

Senator McCain. I am encouraged to hear about your commitment to the Laotian solution because, clearly, I think, General, it might be worth restating on the record that the proportion of those who were shot down versus those who were returned is directly out of balance as to those who were shot down and captured in North Vietnam. And clearly that part of the problem is very, very critical. I think you would agree.

Let me just make sure I am clear as to your position on this issue, if I could perhaps restate it, which I think by the way is exactly mine, that there might be or may be Americans alive in Southeast Asia, there are unresolved discrepancy cases, but so far there is no evidence that you have seen that there are Americans alive. Is that a correct statement or would you care to rephrase it?

General Vessey. I would just say that other than the evidence we had to begin with which are the evidence in these compelling discrepancy cases plus the live sightings, we have unearthed no new evidence to indicate that there are.

Senator McCain. So we must continue to operate under the assumption that there are Americans alive.

General Vessey. That there may be, I would say. And I think as we go through these, we have to be sensible and realistic ourselves

as we go through and gather more and more evidence. I would say I have come to the conclusion that the probability of there being live Americans is, that the probability is considerably lower than I thought it was when I took on the job in 1987.

Senator McCain. There will be witnesses that follow you, General, that will allege that there is a massive cover-up in the Pentagon of this whole issue. And I wonder if you would express again your views, given your 49 years of experience and your 5 years of involvement in this issue. Is that, one, possible or, two, likely?

General Vessey. Well, I'm not the smartest guy in the world, and I admit that I could be hoodwinked on this issue, but I think it is very unlikely that you would have 150 or so people who are involved in it and have been involved in it continually conspire to cover it up without somebody blowing the whistle.

I just think it is very unlikely. I can't see any evidence of it, and I think that in America you can't get five people to cover something up together for very long, to say nothing of 150, and so I just don't think there's any cover-up.

Senator McCain. General, are you satisfied with the so-called road map as far as the United States policy toward Vietnam and the route toward normalization is concerned?

General Vessey. Well, I might have nit-picked it and made it a little bit different had I written it exactly myself, but it's fine. It's out there, and it will work.

Senator McCain. Have you seen any evidence that American prisoners of war may have been taken to the Soviet Union?

General Vessey. I have seen none.

Senator McCain. Do you think there is a possible scenario?

General Vessey. Well, it is a possible scenario, but I think that you would know probably better about this than I in talking to other former prisoners. Those that I've talked to didn't see evidence of where that might have happened. There are some anomalies in the interrogation of some of the prisoners, but I don't see any evidence of it.

Senator McCain. Finally, general, and maybe you don't feel qualified to respond to this question, Colonel Peck, who I met and spent some time with, has made some very serious allegations about the way that the office carried out their responsibilities, with the mind set to debunk and other areas of concern. Have you had a chance to review his allegations and made any decision or have any opinion on them?

General Vessey. Well, that belonged to the Secretary of Defense, and I've got enough work on my own to take care of without taking on the Secretary's job, and I know he investigated that and you are going to look into that.

I must say that I met with Colonel Peck a number of times and had a great respect for Colonel Peck's previous service, but the allegation that his own office under his direction was not doing the correct thing I found a little strange, because the people that worked for him seemed to be very competent and helpful to me.

Senator McCain. I would like to finally say—Mr. Chairman, I know I express the views of all of us—our deep appreciation for your very hard work and the enormous success that we have achieved so far. In the view of many of us that is true, although

admittedly we have a long way to do, it is directly due to your efforts, and we are very grateful to you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to ask about a statement that was in the Washington Post last week that talked about—Vietnam Underlines Cooperation on MIA's—and in that piece the Deputy Foreign Minister indicated that they were going to release further secret documents regarding how many planes had been hit, and their records and so forth. I do not know if that was done. It was supposedly this week it was going to be done, or maybe last week.

But he also complained in that piece that the MIA effort had been complicated by the U.S. refusal to reciprocate Vietnam's release of old war secrets and "it would be better if the U.S. gave its classified information about how many planes were shot at, how many were shot down, and how many were missing." Is this a problem at all?

General VESSEY. Well, first, Senator Kassebaum, I'll tell you that that article didn't reach me in North Central Minnesota, so I didn't read it, but it seems to me that we have given Vietnam as much open information as we can on these cases.

I don't think he has an issue there, and I would say to you that I believe that the information he has talked about releasing is the same information I think I showed the committee members, at least the chairman and Senator Smith and Senator McCain in information found in Quang Binh Province during the 14th investigation, and it's my understanding that the useful part of that information was given to our people during the tech talks this past week.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What type of influence do you think Vietnam has at this point over Cambodia and Laos? Does it have enough that it can prompt them to move in a more constructive manner?

General VESSEY. I don't know the answer to that question, Senator. The Vietnamese officials with whom I've dealt say we can speak to the Laotians and the Cambodians but resolving problems in Laos and Cambodia is very much their problem, and they will have to do it there, but the Vietnamese officials did agree that both we and they would seek the cooperation of Laos and Cambodia in resolving the cases of those that were lost to areas then under the control of Vietnamese forces.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think that the reason Vietnam appears to be so much more forthcoming and wanting to resolve the POW/MIA issue is that they really would like to be able to normalize relations and establish some trade?

General VESSEY. They certainly want to normalize relations. I think the Vietnamese leaders, and certainly one senses it from the Vietnamese people not involved in politics in Vietnam when you're there, that they recognize the world is changing very dramatically and they want to be a part of that changing world.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much, General Vessey.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator McCAIN. Could I mention one thing, Senator Reid, very quickly? I would also like to express my appreciation, General Vessey, for stressing the continued reeducation camp detainees. He brings it up every time. There's 100 to 200 who are still in prison after all these years, and as a humanitarian aspect I think it is very important, and I appreciate your efforts in that area, too, and there are hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese Americans who appreciate your efforts on their behalf, too, General Vessey.

General VESSEY. I want to say, Senator, I have great hopes that the Vietnamese delegation in New York is watching the televised proceedings of these hearings and will hear those words and move out smartly with the review they promised and the early release of those remaining detainees.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, if I can, that the committee will be traveling to the region in February and plans are already being laid for that trip and for meetings with the Governments of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

I hope that these visits will encourage cooperation from governments in the region while also allowing Senators to make judgments about the level of cooperation. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House we held hearings on this issue, and that was many years ago, and I think kind of the shame—and maybe that is too hard a word, but the difficulty with all of this is we have waited so long to try to do something like this, and it was, I think, as a result of those photographs that came out and a number of other things that focused attention on this that we are doing it, and I am glad we are doing it, even though it is late in the game, because I think we are doing it with some finality.

General, Secretary Cheney testified today that there are 88 additional staff that he has working on this, and you have indicated there are about 150 I think you said, working on it. How many Vietnamese are working on it? You have indicated there are some people in the wooden canoes and flying these old beat-up helicopters, but the point of the matter is, how many of those are there?

General VESSEY. I can't give you an exact number. Of course, it varies from time to time. What the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Persons does is go out into the provinces to generate support at the time, and the Foreign Minister, when I was last there, gave me a number of—I guess it was in the next-to-last trip that Minister Thach gave me a number of the man-days that Vietnam had dedicated to this issue since we started the joint investigations in 1988, and if it is even within 20 percent of being correct, it's a staggering amount of man-days that were devoted.

Senator REID. Do you remember what the figure was?

General VESSEY. I can't remember. I'm sorry to say I can't remember, but I was thinking that we had perhaps spent about 3,500 or 4,000 American man-days on the ground in that time, and my recollection is that the Vietnamese figure was around ten times. That is what he gave to me. Now, what is counted in that, I can't tell you.

Senator REID. On page 15 of Secretary Cheney's testimony he indicates that some of the most vexing questions remaining from the

Vietnam War relate to the unaccounted for in Laos of the 528 Americans who remain unaccounted for in Laos, 335 are in the category of POW/MIA. At Operation Homecoming, only 9 Americans captured in Laos returned as POW's. Now, that percentage of difference is significant, is it not, as compared to, say, Vietnam?

General VESSEY. Yes, it is, but I would say to you that the 335 that are in the category of POW/MIA, and it's my understanding that that's kind of where they are now, that number included only a fairly small number of people who were believed to be prisoners, and as you talk to the later witnesses you have people out here, sitting here today who know more about that than I. Now, these other people were missing, but not necessarily believed to be prisoners.

Senator REID. That is something we should pin down.

General VESSEY. What you need to do is get at the facts in that issue. It is an important point, and as Senator McCain said, the percentage of those who are missing is much higher—unaccounted for is much higher from Laos than it is from Vietnam.

Senator REID. We do not like to think about this, much less talk about it, but a large number of the people that we are trying to account for could have been killed, is that not right, after they were on the ground, for example?

General VESSEY. Yes. Yes. In fact, that is what we are finding in the discrepancy case investigations in Vietnam. We're finding that some of the people tried to escape and were killed, or they died later from wounds that they received at the incident, or whatever it was.

Senator REID. Are we going to be able, do you think, General Vessey, to get information in that regard?

General VESSEY. Vietnam since 1988 has been more cooperative in telling us what happened to the people. When the first sets of remains came back in 1987 and 1988 they gave us a little narrative of what happened to the person, and by and large, at least they were not inconsistent with what—with the information that we had.

Senator REID. How many of the missing-in-action POW's were airmen as compared to on the ground?

General VESSEY. If I can search in my bag here, I'm sure I have that on a card. I say that, and I probably won't be able to find it.

Senator REID. General, you can supply that for the record, but do you have an idea?

General VESSEY. The total—well, let's just put it in the record. We will give you the exact numbers in the record, and that saves me fiddling around in my briefcase here.

Senator REID. I just need a general idea. You can put the exact figure in the record, but is it 80 percent, 50 percent?

General VESSEY. The largest number of the 2,273 unaccounted for in Vietnam today, the largest number are Army, and the second largest number is Air Force, and then it goes down, Marine Corps, the Navy, is my recollection, but one of you guys has surely got that number some place.

All right, of that total, of the 2,271, now, 674 are Army, 448 are Navy—I'm sorry, 823 are airmen, so the largest number is Air

Force. Most of the Navy people are aviators, 283 Marines, 1 Coast Guard and 42 civilians.

Senator REID. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vessey, you have always been very forthcoming with all of the information that you have been able to share with any of us in any fora that we have had an opportunity to hear you. I would like to focus for just a minute on the kinds of information that you do not have but think might be available.

I wonder if you could address the question of any types of information that is otherwise ascertainable, as far as we know, but not currently available to you, that might be within the Vietnamese sphere of influence or other Southeast Asian countries' influence, or the kinds of procedures that have been denied to us and the kinds of access, that have been denied to us as well.

What is it you would most like to have in fulfilling your mission that is not currently available and, from the point of view of this particular committee, what kinds of information might we be able to gather from whatever sources are available to us that you have not been able to gather and would be helpful in the totality of resolving the individual cases and the overall concerns about those who may or may not still be missing?

General VESSEY. From Vietnam, is it clear that historical records, there are certain sets of historical records that are very important, and the list of prisoners that they had for example would certainly be very a very illuminating document.

The results of their efforts to recover remains, now whether or not they have this in any sort of records, I am not sure because this was sort of a decentralized operation, they gave instructions to subordinates unit to collect remains and information about Americans that had been killed.

If there is some sort of a record of that, it would be particularly useful, even if it is not a centralized record, if we are able to get that record from provinces or military regions or whatever it happens to be.

Senator ROBB. General, could I interrupt? Have you specifically requested that precise information?

General VESSEY. Yes.

Senator ROBB. And what has been the basis of the denial of that information?

General VESSEY. In fact, it has not been denied, Senator. What we agreed in October in Vietnam was that Vietnam would conduct a prompt and diligent search for all historical records that might pertain to the fate of missing Americans.

Now if in fact that is carried out, we will get the information we are looking for and we have said that we will help provide technical assistance and that is, tell the Vietnamese to the best that we understand, where they might search for those records, that is, what particular units and so forth might provide that search.

And in our Defense Intelligence Agency we have people who have studied this problem for years and they know which records to get at. Now it is my expectation that working through our office in Hanoi, that we will relay to the Vietnamese where we believe

this search should take us and then the Vietnamese will be forthcoming with us and tell us what records they have and where we might find them, and we have what I said I hope we would have is honesty and diligence on both sides, we will get the answers.

Senator ROBB. Have you yet encountered a situation where you knew or had every reason to know that a particular document or set of documents existed and that they specifically denied you access for any particular reason?

General VESSEY. Well, for example, the document that was found in Quang Binh Province during the 14th investigation, we were given only the extracts from that document that pertained to the particular cases that were being investigated in the 14th investigation.

When I raised it with the Vietnamese officials in Hanoi, they said, well, you will eventually get all of that information, but we are doing first things first. We had agreed that we would investigate these cases, so we are investigating those cases and we are giving you that information. When we get to the other cases, we will give you the other information.

So I urged them, please, do not do that, give us all the information that you have, whatever cases they are on, so that we can move on with all alacrity to resolve this whole issue, that is in your interest, it is in our interest.

Now since then we have, it is my understanding that in the last technical talks we have gotten most of that information, but again, you see some of the same thing that occurs here within our own government, it seems to me, I have heard that our people were told that the Vietnamese defense department said they cannot give the whole document because it also contains classified information and they will give us the extracts which pertain to ours.

So there is a certain amount of bureaucratic problems that the Vietnamese have to go through to solve this information release problem too.

Senator ROBB. Do you think they understand that their credibility is judged at least in part on their willingness to provide information that is available to them?

General VESSEY. Certainly, the officials with whom I deal understand that, but it is kind of like dealing with the American Government too, in that maybe the guy who has the file does not quite understand it the same way that this boss understands it.

So it is something that we have to work through in our country, and they have to work through in their country. I do not know how this agreement for the fullest, for this prompt and diligent search will come out, but if it is done correctly, we should get the answers and it is my hope that our people will work with the Vietnamese and I intend to go back to Vietnam in some week's time, before the end of the year and see how we are doing with that.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I see that time has officially expired. Could I ask just one additional question, just while General Vessey is here? General, you have had an opportunity to work with both the immediate past prime minister and foreign minister and have met with, at least once, the new prime minister and foreign minister.

Do you ascertain any changes in terms of official government policy with respect to this particular issue that is discernable at this point?

General VESSEY. I came away, certainly pleased with what the new prime minister and the new foreign minister said. They made it very clear that they wanted to resolve this problem. They also said they are going to continue to cooperate on this problem as a humanitarian issue, whatever the United States does, whether—the prime minister used for example, the President's recent renewal of the trade embargo.

He said, Prime Minister Vo Wat Kiet said, we did not like to have the trade embargo renewed, but he said, I want you to know and I want you to tell the President that we will continue to cooperate on POW/MIA because we think it is a humanitarian issue and we owe it to the American families as a humanitarian gesture and we are going to continue to cooperate on this issue if the President renews the trade embargo five more times.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, General Vessey. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, before we break, I think we have a few more questions we would like to ask you. I would like to just do a little bit of housekeeping if I may.

First thing, I just would like you to know that Senator Smith and I invited Ambassador Lang of Vietnam's Mission to the U.N. to be here so that they do not have to watch it on TV, and in fact, the ambassador is here and listening to these hearings.

General VESSEY. Good.

The CHAIRMAN. And I hope that that will help communication in this process.

Second, I want to emphasize what is obvious to a lot of people, when you have 12 Senators asking questions of one witness, inevitably time is chewed up and we all recognize that, and I want to underscore that the committee does not view these public inquiries as all inclusive by any sense of the word.

There will be questions submitted in writing. There will be depositions taken outside of this process, all of which will be made part of the public record. But we do want as much of it to be, at least in the outlines, conducted in public so people can see where we are going and understand the methodology. We particularly wanted to establish the baseline for where we are beginning from for the rest of what follows.

This afternoon we will be hearing from other members of the administration who have detailed knowledge of some of the things that you have alluded to today, and tomorrow, we will receive a very important testimony from those who are on the ground in-country, both in intelligence as well as in the field who have been pursuing this for a long period of time.

Then we will hear from families and their perspective, and we will hear from veterans' groups in this country and their perspective, and then finally on the third day we will hear from some of the critics of the process, those who have a different point of view.

And the committee will then begin its analysis of much of what has been laid out here, and as I said earlier, we will have a public airing of that analysis when the committee deems it has some story

to tell or some conclusions to draw or a capacity to put something out publicly.

I would just like to come back to a few things if I can quickly. You discussed a moment ago how we classify some of these people and the judgments that we have to make, and obviously these are very tough judgments in some cases.

The question arises whether or not there has been some effort within the process because of the nature of the toughness of the decisions, for instance, if there is a determination that someone was tortured and died subsequently, or if there were a determination that the circumstances surrounding someone's disappearance might be embarrassing, is it fair to say that you have knowledge of or have come across some situations where those determinations might exist and there has been an effort to spare a family or to not exactly tell a whole story and that that might have left some of those question marks hanging out there?

General VESSEY. I am not a good one to answer that question, Senator. It is my understanding, and it has also been my great hope that the families would be told whatever it is that can be told the families.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not families have been told in all cases the full measure of what the government knows regarding one of their loved ones?

General VESSEY. It is my understanding that the policy is that if the family wants all the information; they can get all the information, but where—if it is simply that the serviceman was killed in action, and the family does not desire anymore information in that particular case, that the additional information has not been provided.

But again, I am not the expert on that particular field, and I think you ought to—

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough. Well, as I said, General, the committee is determined to ask some tough questions through the course of this and some of them may not have answers that are altogether happy or pleasing and I think if we do not do that we are not going to get at this correctly.

General VESSEY. But I believe I should tell you a couple of other things that pertain to your question on another facet of that point, and that is that in terms of classifying these particular cases into discrepancy cases or last known alive and so forth, it is my own personal view that our people are bending over backward to give the benefit of the doubt to having the person be alive.

For example, I recall in the original set of discrepancy cases an argument that was going on about whether or not a fellow who dropped from a helicopter that was 100 some odd feet in the air should be included or should not be included, and I think they finally included him.

So that is the sort of extremes that our people go to keep the possibility of somebody in there who might have a chance.

Now on the Vietnamese side, my approach with the Vietnamese is that we are not trying to reconstruct the past or come up with war crimes trials or any such thing as that. We want to know what happened to our people. First we want to know, are there any live Americans there? And we are not going to ask the question about

what you said in the past, that you said you were not any, and now there are, I mean, fine, if there are some, let us have them, and we are just going to ignore the past statements.

And if people have been killed under circumstances that are embarrassing, we are not going to make an issue out of that. What we want to know is where are our people, how do we—what happened to them? We are not going to make, we are not going to come back and say, you should try the person who killed this person or something like.

We agreed when I first met with them that we cannot go back and reconstruct the past. We cannot change the past. We have to start from, then it was 1987, we have to start in 1987 and go forward.

So that has been our general approach with the Vietnamese. We have not looked for opportunities for recrimination or some such thing as that, and what happened to these people.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is an important statement, and an important policy. I would hope my colleagues also think it is an important message in terms of breaking the logjam. There is, after all, another side which we all know which is that we also took prisoners and I am not sure that we can account for all of the prisoners that we took.

And I can certainly say from this Senator's experience that there are some instances where I know some prisoners disappeared and that was the nature of the war. And so I think if we all get back into that, we are really not going to resolve this and it would be an enormous loss. So I share that view, and I think it is important.

Let me ask you also, General, among those 2,273, were any known to us to be or classified as deserters?

General VESSEY. It is my understanding that none were classified as deserters. Now there is some evidence in some very few cases that some might have been there under their own free will. Later on there was some evidence that came up, but the evidence is pretty scanty and certainly not something where you would want to—I would not want to accuse any of these guys of being deserters or anything like that. There is just not evidence to do that.

In the cases I have personally reviewed, I do not see any deserters or collaborators or any such thing as that. They were honest soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and one Coast Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a body of about what, 40 some civilians, is that accurate, who are listed as—

General VESSEY. Yes, sir, 42 in Vietnam. Now there are more in Laos and I do not have that number, but I am sure you will get it from the others.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what is going to be important is as the committee reviews this, obviously, to try to make some judgments about that. I think that as we get into the Bobby Garwood piece of this, there will be questions raised about that sort of treatment, and whether or not that might have served somehow to send a message that had a negative impact on the possibility of finding some other people, and I think that is something the committee needs to look at.

General it is my understanding that the search and rescue reports, the SAR mission documents have been destroyed, I gather

not through some ill-conceived intent, but rather as a matter of proper destruction of documents.

Now this strikes me as being absolutely contrary to the concept of this being one of our highest priorities and can you confirm that? Is that accurate?

General VESSEY. You will have to get the experts to do that from the Defense Department. That is my understanding too, I found—

The CHAIRMAN. It is your understanding that those documents are gone?

General VESSEY. That the search and rescue squadron documents have been destroyed, as the normal destruction of documents. But let me say that it was not, it was probably the belief that all the information pertaining to the POW/MIA people had been gleaned from those documents certainly before they were destroyed.

But I guess it points up an anomaly here. We get rid of unclassified material that might be good material and classified material that might be worthless hangs around for a long time because it is classified.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your belief based on your 5 years in negotiations that Vietnam genuinely wants to resolve this issue?

General VESSEY. I believe they do.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it your belief that the agreements that have been reached and I distinguish agreement from cooperation, but the agreements that you have reached are sufficient at this point in time to permit us to resolve this issue?

General VESSEY. I believe we have the broad outline agreement to resolve the issue. Now we may need agreements on details inside of those other agreements, but I believe, as I said in my statement that we have the agreements to move toward fullest possible accounting. If we get the right cooperation and level of effort from the government of Vietnam and that we in fact do our work ourselves. We have a lot of work to do too.

The CHAIRMAN. And assuming that that cooperation is forthcoming to give flesh to those agreements, how much time do you believe it would take to resolve this issue?

General VESSEY. Well, the fullest possible accounting will go on for a long time. My oldest son is the deputy chief of mission in our embassy in Papua, New Guinea and every once in awhile he writes to me about Americans having a crew down there in Papua, New Guinea recovering remains from people who were lost in World War II.

So that is almost 50 years, so that part of it may go on for a long time, but the issue of being generally satisfied on the live American thing, we are going to prove a negative there in the live American thing, so you really do not prove it conclusively because every one has some probability, some possibility of being alive, so finally you do not prove that until you get through all of it.

But certainly we will shed an awful lot of light on it with good cooperation from the Vietnamese government and good diligent work by ourselves in investigating these discrepancy cases. We will have a much better view of whether or not Vietnam is telling the truth when they say, we do not hold live prisoners.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say then, that the process of getting remains and the process of carrying out these agreements could go on for a long period of time?

General VESSEY. I think the remains issue is a difficult one, because the losses in the south are battlefield losses. Those will be far more difficult cases to investigate. There will be less historical records there and the precise locations will be more difficult to find.

The air losses in the north, I think, the additional remains will also be difficult to recover now because by and large these crash sites have all been scavenged by people looking for metal and so forth, and so, there are very—I do not know that we have found any new virgin sites that have not been scavenged in some way or another in recent times, I think every one we have gone to.

And those people that were lost in the north in crashes, some there were identifiable sets of remains and got a lot of those earlier on, but as I pointed out in listing the remains that have back since 1987, there are 100 sets out there that might be American remains which the anthropologists will tell you, these exhibit evidence of remains that have been, that have come from airplane crashes. They are sorts of fragmentary remains that come from airplane crashes, and lacking the contextual background for that particular set of remains, unless you get something that is good from the skeletal remains itself, you cannot identify it.

Whereas, if you know that an airplane crashes over here and Bill Jones and John Smith were two guys in that airplane, Bill Jones was a big guy and John Smith was a little guy and you go to that airplane site and you find some remains of a fellow that was a big fellow and some of a little fellow, you know which was which by process of elimination, even though you did not have all the forensic, anthropological means of identifying each of those sets of remains.

Now once these remains have been picked up and moved around, and we do not know which crash site it came from and so forth, they are very difficult to identify and that will take an awful lot of work.

The CHAIRMAN. The real test here, General, will be in the next months to make a reasonable judgment that the agreements are being given the flesh of cooperation, that it is the fullest cooperation possible, and finally, and most importantly, that we are satisfied to the best of our capacity and judgment that no one is being held alive, is that correct?

General VESSEY. I think that is a good statement.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you see that as something that can be resolved over a period of months?

General VESSEY. Every time I have said it could be resolved over months, it has taken years, and it always turns out to be harder than we thought it would be. It seems to me, it is my intention to go back to Vietnam between now and the end of the year and look and see how we are doing with the specific agreements that we reached in October which is the broad framework for moving ahead on the fullest possible accounting.

And it will probably be another 6 months or so before we really know that all of that is in place and working well. We will have

some refinements to work out which we will work out in the technical talks.

These discrepancy cases, the original 119, have turned out to be far more difficult than I thought they would be. When I gave Nguyen Co Thach the first 70 in June 1988 I believe it was, I gave him a list, and I divided it up into a book by reading the cases myself and saying, you ought to be able to resolve this number in 30 days, this in 60 days, these in 90 days.

Well, we are still, we are years down the road and we are still working on some of those cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Final question before I turn to my colleague, some of us have argued and I emphasize the individuality of this argument within the context of this committee, that some of us have argued that the POW/MIA process and the putting to test of Vietnamese intentions would be greatly enhanced by getting more and more Americans in-country.

The more people there are, the more flow of information there is potentially and if there were somebody alive, the better chances of finding him. How do you react to that concept?

General VESSEY. I think that is right. Vietnam is far more open today than it was just a few years when I started in this process. There are two sides to that. One is you will have more eyes looking around there and seeing things.

The other thing is you probably are going to have more live sightings too. A live sighting today of a caucasian being seen some place in Vietnam probably does not mean anything at all because there are all sorts of caucasians running around there now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it is almost time to wrap up here. I do want to make two or three points. I do want to, based on what General Vessey said and what the Secretary of Defense said, I would like to put on the record a request that the committee do look into those discrepancy cases and the background that led up to each of those discrepancy cases.

Two or three quick points, General, you mentioned regarding the cooperation with the—internal cooperation with the DIA and the fact that they have worked closely with you and in harmony.

But it has been said that there has been some criticism about this discrepancy process, that is not working and that the DIA basically indicated that to you. A, is that true, and if it is, what did you do about it?

General VESSEY. I do not recall anybody in DIA telling me anything about the discrepancy business is not working.

Senator SMITH. So there was never any request by you to anyone at DIA to review any findings regarding a discrepancy case process?

General VESSEY. That is not the answer to the first question, and I want to make that clear, that I argued—these guys will tell you, I argue with them all the time, that we are—and I sit down and go with them through the cases and so forth and the evidence and challenge them on how they came to it and so forth and we have some knock-down-drag-outs.

But, sooner or later you have to make a judgment but I have let them make their own judgments in these issues, but I have, as they

will tell you, continued to challenge them. So to say that all has always been sweetness and light between me and every member of the DIA and their analysts would be totally wrong because it is not the case.

And it has not been in my lifetime on issues other than POW/MIA, the intelligence officers that have worked for me through the years know that I am going to wrestle them to the ground on how they come to their conclusions because I think it is important for me to understand it in dealing with the intelligence, that it is important for me to understand how they came to the conclusions they came to, whether it is POW/MIA or the probability of enemy attack or where the enemy is or whatever it happens to be.

Senator SMITH. Again, focusing on the discrepancy cases, one of the concerns that I have regarding any movement to normalize, which is a policy matter which is not the scope of this committee and I do not want to get into it, other than to just simply mention it in passing, is that I have seen some of this intelligence myself and I know many in the agency that I have talked to feel that there are substantial number of remains that they still have, the Vietnamese still have knowledge of, whether they be in a warehouse or some other definition of a warehouse or whatever the heck you want to call it.

And that they are not forthcoming with that information, and that in effect, the DIA has briefed you on that and you are aware of that. So how can we then say that we are making progress in this discrepancy case approach, if we have accounted for a very small, nominal number of discrepancy cases and yet they are still, allegedly based on our intelligence, whether that is accurate or not remains to be seen, but some 400 at least, cases of remains that are still lying around.

Surely, if they are going to be somewhat reticent to provide information on remains, they sure as heck could be very reticent to provide anything on live Americans as I would interpret that.

General VESSEY. That is correct, if that is in fact the case, that they do have 400 sets of remains. I do not know whether they have 400 sets of remains.

Senator SMITH. Has the DIA ever indicated to you that they think there are 400—

General VESSEY. There are people in the DIA who believe that they might have several hundred sets of remains, and I tried to lay that out in my statement there, that yes, you can build a case, you can build a pretty good case that Vietnam likely has a number of sets of remains.

Now, there are also, it is fair to say, and you will get into all of this, you will see that there are some, I do not want to call them weak reads, but there are some single source bases for these conclusions and you have to evaluate that, what the Vietnam leaders at the highest levels of the government say, we are not holding remains.

Now they are saying, we are continuing to try to collect remains, and that Vietnamese people have remains. So I do not know what the answer to that is, and as I tried to say in my statement, we will just have to continue to work and let the facts come out for themselves.

What we want are the remains back if they have remains, I cannot for the life of me figure out why they would keep them. We are certainly not going to pay them any money for them, or the time for bargaining is gone. The bargaining days are over on this issue, and so if they do have remains, I hope they will return them quickly, and if they do not have, well, we do not have them.

And we cannot—we do not know the answer to that question and as you say, you can build a case that says they well may have a certain set of remains, and you build it on this sort of logic chain, but there are some things that might not be totally correct in that logic chain.

Senator SMITH. I am assuming that this information has been presented to the Vietnamese by you as have the discrepancy cases—

General VESSEY. Ad nauseam.

Senator SMITH. OK. One final point which I think is very important to the hearing and to the whole investigation, and it is the final point, Mr. Chairman, is that this whole definition of evidence fascinates me as to what evidence is.

The mortician, alleged mortician made a statement that he saw or was personally involved with a number of remains, and it is my understanding the agency believed him and he was, as a result of that, we were pursuing this information on remains.

And in the Clarence Thomas hearings, one statement, one witness alleged evidence, almost denied an individual the Supreme Court. I assume that would be considered evidence. Whether or not it is accurate, it is still evidence.

I am just fascinated by the definitions here. We have evidentiary information that has been provided by our sources and methods of intelligence which basically concluded in a number of discrepancy cases how people died; but whenever similar evidentiary standards are applied to why somebody lived, it does not relate.

I want to finish the point here and let you respond. My definition is a high bar. You can say we need one lie detector test and we can raise the high bar and say we need two and then we pass that and then we raise it again and say we need three and then raise it again and say we need four or five witnesses to review this.

Let me bring it right to the point, on page 5 of your statement on number A at the bottom, second paragraph from the bottom, there are some additional salient points on the live prisoner issue, quote: "We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigation, that all Americans seen by U.S. POW's in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for as returned POW's or through returned remains or having been reported as having died in captivity."

Now based on that statement, I would assume, and if I am wrong please correct me, that if POW John McCain or POW Red McDaniel or Robbie Reisner or any other POW who had come home had said to you, General Vessey, I saw five guys here are their names. They are not on the list. I was with them. I was there. They were with me side by side and I turned and I walked out to get on the plane to come home and I looked around and they were not here, and here are their names.

Am I to assume that that would be evidence in your definition, evidence, that those men were alive and are presumed, at least presumed to be prisoners of war at the time that those men left?

General VESSEY. Yes, unless there were other evidence that countered it—

Senator SMITH. But assume that there was no other evidence, you would take the word of John McCain or Robbie Reisner or any other POW, correct?

General VESSEY. Right.

Senator SMITH. Well, this is where I have a problem, in 1975 Robert Garwood was still carried as a prisoner of war, nobody knew anything—at least nobody was admitting anything that they knew about what he did or did not do in Vietnam, and he still says to this day he was a POW. He still says to this day that he saw live Americans that did not come home after everybody had come home.

Why is that not evidence?

General VESSEY. Let me say that my statement here is post-Garwood, and I am back to what I said we were doing with the Vietnamese. I have not gone back and tried to reconstruct the—

Senator SMITH. But Garwood still maintains, General, he still maintains—

General VESSEY. I would tell you that you will just have to listen to Garwood and make your own judgments.

Senator SMITH. Well, I probably will.

General VESSEY. Garwood has not been forthcoming to the Department of Defense and—

Senator SMITH. Well, that is incorrect, but I—that is not correct.

General VESSEY. That is a matter of judgment and let me say that I have not dealt with Garwood. I would not know Garwood if he walked across the floor here today, but there are a lot of people around who have dealt with him and you will just have to take the Garwood thing and wrestle it to the ground.

Senator SMITH. Well, I do not want to argue with you, but I just want to make a point that Robert Garwood was a POW.

General VESSEY. Robert Garwood says he was a POW.

Senator SMITH. He certainly was a POW, General.

General VESSEY. He was captured.

Senator SMITH. He was wounded in a capture. He killed at least one Vietnamese in the capture, that is certainly not desertion as I understand the definition of desertion. So at one time he was a POW, and all I am saying is that Robert Garwood said he saw live Americans and so I do not think it is accurate to say that no one POW has ever said he did not see other POW's because Robert Garwood did.

That is all I am trying to point out, I am not trying to argue.

General VESSEY. May I just say to you, look at all of the statements that Garwood has given. The statements that he gave when he first came back and the other statements that he has given and look at all of them and then make your own judgment.

There is no point in you and I arguing about Garwood. We could stay here all day long and I accept your point.

Senator SMITH. All I want to say is that in definition of evidence—

General VESSEY. And I would happily change my statement to other than former one time POW, alleged POW, Robbie Garwood, I would change my statement to make that correction.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, let me just say again that Mr. Garwood will be completely debriefed and deposed by the committee. All his prior statements will be sought by the committee, a full analysis and comparison will be made and as you said, General, we are going to have to wrestle that one to the ground and the committee will do its best to do that.

You made one comment and I would just like to come back to it and then we will close off. You said that you have come to believe that the probability of someone being alive is very low.

General VESSEY. No, I said it was far lower than what I thought it was when I started this thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you quantify it? I do not want to pin you down but I am interested, is there any way to quantify that?

General VESSEY. I do not want to start—I made that sort of pledge to myself that I was not going to start guessing about whether or not there were people or not, and I think I would kind of like to stick to that. I would just say to you that based upon what we have learned in examining these discrepancy cases, that there were cases that looked like they really had the best chance of being alive.

We have resolved many of those cases, and they are not alive.

The CHAIRMAN. So the ones where you made a judgment based upon your experience and neutrality and not even neutrality, but based upon your commitment to the presumption that somebody was alive, you approached this saying, we are going to believe somebody is alive, correct?

General VESSEY. Yes. Reading these statements, I said—I would read those statements, and I would say, here is a real discrepancy case. This is one that—

The CHAIRMAN. You were excited about the possibility that you might find somebody alive in that case or that there was a legitimate question—

General VESSEY. Certainly, a legitimate reason for investigating the case.

The CHAIRMAN. And those cases were the ones where you thought there was the best opportunity for you to find somebody alive?

General VESSEY. Yes—

The CHAIRMAN. Based on your judgment, looking at all the cases—

General VESSEY. Let me say that I did not make the judgment, this was the best and this was the least best. What I did is I read those cases and I said, these are real discrepancy cases and they ought to be investigated.

The CHAIRMAN. And each of those cases—

General VESSEY. I did not categorize them as 1, 2, 3, 4—

The CHAIRMAN. But in each of those cases where you thought you had the best shot—

General VESSEY. In many of those cases.

The CHAIRMAN. In many of those cases, you found, where you resolved them, they were resolved that the person had died?

General VESSEY. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the remains have since been recovered?

General VESSEY. Well, not in all cases. The remains have not all been recovered.

The CHAIRMAN. But you made the judgment that they had died?

General VESSEY. Our people have made the judgment that the person has died.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is there any degree that you sense that because of the sensitivities of this issue, because of the extraordinary gaps in information, et cetera, that there has been a walking on eggs sort of attitude in the Defense Department that has restrained people from communicating or fully communicating and that has created more questions?

General VESSEY. No, I do not think so. I would say to you, that we are now 18 years from the end of the war and the people, the Defense Department at that time had a great deal of sensitivity to the families and so forth.

Now the people who are casualty officers now are long since removed from the war in Vietnam. I suspect that many of them did not fight in the war, and so when you hear—I wrote a little note when somebody talked about alleging why information was not given to the families, there are two things.

One is that the department does not want to give wrong information to the families, and that came out very much in the secretary's talks about the friendly fire issues. But I would also say that it is a long time since the war now and there have been great many turn overs in casualty officers and so forth and what the department needs to do is certainly have sensitivity training or something for the people that deal with the families, recognizing that the issue has stayed with the family. That is their loved one and no changes have been made in that.

He has been gone since the war and has stayed gone ever since the war and that issue still burns with that family. So what we need to do is have the sensitivity in the bureaucratic and I would say, even with the committee in dealing with this thing, is recognizing that. It is hard to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize it is hard to do. I think perhaps there ought to be a new commitment in the effort to try and deal, particularly with those families that are most concerned, and I think the Secretary incidentally indicated that.

I think that in the wake of the Stevens photo, there has been a better effort to try to respond to that, but I think there are a lot of families still out there that have questions that do not feel like they have the full sense of their file or that people are there and available.

And it might be a good idea to kind of go back to square one here and identify any or all families that might have that kind of question, identify the degree they feel they are outside of the loop, and get a review process that satisfies their questions. The committee here, I can assure you, is hearing from those people and we are going to be coming to the department anyway and saying this person is alleging this or that and trying to track it down because I

think that is one of the things the committee can perhaps help bring to closure.

General VESSEY. I think that is right and I think we heard that commitment from the Secretary of Defense this morning, and I would also say that given the new openness of Vietnam or the apparent new openness, time will tell whether we actually have new openness, that the Secretary has devoted additional resources to this problem.

It is being reorganized within the department to take advantage of the new openness and so I think there is a great opportunity for the department to review this whole matter and I am confident that they will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, again, we appreciate and respect enormously your efforts on this and we are very grateful to you for taking the time to be here this morning. We will leave the record open for the submission of additional questions in writing and also for the submission of those answers that you wanted to put on the record, reflecting the figures that Senator Reid and others asked about.

We have a lot of ground to cover. Let me just say the next round of witnesses, that we would request summaries of about a 10 minute period of the testimony. The full statements will be placed in the record. We want to maximize the time for questioning and we will reconvene here at 2:15 p.m.

We stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee recessed for luncheon, to reconvene this same day, November 5, 1991, at 2:15 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee resumed at 2:15 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I am determined that we try to run these hearings on normal people time and not U.S. Senate time, so we are going to start these things when we say we are going to, and we are going to try to move them along as expeditiously as possible.

This afternoon, we are continuing the first set of hearings of the MIA/POW Select Committee and we will move forward with testimony from the administration. For those who are just either tuning in or arriving or paying attention for the first time, through this afternoon we will hear from various administration officials who have been personally and deeply involved in this issue over a period of time.

Our witnesses are Mr. Duane Andrews, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; Ken Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and the Chairman of the POW/MIA Interagency group, Mr. Carl Ford, the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs together with Michael Ryan and George Christmas. And finally, Dennis Nagy, the acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency accompanied by personnel from the department.

Now that is a lot for one afternoon. We are going to do the best we can to move through this.

I repeat, because I keep feeling it is very important for all to understand, these are the baseline hearings. It is important for us to establish what we are doing today, what the current standards are that we apply today, how we are approaching this issue today, and also to try to draw on people's assessments and judgments about past efforts inasmuch as they help shed light on the overall affair.

But I think that nobody should mistake this as being the final word with respect to any of the inquiries that are being made in the course of today.

Now I would ask you, Mr. Andrews, if you would please, if you could summarize, in 10 minutes or so, to the best of your ability and then we can proceed into the question period, and to whatever degree your statement is not reflected in that 10 minutes, we will put your full statement in the record.

Thank you for being with us. May I ask you if you would stand so I could swear you in please.

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUANE P. ANDREWS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith and Senator Grassley.

As you requested in your letter of October 17, I am pleased to summarize the process and the key findings of our inquiry into the Colonel Miller, Mike Peck's allegations of an impropriety in the POW/MIA resolution process.

I am not formally part of that process, but I am responsible for the staff oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and while I can address our management inquiry, specifics concerning the details of POW/MIA policies, practices and procedures would best be directed at members of the IAG and especially DIA and Carl Ford which you will heard from later this afternoon.

Regarding the Peck matter, as soon as Secretary Cheney learned of Colonel Peck's allegations, which was the day following his departure, he asked me to work with Mr. O'Donnell, the general counsel of the Department of Defense, to look into Colonel Peck's complaints.

Secretary Cheney wanted to know what was wrong and as you know, resolution of the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action is one of the highest priorities of the Secretary and if there were improprieties or management problems, the Secretary wanted them identified and he wanted fixes made.

Mr. O'Donnell immediately met with Colonel Peck and Colonel Peck was unable to provide him with any specifics that would flesh out or support his sweeping charges.

Nevertheless, I set up a three person team consisting of Mr. Ron Knecht, my Special Assistant who is with me today; Col. Dick Mitchell of the U.S. Army from the staff of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and Mr. Craig Alderman, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, and charged them to conduct an in-depth management inquiry to determine the significant events that led to Colonel Peck's memorandum, the subsequent actions taken by DIA management, and the substance of the various allegations contained in Colonel Peck's memorandum.

The members of this management inquiry team have extensive managerial and intelligence experience, but are independent from the POW/MIA oversight and management structure.

The inquiry team examined Colonel Peck's allegations and developed a plan and a list of questions designed to ascertain whether the allegations were supported by facts. They interviewed participants in the POW/MIA resolution process, examined work reports, internal memoranda, mission, duty functions and case files, et cetera.

The management inquiry in the Colonel Peck's allegations found the following circumstances: Lt. General Soyster, the Director of DIA at the time, selected Colonel Peck to head the special office for POW/MIA on the basis of his prior outstanding service record and

his evident familiarity with the region, developed during three distinguished war-time tours of duty in Vietnam.

Colonel Peck assumed his position as Chief, Special Office of POW/MIA in mid-July 1990. By October 1990, the senior leadership of the DIA was aware that Colonel Peck was not effectively managing the POW/MIA office or providing quality intelligence support. As Colonel Peck had been on the job only a short time and had an outstanding military and combat record, his supervisors attempted unsuccessfully to help him adjust to the job.

The freeze on the movement of Army personnel during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led General Soyster to keep Colonel Peck in place even though he was not satisfying his customers.

In early January 1991, General Soyster instructed his staff to find another suitable position for Colonel Peck. General Soyster did not view this as a prejudicial move, just a case where we had a good officer who had been put in the wrong job.

On February 8, General Soyster told Colonel Peck that it was just not working out and that he had found him a good job more in line with his skills. He proposed, as Colonel Peck speaks French and had trained with the French army that he transfer him to a liaison position with the French army in Germany. Colonel Peck said that he did not want to move from the area. As General Soyster was fully involved with support to Operation Desert Storm, he instructed his staff to continue to look for a job for Colonel Peck in the Washington, DC area.

On February 12, 4 days after General Soyster's discussion with him, Colonel Peck handed his superiors a letter that contained broad and unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety in the conduct of POW/MIA activities. Subsequently, General Soyster relieved him from his duties on March 27, 1991 and on March 28, Colonel Peck attached a letter of farewell to his staff on the door of his office along with a copy of his earlier letter with some personal references blacked out.

The management inquiry team could not find facts that would support Colonel Peck's various allegations of a cover up or of the manipulation of the POW/MIA office to frustrate the resolution process. They did find shortfalls in the internal management of the special office for POW/MIA and some variability in the quality of the analysis files and the analysis process.

The observations the inquiry team reported led me to conclude that the Director of DIA had erred in assigning an individual to manage the special office that did not adequately understand the processes used in intelligence collection and analysis and who held such strong personal views that he was unable to remain impartial, a key attribute of an intelligence professional.

I believe that it is clear that despite his record as a combat leader, he was unable to function effectively in this type of job and I very much agree with General Soyster's observation that Colonel Peck was just simply poorly suited for the position.

However, both Colonel Peck and the inquiry team identified improvements that could be made in the process used to establish priorities and to request intelligence support from the special office, and these are significant.

The new head of the DIA special office for POW/MIA, Bob Sheetz, who you will hear from later today, has corrective management actions well underway to strengthen the internal management of the analytic process and to clarify the processes used to interact with customers.

We will continue to follow up and will take additional corrective actions when it will improve the resolution process.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this has clarified the record of this inquiry for you. Resolution of the issue of prisoners of war and missing of action is a matter of the highest priority to the department and to our country.

It is also a high personal priority for me. I served in Vietnam and had friends who were killed, were taken prisoner and are missing. I want the issue resolve and I pledge my fullest cooperation with the committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrews follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DUANE P. ANDREWS

Good Morning Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. As you requested in your letter of October 17, 1991, I am pleased to summarize the process and the key findings of our inquiry into Colonel Peck's allegations of impropriety in the POW/MIA resolution process.

As soon as Secretary Cheney learned of Colonel Peck's allegations, he asked me, as I am responsible for oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to work with Mr. O'Donnell, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, in looking into Colonel Peck's complaints. Mr. O'Donnell immediately met with Colonel Peck. Colonel Peck was unable to provide Mr. O'Donnell any specifics that would flesh out or support his sweeping charges. I then set up a three-person team consisting of Mr. Ron Knecht, my Special Assistant, Colonel Dick Mitchell, U.S. Army, from the staff of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Mr. Craig Alderman, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, and charged them to conduct an in-depth management inquiry to determine the significant events that led to Colonel Peck's memorandum, the subsequent actions by DIA management, and the substance of the various allegations contained in Colonel Peck's memorandum. The members of this management inquiry team have extensive managerial and intelligence experience and are independent from the POW/MIA oversight and management structure.

The inquiry team examined Colonel Peck's allegations and developed a plan and a list of questions designed to ascertain whether the allegations were supported by facts. They interviewed participants in the POW/MIA resolution process and examined work reports, internal memoranda, mission and duty functions, and case files.

The management inquiry into Colonel Peck's allegations was thorough and found the following circumstances. Lieutenant General Soyster, the Director of DIA, selected Colonel Peck to head the Special Office for POW/MIA on the basis of his prior outstanding service record and his evident familiarity with the region, developed during three distinguished wartime tours of duty in Vietnam. Colonel Peck assumed his position as Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA in mid-July, 1990. By October 1990, the senior leadership of the DIA was aware that Colonel Peck was not effectively managing the POW/MIA Office or providing quality intelligence support. As Colonel Peck had been on the job only a short time and had an outstanding military and combat record, his supervisors attempted unsuccessfully to help him adjust to the job. The freeze on the movement of Army personnel during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led General Soyster to keep Colonel Peck in place even though he was not satisfying his customers.

In early January 1991, General Soyster instructed his staff to find another suitable position for Colonel Peck. General Soyster did not view this as a prejudicial move—just a case where a good officer had been put in the wrong job. On February 8, 1991, General Soyster told Colonel Peck that it was just not working out and that he had found him a good job more in line with his skills. He proposed, as Colonel Peck speaks French and had trained with the French Army, that he transfer him to a liaison position with the French Army in Germany. Colonel Peck said he did not want to move from the area. As General Soyster was fully involved with support to

Operation Desert Storm, he instructed his staff to continue to look for a job for Colonel Peck in the Washington D.C. area.

On February 12, 1991, Colonel Peck handed his superiors a letter that contained broad and unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety in the conduct of POW/MIA activities. Subsequently, General Soyster relieved him from his duties on March 27, 1991. On March 28, 1991, Colonel Peck attached a letter of farewell to his staff on the door of his office along with a copy of his earlier letter with some personal references blacked out.

The management inquiry team could not find facts that would support Colonel Peck's various allegations of a cover up or of the manipulation of the POW/MIA Office to frustrate the resolution process. They did find shortfalls in the internal management of the Special Office for POW/MIA and some variability in the quality of the analysts files and the analysis process. The observations the inquiry team reported led me to conclude that the Director of DIA had erred in assigning an individual to manage the Special Office for POW/MIA that did not adequately understand the processes used in intelligence collection and analysis and who held such strong personal views that he was unable to remain impartial—a key attribute of an intelligence professional. I believe that it is clear that despite his record as a combat leader, he was unable to function effectively in this type of job. I agree with General Soyster's observation "Colonel Peck was simply poorly suited for this position."

Both Colonel Peck and the inquiry team identified improvements that could be made in the process used to establish priorities and to request intelligence support from the Special Office. The new chief of the Special Office has corrective management actions well underway to strengthen the internal management of the analytic process and to clarify the processes used to interact with its customers.

I hope this has clarified the record of our inquiry for you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate that statement. It certainly sets us out on the road to clarifying it, if it does not do it entirely.

I would like the record to show that Senator Smith and I have both left numerous telephone messages with Colonel Peck in an effort to contact him in anticipation of testimony before the committee.

Neither of us to date have succeeded in communicating with him or in having him return those calls. Now whether or not that indicates that he is just out of town or not around or something, I do not know and I do not want to have it result in a conclusion except to the effect that we are having difficulty in contacting him and getting him to appear.

The committee clearly wants to talk to Colonel Peck and clearly has to talk to him and if need be, the committee will ultimately issue a subpoena in order to do so, but I hope we can arrange that without it.

With respect to policy and documents that are classified which is a key issue to us, I have here a communication, an unclassified communication from JCRC, liaison in Bangkok to Commander, JCRC, Barber's Point, and what it says is, let me read from this document. The document date is 3/7/91:

After many discussions with members of the LNO staff, I find that there is little defined guidance with regards to classification of our reporting. There does not seem to be any consistent classification authority and everyone has their own opinions as to what should be classified and what should not. It appears to me that the only information which legitimately deserves to be classified is any information which would or could identify our sources. The actual information is often collected in crowded situations with many observers and relates to past events. Therefore, in the absence of any further guidance, I intend to issue our reports as unclassified, with the exceptions being the source data section and those sections which identify or could identify the source. Please advise if this is incorrect or if there is any clear-cut guidance.

Senator REID. Who was that to, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. That is from the Joint Recovery Command in Bangkok to Washington, to intelligence here, excuse me, to Barber's Point, HI; it is to the commander at Barber's Point, HI.

And the response to that was as follows:

Classification of POW/MIA crash site, grave site reporting, per reference A, all reports concerning live sightings of American personnel in Southeast Asia must be classified secret. To clarify reference A, live sightings of American personnel refers to reports concerned with sightings of Americans, caucasian, black, mongoloid, et cetera, living as prisoners, detainees or living relatively free at the time of the sighting.

Now a report noting that an American has been killed or died is considered a live sighting report. Now, first of all, I guess, why was the policy changed? What was the reason for classifying things that people in the field feel don't need to be classified, making them classified?

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I just became aware of this when you started reading it. Classification policy is a very complex matter and I wouldn't want to jump in to try to second guess the author of this particular message, without having an opportunity to look into it.

I don't know the answer to your question. I would be happy to look into the matter and get back to you. We certainly have a policy in the department that we maintain our materials at the lowest classification level possible, and we should not over-classify anything, and I would have to look into that matter, talk to the author and find out what the basis was.

Now some of the witnesses this afternoon would probably be in a better position to answer those questions, but I will follow up.

[Mr. Andrews response follows:]

We have received recommendations for changing the current classification policy from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the OSD Staff. We are still awaiting recommendations from JCRC on changes to the current classification policy as they have been absorbed in supporting current field investigative actions. As mentioned during the hearing, classification policy is complex and we have to ensure adequate protection of sources, provide guidelines for evaluating the content of the reported data, and identify the means available for reporting data as a function of classification. Finally, before we promulgate a new set of classification policy guidelines, we need to make sure that they can be implemented in the field. We anticipate having a revised classification policy by the end of January 1992.

The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, we would appreciate it. I mean, can you see that this is the kind of thing that causes people to leap backward and say, what the hell is going on? Why? Isn't that a matter of common sense?

Mr. ANDREWS. Sometimes common sense eludes us, but I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that on its face it might seem like it was unnecessary, but I think until we can look into the details and look at exactly why they felt, the particular author here felt that it was needed to be classified, I think we should withhold judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, obviously, I appreciate it. That is very important to us and it's going to be very important to this relationship, to try to break through that, what I referred to as sort of the mumbo-jumbo of classification. I mean, look, there isn't a Senator here who isn't going to be sensitive to the question of protecting a legitimate source or something.

But it can't be used to create a blanket policy that results in information not getting out or in reports somehow remaining in what Colonel Peck referred to as the dark hole or the black hole and I think that is key.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, common sense needs to prevail in these kinds of things, and I hope we are able to work with the committee to either convince you that we have good reason to classify the material, we want to retain the classification or we will reduce that classification level or declassify it totally.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we now understand, based on Secretary Cheney's testimony this morning and on current policy, that the intelligence data that we originally wrote to you, requesting access to will now, at least to the committee, appropriately cleared staff and to Senators, be made available in unredacted and uncensored form?

Mr. ANDREWS. We worked hard with the committee staff to try to determine exactly how to handle the most sensitive of our holdings in the files. I believe we have a good understanding of what that will be. Exactly what the Secretary said this morning, we will open up our files to the committee.

We have to be particularly sensitive of those perishable sources and methods that we have talked about. We have procedures where we would redact certain copies that are brought over for general use, but show the material that was redacted to key members of the committee.

We are not going to withhold information that the committee needs or wants.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally, let me just take a moment of my own time, but do you personally review all the live sighting reports?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir. As I said at the beginning, I am not in the formal resolution process. I work intelligence policy and oversight of the intelligence agencies. We tried to streamline our activities in the department, based on the priorities set by the Secretary, to be able to not have too many people in the loop that caused confusion and contribute to the problems that you have alluded to or discussed here today.

Carl Ford today is the focal point for these activities in the department, and even though I am an Assistant Secretary for C3I, including intelligence, we would defer to him to handle the flow of information from the committees into the DIA's POW/MIA office.

We try to make that as streamlined as possible. So I do not get involved in the resolution of cases. We have looked at the files as part of a management inquiry. We looked at a select set of files, we tried to sample to determine the quality and determine what, try to get at the bottom of the questions that Colonel Peck was raising.

And we made judgments on that, but that is the extent of it.

The CHAIRMAN. How many years have you been involved in intelligence analysis and gathering?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, intelligence, one way or the other, 23 years; intelligence analysis, probably only a few of those 23 years.

The CHAIRMAN. In the course of any of those years, have you ever seen a document or come across evidence personally that would lead you to believe somebody was alive and being held against their will in Southeast Asia?

Mr. ANDREWS. I saw many documents at the time that would lead me to believe that someone was alive.

The CHAIRMAN. What period of time was that?

Mr. ANDREWS. This was during the war and in the period immediately after the war and up to the release of the prisoners. I haven't seen anything recently that would, I would say, point to someone, other than the cases that you have talked about, that I believe would document that we have someone that we can point to, that we need to go in and extract. I just haven't seen that.

The CHAIRMAN. After Operation Homecoming, and with the conclusion in January 1973, of the formal involvement, did you have any reason to believe that somebody was still alive in Southeast Asia that was not accounted for?

Mr. ANDREWS. I wasn't in the POW business at the time and I had no reason to believe that anybody was unaccounted for at that time or was alive at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Or subsequently. You have never seen any documents subsequent to 1973, in your role in intelligence that would indicate that to you?

Mr. ANDREWS. In my role, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On July 5, I wrote a letter to you, Mr. Andrews, expressing some concerns that I had with the information on the Peck resignation, and you did respond to those inquiries that I made very promptly. And I do appreciate that.

Let me get that on the record that there was a prompt response, and it was within 2 weeks. I am not an expert on intelligence, to say the least, and just a question in terms of the process here, a little bit.

Do we have, in your estimation, what is called an all-source collection plan, right now, on POW/MIA matters? In other words, optimizing all collection assets at your disposal? DOD, national, from an intelligence aspect, in other words, from an intelligence aspect, is it treated as the highest priority?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think for intelligence, my impression based upon what I have been shown is that it is treated as one of the highest priorities in the collection of intelligence. I would have to defer, to get the specifics of the current collection plan to the head of the POW office or to the acting director of DIA testifying later today. They can shed more light.

But clearly, with my experience in resource management of intelligence resources, I see the tasking that we have out there, and this is clearly, with all of our various types of intelligence, this is clearly one of the highest priorities.

Senator SMITH. But there are categories, as I understand it. Category 5, Category 3, Category 1. It is my understanding that this is Category 3. Is that correct?

Mr. ANDREWS. I cannot confirm that, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Who can confirm that?

Mr. ANDREWS. The Director of the DIA and the head of the office should be able to.

[Classified material provided to the committee.]

Senator SMITH. In the communication that you had with me this summer regarding Peck's allegations, you did indicate to me that the allegations were severe but that you did not find any evidence that they were valid. Secretary Cheney, as I understand it, asked you, or directed you, to do a formal inquiry into this. And you did, as you indicated to me. Was the answer to this inquiry, was this a written response to the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, sir. As I communicated to you, we completed the inquiry and presented the findings to the Secretary orally.

He felt that that was adequate for his purposes. We went about our job of trying to implement the fixes that were identified. So we turned our attention to try to fix those management actions and those tasking problems that we felt needed attention.

Senator SMITH. I will not question you on the veracity of your statement, but it just seems to me very difficult to believe that something of the magnitude of the charges that were in the resignation letter and some later public testimony and private testimony of Colonel Peck, that the response to an inquiry from the Secretary of Defense would not be put in writing, that it would simply be an oral briefing. So you stand on that statement, that it was an oral briefing to the Secretary of Defense and there was absolutely nothing put in writing?

Mr. ANDREWS. Absolutely. I frequently get tasked by the Secretary, as one of his senior advisors, to look into matters and provide him information, provide him reports. And this was one of those cases.

Senator SMITH. In your press release after the inquiry, I guess right around the time you provided the written communiqué to me, you were quoted as saying there was no evidence to support Colonel Peck's allegations. One of Peck's primary allegations, as I understand it, was that he felt that he could not prioritize the analysis reports, that his work was often sidetracked by ad-hoc taskings—I think to use his term, a plethora of busywork. Projects directed by individuals outside of DIA. None of these outside taskings were formal. They did not follow any formal intelligence communications, but essentially he had a lot of masters, a lot of people directing him to do things. That was, as I understand it, one of the main charges that Peck made. Now are you saying there is no validity to those charges at all?

Mr. ANDREWS. Not at all, sir. In fact, I believe those are true, what we said. The context of that statement was allegations of impropriety. In the next paragraph of that news release, we said. As in the case when any thoughtful officer examines an issue, Colonel Peck made some helpful suggestions on ways to strengthen the special office. And I am leaving a couple of words out.

Well, I will read the whole thing: strengthen the Special Office of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. Members of the POW/MIA interagency groups should use a more formal process to request support from the office, and a procedure will be established to decide the priority of competing requests for POW/MIA intelligence information.

Clearly, that item was one of the primary concerns that Mike Peck had. We agreed with that concern and implemented actions to correct it.

Senator SMITH. Well, it just seems to me—and I do not have a copy of your press release here, I thought I did. But it just seems to me that if in fact Colonel Peck made these kind of charges, you did indicate that there was no evidence to support Peck's allegations. He made a number of allegations, no question, and this is one of them.

So you do stand corrected, then, on that point? That he was accurate in terms of the busywork, or some of the things, the taskings that were done? I do not want to use the term busywork, but taskings that were done?

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator, there is not an inconsistency here, I do not believe. The context of the press release was that we were talking about impropriety or allegations of impropriety. I went on to then make the statement that those suggestions on how to improve the management of the office we did agree with, and have taken corrective action.

Senator SMITH. You do say that. You do use the term allegations of impropriety in your press release, clearly. But the headline on the press release says, DOD finds no evidence of Peck allegations, and then in the next to the last paragraph, you say, these conclusions should not surprise anyone. Over the past decade investigators from the Department of Defense and Congress have looked into similar charges seven separate times. In each case, the allegations were found to be baseless.

And, you know, impropriety is kind of lost, if you will. I think the clear intent of that press release was to show that Colonel Peck—and I do not want to use the term discredit because I do not want to put words in your mouth—but it was clearly an attempt to show that Peck was off base with allegations, whatever those allegations may be.

You do not say in there, that this business about tasking and so forth is one of the things that you supported. You do not say that. Is that not accurate?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, now, I do say that in the last paragraph on the first page, where I start out. As in the case with any thoughtful officer, and I say. You should use a more formal process to request support. And a procedure will be established to decide the priority of competing requests for POW/MIA intelligence information.

Senator SMITH. Well it is kind of lost, but my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley:

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Smith covered most of the things I wanted to cover, but I would like to reserve my time, just in case something else comes up at the end of the first round.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine, we will reserve your time. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Andrews, perhaps Secretary Cheney did not need it in writing, a response to the serious allegations that Colonel Peck made, but I think this committee does, and I would appreciate it if you would give us a written response to his allegations.

I, like you, have high respect and regard for any man who has served his country in the outstanding and dedicated fashion that Colonel Peck has, and when anyone of his caliber makes some alle-

gations, I would like—if you would—give us a written response. Any addition to your press release, I think, would be very helpful. OK?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Two aspects of Colonel Peck's allegations bothered me a great deal. One was the assertion on his part, a very passionate assertion, that within the organization there is a mindset to debunk—I believe those are his words—live sighting reports. And he felt very strongly about that. And he felt that this inhibits the process from the beginning. And I would like for you to address that concern of his, or allegation of his.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, Senator, we were unable to determine why he felt as strongly as he did about that particular issue. We know that he had heard that prior to arriving at his job heading the POW/MIA Office, and at the time he took the office we specifically asked him to give us examples of what you are talking about, what is it that bothers you, what is it that we can do, and where can we look to find this mindset? He was not able to provide us with that.

Now, he acknowledged in the discussions we had the importance of checking individual reports against the whole database, the aggregated knowledge of the POW/MIA Office, because many of the live sightings were in fact based upon rumor, or were attempts by individuals to manipulate the issue.

One of the problems that we discovered, and it was just a matter of time—he got into the job, he was so busy, it was difficult for him to take time and learn the basics. That is the reason I expressed the concern that in the future the director of the DIA should appoint someone with experience in intelligence analysis. He was not able to look into the substantive intelligence process, which was routinely dealt with on a day-to-day basis in his office, to really understand what was happening.

Often they say, well, let us give you briefings on clandestine intelligence, how it works, what the problems are, and he was busy. He had a lot that he was doing. I think he was sincere about that. But I do not think he really understood it. And so we looked for evidence of a mindset. We could not find any.

Clearly, as part of routine intelligence processes, you have to look, since you have no direct information or direct way to determine whether a source is in fact true, you have to look for ways—is the source reliable, can we depend upon this report? So it is kind of an indirect way to do it. But we could find no evidence of that as we looked at the office.

Senator MCCAIN. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that Colonel Peck will respond to either you or Senator Smith, because clearly this is a very disturbing allegation, and one which, in all due respect, Mr. Andrews, I think we need to explore further.

Another concern that Colonel Peck voiced in allegation that also I found disturbing, was that there were nongovernmental entities intimately involved in the process of evaluating live sighting reports, et cetera. Did you find any credence to that concern that he voiced?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, we did spend a considerable amount of time trying to pursue that particular question. There is, of course, a member of the interagency group that has a nongovernmental

person, that has an official position on the interagency group. We did not find any unusual involvement in the resolution of live sighting reports by that particular individual.

We asked repeatedly for specifics that we could follow up on, and Senator McCain, if at any time Colonel Peck wants to come forward with specifics, we will be happy to do it, because my goal and the charge from the Secretary is to find the problem and fix it. And the Secretary is leaning as far forward as anyone trying to get on and get these problems dealt with.

If he cannot point to something, we have a hard time knowing what to fix. But I did not find any other outside involvement. You can talk to the Chief of the Office, who might be able to shed additional light, but in the process of this inquiry we did not find any.

Senator McCain. Finally, in your 23 years, Mr. Andrews, you have from time to time seen a tendency to overclassify information, have you not?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. I think possibly Mr. Chairman—

Mr. ANDREWS. I never did that, of course. [Laughter.]

Senator McCain. You were the one who was always trying to declassify, I am sure, but in reality we need to look into this whole issue of overclassification because I think it has had a chilling effect on the confidence that the American people have in this whole process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Andrews.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Reid.

Senator Reid. How long have you been involved in this POW/MIA matter?

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator, I think I heard the question, how long have I been involved in this? In my current job, I have been on as Assistant Secretary for 2 years. I was involved on the periphery back as a member of the House Intelligence Committee staff when they did their investigation, but then nothing until this inquiry came up.

Actually, the first real involvement was in January, when General Soyster came to me and said, you need to know that I have some problems in my POW/MIA office and I am going to have to deal with that. And I said, all right, General, why do you not deal with that.

It was at that point that I really first started focusing on this particular issue. Because of the streamlined management that we had in place in the Department—Carl Ford was the focal point for that. And we were just supporting his activities. And then the DIA was, of course, the analytic focal point for the POW/MIA, so it was really in January when he brought that to my attention that I first got involved, and then, of course, the management inquiry in March got me into it in some detail.

Senator Reid. Now you do other things than coordinate this POW/MIA matter?

Mr. ANDREWS. In fact, my only formal involvement other than my job is responsibility for the overall supervision of intelligence activities in the department.

Senator Reid. As it relates to this?

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. As it relates to this, my only involvement was the management inquiry.

Senator Reid. So you have done nothing other than what you have related in your statement here?

Mr. ANDREWS. Pretty much what we have talked about today is what my involvement has been.

Senator Reid. What is Colonel Peck now doing?

Mr. ANDREWS. I have no idea, sir. He has retired.

Senator Reid. And he had retired at the time you conducted your investigation?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, he was still on active duty through, I guess, most of the investigation.

Senator Reid. And had he left by the time your investigation terminated?

Mr. ANDREWS. He left after the investigation had terminated. He left at the end of July, and we wrapped up the investigation in early June.

Senator Reid. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. Mr. Andrews, what was the date that you reported to the Secretary on your findings?

Mr. ANDREWS. That should be at the tip of my tongue. It was early June.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not—

Mr. ANDREWS. I can get the exact date and supply it for the record, but it was early June.

The CHAIRMAN. It was early June that you reported to him, that was your oral communication?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many people did you detail to the task of this inquiry?

Mr. ANDREWS. We had three, the three professionals that I mentioned to you at the beginning of my statement were the management inquiry team, and as they went through their business of looking at files and so forth, they were supported by the POW/MIA Office. But the team was independent and was made up of three people.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the three people?

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Ron Knecht, my special assistant; Colonel Dick Mitchell, from the Army, who is a member of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Intelligence, the OSD staff that oversees intelligence; and Craig Alderman, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the date of assignment to them of this task?

Mr. ANDREWS. I believe it was around the 5th of April that I formally tasked the group to conduct the investigation. And it was not their full-time—although they ended up spending a lot more time than we had initially expected. I will get you the exact dates.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was around the 5th of April that you tasked them?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. April 8 is the date.

The CHAIRMAN. And Colonel Peck resigned on 12 February 1991. What happened between February 12 and April 8?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, first of all, he submitted—I remember this, just to review briefly, February 8 is when General Soyster said, I am going to replace you in this job. You have got to move on. On the 12th, he said, I have these problems and I, by the way, would like to submit my resignation.

They were trying to find him a job to move to. They were trying to take care of him because, again, this was a good officer who was just in the wrong job from General Soyster's perspective.

It was not until the 27th of March that he was actually asked to leave the head of the POW Office. And he departed on the 28th of March. And then he retired at the end of July.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. But that even raises the curiosity more, if there was a move to change him on the 8th of February, and on the 12th of February he writes these very significant charges.

But then it is not still for more than a month and a half before he is actually relieved, notwithstanding the charges he has made and the decision to do so, and even longer before an inquiry is begun. I do not understand that. It seems to me that the inquiry would begin almost immediately.

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator Kerry, this was happening inside the DIA. I was aware in January that there were problems. I was not aware of the letter or the memo, the Secretary was not aware of the memo, and none of us became aware of that until he departed the office on the 28th and the memo came to our attention.

The CHAIRMAN. On 28 March?

Mr. ANDREWS. When he departed on the 28th it came to our attention early on the morning of 29th. The Secretary was informed immediately and asked for the inquiry immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Between April 8 and June, approximately a 2-month period of time this inquiry has undertaken. Is that accurate?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me just sort of go through a couple of things here, for instance, Colonel Peck made the charge saying:

I became painfully aware that I was not really in charge of my own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger, and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA.

What steps did the investigators take to check out that particular charge?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, we talked to Colonel Peck and asked him what did he mean by that? That was the first step. We talked to his associates in the office to follow-up on any indications that Colonel Peck had given us on outside influence. We talked to members of the inter-agency group about their views on the various matters that were being discussed.

It was clear that there were phone calls coming in from members of the inter-agency group asking the office to do things. This is where we've said, you know, we've got to fix this.

The thing that surprised all of us is Colonel Peck was a very senior officer. He was—had a lot of responsibility prior to this assignment; had a lot of responsibility in this assignment. The director of DIA was relying on him to fix the problems.

We were surprised, as we looked into this issue, that he hadn't done something specifically to fix these problems. There were no examples that he gave us during the inquiry, where we could trace that he had started to fix a management problem, instituted a policy, and someone came in and said you've got to take that policy and throw it away.

We kept searching for that. He came forth in February, and tried, you know, and discussed with his supervisors, well, I think we need to make some changes. And they said fine, why don't you go make them—this was a senior officer, who was a direct report to the Executive Director and the Director of the agency.

So we did look into that, and we didn't find any evidence of anything unusual, other than there was a sloppy tasking process that needed to be fixed. And we've corrected—we believe we've corrected that. We have a single channel that tasking will come in and will resolve priorities, and that DIA can get on and do its job of intelligence, and we can handle these various requests through Carl Ford's office.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was an adjustment that you made as a consequence of that particular observation?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, now subsequently he suggested, "from my vantage point"—quoting him—"I observed that the principal Government players were interested primarily in conducting a "damage limitation exercise," and appeared to knowingly and deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and "busy work". "What steps were taken by the investigators to determine the veracity of that accusation?"

Mr. ANDREWS. Again, as we did with all of these, we said, okay, we accept that. Now, what can you tell us—give us some examples. Tell us what the specific problem is, and how you would go about fixing it. And we would get some information that we could follow-up on, and we did. But nothing that pointed to a problem other than what we just talked about, and that was a problem in tasking flow. Someone had to handle the request for information, request for work. And someone had to prioritize them.

That was—that should have been the job of the head of the office. But somehow the system wasn't working. And he wasn't—he wasn't taking care of ensuring that there was a single, tasking voice coming into the agency. People were calling direct. So we—

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been corrected?

Mr. ANDREWS. We have—the new director of the office—and you can get more details from him—has taken action to ensure that tasking comes through a single channel.

The CHAIRMAN. So, in effect, there has been a response to his second observation? I mean, there is now a single tasking, and a different approach. Is that accurate?

Mr. ANDREWS. As I said, the management inquiry agreed with those observations and we have taken action to correct them.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to the "mind-set to debunk," it said here, quote "it is held at all levels." What steps were taken to determine the degree to which that might or might not apply at all levels? Were all levels examined?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, we had discussions with members of the inter-agency group. We had discussions with senior officials in the Department. We did not find—and we had, of course, many discussions with Mike Peck to try to determine exactly what he meant by that statement.

And we were not led to any answers that were helpful for us. As I said, we would be happy to pursue additional leads. But in the management inquiry, we were not led to anything that would point to a particular mindset.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—do you think—and I know you can tell what I am getting at, but I want to—do you think that the Secretary of Defense would have personally authorized a Senate staffer to fly to Bangkok and spend a week using a military plane, and so forth, had it not been for this memo and photographs that had appeared?

Mr. ANDREWS. With this Secretary of Defense, absolutely. I believe he would have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. So you think the fact that the memo appeared, and the fact that there was this renewed interest would not have perhaps brought the Secretary to personally make that kind of a stake in this?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think the Secretary was personally interested in this subject from the day he walked in the door.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not doubt that. I do not question that. I am certainly not doubting where the Secretary is coming from on this, I do not want you to misunderstand me.

What I am getting at is that there is—if there is this kind of struggle within the Department, as of a number of months ago, where you have a career—as you say—dedicated, capable officer about whom you can't really find something in the service jacket that suggests otherwise, who suddenly gets frustrated—can you see why people on the outside might get frustrated and have a similar sense of this attitude to debunk, and sort of—that after—I mean, look, it is 18 years, right? 19 years—it is pretty hard for some people to maintain the same sense of fervor and commitment.

You look at 1,000 of those reports, and 1,000 of them do not pan out. And the next one comes across your desk—I would probably have a hard time looking at it—I mean, I do not think this is a blame thing. I am just trying to get at a reality here. And the reality may be that the machinery was creaking a little bit, and it needed some oil or something. Is that an unfair assessment?

Mr. ANDREWS. I think that what has occurred, subsequent to this, the Peck memo, the inquiry, the attention that's been brought to this has been healthy. I think that there are things that have been done that needed to be done. They had not come to management's attention. That's what we rely on people like Colonel Peck to do, is to bring it to our attention. He failed to do that.

We were able to see the problems, and to take corrective actions. So I can't—of course, things have happened that were positive from this, because there's been a lot of management attention brought.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that is an important statement. That is a fair and important statement. And that is what I am trying to get at.

Now, the—did any of these investigators, these three people who were charged to look at this issue reduce to writing any of their interviews, or any of their observations?

Mr. ANDREWS. We have various pieces of working material, one-page summaries of observations of one member that I am aware of. One of the members I am not aware of put anything in writing. My special assistant, who sits behind me, was responsible for many different pieces of material, including a lot of letters responding to congressional inquiries about this, and letters responding to queries of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and others. So that a lot of what we had, from the management inquiry has found its way into the record. No specific reports were written. There was a transcript taken of the initial Peck interview that he consented to.

But other than that, there is nothing else in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to request that the transcript of the original interview with the Colonel be made available to us. I would like to ask that whatever those small, working writings are, that they be made available to us.

But I would say to you, very respectfully, Mr. Andrews, that I think that this is, in a sense, another example of the kind of thing that just adds to the folklore, if you will, of doubt. If you have the U.S. Army officer who is retiring in as sensitive a position as this one retiring under these circumstances and then you set out to have an investigation which you intend to make public to determine the bona fides of the Department's efforts, it would seem to me that there is a requirement that that somehow be documentable to be as thorough as possible—given the climate, and the mood within which we are all operating on this issue.

And I think that when you, by your own acknowledgement can say well, we had to make this change, and we had to make this change, and we did respond to this, there is at least a tenor of a kernel of truth—maybe exaggerated, maybe strong. But there is a kernel of observation there which may, indeed, have been legitimate, which you have a very real need to document your response to.

And I think that is one of the reasons why when you have a verbal communication to the public, well, we have looked at this and thoroughly analyzed it, and, indeed we found that we are not culpable, people stand back and say hey, wait a minute. Is that fair that you understand the reaction people have?

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator, I understand—I understand what you are trying to say. I will only say that at the time, if you look at the context we were conducting this inquiry, we approached it in a very open, and sincere way with the very strong direction from the Secretary to find out what's wrong and fix it. Our goal wasn't, at that time—I wasn't worried about the politics. What I was worried about was finding if I had a management problem in one of my organizations and taking action to correct it.

If we would have found more substance, more credibility to Mike Peck's message, I could guarantee you we would have done more to document it. What we found was there wasn't anything here. And because of that, we felt that the steps we took, and the way we approached it was sufficient. We can be second-guessed on that, but

that's—that was the way we approached it. And it was a sincere effort to try to get to the bottom of the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you find that anyone had access to Top Secret, Codeword message traffic for which they were not cleared?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Andrews, let me pursue this mindset to debunk that Colonel Peck referred to either in his resignation letter or his public statements—I am not sure which, or both—is this—are you saying that this has never been heard before in the—within the agency?

Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, no, not at all. In fact, the Tighe Report and the Gaines Report, which the committee has had available to them, both talk about a mindset to debunk.

And I look at those reports, and I see the evidence that they talk about. I also see that there were other internal inquiries that said no, there wasn't such—that this was good, intelligence trade practice.

What I had to focus on was this period that Colonel Peck was there, and the inquiry team's findings. And at the time we went in, and looked at the process that was in place, and talked to the analysts and talked about their procedures and how they handled live-sighting reports, looked at their files, we saw a lot of very sincere people that sometimes were over-worked. And sometimes the product was deluded by a lot of fraudulent, you know, reports—particularly during the period where we were getting the dog tag reports. But I didn't—we didn't find a mindset.

Senator SMITH. Let me just ask a question on the point you just made—is there a Gaines Report?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. A written document?

Mr. ANDREWS. There is a summary. I don't know if it's a complete—there's a summary of the Gaines Report that's in writing.

Senator SMITH. Well, what I want to know is if there is written document called the Gaines Report in DIA. Is that true or not true?

Mr. ANDREWS. There is not a written document called the Gaines Report. There is a document that summarizes that particular finding, and people refer to it as the Gaines Report.

Senator SMITH. All right, what is the formal title of it? The Deputy Director's POW-MIA Task Force Report? And I would ask the staff, has that report been made available to this committee?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, it is the Director's POW-MIA Task Force Report, March of 1986. And it has been made available.

Senator SMITH. I don't have a copy of it, or I was not given a copy of it. And I wish I had been. But in any case, that was made available.

Mr. Chairman, this is meant to compliment the witness, not to criticize the witness. But I want to call your attention to something, because this is a dramatic departure from something that occurred 2 or 3 years ago. And if Secretary Cheney was responsible for this, or Mr. Andrews, I commend them for it.

But I want to quote from a point paper—when I was in the House of Representatives last year, I had a piece of legislation on

de-classifying intelligence. It went a little bit further than what Senator McCain's legislation did. But it was similar.

And at that time, the House Armed Services Committee requested some type of analysis of that legislation from DIA. I have a copy of that in which it says as follows—this was a point paper on the Smith Amendment on disclosure of POW-MIA intelligence. And this is very, very important because it goes to a question that you asked as well.

Of the three reports cited in the amendment, and that would be the Tighe Amendment, the Gaines Report, and the Brooks memorandum, those three were the things that were mentioned specifically by me—of the three reports cited in the amendment, only the report issued by General Tighe in 1986 is in written form.

The other two were apparently all briefings to the Director of DIA. An unclassified version of the Tighe Report was released in 1986. And then they go further. The DIA maintains that all three reports, to the extent they exist, represent confidential advice to a former director on the effectiveness of the internal workings of that agency. Because of the classification and sensitivity of these reports, the confidential sources and diplomatic relationships involved in Southeast Asia, and because of the intended use of this information, DIA does not wish to release any internal report of this type.

The administration would resist this amendment because of executive privilege. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its efforts, but does not wish to invade the confidential relationship that existed between a former director and his hand-picked advisors. Further, DIA will make the entire Tighe Report available, et cetera. Recommendation opposed the Smith Amendment because of the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved, and the nature of these types of reports.

So Mr. Chairman, I would have to say for the record, that at least whoever was in charge of the shop last year, gave erroneous information to the House Committee on the Armed Services in response to a request by them for information regarding my amendment. And I want the record to show that. And I will provide this document.

And if, in fact, now there is a Gaines Report which has been denied personally to me, for a number of years, that that report existed in written form—and at some point in time I will be happy to provide the names of those who said that to me—now we know, we hear that we have a Gaines Report. And I wish that I had a copy of that prior to coming in here today. And whoever was responsible for that on the staff, I would like to have to answer to me for that, because I should have had it.

Do you wish to correct or reinterpret anything that I have said regarding the Gaines Report, Mr. Andrews?

Mr. ANDREWS. I'm not familiar with what you've been reading, Senator Smith, but the Gaines Report that I discovered or that we had during the management inquiry is available. The committee has been provided. And I would have to look into your other concerns.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3040

November 14, 1991

COMMAND CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS
AND
INTELLIGENCE

Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During my testimony before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on November 5, 1991, Senator Smith cited an anonymous and undated House Armed Services Committee-drafted point paper (Attachment 1), titled "Smith Amendment on Disclosure of POW/MIA Intelligence Activities," as an indication that the Department of Defense had knowingly denied the existence of an internal Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) review report commonly known as the "Gaines Report." I agreed to attempt to determine the circumstances that led to Senator Smith being given incorrect information as the Gaines Report does exist and has been provided to the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

We reviewed relevant files in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DIA and recovered several papers related to this matter (Attachments 2-5). We did not find any signed OSD or DIA correspondence which stated that the Gaines Report did not exist. One internal DIA paper (Attachment 2) indicates that around September 1990, when then-Representative Smith's amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Bill was in the draft stage, the DIA was unable to locate the Gaines Report. Subsequently, around January 1991, the DIA located a copy of the Gaines Report (Attachment 6).

After reviewing the working papers and notes we found and the memorandum concerning the recovery of the Gaines Report, I surmise that in the September 1990 period it is very likely that an unknown DIA or OSD employee informed an unknown staff member of the House Armed Services Committee that a copy of the Gaines Report did not exist. However, we did not find any documentation that would indicate that passing such a conclusion to the staff member was anything other than an honest reflection of the circumstances known at the time. This leads me to conclude that no attempt was made to willfully mislead Representative Smith or the Congress as to the existence of the Gaines Report.

Sincerely,

Duane P. Andrews

Attachments:

1. HASC point paper, unsigned, undated.
2. DIA unsigned paper, September 25, 1990.
3. DIA memorandum U-1157/DI-3, undated.
4. DIA Tasking Control Form, October 5, 1990.
5. DIA working papers, "Section 504 of H.R. 5422,"
"Access to POW/MIA Live Sighting Cases,"
- and "The Gaines and Brooks Reports."
6. DIA memorandum, November 6, 1991.

cc: Honorable Robert C. Smith
Vice Chairman

POINT PAPER

SMITH AMENDMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Amendment: Requires the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to all internal reviews relating to DIA's efforts to fully account for POW/MIA or unaccounted for U.S. military personnel. The amendment specifically cites three reports.

Background: Of the three reports cited in the amendment, only the report issued by General Tighe in 1986 is in written form; the other two were apparently oral briefings to the Director of DIA. An unclassified version of the Tighe report was released in 1986 and is available.

Discussion: The DIA maintains that all three reports, to the extent they exist, represent confidential advice to a former Director on the effectiveness of the internal workings of that agency. Because of the classification and sensitivity of these reports, the confidential sources and diplomatic relationships involved in Southeast Asia and because of the intended use of this information, DIA does not wish to release any internal report of this type. The administration would resist this amendment because of executive privilege. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its POW/MIA efforts but does not wish to invade the confidential relationship that existed between a former director and his hand-picked advisors. Further, DIA will make the entire Tighe report available to the Chairman and Ranking member of the committee, if they so desire.

Recommendation: Oppose the amendment because of the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved and the nature of these types of reports.

Received from Mr. Andrews
11/14/91

September 25, 1990

AMENDMENTS TO H.R. 5009
OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

In drafts dated 17 September 1990, Representative Bob Smith submitted for amendment of the Intelligence Authorization bill two related provisions on information concerning military personnel listed as prisoner, missing or unaccounted for in military actions. The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that these proposals are unnecessary and counterproductive, and should be opposed.

One proposal would require agencies whose funds are authorized under the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide any Member of Congress complete access to all classified information which possibly correlates to military personnel reported to be missing in action, unaccounted for, or a prisoner of war from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, or any other action involving the presence of U.S. military forces in a foreign country.

This proposal apparently would mandate full and unrestricted access to intelligence. This would be a drastic step that disregards the special protection necessarily given to intelligence sources and methods, especially sensitive human sources and technical systems. It disregards the principle of allowing the agency with which information originates to control its dissemination. The requirement to provide information fails to include any corresponding provision for the secure storage and handling of classified information. What is more, this proposal would have the effect of requiring dissemination of unevaluated and uncorrelated information, a result that would add more to confusion than clarification of issues.

There is no need to proceed in such an ill-advised manner. Procedures in effect insure that appropriate committee members and committee staff are informed of POW/MIA-related events, briefed on POW/MIA cases of interest and afforded the opportunity to conduct a review of DIA's analytical conclusions. The implementation of the proposed amendment would totally circumvent the committee system of the U.S. Congress - specifically the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, both with direct oversight responsibilities on the POW/MIA issue. DIA knows of no instance where raw intelligence reports are disseminated to any interested member of Congress; however, this amendment would be precursory to like requests on other subjects.

It is important to note that the Department of Defense has extended an invitation to members of the Congress, including the sponsor of the amendments at issue, to visit the DIA facility in the Pentagon to review POW/MIA cases of interest. DIA analysts would be present to answer any questions posed by the members. (To date, one Senator has responded to this invitation and has spent

four days reviewing files at the DIA facility.) The Members may also be assisted by staff of the Armed Services, Intelligence or Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees who have the appropriate clearances and have staff responsibility for POW/MIA issues.

DIA believes that it is inadvisable to go beyond the current situation to one in which access and dissemination of information would be uncontrolled. DIA strongly opposes this proposed amendment on this basis.

The second amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act proposed by Representative Smith would require the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide all Members of Congress complete access to all internal reviews of the DIA Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action. The amendment goes on to name three such reports - the Tighe report, the Gaines report and the Brooks report. The conclusions and recommendations of the Tighe report were disclosed in 1986. Portions of the report are classified because of their potential impact on our diplomatic relations with the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and for other reasons, have been withheld. All three reports, to the extent that they exist, constitute confidential advice to a former DIA Director, from advisors specially picked by him, on the effectiveness of the program for which he felt a heightened responsibility. In this sense the reports are in the nature of confidential Inspector General reports to the Director on the internal workings of his agency. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its POW/MIA efforts, but hopefully without invading the confidential relationship that existed between a former Director and his hand-picked advisors. The caveat "to the extent that they exist" must be added to references to the Gaines and Brooks reports because DIA has been unable to locate these reports in any tangible form. Colonel Gaines and Admiral Brooks each assisted a former Director in assessing the effectiveness of the POW/MIA office. It is not now clear whether these "reports" to the Director were ever in written form or were the subject of oral briefings to the Director.

DIA internal working draft.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum

U-1157/DI-3

TO: DR
ATTN: DI-3

SUBJECT: Representative Robert C. Smith's (R NH) Amendments on POW-MIA

TO: DR DD ED

On 27 September the HASC marked up the Intelligence Authorization Bill (HPSCI version). It was previously reported that Representative Smith planned to offer two amendments concerning POW-MIA matters: (1) to have DIA make available its files to all Members of Congress; and (2) to have DIA make available all its reports—to include the Tighe, Gaines and Brooks reports to Members of Congress.


Representative Smith offered only the second. It was amended to read that DIA should make available the Tighe report with sources and methods material deleted.

A. DENIS CLIFT
Deputy Director for
External Relations

CC:

POW-MIA
GC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 1-68)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-104
U.S. GPO: 1969-362-901/70074

UNCLASSIFIED		TASKING CONTROL FORM		5 Oct 90 (DI-3)	
OFFICE OF ORIGIN DI-3	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NO			
	DATE RECEIVED	DATE TASKED	DATE REVIEWED	CONSUMER CODE	
DIA SUSPENSE: <u>ASAP</u>		TASKING CONTROL NO.: _____			
ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE: _____		COLLAB SUSPENSE: _____			
COORDINATION SUSPENSE: _____					
SUBJECT Representative Robert Smith (R NH) and H.R.5422					
INTERNAL ROUTING				PREVIOUS ACTION OFFICER	
ACTION POW-MIA	COLLABORATION GC	COORDINATION	INFORMATION DR DD ED DI DI-3 VP		
INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE Request a "departmental position paper" on the Smith Amendment to H.R. 5422 to be furnished to OSD/LL, Mr. Mark Bitterman, X78784, see attached documents. The point of contact in DI-3 is LtCol Dixon Jordan, 697-5101.					
SUB ELEMENT INSTRUCTIONS:					
					
RETURN WITH COMPLETED ACTION TO:				FINAL DISPOSITION:	
JAMES S. VAN WAGEREN DI-3, X75101, 2D246 (1187)(EDJ)					
KEYWORD SEARCH ENTRY:					
THIS FORM BECOMES _____ UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)					

DIA FORM 3-1
PREV 3-69

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

Sheet 13-10

Union Calendar No. 481

101ST CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 5422

[Report No. 101-725, Parts I and II]

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 1, 1990

Mr. BELLMON introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SEPTEMBER 19, 1990

Reported with amendments and referred to the Committee on Armed Services for a period ending not later than September 28, 1990, for consideration of such provisions of the bill and amendment as fall within the jurisdiction of that committee pursuant to clause 1(c), rule X

(Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in *italics*)

SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

Reported from the Committee on Armed Services with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

(Insert the part printed in *boldface roman*)

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central

1 SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNACCOUNTED FOR.

6 The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to the classified report of the Defense Intelligence Agency commonly known as the Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure under the preceding sentence any material that in the judgment of the Secretary would compromise sources and methods of intelligence.

WORKING PAPER

SECTION 504 OF H.R. 5422

The Committee on Armed Services of the House amended the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Bill referred to it by including Section 504 in the bill. This section, directing the Secretary of Defense to provide to any Member of Congress full and complete access to the so-called "Tighe Report," relating to efforts by the Special Office for POW/MIA of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for U.S. military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions, was adopted after modification, pursuant to an amendment proposed by Representative Bob Smith.

This amendment is unnecessary inasmuch as the "Tighe Report" was made available to the four committees of Congress with oversight responsibilities for the POW/MIA issue in 1986 when the report was promulgated. Although the report is classified, it remains available for "in camera" review by Members of those committees exercising oversight of POW/MIA matters. Representative Smith has been so advised and has been invited to review the report.

Given the above described policy concerning congressional access to the "Tighe Report" Section 504 is totally unnecessary.

WORKING PAPER

Provided by
DIA External Affairs
provided by POW/MIA for them.

WORKING PAPER

ACCESS TO POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTING CASES

Representative Bob Smith has previously proposed amendments which direct agencies whose funds are authorized under the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide any Member of Congress complete access to all classified information which possibly correlates to military personnel reported to be missing in action, unaccounted for, or a prisoner of war from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, or any other action involving the presence of U.S. military forces in a foreign country.

It is important to note that the Department of Defense has extended an invitation to Members of Congress, who specifically requested access to POW/MIA files, including the sponsor of the amendments at issue, to visit the DIA facility in the Pentagon to review POW/MIA cases of interest. DIA analysts would be present to answer any questions posed by the members. (To date, one Senator has responded to this invitation and has spent four days reviewing files at the DIA facility.) The Members were advised they could be assisted by professional staff of the Armed Services, Intelligence or Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees who have the appropriate clearances and have staff responsibility for POW/MIA issues.

WORKING PAPER

WORKING PAPER

The Gaines and Brooks Reports

Representative Smith has previously drafted amendments to require the Secretary of Defense to provide access to any Member of Congress to the so-called "Gaines and Brooks Reports." These "reports" are internal reviews of the DIA Special Office for POW-MIA and constitute confidential advice to a former DIA Director from advisors specifically picked by him on the effectiveness of the program for which he felt a heightened responsibility.

Portions of these reports are classified because of their potential impact on our diplomatic relations with the governments of Vietnam and Laos.

These reports are in the nature of confidential Inspector General reports to the Director on the internal workings of his Agency. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its POW/MIA efforts, but hopefully without invading the confidential relationship that existed between a former Director and his hand-picked advisors.

WORKING PAPER

MEMORANDUM

6 November 1991

From: Joan Dempsey, GDIP Staff
To: Mr. Knecht, C3I

Subject: Gaines Report

1. You requested that I recount how I came to possess the Gaines report and when I located the document. Following is the sequence of events as best I can remember.
2. In my previous position as Special Assistant to the Executive Director, DIA, I worked POW/MIA issues with the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA. A draft amendment to H.R. 5009, the Intelligence Authorization Bill, was introduced in September 1990, requiring DIA to provide three reports to Congress. Those reports were the Tighe, Brooks, and Gaines reports. The Tighe report was available. The Gaines and Brooks reports could not be located in any office in DIA involved, currently or previously, in the POW/MIA issue.
3. I initiated a search for the Gaines and Brooks reports in September. I requested a thorough review of all former DIA directors' files and record files within the Executive Support Office in DIA, as well as historical files in the DIA library. I also queried personnel associated with this issue in DIA during the time the reports were compiled. The only reference to the Gaines report that was located in late September or early October was a paper copy of briefing viewgraphs provided to a former DIA director on the Gaines study effort. Also at that time, a page-and-a-half list of conclusions and recommendations written by RADM Brooks was located. It was internal staff memoranda, not a report. Ultimately, the amendment was changed to require that the Tighe report be made available to members of Congress and that the Secretary of Defense could withhold sources and methods.
4. I continued to try to locate the Gaines report. Late in 1990, a former director's executive secretary suggested I talk to a military officer, no longer assigned to DIA, who was aware of the Gaines report at the time the study was ongoing. That officer led me to a current DIA employee in the Office of Security and Counterintelligence who had a copy of the Gaines report. I do not remember the exact date but both the employee who had the report and I think it was in January 1991.

Senator SMITH. In your letter to me on July 19, you stated that the director of the National League of Families was not in a position to influence the flow of work in the POW-MIA Office at DIA, not in a position to influence the flow of work. Do you stand by that statement?

Mr. ANDREWS. Her position on the inter-agency group does not entitle her to direct tasking to the POW-MIA Office, or to influence their conduct of business. Now that's not to say in the past that individuals in the office didn't agree when she asked them to do something, or didn't accept tasking. But what I'm saying is her position doesn't entitle her to that. And the procedures that we've put in place are designed to—

Senator SMITH. I do not care what it entitles her to. Does she have—is she in a position to influence the flow of work of POW-MIA issues at the office—or did she?

Mr. ANDREWS. There were lots of examples of where she participated, along with other members of the inter-agency group in activities that the office was conducting. We didn't find, nor did Colonel Peck provide any examples of where that has been any undue or unacceptable influence to that office. As a member of the inter-agency group she did participate in activities, and was briefed by members of the office.

But again, the question—or the answer was, she—the position doesn't entitle her to that. We were not aware of any specific examples where she had any undue influence of the activities of the office.

Senator SMITH. Well, are you aware of the letter or memorandum or some document, formal document, in which she indicated that certain U.S. Senators should not have access to certain classified information? Are you aware of that?

Mr. ANDREWS. I haven't seen the letter, Senator. I've heard of that.

Senator SMITH. Would you consider that influencing the flow of work at DIA?

Mr. ANDREWS. I don't think any action was taken on that. We did not see that as an example of adverse influence of those activities of the office.

Senator SMITH. I just want to clarify one thing because of this Gaines Report. Because I have not seen it. And I just want to know, for the record, the report that she provided to the committee, which I have not seen, is that the entire Gaines Report, or is it a summation of what the Gaines Report was?

Mr. ANDREWS. As far as I know, it is just a list of a series of questions and conclusions, findings made by the task team. I'm not aware of any other back-up to this document.

Senator SMITH. So it is the complete report, is that correct?

Mr. ANDREWS. As far as I know it is complete.

Senator SMITH. What you gave to the committee is the only thing you know of as far as the Gaines Report?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is correct.

Senator McCAIN. I hate to display ignorance. Can I ask what the Gaines Report is?

Senator SMITH. Yes, you can. The Gaines Report, as I understand it from those who have discussed it with me, is that it basically

outlines about 70 percent of the concerns that Mike Peck outlined in his allegations, which Mr. Andrews says were not valid.

So I think there is a clear case here of some major discrepancies between what Colonel Peck said and the Gaines Report said, and what is being said by Mr. Andrews.

Senator McCAIN. Who was Mr. Gaines?

Senator SMITH. Kim Gaines was a former Director of DIA—excuse me, the POW-MIA shop. He was a predecessor of Colonel Peck's.

Senator REID. What you are saying is they both said some of the same things?

Senator SMITH. Absolutely. Senator Reid, there were a number of—I can just—let me just give a couple of points from the Gaines Report that I have now at my disposal, which is that some of the things that Mr. Gaines indicated about the process, the DIA process: unhealthy attitudes; almost total lack of management; working hard but not working smart; haphazard approach to problems and functions too much; direct exposure of the working-level analyst; inadequate planning; internal communication and written guidance; database is a wasteland; working files unprofessional, sloppy, incomplete; no standard procedures; no discipline, coherent collection management effort; too much detective work; not enough analysis—and on, and on, and on.

These are the same things that Colonel Peck is saying. And I think it is very significant here that the existence of this report was denied—was denied to the House Arms Services Committee, and that it was denied as a written document even existing. Now, it is a document. And it is my understanding, based upon the quick review that I have had of the document that was submitted to the Senate staff, that that is still not the complete document, in spite of what the testimony of the witness is.

And these are very, very serious matters.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if we have copies?

The CHAIRMAN. We do have copies. I think we received this.

My suggestion is if senators want to have an opportunity, if you want to have an opportunity to review it, we could move on to another area, and then come back—which I would be happy to do. I think that might be worthwhile. Let me just quickly—between February 12 and March 28, what steps, if any, did General Soyster take to meet with and debrief the Colonel about his charges?

Mr. ANDREWS. As far as I can tell, he didn't take any steps. He was trying to find—he had already told the Colonel that he needed to leave the job, and was trying to find him a job.

The CHAIRMAN. But 6 weeks went by between the time that this memorandum was posted and a communication from General Soyster—a sit-down talk about these charges, a 6-week gap.

Mr. ANDREWS. As far as I know, General Soyster did not get back together with Colonel Peck to discuss the specific charges in his report. And again, I was unaware that this even existed at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. I am just trying to establish the picture here. This is the first chance the Senate has had to inquire about this. And so we want to try and understand it. Did you want to add to that?

Mr. ANDREWS. No, they were just reminding me what I had said earlier, that this was in the middle of Desert Storm. General Soyster had several other things on his mind. And this wasn't something that he was able to pull away and work on a lot until that was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many times General Soyster was debriefed by your group about the contents of the Peck letter?

Mr. ANDREWS. I am told twice.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you formally task your group, in writing, with respect to Secretary Cheney's charge that they investigate this matter?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you submit that also, so we could see what you set out as the charge, so to speak, or their task? Now, was there any draft report prepared for the Secretary on this, or did the Secretary specifically request an oral report?

Mr. ANDREWS. My practice, when he asked me to look into management matters, and report back to him, was to go back to him and report orally. If, at that time, he feels there needs to be something more than that, then he will ask for it. I went back. We reported orally. We felt that we were taking the actions necessary. And that is where it stopped.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Just one comment—Mr. Andrews, Senator Smith has made a very serious statement here, that as short a time as a year ago, the appropriate committee was not given access or the existence of a report was denied. And also that there is not a complete document.

I would appreciate it, as soon as possible, if you could get back to the committee and clarify your response in any way. My understanding is that at this moment you do not know anything about it. But I hope you will look into it. And hopefully by tomorrow, perhaps you could give us a more complete answer on it, if you could.

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator, I will be happy to look into it. I think that the document that has been provided is all that exists. We will get the additional background. I am totally unaware of Senator Smith's concerns.

[The information referred to follows:]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040,
April 8, 1991.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO ASD(C3I)

SUBJECT: Management Inquiry

On February 13, 1991, Colonel Millard A. Peck, USA, submitted memorandum U-0173/POW-MIA, Subject: "Request for Relief," to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In this memorandum, Colonel Peck makes allegations of impropriety in the Prisoner of War and Missing in Action (POW-MIA) activities of the U.S. Government, including the possible unauthorized access to classified information by a private citizen.

I request you lead a management inquiry, on my behalf, to determine the significant events that led to Colonel Peck's memorandum, subsequent actions taken by DIA management, and the substance of the various allegations contained in the memorandum. Please provide a written report of your findings to me by April 22, 1991. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is providing Mr. Craig Alderman

and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) is providing Colonel Richard R. Mitchell to assist in this inquiry.

DUANE P. ANDREWS.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum U-0173/POW-MIA
2. Terms of Reference POW-MIA, Management Inquiry

MEMORANDUM—U-0173/POW-MIA

Date: February 13, 1991

Reply to Attention of: POW-MIA

To: DR

1. PURPOSE:

I, hereby, request to resign my position as the Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW-MIA).

2. BACKGROUND:

a. Motivation. My initial acceptance of this posting was based upon two primary motives; first, I had heard that the job was highly contentious and extremely frustrating, that no one would volunteer for it because of its complex political nature. This, of course, made it appear challenging. Secondly, since the end of the Vietnam War, I had heard the persistent rumors of American Servicemen having been abandoned in Indochina, and that the Government was conducting a "cover-up" so as not to be embarrassed. I was curious about this and thought that serving as the Chief of POW-MIA would be an opportunity to satisfy my own interest and help clear the Government's name.

b. The Office's Reputation. It was interesting that my previous exposure to the POW-MIA Office, while assigned to DIA, both as a Duty Director for Intelligence (DDI) and as the Chief of the Asia Division for Current Intelligence (JSI-3), was negative. DIA personnel who worked for me, when dealing with or mentioning the Office, always spoke about it in deprecating tones, alluding to the fact that any report which found its way there would quickly disappear into a "black hole".

c. General Attitudes. Additionally, surveys of active duty military personnel indicated that a high percentage (83%) believed that there were still live American prisoners in Vietnam. This idea was further promulgated in a number of legitimate veterans' periodicals and professional journals, as well as the media in general, which held that where there was so much smoke there must be fire.

d. Cover-Up. The dark side of the issue was particularly unsettling because of the persistent rumors and innuendoes of a Government conspiracy, alleging that U.S. military personnel had been left behind to the victorious communist governments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and that for "political reasons" or running the risk of a second Vietnam War, their existence was officially denied. Worse yet was the implication that DIA's Special Office for POW's and MIA's was an integral part of this effort to cover the entire affair up so as not to embarrass the Government nor the Defense Establishment.

e. The Crusade. As a Vietnam veteran—with a certain amount of experience in Indochina, I was interested in the entire POW-MIA question, and willingly volunteered for the job, viewing it as a sort of holy crusade.

f. The Harsh Reality. Heading up the Office has not been pleasant. My plan was to be totally honest and forthcoming on the entire issue and aggressively pursue innovative actions and concepts to clear up the live sighting business, thereby refurbishing the image and honor of DIA. I became painfully aware, however, that I was not really in charge of my own Office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA. What I witnessed during my tenure as the cardboard cut-out "Chief" of POW-MIA could be euphemistically labeled as disillusioning.

3. CURRENT IMPRESSIONS, BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE:

a. Highest National Priority. That National leaders continue to address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the "highest national priority" is a travesty. From my vantage point, I observed that the principal government players were interested primarily in conducting a "damage limitation exercise", and appeared to knowingly and deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and "busy work". Progress consisted in frenetic activity, with little substance and no real results.

b. The Mindset to Debunk. The mindset to "debunk" is alive and well. It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office, which is not necessarily the fault of DIA. Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a responsive "action arm" to routinely and aggressively pursue leads. The latter was a moot point, anyway, since the Office was continuously buried in an avalanche of "ad hoc" taskings from every quarter, all of which required an immediate response. It was impossible to plan ahead or prioritize courses of action. Any real effort to pursue live sighting reports or exercise initiative was diminished by the plethora of "busy work" projects directed by higher authority outside of DIA. A number of these grandiose endeavors bordered on the ridiculous, and—quite significantly—there was never an audit trail. None of these taskings was ever requested formally. There was, and still is, a refusal by any of the players to follow normal intelligence channels in dealing with the POW-MIA Office.

c. Duty, Honor, and Integrity. It appears that the entire issue is being manipulated by unscrupulous people in the Government, or associated with the Government. Some are using the issue for personal or political advantage and others use it as a forum to perform and feel important, or worse. The sad fact, however, is that this issue is being controlled and a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort, and may never have been.

d. POW-MIA Officers Abandoned. When I assumed the Office for the first time, I was somewhat amazed and greatly disturbed by the fact that I was the only military officer in an organization of more than 40 people. Since combatants of all Services were lost in Vietnam, I would have thought there would at least be a token Service representation for a matter of the "highest national priority." Since the normal mix of officers from all Services is not found in my organization it would appear that the issue, at least at the working level, has, in fact, been abandoned. Also, the horror stories of the succession of military officers at the C-5 and C-6 level who have in some manner "rocked the boat" and quickly come to grief at the hands of the Government policy makers who direct the issue, lead one to the conclusion that we are all quite expendable, so by extrapolation one simply concludes that these same bureaucrats would "sacrifice" anyone who was troublesome or contentious as including prisoners of war and missing in action. Not a comforting thought. Any military officer expected to survive in this environment would have to be myopic, an accomplished sycophant, or totally insouciant.

e. The DIA Involvement. DIA's role in the affair is truly unfortunate. The overall Agency has generally practiced a "damage limitation drill" on the issue, as well. The POW-MIA Office has been cloistered for all practical purposes and left to its own fortunes. The POW Office is the lowest level in the Government "efforts" to resolve the issue, and oddly for an intelligence organization, has become the "lightening rod" for the entire establishment to the matter. The policy people manipulating the affair have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the shadows, while using the Office as a "toxic waste dump" to bury the whole "mess" out of sight and mind to a facility with the limited access to public scrutiny. Whatever happens in the issue, DIA takes the blame, while the real players remain invisible. The fact that POW-MIA Office is always the center of an investigation is no surprise. Many people suspect that something is rotten about the whole thing, but they cannot find an audit trail to ascribe blame, so they attack the DIA/POW-MIA "dump", simply because it has been placed in the line of fire as a cheap, expendable decoy.

f. "Suppressio Veri, Suggestio Falsi". Many of the puppet masters play a confusing, murky role. For instance, the Director of the National League of Families occupies an interesting and questionable position in the whole process. Although assiduously "churning" the account to give a tawdry illusion of progress, she is adamantly opposed to any initiative to actually get to the heart of the problem, and, more importantly, interferes in or actively sabotages POW-MIA analyses or investigations. She insists on rewriting or editing all significant documents produced by the Office, then touted as the DIA position. She apparently has access to top secret, codeword message traffic, for which she is supposedly not cleared, and she receives it well ahead of the DIA intelligence analysts. Her influence in "jerkling around" everyone and everything involved in the issue goes far beyond the "war and MIA protestor gone straight" scenario. She was brought from the "outside" into the center of the imbrogio, and then, cloaked in a mantle of sanctimony, routinely impedes real progress and insidiously "muddles up" the issue. One wonders who she really is and where she came from . . .

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Stalled Crusade. Unfortunately, what began on such a high note never succeeded in embarking. In some respects, however, I have managed to satisfy some of my curiosity.

b. Everyone is Expendable. I have seen firsthand how ready and willing the policy people are to sacrifice or "abandon" anyone who might be perceived as a political liability. It is quick and facile, and can be easily covered.

c. High-Level Knavery. I feel strongly that this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.

d. "Smoke and Mirrors". From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with "smoke and mirrors", to stall the issue until it dies a natural death.

e. National League of Families. I am convinced that the Director of this organization is much more than meets the eye. As the principal actor in the grand show, she is in the perfect position to clamor for "progress", while really intentionally impeding the effort. And, there are numerous examples of this. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that so many bureaucrats in the "system" would instantaneously do her bidding and humor her every whim.

f. DIA's Dilemma. Although greatly saddened by the role ascribed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, I feel, at least, that I am dealing with honest men and women who are generally powerless to make the system work. My appeal and attempt to amend this role perhaps never had a chance. We, all, were subject to control. I particularly salute the personnel in the POW-MIA Office for their long suffering, which I regrettably was unable to change. I feel that the Agency and the Office are being used as the "fall guys" or "patsies" to cover the tracks of others.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. One Final Vietnam Casualty. So ends the war and my last grand crusade, like it actually did end, I guess. However, as they say in the Legion, "je ne regrette rien . . ." For all of the above, I respectfully request to be relieved of my duties as Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

b. A Farewell to Arms. So as to avoid the annoyance of being shipped off to some remote corner, out of sight and out of the way, in my own "bamboo cage" of silence somewhere, I further request that the Defense Intelligence Agency, which I have attempted to serve loyally and with honor, assist me in being retired immediately from active military service.

MILLARD A. PECK,
Colonel, Infantry USA.

POW MANAGEMENT INQUIRY

What's the story? (Not, what's the problem.)

Define the current situation.

What is known?

What is unclear?

What is presumed?

What is the time-line for the issue? (From "now" back to the start.)

What were significant events?

When?

What?

Where?

Who?

How?

Why?

Is the mission clear?

How is it documented?

Who gives tasking and direction?

What are the products?

Who approves the products?

Where do the products go?

What are the products used for?

Are "answers" directed by external players?

What is the make-up of the organization?

Numbers?

Types of Skills?

Experience level?

Turn-over rate?

What would you change?

Why?

How sure are you that _____ will fix it?

How much of your own money would you bet?

What would cause you to change your presumptions?

Who would be against this change?

Why?

Who would support this change?

Why?

Senator McCAIN. I am sure Senator Smith will provide you with the document that was sent to him, or the House Arms Services Committee saying that they did not exist.

Mr. ANDREWS. If I may add, just as a follow-up comment, the Gaines Report was something that Mike Peck had paid a lot of attention to. And as we looked into the management inquiry, it was clear that some—in fact, he often referred back to this—that many, or some of his comments were concerns that came out of the Gaines Report. But that was in 1986. And that was before the office was doubled in size, and before a lot of changes were made.

And so I don't think it is necessarily a correct conclusion to say well, if it existed then, it exists today in the office. We will look for facts, and if we couldn't find the facts to back it up, we had to conclude that there wasn't a mindset to debunk—which is the major charge in the Gaines Report.

Senator McCAIN. But that does not look into the aspect of informing the House Arms Services Committee that it does not exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, does it strike you as a little bit strange that—or ironic, perhaps, I am not quite sure what the right word is—but the farther we get away from the time that these men were lost and unaccounted for, the farther we get away, the larger the office gets, the bigger the inquiry grow? Does that make a statement about what was not taking place in the immediate period when the trail was hottest? I mean, you know, you just said the office has doubled since 1986. And now we have another 102 people coming on.

If I am sitting there, I am saying, wait a minute—102 people now, the office gets doubled in 1986, and in 1986 it is already 13, 14 years down the road—or 12 years. Does that make a comment, or am I again off-base?

Mr. ANDREWS. Senator, I think you can draw your conclusion. I think as the Secretary said this morning, in the past there were things that probably could have been done that were not done. We are doing the best we can to try to fix the problem and to get on and get the job done—complete accountability.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want you to know this is the first time anybody from the Administration or the Defense Department has come forward—and I applaud you for it—and said, hey there were some problems. Nobody has acknowledged that. There had not been any problems, we have been told, up until now.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Secretary acknowledged it this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed—today, I am saying, and earlier this morning, a very significant statement—I think it is the first time

that it has been on record. And I applaud you for your candor in saying that. I think it is a very important departure.

Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Let me just say this—that you, and Senator Smith have had, because of your responsibilities, access to some of these things we are just learning about now. But I would like to say that I think this questioning that has been done, especially Senator Smith, the last little bit has been most helpful.

We, in our charge, have to first of all determine if there are any live POW's; but also to make sure that whatever decision, how we arrive at our decision looks into all of the problems that have developed in the past, and to make sure that the public knows that we have not left anything uncovered. And I think it is this type of inquiry that Senator Smith did that we are going to have to do more of. So that these areas are resolved once and for all; so that people do not feel it is a cover-up. And we know that your responsibilities are difficult, and this is only part of your responsibility.

But we need your help to get to the bottom of this—these two reports, one of which is oral and one of which is not. So, Senator Smith, I appreciate very much your line of inquiry. It has been an education to us all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions of Secretary Andrews? [No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. If not, Mr. Secretary thank you. And if you would, as Senator McCain has requested, report back with respect to the sequence on what you are aware of, with respect to whether there is any additional report. And staff would be glad to make available to you what we do have, so you can measure that against what you have. And we would appreciate that very much. Thank you.

And if I could ask Mr. Ken Quinn if he would come forward, and then Secretary Ford. I know you are going to be here throughout these hearings, I gather—or representatives. One of the things we are going to do—and I just want to put people on notice is—often, what happens in this process is somebody throws out an accusation and something happens in the course of a hearing, and there is no response to it.

We have asked that, particularly as critics come forward and set forth their feelings about what has not happened, and so forth, we really want the Administration to hear what they are saying. And then we want to have people come on and respond to it. We do not want to just leave things hanging. We would like to try and sort out what is fact and what is fiction here. And we do not want anybody unfairly having a finger pointed at them.

So we would ask if you would be prepared to do that, sir toward the end of this process.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time. It is good to see you again.

Before you sit down and get too comfortable, could I swear you in, if I may?

[Witness sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you just give us a little bit of your background for the record, and how you come to this issue, and what your involvement is before you go into your statement?

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. QUINN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. QUINN. Certainly, Senator. First, let me apologize. I was just down the hall and didn't think I would be called quite so quickly.

I am a career Foreign Service Officer approaching my 25th year. I joined the Foreign Service in 1967 and at the middle of the Vietnam War, and was assigned to Vietnam, and spent 6 years there.

I think in very unusual circumstances I was assigned in the pacification program to MACV, and was in a situation where, as a civilian, I commanded American troops in combat situation. It was an advisory team. I replaced an Army Major. I was replaced by an Army Major.

I did approximately 250 hours of helicopter combat operations in Vietnam. I was shot at and missed; and shot at and hit. Came back after that—

Senator REID. What years were these?

Mr. QUINN. 1967 to 1974—I had a variety of jobs in Vietnam. That was the job I had for the first 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. You had one of the longer tours, did you not?

Mr. QUINN. I came back. I did some time at the National Security Council staff in the State Department. I spent 4 years on sort of loan to the Governor of Iowa, Governor Bob Ray, and working while still in the Foreign Service for him; and worked on refugee issues, as well as issues within the State.

After that, I was in Vienna working on—and this was in the early 1980's, with our mission from the United Nations on Narcotics Control and Middle Eastern refugees, and worked on Secretary Schultz's staff for a couple of years.

And before coming back to Washington I was Deputy Chief of Mission in Manila, 1987 to 1990. During several coup attempts, terrorist campaigns conducted against the United States—which we had 10 Americans, official Americans who were killed—and other terrorist attempts against us.

And then in 1990, Assistant Secretary Solomon asked me to come back to Washington and work for him. And I did. And that is how I got here today.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Secretary, you are fluent in Vietnamese, are you not?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I had a year of training. I used it a lot. In Vietnam I was tested at the 4-4 level. I was interpreter once for President Ford. I have done other meetings in Vietnamese. But to be very honest, it has gotten rusty since I've left Vietnam. I still find myself groping here and there for words.

Senator REID. What does 4-4 mean?

Mr. QUINN. A native speaker would be a 5-5 in the Foreign Service Institute testing system. And somebody who is just getting started, and knew a few words, would be a 0+ which is what I have in French. But we don't, aside from people who are ethnic Vietnamese or who are born there, we don't have any 5-5 speakers in Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise that is that in the course of your visits over there, and in the course of your negotiations as head of the inter-agency group on POW-MIA, you have been able

to rely on your own conversations and interpretations and not on somebody feeding you information and so forth. You have really had a personal involvement in this which is perhaps second only to people like Bill Bell and others who have been over there on the ground working.

Mr. QUINN. Well, certainly being able to speak the language gives you an understanding and another dimension. I would say the Vietnamese Diplomatic Corps has a number of quite accomplished speakers in English. And so we will often have many discussions in English.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you share with us, Mr. Quinn, an outline of your testimony. We will put the full testimony in the record as if read.

Mr. QUINN. I came up. I guess I hadn't done any type of summary of it. Is it possible that I could read it?

The CHAIRMAN. What do you figure?

Mr. QUINN. Maybe 8 or 9 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you 10 minutes anyway.

Mr. QUINN. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, Senator McCain, Senator Reid, my testimony today, I would like to provide the committee an accounting of the diplomatic activities and other efforts of the U.S. Government on the POW/MIA issue, since I became Chairman of the Interagency Group, the IAG in July 1990.

I realize you likely will have questions about other periods of time, and I will, of course, endeavor to answer them. But in terms of effort on POW/MIA, this has been an extremely active period, perhaps the most active since the end of the war.

And it is important to note just what is different because what has occurred in the past 15 months, we now have a clear, carefully spelled out and written down policy on normalization of relations with Vietnam, called the roadmap which blends two important U.S. foreign policy goals: comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia; and POW/MIA accounting. This policy was conveyed to the Vietnam government in writing.

We now have an established process to communicate with the Vietnamese government at the policy level. This channel was established in July 1990 by Secretary Baker and initially focused on the Cambodian peace negotiations, but has also served as an important vehicle to impress upon Vietnam, the centrality of the POW/MIA issue, of improving our relationship.

The first meeting within that channel was held in New York on August 6, 1990 between Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, Trin Sung Lang, who is here today, and myself.

We now have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi with a staff working full-time on this issue, and we now have had over the past 15 months a number of high level exchanges with Vietnam, Laos and the authorities in Phnom Penh, all of which have had POW/MIA as a central topic.

Let me briefly list them. Secretary Baker met with then foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach in New York in September 1990 and with newly appointed foreign minister Nguyen Manh Cam on September 23.

These represented the first bilateral meetings at the secretary level since the end of the war. Foreign Minister Thach visited

Washington in October 1990, meetings with General Vessey and the IAG, exclusively on POW/MIA.

At that time, Minister Thach also came here to Capitol Hill to meet with Members of the Congress. Secretary Baker met with Lao Foreign Minister Phoun in the same period, also the first time since the war that the POW/MIA issue has been raised directly at the ministerial level with Laos.

General Vessey made two trips to Hanoi this year which led to the establishment of our first POW/MIA office, as well as Vietnamese agreement to take certain specific steps which supplement and implement the roadmap.

Assistant Secretary Solomon met twice with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss both Cambodia and POW/MIA issues. Mr. Solomon also met with Mr. Hun Sen in Paris October 24, a meeting that I was also present at, during which POW/MIA cooperation was discussed extensively.

Also important to note are the recent visits to Washington of Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong and Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister, Tran Quang Co, the first senior Vietnamese official to visit the Pentagon, both met with IAG principals to discuss POW/MIA exclusively.

Not all of our diplomatic activities during the past 15 months have been with the governments of Vietnam and Laos and the Phnom Penh authorities. We have also coordinated diplomatic approaches with many countries active in the area to ensure they understood our policy objectives in Indochina.

We have urged friendly countries to limit diplomatic-aid and economic activities with Vietnam until progress is made on these objectives. We have also approached countries which potentially might have information about the POW/MIA issue.

Secretary Baker has personally raised the issue with senior Soviet officials, so has acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Carl Ford, and since July 1990 I have carried on a dialogue with Soviet diplomats, particularly about the possibility of Americans still being alive in Vietnam.

We have also discussed the issue with officials of the People's Republic of China. Just recently we worked with China to facilitate a visit by a family member which resulted in important information being obtained relating to that family's missing loved one.

In sum, the past 15 months have seen diplomatic efforts of an unprecedented breadth and scope on behalf of our POW/MIA effort.

But that is not all we have done. Another extremely important aspect of our efforts which I want to make special note, has been our rapid reaction to reports of Americans alive in captivity.

There have been two such cases to come before the IAG in the last 12 months. The first which occurred in October 1990 involved a report and a photo of an individual identified as Walter T. Robertson. Even though a careful analysis indicated that the person in the photo was not the Walter T. Robertson who served in the U.S. military, or the one who was a crewman on the Glomar Java Sea, we could not preclude the possibility that he was an American.

So the IAG urgently dispatched a plane and a team to Vietnam to investigate the case. We eventually determined that the man involved was not an American.

The second instance surrounded several highly publicized photos which are identified by family members as being five American servicemen. The first of these photos was brought to my attention on July 12 by Shelby Quast, the daughter of one of the men. Shelby is here today.

The certainty with which she and more than a dozen other family members identified the three men in the photo as Colonel Robertson, Lt. Commander Stevens and Major Lundy was powerful and compelling evidence.

Within an hour I had convened an emergency session of the IAG, including General Vessey, which agreement was quickly reached on specific steps to be taken. Before the day was out and with the concurrence of the three families, I communicated the photo to the Vietnamese, to Ambassador Lang, using that channel I mentioned before and instructed our embassy in Vientiane to approach the Lao government and Phnom Penh's ambassador.

In all three instances, we called on the authorities to undertake an urgent and immediate investigation. Shortly thereafter Secretary Baker wrote to Minister Thach stressing the importance of Vietnam's urgent cooperation.

I met for 2 hours with the three families involved. During that time they implored me to go to Hanoi to investigate the photos. I said I would and I did; 3 days later, I left for Asia to investigate that photo as well as two other photos which subsequently became available, which pictured men identified by their families as Lieutenant Borah and Captain Carr.

My meeting with Cambodian officials in Beijing led to unprecedented cooperation by Phnom Penh's authorities in investigating not only these photos but also a number of other POW/MIA incidents. A DIA investigative team which was received in Phnom Penh immediately thereafter developed important information relevant to the photos of the three men. This led to follow on visits including a recent field activity on Tang Island, the site of the Maguez incident.

On this same trip I also travelled to Hanoi and Vientiane. In both cases I stressed the importance of immediate and thorough action to investigate the photo of the three men and the other photos, and I am able to report that the response by both the Lao and Vietnamese governments to this, the most urgent information about possibly live Americans to come before the IAG since I have been its chair, was very positive.

In Hanoi, my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai, I obtained agreement for access to prisons where we had reports the photos were taken, an action again totally without precedent.

The Vietnamese also provided information from military archives and records which heretofore was unavailable and they agreed to immediate reexcavation of the crash site of Colonel Robertson's plane.

Lao officials also pledged full cooperation, and shortly thereafter, acting unilaterally, located the Lao citizen who apparently was the person in the photo identified as Lt. Borah. They also made this

person available to U.S. experts, and I believe you will hear from other defense witnesses regarding the details of this investigation.

I would be remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I did not make specific reference to the superb support I received from Department of Defense personnel, both from DIA headquarters in Washington and those stationed in Bangkok and Hanoi throughout this trip to Asia.

Warren Gray I think is here, Bill Bell, John Cole, they worked, Mr. Chairman, until midnight and beyond every night to ensure that when I went to each location, that I had every bit of information and every resource at my facility to pursue this investigation.

In addition to the diplomatic steps I have just outlined, there have been other significant actions taken in the past 16 months by General Vessey, officials of the defense department, other members of the IAG and indeed by Members of the Congress, and of course, you have made several trips, I know Senator McCain has during this time.

And I think all of this is part of the mosaic for America's POW/MIA efforts, and therefore terribly important. I have not tried to detail any of this in my testimony, but I think it is important that we recognize that there is a totality of effort that goes into this process aimed at assuring the fullest possible accounting for our missing service members.

I believe it would be useful, Mr. Chairman, if I said a few words about U.S. policy, vis-a-vis Vietnam, on normalization of relations with Vietnam. I want to be clear that our policy today remains unchanged. The United States is prepared to proceed toward normalization of relations with Vietnam only in the context of a comprehensive policy settlement in Cambodia.

The pace and scope of the normalization process will be directly affected by the seriousness with which Vietnam cooperates on the POW/MIA issue.

Let me emphasize that the roadmap did not change that policy, rather it details a path we could follow based on that policy. It fuses together our objectives on Cambodia and POW/MIA and lays out a four phased game plan within which, as progress is made on Cambodia and POW/MIA, we are prepared to take concomitant steps in expanding U.S. economic and political activity with Vietnam and Cambodia.

At first the steps with Vietnam will be small, but as mutual confidence is developed, and I emphasize, as progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA continues, the steps increase in importance.

The roadmap is constructed in a way so that we could move rapidly or slowly, depending on Vietnamese cooperation. It is important to stress that central to the roadmap is Hanoi's addressing the live prisoner of issue, returning available U.S. remains, and implementing a 24 month process to investigate every POW/MIA case.

It is also important to note that the roadmap addresses the humanitarian issue of the release of political prisoners still held in reeducation.

While it is useful to enumerate the various diplomatic actions we have taken, we have to judge our success based on the results we achieve, and there has been progress. Our office in Hanoi has had access to information from official Vietnamese records, archives and files as well as war museums.

It has been a significant help in advancing our knowledge in a number of discrepancy cases and therefore directly related to the live prisoner issue. Vietnam responded immediately and positively in the photo investigation, including granting access to two prisons, and in the past 12 months the U.S. has removed 51 remains from Vietnam, 19 of which have been identified as particular U.S. servicemen and 18 others as possibly Americans.

In Phnom Penh we have had more significant assistance on the photo cases and a demonstrated willingness to work cooperatively on other individual cases as well including missing American journalists.

We have seen a number of important breakthroughs in Lao POW/MIA cooperation. We have conducted our first-ever investigations into discrepancy cases involving men last known to have been alive in Lao hands. We have expanded our POW/MIA efforts, previously limited to two southern provinces into four additional provinces. In May, the Lao agreed to an expanded annual schedule of POW/MIA activities including field activities during the rainy seasons.

And most recently, the Lao foreign minister told Secretary Baker that his government would participate in a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and Vietnamese to discuss cases along the Lao/SRV border and as I noted earlier, the Lao cooperated very effectively on the photo believed to be of Lieutenant Borah.

We have consistently told Vietnam that the formal process of normalization of relations could only begin with the signing of the Paris agreement. That approach was embodied in our policy as presented to the Vietnamese by Assistant Secretary Solomon last April.

Based on the fact that both Vietnam and the Phnom Penh authorities did sign the Paris agreement on Cambodia and that POW/MIA cooperation and the release of reeducation prisoners has begun, the U.S. has responded by announcing that we are taking the steps we said we would to begin the roadmap.

Secretary Baker announced in Paris that the U.S. would soon send a diplomatic mission to Cambodia to represent us to the Supreme National Council, lift our trade embargo on Cambodia once UNAMIC, that is the U.N. Advanced Mission in Cambodia is in place and implementation of the peace agreement has begun, remove the 25 mile travel restrictions on Vietnamese diplomats at the U.N., revise our trade embargo to permit U.S. organization travel to Vietnam by groups such as veterans, business organizations and others, and start talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities involved in the normalization process, and earlier Ambassador Lang and I were discussing a date for the beginning of those talks.

Now these are the only steps in the roadmap we have taken with Vietnam. No other decisions have been made to take any further steps. Our policy remains as stated and laid out in the roadmap. That will continue to be our policy. We are in control of the process, and we are prepared to move forward, but only with continued progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA.

Now in that regard, I note that following the Secretary's announcement in Paris, the Vietnamese have given us the increased

access we requested to some key military records and have indicated they have a significant number of additional remains ready for the two sides to jointly examine.

I would hope that this development indicates that we could look to more progress and greater results, because, Mr. Chairman, our policy is driven by a desire to end the agony suffered by families of our POW/MIA's as well as the agony of the Cambodian people. We have made progress toward both of these goals, but we still have a considerable way to go.

So let me end by saying, and on behalf of Secretary Baker as well as for myself, that we intend to build on the accomplishments we have achieved and continued our efforts toward the goal that I believe we all share which is the fullest possible accounting for all of our POW/MIA's.

I apologize, I think I went over the time involved.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quinn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. QUINN

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the select committee, in my testimony today, I would like to provide the committee an accounting of diplomatic activities and other efforts of the U.S. Government on the POW/MIA issue since I became Chairman of the Inter-Agency Group (IAG) in July 1990. I realize that you will likely have questions about other periods of time and I will, of course, endeavor to answer them but, in terms of effort on POW/MIA, this has been an extremely active period, perhaps the most active since the end of the war. It is important to note just what has occurred.

We now have a clear, carefully spelled out and written down policy approach on normalization of relations with Vietnam—called the roadmap—which blends two important U.S. foreign policy goals—a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia and POW/MIA accounting. This policy was conveyed to the Vietnam Government in writing.

We now have an established process to communicate with the Vietnamese Government at the policy level. This channel was established in July 1990 by Secretary Baker and initially focused on the Cambodian peace negotiations but has also served as an important vehicle to impress upon Vietnam the centrality of the POW/MIA issue to improving our relationship. The first meeting within that channel was held in New York on August 6, 1990.

We now have a POW/MIA office in Hanoi, with the staff working full time on this issue.

And we now have had—over the past 15 months—a number of high level exchanges with Vietnam, Laos and authorities in Phnom Penh, all of which had POW/MIA as a central topic.

Secretary Baker met with then Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in New York in September 1990 and with newly appointed Foreign Minister Nguyen Mann Cam in Paris on October 23. These represented the first bilateral meetings at the Secretary level since the end of the war.

Foreign Minister Thach visited Washington in October 1990 for meetings with General Vessey and the IAG, exclusively on POW/MIA. Minister Thach also came here to Capitol Hill to meet with Members of Congress.

Secretary Baker met twice with Lao Foreign Minister Phoun in this same period, also the first time since the war the POW/MIA issue has been raised directly at the ministerial level.

General Vessey made two trips to Hanoi this year which led to the establishment of our first POW/MIA office as well as Vietnamese agreements to take and implement the roadmap.

Assistant Secretary Solomon met twice with Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai to discuss both Cambodia and POW/MIA issues. Mr. Solomon also met with Mr. Hun Sen in Paris October 24 during which POW/MIA cooperation was discussed extensively.

Also important to note are the recent visits to Washington of Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong and Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Tran Quang

Co, the first senior Vietnamese official to visit the Pentagon. Both met with IAG principals to discuss POW/MIA.

Not all of our diplomatic activities during the past 15 months have been with the Governments of Vietnam and Laos and the Phnom Penh authorities. We have also coordinated diplomatic approaches with many countries active in the area to ensure they understood our policy objectives in Indochina particularly on a Cambodian settlement and POW/MIA. We have urged friendly countries to limit diplomatic, aid and economic activities with Vietnam until progress was made on these objectives.

We have also approached countries which potentially might have information about the POW/MIA issue. Secretary Baker has personally raised the issue with senior Soviet officials. So has acting Assistant Secretary Carl Ford. Since July 1990 I have carried on a dialog with Soviet diplomats particularly about the possibility of Americans still being alive in Vietnam. We have also discussed the issue with officials of the Peoples Republic of China. Just recently we worked with China to facilitate a visit by a family member which resulted in important information being obtained relating to that family's missing loved one.

In sum, the past 15 months have seen diplomatic efforts of an unprecedented breadth and scope on behalf of our POW/MIA effort.

Reports of Live Americans

Another aspect of our efforts of which it is important to take note has been our rapid reaction to reports of Americans alive in captivity.

There have been two such cases to come before the IAG in the last 12 months. The first, which occurred in October 1990, involved a report and a photo of an individual identified as Walter T. Robertson. Even though a careful analysis indicated that the person in the photo was not the Walter T. Robertson who served in the U.S. military or the one who was a crewman on the Glomar Java Sea, we could not preclude the possibility that he was an American. So the IAG urgently dispatched a plane and team to Vietnam to investigate the case. We eventually determined that the man involved was not an American.

The second instance surrounded several highly publicized photos which were identified by family members as being five American servicemen. The first of these photos was brought to my attention on July 12 by Shelby Quast, the daughter of one of the men. The certainty with which she and more than a dozen other family members identified the three men in the photo as Colonel Robertson, Lt. Commander Stevens and Major Lundy was powerful and compelling evidence. Within an hour I had convened an emergency session of the IAG, including General Vessey, at which agreement was quickly reached on specific steps to be taken. Before the day was out, and with the concurrence of the three families, I communicated the photo to the Vietnamese and instructed our Embassy in Vientiane to approach the Lao Government and Phnom Penh's Ambassador. In all three instances we called on the authorities to undertake an urgent and immediate investigation. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Baker wrote to Foreign Minister Thach stressing the importance of Vietnam's urgent cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, I met for 2 hours with the three families involved, during that meeting they implored me to go to Hanoi to investigate the photos. I said I would. And I did.

Three days later I left for Asia to investigate that photo—as well as two other photos which subsequently became available which pictured men identified by their families as Lt. Borah and Captain Carr. My meeting with Cambodian officials in Beijing led to unprecedented cooperation by Phnom Penh's authorities in investigating not only these photos but also a number of other POW/MIA incidents. A DIA investigative team which was received in Phnom Penh immediately developed important information relevant to the photos of the three men. This led to follow on visits including a recent field activity on Tang Island, the site of the Mayaguez incident.

On this same trip, I also traveled to Hanoi and Vientiane, in both cases I stressed the importance of immediate and thorough action to investigate the photo of the three men. I am able to report that the response by both the Lao and Vietnamese Governments to this, the most urgent information about possibly alive Americans to come before the IAG since I have been its chair, was very positive.

In Hanoi in my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Le Mai I obtained agreement for access to prisons where we had reports the photos were taken—an action totally without precedent.

The Vietnamese also provided information from military archives and records which heretofore was unavailable and agreed to an immediate reexcavation of the crash site of Colonel Robertson's plane.

Lao officials also pledged full cooperation and shortly thereafter, acting unilaterally, located the Lao citizen who apparently was the person in the photo identified as Lt. Borah. They also made this person available to U.S. POW/MIA experts.

I would be remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I did not make specific reference to the superb support I received from Department of Defense personnel from DIA headquarters in Washington and stationed in Bangkok and Hanoi throughout this trip to Asia.

In addition to the diplomatic steps I have just outlined, there have been other quite significant actions taken during the past 16 months by General Vessey, officials of the defense department, other members of the IAG, and indeed by Members of Congress and private organizations, all of which are very important parts of the mosaic of America's POW/MIA efforts. I have not detailed them in my testimony because you will be hearing directly from many of them about what they have accomplished. I do want to note, however, that they form part—an essential part—of this picture of greatly increased activity aimed at assuring the fullest possible accounting for our missing service members.

The Roadmap

I believe it would be useful, Mr. Chairman, if I said a few words about U.S. policy vis-a-vis Vietnam on normalization of relations with Vietnam. Our policy today remains unchanged. The United States is prepared to proceed toward normalization of relations with Vietnam only in the context of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. The pace and scope of the normalization process will be directly affected by the seriousness with which Vietnam cooperates on the POW/MIA issue.

Let me emphasize that the roadmap did not change that policy—rather it details a path we could follow based on that policy. It fuses together our objectives on Cambodia and POW/MIA and lays out a four phased gameplan within which, as progress is made on Cambodia and POW/MIA, we are prepared to take concomitant steps in expanding U.S. economic and political activity with Vietnam and Cambodia. At first the steps with Vietnam will be small, but as mutual confidence is developed and, I emphasize, progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA continues, the steps increase in importance. The roadmap is constructed in a way so that we could move rapidly or slowly, depending on Vietnamese cooperation. It is important to stress that central to the roadmap is Hanoi's addressing the live prisoner issue, returning available U.S. remains and implementing a 24-month process to investigate every POW/MIA case. It is also important to note that the roadmap addresses the humanitarian issue of the release of political prisoners still held in reeducation.

While it is useful to enumerate the various diplomatic actions we have taken, we have to judge our success based on the results we achieve. And there has been progress.

Our office in Hanoi has had access to information from official Vietnamese records, archives and files as well as war museums. This has been a significant help in advancing our knowledge on a number of discrepancy cases and therefore directly related to the live prisoner issue. Vietnam responded immediately and positively in the photo investigation including granting access to the two prisons. In the past 12 months, the U.S. has removed 51 remains from Vietnam, 19 of which have been identified as particular U.S. servicemen and 18 others as possibly Americans. In Phnom Penh we have had more significant assistance on the photo cases, and a demonstrated willingness to work cooperatively on other individual cases as well, including missing American journalists.

We have also seen a number of important breakthroughs in Lao POW/MIA cooperation. We have conducted our first-ever investigations into discrepancy cases involving men last known to have been alive in Lao hands. We have expanded our POW/MIA efforts, previously limited to two southern provinces, into four additional provinces. In May, the Lao agreed to an expanded annual schedule of POW/MIA activities, including field activities during the rainy season. Most recently, the Lao Foreign Minister told Secretary Baker that his government would participate in a trilateral meeting with U.S. and the Vietnamese to discuss cases along the Lao-SRV border. And as I noted earlier, the Lao cooperated very effectively on the photo believed to be of Lt. Borah.

We have consistently told Vietnam that the formal process of normalization of relations could only begin with the signing of the Paris agreement. That approach was embodied in our policy as presented to the Vietnamese by A/S Solomon last April. Based on the fact that both Vietnam and the Phnom Penh authorities did sign the Paris agreement on Cambodia, and that POW/MIA cooperation and the release of reeducation prisoners has begun, the U.S. has responded by announcing that we are taking the steps we said we would to begin the road map. Secretary Baker an-

nounced in Paris that the U.S. would soon send a diplomatic mission to Cambodia to represent us to the Supreme National Council; lift our trade embargo on Cambodia once UNAMIC is in place, and implementation of the peace agreement has begun; remove the 25 mile travel restriction on Vietnamese diplomats at the UN; revise our trade embargo to permit U.S.-organized travel to Vietnam by groups, such as veterans, business organizations and others, and start talks with Vietnam on the issues and modalities involved in the normalization process.

These are the only steps in the roadmap we have taken with Vietnam. No other decisions have been made to take any further steps. Our policy remains as stated and laid out in the roadmap. That will continue to be our policy. We are in control of the process. We are prepared to move forward but only with continued progress on Cambodia and POW/MIA. In that regard I note that following the Secretary's announcement in Paris, the Vietnamese have given us the increased access we requested to some key military records and have indicated they have a significant number of additional remains ready for the two sides to jointly examine.

I would hope that this development indicates that we can look to more progress and greater results because, Mr. Chairman, our policy is driven by a desire to end the agony suffered by families of our POW/MIA's as well as the agony of the Cambodian people. We have made progress toward both these goals. We have a Cambodian agreement. We have an office in Hanoi. We have some important advances on POW/MIA. But we still have a considerable way to go. So let me end by saying, on behalf of Secretary Baker as well as for myself, that we intend to build on the accomplishments we have achieved and continue our efforts toward the goal we all share—the fullest possible accounting for all our POW/MIA's.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate the testimony and really, that was a guideline, not a strict requirement.

Let me ask you some questions which position me sort of as a devil's advocate a little bit, and I want to emphasize that I am not, at this point, taking one side or the other in this, but I want to try to test some of the theories about all of this.

First of all, when was the last time, during that period of service in the early 1970's, that you left Vietnam?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I transferred out in May 1974, but I returned to Vietnam on several occasions after that, and I was last there at the end of March, the beginning of April with General Wyand on the Presidential fact-finding mission which made an assessment for President Ford of the military situation and provided a prognosis for the survival of the government in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. Now at that period of time, which was after the formal conclusion of the United State involvement, during the interim period prior to the fall of the government, did you have any knowledge at that time of intelligence that indicated the possibility of any Americans being held alive in Vietnam or in Laos?

Mr. QUINN. Alive in captivity?

The CHAIRMAN. In captivity?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So after Operation Homecoming, to the best of your knowledge there was no data that you had access to through your sources in Vietnam and through the U.S. Government that indicated to you that an American was being held alive and in captivity?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir. But I think I should emphasize that POW/MIA was not a subject that I worked on in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, fair enough. I am just wondering if in the course of your discussions somebody came up to you and said, hey, you know, not everybody went back, Operation Homecoming is not complete. Did you ever hear that?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, I did not. There were reports during the war which I remember seeing of individuals who had possibly gone over to the other side, I am not sure what the right word is on that and there were a couple of names there who I understood did not return.

I didn't know and I still don't know today what their fate was, but those were the only names that I recall from that period.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those people that you say, quote, "went over to the other side," listed as MIA/POW today?

Mr. QUINN. The one name that I recall from that period, I believe is not listed as POW/MIA, but is listed as somebody about whom we don't know what his particular fate was.

The CHAIRMAN. So that person is not among the 2,273?

Mr. QUINN. I don't believe so, but I would have to—

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Ford, do you know the answer to that?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, as far as I know, there are no names on our list of 2,273 that were in a deserter or AWOL category.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come back to that later but let's sort of look at this thing from the perspective of the average American who doesn't know a lot about it, who certainly hasn't read intelligence, would you say, is there any doubt in your mind, that Vietnam wants to normalize?

Mr. QUINN. No, I believe that Vietnam does want to proceed in the direction of a better relationship, a more normal relationship with the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Could Vietnam normalize if a week from now we discovered a camp full of Americans being held or with 10 or 2 or 1?

Mr. QUINN. I couldn't imagine that possibility, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And they must be aware of that, correct?

Mr. QUINN. I would assume that having had people in the United States, that they would know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Most people would assume that if we were to discover they were holding somebody, it would be years before this country—

Mr. QUINN. It would be destructive of the whole process.

The CHAIRMAN. Now if that is true, and I accept that that basically is true, can you help the committee to understand, for those who assert that the government is holding somebody over there, what rationale, what is the purpose, what gain since 19 years have almost elapsed and there has been, I take it, no offer—have you ever received an offer to negotiate the return of people?

Mr. QUINN. Return of live—

The CHAIRMAN. Return of live Americans?

Mr. QUINN. I never have, no, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone ever seen any intelligence or any data that has through a back channel that has sought payment for the return of people?

Mr. QUINN. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, why would the government today be holding somebody in your view, you are the head of the group that is tasked with trying to return a live American, what is there that would make you believe that there is an opportunity that a live American might be held by the government? I am leaving

aside the possibility of some outside group. But is there any rationale at all that you could understand that comes to any person in your group?

Mr. QUINN. I don't think that there is anything that I would think of that would explain a position like that on the part of Vietnam. I have had many meetings over the time that I have been in the IAG and I have met with people who are critics of our process and who put forward arguments or possible justifications, sometimes it relates to expert information, technical information that particular Americans might have had.

So I have heard these positions put forward, but I believe that for Vietnam to take a position like that, they would have to understand that it would be very destructive of any type of diplomatic hope of progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Now presuming that when, let's say that, let me ask it this way. When I was in Hanoi I met with the ambassadors of Great Britain, Italy, France, Australia and one other country, it slips my mind at this moment, but all five of the ambassadors looked at me in the course of our luncheon and said, Senator, you are crazy.

Your country is crazy. We are over here. We go all over the Country. We have diplomatic presence, you don't. Why don't you get over here, and if you want to find people who are alive, get your people in the country, on the ground, and talk to people the way we do because we have been here for years, and we don't have any sign of any of your people being alive.

Now are we different? Do we view the world differently? Is there some reason that we should look at this differently, and again, I am sort of being the devil's advocate on this with you, but I want to know what your thinking is on it since you are the head of this agency group?

Mr. QUINN. I think that is important to have people on the ground and able to move around and talk and investigate and that's why we have the office there. So I think that is—and the office has more than proved its worth in the short time that it has been open, to me. So I think that is very valuable.

At the same time, Vietnam was a traumatic experience for our country, and I think it is very important how we proceed in the future and there are obviously a lot of wounds that are still there and they haven't healed.

So our approach has been one to try to find a diplomatic strategy in which we show Vietnam that, yes, we can proceed. Yes, we can move ahead, and to be very clear and precise with Vietnam in saying, this is what has to happen for us to be able to move ahead, and it outlines steps that we can each take, build confidence with each other that we are addressing each other's needs and to move ahead and resolve this issue in a way that will be, allow us to provide the fullest possible accounting on POW/MIA's and also in a way that can have the support of the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what is the likelihood, that somebody fell into hands outside of the government, and that some tribe or group or who knows what, were holding somebody in a jungle in a remote area which is not accessible and that the government wouldn't know it? What is the analysis with respect to that?

Mr. QUINN. In my conversation with Foreign Minister Thach, he has said that Vietnam was not holding anybody alive, but he couldn't say for sure that there wasn't a situation exactly like the circumstances that you have just mentioned, and in fact, he then provided us this information about Walter R. Robertson and the picture which he did not vouchsafe that it was true, but he wanted to be passing on the information which fit the circumstance like that.

So I think you would have to say, given the fact that we have the discrepancy cases, that you have Americans who we cannot say for certain that they perish in the incident and even that took place, that we have to act with the possibility that there could be somebody alive and it's possible that—

The CHAIRMAN. Based on your knowledge of Vietnam and of the region, it is fair to say, is it not, that there are some regions remote enough and some areas that are not sufficiently within the real control of the government, that that could exist?

Mr. QUINN. Well, for Vietnam, it has to be extremely remote. It is a heavily populated country, approaching 70 million people. It has an established governmental infrastructure, and I think the Vietnamese government knows basically what goes on its country.

Laos is different. You know, a huge area, only a couple of million people, that is, I think, if you are talking about probabilities within possibilities, that is a country in which something like that could have a slightly higher probability of occurring.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is going to be important for the committee to try to narrow probabilities and possibilities and—

Mr. QUINN. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. And to try to make assessments regarding them, so, let me come back to that and let me let my colleague pick up—

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, could we limit it to 5 minutes, there are six of us here.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Quinn, your predecessor, Mr. Lamberton in 1987 said the issue as far as State was concerned was the priority with Laos, the issue of POW's and MIA's. Is that still the case in your opinion?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, it is, it still is. But I think it would be important to note that since then, I don't know exactly what other things we were saying about narcotics in 1987, I would have to go back and check the record.

But certainly now, narcotics cooperation is another very important subject in our relations with Laos.

Senator SMITH. In Henry Kissinger's memoirs, he made a statement that in February 1973, that the North Vietnamese handed over to him a list of POW's that had been captured in Laos.

I assume that that list is, I don't know if you have ever seen it—

Mr. QUINN. I have not.

Senator SMITH. The concern that I have, is that the nine that the North Vietnamese had or were these prisoners that were captured by the Pathet Lao? I would like to have, just for the interest of folks back there, have the opportunity to see that list or for the

committee to have access to that list. I won't question you on it at this point.

How many reports do you know of in the Department of State pertaining alleged sightings of American POW's in Laos?

Mr. QUINN. Well, most of the reports that are received at the Department of State would come either from the defense department reporting in the field, through its intelligence agencies, or from our embassies, report of our embassy in Vientiane or our embassy in Bangkok reporting, or if other individuals, private citizens would somehow come to us directly.

I don't have any idea—and I am not sure which of those categories you would be referring to.

Senator SMITH. The point is, I think there has to be communication obviously between State and DIA and State or DOD and—

Mr. QUINN. Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH. In terms of keeping the established priority, if POW's are the priority issue with the State Department and with Laos, and surely they ought to have some feedback from DOD as to how many POW sightings we have. So is there such communication between the two as far as you know?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir, there is certainly communication—

Senator SMITH. But at this point you don't know how many there are?

Mr. QUINN. I don't know. I wouldn't have a number, but I would certainly undertake to try to get you a number.

Senator SMITH. It just seems like in your position you should know, you want to know the number if it is a priority issue, then it would seem to me that you ought to know how many alleged sightings there are—

Mr. QUINN. The information, if I could, Senator, there is voluminous traffic flow and we have reports that will come in that sometimes will be hearsay reports, they will be second hand. Everything is written down and conveyed and that flows through the communication channel and it goes to the analysts and they will look at it and sort it and make some judgments about which are ones that we really should pay attention to and of course, we depend on their judgments to a very high degree.

Senator SMITH. I will accept that. Have we made similar proposals to the Lao that we have made to the Vietnamese. We don't have the diplomatic ties—we have at least some type of embassy ties in Laos. Have we made similar proposals to them? Take us to the live sighting locations, A, and B, have they accepted?

Mr. QUINN. We have gone to them with the live sighting reports and they said that they would investigate them. They said that they would take us, after—when they have done their unilateral investigation, that they would also take us. They did that with the Borah case. They have said that they would do that with the Carr case, and we have our Lao investigator who is here from the embassy in Bangkok—

Senator SMITH. Prison sites, alleged prison sites?

Mr. QUINN. I don't know—we don't have, that I have seen, specific reports of prison sites with particular individuals in them right now to request. I know that there are reports of—

Senator SMITH. But they have not said that you can come, as Vietnam has said, even though we haven't gone yet, they have said you could come to prison sites, have they said that, like the Vietnamese have?

Mr. QUINN. I have not raised with them visiting particular prison sites. I have raised with them particular cases and investigating the reports where those are. Let me, if I could, just check to be sure.

As I said, Senator, we have generally not had information that puts specific individuals in specific prisons. I assure you if we had that, we will follow it up. There is, I am told, one report that Captain Carr was held in prison, and that we have asked to go and visit that site and they have said that they will arrange for us to do that.

Senator SMITH. Senator Grassley is up next I believe.

Mr. QUINN. Senator, it is good to see you. Senator is my Senator, I am from Iowa.

Senator GRASSLEY. Notice that he smiled when he said that. You informed them you were from Iowa. I assume you have already said that—

The CHAIRMAN. He did all that refugee work in Iowa. [Laughter.] Senator McCAIN. Is this refugee work, people fleeing Iowa for Arizona? [Laughter.]

Mr. QUINN. There was some initial flight the first winter, Senator McCain, but the ones from Laos actually—

Senator McCAIN. We have settled very successfully the Iowans in Arizona. [Laughter.]

Senator GRASSLEY. Do my 5 minutes start right now, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Right this instant.

Senator GRASSLEY. If I could, the first thing would be to discuss something with you that I brought up with General Vessey. I don't know whether you were here or not and it doesn't matter. It pertains to the normalization of relations with Vietnam, and resolution of the discrepancy cases.

My question to him, and to you because he could not give a definite answer, is what officially are the criteria for discrepancy cases? He left the impression with me that the criteria was rather subjective.

Could you tell us what the criteria are and please understand if you want to elaborate in great detail in writing I would be glad to have it that way. But somewhere along the line I have to get a pretty definite answer on this.

Mr. QUINN. The basic general definition, and if I could, we will submit something in writing, but is that there is evidence that the person involved survived the incident and that Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia would have information about the fate of the person.

Senator GRASSLEY. Maybe, I want to emphasize the word policy, to get away from what I got from General Vessey, being very subjective. I think he kind of referred to the fact that there wasn't a policy.

Is there a policy on what is a discrepancy case and what isn't, or are you saying that what you just told me is the expression of that policy?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, that is right. What I have told you is the expression of the policy.

Senator GRASSLEY. Then my follow-up question is, who is responsible for setting the policy governing discrepancy cases and who determines which cases are discrepancy cases and nondiscrepancy cases?

Mr. QUINN. Well, discrepancy, the cases, the experts on the Cases reside in the defense department, and they do the analysis based on all of the information and will make those of us who are in policy positions aware of which cases there is information that we have that a person would have survived the incident and that the Vietnamese would have knowledge of the Laotians would have knowledge of that.

Senator Grassley: Would it be fair to say that the state department is not in any rush to resolve these cases simply because we want to move toward normalization?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, it is very fair to say that.

Senator GRASSLEY. If this committee were to show that a discrepancy case that has been "resolved"—and for the definition of resolved, we would accept your decision—should not be resolved based on further evidence on its merits—that the merits would say that it should remain open—could we expect that such a case would itself become a discrepancy case that would still beg a resolution?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, you should, and in fact, we have had just a case exactly like that, and if I could explain. I mean, one way of being sure that you have an accounting is that if you have remains that come back, that can be identified as an individual. Then you can be sure what the fate is.

But if you don't have remains, then you look and assess all of the information you have and you make a judgment. That was done in the case of Colonel Robertson, but when we had this new photo evidence and we had identification made by members of the Robertson family, it didn't matter what our previous judgment had been, we didn't have remains and we pursued it with all of the vigor and energy that we could. And if there are any other cases, no matter how they have been adjudicated, if we don't have the remains that are returned, and we have new information that comes from the committee or anybody else, we will, of course, pursue it.

Senator GRASSLEY. That is a very good example. So that at this point, I take what you say is that the Robertson case would be now a discrepancy case?

Mr. QUINN. We are still looking at the photo and we are continuing to pursue that and investigate that case and so I would not consider it one in which we have reached final conclusions.

Senator GRASSLEY. Who would make the decision on whether or not a case like this is a discrepancy case?

Mr. QUINN. The IAG would meet and review and discuss cases like that. Of course, they are discussed with General Vessey, but we, of course, rely very extensively on the work that is done by the defense department experts, both in DIA and in the Pacific Command and JCRC, who also have people in Hanoi and in Bangkok and so we rely on their expert analysis and work and then try to make the best possible judgments we can about how to proceed.

Senator GRASSLEY. Does one or more than one person, or maybe different people for different cases make this decision or is it one person—

Mr. QUINN. It is not any one person, no.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. We heard this morning that the U.S. and Vietnam have agreed to certain procedures for investigating live sighting reports. Does this include our government turning over classified file information on POW's like sources and methods?

Mr. QUINN. Certainly not turning over anything about sources and methods, I couldn't imagine a situation in which we would do that. There are situations though where we have information and in which we make a prudent judgment or attempt to make a prudent judgment as to what information we would provide to Vietnam.

So in the case of the Robertson, Stevens and Lundy photo, we did provide information to the Vietnamese government, the Cambodian government and the Laotian government which we expected them to investigate and work with and we asked them to provide us answers. But we certainly didn't turn over anything.

In fact, one of the things Colonel Cole and I did and Warren Gray until about 2:00 in the morning was going through this information to make absolutely sure that in no way was there any compromise of where we were getting our information.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. So you have reached no conclusions concerning the photo of the three?

Mr. QUINN. I have not. And of course, the photo is being analyzed and I think you will hear later from people in DOD and DIA about it.

But I have said publicly to the families that until I would see information that would indicate that either that Colonel Robertson is conclusively dead or that the photo can somehow be demonstrated that it is not what it purports to be, that we would continue to pursue it and investigate it.

Senator McCain. You mention in your statement that the Walter T. Robertson photo you determined was not an American. How did you do that?

Mr. QUINN. Well, the photo was of a black person and Walter T. Robertson who served in the U.S. Army, I believe, was caucasian. Second, Walter T. Robertson returned from Vietnam and is alive in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You applied some extraordinary methods to that case. [Laughter.]

Mr. QUINN. I guess that is a source and method we could reveal. Senator McCain. And you have no conclusions about the Carr picture?

Mr. QUINN. I do not, but I believe some of the other expert witnesses may.

Senator McCain. How firm are the POW/MIA conditions of the roadmap?

Mr. QUINN. They are central to the roadmap and they are very firm. I think that statement is as strong as I could make it.

Senator McCain. In the last year thanks to Vietnamese desire for normalization and driven largely by their economic conditions and General Vessey's outstanding work, you have seen great progress?

Mr. QUINN. I think we have made progress. I think we are going in the right direction. And I think we have set a framework in a stage for moving ahead and getting more answers.

Senator McCain. More progress than you have seen in previous years?

Mr. QUINN. I think so, Senator.

Senator McCain. And you are optimistic?

Mr. QUINN. Yes.

Senator McCain. About the resolution of this issue?

Mr. QUINN. I am optimistic that we have momentum, that we have found a direction and that we are going in the right direction. I guess anytime you talk about Vietnam I want to be sort of guarded about expressing optimism about anything.

But I have some guarded optimism that we are going in the right direction and we have the potential. I think that we have the potential now to really move ahead and get more results.

Senator McCain. I was contacted today by Mr. Earl Bond from California who is the father of Captain Ronald Bond, USAF. He has been missing since he was shot down over Laos in 1971.

His father, naturally, argued he had been denied information by DIA and that he has a right to know. And he further alleges that Defense Department officials have publicly asserted that they have provided him the information. You are not familiar with that case?

Mr. QUINN. I am not, I am sorry, Senator.

Senator McCain. Could you provide for the record a response for those allegations or have Mr. Ford or someone do so? I would appreciate it.

Obviously, these hearings will spark renewed interest on the part of many concerned individuals as well as family members.

How did they determine that the Borah, how did they track down the Borah picture or the individual who was purported to be Mr. Borah? Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. QUINN. I know the answer generally and I think you will get more details later.

But we provided some information to the Lao and they went and looked and found the man who appeared to be the individual that was in the photo. Then our team went out, they met with the individual. They saw him. They had a chance to photograph him, take fingerprints, interview him, ask him about the photo and how it was taken, compare the photo with him and with other photos.

But, again, I was not the one who was involved in that. And I think you will be hearing from the individuals who were and they can give you a much more precise and detailed answer.

Senator McCain. But in the case of Laos, which is the focus of a lot of our attention because of the disproportionate numbers of POW's who were returned as opposed to North Vietnam, in your view are the Laos still significantly controlled by the Vietnamese? And what is the degree of their cooperation? And if they are cooperating, is it because the Vietnamese are telling them to or is it

because of their desire for better relations throughout the region, including with Thailand?

Mr. QUINN. Well, Laos has always lived in the shadow of Vietnam. It is a country of 70 million and a county of 2 million or 3 million people nearby.

But I feel that Laos, the Laotian people are very proud and that they had a very close relationship with Hanoi during the war. But I think it is somewhat more distant now. I would certainly never say that it is a country that is not influenced by Vietnam. Certainly it is influenced significantly, but I think not as much if you look back at 1975. And I think the Laotians are trying to find their own way. And they are very sensitive to the suggestion that somehow that they just are a subdivision of Vietnam. So we deal with them as an independent country. And I believe that the facts justify that approach.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Reid.

Senator Reid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For my own personal curiosity and also to lay an appropriate background, tell me again what you were doing in combat situations as a foreign service officer.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, Senator.

I was assigned as a foreign service officer to Vietnam. And then I was assigned to MACV, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and the advisory program throughout Vietnam for the provincial and regional forces in Vietnam and for local government. It was a combined military and civilian operation with an integrated military and civilian chain of command down to the district level.

And so I was a district senior advisor, I guess the equivalent of maybe like a county in the United States. And I went into, I was in Sedec Province down in the Mekong Delta. And I went into a district and replaced a U.S. Army major as the district senior adviser.

And this district happened to be right at the edge of the Vin Long army airfield. And so we engaged every day in joint operations with helicopter units that came off the Vin Long army airfield and going out in the helicopters, searching for areas and troops when the time came. And I went out in my civilian clothes and did everything the Army major before me did and, I presume, the Army major who replaced me did.

The CHAIRMAN. This was early training for his dealings with us. [Laughter.]

Mr. QUINN. I expected when I joined the foreign service that I was going to be off in Paris or Vienna or someplace with aperitifs and discussing the nuances of international relations with diplomats, some place in Europe. And I suddenly woke up and I was in Vietnam in this situation one morning. It changed my life.

Senator Reid. Do you believe the allegations that there is a tendency to find fault with the source of information rather than investigate the data? This has been talked about by a number of Senators here today. Let us hear what you have to say about that.

Mr. QUINN. There are, I would, I guess, start by saying of all the people that I deal with from DIA, DOD, and so on, have always shown to me that when they have information and that it looks

good and they make a judgment that we proceed after it rapidly and vigorously. And I do not have any sense that there is anybody who is doing anything other than that.

Senator Reid. How about in the past?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I have only been in this job since July 1990.

Senator Reid. But you, of course, have looked at what has gone on before, I hope?

Mr. QUINN. I have not made any investigation of what has gone on before I came into the job and start from there. And obviously, there are some references to the past.

But to answer, if I could take one second, that in our State Department business overseas, we process thousands and thousands of cases of people who are after visas. And it has occurred to me as I have looked at these two processes, that I have seen something happening in the State Department where we have had so many in some places, so many stories that are brought to us by people who are interested in a visa to come to the United States, but it is not, and these turn out to be bogus stories and they are not true.

And I know that our officers who deal with them will sometimes feel that they are inundated with that type of information. And I have seen in just sampling and looking at these reports as they flow in that you get time after time in the POW/MIA issue people coming in, looking to try to extort money from us, looking to somehow try to present us with hearsay information in a way that they can gain some advantage. That having that type of situation in all of those reports, because every one of them has to be gone through, I think that it does not help. I think that it can cause skepticism to creep into the process.

I do not know that it has, but I have felt that that kind of analogy is possible.

Senator Reid. I am reminded of a statement that Chairman Kerry made earlier today that I think we need only look at the fact that here it is 18 years, 19 years later. And the investigatory staff, call it whatever you want, is getting bigger rather than smaller. And you would think it would be just the opposite. Obviously, something has to occur so the staff winds down.

And I just have to believe the little bit that I know at this stage that we may have had too many people that looked at this as it were a visa application and not somebody who is waiting for their loved one to come home.

Mr. QUINN. Again, I just want to repeat that nothing where I have been involved since I have been in this job, where any of this information has been discussed, that nobody has tended to debunk it.

Senator Reid. You made that point clear. But you see, that is a problem that we have every step of the way. Everybody is saying, while I was on watch we did everything that we could. Well, somewhere along the road something has gone wrong. Or we would not be now, almost 20 years later, building a staff rather than cutting it back.

Mr. QUINN. If I could, I think that one of the reasons that we are building the staff now is that there is a lot of work to be done and we see now the potential for doing it. And if we could keep moving in this roadmap approach and continue to take steps, this is going

to open up for other and more activity and we want to be able to move in when that door is open and hit the ground and do this kind of accounting as fast, and investigations and access to information and interviewing people and following up, as fast as we can.

I do not think that the American people would be satisfied with us saying now you have these things available and you do not have the resources ready and the people ready to move ahead and take advantage of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Reid. I think that is a very fair statement.

And obviously there is a greater opportunity today which requires more on the ground personnel. We were not in Vietnam until this past year and so forth. Some might question whether we could have been there sooner, but the interesting inquiry for this committee and the difficult inquiry, and it is raised by Senator Smith pointing out the sort of difference between what was responded to to the committee and then what finally turns up. And that as you go backward in time, somehow you have to establish what the probability was in 1973 and 1974 that somebody was alive because it is depending on that probability that you can begin to make some judgments about the possibilities and probabilities of discrepancy cases today.

If in 1973 it was highly unlikely that somebody was alive, it is less likely that 19 years later they are. But if in 1973 there was, almost to a certainty, somebody alive, there is a greater likelihood that 19 years later somebody may be alive. And so we are forced, automatically, to try to make some assessments about the state of knowledge back then which is why I said the committee will trace the chain of custody of this issue, if you will, almost building a chart from where we were in terms of our knowledge and the negotiations in Paris.

Because there is no way that we can sit here at the end of this inquiry and try to make a judgment and say, well, gosh, we do not think somebody is alive today if we are discounting the odds that somebody might have been alive back then.

So as uncomfortable and difficult as that inquiry is, I think we are forced to try to make it.

Mr. QUINN. I think, Senator, that any type of thorough investigation and review of the issue would have to include that. I just wanted to make the point that from the time I came I have been looking ahead to what is it we can do, what steps can we take, what diplomatic or other measures can we pursue to get at the answers.

The CHAIRMAN. And your first formal contact with this in official capacity with responsibility for the issue was?

Mr. QUINN. July 1990.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It was really along those lines that I wanted to begin my questioning. It relates to the degree to which you believe there was a consensus about the number of men last known to be alive in Laos and Cambodia back in 1973. To what degree do you think the consensus existed with regard to the numbers back then?

Mr. QUINN. In 1973? I was on the Cambodian border in 1973. And I was not aware of what the discussion was at that time. I really feel inadequate to answer the question.

Senator DASCHLE. I am not asking what you knew then. I am asking about your knowledge now, having had this position for a year with access to the records that must have been compiled over the last 17 years. To what degree do we now know there was a consensus about numbers of live men left in Cambodia and Laos?

Mr. QUINN. I am not aware, Senator, that there has been any judgment at any time in the executive branch that there were Americans left in Laos or Cambodia after the official release of POW/MIA's. I have never heard such a report and I am not aware of evidence or information about Americans being held, still held as prisoner.

As I mentioned earlier, there have been reports of maybe some who are not prisoners, who might have remained behind. And I mentioned that, and perhaps you were not here, but of people being held prisoner, I am not aware of any information or assessment or analysis in that regard.

Senator DASCHLE. I guess what I am asking is this: Is there a consensus about what would now be the base number as we work to resolve the cases, especially those cases in your testimony? The numbers used to conduct our first investigations in the discrepancy cases involving the men last to be alive in Lao hands?

I am surprised that these are the first ever investigations, 17 years later.

Mr. QUINN. These are the first ones we have been permitted to do.

Senator DASCHLE. That was my question.

How do you know, if you have no base number from which to work, what the number of discrepancy cases are? What is the number of discrepancy cases in Laos and Cambodia?

Mr. QUINN. I do not have the exact number. But let me, if I could, refer.

There were 49 cases, Lao border cases, where there were areas, there were Lao's controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war in which we believe the Vietnamese could have or should have information relating to those cases. There were 15 additional individuals who were listed as POW's during the release of prisoners. And it is those numbers that I have had DIA and the Defense Department brief me on as particular cases.

Senator DASCHLE. This is just Laos? Or is this Laos and Cambodia?

Mr. QUINN. Just Laos.

Senator DASCHLE. So what you are saying is, there were 64 outstanding cases total involving people in Laos?

Mr. QUINN. You asked me in terms of the discrepancy cases.

Senator DASCHLE. So there are 64 discrepancy cases?

Mr. QUINN. Those are the discrepancy cases, as I say, that comes from DIA analysis. And what I am repeating to you is what has been briefed.

We do not have a set menu of numbers of cases with an official total for any of these countries.

There are 9 discrepancy cases in Cambodia of the same way that I have described. Now you get other information at different times that would take a case and put it in, take a case and put it out.

I want to be clear and I want to emphasize that we, because you can convey—anytime you say a number you can convey a sense that somehow these are the only cases that you care about and that they are the only ones you are going to pursue. That is not the case. We are interested in all 2,272 of those individuals listed as missing in action.

When you start talking about these other shades in between, you are talking about the degree of information and knowledge that we have. And I do not want to leave any suggestion that somehow these are cases that fall into circumstances which we only pursue those more ardently than others. Last known alive discrepancy cases, that is where you have information where an individual was alive and you have reason to believe that the Vietnamese know what happened to him or he fell into Vietnamese hands. Of course, they are people who we cannot say are dead.

And because we put our emphasis on the live prisoner issue, whether it is Laos or Vietnam, that those are the ones to which we would give the highest priority. And that is where General Vessey's 119 cases have come from.

Senator DASCHLE. But that last known alive figure is not just Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. QUINN. That is correct.

Senator DASCHLE. You see, I started my questioning by asking you if you could differentiate between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and give us the last known alive figures for Laos and Cambodia. You gave me your discrepancy figures which are helpful.

To the extent we could, for the record, I think it would be very helpful to differentiate and to quantify and even substantiate, if that needs to be done, the figures as they relate to each country.

Second, I suspect that part of the reason discrepancy numbers are so low in Cambodia is because, from what I am getting in the testimony, frankly, there has been very little contact with Cambodia. I mean, I would imagine that with greater contact and greater information comes greater possibility for discrepancy. As a result, those numbers could increase.

However, it would be very helpful to have a base number from which we could work in order to obtain a better understanding of the degree to which the problem exists in all three countries.

Mr. QUINN. I am sorry if I confused or misunderstood the question. I thought you had asked about discrepancy cases as opposed to last known alive.

Anyway, as I understand it, it is better for you to hear this directly from DIA. But in Laos, in terms of last known alive cases that they carry, there are 16 cases involving 22 individuals who would fall into the last known alive or listed as POW at homecoming category.

Senator DASCHLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. This is going to be our longest day, our most arduous day unquestionably.

But the next panels are important also, and we want to leave time for them. They are particularly important for a number of reasons.

Before we move to them, Mr. Secretary, let me just ask you. You said we are going to pay attention to all 2,273. And, indeed, we ought to.

But is there not a point here where we have got to come to closure on some of these cases? I mean, I have looked at some of the 2,273 and frankly, when I was over in Vietnam I got information from the Vietnamese regarding six or seven discrepancy cases that I believe, I am confident, I know the team has now, they have resolved. But at the end of that I must tell you I was capable of drawing the conclusion and was prepared to draw a conclusion that personnel on the ground had testified that that person had been killed, that the circumstances were clear. It was verifiable in terms of place, time, date and so forth. But because you do not have remains it sort of stays in this murky area.

And it just seems to me that that is wrong, that we have got to start to draw some conclusions about these or you kind of go on forever. Now is that going to happen? Are we prepared to do that based upon the information we are now getting?

Mr. QUINN. I think what is important, Senator, is that we know that we are not going to be able to account for every last serviceman who has not returned from Vietnam.

There are some cases because they were over water and other circumstances that make it highly doubtful. But what is important is that we have a process which can be viewed as an open and credible process by the American people and that we have gone through and we have looked at every case. And we can, at the end, say and feel that Americans would agree that we have done our best, that we have looked in every possible way and then we have made our judgments.

I think to make the judgments that you are suggesting before we have that leaves the door open.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what people want to know is, and what we want to know is that while we are going to turn over every stone and we are going to make every effort to open this process up, and I suggest at the end of this inquiry people are going to have a better sense of this than they ever had before, but where you have eyewitnesses—

For instance, in one of these cases they say, look, we came on these people and we killed them. And here is what we did with them. And there are four or five people who say this is what we did. We did it. And you have a date and time and other sort of corroborative evidence. The question is, are we going to make a determination and share that with the families and bring the lists down by a commensurate number of people according to those determinations?

Mr. QUINN. The answer is that that process has already begun as part of General Vessey's efforts. And you have some cases that have been resolved because remains have been found and brought home. There are others where you consider that the fate has been reconfirmed through this investigation. And those judgments have been made. And that process is going on right now.

The CHAIRMAN. And being communicated to the families?

Mr. QUINN. Yes. Well, that is really, I mean, Mr. Ford and the Defense Department are the ones who are in charge of that. But I mean, that has gone on as part of General Vessey's process.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you another question. I am not trying to diminish your job or take a job away from you, but would we be better off if now that there has been this reorganization within the Defense Department and there is sort of one person responsible, would we be better off not having an inter-agency group per se or have a direct reporting of agencies to that one person so there is one person responsible and everybody knows who we are dealing with here?

Mr. QUINN. Well, we have not hesitated to reorganize this process. And there have been a number of steps taken just in the last year, year and a half.

You will hear later from General Ryan and General Christmas who will talk about what they are looking at in terms of reorganization, in terms of the field components to ensure coordination. We have not hesitated also in Washington with Secretary Cheney, the Carper group from the House of Representatives made up of six Vietnam veterans that produced what I think is very useful and stimulating report.

And I know that there is thinking going on within the executive branch now as to are there other steps we can take to reorganize this and to make it more effective. And we will certainly take your suggestion back as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman McCloskey and Congressman Carper have been in touch with the group and I think it is a good report.

And that report, without objection, will be made a part of this record in its entirety.

[The information referred to follows:]

FRANK McCLOSKEY
8TH DISTRICT, Indiana

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

PROSECUTORY AND
MILITARY POLICE SYSTEMS
INVESTIGATIONS
ARMED FORCES PANEL

POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMITTEE

CHAMBERLAIN, PORTLAND, OREGON
LIFE SERVICE
INVESTIGATIONS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

October 18, 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry, Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
SROB 421
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chairman Kerry: *John*

As you know, I recently returned from a visit to Laos and Thailand where I met with Lao officials concerned with the humanitarian and MIA/POW issues. My brief stopover in Thailand allowed me to speak with those U.S. officials in charge of both the Joint Casualty Reconciliation Center and the Stoney Beach live-sighting response project in Bangkok. In addition, I interviewed Col. Jack Bailey (USAF, ret.) who has for some years been active to collecting information on the possibility that U.S. servicemen are being detained in Indochina.

Discussion of the MIA/POW issue can become a highly emotional one. One lingering tragedy is the countless times hopes of families have been raised only to be dashed because of unscrupulous individuals trafficking in phony photographs or artifacts purporting to prove the survival of a particular serviceman. It is my view that we must move swiftly to deter such behavior in order to focus time and resources on those MIA/POW cases which merit intensive scrutiny and attention at the highest levels of government.

On October 3, I had the opportunity to meet personally with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for MIA/POW Affairs on these types of cases. I was encouraged by their interest and receptiveness to new information provided on one such compelling case. It seems to me that we now may have a special opportunity and responsibility to do everything possible within the next year to close out the MIA/POW issue in a fair and effective way.

The following are some of my impressions and suggestions which I have developed from my trip to Vientiane and Bangkok which may be useful to your committee as you begin hearings in the near future.

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1. Quick reaction response to live sightings an urgent priority -- We must recognize the importance of providing the government of Laos with the means to undertake quick reaction responses to live-sighting reports in conjunction with U.S. personnel. In my meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Souleavong in Vientiane on September 30, 1991, I raised this issue. It was indicated that the Lao government was ready to do more and considered their cooperation on MIA/POW issues an "official responsibility." In my view, such a capability should consist of DoD providing pilot training to the Lao as well as modernizing its current fleet of helicopters in order to provide all-weather, all-terrain search capabilities.

2. Greater interagency coordination required -- One disappointment growing out of briefings prior to my trip was the lack of coordination, information hand-off, intelligence confusion and general delay in following up leads. If the MIA/POW issue is truly a national priority, the agencies of government should act like it. It is particularly bothersome to hear that there is little if any information exchange between the CIA and DIA. In effect, our CIA "doesn't do MIA/POWs." This should be a matter of concern to all of us. It is also of concern to learn of reports where MIA fingerprints simply disappear from FBI files. Such unsettling concerns ought to be resolved and fully explained in the process of congressional oversight.

3. Reconciling historical discrepancies -- The comments of official Pathet Lao spokesmen during early 1973 when the Vietnam armistice was being negotiated explicitly stated that U.S. POWs were being held and their return would be subject of negotiation. During my visit to Laos, I asked to speak to the individual who was quoted at that time saying the Pathet Lao held POWs. After initially being told the individual was deceased, I was then informed by Vice Minister Souleavong that this man, Mr. Soth Pathrany, was alive. I have formally requested that appropriate U.S. government officials be allowed to interview him in order to address this matter.

4. More substantive and frequent humanitarian aid efforts in Laos justified -- The expression of appreciation by the Lao people to the 30,000 lbs. of medical equipment, supplies and pharmaceuticals which we delivered on September 19, 1991 to Vientiane was truly impressive. What mattered most to these people and their Ministry of Public Health was that such a gesture reflected a sincere desire of the American people to assist their country. As you know, Laos has a population of only 4 million people. Certainly, additional flights coordinated through the Pentagon's Office of Global Affairs will go a long

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way to build on stronger ties between ourselves and the Lao at a very minimal cost. One benefit can be a more effective MIA/POW recovery program to tangibly demonstrate the good faith and sincerity of the Lao government on this issue.

5. Permanent program needed to deal with unexploded ordnance in Laos -- In addition to the lack of mobility to deal quickly with live-sighting reports is the legacy of the U.S. aerial campaign in Laos where more bombs were dropped than in World War II. Whenever it is agreed that a crash site may be visited, it is standard procedure that U.S. ordnance experts conduct a survey of the site and defuse unexploded bombs and bomblets. Unfortunately, Lao children and farmers are still being killed and maimed when they accidentally step on such ordnance. It is my view that DoD and the Department of State should consider a permanent and systematic program of bomb disposal in Laos. Such a step would go a long way in demonstrating our sincerity for improved relations.

6. Diplomatic Representation in Laos should be upgraded -- At the present time, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is headed very ably by Mr. Charles Salmon who is our Charge D'Affaires. However, we should consider upgrading our representation there to Ambassador status. Again, this is a low-cost step which taken in the context of these other proposals should no doubt help resolve the MIA/POW issue.

I have been closely following the MIA/POW issue for over six years. While I do not subscribe to any "conspiracy" theories which some have suggested is the reason why we have not obtained a better accounting of our MIA/POWs, it is clear that we could be doing a much better job and a much smarter job. If I can be of further assistance to you and your committee, feel free to call upon me at any time. This issue deserves the appropriate amount of time and attention, especially if we truly believe it is of the highest national priority. I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Warmest personal regards,

Frank M. McCloskey
Frank McCloskey M.C.

THOMAS R CARPER
RICHMOND, ALABAMA

COMMITTEES
BANKING FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 25, 1991

The Honorable John Kerry
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
SH - 705
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear John:

I am pleased to transmit to you and the members of the committee the attached report that several of my colleagues and I who served in the Vietnam War - Representatives Skaggs, Peterson, Kolbe, Rhodes, and Gilchrist - compiled as a result of our recent mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in August, 1991, for the November 5, 6, and 7 hearing records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

In returning to Southeast Asia for the first time since the Vietnam war, we reviewed the POW/MIA issue; the need for a comprehensive, international accord on Cambodia; the prospect of normalization of relations with Vietnam and Cambodia and upgrading relations with Laos; and the lifting of the economic embargo against Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Administration has stated that it would begin the process of normalization of relations with Vietnam once a comprehensive settlement for Cambodia is signed. Now that an agreement has been signed, discussions can begin pertaining to normalizing relations between the United States and these Southeast Asian countries and lifting the U.S. economic embargo against Vietnam and Cambodia.

I hope this report will be of value to you in reviewing these issues.

Sincerely,

Tom Carper
Member of Congress

Sincerely,
John, many thanks
for your willing-
ness to meet
with us in August prior to our COO's
departure for S.E. Asia. Collectively,
we've done some good, I think.
Obviously, more remains to be done, and
we look forward to working with you.

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REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA—AUGUST 3-11, 1991

FOREWORD

In March 1991, Congressman Pete Peterson and I began discussions which grew into a month-long fact-finding probe into the long-unresolved controversy over the fate of America's missing-in-action servicemen who are still unaccounted for more than 15 years after the Vietnam War. Our review and analysis led us to organize a Congressional delegation, unique in composition and mission.

We enlisted a bipartisan delegation marked not only by its members' common bond of military service in Vietnam, but by their open spirit of inquiry. As we began planning what was to be our first trip back to Vietnam since the war, each brought *longstanding* questions about the fate of fellow servicemen. Only weeks before our trip, the publication of a photograph of three individuals identified by family members as their long-missing loved ones provoked sharp reactions across the country.

Over the years, our country's views of the POW/MIA issue have been influenced by conflicting forces. The hopes of loved ones have been manipulated—by governments of the region, by profiteers, by sensationalists. Many have questioned our own government's role in resolving the POW/MIA dilemma. Was there a coverup, as some alleged? Has resolution of the issue been a real governmental priority? Was the failure to make more progress a symptom of mismanagement or incompetence? Was the secrecy which shrouded our government's efforts to gather information frustrating its aim of winning public understanding?

The announcement in April 1991, that our Government would address the POW/MIA issue as part of a "roadmap" which would govern the pace and scope of any normalization of our relations with the government of Vietnam gave added focus to our agenda. Despite the State Department's apparent unwillingness to share the text of its roadmap with the CODEL, the Department and many government and nongovernment officials urged us to reinforce its message to those leaders we might meet in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Perhaps ironically, the roadmap fused two of the most haunting remnants of conflict in post World War II Southeast Asia—the genocidal devastation and civil war in Cambodia and the unresolved fate of America's missing in action.

We set out for Southeast Asia in August, therefore, to study all facets of the POW/MIA issue as well as the process of settlement of the civil war in Cambodia, both key elements of the roadmap. We did so on the premise that an "on-the-ground" analysis might be not only more telling, but that it might differ substantially from "findings" reached in Washington, D.C.

We framed our inquiry to focus on four subjects: (1) the intensity and effectiveness of our own government's efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue; (2) the level of cooperation we are receiving from governments in Southeast Asia; (3) progress toward a comprehensive, lasting peace in Cambodia; and (4) the process for normalizing relations between our country and both Vietnam and Cambodia, and for moving toward full diplomatic relations with Laos.

This publication reflects our findings. It reflects the rich, diverse backgrounds of the members—experience in military service, foreign affairs, intelligence, international trade and economics, organization and management, and veterans' issues. Most importantly, it reflects the objectivity with which the CODEL members confronted the vexing questions they studied. Despite differences in their backgrounds, the members had a common commitment to conduct a studied, independent analysis of the issues. That open spirit of inquiry and the debt we owe to those who did not return from this war, as well as to the anguished families of the missing in action, have, in my view, forged a commitment far more compelling than party or philosophy of government. It is my hope, and that of the members of this delegation, that this report will help move us closer to the answers we all seek.

TOM CARPER.

INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 1991, a bipartisan group of members of the House of Representatives began an 8-day trip to Southeast Asia to complete an examination into the fate of servicemen unaccounted for in Southeast Asia; progress on the search for a satisfactory settlement of the civil war in Cambodia; and the process of improving and normalizing relations between the United States and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, respectively. The delegation consisted of Representatives Carper, Peterson, Kolbe, Rhodes, Skaggs, and Gilchrest. The delegation met with officials of the Lao People's

Democratic Republic, the State of Cambodia, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The trip also included a series of en-route briefing and fact-finding sessions with Department of Defense officials at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, and with State Department and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand. (See attached schedule.)

This report incorporates current information furnished by officials of the countries we visited, as well as our own analysis and recommendations, based on extensive study, briefings, and observations. We hope this report will be helpful to the Congress as it is called upon to consider legislation or to review policies on the issues discussed. We take the liberty of directing this report as well to the Executive Branch in view of the paramount importance we, and, we believe, the American people, attach to these issues.

This delegation was privileged to travel to this region and study these issues at a critical point in time. We respectfully offer our views to those entrusted with responsibility to shape and execute national policy.

DISCUSSION

In sense, journey Southeast began before one our to Asia long we boarded our C-135 at Andrews Air Force Base. In some measure it began with our service in the Vietnam War more than 20 years ago, representing, as we do, the experience of Army and Marines on the ground, Navy in the air and inland waterways, and Air Force in the skies. This journey was a genuine quest for answers, and each of us had been seeking those answers long before this CODEL was conceived.

Our search had its roots in the Vietnam war, a conflict which shaped each of us as individuals, and from which each of us returned a stronger person.

Just as the war affected us as individuals, the conflict and its aftermath altered us as a nation. As a society, we have grown from that experience, and largely put the war behind us. We in the Congress have helped bring about that closure—through the establishment and funding of veterans' programs, the development of a framework for resolving claims based on "Agent Orange" exposure, and many other ways.

Vestiges of the war have continued to haunt us, however. None has had more troubling affect than the wrenching questions evoked by the letters "POW/MIA."

As veterans of the Vietnam War, we feel a special poignancy in the question—what happened to our missing in action? Grappling with that question as a group, though, has taken us in many directions. In this effort, we have re-walked paths a number of our colleagues in Congress had charted, reviewing their hearing records, reports, and studies. Over several weeks, we met with virtually every available expert—inside the U.S. government and out, from spokesmen for, to the most vigorous opponents of, Administration policy.

Pursuing questions methodically and analytically, we continued to confront voices of skepticism and distrust. Allegations of "government coverup" continue to find their way into a national debate which has come to be referred to as "the POW/MIA issue". Is there substance to the "conspiracy" theory? If not, how would one overcome such perceptions? "Travel to Southeast Asia, see things on the ground! You'll see all we're doing to get this issue behind us," we were told. However, we found the view on the ground in Southeast Asia almost as obscured as the view from Washington.

It is clear that resolving the POW/MIA issue is a matter of national policy. It is equally clear, however, that the policy has never had the "top" priority our chief executives have rhetorically assigned it.

We salute the many dedicated, talented professionals—linguists, anthropologists, forensic analysts, technicians, and others—who have devoted years, and often much of their professional working lives, to searching for hidden answers. We want to provide that acknowledgment because they seldom if ever win medals or public accolades for their painstaking work. Like so much of the work associated with this "highest national priority" it is a story that has never been fully told and thus not understood. Their work has helped to unravel the mystery for many families of missing servicemen, and ended years of doubt and uncertainty. They deserve the praise and admiration of all Americans for their selfless work under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

Policymaking

We have certainly seen considerable energy and a high level of U.S. Government concern devoted to POW/MIA matters in recent months. Over the years and up to the present, however, dedicated and focused central management, direction, and

consistent coordination of POW/MIA activities has seemed as much fortuitous as planned. This sweeping charge is not made lightly or without due regard to the complexity of the job.

Reluctantly, we have to question the leadership directing those efforts. We question whether, at the highest level, there has been the kind of ongoing, hands-on direction needed to carry out a compelling national priority.

It appears that policy on the POW/MIA issue is not set by any one single responsible official. Instead, policymaking regarding the POW/MIA issue is "coordinated" through an interagency body—the POW/MIA Interagency Group (IAG). That group's membership includes representatives of the Defense Department, the National Security Council staff, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National League of POW/MIA Families. The IAG reportedly meets relatively infrequently.

We have not attempted to make any judgment regarding past decisions to use an interagency mechanism to carry out policymaking on this issue. But after evaluating existing arrangements, we believe a new direction is needed. In our view, more aggressive efforts must be taken to find any American servicemen who may still be alive in Southeast Asia, and to locate and identify remains of others. We do not believe an interagency coordinating group provides the best framework for carrying out this mission.

Such an effort requires more than simply "coordination." Indeed it may be that our government has been "coordinating" too long and not managing enough. In any event, we find no basis to believe that the IAG is—or could be—singlemindedly devoted to achieving the mission we believe must be established. By virtue of the composition, and the coordinating role it plays, the IAG's members necessarily owe their first loyalty to their parent organizations. As a result, it would appear that the MIA issue itself has become, or perhaps has always been, driven by competing interests, subordinate to and overshadowed by national security, diplomacy, protection of intelligence assets, and other government and private interests.

In examining the operation of the IAG as currently structured, we find no precedent for a representative of a nongovernmental organization, the National League of Families, participating as a member of a high-level governmental working group. It is of utmost importance that our government act with sensitivity to the families of those missing in action. That sensitivity should be balanced, however, with a sensitivity to distinctions between the grant of advisory authority and that of decision-making authority. It is not clear that such lines have been appropriately drawn here.

Priority

Our government has identified resolution of the POW/MIA issue as a high national priority. But it has not organized and managed that effort commensurate with its rhetoric. No administration has devoted to this issue the level of resources that would presumably attach to our "highest national priority." Even setting aside the rhetoric, our government has simply not done a good job of basic management.

We have not, it seems to us, identified with sufficient clarity and focus just what the POW/MIA mission is. Indeed there are different missions, and we question the assignment of priorities among them.

It remains our Government's view that it can not rule out the possibility that Americans missing in action remain alive in Southeast Asia. Our own visit, while providing no indication that any government is holding American prisoners of war, gave ample evidence of why the American public has come to doubt its own government's effort to resolve these questions. One must question the priority that has been given to finding these men.

Our Government's policy holds, in pertinent part, that "actions to investigate live-sighting reports receive and will continue to receive *necessary priority* and resources based on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive." (Emphasis added.) It is noteworthy that the "cannot rule out the possibility" position was only adopted in 1987. From 1973 to 1987, the government position was that "no living MIA/POW's remained in Southeast Asia."

As to current policy, the precise meaning of the phrase "necessary priority" is not clear. Our own observations lead us to conclude, however, that our government's primary energies and resources—such as they are—are being devoted not to any aggressive effort to find the living, but instead to locating remains and accounting for the deceased. Since 1987, the method of search for live Americans has been essentially "reaction" rather than "action" oriented. More specifically, the search has been largely an exercise in *rejecting* evidence: disproving the validity of photographs and debunking reports of "live sightings", rather than aggressively trying to deter-

mine if they are *true*. The presumption seems to lie on the side of hoax and falsehood.

It is simplistic, and bordering on the evasive, for our Government to declare that "[o]nly the communist governments of Indochina know the answer." (See DOD's POW-MIA Factbook, July 1991.) One could infer from that statement that our own government is under no real obligation to act, let alone take heroic measures. In any case, the facts belie the "only they know" proposition. This DOD rhetoric ignores the fact that Laos, for example, is a desperately poor country whose infrastructure is so fragile that its major cities are not linked by a highway network. Travel from point to point may take 2 weeks. If one of the more than 500 pilots downed over Laos (only nine of whom were among those released in 1973 in Operation Homecoming) survived and fell into the hands of forces other than the Pathet Lao, for example, might he be alive today in one of the many remote parts of Laos not subject to the control of the central government? In terms of what is known and knowable, we have to consider that possibility seriously. Indeed knowledgeable U.S. Government officials found reason to believe that recently released photos, one set initially thought by some to be of Navy Lt. Daniel Borah and another strongly resembling Army Capt. Donald Carr, were taken in Laos. (Our delegation urged the Lao to give all possible assistance and access to U.S. efforts to investigate those cases. The Lao did follow through aggressively. That effort, however, led to the finding in the first case that the photos thought to be of Lt. Borah, compelling as they appeared to be, were not of an American.)

Organizational Structure

Just as the POW/MIA mission on which our Government is embarked appears to suffer from a lack of focus and misdirection of purpose, its execution is hampered by what could be characterized as a byzantine organizational arrangement.

After reviewing our Government's POW/MIA operations, we found ourselves asking the question, "who's in charge here?" One finds no satisfactory answer to that question. Indeed the answer seems to be "everyone", and, thus, "no one". Why that is so becomes readily apparent: the organizational landscape is crowded with different offices. These include a POW/MIA office in the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), the Special Presidential Emissary for POW/MIA; and the POW/MIA Interagency Group.

Certain responsibilities among these offices overlap. Each reports to a different authority. Information-sharing among them is uneven. Coordination among them appears to be a matter of practice, but is not organizationally assured. Some are dedicated exclusively to POW/MIA issues; others are subject to being diverted from that effort to address entirely unrelated responsibilities. Finally, the authority of the entity dedicated to coordinating policy on POW/MIA matters, the Interagency Group, is simply undefined.

The missions of the various offices and agencies with responsibilities for POW/MIA matters vary widely in scope. For example, the able Special Presidential Emissary, General Vessey, has a very narrow formal mission: resolution of 119 "discrepancy cases." Nevertheless, the perception in America and abroad is that this official heads the entire POW/MIA investigative effort. We can only speculate as to whether this is due to his identification as a Presidential representative, the high esteem in which General Vessey is held, or some other reason.

An effort to pinpoint the various offices involved in the POW/MIA issue, their respective missions, and their reporting arrangements is, frankly, confusing. What then, do the families of those missing in action, or the foreign governments whom we are pressing, make of it?

While we have concluded that no one is really "in charge" of the government's POW/MIA effort, the command structure of the organizational components of that effort suggests too that it is not a high profile, high priority effort. For example, what the Defense Department reports to be "the only government organization which has as its sole mission resolving the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel who remain unaccounted for as a result of the Southeast Asian conflict" (i.e. JCRC) is headed by a *lieutenant colonel*.

The services have signalled the priority they assign to the issue both in the ranks at which these command positions are maintained and in the manner they have been filled. Instead of a regular rotation of command and the new vision and incentives for mission success that go with it, the services have permitted officers to remain in command slots for as much as a decade. These positions have become truly "dead end" slots, due, apparently, to the priority placed on the mission. As such, they have not attracted the best managers and commanders.

The services should not be singled out for blame. If we are correct in believing that the services have not assigned POW/MIA operations a high priority, we are saying no more than that they reflect an attitude which has been prevalent in other parts of our government. And yet the relatively low ebb at which these operations are carried out is at shocking variance from the expectations of the American public, let alone the families of the missing. At its most basic level, the relative lack of priority means the work of our people in the field is seriously hampered by poor support. JCRC personnel working in the field, for example, asked our assistance to acquire ordinary field equipment.

We were all impressed with, and touched by, the dedication and sacrifice of the men and women working in the field in such demanding work as investigation and excavation. We certainly don't want this report to impugn those who have given so much of themselves to the POW/MIA effort or to denigrate the fine work they're doing. Our call is for more focused leadership, and better organization and management. To call for a more aggressive effort is not to characterize ongoing activities as unimportant. To the contrary, we are sensitive to the commitment and efforts of those who labor to excavate remains, to interview refugees, to track down live-sighting reports, to find archival records, to catalog endless fragments of information, and to piece together bone and dental remains.

What is clearly missing is a single high-level office with responsibility to manage resolution of POW/MIA affairs, armed with the recognized priority, resources, and sense of urgency to accelerate and amplify ongoing efforts.

Allegations of "Coverup"

In view of the many-faceted effort involved in compiling a full accounting of the fate of the missing-in-action, it is profoundly disturbing that a number of Americans still cling to notions of government "cover-up". While it should go without saying, it is clear to us that our Government is *not engaged in any conspiracy or "cover-up" on the POW/MIA issue*. Unfortunately, the government's mishandling of the issue—the lack of priority assigned to it and the organizational problems in the command structure—has provided grist for the mills of the conspiracy theorists.

Significantly, an aura of clandestine secretiveness surrounds the entire POW/MIA operation. It is difficult to disassociate that secretiveness from the perception that a government operating in darkness must have something more to hide than its sources of information. The need to weigh carefully the value of maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information against the public's right to know takes on extraordinary significance in the context of POW/MIA affairs especially with all the misinformation and perception of government wrongdoing.

When Americans question whether they can trust their own government, as many do regarding the POW/MIA issue, we should take notice. But the secrecy surrounding its POW/MIA operation compounds the credibility problem our government has in claiming "this is an issue of the highest national priority."

We believe it's time to bring the POW/MIA issue as fully as possible out into the open. To demystify it, it is imperative that we declassify much of it. Communicating completely, objectively, communication is an important part of what is needed to win public and accurately is never an easy task for government. But such confidence that everything possible is being done to render a full accounting of the missing in action.

In urging that our Government take steps to restore public confidence, we also emphasize the importance of continued sensitivity to the depth and volatility of feeling on the POW/MIA issue. Some groups and individuals continue to charge that governments in Indochina are holding large numbers of Americans against their will. We have found no evidence to corroborate such charges. However, it is important that U.S. public officials avoid actions that would fuel such speculation.

Ultimately, we call on the government to assure not only that its efforts are as open as possible, but that its focus be clear and unequivocal. That focus must, as a *first priority*, be on finding any Americans who may still be alive in Southeast Asia. A prescription for aggressive action is needed. It is clear that time is running out—and future efforts will be measured against that reality.

Foreign Cooperation on POW/MIA Issues

In reviewing with U.S. officials the cooperation we are receiving from the governments in the region, it became apparent—just as is the case with other aspects of the issue—that only part of the story is "getting out". Rather than "stonewalling", as many have believed to be the case, we found that cooperation by these governments, *particularly Vietnam*, is improving. Of course, only a few years ago we confronted a very different attitude in the region. Those working in the Departments of Defense, State, and other tasked agencies deserve credit for their collective efforts

which have helped to bring the Vietnamese, particularly, to the current level of cooperation.

This is not to say that we should be satisfied with the levels of current cooperation. In fact, we pressed that point consistently in high-level meetings throughout this trip. This is an important message, and one that should be raised repeatedly in all our contacts with those governments. In fact, Vietnamese officials gave promises of even more cooperation and allocation of resources; these assurances should be tested quickly.

At the same time, recognition should be given to the cooperation and assistance we are receiving. It is ironic that our government should have diplomatic relations with Laos, a country which, until recently, has provided relatively limited assistance in POW/MIA matters despite the widespread view that most of the unanswered questions concerning the missing-in-action lie in Laos, while maintaining a trade embargo against, and diplomatically isolating, Vietnam, a country which has substantially increased its cooperation on a range of POW/MIA issues. The question must be raised whether beginning the process of normalization of relations with Vietnam and lifting the economic embargo is likely to enhance or diminish Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA issues.

By contrast, Laos, while saying the right things, has done less than Vietnam. Laos has agreed to a "one-year plan" for investigating crash sites. The U.S. has made proposals to the Laotians aimed at increasing the resources—materiel and personnel—devoted to these efforts. Our delegation urged Lao officials to do so. We do find noteworthy the support the Lao furnished U.S. investigators this summer, which ultimately produced disappointing findings in the case of photographs family members had identified as being of Navy Lt. Daniel Borah.

Laos, which has diplomatic relations with us, seeks to elevate relations to the ambassadorial level, and to win most-favored nation trading status. But the Laotian government clearly understands that future relations with the U.S. depend on improved cooperation on MIA issues.

It is important, however, that we not focus too narrowly in our efforts to secure the fullest possible cooperation overseas on POW/MIA matters. The Vietnam War, we know, saw many East bloc countries, from nearby China to far-off Cuba, lend support to the North Vietnamese. That support ranged from materiel assistance to stationing military advisers in-country. The effort to resolve the POW/MIA issue is ultimately a search for information, and we must seek that out wherever it may be. Indeed the radically changed or changing geopolitical climate in many of North Vietnam's former wartime allies suggests that the opportunity to secure cooperation and information from such governments may be greater now than perhaps ever before. We appreciate that the Department of State has pursued such inquiry with the Soviet Union, China, and other governments. We do not question the aggressiveness of that pursuit. We simply urge the Department to continue to explore these channels, consistent with the priority this search demands.

Vietnam

It is clear that all the countries in the region want improved relations with the United States. They realize that the Soviet Union, their former patron, has more pressing domestic concerns, and they are anxious to avoid domination by Japan or China. Voices in this country have urged our Government to forge a lasting trading relationship with Vietnam, a country which seems to be seeking to put enmity behind it. In our view, both nations could potentially benefit in the long term from a closer political and economic relationship.

Vietnam is a country of roughly 70 million people. It is noteworthy that that population has climbed substantially since the war's end and the country's unification in 1975 when, according to United Nations census data, the combined population of North and South Vietnam totalled 48 million. Also, that population is relatively young, with a median age of 20.9 years, and its labor force is estimated to number 35 million. Domestically, Vietnam has instituted major economic reforms which have begun to improve the quality of its people's lives. Still Vietnam remains a desperately poor country with dramatic needs for infrastructure improvement and for economic development. The U.S. can play a major role in that nation's economic "blossoming" or we can cede those opportunities to international competitors.

Our State Department's formula for the process of normalization with Vietnam is set out in a "roadmap" which ties normalization of diplomatic and economic relations to continued progress on POW/MIA efforts and to Vietnam's carrying out our policy goals for achievement of a Cambodian peace settlement. The "roadmap" concept can be helpful, in our view. And our Government must be prepared to honor its

stated commitment to "immediately" proceed on the path toward normalization as soon as the conditions stipulated in the first phase of that understanding are met.

A roadmap can provide more than a single route to the destination, however. In other words, the "roadmap" should not become a "roadblock." While we see merit in conditioning full normalization of diplomatic and economic ties to certain actions by the Government of Vietnam, we believe that that government has taken steps which warrant our giving consideration to review and possible relaxation of certain aspects of our trade embargo. The relatively rapid progress toward a peace settlement in Cambodia also suggests the need to reassess the precise formula reflected in the "roadmap."

Vietnam's recent 7th Party Congress suggests both a continuing emphasis on market-based economic reform and a "tilt" toward China. These developments also suggest the value of a positive signal from the United States. Vietnam faces deep financial problems with the elimination of Soviet aid, and with Japanese and European companies poised to reap opportunities there for trade, our Government's posture ultimately may place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage.

In our view, a first step at least is warranted—to grant an exception to our country's trade embargo to permit telecommunications links between our countries. If we can re-establish telecommunications links with Iraq as we have recently done, we should do no less in Vietnam. It would appear that the bar to such links takes its heaviest toll not on the Government of Vietnam, but on our own Vietnamese-Americans, who are denied the means to speak with loved ones who remained behind as well as on U.S. personnel operating in Vietnam. A second element could be to eliminate the 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnamese officials working at the United Nations. We have called repeatedly on the Vietnamese to ease travel restrictions on U.S. officials and citizens traveling in that country. Our calls would be more credible if we eliminated what appears to be simply a punitive restriction. In that connection, it would be helpful for our Government to allow American businessmen to travel to Vietnam to explore commercial possibilities. Such a step, well short of actually conducting business, would also enhance search efforts by placing more American feet in-country and fostering more spontaneous travel to isolated regions. In taking such initial steps vis-a-vis Vietnam, however, it is important to avoid creating the perception that they represent elements of a quid pro quo. To that end, these steps could well be taken without fanfare or pronouncements; the message would be easily understood by the Vietnamese.

This delegation witnessed the promising working relationship which has developed between members of our POW/MIA office in Hanoi and their Vietnamese counterparts. The opening of that office, the access our people are getting to pertinent military archive materials, the Government's willingness to permit American officials to begin visiting prison facilities, and other actions taken in response to recent requests in connection with the publication of the "Robertson/Lundy/Stevens" photo, for example, are not insignificant acts. This is particularly so in light of the more hesitant and limited cooperation we have enjoyed in some of our dealings with the Lao.

Vietnamese officials characterize their cooperation in accounting for the fate of our missing-in-action as "humanitarian." Surely, it is in our interest to respond in a similarly humanitarian manner by opening telecommunications links. Although this step is currently contemplated only in the second phase of the "roadmap", favorable action at this time, reflecting some flexibility, seems appropriate.

Still, there is very credible evidence that, although Vietnam has turned over remains in the past, it continues to hold the remains of additional Americans. In discussions with Government officials, the delegation emphasized the importance of "unilaterally" returning recovered remains, and suggested that such action would benefit both of our countries. As the roadmap itself makes clear, the repatriation of remains in Vietnam's possession is an issue which must be resolved before we consider full normalization. In that regard, the Vietnamese can take still further action to repatriate remains. In our discussions, we requested the Vietnamese to institute appropriate steps to waive or alter laws which bar or inhibit Vietnamese citizens from bringing forward or identifying the whereabouts of remains of U.S. servicemen. While we obtained no commitment on this point, it is an issue we would urge our Government to pursue further.

Cambodia

We cannot overstate the importance to the region of achieving real peace in Cambodia. The "roadmap" is right, in our view, in calling on Vietnam to use its influence to press for a comprehensive peace settlement. The Cambodians themselves

have taken important steps in that direction. Here, too, our Government can reach its objectives along more than one road.

In our discussions, we urged Cambodian officials as well as the Vietnamese—who can play an important role—to work toward a comprehensive, lasting settlement. We pressed them to follow the general framework, if not the blueprint, of the Cambodian peace plan endorsed by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. There are certainly limits to the leverage which the Vietnamese can exert, particularly given the well-founded Cambodian concern that the formula for a settlement not provide any opening for the Khmer Rouge to seize power. Nevertheless, there appear to be common interests within Cambodia and in the region in achieving a comprehensive, lasting settlement which ensures the right of the Cambodian people to elect their own government and which protects against the return of a genocidal regime in Phnom Penh. Resumption of relations between China and Vietnam points in this direction.

Differences remain on the nature and extent of a U.N. role in disarming and demobilizing the armed forces of the warring factions. These differences stem from an enormous and justified mistrust of the motives and plans of the Khmer Rouge. While we have encouraged adherence to the U.N. plan, one should not be surprised to see the nations most affected—Cambodia, Vietnam, China, and Thailand—reach their own understanding. As long as such an understanding is comprehensive in scope, and guarantees the Cambodian people self-determination, while checking foreign interference in Cambodian internal affairs, we do not believe such an accommodation should adversely affect the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam.

Stability in this region is clearly linked to stability in Cambodia. With that perspective, we note that Cambodian peace talks continue to progress at a pace which gives a real basis for optimism.

Laos

Like Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos is clearly a state in transition. It is progressing methodically, with substantial economic reforms, to develop something closer to a free-market economy. The country has only recently adopted a new constitution. It is a country with great needs. Understandably, Laos' concerns vis-a-vis the United States occupy a relatively lower priority than those of many other nations. In regional terms, however, it should not be overlooked. Its peasant farmers' production of opium-producing poppies, alone, demands that it not escape our attention. And certainly our Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Agency has real concerns. Laos may also hold answers to the MIA riddle, given its rugged terrain over which more than 500 pilots were lost, only a handful of whom were among those released by Hanoi in 1973. One must also acknowledge the vast humanitarian needs facing this country. U.S. Government-provided humanitarian assistance, frankly, is meager in scope.

Until recently, the Lao have appeared to move warily to meet our urgings. Some ascribe this to culture, others to limited resources—materiel and human, others to the question "why should they?"

One need not have confidently answered that question, however, to conclude that our Government can and should do more in Laos.

Regional Issues and the United States

We welcome the State Department's efforts to link improvements in cooperation on POW/MIA developments to easing in our relationships with these countries. Our extensive travel throughout Indochina provided graphic evidence, however, of the poverty of this region, of the toll of decades of war, and of the need for humanitarian and technical assistance. Each of these countries remain fascinated with America and looks to us with hope. Each wants to put war behind it.

A common pattern of commitment to economic reform holds some promise for improving the lives of the peoples of the region, as well as for cementing better relations between these nations and their neighbors and with the West. The question can be raised whether beginning the process of normalization with the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, would encourage or discourage economic reform. From our study, the answer appears to be that economic reform would be encouraged by beginning the process of normalization.

In considering the question of improved relations with these countries in the future, it is important to appreciate that these are all states in transition. We can only speculate on where that transition will ultimately take them. At this point in time, though, one finds striking the contrast between the spirit of economic reform manifest in each of these countries, on the one hand, and their apparent ideological

rigidity, on the other. The degree to which real political reforms take root will, of course, ultimately color the depth and nature of future relations with us.

There are other important issues to be considered—issues regarding the plight of Cambodian refugees, political detainees in Vietnam, humanitarian and discrimination issues related to the treatment of those who served with us in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and narcotics control and interdiction. We pressed the respective governments on these and other issues, and urge the State Department to continue to do so.

There is much that can be done in this region, perhaps in part by our Government and certainly by nongovernmental organizations. Solely by way of example, one opportunity for important work lies in the humanitarian program for Amerasian youngsters and family members who pass through a transit center in Vietnam on their way to the United States. Thousands more will pass through its doors. While this center provides housing, often for many months, only very rudimentary English instruction and sewing and jewelry-making classes are available to the in-transit residents. The scene cries out for assistance to arm these people with the language and employment skills for the difficult transition ahead.

The region has seen much suffering. And, its needs are great. But we also found reason for hope—in the domestic changes underway, in momentum for peace in Cambodia, in the search for a positive relationship with this country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of our findings, discussed above, we believe that progress in both accounting for the fate of America's missing-in-action in the Vietnam War and moving toward a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia can be advanced by a number of actions on the part of our Government. Accordingly, and with due regard to the expertise in, and jurisdictional authority of, several committees of the Congress, we offer the following recommendations for appropriate executive and legislative consideration. We recommend that:

1. The U.S. Government clarify the priority it attaches to resolving the POW/MIA issue—which, we urge, reflect that it truly considers it a high priority—and that it allocate a commensurate level of resources to that effort;

2.(a) Responsibility for policy formulation, coordination, and operations be vested in the Secretary of Defense; and (b) that the POW/MIA Interagency Group be disbanded;

3. In carrying out such responsibility for POW/MIA affairs, the Secretary of Defense establish a single office—headed by a highly motivated and able officer of at least one star rank, such position to be rotated at appropriate intervals—to be in charge of all POW/MIA activities and to whom all elements carrying out those activities report;

4. The Secretary reorganize those elements carrying out POW/MIA activities, particularly JCRC and CILHI, to assure integration and uniform reporting within a single command structure; and immediately replace current incumbents in command/director positions who have served in that capacity for 5 or more years;

5. The Secretary take all possible steps, coordinating as necessary with other involved Departments, to accelerate efforts to achieve as full an accounting as possible of the fate of America's missing in action, to include such specific measures as:

(a) deploying in Vietnam and Laos, particularly, (rather than in Hawaii or Bangkok) such additional personnel as "are deemed to be needed to expand efforts currently carried out under the auspices of the JCRC and CILHI; pressing Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia for the right to assign such personnel for extended in-country stays of up to 6 months; and assigning certain of those personnel to work independently to clear landing zones near crash sites to reduce the time required by excavation teams to reach remote sites;

(b) strongly encouraging the governments of Vietnam and Laos to designate personnel for the United States to train to assist in our excavation efforts in those countries;

(c) pursuing aggressively an arrangement under which in-country teams can increase their access to excavation sites and the safety of such transportation (through negotiation to permit the use of U.S. helicopters and pilots, or in the alternative, arrangements for training Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian pilots to fly U.S. owned or leased helicopters which could be given to those governments upon completion of our Government's efforts;

(d) stimulating further cooperation from the governments of the region through increasing the school-building activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (through the Corps and possibly also through other Department assets such as Navy Seabee units) in Laos, and possibly replicating those efforts in Vietnam and Cambo-

dia, (consideration should also be given to such humanitarian assistance as construction of health clinics); and

(e) developing more reliable mechanisms for ground transportation of U.S. personnel in the field in Vietnam (to include consideration of deploying utility vehicles donated by the Japanese during the Persian Gulf crisis if they are readily available and could be serviced by dealers in Vietnam in lieu of the current practice of using vehicles which must be flown to Guam to be repaired);

6. The Secretary limit to an advisory role the involvement of nongovernment entities in the area of POW/MIA affairs, and that the Secretary consider establishing a Federal advisory committee through which such nongovernment entities might provide guidance;

7. The Secretary (a) review the classification procedures applicable to intelligence-gathering in POW/MIA affairs, and take all necessary measures to declassify information on, and gained through, such intelligence-gathering, to the maximum extent possible; and (b) strive to reduce the clandestine character of POW/MIA search activities (recognizing that that secretiveness may have more to do with the professional backgrounds of those assigned to such missions than to the requirements of the search itself);

8. The Secretary, after carrying out the above recommendations and any other actions to further efforts to provide as full an accounting as possible of the fate of those missing in action, *personally* communicate with the American people through electronic and print media, to the extent possible, to explain in full the means through which the Department is working to resolve the issue and the degree of success it has had, with the aim of enhancing public confidence in that process and minimizing the suspicions which have clouded that effort;

9. The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, develop a coordinated "master" plan for carrying out POW/MIA operations, which identifies the precise roles, responsibilities, and interaction of and among the respective Governments, agencies, and officials involved;

10. The Secretary prepare for the Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs (General Vessey) a follow-up list of additional compelling cases for resolution to be taken up upon completion of the original list of 119 "discrepancy cases" (with an eye to dispelling concerns that still more compelling cases were not included among the original 119);

11.* The Secretary of State consider—in light of both the progress already made toward realizing a comprehensive, lasting settlement of the civil war in Cambodia and actions taken by Vietnam—recommending to the President taking a first step or steps (consistent with the Secretary's assessment of the progress achieved) toward normalization of relations with Vietnam (to include our Government's carrying out the steps outlined in Phase I of the "roadmap"), and particularly toward recommending (a) the grant of an exception to the trade embargo to permit telecommunications links between the two countries, taking into account how that step is in our own country's best interest, its humanitarian significance, as well as Vietnam's substantial progress toward development of a market economy; and, (b) lifting the 25-mile travel ban on diplomats representing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the United Nations and easing the travel restrictions on officials of Vietnam and Cambodia who seek to visit the United States;

12. In light of the steps already taken by Vietnam, the Secretary—upon the signing of a Paris Conference/United Nations agreement on a Cambodian political settlement—begin immediately the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam as set forth in the April 1991 "roadmap", to include speedy action to facilitate telecommunications links as described in recommendation number 11, above; and

13. The Secretary of State consider any other steps within that official's control which might further U.S. Government efforts to hasten the process of obtaining as full an accounting as possible of the fate of America's missing in action as well as public confidence in that accounting, to include:

(a) determining whether provisions of Vietnamese law may deter or inhibit some Vietnamese citizens from relinquishing or identifying the whereabouts of remains of U.S. MIA's, and, if so, exploring with the Government of Vietnam legal remedies to encourage such citizens to return such remains to include consideration of our Government's instituting a policy of providing modest financial rewards in instances where the remains were subsequently identified as Americans; and

* The delegation recognizes that progress toward, and potentially imminent signing of, an agreement on a Cambodian political settlement may make this recommendation moot.

(b) coordinating with officials of the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to request their assistance in enabling family members of U.S. MIA's/POW's to move freely about those countries, and to encourage and facilitate the efforts of family members so interested to do so.

ITINERARY

Saturday, August 3

6:30 pm—7:30 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ken Quinn at Andrews Air Force Base.

7:30 pm—7:45 pm: Press Conference at Andrews Air Force Base.

11pm: Depart Washington, DC for Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

Sunday, August 4

2 am: Arrive Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

Sleep

11 am—12 pm: Brunch with CINCPAC Rear Admiral Larry Vogt.

12 pm—1 pm: Briefing for members and staff by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) staff: Lt. Col Joe Harvey (Commander, JCRC); Lt. Col. Roger Gaebel (Negotiations officer); Major Jim Moye (Operations Officer); LCDR Sharon Armour (Executive officer); Mr. Ray Spock (Casualty Data Division Officer); Captain Chad Pohlrs (Senior Analyst) at JCRC, Barbers Point—Hawaii.

1 pm—2 pm: Briefing for members and staff by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) staff: Lt. Col. Johnnie Webb (Commander, CILHI); First Sergeant Richard Huston (First Sergeant); Captain William Hudson (operations officer); Chief Warrant officer Michael Gosnell (Adjutant); Major Jimmie Schmidt (Odontologist); Mr. H. Thorne Helgesen (Lab Administrator); Dr. Kim Schneider (Anthropologist) at CILHI.

2:30 pm: Depart Hawaii for Bangkok, Thailand.

Tuesday, August 6

1 am: Arrive Bangkok, Thailand.

Sleep

8 am—9 am: Coffee for members and staff with the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand at the Imperial Hotel: David Hendrix (County Corp. officer, Citibank N. SA.); Harold Vickery (Director of Vickery, Prapone, Pramuan & Worachai, ROP); Toby Marion (General Manager, Caltex Oil Thailand T.T.D); David Lyman (Partner of Tilleke & Gibbins ROP); Thomas Seale (Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand); Kenneth Lambert (Chairman, KLPL Asia); Raymond Eaton (Chairman, Export Development Trading); Beth Krasna (Director, Krasna & Associates); Jerry Loupee (Managing Director, Himont Asia Pacific); Richard Blue (Representative, The Asia Foundation); David Copeland (Managing Director, Black & Veatch International); Douglas Gardner (Chief of Finance & Admin., Maekong Committee); Tom Olson (Country Manager, American President Lines); Jack Phillips (Resident Manager, Premier oil Pacific LTD); William Reinsch (Managing Director, Transpo International LTD); Annick Hemsin (Director, Tilleke & Gibbons Consultants LTD).

8 am—10:30 am: Working breakfast for members and staff with Deputy Chief of Mission Victor Tomaseth (US Embassy—Bangkok) and Special Assistant to the Ambassador Andre Sauvageot at the Imperial Hotel.

11 am—2 pm: Briefing and working lunch for members and staff with Major Frye and Colonel Kohl of JCRC and CILHI at the US Embassy—Bangkok (includes briefing for members only).

2 pm—3 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) staff: Glen Cooper and Don Stern at the US Embassy—Bangkok.

3:30 pm: Depart Bangkok, Thailand for Vientiane, Laos.

4:30 pm: Arrive Vientiane, Laos.

4:30 pm—6:30 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Charge D'Affaires Charlie Salmon at the US Embassy—Vientiane (including several embassy staff).

6:30 pm—10:30 pm: Reception and Dinner for members and staff with Charlie Salmon, US Embassy staff, and Lao officials (See attached list) at Charlie Salmon's Residence.

Wednesday, August 7

7:45 am—8:45 am: Working breakfast for members and staff with US experts assisting the government of Laos on economic reforms and UN representatives at Charlie Salmon's Residence.

9 am—10 am: Meeting for members and staff with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Soubahn Srithirath of Laos.

10 am—11 am: Meeting for members and staff with Vice President of the National Assembly Thongsing Thamoavong of Laos.

11 am—12 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Phoun Sipraseuth of Laos.

12 pm—1 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Phao Bounnaphonh of Laos.

1 pm: Depart Vientiane, Laos for Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

3:30 pm: Arrive Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

4:30 pm—6 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong of Cambodia.

7 pm—10 pm: Meeting and Dinner for members and staff with Deputy Prime Minister Kong Som 01, Deputy Foreign Minister Long Visalo, Member of Parliament Dr. Abdul Xoyome, Member of Parliament Ms. Som Kim Suol, Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs Sim Suong, and Director of the Department of the America's Theam Chuny.

10 pm—11 pm: Press interviews.

Thursday, August 8

7 am: Depart Phnom Penh, Cambodia for Hanoi, Vietnam.

10:30 am: Arrive Hanoi.

12 pm—2 pm: Working Lunch and Briefing for members and staff with Bob Desatze, Researcher at US MIA office in Hanoi, at Boss Hotel.

2 pm—3 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Director of the Americas Department Mr. Dang Nghiem Bai at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (old French Governor's Palace), including Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Officials.

3 pm—4 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials.

Delegation split into two groups.

Group A: Reps. Carper, Kolbe, and Skaggs.

4 pm—6 pm: Visit to Prosthetics Center (AFMA Center) hosted by Director Dang Hanh Loc and Le Duc Loi (engineer).

Group B: Reps. Peterson and Gilchrest.

4 pm—6 pm: Visit former POW prison compound. Reps. Peterson and Gilchrest attended.

Delegation regroups

7 pm—10 pm: Dinner for members and staff at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted by Mr. Dang Nghiem Bai and staff of the Americas Department.

Friday, August 9

8 am: Depart Hanoi for Ho Chi Minh City.

10:30 am: Arrive Ho Chi Minh City.

2 pm—3 pm: Visit to the Amerasian Transit Center for members and staff with ATC Director Mr. Le Van Thien and ATC Deputy Director Mr. Tuan.

3 pm—4 pm: Visit to the Orderly Departure Program for members and staff with Alison Krupnick (consul).

5 pm—6 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Vice Chairman of the People's Committee Pham Chanh Truc, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs office of HCPL City Huynh Ngoc An, Economic Advisor Nguyen Hau, at the residential palace.

Saturday, August 10

7 am: Depart Ho Chi Minh City for Da Hang.

9 am: Arrive Da Hang.

Delegation split into two groups.

Group A: Reps. Carper, Peterson, and Kolbe.

9 am—10 am: Visit with Vietnamese members of the 14th Joint U.S.-Vietnamese Excavation Team: Director Nguyen Dinh An, Ngo Van Tran, Doan Ngoc Dau, and Mai Quy Trung.

10 am—11 am: Visit with US and Vietnamese members of the 14th Joint U.S.-Vietnamese Excavation Team: Investigation & Recovery Team Commander Bill Bell, Investigation Team Chief James Webb, Team Medic Garry Bolduc, Team Analyst Keith Flanagan, Team Analyst Stephen Thompson, Grave Recovery Specialist Randall Nash, and Grave Recovery Specialist Tommy Taylor.

Group B: Reps. Skaggs, Rhodes, and Gilchrest.

9 am—11 am: Tour of Da Hang.

Delegation regroups

11 am: Depart Da Hang for Hanoi.

1 pm: Arrive Hanoi.

2:30 pm: Meeting for members and staff with General Secretary, Vietnamese Communist Party, Do Muoi, including Foreign Ministry officials.

4:30 pm Depart Hanoi for Hawaii.

Cross international date line

Saturday, August 10

2 pm: Arrive Hawaii. Press Conference.

3 pm—5 pm: Discussion with CINCPAC General Fields and Major General Christmas.

Sunday, August 11

6 am: Depart Hawaii for Colorado (initial disembarkation) and for Washington, DC

BRIEFINGS RECEIVED IN PREPARATION FOR TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following meetings and briefings were held prior to departure for Southeast Asia, August 3, 1991:

July 22

Khenthong Nouanthasing, Second Secretary, Embassy of Laos

July 23

Jim Webb, former Secretary of the Navy

July 24

Bill Herod, Editor Indochina Digest, trade journal Robert Muller, -Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation

July 25

Rep. Lane Evans, who recently traveled to Vietnam General Vessey, -President's Special Emissary to Vietnam Marie Huhtala Acting Director, -Office of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia affairs; Scot Marciel, Laotian Desk -Officer; Frank Light, Vietnamese Desk Officer; Department of State

July 29

Ann Mills Griffiths, National League of Families
Kien Pham, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Bob Sheets, Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
Lionel Rosenblatt, President, Refugee International
Senator John McCain, who recently traveled to Southeast Asia
Gerritt Gong, Resident Scholar on Southeast Asia, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

July 31 Allen Pell Crawford, Investigative Journalist, Washington Post

Bill Franke & Steve Hayes, 'Operation Smile', private humanitarian relief operation in Vietnam

Paul Mather, former Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center
Senator John Kerry, who recently traveled to Southeast Asia

Aug 1

Chris Lamb, Former Australian Ambassador to Burma and Thailand, now based in Washington

Jay Winik, National Defense University

Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian & Pacific Affairs

Aug 1

Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Captain Red McDaniel, Col. Mike Peck

Aug 3

Ken Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who recently returned from Southeast Asia

The CHAIRMAN. Now there are obviously some instances of fraud here. They have been proven. It is clear that there is fraud.

Have you got any sense from the policy perspective of what, if anything, people are seeking to gain from a policy point of view by perpetrating fraudulent POW/MIA claims?

Mr. QUINN. I am really not familiar with the details of fraudulent POW/MIA claims.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, photographs were circulated which were asserted to represent POW's. And the photographs have been proven to be fraudulent.

So someone saw fit to offer up a photograph knowing full well that it came out of a Soviet magazine, for instance.

It is a hoax, right? What is the purpose of that hoax? Is the purpose to keep America angry at Vietnam? Is the purpose to stir up the water so that we will not normalize? Is the purpose, I mean, what is the purpose? What are they trying to do, make money?

Mr. QUINN. I think there are a lot of people who want to make money. I think it is hard to put, impute motives to what people are doing. But I think that there is no end as to what people will go to try and sell something if they think there is a buyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we ever bought any? I do not think anybody has paid for them, have we?

Mr. QUINN. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. So where is the money?

Mr. QUINN. I think the impression has been around, there have been stories that there have been rewards. There are stories about that in Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos that if you would provide POW/MIA materials or remains you might be able to get a visa. Certainly there are people, boat people, who have left with the mistaken belief that this could somehow help them get accepted for resettlement in the United States of America.

I think these kinds of rumors and myths have floated about in Vietnam and Cambodia. And it is like, you know, during the war there was always people trying to sell you bad intelligence, made up information. Some people are looking to ingratiate themselves. Some want to go the United States. Some may do it for motives that I could not understand. And others do it because they think there is money.

And if you are a middle man in Vietnam and you can convince somebody who is going to take off as a refugee or somebody in Cambodia who is heading for the Thai border that, look, you will be better off if you have something that looks like it POW/MIA information, they can probably sell that.

So I think there is no doubt that there is that type of activity that goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. There was an article about, I do not know, 3 months or 4 months ago, June, I think, in the Washington Times, as I recall, about a story that a former Pathet Lao general, General

Singaphou had allegedly had a discussion with two Americans from the embassy, is what the article said.

And that he had stated to them that Americans had survived and been captured in 1968 at the so-called Lima Site-85, which as far as I know from all of the briefings that I have had on it as far as we know that everybody died there. Did that come to your attention at all?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir, it did, Senator. And during my visit to Vientiane in July when I raised the Borah, Carr, Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy photos, I also brought up the subject of access to this general.

And at that time I obtained from the Lao government their agreement that they would provide us access to him.

Senator SMITH. And have we gotten that access?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. We have? We have spoken to General Singaphou? And if you can say it in open session, what was his response?

Mr. QUINN. I believe his response was that he was remote and distant from that operation at that time and that he did not have the specific information about it.

Senator SMITH. So he denied then that he had such a conversation?

Mr. QUINN. I am not sure if he denied having said that, but I think he denied that he had that kind of information that he knew to be true.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. No more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of any rescue missions that were made to go into Vietnam to try to pull people out?

Mr. QUINN. By the U.S. Government?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. QUINN. Do you mean beyond the Songte raids?

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond the Songte raid.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir, not unilateral American. I do not think so. You are talking about, certainly, during the war I remember the stories.

The CHAIRMAN. No, since the war, during the 1980's.

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. U.S.-sponsored, he means.

The CHAIRMAN. U.S. Government or U.S.-sponsored rescue missions.

Mr. QUINN. I am not aware of any rescue missions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

We will leave the record open with respect to your testimony. There will be some questions that we will submit in writing and we would appreciate your answers thereto. And thank you very, very much for taking the time.

If I could ask Secretary Ford and Major Generals Ryan and Christmas if they would come forward please. Thank you, gentlemen, for your patience.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could take a moment to clarify the record on the point that I made regarding the reason.

Staff indicates to me the reason why the document that we were referring to as the Gaines report was not provided here was because it was a classified document and should not have been provided. So that is the reason why the document was not here. And that is appropriate.

And as far as I know that document was turned over to staff and is in the room. Just because it is classified, I have not gone up to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, could I ask you to rise? And if we could just go through the formalities.

[Witnesses sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. We very much appreciate your patience. It has been a long day here and I think you are testifying again tomorrow. And I know you have a lot to do other than testify.

On the other hand, I think the testimony of each of you is terribly important for this process. And we are very appreciative of the time you have taken to be here.

Mr. Secretary, particularly I want to express appreciation to you. I think certainly since I have been front and center on this as Chairman of the committee and prior to that I have had nothing but cooperation from you. And I have appreciated it enormously. I think you have been forthcoming. You have been available to us. And you have indicated, and I think helped change significantly the relationship and the attitude with respect to this.

The committee appreciates that. And I think nothing will serve all of us better than to continue that and to have that kind of relationship here.

And so we begin, I think, on a very good footing. And I want to express the gratitude of the committee for that.

We welcome your opening statements and then we will proceed to ask questions.

STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would, if you would allow me, just submit my written testimony for the record and make a few informal comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, and other members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today as a witness. Yours is an important task: to educate the American people about the POW/MIA issue; to provide legislative oversight for Executive Branch policy; and to review the process by which the POW/MIA issue is pursued and, hopefully, resolved. I welcome this opportunity to address the Committee, and provide you with an overview of Defense's efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue. Our first commitment is to the families. We seek as a priority to end the uncertainty for thousands of families whose loved ones are still unaccounted for from all our nation's wars.

Let me first reaffirm the importance attached to the POW/MIA issue by the Department of Defense. Simply stated, resolution of the POW/MIA issue is one of highest national priority. This priority is fully supported by President Bush, Secretary Cheney, and General Powell. We have acted to implement this policy by press-

ing the governments of Indochina to expand POW/MIA operations. Until recently, the results have been meager. Over the past year, new promises of cooperation by the Indochina states have allowed us to increase the numbers of personnel dedicated to our effort. Our augmentation is now largely complete, having added 88 new people to the some 150 world-wide, who already work on the POW/MIA issue full-time.

Secretary Cheney has also recently created the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. This individual will provide a single point of leadership within the Pentagon for the POW/MIA issue. In addition to the DASD, Secretary Cheney has increased the staff from 3 to 14. This expansion was dictated largely by the increased scope of our operations in Southeast Asia. I would like to briefly describe our expanded operations, and then respond to your questions.

Live Sightings

Our most urgent priority is investigating whether or not live Americans are held against their will in Southeast Asia. The *live prisoner* issue has been at the forefront of our investigations. While the governments of Indochina have consistently denied that they are still holding American prisoners, their denials have not deterred us from pursuing the *live prisoner* issue directly on each and every occasion, and at all levels, with them for several years. We intend to keep the pressure on.

Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans are still detained against their will, information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Our assumption is that at least some Americans are still held captive. Should any report prove true, we will, as President Bush has pledged, take *decisive* action to return them home. We have a live-sighting investigator on the staff of our Hanoi Office, that I will discuss later, and we are hopeful that he will be granted free access by the Vietnamese to carry out his duties. To date, we have not reached complete agreement with the Vietnamese on the modalities of investigating live-sightings in Vietnam, but we are continuing to negotiate this important issue at every opportunity.

Investigating live-sightings reports will continue to be our first priority. We will dedicate all resources necessary to support this vital requirement just as we have with the photographs that have appeared prominently in the media this past summer. Unfortunately, during our investigations of the photographs, we have uncovered a number of fabricators. Although the time spent tracking down these low-lives is necessary, it detracts from the time we can spend investigating the many compelling cases in which there is the greatest likelihood that the serviceman may still be alive.

We are also plagued by a number of well intentioned, and not so well intentioned, part-time private investigators. The worst of this group traffic in reports obtained from unnamed sources in Southeast Asia, invite publicity to their claims of live Americans, promise great results, and often seek to raise money to keep their efforts going. It is also common practice for them to claim that their information is proof positive of government ineptitude and cover-up. In the process, they raise the expectations of the families desperate for any sign that a loved one is still alive. Unfortunately, when we investigate their we find no Americans, only unsubstantiated hearsay accounts, and too often signs of deceit and fabrication. Individuals who repeatedly provide false information, well intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions. The families have suffered enough.

Vietnam

Over the past year, the Vietnamese have demonstrated increasing levels of cooperation in resolving the fates of Americans missing in Indochina. Increased access to Vietnam and Vietnamese wartime records is largely due to the personal efforts of the President's Special Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs, Gen. John Vessey, USA (Ret.). His persistence has allowed us to forge ahead at an accelerated pace. In April, he led an interagency delegation to meet with Foreign Minister Thach in Hanoi. At that meeting, General Vessey and Foreign Minister Thach agreed to establish a POW/MIA Office in Hanoi that would: conduct in-country investigations of reported first hand live-sightings; research historical records; conduct forensic review of jointly or unilaterally recovered remains; and conduct advance planning and execute joint field operations. On July 8, the U.S. POW/MIA Office opened in Hanoi with an initial staff of five. So far, the Office has been a success, providing a ready point of contact with the Vietnamese, and increasing communication between their officials and American POW/MIA specialists.

In September we completed the 14th Joint U.S.-Vietnam Field Investigation. This joint investigation was our most ambitious effort to date, and Vietnam's preparations and cooperation were improvements over past field investigations. Of signifi-

cance, the Vietnamese allowed our resident researcher access to contemporaneous wartime documents that addressed the specific incidents of several previously unaccounted for Americans. As a result of these efforts, we believe that we may be able to confirm the death of an additional five individuals. We are hopeful that the Vietnamese will provide access to similar records for other wartime military regions.

Despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance. Vietnamese officials could do much more to assist our efforts. Too often our office finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live-sightings, improved helicopter transportation, and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled. Vietnam's foot dragging on the unilateral repatriation of remains is especially frustrating.

Laos

During early 1991, we conducted the first joint investigations of discrepancy cases involving Americans last known to be in Pathet Lao hands. Shortly thereafter, in May of this year, the U.S. and Lao agreed to an expanded plan for increased joint cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues for the rest of 1991. Activities agreed upon include further joint investigations of discrepancy cases, small scale joint surveys and recoveries and joint crash site excavations. So far, we have conducted the first three activities under the expanded program. Actual Lao cooperation on the ground has not yet fully succeeded in implementing the promised schedule. For example, we have had to delay a field activity scheduled to start late this week until the Lao repair the helicopter that they had planned to dedicate to the mission. We believe that these shortcomings are more a function of limited resources and capabilities than a lack of commitment. In fact, they have been very cooperative on urgent investigations such as the purported Borah photograph. We have two major field operations planned before the end of this year, and I am hopeful that implementation will continue to improve rapidly and enable both countries to get back on track.

Border Cases

Approximately 85 percent of the losses in Laos occurred in areas under the control of Vietnamese forces during the war. Accounting for Americans lost in such areas must be a trilateral effort between the Lao, Vietnamese, and U.S. While field operations inside Laos will necessarily be bilateral U.S.-Lao activities, the success of such efforts will largely depend upon U.S.-Vietnam cooperation. The historic records and documents required must come from the Vietnamese. We have developed a plan to work on these difficult border cases and are planning to request a meeting with the Lao and Vietnamese in Hawaii this December to explain our proposals.

Cambodia

Phnom Penh has recently begun to cooperate with us in accounting for Americans missing in Cambodia. Since July, three investigative teams have traveled to Cambodia to follow-up on the photographs alleged to be of live American POW's. Their cooperation assisted our specialists in tracking down a number of what proved to be fraudulent photographs. Since July, we have also conducted two technical meetings with the Cambodians, the first such activity since Phnom Penh fell in 1975. Phnom Penh officials have also unilaterally returned remains that we hope will prove to be an American unaccounted for from the 1975 Mayaguez incident. We are hopeful that their cooperation will continue to improve.

Korea and the Cold War

In addition to our efforts in Indochina, we recognize that there are 8,177 Americans unaccounted for from the Korean War, and perhaps as many as several hundred missing as a result of Cold War incidents. Accounting for these men is also of concern. We will continue to press the appropriate Governments for the fullest possible accounting.

The North Koreans hold the answers to these 8,177 Americans, including 389 initially classified by their Services as prisoners of war. Negotiations with the North Koreans on this subject have been conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in defense of freedom in Korea. The North Koreans have proved unwilling to cooperate fully with the UNCMAC, preferring instead to have occasional discussions with our embassy officials in Beijing, and to use Congressional delegations to return a small number of American remains to U.S. control. With the help of Senator Smith, we are pursuing an alternative approach that we hope will be more successful.

In the past year, we have made several approaches to the Soviets to investigate whether they possess information on Americans lost in Cold War aircraft incidents. In some of these cases, our information suggests that crewmembers survived their incidents of loss. The Soviets, however, have repeatedly denied any knowledge of the fates of these individuals. In April, the Department of State sent a demarche to the Soviets regarding this issue. More recently, Secretary of State Baker raised the issue with his Soviet counterpart during the Moscow Summit. The Soviets pledged at that time to make relevant KGB records available to our specialists. We have sent a second demarche requesting access to the promised records. We have also raised the issue of Cold War losses with a delegation of Soviet and Russian veterans' groups when it visited my office last month. With their help, we hope to raise the consciousness of other veterans, and convince them that this issue is one of signal importance to the American people.

Recent Photographs

As the Committee is aware, there have been a number of photographs that have surfaced in the media, and which have been identified by family members as MIA's from the Vietnam war. We take each identification seriously, and will use our full resources to answer the questions raised by these photos. I would like to briefly give you a status report.

Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy

The first photograph to appear in the media this summer—identified by family members as depicting Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy has proven difficult to investigate. No one has claimed to have seen any of the individuals pictured. The associated reporting, except for limited biographic data widely circulated by POW/MIA activists in Southeast Asia, has also proven false. In addition, our photographic experts indicate that the photograph has been altered. The alteration is similar to changes made to five other purported POW photos that we have proven to be hoaxes. The identifications by the families are the only positive information we possess. We are continuing our investigation, however, the information available to us strongly suggests that two of the individuals allegedly pictured perished at the time of their loss incidents. In the absence of additional reporting, we may not be able to resolve this case.

LT Daniel V. Borah

A photograph taken in Laos surfaced earlier this year that was identified by family members as LT Borah. In addition, a forensic anthropologist positively identified the person in the photo as LT Borah. With the help of Laotian officials our investigators were able to locate the individual who turned out to be a 77-year old Lao highland tribesman. The man was interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted. He identified himself in the photo, as did a second individual who also appeared in the picture. Family members who want to see the tribesman for themselves will leave in a few days for Southeast Asia. They will be accompanied by our investigator who first interviewed and photographed the man in Laos.

CPT Donald G. Carr

The case of CPT Carr is quite compelling because of the remarkable likeness between the 1989-1990 photograph we obtained from Colonel Jack Bailey, USAF (Ret.), and CPT Carr's wedding picture. Secretary Cheney met with Colonel Bailey on 8 October. During the meeting Colonel Bailey promised that he would give our investigators access to his subources, and introduce us to the individual who took the photograph. Accordingly, I dispatched a Department of Defense team to accompany Colonel Bailey to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, after a week in Bangkok, Colonel Bailey was unable to provide the access or information he had promised. He also disclosed that the photograph—instead of having been taken in Laos as he previously indicated—may actually been taken in Burma or Thailand. Despite this setback, we continue to apply all our available resources to locating the individual pictured in the photograph.

USG Commitment

The Department of Defense is firmly committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans from all our nation's wars. You would be hard pressed to find a group of individuals more dedicated to the task of resolving the fates of our POW/MIA's than those who currently work on this issue. They work long and hard, often in primitive field conditions, to learn the facts about our missing in action. It is thankless work, but work that our teams enthusiastically undertake. You will have an opportunity to talk to three of these individuals later in the

hearing. I am sure you will discover first hand why we are so proud of the people that work this issue.

In a few minutes General Christmas will outline one of the newest signs of our commitment to this issue—the establishment of a Joint Task Force in our Pacific Command, to focus and expand our field investigations. Given the opportunities provided by the Indochinese governments, the task force will bring a new intensity to our operations. We now have the staff and expertise available to move forward as quickly as the Indochinese governments will allow. The ball is in their court.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORD. You have been very patient while my colleagues from the administration read their statements. It has been a long day and I think that I will not do that to you or any of those who may be listening.

I would like to comment about the issue of manpower. And why all of a sudden have we increased the size and character of our effort? And at least try to put some perspective on it from where I sit since I was one of those who was recommending some of the changes, both organizationally and in manpower.

I think that it is important for you to understand and recognize how difficult it's been all these years for my predecessors to get cooperation from the Vietnamese, the Lao, and the Cambodians. General Vessey and others have done an outstanding service for our country, but one which has been frustrating and difficult to say the least.

Because of the lack of cooperation and because of the, the best way I can describe it, the political manipulation of this issue by Vietnam, and to a certain extent Laos, there was a limit to what we could do beyond looking at the intelligence and, when they would allow us, sending a few people in, our specialists, to operate on the ground.

In the last year and a half things have begun to change. A good part of the credit has to go to General Vessey and his persistence in pushing the Vietnamese. Others of us have also been pushing equally hard, we hope, on the Lao. So that is has begun to pay off a little bit. It also is quite clear to the Vietnamese and the Lao that they want something from us. So it has been in their interest to be more cooperative.

But the first instance that I know of in which the issue of manpower, for example, came up was in the period of February-March of this year. It was in a discussion and the Secretary agreed in principle, that yes, we did need to reorganize; yes we do need to increase our capabilities in anticipation of opening an office in Hanoi and to take advantage of what appeared to be real cooperative efforts on the part of the Vietnamese.

So I just point out it happened before Colonel Peck was reassigned. The Secretary was aware of Colonel Peck's concerns and his charges. And it was certainly well before all of the attention that was paid this past summer to the photographs. And, in fact, the outline of those proposals back in February-March, and I don't remember the exact date, really haven't changed all that much.

So the other question that was asked was: Is this a new issue? That's why the Secretary, for example, was asked, is it something that he did after many of these issues were becoming more public. The fact is that he authorized an aircraft and a team to go into

Vietnam in the fall of 1990, again long before these issues were as public as they've become.

So his charter to me has always been err on the side of if there's any chance at all that there might be an American alive, don't spare any resources, don't hesitate, let's go do it. So this is not something that is new or different about his approach.

And every time I've asked him for resources or asked him for his personal intervention, he has always said yes. So I just wanted to indicate that these issues have been something that are not just new views of his or views of the Defense Department.

I would also like to just briefly comment on the composition of this panel. Clearly there is a past to this issue, but there is also a future. And I am more representing the past, but hopefully transitioning into the future.

And my colleagues from the JCS, General Ryan, and from CINCPAC, General Christmas, are the future, at least in terms of the implementation of this issue. And one that I think that if you put together with the point man in the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs that the Secretary has agreed to, and if you then consider the military aspect of this and implementing it out in the field, representing by General Ryan and General Christmas and tomorrow some of our most important assets, the people who actually work out in the field, I think that you will see, we hope to be able to tell you not just about all the things that we've done wrong, and clearly as the Secretary said, as you noted, for anybody from the administration, this one or any past administration, to get up and say that we've done everything right on POW/MIA over this almost 19 years, one is just flat wrong and there is absolutely no way we can walk away from the problems that we've had.

We've done a lot of good things. We've had a lot of dedicated people working this issue from the beginning, but we have made errors. We have not always done it the way we wanted to. And I can't speak for my predecessors, but I can speak for myself and my tenure of the past 2-1/2 years, we haven't always done everything like we would want to. But we're trying to improve.

And I have hopes that, one, we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight. And we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. And I can sit here and I can tell you about what we're going to do and I can talk about it. The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results. And to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say. And that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we are going to demonstrate over the next months, weeks, years that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. And that's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them.

I hope that you also when you find good things, particularly about the people in the field who, far from the limelight, far from the excitement of Washington, are on a daily basis out there slugging it out, oftentimes in very primitive conditions. And you've got three representatives of that large group and I think three good representatives. And I hope that your visits to the region, your dis-

cussions with these people, you can also say some good things about them.

It's hard to keep doing your job day after day when you hear nothing but coverup and how badly you do it. Despite all of that, every personal experience I've had with them makes me very proud that, one, they work for DOD, and two, that they're working on this problem.

Let me stop there and turn to my colleague, General Christmas, who does have some testimony that'll be an expansion of what the Secretary said about what CINCPAC will be doing in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. General, before you pick up, I would just like to say that I think your impromptu remarks are as forceful as any prepared or other remarks that I have heard, and my only regret is that more of the writing media who were here this morning for the Secretary are not also picking up on the essence of what you have just said, because I think it is terribly important, and the committee accepts the statement.

I think to be able to say, look, we have made some mistakes, there have been some problems, and to sit there and say, we have got a credibility problem is almost half the battle. The other half is obviously to resolve the question of how we got there and we are going to try to do that.

The second thing I want to say is, I could not agree with you more about the people in the field, and I have personally insisted that we bring some of them back. I know it is a pain in the rear end for them to come that distance and to leave what they are doing, but I happen to believe that they are heroes in the best sense of the word. I think that Americans need to know how many years people have been out there in the field in some mighty dangerous, sweaty circumstances, jumping on helicopters that most of us would hold our breath going near, and going out into the jungle and doing this.

I think it is an extraordinary story and that is why we are going to lead off with it tomorrow morning, because I want people to get the essence of this effort over the years. While there have been faults, while there were problems, while there may be information that should have been forthcoming that has not been and we do not know all the whys and wherefores of that, the fact remains that there have been some awfully good people out in the field working to get answers. I think people need to have a balanced view of this, so I appreciate that and your comments, and I think the committee accepts them as stated. General.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS (J-3), U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

General CHRISTMAS. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, Senator McCain, I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee today. Like you, those of us on active duty today are deeply committed to finding the answers to the questions surrounding Americans unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia. We have a solemn obligation to our fallen comrades and to their families to resolve this vexing issue once and for all.

Having served as a commander in combat, and later as a project officer for the designation and entombment of the Vietnam unknown soldier, I have a particularly strong sense of obligation in this regard. Moreover, as the director of operations for the U.S. Pacific Command, I am responsible for directing the activities of the POW/MIA search teams. I would like to present to you the Pacific Command's views on the state of the POW/MIA issue.

Specifically, I will discuss the recent developments in the region and the initiatives the Command has undertaken to respond to them. Perhaps at no other time have the opportunities to dramatically expand and accelerate casualty resolution operations in the region been so great. We have established the POW/MIA Affairs Office in Hanoi, and the Vietnamese are affording the staff and our search teams good cooperation. The mission of the Hanoi office is to conduct in-country investigations of reported first-hand live sightings, to research historical and archival records, to conduct forensic review of remains jointly recovered or unilaterally made available by the Vietnamese, and to conduct advance planning and prepare and execute joint field operations.

During the most recent round of investigative activities, our teams were given increased access to Hanoi's wartime archives—an action which we have long urged the Vietnamese to undertake. We think the Vietnamese, however, can do more, particularly with regard to the disclosure of all relevant wartime documents, access to former cadre who were involved in the capture and detention of American prisoners, and turnover of remains recovered unilaterally.

Naturally, we will continue to pursue greater disclosure, access, and their unilateral efforts through the Hanoi office each time we conduct the technical meeting, similar to the one we conducted this past week.

In Cambodia, the Phnom Penh authorities last month permitted for the first time an American survey team to investigate the circumstances of loss involving missing American servicemen and news correspondents. This followed closely their assistance to our investigators who traveled to Cambodia to follow up widely publicized photographs identified by family members as Americans unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia. While it is too early to tell whether the Cambodians will sustain a cooperative relationship on POW/MIA's, we were satisfied with these initial efforts and are prepared to follow up on their future breakthroughs.

In Laos, we are hopeful the authorities there will follow through on their agreement to engage in a year-round effort to investigate cases of Americans who were known to have been held captive by Pathet Lao forces and to recover the remains of those killed in action. We were pleased to learn last month that the Lao Government has made additional people available to work with our joint teams. The Lao had previously cited a lack of personnel as a reason for the modest level of field activities which they had permitted over the last several months.

The Pacific Command, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, has moved quickly to capitalize on the favorable climate of cooperation in Vietnam. We plan to execute a comprehensive casualty resolution campaign on a scale

which the Department of Defense has wanted to carry out since the signing of the Paris Accords in 1973, but could not because of Vietnam's intransigence. To execute this plan, we are fielding additional search teams and putting in place other necessary resources.

Our plan is focused on investigative activities to determine whether unaccounted-for Americans are alive. Using the staff of our Hanoi POW/MIA Office, soon to be a detachment of the joint task force organization I will describe shortly, and mobile field teams, we will follow up aggressively on reports of Americans alleged to be alive in Vietnam and investigate discrepancy cases, those compelling loss incidents which suggest a missing American was captured, but the Vietnamese have returned neither the person nor his remains.

We have singled out these cases for priority investigation because if there are Americans alive, they are most likely associated with these losses. To execute this priority investigative activity, we will expand the staff of our Hanoi office and task the staff to carry out full-time investigation of these cases. If we can resolve these cases, we will have done much to shed light on the live prisoner issue.

We see opportunities to recover concurrently the remains of the known war dead. For example, as our search teams investigate the cases of MIA's who were last known alive, they will attempt to resolve other losses in geographic proximity to these cases. In general though, we view the recovery effort as a long-term process which would begin only after we have resolved the live prisoner issue.

Now that the Cambodians are cooperating, and in anticipation that the Lao will increase their cooperation, our staff is developing plans for POW/MIA operations for those countries as well. As with Vietnam, we will give priority to those activities which will shed light on the issue of living Americans. As part of this effort, we hope to soon establish POW/MIA detachments in both Phnom Penh and Vientiane.

The Pacific Command will execute the operations specified in these plans by employing a two-tiered concept. First, a joint task force, or a JTF, will be established which will integrate POW/MIA operations and support functions under a single commander, a brigadier general. This officer will have responsibility for the entire mission of searching for MIA's and recovering the remains of war dead in Southeast Asia, a mission for which heretofore a number of agencies have shared responsibility.

Second, the Joint Task Force Commander will report directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command who, in turn, will respond to taskings from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would like to elaborate for a minute on how this two-tiered concept with its unity of command will work. As POW/MIA policy is formulated here in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will communicate guidance and operational taskings to the Joint Task Force commander via the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command. The theater commander and the theater command will then make available to the Joint Task Force the necessary resources and expertise available within the Pacific Command headquarters and the theater's service components to execute these operations.

For example, if the Joint Task Force commander needs helicopters to ferry his search teams to remote locations, aviation units will be tasked to provide this support. Now, Senators, in this particular example I must point out that the Southeast Asian governments will have to agree to the employment of these assets in their countries. In planning and executing the operations, the Joint Task Force commander will direct the activities of the POW/MIA detachment based in Hanoi, as well as the other detachments when approved.

So as you can see, by establishing the Joint Task Force and employing our command and control concept, we will have forged a direct line of authority which will run from Washington all the way down to detachment commanders in the field, giving them the necessary assets that they need to accomplish their mission. The Pacific Command headquarters staff and the subordinate service components are currently looking at additional ways to improve logistics and communications support to the search teams and the Hanoi detachment. These were areas over which congressional observers recently expressed concern and, I might say, rightfully so.

We have procured or are in the process of procuring equipment ranging from ponchos to sophisticated radio communications gear. We have looked at ways to provide sustained, cost-effective vehicle operations and maintenance for the search teams and will soon initiate procurement actions, which will alleviate shortfalls in this area. Meanwhile, the staff of the U.S. Army Pacific Command has prepared a concept of operations for providing helicopter support to the JTF teams, should the Southeast Asian governments allow their use.

The JTF will not be a paper organization. On July 30, the Secretary of Defense authorized a substantial increase in personnel who will come under the Joint Task Force. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center, whose personnel will form the operations nucleus, will double to 76. These increases are earmarked for the actual search effort on the ground. Highly-skilled linguists and analysts are being assigned so that we can put more teams on the ground for longer periods of time. We will ensure the work of these teams is made known to the families and to the American public. To the extent possible, we will give the media every opportunity to cover our activities, and in keeping with our longstanding practice, we will notify expeditiously the families on the results of our investigations and recovery operations through the established Service Casualty Affairs channel.

We have nothing to hide. To the contrary, we are most anxious to tell the American public of the dedication of our people in the hard, often dangerous work that they perform, and that you have alluded to, sir. The Pacific Command is moving quickly to put the right organization, people and resources in place to expand and accelerate POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia. Our outline plan has been approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are currently developing a detailed operations plan which will be submitted through the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. Once approved, the Chairman will direct that we execute the plan.

Given the favorable climate of cooperation in Southeast Asia, I am confident we will make substantial progress in the weeks and months ahead. I look forward to the committee's visit to our field locations so that you, again, can see first-hand the results of our efforts to illuminate the live prisoner issue and move deliberately toward achieving the fullest possible accounting of all missing Americans. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Major General Christmas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS

Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, and distinguished members, I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee. Like you, those of us on active duty today are deeply committed to finding the answers to the questions surrounding Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. We have a solemn obligation to our fallen comrades and their families to resolve this vexing issue once and for all.

Having served as a commander in combat and later as the project officer for the designation and entombment of the Vietnam unknown soldier, I have a particularly strong sense of obligation in this regard. Moreover, as the director of operations for the U.S. Pacific Command, I am responsible for directing the activities of the Command's POW/MIA search teams.

I would like to present to you the Pacific Command's views on the state of the POW/MIA issue. Specifically, I'll discuss the recent developments in the region and the initiatives which the Command has undertaken in response to them.

Perhaps at no other time have the opportunities to dramatically expand and accelerate casualty resolution operations in the region been so great. We have established a POW/MIA Affairs Office in Hanoi and the Vietnamese are affording its staff and our search teams good cooperation. The mission of the Hanoi office is to conduct in-country investigations of reported first-hand live sightings, to research historical and archival records, conduct forensic review of remains jointly recovered or unilaterally made available by the Vietnamese, and to conduct advance planning and prepare and execute joint field operations. During the most recent round of investigative activities, our teams were given increased access to Hanoi's wartime archives—an action which we have long urged the Vietnamese to undertake.

We think the Vietnamese, however, can do more particularly with regard to the disclosure of all relevant wartime documents, access to former cadre who were involved in the capture and detention of American prisoners, and turn-over of remains recovered unilaterally.

Naturally we will continue to pursue greater disclosure, access, and their unilateral efforts through the Hanoi office and each time we conduct a technical meeting similar to the one held last week. (30 Oct.-1 Nov.)

In Cambodia, the Phnom Penh authorities last month permitted, for the first time, an American survey team to investigate the circumstances of loss involving missing American servicemen and news correspondents. This followed closely their assistance to our investigators who traveled to Cambodia to follow-up widely publicized photographs identified by family members as Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. While it is too early to tell whether the Cambodians will sustain a cooperative relationship on POW/MIA, we were satisfied with these initial efforts and are prepared to follow-up on future breakthroughs.

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The Pacific Command, in conjunction with the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense, has moved quickly to capitalize on this favorable climate of cooperation, in Vietnam. We plan to execute a comprehensive casualty resolution campaign on a scale which the Department of Defense has wanted to carry out since the signing of the Paris Accords in 1973, but couldn't because of Vietnam's intransigence. To execute this plan, we are fielding additional search teams and putting in place other necessary resources.

Our plan is focused on investigative activities to determine whether unaccounted for Americans are alive. Using the staff of our Hanoi POW/MIA office, soon to be a

detachment of the joint task force organization I will describe shortly, and mobile field teams, we will follow-up aggressively on reports of Americans alleged to be alive in Vietnam and investigate discrepancy cases those compelling loss incidents which suggest a missing American was captured but the Vietnamese have returned neither the person nor his remains. We have singled out these cases for priority investigation because if there are Americans alive, they are most likely associated with these losses. To execute this priority investigative activity, we will expand the staff of our Hanoi office and task the staff to carry out full-time investigation of these cases. If we can resolve these cases, we will have done much to shed light on the live prisoner issue.

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Now that the Cambodians are cooperating, and in anticipation that the Lao will increase their cooperation, our staff is developing plans for POW/MIA operations for those countries as well. As with Vietnam, we will give priority to those activities which will shed light on the issue of living Americans. As part of this effort, we hope to soon establish POW/MIA detachments in Phnom Penh and Vientiane.

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Second, the JTF commander will report directly to the commander in chief of the Pacific Command who, in turn, will respond to tasking from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I'd like to elaborate for a moment on how this two-tiered concept with its unity of command will work. As POW/MIA policy is formulated here in Washington, the joint staff will communicate guidance and operational tasking to the JTF commander, via the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Command. The theater command will make available to the JTF the necessary resources and expertise available within the Pacific Command headquarters and the theater service components to execute these operations.

For example, if the JTF commander needs helicopters to ferry his search teams to remote locations, aviation units will be tasked to provide this support. In this particular example, however, I must point out that the Southeast Asian governments will have to agree to the employment of these assets in their countries.

In planning and executing the operations, the JTF commander will direct the activities of the POW/MIA detachment based in Hanoi as well as the other detachments when approved. So, as you can see, by establishing the JTF and employing our command and control concept, we will have forged a direct line of authority which will run from Washington all the way down to the detachment commanders in the field.

The Pacific Command headquarters staff and the subordinate service components are currently looking at additional ways to improve logistics and communications support to the search teams and the Hanoi detachment. These were areas over which congressional observers recently expressed concern. We have procured or are in the process of procuring equipment ranging from ponchos to sophisticated radio communications gear. We have looked at ways to provide sustained, cost-effective vehicle operations and maintenance for the search teams and will soon initiate procurement actions which will alleviate shortfalls in this area. Meanwhile, the staff of the U.S. Army Pacific Command has prepared a concept of operations for providing helicopter support to the JTF teams.

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We will ensure the work of these teams is made known to the families and to the American public. To the extent possible, we will give the media every opportunity to cover our activities and, in keeping with our longstanding practice, we will notify expeditiously the families on the results of our investigations and recovery oper-

ations through the established service casualty affairs channel. We have nothing to hide; to the contrary, we are most anxious to tell the American public of the dedication of our people and the hard, often dangerous work which they perform.

The Pacific Command is moving quickly to put the right organization, people, and resources in place to expand and accelerate POW/MIA operations in Southeast Asia. Our outline plan has been submitted and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are currently developing a detailed operations plan which will be submitted through the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. Once approved, the Chairman will direct that we execute the plan.

Given the favorable climate of cooperation in Southeast Asia, I am confident we will make substantial progress in the weeks and months ahead. I look forward to this committee's visit to our field locations so that you can see firsthand the results of our efforts to illuminate the live prisoner issue and move deliberately toward achieving the fullest possible accounting of all missing Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. General Ryan, do you have a statement?

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL E. RYAN, VICE DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), THE JOINT STAFF**

General RYAN. I do not have a prepared statement, Senator. I stand ready to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Let me begin the questioning, Mr. Secretary, by asking you when was your first official involvement with the POW/MIA issue.

Mr. FORD. It was 1987 or 1988, and I do not recall the exact date. I was serving as the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and was asked to do an estimate on the POW/MIA issue. Prior to that time I had, as an interested student of the region—as a former serviceman generally interested in the issue, but had no formal responsibilities—after the estimate, I did not have another occasion to work on the issue until I came to the Defense Department in March of 1989.

The CHAIRMAN. What did your 1987 estimate require you to do?

Mr. FORD. It was to look at the questions on whether or not—to check on whether the intelligence community was looking at all the right issues and to make a best judgment as to the question of whether there were any Americans alive in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom did you do that for?

Mr. FORD. I did that for the Director of Central Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. What conclusions did you come to?

Mr. FORD. I would have to refresh my memory on the actual findings. My recollection was that we could not make a judgment based on the evidence that we had available.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a formal report submitted to the DCI?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. I am sure that it is available.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that report be at CIA?

Mr. FORD. It would be. I think it was at the secret level, but I am not sure.

[Requested classified material was provided to the committee.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will request that, obviously. Apart from the assessment about the flow of intelligence, what conclusion did you draw with respect to the probability of live Americans being in Southeast Asia?

Mr. FORD. In that intelligence estimate?

The CHAIRMAN. At that time.

Mr. FORD. I think that, as I recall and again, I would have to refresh my memory, a lot has happened since then on this issue. I think that we determined that there was not enough information to make a firm judgment that there was somebody alive. There was clearly no evidence that there—we could not demonstrate that there were not. In fact, it was very similar in terms of our findings to what has become the standard position of the U.S. Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any evidence that you recall that distinctly suggested to you that somebody was alive?

Mr. FORD. No evidence at that time. In fact, I think that subsequent to that estimate, there has been far better—far more detailed work done by others than was available at the time in 1987, 1988, when I did that estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulties with any agency in securing answers to inquiries that you made?

Mr. FORD. None that I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you come across any evidence of any kind whatsoever leading you to believe that, for any period of time, there might have been a so-called cover-up or effort to avoid evidence?

Mr. FORD. None that I looked at personally. Most of my effort was managing the process of the intelligence community in looking into this issue, and we were focusing more on contemporary, current practices in intelligence and questions. The estimate was not focused and did not cover, as I remember in any detail at all, what happened in the period, say, 1970 to 1975 timeframe.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are now really the principal point person on this. Is that fair to say?

Mr. FORD. I think it would be fair to say that I have been the Secretary's representative on this issue. I have other responsibilities. This is not my only job.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Mr. FORD. I am more of the person who if I can identify problems, if I can be of assistance to either a Government agency and/or a family, or an interested person, I try to put them in touch with the right people, or try to solve the problems if they come up.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as a former service-person yourself, and flanked by distinguished generals and recognizing as well as anybody in this country what is at stake here, there are not any of us who does not find our skin crawling at the notion that somebody might have tubed some information or cast it aside, or somehow found other imperatives that were more important than pursuing this. Is there anything that you have come across? I mean, this thing lives, we all know it lives. You have said we have a credibility problem. What is it that allows this to live? Have you come across anything that suggests to you that at some point in time someone might have paid less than the attention that was due, or is this just something that has come out of whole cloth?

Mr. FORD. I certainly, Mr. Chairman, do not have any evidence that anyone knowingly, for example, made decisions or did things knowing that there were Americans alive in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Even if there were, I do not see any evidence of that, but I think that those are the sorts of questions that you really have to ask the people that were responsible for our Government policies

in those days—what was in their mind, what they knew at the time?

In retrospect, I have to admit to you that if I had been there, I hope—I do not know how I would have reacted, because I know a lot more now than I probably would have known in those periods of time—I hope that I would have been a little bit more firm on pressing the governments, particularly Laos, about their holding of Americans and holding them to account for it. It is easy for me, 19 years after the fact or 10 years after the fact—whatever, and the perspective of 1991 to make that—and I do not know if even I, as strongly as I feel about this issue, would have acted differently if I had been responsible at the time. It does seem to me that there could have been more done.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee has, through individuals, often met with Ross Perot. I have had occasion to meet with him. I know my vice chair has, others have. Here is a man who invested considerable money, time, energy, effort, and finally threw his hands up with a sense of disgust, whose motives are just unquestionable with respect to this issue. Looking back at that now, as you undoubtedly have had to, have you talked to him? Has any current generation of policymakers on this issue met with those sort of people to really debrief and to get a sense of where they are coming from in this, or has that been too much a part of the past to deal with?

Mr. FORD. I personally have not talked to Mr. Perot. I have tried to talk to people who have worked this issue over the years, long before I was involved in it, to sort of get their sense of history, their sense of what happened and why, at least in part so that I did not have to reinvent the wheel, as a new kid on the block. And—but that only goes back, quite frankly, to the early to mid-80's, in which a new group of people who took it, quite frankly, more seriously and were—at least the ones I have talked to—I am confident tried to do better than they thought people in the past had done. They are clearly not in exhaustive discussion with all of the people who have done this problem before me.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever in the course of your tenure in this job previously heard of any documents being destroyed?

Mr. FORD. No. No. If I did, I would have been very, very angry and upset, and would have done something about it. That is not to say that documents haven't been destroyed. It just simply has not come to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was my question.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you—well, I will strike that. Let me turn to colleagues so that we can keep the round going and be fair. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Ford, the interagency group some time in 1989, January, I think, put out a report saying that there was an agreement reached with Laos, that they would provide access to wartime records and so forth on Americans who not only were under the alleged Pathet Lao control, but also under the control of North Vietnamese in Laos—any records that they had, either dead or alive. Have they lived up to that? Give me one line or two. Where are we on that? Have they responded to that in a positive way?

Mr. FORD. I think that there has been some progress in Laos—Laotian cooperation on POW/MIA. There are a number of firsts that we can point to within the past year or so, of finally getting into areas, some of the cave areas for example, where we knew that Americans were being held prisoner at one time. These areas had been denied to us for many years. We also have seen cases where, although we wanted to do it ourselves, before we could get down to Savannakhet, the Laotians had found the man who was in the purported Borah photograph, for example. But if you ask me, am I satisfied, are they doing all they can do, the answer is absolutely no, they are not and that there are a lot of things that we would like them to do for us that they are not doing.

Now, part of it is because there is a big difference between Laos and Vietnam. In Vietnam, as best we can tell, they were great recordkeepers and every scrap of paper having to do with Americans, there is a long record of this keeping things.

In Laos, these were guerrillas operating in an area being bombed regularly by the United States. They were not in control of the whole country. They did not apparently keep records quite as well as the Vietnamese. They often had a practice, unlike the Vietnamese, that if they found an American, they more frequently killed him than not, and that you had to be very lucky to be one of those who was captured and did not die immediately. Subsequently, as they have taken power, trying to go back and get into these issues, they quite frankly consider it a matter of national security. It is like trying to pull teeth to get them to 'fess up to some of these things. I am not sure that we will ever get them to be able to convince us in the same sort of detail that the Vietnamese may be able to, because they do not have the sort of records that we would like to see in the absence of other information.

We are not going to trust what the Vietnamese or Laotians say 100 percent, but it certainly helps if we have their journal of the day of an incident and they say that this particular American was captured, was shot by local militia 30 minutes after his capture and we think his remains are located so-and-so. That certainly is more information than maybe we had at the time of loss. In the case of Laos, all we have got basically are anecdotal memories of villagers to put together with our investigations.

One of the differences though, also in Laos, is because of its more rugged terrain and because of fewer people. When we actually visit crash sites, for example, we often find things that have been there since 1971 or 1968. That is not really the case in Vietnam. Often, we do not find anything. So there are pluses and minuses and I think that the Lao are trying to do better, but they have a long way to go yet.

Senator SMITH. In all my interactions with you since I have been in the Senate, and since you have been in your position, we have had some differences, but you have always, as far as I know, been totally candid with me. I hate to ask this kind of a high, inside fast ball here, and I realize you would probably not be the one to make such a decision, but supposing somebody were to turn up who was a deserter by the military definition of the word today. What would be your recommendation in terms of that individual? Would you recommend prosecuting that individual as a deserter? The reason I

am asking the question is if there is such a person out there, maybe we can send a message through these hearings; but I would be curious to know your recommendation and I realize it would not be probably your final decision to make.

Mr. FORD. Obviously, that decision would have to be a function of the secretary of the service that the individual came from and also, probably eventually the Secretary and the President of the United States. I mean, we've had various forms of amnesty over time. My sense of it is that I hope there's no one out there who's been living in Southeast Asia for fear that if they came back they somehow would be seriously punished.

Obviously, we would have to go through the official procedures as such actions and such persons would normally be done, but the fact is that if we knew that a person had been for 20 years hiding from us in very primitive conditions for fear that he somehow would have to go to the stockade for 6 years, I hope that's not the case. I hope they know to come home.

Senator SMITH. One quick final question. My time is running out here. In the meeting that we had with several Senators, you made a statement regarding Garwood's recanting testimony. You later sent me back a full letter of apology for that and I accept that and do not bring it up to make an issue of it, just simply this question. What brought you to that conclusion at the time you made the statement? Was it a specific individual who made that statement to you within the agency, or was it just something you received by osmosis, or what was your reason for feeling that way? Obviously you felt that way when you said it.

Mr. FORD. Senator, as you know, I clearly know better than to talk about this issue with you. You probably know more about this particular incident than anyone that I know of. You were there during some of the interviews, and I learned my lesson. I misspoke. I clearly had received both by osmosis and by various briefings from different individuals a different impression.

When I realized that I had not only misled you, but I had misled other members who heard my presentation, not only did I write to you, but I thought it was important to write to your colleagues as well, because I don't want anything—I'm in a position, as Senator Kerry said, I'm sort of a spokesman, and what I say, right or wrong, may have more influence than it really should have. And—but in this case, what we've done is that the Secretary, who was there also, has asked that this be fully investigated and sort of redone, and have analysts who are very capable but who have been working different problems, go in and look at it afresh and see what the cases are. I'm going to reserve my judgment until they've completed their studies and when they give me their briefing, I'm going to ask them a lot more—a lot harder questions this next time.

Senator SMITH. Just a final point. You did not have to go into further explanation. I accepted that. I think that the difference, and just to point out for the record, is there is a difference between not believing Garwood—which I know many in the agency, maybe all in the agency, do not, and I understand that. It is just that the issue of recanting where Garwood himself said he recanted what he said was the issue that I wanted to clarify. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I could just remind you also that the committee would like as soon as possible the raw Garwood initial debriefing data and the records with respect to that, because that will be one of the initial areas of inquiry.

Mr. FORD. I will pass that request on. The only sensitivity I know, and it may not really be a real one, is that my understanding is that there are agreements between DIA, for example, and Garwood's lawyer about privileged information, et cetera. I don't think in this case it will—it will be an issue, but I think that it would be something that obviously may be asked that it be kept between the members and the staff of the committee as opposed to something that would be public.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Whatever ultimately is public will hopefully come from Mr. Garwood's lips himself, but in terms of the background and understanding of it, the committee needs to review that. Senator GRASSLEY.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Cheney referred to 102 personnel who have been added to help resolve the issue. I would like to know if you could provide this committee with a list of who these people are and what their functions are, and could you tell us now how many of these 102 are devoted strictly to looking for possible live prisoners.

Mr. FORD. I know generally the number of people who are out in the field and their primary function is live—the live prisoner issue. Now—

Senator GRASSLEY. How many of the 102 would fall into that category?

Mr. FORD. My sense is that it's the 88 that we're talking about are—some of them are not in Hawaii, or in Southeast Asia. They may be here in Washington say, for example, at DIA, but all of those people are focused on increasing the real—instead of paper-pushers like me—people who are actually enmeshed in the details on a day-to-day basis. General Christmas may have more details about what CINCPAC is doing.

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me be very clear. I am talking about those who are going after live-sighting reports, whether it is live prisoners, as opposed to those who are trying to find bones or get confirmation.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. I understand.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK.

General CHRISTMAS. First of all, of the 76 that we have as part of the Joint Resolution Center, the JCRC in Hawaii, all of them are devoted to the entire POW/MIA issue. When we put the joint task force together, we will have a minimum of five search teams and two teams which you, I think, referred to as the guys who look for bones. But five of the teams will follow up on live sighting reports and discrepancy cases which are most likely to lead to living Americans. That's the way we are operating. So you can see how that breaks down.

Five search teams and two recovery teams will go in for 30 days at a time. They will come back out. They will work their reports and findings, and then other teams will go back in. So we hope that we're going to have this continuing effort to resolve this very important issue.

Mr. FORD. Senator Grassley, if I could just add one—one comment. I understand your concerns and—about looking for bones, and I hear that quite frequently, and I know that there is a sense that that's all we're doing. I think that it's unfair to our people in the field to suggest that their primary focus is on remains recovery. We go where the facts lead us as we identify each case and try to follow it through for the fullest possible accounting. If the facts lead us to the notion that we can either recover the remains or that we think the Vietnamese or Laotians have those remains, we think it's important as our accounting to the families that we can give them that information. I haven't talked to every family member, of course, but I've talked to a lot over the past 2-1/2 years, and I get the sense, every one of them would like to have—even in their heart they may know that their son or their husband or whoever is dead, but they want them to be alive.

They want them to walk out of the jungle and come home, but they will tell you very quickly that if that can't be the case, please end the uncertainty for me. Give me something so that I can put this to rest, I've been with it so long. Well, one, it tears your heart out that these people have had to go through this all these years. But second, if we can give them something that answers those questions, maybe it helps end their uncertainty. For others, it causes new problems, whether this is enough, whether there is sufficient evidence, and on and on. This shouldn't be against your time, but I thought it's important that we say that, that our purpose isn't really for just going after bones.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, it is OK that you have said it now, or it is OK that you say it any-time. Understand my question. I wanted just some statistics on the number of the 102 who are in one category and the others who are in another category.

Mr. FORD. It is 38 in Hawaii, and those people will be 18 at CIL-HI, 18 at DIA and 9 at Stony Beach.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I did not know you would have those numbers. What I would like to have is a list of whatever, 102, and where they are assigned, and what their job is.

Mr. FORD. We can do that for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

DIA SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION

PLUS-UP ASSIGNMENTS (ALL POSITIONS LOCATED AT DIA, WASHINGTON, DC.)

Division Headquarters

Administrative assistant—Hiring in progress

External Relations Branch

Intelligence officer (3 positions)—Hiring in progress

Analysis Branch

Intelligence officer—Hiring in progress

Intelligence officer—Mr. Paul Mather

Intelligence officer—Lt. Paul Maguire, USN

Intelligence specialist—Petty Officer Steve McCabe, USN

Intelligence technician—Hiring in progress

Data Base Management Branch

Computer programmer—Nominations from Army being reviewed

Intelligence technician—Ms. Benita Wood

Intelligence technician—Ms. Carol Stewart

Intelligence technician—Hiring in progress

Current Operations Branch

Intelligence officer—Cpt. Tami Turner, USAF

Intelligence officer—Maj. Jeannie Schiff, USAF

Intelligence officer—Cpt. Sandra Caughlin, USA

Intelligence officer—Hiring in progress

Secretary—Hiring in progress

Intelligence technician—Hiring in progress

STONY BEACH (ALL POSITIONS IN THAILAND UNLESS INDICATED)

Intelligence officer—hiring in progress

Intelligence officer—hiring in progress

Intelligence officer—Hiring in progress

Intelligence specialist—Sfc. John Bankwill, USN

Intelligence officer—Cpt. Randall Mastromonaco, USAF

Intelligence officer—Maj. Charles Robertson, USAF

Intelligence officer—Requisitions in progress

Intelligence officer—Requisitions in progress

Intelligence officer—Requisitions in progress

* Individual located at DIA, DAM-2 in Washington, DC.

POW-MIA TASK FORCE (ALL POSITIONS IN WASHINGTON, DC)

DIA Element

Supervisory intelligence officer—Harold E. Sprague

Administrative assistant—John Emery

Secretary—Jane Osborne

Intelligence officer—Barbara Banks

Intelligence officer—Cpt. Alex Odren, USAF

Intelligence technician—Ray Craib

ADP specialist—Paul Nanko

Intelligence specialist—Petty Officer Paul Diczno, USN

Reservist Support Element (USAF)

Commander (2 positions)—Reports 1 Mar. 91

Secretary—Reports 1 Mar. 91

Team chief (3 positions)—Reports 1 Mar. 91

Intelligence officers (7 positions)—Reports 1 Mar. 91

Senator GRASSLEY. I have some more questions, but I will wait for another round if you want me to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ford, you heard my request on behalf of Mr. Earl Bond. I will be glad to provide you that information. I guess Mr. Quinn was not the appropriate one to ask that.

Mr. FORD. No, sir. We were really the more appropriate and we are—I've asked my staff to contact your staff to get more details, and we will have a written answer to you to the best of our knowledge of the case, tomorrow or the next day.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. You said earlier, Mr. Ford, that things were done wrong or not as well as they should have been, and mistakes were made, basically is what you have told this committee. I am curious what your view is of why those things happened. Was it because of bureaucratic ineptitude? Was it because of, as Colonel Peck alleges, mindset to debunk, or what in your view was the reason that some mistakes were made and the job was not done in the best fashion?

Mr. FORD. I have obviously thought about that a lot, and tried in my own mind to try to sort out what some of the problems were. I don't profess to have the full and final answer, and just give you

my snapshot view of just a few years working the issue. I think that it's a very complex analytical problem, one of the most difficult I've ever been involved with, and with a high learning curve.

The CHAIRMAN. Pull the mike just a tiny bit closer.

Mr. FORD. The learning curve is very high, and in which you as human beings—mistakes are going to happen. They're not intentional. They're more simply that we are working with limited knowledge, fragments of information, also we're dealing with volatile emotional issues. I mean, if—and I've told this to several families and they may believe me, or they may not—but if my father or my son was still in Southeast Asia, and I didn't have any answers, and I had not gotten my satisfaction from my casualty officer, I'd be upset too. So that there's a certain emotional nature, and I don't care how good our casualty officers are, some of them have been doing it for a number of years. They are not going to be 100 percent every minute.

Senator McCAIN. You do not believe there was a mindset to debunk?

Mr. FORD. I think that there are people past, present, and the future, who probably for their own reasons will believe that they have the answer, and they will be there trying to suggest—to prove their answer, whether that answer is debunk us in the executive branch, or to debunk the issue in Southeast Asia. I have been an analyst most of my adult life and all of them are not as objective and perfect as you would like. They take their own personal views into it and they're going to try to make a point.

Senator McCAIN. I do not want to belabor the issue, but would you characterize the mistakes that were made that you have acknowledged to this committee as bureaucratic bungling, mindset to debunk, or just as you have just described, the emotionalism surrounding the issue? I think it is important for us to understand what is your best view of why these mistakes were made.

Mr. FORD. I hope this doesn't sound too glib, because it's not intended to be. I think it's all of the above. I mean, I can't find—the only one that I can't find in my research, or my contact with people, is a purposeful, politically motivated or privately motivated cover-up. Every mistake that can be made by bureaucracies and human beings, has probably occurred in the last 19 years, and I can point to a few that I've made, errors in judgment, or whatever.

Senator McCAIN. I would like to return to what the chairman was asking a little earlier of another witness, and I have to go back to Secretary of Defense Cheney's statement this morning. A photograph taken in Laos surfaced earlier this year that was identified by family members as Lieutenant Daniel V. Borah, U.S. Navy. In addition, a non-government forensic anthropologist positively identified the person in the photo as Lieutenant Borah. Then, with the help of Laotian officials, they find out it was a 77-year-old Laotian individual with some French blood.

Why would someone go to all that trouble to take a photograph like that and circulate it around, and have the family identify it? What I am worried about here now, Secretary Ford, is what we are doing to these families. What somebody is doing to them, not only to the American people, but you just put yourself in the situation earlier of the son or the father of someone who is listed as missing.

My God, how terrible is this, to subject a family to this. Why would they be doing something like this in your view?

Mr. FORD. For the life of me, I can't understand why people would do this. I mean, I've had the same sorts of questions that I've heard you and Senator Kerry, and I know Senator Smith and I have talked about. I don't see a lot of money changing hands.

I mean, there is some pocket-change money passing hands in Southeast Asia, between Laotian and Cambodian and Thai people who bring in a few bits of information. There is also some money raised here and there, but it's all really sort of small change. This is not a financial issue that I can tell. I mean, it's a local official in Cambodia selling information to possible refugees for a couple of bucks and thinks that he—telling these people if you have this bone, or if you have this belt buckle, if you have this picture, you're going to get to the United States when you get to the refugee camp, and I'll give it to you for \$1. But the only problem is, he's got a thousand of them. He only makes 1,000 bucks, but it's still small change. I don't know, other than those people who simply are trying to manipulate U.S. policy, try to throw us off the track.

There have been examples in the past that clearly the intelligence services in Southeast Asia were manufacturing stuff, and it goes up and down, and almost seemingly without the knowledge or active participation of the foreign ministry or other high officials in the government. But the dogtags that are manufactured and/or submitted to people here in the United States, all kinds of things that there is no really good answer for, I'm afraid that whatever the reasons are, what we put the families through is that they had their heart broken the day they got the news that their loved one was missing, and they have to go through this agony of having to live through it again.

There's nobody on my staff or anybody I know in the Pentagon who doesn't want these reports to be true. We don't want to have to tell another family that they've been jerked around by a scam artist. I mean, there's this one group that I know has touched at least two and probably three families and they're still doing it. Despite our passing on the word that there's something really fishy about this whole group, the same people are passing on information that one, related in one fashion or another to the Borah photograph, to the new Stevens photograph, and to information having to do with the Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy photograph.

Senator McCAIN. Do you want to identify this group?

Mr. FORD. Well, I do not know their real names. I just know of them. They are people operating out of Southeast Asia, Laotians who claim to have information that they'll provide to us and they provide it to a number of Americans, private people interested in the subject, Government, like us. It's unclear whether they—the people receiving it, mostly Americans, accept at face value that it's probably—could be true. And how—where do you cut off? I mean, just because a guy is a known scam artist and he gives us a photograph, I don't immediately assume that it's bogus. I can't afford to, because it may be the one time that either he stumbled onto the truth, or for whatever reason, this time it's real. So each one of

them has to be taken seriously and checked out with the hope that it might be true.

But when you find people who are clearly involved in this, the only thing we know to do is polygraph them, and if they pass the polygraph, take them very seriously. Unfortunately, every time we get a chance to get hold of one of these guys and put them on the polygraph, they blow it, and so we just keep pushing ahead hoping that one day we're going to find one of these people who has some real information. If we do, I'm confident there's—that it's not just rhetoric. If we find out the location of Captain Carr or anybody else, there is no doubt in my mind there won't be any foreign policy, there won't be any domestic political reasons. We'll go get him. If he can't get out, we'll go get him.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had to go preside over the Senate and so I missed some of the intervening testimony this afternoon and the formal opening statements of Secretary Ford, General Ryan, and General Christmas. I hope you will forgive me for stating as a point of personal privilege that my own association with General Christmas goes back something in excess of 25 years, when he and I were company grade officers and served together. I have not had much contact with him since he was Medevaced from Hue after a very courageous and very heroic display of leadership, and he was recovering for quite some number of years, but I am very pleased with the prospect that we may have an opportunity to work directly with General Christmas, and I hope when we make the visit to Vietnam next year that he will be in country at the same time so that we might have an opportunity to visit some personally.

As an aside, I bring him greetings from Pat Mayer, someone he will remember going back 25-plus years from another Marine Corps association.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question that goes directly to the area that General Christmas is overseeing at this point, and that has to do with the ability to follow up on any contemporaneous reporting of live prisoners, what I guess in the civilian world would be viewed as a form of hot pursuit. General, would you say that given the configuration and the resources that are available to you at this time, that you have the capacity should someone have a contemporaneous live sighting, and not one that is reported and is very, very old, to follow up expeditiously to determine whether or not it is true and whatever else might be appropriate?

General CHRISTMAS. At present, Senator, we're putting in the mechanism that provides that, and we have talked already today about the need for the Vietnamese to be more forthcoming in allowing our Stony Beach operator—allowing our people free access so that they can rapidly respond in Vietnam. We have teams in Bangkok right now. We hope that as things progress in both Laos and Cambodia that we will be able to put detachments there that will be able to react immediately to those live sightings.

Now, will we be able and prepared to bring that American out? Well, I think that is the reason we need a good, solid, joint task

force that can respond to policy that will come from the national command authority, from the Secretary of Defense and down through the Chairman to us.

Senator ROBB. Let me ask just one other question. You talk about the coordination between the two commands. One of the concerns that I have had with respect to the whole POW/MIA issue has been the number of different agencies that have some level of responsibility for follow-up in any of these areas, and I am curious. Either you or Secretary Ford might be able to respond to this question. The new assistant secretary for POW/MIA affairs, where will that individual fit within the chain of command? I think General Christmas described the chain of command on the military side, and I am curious how the responsibility of the new assistant secretary will play out with respect to the military assets that are available and/or other civilian agencies that may have an interest in this particular question.

Mr. FORD. Senator Robb, the way I would describe it is a very close partnership between the deputy assistant and the joint task force at CINCPAC. The deputy assistant for POW/MIA affairs will be the Secretary's personal representative on this issue, so that when the military comes through the normal chain of command from the CINC to the Chairman, they then come to the Secretary with recommendations. As we did in Desert Storm, or as we do on any sort of crisis situation, it is then up to the deputy assistants to brief the Secretary and give him advice and provide comments to the Chairman and to the military.

We're going to work this issue the way we work every other issue and that is a very close working relationship between the military, who are implementing, and the Secretary who has responsibility for overseeing the policy aspects to make sure it is done right.

Senator ROBB. With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I must say when you say that you have a partnership rather than a command relationship, it concerns me a little bit. I am pleased, and I think one of the innovations that has been most helpful in Desert Storm, for instance, was the kind of clear command and control relationships that were in evidence. I am not suggesting a specific response or solution this time around, and indeed hope that kind of partnership would exist in all cases.

Mr. FORD. I wish that we had a perfect answer for you. I think that what General Christmas said was very true, and as the Carper Committee, and I'm sure this committee will find, there have been too many cooks in the stew. We are taking the military chain and we're putting in one cook, the JTF commander—and that one cook is reporting to the chairman and to the Secretary of Defense.

The DASD will be working for the Secretary of Defense, so there's going to be fewer cooks, more responsibility, and at least in terms of the Secretary, there'll be somebody he can turn around and say who's responsible for this. On his side is will be the DASD, whoever that should be. He will also be able to turn to the Chairman and say, why did we make a mistake, let's get it right. So the responsibility chain is much more limited now, and he can turn around and see who was responsible for good things or bad things, whichever they may be.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, I note that we have some number of cooks in our chain of responsibility, one of which is to report to the floor when a vote is on, and a vote has just begun. With that in mind, I will defer any additional questions. You may have something that you want to tie up at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. What I am going to do is I want to keep this going. Senator Smith has departed for the floor to try to vote rapidly and return, and then I will leave so that we can try not to have an interruption if possible. I know Senator Grassley had some more questions. I would like to—

Senator GRASSLEY. Should I go vote?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be good if you went to vote now and then came back as fast as possible. That way you can back up Senator Smith and we can continue the process. We do have one last panel after this.

With respect to the helicopter situation and the ability to go out on a fast response, live sighting capacity, is there a discussion with respect to Laos of having non-U.S.—identified—I mean, I could well imagine why some people would be apprehensive about United States colors flying in choppers in Vietnam. Is there a methodology to get a lease-back situation, private company to somehow deal with that?

General CHRISTMAS. Yes sir. Senator, you have—the preferred course of action is obviously good old U.S. birds with our pilots to put our folks in and put them out of harm's way. We would feel a lot more comfortable that way. Obviously, there are other courses of action that we have to fall back on to provide that capability. The second course of action is, of course, is leasing. Currently—both working with the Vietnamese, working with the Laotians and working with the Cambodians—recently, for Tang Island we went into leasing-type agreements. Of course, the third course of action is, as you've heard so much, that the Laotian helicopter that's now down, or the old Russian helicopter with the Vietnamese—sir, we go from the top and then we take the next course and the next course.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think the third course of action is not acceptable and I tried to make that clear when I was over there. Ambassador Lang is not here right now, but I know his representatives are. He will be back tomorrow morning, I know, to follow the proceedings, but I made clear to him and to the Vietnamese, on the record now, that this committee when it visits in February will look hard at whether they have fulfilled the promises that have been made.

To whatever degree the Vietnamese are looking for an improvement in the relationship, I know I can speak for every member of this committee that if that access is difficult, or if those promises are not being fulfilled, we are going to look with a big question mark at that. And I have personally had General Secretary Do Muoi, and prior to him, General Secretary Ling, and the Foreign Minister, and all the other members of their departments look me in the eye and say, you can go anywhere in the country and we want you to have access.

So I think the committee is going to look very hard at the follow through on that. General, if we can be helpful, obviously, in trying to leverage it, let us know.

What is the process now for a live sighting follow-up? Do you initiate immediately? Do you follow up actively? Does it have to go to Washington, or is this an instant kind of response?

General CHRISTMAS. Well, first of all, if obviously we can make an immediate follow-up, if in other words the information has come to us right there on scene and we can initially follow up, we obviously would. What we normally do is collect the information. We collect what we can. We get it back through the analyst channels, and we try to open up all information available to see what we have. Then, if we can make that instant contact, obviously we do.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not have to go to Washington for any approvals on that anymore. Do I understand the chain of command now?

General CHRISTMAS. Our Hanoi office has the authority to follow-up on live sightings within Vietnam, and we would suspect that if we had the opportunity to put detachments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, they would have a similar capability.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, over the years you read a lot of allegations on this issue. Whole books, movies and so forth. Some people assert that there are camps that are holding 50, 200 people or so. What is the possibility of that kind of camp existing based on all the intelligence and data that we have now?

Mr. FORD. This was discussed earlier in the afternoon and I think I generally agree with the characterization that I think Ken Quinn gave. That is, in Vietnam I find it very difficult to accept the fact that there is a camp that the Vietnamese don't know about. It could be, but I find it—maybe in the central highlands near the Lao/Cambodian border it's conceivable, but not very likely. In Laos and in Cambodia, I think that there are areas in which the government does not have good control. Once you get out of the cities, the transportation is just atrocious, so it's conceivable that there could be small camps. Particularly if they moved around a lot, and were a part of—in areas in which the government didn't have good control.

Do I have strong evidence? No, I don't have that. I have reports of a general nature that people have been seen in a camp, but with not enough specific detail to really do much with. When we do, we look for it, can't find it. If we knew a camp existed we would go in in various ways and try to find out who was there.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the rationale, even in Laos, for a group that, let us say, was not in control of the government? I mean, it has been 19 years. I take it, and I asked this of Mr. Quinn, have you or any of your people ever been approached with a possible secret deal to return somebody for money or for any other reason? Is there a record of such an offer and a transaction in the making?

Mr. FORD. By one of the governments or private individuals?

The CHAIRMAN. By private individuals or the governments.

Mr. FORD. No, the closest thing that comes to that was the Walter T. Robinson case that Secretary Quinn mentioned earlier. In fact, he described it as we made the judgment in sort of analyti-

cal terms. We actually sent a team to Vietnam. I mean, it was not—we know when we went that the chances of its being Walter T. Robinson were virtually zero, unless all of our information was wrong, but the picture was compelling that it could be an American. The position that we took at Defense was that we don't know who this person is. It could be an Amerasian, it could be an American, but why don't we just go up and ask him and find out. Well when we got there we found out that he was Amerasian, he was on his way out of Vietnam legally, and to the best of my knowledge he is out now.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the theories that is often advanced is the pearl theory, that since the French are supposed to have—there is evidence that the French did some trading in the post-Dien Bien Phu period for prisoners—that therefore people are holding Americans in order to do some trading. What you are saying is that there is no document or evidence or statement of any kind of any government official that you know of, that anyone has ever been approached in 19 years for that kind of a trade. Is that accurate?

Mr. FORD. To the best of my knowledge. I obviously don't have an encyclopedic knowledge of this issue, but I have not run across any.

The CHAIRMAN. Within the whole interagency group, no one has ever surfaced any possible deal, is that accurate?

Mr. FORD. That is accurate, and in fact, if somebody did, I'm convinced that if we thought there was some serious intent on the part of the person making the deal, we would try to follow up on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Within the Laotian culture, what would be the ability and purpose of Americans being held over the course of 19 years, or 18-plus years? Would it be slave labor? What is the rationale here?

Mr. FORD. Senator, it's obvious that you have gone through some of the same questioning that I have in terms of what the motivations would be of people. I have not come up with anything that I find convincing that explains to me why people do things like keep hostages. In the Middle East, for example—

The CHAIRMAN. For hostages, they hold them for the release of other people, correct?

Mr. FORD. Or for financial gain. All I can tell you is that there are still reports coming in that suggest that there might be live Americans in Southeast Asia. There are photographs, for example, the Carr photograph, which is compelling, and which is not just Carl Ford's eyeballing it, which I always thought non-expert. They certainly look alike to me, but as our experts look at it they also are beginning to say yeah, there is a resemblance there that's uncanny. That's not a quote, but that's a bottom line. I don't know why, what the motivation is, but the fact that there could be an American there is still something we can't dismiss.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely not. What I am trying to get at is the question of the wholesale—you know some of the theories hold up the notion of 50, 100 or this, or that. Now, is it possible that in the aftermath of the war, particularly during the period when Vietnam was closed to us between 1975 and 1979 particularly, that people were held but that then the dynamics changed and because holding people did not bring about what some thought it might have brought about, those people were lost, and that that may be part of

what has fueled this. Is that a theory that might have perhaps more life?

Mr. FORD. It's certainly one of the possibilities that I think that should be considered in trying to get at this question of motivation. I think that there is also the likelihood that—I mean there are other scenarios. One that hasn't been mentioned that I've always found very credible is people who were injured at the time of their loss, and that are not aware that they are Americans and they're not home.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me do this, Mr. Secretary. They are holding the vote for me, I need to get over there. I think the hiatus will be marginal because I am sure that Senator Smith is on his way back. If you could wait and we will just recess momentarily until Senator Smith gets here to pick it up.

[Recess.]

Senator SMITH [presiding]. We will reconvene.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be back in just a second. I am under the impression, based upon the comments on the floor, that there probably is going to be another vote, they say within 15 minutes after this one ends, but this one may be open for a little while because there were a lot of Senators who had not yet voted, even though the time had run out, so we will just try to keep going. Just a couple of more points for me. It seems as if you are very candid about problems that may have taken place in the past. Is there any way that you could recommend how we could reconstruct some of that to see if anything was missed, back in, obviously long before your watch, back into the period of the 1970's and moving on up, how we could reconstruct just some of those mistakes—not in the sense of trying to identify anybody who is making mistakes necessarily, that is not the point, but just to try to see if there is anything that we did miss, so we do not have to go back and root through reams of stuff that you have all been through?

If you could help us in that regard, either with a comment now or something perhaps for the record, it would be very helpful.

Mr. FORD. I think that I briefly mentioned where I would start, and that is asking to appear either in public session or private session, whichever you prefer, some of the people who were my predecessors who worked the issue, and hear from them directly. I'm sure they've thought about it and have thought about their actions and their decisions. They may think they were all perfect, I don't know. But I think that's the place to start, with the people who were involved directly with these issues at the time, and get from them their view 10, 15, 20 years later.

I will be very frank with you that I have been so busy looking at today and tomorrow. There are so many things to do that I don't have time to do. In fact, that's why I strongly recommended to the Secretary that we have a deputy assistant. As far as I'm concerned, it's a full-time job. I can't devote full time to it, and when I realized that, that was my recommendation; we've got to get somebody full-time. There are so many things that we would like to do better in terms of the way we interface with the families, how we want to—as you see, we are beginning to have the military take a much more active role now that we have more access to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—and those are the issues that I've concentrated on.

I will admit that if I'd had more time, I would have probably thought more about and done more about some of the things that happened in the past. But, to be quite honest, my priority has been on where we were going.

Senator SMITH. Just a couple of comments, and you might want to respond to them if you wish. In listening to Senator McCain's line of questioning regarding the photos, and a lot of banter back and forth in regards to what the motives might be, one of the striking things about those photos to me was, and I think everybody agrees—I know you and I do because we talked about it—was that at the very least the similarity between the alleged POW and the other subject. I mean, if this is a scam and these are not valid photos, this is not just somebody dragging out belt buckles; these are fairly substantial efforts.

Mr. FORD. They're pretty well-organized and knowledgeable people doing it.

Senator SMITH. I mean, you know you just cannot go out and find somebody as handsome as you or me that quickly, you know what I mean, it takes a while. It is not that easy to do, to get somebody with at least a similarity, and I know that certainly the Borah photo, and certainly the Carr photo, or the alleged Carr photo, there is a similarity there in many ways. So, still I guess the jury is still out on that Carr photo.

Mr. FORD. Well you and I have talked, and I've spoken to Mr. Borah on the telephone, I have not met him, but I have seen Mr. Borah and at least one of his sons on television. I can remember at the time, having seen just the photograph, and seeing the family members on the television, saying, wow. Just simply the hairline, the shape of the face, there clearly was a very close resemblance between the Lao tribesman and the Borah family. The family resemblance I thought was striking at the time. It was in my mind not a foregone conclusion that that particular case was going to turn out the way it did.

Even when I see the photographs today, it's clear to me that somebody had to do a lot of homework to match up a hill tribesman in Savannakhet province in Laos, take a picture of him, and then come back and somehow be knowledgeable enough to make the association with Lieutenant Borah. That's quite extraordinary. As we got into this case, there seems, as I mentioned earlier, the people who had provided us originally the Borah photograph, as we go back and trace where it came from, those people seem to be up to their hip boots in all kinds of scams. Why they did it, what's in it for them, I don't know. This is one of those cases that I have had to talk to Mr. Borah and hear the pain he feels, and the uncertainty about what's happening. He wants desperately for this person to really be his son. Anybody who would put those people through it, they ought to put him in jail and throw away the key.

That's my own personal view. I don't know what the motivation is, but I don't really care as long as this sort of travesty goes on. One, it breaks the hearts of the families, and second it makes our investigators' and our specialists' job doubly difficult. As I said, we can't just assume—well, it's another scam. The fact is that you see in the Borah photograph and the Carr photograph—you see a compelling resemblance that has to make you go the extra mile, even

when the trail gets cold or it looks like it might be another scam, you just keep pushing.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you one other question before Senator Kerry gets back. Roughly 500 or so of these Lao missing who have not been accounted for, a little over 500. It is my understanding that about 120 of those individuals were in one way or another seen, or witnesses say that they ejected, or at least our reports indicate that they ejected from their aircraft, which would remove them from any casualty site—or should move them from any casualty-site excavations that we are doing.

Have you pulled those, isolated those cases and are you working on them? They are not in with the discrepancy cases that General Vessey's working. So have you pulled these things into one group and are looking at them that way, one by one, or how are you dealing with them?

Mr. FORD. We're trying to, but part of this is simply a matter of chance. That on the day of an individual's loss, for whatever reason, we happen to have more information, and so we have more to begin with. We are trying to prioritize our resources and efforts toward the ones that we have the most information on, more information to go on. We are trying to find out as much about each of these cases as we can, put them in some sort of order geographically, and in terms of information so that we can go on to find them—and we're systematically trying to go through these cases.

Part of the problem in Laos and Vietnam is that we have been working on these 119 cases in Vietnam, for example, since the 1987-1988 time frame. Only now, in the last trip—the last two trips to Vietnam—have we begun to get out beyond those cases and say we've got to go to other areas and visit other places and interview more people.

In the case of Laos, we know where many of these areas are that the Pathet Lao held Americans, and we want to go there, we want to talk to people. There are no crash sites, we just simply know where the caves were, and we want to go and talk to people who were there. We've found in our experience that they have pretty good recollections of those days, and that by piecing together the stories of several different people we can often get a somewhat better account of what may have happened to some of them.

You've got to remember that most of the cases, and the number escapes me right off the top of my head, most of the cases in Laos are cases in areas where the Vietnamese were in control. When we go to the Vietnamese, they say, well, that's in Laos. We don't have any control over that. When we go to the Laotians, they quite rightly say, listen, the Vietnamese were there during the war, we don't know anything about it. We have been back and forth with both governments for as long as I've been here, trying to get them to focus on these cases.

Senator SMITH. This is why we need some kind of trilateral talks.

Mr. FORD. Yes, and we seem to be making some progress. The State Department, hopefully with others' participation, will be meeting with the Vietnamese and the Laos in December in Hawaii to talk about this very issue. We're also prepared to talk to the Cambodians about it. I'm not going to promise anything because we don't have anything concrete, and I've been disappointed before

thinking that we've made some progress on the border cases. But I think that we're in a better position now, we have more leverage than we've had before, and I'm at least hopeful that this time we won't be disappointed.

Senator SMITH. All of that information that came out about the atrocities and all the press reports and information regarding prisoners in Laos and so forth, I assume that you have—I have never really looked at what you have on that particular subject in the intelligence—never had the opportunity to do that. I assume that is somehow catalogued or together in a way that that can be looked at by the committee. Is that true, so that we can at least get a rebuttal to those public statements that were made by Lao officials and others about POW's, allegedly holding POW's by the Pathet Lao.

Mr. FORD. I'm not sure what order and shape it's in, but I'm sure that we'll be happy to share with you the information we do have. There have been a number—we are just like you. We look at Laos and we see hundreds of question marks and it is a difficult area for us to operate in, and a difficult area for us to come up with answers. I mean, we have had the reports—the same reports of Americans who we know were in captivity at one point or another in Laos and we don't have any answer as to what happened to them. Until we do, we're not going to feel very comfortable that we're on top of what's happening in Laos.

We are at a position now where, for example, CODEL travelled to Laos, and one of the Congressmen put the Laotians on the spot and said, well I would like to talk to Soth Petras, and the story had been that he was dead, and that's what we had been told for some time. We come to find out he's not dead, and they indicated that they were going to let us have access to him. I right off the top of my head don't know, but this—I think you will find it fascinating to talk to Bill Gadoury when he appears before you tomorrow. He is a bright, articulate, dedicated person who has been working the Lao problem for some time, and his insights and his direct knowledge, rather than hearing from me second or third hand, I think you will find very interesting. If he doesn't know the answer, the answers aren't there.

The same is true for Bill Bell in Vietnam, and John Cole for looking at the intelligence view. Hopefully you will be able to have more satisfaction when you talk to where the rubber hits the road with—our field people.

Senator SMITH. Senator Grassley, do you have any further questions?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, I do. Mr. Ford, just so that we are all working from the same sheet of music, and this is along the line of questions you heard me ask other witnesses. If this committee were to show that a discrepancy case, or any other case for that matter, which has been determined to be resolved and which should not have been resolved on the merits, and which on the merits should have remained open, can we expect that such a case to become a discrepancy case that needs to be resolved?

Mr. FORD. Definitely. If we make a mistake, we'll be the first ones to admit it and be glad that we made the mistake. If some-

body walks out tomorrow and we said they were dead, you won't hear a peep out of us, we'll be as happy as everybody else.

Senator GRASSLEY. When you are briefed on the various cases, do you read the live-sighting reports and raw intelligence data or do you rely upon summaries of these?

Mr. FORD. It varies. My staff receives, I think, every report from DIA. Those reports that they believe are significant or something that I ought to know about right then they submit them to me. If they are ones that they want to have DIA check out more closely or that appear to be more routine—say it's 5 years old as opposed to something more immediate—I do not see all of them. I think that it's an area in which we have learned by example that we have to keep a very close pulse on.

I have, for example, talked to the head of the POW/MIA office in DIA, Bob Sheetz, and indicated that I wanted him to err on the side of badgering me with information as opposed to feeling like I didn't want to hear about it. I just don't want to be in a position that I'm the last to know that there is some important piece of information that somehow just didn't get to me.

Senator GRASSLEY. The last time I saw you we were on a late-night network show together, and on that show you indicated that you had four analyses pertaining to the Carr case. What are those analyses and what did they show, and has the Sandia lab ever analyzed the Carr photos using negatives?

Mr. FORD. The last part of your question I would have to double-check. We have a report that I saw for the first time yesterday back from Sandia, I think, that is of the Carr photograph. The reason I pause is that I got a report on Stevens and a report on Carr yesterday. One was from Los Alamos and one was from Sandia, and I may have them mixed up. The report from the Carr photograph was inconclusive but they indicated that there was a great resemblance and that they thought it was possible that they were the same person—the two photographs.

It's the most positive report from any of our expert photographic analysis people that I've seen. They found there were many similarities. In fact, as I mentioned to several people, in fact, it was from Los Alamos and it said, in our view, a strong possibility exists that the subject, in this case the Carr photograph we've all seen in the newspapers, is an aged Captain Carr. They go on to say, however, this assessment is not conclusive, but that's the most positive one I have ever seen. They also have a photograph where they have taken—what I thought was a very interesting approach—half of the wedding photograph and half of the more recent photograph and put them together, and there is quite clearly a striking resemblance.

[See appendix p. 398.]

Senator GRASSLEY. Were those analyses done from the negatives?

Mr. FORD. I would have to check the report to be sure.

Senator GRASSLEY. If they were done from the negatives, would you supply those to the committee?

Mr. FORD. The information, or do you want the negatives?

Senator GRASSLEY. The negatives.

Mr. FORD. I don't see why there would be any problem with that.

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the status of your analysis of the Stevens photo where he is allegedly standing with a woman?

Mr. FORD. That was the other report that we got that I saw yesterday and that report was just the opposite in the sense that it was inconclusive but, in their judgment, it was not likely that it was Stevens.

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the status of your analysis of the photo of the three pilots, I guess the first photo that you were made aware of?

Mr. FORD. This has been a difficult case for us because we have not been able to locate the people in the picture. We have not been able to locate who took the picture and we have family members who are convinced that they are their loved ones.

We have no direct information other than their identification and we still continue to have an active investigation of that photograph.

Now, what we have known is that associated with the photograph, either directly or indirectly, has been a series of scams, but they are not the photograph that the families identified.

The only thing that has been altered in that photograph is a sign that appears on the photograph. That appears to have been done by the same people who did the photos out of the Soviet magazines.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Would my colleague yield for a question just for a moment?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, but I think he has answered it satisfactorily and I will go on to my next question—but I would yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood from some sources that there was an enhancement done which showed the individuals in that photograph carrying rifles, carrying weapons, and the notches and ends of their weapons were actually visible at the lower end.

Is that accurate?

Mr. FORD. That is correct. That was from one of our national labs photograph analyses. It appeared to be German World War II weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not there some sort of inherent contradiction in the notion that three people are being held prisoner, but they are holding rifles kind of surreptitiously in the picture?

Mr. FORD. Sir, I understand your question. I understand your concerns. The standard that I have is if I can demonstrate to the families that their identification is incorrect, I don't hesitate to approach them with that case. If I don't have the evidence, as far as I'm concerned, until I have the evidence, I'm going to keep looking.

The CHAIRMAN. I think all of us appreciate that and I think that is the right way to approach it. But I did not hear you volunteer that. I have not heard that sort of come out. I mean, that is why I asked you, I guess. I just wanted to make sure that was, in fact, ascertained by the Department and one of the question marks that is now raised with respect to the photograph.

Mr. FORD. We can not say that the family identifications are incorrect. We have real questions and I've explained.

The CHAIRMAN. I will raise the family as a question mark and as I say to you, I understand why you do not say it is incorrect in the face of positive identification.

Mr. FORD. It is one of the cases Senator Grassley talked about where we had made an analytical judgment on Colonel Robertson. We have, in fact, taken that back and said, well, not so fast.

We may have made a mistake, despite the fact that the Vietnamese have provided us with even more information than we had before. As long as we have these inconsistencies that are difficult to demonstrate to any degree to the family, we are going to keep the case active and keep it open.

Hopefully, we will find who is in that photograph and that will solve the question.

Senator GRASSLEY. Before I ask my next question, besides those negatives, if that is what you have, also the analyses of the negative?

Mr. FORD. Yes, I want to make sure that I don't mislead you. I was going off of just my recollection. My staff has indicated to me that we no longer have the negatives. They were given back to Colonel Bailey, who requested them from us.

We have, I hope but I don't know for sure, we have gotten a later generation of photograph and/or negative that we were working from.

Senator GRASSLEY. But you could provide us with your analyses?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. In fact, we can give you the analysis that we received not only from our own in-house, but also, if we have the Sandia or Los Alamos reports, we'd be happy to provide those as well.

Senator GRASSLEY. According to Secretary Cheney and General Vessey this morning, a DOD policy states family members can have access to information about their loved ones, except for information that would compromise sources and methods.

Is that your understanding of our policy?

Mr. FORD. That is certainly my understanding, that that is the policy. I hear the same complaints that you do from family members who feel that we're not giving them enough information or that somehow we're holding back.

In most cases we find—that I have investigated personally—that is partially true. In some cases, they're just through error. They have more or less than some other family member.

Sometimes it's our fault and sometimes it's the family's fault, but there are problems there that we've got to correct. When people come in, as I had—there's a young lady here from Alaska. I think she's here today. You don't have to talk to her very long to realize that she has a real problem with us, and that she doesn't think we played fair or square with her.

As long as you have that, it's hard to say, well, we're doing a great job.

We're going to have to find a way to make sure that as many family members as we can are satisfied with the treatment that they receive from the Defense Department.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, that is very good and I am glad to hear that and I am sure you would not condone that lack of cooperation. I think you have answered my question. It was going to be that if the committee brought you information to this effect, you would consider it and look into it and I think you have said that.

Mr. FORD. Yes, we sure will.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have just one last question. In our previous conversation before I went to vote, you mentioned only seven of the 102 new personnel will be with Stony Beach. There's a 1986 memorandum of understanding between JCRC and Stony Beach, determining that JCRC would handle excavations and Stony Beach would handle investigations of live sightings.

Has there been a new memorandum of understanding?

Mr. FORD. Not to my knowledge, Senator, but I think that we have to keep in mind that we are in transition to a new set of organizational procedures, both on the civilian side of DoD and also on the military side, and that the joint task force is trying to centralize and organize this process. When we do that, we are also trying to protect our credibility and our ability to look at this problem from Washington and to make sure that there is a certain transparency in our process.

We frankly have not worked out all these arrangements and procedures and we are seeking recommendations from the field from DIA on how we can best do that under the circumstances.

If that means change it a little bit, we will change it. If it means keeping the old procedures, and everyone decides that the best way, we'll keep that.

We have a new opportunity that we didn't have before. We've got much greater access to Vietnam. So we're going to tailor our approach and our procedures to fit the situation.

Right now, it's too soon for me to give you a judgment on where we're going to come out. Hopefully, it will be the best answer but we will keep you informed as we make those decisions and you can judge along with us whether we're doing it right or not.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think what you are probably saying is there could be a new memorandum of understanding.

Mr. FORD. That is quite likely.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. By way of housekeeping, let me say that we are going to have another vote here shortly and possibly even another vote after that.

It has been a very long day and I think that it really makes a lot more sense not to feel any pressure and not to treat the next panel haphazardly.

So what I would like to do, if it is acceptable and I understand a number of you have to be over at the House in the morning, I would like to ask Mr. Nagy and Mr. Sheetz and company if you would be willing to come back after that in the morning.

I want to go with the first panel with Mr. Bell and Colonel Cole, first and then we will put you on after that. I think that will flow well that we will be able to fit everybody in without as much pressure as today.

So we will end with this panel momentarily as we head over.

General let me just ask you, now that you have this new structure and you have this new ball to juggle, are you satisfied that right now you have the structure in the making that is going to permit you to do the job, that we are not going to come back here in five months and say you did not get what you needed or that you did not ask for what you wanted?

General CHRISTMAS. Senator, yes I am. The reason I am is because that is what the two-tiered strategy is all about. It is a strategy that worked in Desert Shield, in Desert Storm, a strategy that worked in Bangladesh with Sea Angel, the strategy that worked in the Philippines with Fiery Vigil.

Very simply, you have a Joint Task Force commander and he's responsible. Just above him is the Commander-in-Chief of the entire Pacific Command. It's a direct line.

Whatever that Joint Task Force commander needs, he goes to the CINC. He goes through me, the Director of Operations, as a facilitator.

I will go to all those component commands, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and those sub-unified commands. What we can't do for him from that aspect, then I turn to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I say, we need this additional support to be able to carry out the mission.

Yes, sir, I'm very confident that this is the proper organization, with the unity of command that is genuinely needed to accomplish the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to personnel on the ground, when I was there last and discussed this with Bill Bell and others, I raised the question, should we have a team for each province? I mean, if this is really a priority and if we are assuming that somebody might be alive, then every day that goes by is a day too many.

Do we not, therefore, have an obligation to maximize the on-the-ground effort, the search capacity, the oversight, et cetera, and really push for more, even now?

I know the response from Bill and others is, do not give us unqualified people. It takes time to train people and have them qualified and so forth.

I guess my question is, are there not, within the reserves in this country, personnel who did time in Vietnam, who are Vietnamese-language qualified, who are disciplined and quickly trainable and who might be able to augment this thing so that we could really get at it rather than just doing what is enough? Go in with almost a surplus of people and make it happen?

General CHRISTMAS. Senator, that is the ideal thing about a Joint Task Force. It is a task-organized force. We can reach out, as an example, requesting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get certain capabilities, as an example, that might be in the reserve.

The key is that, this is a living organization that will expand and contract based on the access that is provided to us. Bill is very clear, we can only put into his detachment, those folks who are qualified.

The folks who we are now getting, who have been authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are those from all of the armed services.

As the Hanoi detachment develops its leads, and says, this is what I need, We will be able to task-organize, our teams and be able to bring in to them exactly what they need to accomplish the specific task at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, does the DIA have a database into which all of the information, human intelligence, signal intelligence, photo intelligence, from all agencies has been collected and cross-tabbed?

Mr. FORD. I can't confirm that myself, Senator. I think that Mr. Nagy and Bob Sheetz and others would be able to do that.

My sense is that we have tried over a period of time to find every file that we can find, wherever it might be located, because in our business, bits and pieces of information, no matter how fragmentary, can make all the difference in the world when you work with so little.

A lot of information is in Hawaii, where our field operators have been operating out of, so they have their database. We try to make sure that the DIA and the JCRC and CIL-HI were working from the same sheet of music.

In fact, when we can, we have been trying to pass sanitized information to the Vietnamese, so that they have some sense of where we're at and how we're operating.

I can't guarantee you that all of these databases are exactly the same and, in fact, I'm almost certain that there are things in one that are not in the other. It's a problem that we're just trying to work on now.

Hopefully, with the unity of command that we've been talking about, that will be one of the priorities, to make sure that all of the databases that we've got are exactly the same. People will share and be able to copy and give information to each other, just a double-check, to make sure that we have all the files.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the helicopter situation, what is the Lao objection to that? Have they stated a specific objection?

Mr. FORD. Well, I find that the Vietnamese and the Lao have similar objections and that part of it is that these are, lest we forget, still Communist countries that we fought for some period of years and don't particularly cotton to the notion of U.S. Army helicopters or U.S. Air Force helicopters flying over their territory.

I don't agree with them, but I think that that's clearly the first and foremost it's a matter of national security. They're not particularly sure they trust us with our helicopters.

We never said that would stop us. We'll do it any way they want to do it. Part of the problem, and you've been there, both of you, we're just tired of putting our people in the field at risk by flying MI-8 helicopters that are not in good repair.

We've got to get out there. Why not from Australia, why not from the United States? Laos is talking to an Australian company. We simply said we would pay you to lease these things. Do whatever you want. Buy new helicopters. Rent them, lease them, buy American, whatever you want to do. Get some new helicopters.

Now, this is something that I think will make a difference. Basically, the message they're getting from the policy community is solve the problem. Whatever you have to do, get better helicopters. I'm confident that when you go out in February, we'll at least be able to give you much better answers and we'll know where the blame is, whether it's in our court or—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would hope that when we go out there in February that we have some choppers that are operating and that will work. I can understand that, sir.

Senator SMITH. I will second that. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I really was not thinking just of us personally, but I was thinking far more of just getting it going. I must say this

will be a bone of contention, because they legitimately raised the question, the sensitivity to, you know, a green helicopter with U.S. markings—might even become a quick target.

But to have neutrally marked and clearly identifiable choppers of some other kind, whether with red crosses on them or whatever, it seems to me there ought to be a way to get them there and get them quickly.

My personal opinion is if you want to put to rest people's questions about response time on a live sighting or ability simply to react and go out, there are few things that would contribute as much to that. Then I think it would be a tremendous step forward. So I hope it can happen sooner rather than later.

Mr. FORD. It is hard to imagine a live-sighting program that's credible, that doesn't have the ability of free access any place, any time we want it and in a practical way.

Now, I would point out, Mr. Smith mentioned several times this problem, when the 25-mile limit was lifted on the Vietnamese, for example, they can travel anywhere in the United States, they can lease helicopters, we don't ask them where they're going. They can do anything they want in this country.

I think what we're really asking is reciprocity. In this case, one that is extremely important to us, to be able to go and check out on live prisoner issues that will never be credible if we have to ask the Vietnamese or the Lao every time, oh, by the way, we want to go check on a prison that may be located 35 kilometers from Savannakhet. I mean, how will anybody believe us that we're really serious about it, if that is the procedure that we have to operate under?

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that and I think it is terribly important to move forward on that.

Mr. Secretary, as I asked you earlier, I do not know, you are not going to be here every minute, because you go to the House, but I gather you will have a representative here who will—

Mr. FORD. Yes, I will. We'll have somebody here at all times.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will personally return on the back side of these hearings?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. I've talked to Ken Quinn and he's also prepared to come back.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I say that is I think nothing could be more important than to have front and center to respond to some of the families' concerns, to some of the critics' concerns, and where you cannot, to be able to say to us that you are going to get that response the next day.

I think that will help build the relationship and begin to defuse some of the feelings that there is an unavailability or an unwillingness to do so.

Mr. FORD. We look forward to the opportunity to come back and we'll try to put sort of a representative sample of the administration witnesses together so that we can try to cover as many of the issues as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very, very helpful and the committee will obviously make any time available to you that is necessary to do that as we proceed from here.

We have another vote on, we are on the back end of it. As we adjourn for today, let me re-emphasize that the committee understands that it has so far only scratched the surface of a lot of issues.

Much of this work will not be done here in the hearing room, it will be done through staff's talking depositions, through interrogatories that will be responded to, through data that will be collected and evaluated. As we go along, hopefully we will draw some intelligent and thoughtful conclusions or even some questions and then come back and pose them, without jumping to any hasty conclusions or judgments.

One thing that I want, and I know Senator Smith wants, is for the committee to be judged as being absolutely neutral and fair in this process. There is a lot of data to go back and review. So this is the beginning, it is the baseline, and there is a lot of work yet to be done over the course of the next months.

I am, again, very appreciative to you. It has been a long day. I know you have got other things you would like to be doing. I think it is important, obviously, and I know you think that, or you would not have been here.

I know the Secretary, Secretary Cheney, thought it and thinks it or he would not have made this commitment of his staff throughout today.

It is a good beginning and I think we all very much appreciative you for helping us to make it so. I hope we can build on this over the course of the next months and put this issue to rest, for families, for the country and for everybody. There are some tough choices yet to be made, but I am confident that we can do it.

General, I applaud you for your commitment to this thing in classic Marine fashion and we look forward to working with you. Thank you very much.

We stand adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 7 p.m., the committee adjourned, to be reconvened at 10 a.m., Wednesday, November 6, 1991.]

POW/MIA POLICY AND PROCESS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SH-216, Hon. John Kerry, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Brown, Grassley, Kohl, McCain, Reid, and Kassebaum.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Good morning. Welcome to the second day of hearings of the POW/MIA Select Committee. We appreciate everybody's patience yesterday. It was a long day. It is my hope that today will not be quite as long, but it is an important day of testimony also in helping us to set out the framework of the next months.

We will begin today with the testimony of Garnett E. Bell, who is Chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi; Mr. William Gadoury of the Casualty Resolution Center. He is a specialist in Laos of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center; and Colonel John Cole, who is the Director of Stony Beach, the DIA entity in Thailand.

Each of these gentlemen has traveled back a considerable distance and at some personal and professional dislocation in order to be here. They are not used to testifying before Congress; if they had their choice, I know they would not choose to be here before the Congress. But it is precisely because they are not the normal testifiers that their testimony is really so important to us.

I think that each and every one of them brings a remarkable level of commitment to this issue and of understanding about this issue. We are extraordinarily fortunate to have these kinds of professionals involved in this effort. Yesterday I did not say lightly that I think they are really legitimate heroes of this effort.

Today I want them to tell their own story, and we may have to try to drag some of it out of them because I know that they are modest and they are not going to talk about the length of time or the amount of energy they have put into it very easily. But I think it is terribly important for America to hear this.

Their story is an important part of understanding the genuine good faith effort that people have been making and the type of commitment that individuals have made to this issue over the years. And any inquiry into the POW/MIA effort that is lacking in

their testimony is an incomplete inquiry; that is why we are here today.

We are not going to spend a lot of time with openings. We want to try to maximize the time for testimony. So let me just turn quickly to my colleague, Senator Smith, and see if he has any comments and then we will proceed.

Senator SMITH. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I am anxious to hear from the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Without further ado, then, we turn to the testimony of our first panel and, gentlemen, I would ask is there a particular order you are going to testify in?

Mr. BELL. The same order on the list here.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask each of you if you would stand so you may be sworn?

[The witnesses were sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bell, if you would lead off, please. If you will forgive me, I may sort of interrupt you or any of my colleagues may try to sort of draw out a little of the picture of this thing that may not be completely in your prepared comments. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF GARNETT E. BELL, CHIEF, U.S. OFFICE OF POW/ MIA AFFAIRS, HANOI

Mr. BELL. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, and Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity to share with you my views on our efforts to account for Americans missing in Vietnam.

My involvement in the issue spans 23 years. During the war, I was assigned to an intelligence team whose mission was to collect information pertaining to American prisoners of war and missing in action.

The CHAIRMAN. What years was that? Just give us a sense of the time frame.

Mr. BELL. This was in 1968, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Until when?

Mr. BELL. Actually, 1967 and 1968, but again in 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your rank or station at that point?

Mr. BELL. I was an NCO in the U.S. Army, sir.

Many of our team's reports can be found today in the case files which we maintained on unaccounted-for personnel. In 1973, I was an interpreter for Operation Homecoming—the repatriation of our POW's to the United States. I later served with the four-party joint military team in Saigon and the Indochina Refugee Reception Center at Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas. I have been assigned to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center since 1980 and am currently the chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi.

From an initial staff of two, we now have six people assigned on a temporary basis. The function of the office is to investigate live-sighting reports, investigate discrepancy cases, research archival files, examine and arrange for the repatriation of remains.

My presentation today will discuss our efforts to investigate live-sighting reports. I'll describe how we obtain this information and the follow-up actions which the Hanoi detachment is taking. I'll

also discuss discrepancy case investigations and what we have learned from those activities.

With the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the exodus of southeast Asian refugees, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center implemented a program to interview those who have knowledge of POW/MIA-related incidents. I have personally conducted interviews at refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macao, The Philippines, China and Japan. My reporting has included live-sighting reports and details of southeast Asian prison camps.

Since 1987, the JCRC and Defense Intelligence Agency have shared responsibility for collecting information from refugees. Live-sighting reports receive the first priority of all interviewers. But, based on a memorandum of agreement, the JCRC interviewers generally concentrate on those who have information on remains or crash sites and grave sites, while the DIA interviews refugees who allege unaccounted-for Americans are still alive.

Interviewers assigned to the Hanoi office have had some opportunity to follow up on live-sighting reports. For example, in August I traveled to two prison camps west of Danang to investigate a report, along with an associated photograph, which alleged Americans were being held in this area. I observed no Americans at the camps. But one of the camp commanders knew of some foreigners who were working on a hydroelectric project nearby. Our request to visit this site was denied.

The follow-up of live-sighting reports is but one way the Hanoi detachment is attempting to shed light on the live prisoner issue. We are also pursuing MIA cases of which the Vietnamese ought to have knowledge. We use the term "discrepancy case" to describe these incidents. If there are Americans alive in Vietnam, they are most likely associated with these losses.

As you are aware, an agreement between the President's emissary, General Vessey, and Vietnam's foreign minister enabled our teams to begin investigations of discrepancy cases in September 1988. The results of these investigations have been mixed. For about half of the number of MIA whose cases we have investigated, we have yet to determine their fate.

To resolve these cases, as well as the live-sighting reports, we need to meet with cadre who were involved in the detention of American POW's and also to have access to Vietnam's wartime historical archives. We have had access to some records and witnesses' testimony which has matched that obtained from witnesses no longer under Vietnamese control.

This is a good sign, but it is readily apparent to me, my fellow investigators, and our intelligence analysts that the Vietnamese can do more. I quite often remind my Vietnamese counterparts that eventually the truth will become known and that they can quicken this process by full cooperation and disclosure.

In the weeks and months ahead the Hanoi office looks forward to launching an accelerated and expanded search effort to resolve the issue of live Americans while moving deliberately to achieve the fullest possible accounting of all of our missing in action.

We certainly appreciated your visit with us last summer, Senator Kerry, and look forward to seeing all of you in Hanoi when your schedules permit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garnett E. Bell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARNETT E. BELL

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We certainly appreciated your visit with us last summer, Senator Kerry, and look forward to seeing all of you in Hanoi when your schedules permit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell.
Colonel Cole.

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN COLE, U.S. ARMY. CHIEF OF THE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S STONY BEACH TEAM

Colonel COLE. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs, my name is Col. John M. Cole, Jr., U.S. Army. Since August 1990, I've been the chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Stony Beach team in southeast Asia.

This team was formed in April 1987 to collect and report intelligence required to assist in the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. Priority is on the live prisoner issue, especially on photo and last-known-alive cases.

Our primary collection activity centers on the debriefing of southeast Asian refugees and displaced persons currently housed in refugee camps throughout southeast Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. These refugees and displaced persons are the predominant source of first-hand live-sighting reports from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Stony Beach works closely with refugee camp administrative personnel to screen new arrivals and residents as to their knowledge of possible American prisoners of war. Individuals identified through such screening as subsequently debriefed in depth by Stony Beach debriefers. Information obtained from these interviews is reported from the Defense Attache office in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok as Stony Beach intelligence information reports, IIRs.

Primary consumers of our reporting includes the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA's and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at Barber's Point in Hawaii. Our tasking and priority is set by DIA. We do not actively collect crash site or grave site and remains information from refugees and displaced persons, since under the terms of our memorandum of agreement with CINCPAC, JCRC has that mission. However, when we do obtain such information, we promptly pass it to JCRC for disposition and reporting.

In addition to refugee and displaced persons, Stony Beach also screens emigres leaving Vietnam under the orderly departure program—reeducation camp releasees, reunification of families, Asians and so on—for POW/MIA crash site/grave site information, as well as information about recovered remains. We also interview/debrief persons who volunteer POW/MIA information, and it is from this source that many of the photos and live-sighting reports are obtained.

Additionally, over the past summer we have also formed teams with the POW/MIA office and with JCRC personnel to investigate late-breaking photo cases in Laos and Cambodia. In fact, we have visited Phnom Penh three times since July. It should be noted that until this past summer, Cambodia was basically a denied area for POW/MIA case information or investigation. Progress has been made in Cambodia, in that we have just developed a one-year plan

for joint investigations of first-hand live-sighting reports in Cambodia's eastern provinces. We have asked to go in in December, sir.

Perhaps this summer's most important development in terms of future significance was the acceptance by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam of a U.S. Government POW/MIA office that Mr. Bell outlined, with a live-sighting investigator as part of that staff. Stony Beach personnel have been given responsibility for this vital mission.

Progress has, up to this point, however, been rather disappointing in terms of results. Despite Vietnamese claims of total freedom of travel to pursue first-hand live-sightings, both captive and living free, our investigator has not yet been permitted by the Vietnamese to travel outside Hanoi to complete his investigations. However, just the day before yesterday we received word that the Vietnamese may now be beginning to permit this travel. Time will tell as to whether this can be done without undue advance notice restrictions.

Stony Beach personnel are professional human resource intelligence debriefers and linguists familiar with the cultures and peoples of southeast Asia. We are fortunate to have assigned totally-dedicated personnel who work far in excess of a 40-hour week, week in and week out. Most of us are military, so our commitment is not only to agency and mission but also to our fellow brothers and sisters under arms.

We are fully aware of our sacred trust and promise this Committee, the American people and, most importantly, the families of those still unaccounted-for that we at Stony Beach will not rest until our mission is complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

Mr. Gadoury, I mispronounced your name to begin with. I apologize.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. GADOURY, JR., CASUALTY RESOLUTION SPECIALIST, LAOS JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Mr. GADOURY. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to share with you some of my observations on our government's efforts to account for our prisoners of war and missing in action in Laos.

In October of 1990, I retired from the Air Force after having served for 22 years. My specialty was operational intelligence. During the Vietnam war I spent 3 years working closely with our pilots who flew combat missions out of Thailand, some of whom are among those listing as missing in action.

In 1984, I began work at the Casualty Resolution Center, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, as an analyst in Hawaii. Since July of 1985, I have been assigned to the JCRC liaison office at our embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

I'd like to discuss two of our POW/MIA operations for which I have responsibility—the Lao refugee interview program and investigative activities inside of Laos.

When I arrived in Bangkok in 1985, my own personal highest priority was to find hard, credible evidence that Americans are still

alive in Indochina, evidence which I dearly hoped would lead to the return of some of my former comrades-in-arms. I have interviewed hundreds of people who have or alleged to have information concerning cases of deceased Americans, as well as accounts, usually hearsay, of Americans still alive, either in captive situations or living freely.

I have filed detailed reports on each account and received follow-up requirements from the DIA's POW/MIA branch office. Based on these follow-up requirements, I have conducted re-interviews with these sources as expeditiously as possible, but, despite my best efforts over the past 6 years, I have yet to find that hard, credible evidence of which I spoke a moment ago. Nevertheless, I have not ruled out the possibility that Americans may be still alive in Indochina.

In addition to visits to Lao refugee camps in Thailand, I have made many trips to remote parts of Laos searching for information on MIA's. In April this year, I led a team whose mission was to investigate discrepancy cases, compelling losses of which the Lao ought to have knowledge. The focus of this particular investigation was to determine the fate of two Americans who were held prisoner in the late 1960s in caves near the Communist Pathet Lao headquarters at Vieng Xai in northeastern Laos.

Prior to our arrival, Lao officials had located a first-hand witness to one of the incidents. He was a former Pathet Lao soldier who, during the war, was with a small unit which was responsible for caring for an American prisoner who had been transferred to their custody from another nearby unit. He took my team to a cave where the American was held for approximately 8 months; he also led us to an unmarked area where he recalled burying the American after he had succumbed to a high fever.

There were no grave markers, and the surrounding area had changed in the 23 years which had elapsed. The witness was, therefore, only able to recall the general area of the gravesite. The Lao government has agreed to permit us to return to this area during the coming dry season to continue the investigation.

As for the second American, my team obtained only limited information from a third-hand source. We are working with the Lao to attempt to locate first-hand witnesses.

The following month, in May, I was assigned to a team tasked to follow up on two prominent discrepancy cases. One of the cases involved an American and an Australian, both civilians, who were taken prisoners by Pathet Lao forces in September 1974. The other case involved an Air America employee who was held prisoner by the Pathet Lao for 3 years before he and 6 other prisoners escaped in 1966.

Unfortunately, due to bad weather, which resulted in our Lao counterparts' inability to coordinate our visit with local officials, we were unable to investigate these cases. Instead, our activities were limited to crash site surveys and gravesite excavations. We are working with the Lao to investigate these cases as soon as possible.

In September, I led yet another team to southern Laos to conduct investigations into cases relating to missing Americans alleged to be associated with several photographs. Lao officials, during an

earlier unilateral investigation, had located the subject in one set of the photographs, which was allegedly related to the case of Navy Lieutenant Daniel V. Borah, Jr. The actual subject of the photograph, an ethnic Mang Kong tribesman, whose name was Ahrao, was located in a small town in southeastern Laos near the Vietnam border.

Mr. Ahrao told us how a traveling merchant stopped by his rice field one day last year and offered to take his photograph. He had not previously met the photographer and had no idea that the man planned to misrepresent his photograph as that of an American POW. We interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted Mr. Ahrao. A second man, who was alleged to be Borah's prison guard, was also present. In reality, he was just a friend who was helping Ahrao clear his field on the day the photographer stopped to take the picture.

As part of the same investigation trip, the team traveled to Attapeu Province in the southeastern corner of Laos to attempt to locate the survey the crash site of Captain Donald G. Carr, the alleged subject of another set of photographs which are still under investigation.

Due to recent monsoon rains which had washed out the dirt roads in the area and flooded the rice paddies, the only flat, non-forested areas in which we could hope to land our helicopter, the provincial officials informed us that it would be impossible to travel to that remote area where we believe the crash site is located.

Members of the Committee, I do not know if there are unaccounted-for Americans alive in Laos; but as long as the possibility exists we must continue the search through the refugee interview program and the live-sighting and discrepancy case investigations.

This concludes my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of William R. Gadoury, Jr., follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. GADOURY, JR.

Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here to share with you some of my observations on our government's efforts to account for our prisoners of war and missing in action in Laos.

In October of 1990, I retired from the U.S. Air Force after having served honorably for 22 years. My specialty was operational intelligence. During the Vietnam war, I spent 3 years, working closely with our pilots who flew combat missions out of Thailand, some of whom are still missing.

In 1984, I began work as a Casualty Resolution analyst at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, or JCRC, in Hawaii. Since July 1985, I have been assigned to the JCRC liaison office at our embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

I would like to discuss two of our POW/MIA operations for which I have responsibility—the refugee interview program and investigative activities inside Laos.

When I arrived in Bangkok in 1985, my own personal highest priority was to be the first person to find hard, credible evidence that Americans are still alive in Indochina; evidence which I dearly hoped would lead to the return of some of my former comrades-in-arms. Over the past 6 years, I have interviewed hundreds of people who have had, or alleged to have, information concerning cases of deceased Americans as well as accounts, usually hearsay, of Americans still alive—either in captive situations or living freely. I have filed detailed reports on each account and received follow-up requirements from the DIA's POW/MIA office. Based on these follow-up requirements, I would conduct re-interviews with these sources as expeditiously as possible. Despite my best efforts, I have not yet found that hard, credible evidence of which I spoke a moment ago. Nevertheless, the information obtained

thus far precludes ruling out the possibility that Americans are still alive in southeast Asia.

In addition to my visits to refugee camps, I have traveled throughout Laos searching for information on MIA's. In April this year, I led a team whose mission was to investigate discrepancy cases—compelling losses of which the Lao ought to have knowledge. The focus of this particular investigation was to determine the fate of two Americans who were held prisoner in the late 1960's in caves near the Communist Pathet Lao headquarters at Vieng Xai in northeastern Laos.

Prior to our arrival, Lao officials had located a first-hand witness to this incident. He was a former Pathet Lao soldier who, during the war, was with a small unit which was responsible for caring for an American prisoner who had been transferred to their custody from another nearby unit in early 1967. He took us to a cave where the American was held for approximately 8 months. He also led my team to an unmarked area where he recalled burying the American after he had succumbed to a high fever.

There were no grave markers and the surrounding area had changed in the 23 years which had elapsed. The witness was only able to recall the general area of the gravesite. The Lao government has agreed to permit us to return to this area during the coming dry season to continue this investigation.

As for the second American, my team obtained only limited information from a third-hand source. We are working with the Lao to attempt to locate a first-hand witness.

The following month—in May—I was assigned to a team tasked to follow-up on two other prominent discrepancy cases. One of the cases involved an American and an Australian, who were taken prisoner by Pathet Lao forces in September, 1974. The other case involved an Air America employee who was held prisoner by the Pathet Lao for 3 years before he and 6 other prisoners escaped in 1966. Unfortunately, due to bad weather and our Lao counterparts failure to coordinate our visit with local officials, we were unable to investigate these cases. Instead, our activities were limited to crash site surveys and gravesite excavations.

In September, I led yet another team to southern Laos to conduct investigations into cases relating to missing Americans alleged to be associated with several photographs. Lao officials, during an earlier, unilateral investigation had located the subject in one set of photographs which was allegedly related to the case of Navy Lieutenant Daniel V. Borah, Jr. The actual subject of the photograph, an ethnic Mang Kong tribesman, named Ahrao was located in a small town in southeastern Laos near the Vietnam border.

Mr. Ahrao told us how a traveling merchant stopped by his rice field one day last year and offered to take his photograph. He had not previously met the photographer, and had no idea that the man planned to misrepresent his photograph as that of an American POW. We interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted Mr. Ahrao. A second man, who was identified as Borah's prison guard, was also present. In reality, he was just a friend who was helping Ahrao clear his field on the day the photographer stopped to take their picture.

As part of the same investigation trip, the team traveled to Attapeu Province in the southeastern corner of Laos to attempt to locate the survey the crash site of Captain Donald G. Carr, the alleged subject of another set of photographs which are still under investigation. Due to recent heavy rains which washed out the dirt roads in the area, and flooded the rice paddies—the only flat, non-forested areas in which we could hope to land our helicopters—the provincial officials informed us that it would be impossible to travel to the remote area where we believe the crash site is located.

Members of the Committee, I do not know if there are unaccounted-for Americans alive in Laos, as long as the possibility exists, we must continue the search through the refugee interview program and the live-sighting and discrepancy case investigations.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions which you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gadoury.

Let me now try, if I can, to take a few minutes just to pull out a little more, if I can, of sort of who you folks are and what you have put into this effort.

Mr. Bell, if you could bring the mike a little bit closer, I think it would be helpful. When was the first time that you became associated with Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. 1965, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's the first time you went over there?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity did you go over there then?

Mr. BELL. Infantry, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you were one of America's troops in Vietnam in 1965?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Involved in combat?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, in the central highlands.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was that tour of duty?

Mr. BELL. That was a 1-year tour of duty, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you then return subsequently?

Mr. BELL. Actually, I returned to the U.S. and transferred to another unit that was deploying to Vietnam at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. So you went back to Vietnam almost immediately?

Mr. BELL. At that time, I went to Ft. Holabird for training and then redeployed to Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. And how old were you then?

Mr. BELL. 24, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You went back to Vietnam for a second tour of duty?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how long did that tour of duty last?

Mr. BELL. That lasted until the end of 1968, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And what capacity did you serve in the second tour of duty?

Mr. BELL. Initially I worked in tactical intelligence in the field, and beginning in 1968 I worked at the national level in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did you work for there?

Mr. BELL. I worked for the MAC-V J-2, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That's the Military Assistance Command, correct?

Mr. BELL. Actually, the 525th Military Intelligence Group, which was under the MAC-V J-2.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did that tour last?

Mr. BELL. Until the end of 1968, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then where did you go?

Mr. BELL. I went to Ft. Bragg, NC, to Special Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do there?

Mr. BELL. Worked in the military intelligence detachment.

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, yesterday we lasted a long, long time, and appropriately so, but let me point out that to go through the biography, which is available to all the Members of the Committee, should be used on your time so that the rest of us have time to question.

Senator McCain. May I finish speaking, Mr. Chairman? Or maybe we should proceed with the hearing, because there are some very important witnesses and questions that need to be asked. I am fully appreciative, and I think the Members of the Committee are, of the bio and the credentials of the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your service at that period of time, the next tour that you did?

Mr. BELL. The next tour was for Thai language training, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did you then return to Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. 1973, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. BELL. Operation Homecoming, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And after Homecoming—Homecoming lasted for what period of time, about a year?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. It actually lasted about 2 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Two months. And then you went to?

Mr. BELL. I went to the Hanoi liaison office in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been involved with the POW/MIA issue ever since then; is that accurate?

Mr. BELL. Mostly. There were a few years when I actually had little or no participation.

The CHAIRMAN. How many years of that period?

Mr. BELL. Four.

The CHAIRMAN. So, with the exception of perhaps 4 years, since 1965 you have almost exclusively been involved with Vietnam, with the war, with intelligence, and with the POW/MIA issue, correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you decorated for your service in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. The normal decorations, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been head of the POW/MIA office for how long now?

Mr. BELL. Since May of this year, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At any time during the course of your service or involvement with this issue, has anyone ever held you back or restrained your efforts to find somebody or diverted information that you have provided or covered up any information that you have provided?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did that happen?

Mr. BELL. It's happened occasionally over the years, if you're speaking of reports that are edited and that sort of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm trying to find out whether or not it is your perception that legitimate information that you uncovered with respect to the potential sighting of a live POW or information regarding an MIA, that you were restrained in your ability to get that information to where it should go, or that it wasn't acted on.

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I don't think you could describe it as restrained.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you have in mind? What were you saying to me?

Mr. BELL. Just maybe not the best possible circumstances for doing the work.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you describe that for me?

Mr. BELL. Occasional lack of support, occasional misunderstandings on the objectivity of investigations of cases and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can, Bill, I'd like to ask you to try. Help the Committee to understand that, be a little more precise, perhaps with a circumstance in which you felt that you had something you thought ought to be treated differently and it wasn't, just to get a sense of it.

Mr. BELL. This is a typical pattern I think you'll run across anywhere in the military system, sir. What I'm referring to here is, as a specialist you do a detailed investigation and you submit a report, and it's possible that that report will not be final even though it's an investigation. The report is subject to be edited and altered by others who may be a navigator or an infantryman because they are in your particular chain.

And this is something that everyone in my profession has to work with.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying to the Committee that you came across information that suggested to you that someone was alive and that that information was subsequently changed to suggest otherwise?

Mr. BELL. Not necessarily, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you be more precise, then?

Mr. BELL. I think what I'm talking about here is the relationship between one case as it pertains to another case. In other words, information which may not specifically correlate to an individual may have a bearing on another case, and if it's separated out from the case that's under investigation and reported separately then it's very difficult to retrieve and collate the information.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me sort of put it to you more bluntly, then. Over the course of time, many allegations have been made, as you know, that there's been a coverup. Allegations have been made that live-sighting reports have not been followed up on, or that specific known information about Americans being alive has not been acted on.

Do you know whether or not that has happened? Has there been a coverup?

Mr. BELL. I don't think there's been a coverup, sir, but I think it's possible that information was not acted upon.

The CHAIRMAN. My time has expired, but what period of time, to your knowledge, do you believe that information was not acted on?

Mr. BELL. Around the time of the release of U.S. prisoners and shortly thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN. My time has expired. Obviously we will be following up on this.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. If I could just pick up briefly on Mr. Kerry's line of questioning, Mr. Bell, all three of you folks are out there on the front line, if you will, meeting with or getting first-hand information that comes in from refugees and other sources.

Is what you are saying that perhaps you take a report—not being specific, any specific report, but a particular report—you may feel that has more importance than what comes back to you through the system? Is that a fair statement?

In other words, do you feel stronger about something when you send it out of there than what happens when it comes back? Is that a fair characterization of what you are trying to say?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I think the problem there is the sanitization to go to particular families, which is—the way I understand it—why cases are separated, but the problem is, cases are often related, because you have evacuation systems, you have proximity to various cases, and once the information is separated off from the basic

report, it's very difficult to go back and find the information or to be able to follow it up or be able to use it.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask it this way. Are you saying that this kind of thing happened—you're referring to it as happening more in the past than currently?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I think that's very important to point out, because many of your colleagues before you have essentially said similar things.

Let me ask you, Colonel Cole, can you walk me through what happens when a refugee gives you a live-sighting report? Just tell me what happens as far as what you do with it, how you deal with it, and where does it go, as far as you know?

Colonel COLE. Sir, if it's a live-sighting report given to one of our debriefers—for example, let's pick a camp on the Cambodian border, site 2, 192,000 people. We have an active program in that camp. We have several people who are refugees themselves living in that camp who are spotters. They work the new arrival centers. Site 2 is comprised of eight formerly separate camps, so you've got eight, if you will, separate camp administrations. We're in contact with all of those arrival centers.

So let's say in one of those arrival centers a refugee comes in with a story. Our man goes out there on a regular basis at least 2 days a week. He has been flagged that there is a refugee with his story. He will then interview the man again, or the man will have probably at least had his story taken down by our local refugee spotter.

Once that story is taken then by our American debriefer, he returns to Bangkok and researches what we have in terms of data on hand to see if it correlates with any cases. Most certainly, he types up an intelligence information report which is then sent in to POW/MIA here in the Pentagon, at DIA.

Senator SMITH. Do you get feedback as to what the diagnosis—that's not a very good word, but analysis is?

Colonel COLE. Yes, sir. We get feedback in terms of what we call an evaluation, what quality report it is, number one, and in most cases involving live sighting, first-hand live-sighting information, we will get back an SDR—a source-directed requirement follow-up reinterview requirement from DIA, so we're going to go back out and reinterview that person and see if there are others who may have a similar story that we can follow up on.

Now, since he's from Cambodia, we're now getting access to Cambodia. Our next step would be then to ask for access inside Cambodia to the location where the individual is talking about.

Senator SMITH. So you do cross-reference? In other words—my time is running out, but if you get 100 refugees, for example, who all come in with a live-sighting report, you're going to cross-reference these to see how many times the same sight, the same alleged sighting individual, and you cross-reference all that, and then how do you come to any conclusion as to whether or not these are valid or not?

Colonel COLE. Senator, the important discriminating factor here is, is the report here saying information, or is this individual saying that he saw the alleged American, the alleged live Ameri-

can with his own eyes, or did he receive that information second, or third, or fourth, or fifth-hand?

Senator SMITH. If it was first-hand?

Colonel COLE. If it was first-hand information, sir, we're going to go to town with it.

Now, come back for a second and say hypothetically speaking it's hearsay. Say it's a hearsay, that he received it from, say, a cousin. That is still going to be reported, but it is not going to be given as much validity as would a first-hand, live-sighting report.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. Thank you all for being here today.

Mr. Gadoury, is there any doubt in your mind that the Laotian that you found is indeed the same person that was in the picture that was alleged to be Captain Borah?

Mr. GADOURY. No, sir, there's not.

Senator MCCAIN. There's no doubt in your mind whatsoever?

Mr. GADOURY. No, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Bell, I'm very interested in your comment. From reading your statement, you say that the Vietnamese have shown increased cooperation but there are still areas where they could be much more cooperative. Would you tell the Committee areas—I think it's very important from the perspective where we could get increases in cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese.

Mr. BELL. One way they can cooperate with us, sir, is to arrange for us to interview senior cadre who were responsible for the detention and evacuation of U.S. personnel during the war. Another way that they can increase the progress is to make more documents and historical archives available, and also to work more closely with us, with our office in Hanoi, and also participate in our interviews when people come in and claim to know the location of Americans still remaining in Vietnam, or who know the location of crash sites with remains.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any problem with access to getting around to different places in the country?

Mr. BELL. At present we do, sir. We've been informed that this is going to be streamlined, probably in accordance with the agreement for our office.

Senator MCCAIN. I know you're very busy, Mr. Bell, but if you will do us a favor, and also Colonel Cole, and Colonel Gadoury, provide us in writing those areas that the Vietnamese need to cooperate more so that when we do communicate with their Government we can lay out the specifics in hopes that we can attain that degree of cooperation which you feel necessary in order to get the job done.

[The information referred to follows:]

USCINCPAC will be responding to the requirement for Mr. Gadoury and Mr. Bell. Col. Cole's recommendations for improved cooperation by the Vietnamese are listed below:

1. The U.S. needs access for our live-sighting investigator without prior notification to the Vietnamese.
2. The U.S. and Vietnam need to establish a special framework of cooperation on the issue of live-sighting investigations. Apart from access, this

framework needs to address all issues influencing the conduct and credibility of live-sighting investigations.

3. The issue of helicopter availability to live-sighting investigators needs to be resolved.

Mr. Bell, let me go back, if I could, to Senator Kerry's line of questioning. It's my understanding in response to his questions that you felt that there has been some editing of reports that you feel probably did not adequately describe the situation as you saw it. Is that your statement?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. But you also said that the majority of this problem took place, in the time frame immediately following Operation Homecoming and the conclusion of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. Is that also correct?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I understood that to be a different question. The question was about information not being followed up on, if I understood the question correctly.

Senator MCCAIN. What I'm not clear on is, is this a problem with improper behavior which would then lead one to conclude that there's a "mind set to debunk," which—as you know, which has been an area that we've been very concerned about, or is it because of differences of opinion as to the validity of these sightings, and if so, what needs to be done to make sure that someone like you gets the unvarnished information to the people that it needs to get to?

Mr. BELL. I think you could probably best describe it as a difference in opinion, sir. There are some of us who are in the field as investigators who are also qualified as analysts, who have been trained as analysts, but we're discouraged from making analytical comments because this is a job that's done somewhere else.

But nevertheless we feel that field analysis and field comments are important, and for the reason that I've just described, because one case can relate to another case, and we have had instances where we feel this could have been better managed if we are able to approach the Vietnamese and cover the entire camp system rather than piecemeal in order to establish a normal route of evacuation and a normal accounting from their records.

Senator MCCAIN. You can provide us with recommendations so we could do better in that area?

Mr. BELL. I think what we need to do there, sir, is to make sure that the report is done in the field rather than back somewhere else, to make sure that the team that conducts the investigation has a consensus. Any differences of opinion amongst the highly trained specialists should be listed in that report, but that should be the final report.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you give us some specifics of areas of information that was not addressed in the area that you're apparently most concerned about, the period immediately following the end of the United States' involvement in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. Well, for example, if a man was still in captivity after the POW release and later his remains were repatriated to the U.S. and we had refugee reporting concerning the detention facility or the incident involving his death, this would be a resolved case from the standpoint of an analytical position, but from the standpoint of a field investigation, the next consideration would be, what

camp was this man held in, and are there any more individuals in the same status?

Senator McCAIN. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to cover a couple of areas very quickly, if we could. One is travel. We've talked about travel. We've talked about getting into the sites, looking at them. Have we had, ever, unfettered access to Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam, where we can go on a moment's notice without preapproval from the Government?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. Not in Laos, sir.

Senator BROWN. So the fact is, we've never had an ability to follow up on reports without the Government going along and having notice?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator BROWN. We have, as I understand it, some 109 first-hand sightings of potential POW's, I guess that's the way to describe it, that have not been challenged, or at least we haven't come up with an explanation for. Have we used satellites to monitor all those areas of those sightings? This may be something you don't want to get into right now, but I'd like to know, can you assure us that every one of those sightings have been followed up with satellite observations?

Colonel COLE. Sir, without getting into specifics in areas that we can't cover in this open session, I can assure you that every means possible is being employed to follow up on those.

Senator BROWN. Well, let me express a concern. If the North Vietnamese are telling us the truth, then there aren't any prisoners there. If there aren't any prisoners there, it doesn't make sense to bother to check the records or check the other things in terms of finding live people. Now, it may be, I think it is important and valuable in terms of cleaning up our records and comforting their families, but there's no point in doing it if they're telling us the truth.

If they're not telling us the truth, checking with them doesn't make any sense. What we ought to be doing if they're not telling us the truth is finding some way to have someone on the ground go check out those sightings. Maybe we ought to save this till later on, but it strikes me that all of these other activities don't make much sense if you're not doing on-the-ground checks on all the specific reports. Am I missing something?

Colonel COLE. Senator, you're not, and that's what we're attempting to do with our live-sighting investigator. Mr. Bell may want to elaborate on that.

Mr. BELL. We are now waiting for word from the Vietnamese for what they consider rapid response, and I'm thinking of 1-day approval for movement to the field.

Senator BROWN. Perhaps recruiting information from officials of those Governments is another area we ought to cover in closed session, but one thing that would be of interest, of all the live-sighting reports we have, first-hand reports, they've come in over a period

of years since the repatriation in 1973. Are you free to give me an idea of how many of those have come in in the last 3 years? Is there a point at which they stop?

Colonel COLE. Sir, I don't have that data handy. I think Mr. Bob Sheetz from the POW/MIA office can provide that to you, sir, in terms of total numbers and the ups and downs of numbers.

Senator BROWN. Well, it simply strikes me that while we've reviewed some of the activities that you are involved in, with all due respect, they don't have much relevance. I'm not trying to be hard on anybody, but it strikes me that checking with the Vietnamese to check their records, or going on a trip preplanned with the Governments involved, if they're not telling us the truth, is a waste of time, isn't it?

Mr. BELL. Well, sir, I think it's important we remember here that out of those approximately 105 reports that are unresolved, at least half of those reports pertain to a person who is alleged to be living openly and freely, and we would have to assume that there is knowledge on the part of the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese have a very detailed system of accountability within their country. They have an organization called KH-1 that falls under their public security. Every person in that country is registered in a household by name. Every child that's born is entered into those computers, which is tied in with their United Nations population control program.

Every foreign visitor that enters a country is required to fill out a card, every foreign resident fills out a card, and if a person moves from one hotel to another hotel in the same city, he is required to reregister prior to 1600 hours that day, and that also goes into the computer, and the Vietnamese have maintained that if there are any Americans in Vietnam, they're not under Government control because they have the capability to monitor the presence of foreigners in that manner.

Senator BROWN. So the checking can at least help you identify reports that aren't valid, or don't appear to be POW's?

Mr. BELL. We're not able to determine that until we go into the field, because in the past, when Americans were remaining there, when we have asked the Vietnamese, why did you say there are no Americans here in Vietnam, when actually, in the case of Congressman Montgomery for example—and I believe that they brought this up while Senator Kerry was there—and the opinion of the Vietnamese, in the case of Robert Garwood, for example, was that we did not reveal his presence for two reasons. No. 1, he surrendered, and No. 2, he asked us not to advise the U.S. Government of his presence here, so in our opinion there were no Americans remaining here even though Garwood was still here.

Senator BROWN. Did we ask them if there were any others that fall into that kind of category?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. What kind of response have we gotten?

Mr. BELL. There are no Americans remaining.

Senator BROWN. But have they answered directly that there's nobody there, even counting people who have requested that they not be named?

Mr. BELL. I think they've been more specific recently, sir, and have indicated that this is a matter of their national honor, that they are certain that there are no Americans remaining there in any capacity.

Senator BROWN. So it's not a gray area, they've been very specific?

Mr. BELL. More recently, yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator Brown. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I want to continue along the same line of questioning as Senator Brown.

It kind of reminds me a little bit of, as background, some ways in which our own Defense Department operated when there were inspectors coming around to defense contractors. They'd let them know a couple of weeks ahead of time that they were going to be there on such-and-such a day, and it gave the defense contractors an opportunity to get their house in order and all the waste and fraud covered up, and the employees and everybody kind of up-to-date on how they were supposed to act so that there wasn't anything wrong.

Now, needless to say, if this is our method of operation in Vietnam, you know, that looks pretty ridiculous to the average person out there in America who's concerned about the effectiveness of our program. I think I heard you, Mr. Bell, say that you're hoping to get a 1-day notice to go out. Right now, how much notice do you have to give to the Vietnamese Government before visiting either a crash site, a prison, a source, or anything else that you want to visit?

Mr. BELL. The prison visits that we made, sir, took several days' notice.

Senator GRASSLEY. You have to give several days' notice?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. But even with one day's notice, isn't that—I mean, in the day of modern communication, or even in the communication of Southeast Asia, it's still going to give them plenty of time if they want to cast a certain environment there, prepare people for your coming, it surely isn't absolutely necessary for you to do your work. I mean, your work's going to be most effectively done, right, when you, Mr. Bell, decide on the spur of the moment that you want to go to a certain point and look?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. So what good is really a 1-day notice going to be, except it's a shorter period of time than you now have to wait?

Mr. BELL. Well, 1-day notice would be helpful depending on the mode of transportation, sir. As you know, we've been discussing with the Vietnamese the employment of helicopter support. In the case of a helicopter, this would be advantageous, but in the case of road transportation, due to the bad infrastructure in Vietnam, regardless of the time that it takes to obtain the approval, it will still take several days to reach the site, if it's in a remote area.

Senator GRASSLEY. Is it unrealistic to think of our having our own helicopters over there and not relying on them for the use of their helicopters?

Mr. BELL. Their position, sir, is that any helicopters employed by the U.S. will be civilian helicopters and they will be flown by Vietnamese pilots, and they are willing to discuss a joint venture.

Senator GRASSLEY. You're out there carrying out policy, and you've got to work under a policy created by the bigwigs at the State Department that are trying to normalize relationships with the Vietnamese. This approach that our Government's using—that they are satisfied with the 1-day notice—that makes your job very difficult, right? As opposed to if our Government was pursuing to really check in the full faith of the Vietnamese Government, we would say we aren't going to be satisfied until our people can go anywhere they want to in the country to look for these prisoners and to check on live-sighting reports and crash reports?

Mr. BELL. Well, sir, the live-sighting reports, the fact that we're investigating those, or just beginning to investigate those, works in complement with the discrepancy case investigations, because the discrepancy case investigations are those cases which would most likely pertain to any Americans that are still there alive today, and the reports alleging that Americans are still there are being addressed simultaneously.

The normalization process, the fact that it may improve or hinder relations, is not a consideration that we have in the field. When we're in the field and we investigate a case, we try to be as objective as possible, and we have no consideration whatsoever concerning the normalization process or any other aspect of the political scene in Vietnam.

Senator GRASSLEY. But you have to operate under it.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me ask you, Mr. Bell, but also anybody else on the panel who wants to offer your judgment. This is in regard to present policy, whether it takes several days to get cooperation, or whether it's the ultimate, or at least what you hope is a better situation of 1-day. How confident are you that during whatever time you have to wait for the Vietnamese to give their okay, that they aren't hiding things or coaching people on what to say, in a sense like defense contractors used to do on defense fraud that I referred to?

Mr. BELL. That's extremely difficult to estimate, sir. We work normally from leads, and based on our experience leads come from refugees, they come from witnesses that we meet in the field, and they come from documents. The witnesses can be evaluated on the scene, and then we can obtain information from refugees and in some cases but not all cases confirm or deny what we've learned through the records and the witness testimony.

Senator GRASSLEY. Just give me your gut feeling. Do you think the Vietnamese are hiding things after you've notified them that you want to go to a certain place, and that they're coaching people on what to say? I mean, here you are, a person advising us as we're investigating this. We've got to know what your gut feeling is out there, not just what the official line is.

Mr. BELL. That would depend on the particular area that you're working in, sir. We find that once you leave Hanoi and get into the local province area it's a matter of the support of the province task teams. Some province task teams are very efficient, very profes-

sional, other province task teams are not. We have had cases where we feel that the witnesses were being coached, and we have brought that to the attention of the Vietnamese.

Senator GRASSLEY. I'm done, Mr. Chairman. I guess maybe just for the benefit of my colleagues on this Committee, I think what we're hearing as a result of Senator Brown's questioning and the response to my questioning is something I tried to point out yesterday.

We've got to be very skeptical. The word I'd like to emphasize is to be skeptical what we're being led to believe by our Government, that the Vietnamese Government is heading toward being very cooperative, or what we might think or hope the Vietnamese Government is doing. I think we've got to separate rhetoric from fact, and I think we're getting a picture here that they really aren't being very cooperative. If they are being cooperative, it's not in a very timely fashion, so cooperation means very little.

I would also reemphasize, just in case there's an issue here for the Vietnamese Government, I think they ought to know that we would all welcome and would not hold past history against them at all if there was a dramatic change of practice on the part of the Vietnamese Government for total cooperation along the lines of where our people could go any place that they want to go, and if either the Vietnamese Government came up with an American there who they previously said was not there, that we would not look at it as an opportunity for punitive action against the Vietnamese Government, but that we would look at it as an opportunity for a further opening of relations and normalization of relations.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say to my colleague, his point is now even more obviously well taken, but it was well taken before the applause. I think you've got to kind of measure this, and it's a little more complicated.

I remember when I met with General Secretary Linh just at the end of his term as General Secretary, I raised that issue. I also raised it with the new General Secretary Do Muoi, and I raised it with Garnett Bell present and with the entire team present when we met with the Vietnamese counterparts of the POW/MIA team.

I said to the General Secretary, Mr. Secretary, unless you allow us immediate capacity to travel in-country, nobody's going to believe that it's a genuine, bona fide check on whether somebody was there, because in a matter of hours you can lose somebody, obviously, so there has to be a capacity for Americans to know that there really was a check.

Now he said—frankly, he had trouble understanding, and I wanted to ask some questions of Bill Bell about this. He had trouble understanding why this issue was so serious, because he said, you know, I don't understand, Senator, why it is that now suddenly this issue is so serious for you, when in 1978 and 1979 when I was negotiating with President Carter it was not even on the table, and it wasn't. That's the reality.

It didn't become that significant until 1980, 1981, when it was raised in the American consciousness, and Bill, maybe you can later add to this, but I think the Vietnamese have had difficulty determining whether we were really serious about this issue or

whether it was a moving of the goal posts, whether it represented an American kind of game that was being played.

Now, I think—and I think Bill and the others would agree—they have come to understand it and view it as being something serious and different, so my hope is that there will be a follow-through on what Secretary Do Muoi said and Secretary General Linh said, which is, they will allow us to go anywhere in the country without prior notice and approval.

Now, that has to be measured against the fact that this is a communist country with its military bases, and I suppose it's fair for us to ask if we would allow a foreign entity with whom we had been at war to go anywhere they want in the United States, including to our nuclear facilities or our military bases, or whatever, so it isn't, perhaps, totally as simple as we want to believe it is, and I think we have to try to somehow work out a middle line, and maybe later Bill can tell us whether there is one.

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, may I just make one comment, in addition to yours? I agree with what you say, but I think the witnesses have made clear that there has been progress made and we should not deny that as far as the Vietnamese are concerned.

At the same time, these witnesses can provide us with the specific needs that they have in order to carry out their jobs, and I think when they provide us with that, their specific requirements, we can relay those to the Vietnamese, and if the Vietnamese honor those requests, I think it's significant. If they don't, then I think it's also significant.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. That's a very good point, and if I could ask the indulgence of the Committee just to add one thing to it, with respect to the records, the issue that Senator Brown brought up, I think it is important that those records be sought, that they be provided, and that that inquiry go forward, because for the discrepancy cases those records can in fact provide the resolution of those cases without going out into the field, and the reason for that is that those records may show a particular unit and its activities and what happened to a specific individual. In fact, recently General Vessey was given, I believe, a set of records that were extraordinary in their detail which provide huge insight into what may have happened to people in a particular area.

So I would think there has to be both, is the bottom line.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I make one comment—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. On what Senator McCain just said? There probably has been progress made in the sense there's an office there, we have people there, there's some dialogue going on that wasn't there before. We have a few days notice to do something now, where maybe it wasn't done before.

But if the Vietnamese Government's desire is to frustrate what we really want, they can frustrate that even with the 1-day's notice, and yet it looks like progress to us. But with the communication, the ability to coach people, the ability to move people around, that can be done in a 24-hour period of time. They have

still accomplished their goal, and it looks to us like progress is being made, and that's what we're here to find out.

We're here to find out what our Government knows, first of all, about our prisoners, and then when we find out what our Government knows about prisoners, we then find out whether it's being pursued adequately by the Vietnamese Government. But if the Vietnamese Government wants to frustrate this progress, they can do it with a 24-hour notice, just like they can a few days' notice.

The last thing I would say before I'm done, Mr. Chairman, is I appreciate everything you've said, but I think you and I are politicians. I don't think we want to think too much like diplomats as we look at our effort of oversight. We are not professional diplomats. Part of the problem, I think, of accomplishing this is all the niceties and the other quirks of diplomacy that stop people from really being honest and above-board and frank with each other.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, a quick response. We are politicians, and I think that the people here are best qualified to tell us what the tools are they need to get the job done, and that's why I would rely on their recommendations as to how they think they can best get the job done.

I don't know if it's 24 hours, 2 hours, 20 minutes, or exactly what those procedures are, but I would have a tendency and would the Committee and the Congress would rely on their best judgment, who are the ones we're asking to carry out the job as to what tools they need to get that job done, and I believe they're going to be providing the Committee with those specific recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think a number of areas of inquiry have been raised that we should pursue with this panel. I know Senator Kassebaum is waiting patiently, and I thought we were on our way in the transition from politicians to statesmen. Maybe we can do that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take advantage of the expertise of all of the panel to pursue the question of fraud and how pervasive it might be.

When Secretary Cheney testified yesterday he mentioned a photograph that I think he said, it was found out then there was a Soviet baker and there were three people in it. When General Vessey testified he said the Vietnamese officials will also tell us that private Vietnamese citizens attempt to recover and hold American remains in the expectation of some sort of benefit.

I wonder if you could comment a bit on this, whether there are citizens who are holding some remains? Is the motivation financial in both instances? Where there are potentially doctored photographs, how pervasive may it be? Can you shed any light on this, Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. Yes, ma'am. I don't think for the most part the photographs and the remains are related.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I realize that they are not.

Mr. BELL. The photographs that we've seen, some are still under investigation, some have been determined to have been extracted from Soviet publications and so forth.

The question of remains in the hands of Vietnamese citizens, we believe, that there are probably some remains in the hands of pri-

vate citizens who expect to receive some kind of remuneration for their efforts in recovering these remains.

The problem we have is that most of these remains were recovered in an unprofessional manner because they were removed from crash sites. As General Vessey pointed out yesterday, there are virtually no crash sites left in Vietnam that have not already been excavated and scavenged due to the passage of time, due to the economy, because they need the metal.

We have numerous reports in our files that give the name, address, and location of people who have remains that are associated with valid names. But we do not yet have a process. We have an informal process where in the course of our investigations, if we pass through one of the areas that is listed in our records as someone who has remains, we are allowed by the Vietnamese to contact that person and attempt to obtain the remains.

But more often than not the person wants money. And we are not authorized to pay money because that is the policy of our Government. And we inform the person who claims to possess the remains of this policy.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Gadoury, you work with the Refugee Interview program. Is this something that you have seen?

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, ma'am, but specifically directed toward Lao refugees in the camps in Thailand. The situation in Laos is a little bit different.

My experience since 1985 has been that in the first couple of years it seemed that most people who were coming forward, whether they be refugees or people outside the camps, were coming forward with basically two motives, two primary motives that we saw on a regular basis. One was the refugees inside the camps who hoped that maybe by presenting information about MIA's or POW's they could get some kind of special consideration for resettlement.

And the other one was there were people both inside the camps and outside the camps who were involved with the Lao resistance and they hoped that by somehow providing information to the U.S. Government, that they perceived the U.S. Government to feel important and that that somehow might translate into support, either indirect or direct, to Lao resistance efforts. These are primarily Laotians who are operating along the Thai border, back and forth into Laos.

But the situation changed rather dramatically in 1987, especially after some private groups were advertising rewards for the return of live Americans. Unfortunately, it seems that the word gets skewed, both through the news media in Thailand and from word of mouth from person to person. It wasn't long before people were coming forward in large numbers who had heard through various means that if you provided information, dog tags, bones that you might be able to get part of this large reward that they had heard about.

So then we saw a dramatic increase in numbers of people who were coming forward hoping they could get some kind of remuneration or rewards. Once in a while we would see dog tag reports coming across from Vietnam, across Laos, out through that channel. Word had been handed off from Vietnamese to Lao to Thai.

But that was rather small. The cottage industry of dog tag reports was primarily from Vietnam, not so much from Laos.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well in that instance, my time is running out, did you work with the private groups? Were the private groups there offering money?

Mr. GADOURY. No, ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Did you work with them? I thought you said that word got out that they were offering money and that is why large numbers starting saying they held remains?

Do I misunderstand?

Mr. GADOURY. No, ma'am. That was the origin or sense of reporting that we were getting.

Obviously, people would come forward to us with information and would ask us about rewards. And the standard format or situation may be that a Thai would come to see us and say they were contacted by a Laotian, maybe their relative or a friend, and they had remains in Laos. And they've heard that there's rewards and they could then cross the border if we could certify we would pay a reward.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So I guess all three of you do not necessarily feel there is a network capitalizing on this in any way there, either with fraudulent photographs and/or trying to get rewards from perhaps saying they have remains?

Colonel COLE. Ma'am, I think there is evidence of a network that we discovered in our investigation along the Thai/Cambodian border and in Cambodia in follow-up to the alleged Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy photograph in July, August of this past year.

We found evidence of a number of known individuals who had worked in selling this kind of information before involved in the pictures. And this was the group that we found the pictures out of the Soviet publications on.

However, we've been unable to follow-up with probably the ring leader of this group who has gone underground. He's a ceramic tile merchant down in Pong Song. And on numerous trips to Cambodia, I've talked this over with Senator Kerry before, we've been looking for this guy. We've asked the Thai authorities to help. We don't want him arrested necessarily. We just want him made available for questioning. We think he's in Thailand someplace, but we've been unable to find him to follow-up on the activities of this group.

Mr. GADOURY. If I may add to that, I think we've experienced and we've seen several small groups of people who have conspired to try to fabricate or to look for information which they felt they might be able to bring back and to somehow translate into a reward or some type of a payment.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well it certainly is a cruel hoax. It would seem to me that something—it is something we should be mindful of during these hearings and find a way to encourage that it be addressed in some way.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, we are going to be looking very specifically with staff, specific staff assigned to the entire hoax picture. We will probably have, maybe, even a separate set of hearings, depending on the committee's wishes regarding that.

And we will be working closely with Carl Ford and with the authorities involved in this in order to see if there are not ways to

deal better with this network and with the hoax effort. And we think there are. And we are going to work with you on it.

Colonel COLE. Sir, could I suggest that when you make your visit out to Thailand and Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, that we maybe even take the Committee out to site 2 where we found four or five of these many rings operating involved in picture and information trafficking, just to introduce you to the local environment, sir. Maybe it would help.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The Committee decided to do it, but it wants good helicopters.

Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, the American public is concerned. That is why we are holding these hearings.

Let me start by asking, did any of you have any information or any knowledge or belief that there were Americans alive in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming terminated?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. You do believe there were?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. The other gentlemen?

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. No, sir.

Senator REID. Would you tell me, Mr. Bell, upon what you base your statement?

Mr. BELL. Well, sir, at the time of the POW release, I don't think there was any hard evidence to indicate that.

But I think after we began to interview refugees and based on the investigations that we've conducted in the field and overall, I think we can say that with certainty now.

Senator REID. And you can supply to the Committee what information you have at your disposal that would give us that certainty?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. How many examples do you have that you could give the Committee?

Mr. BELL. I would have to check the records on that, sir.

Senator REID. Would be it 6 or 12 or 20? I am not pinning you down to an exact number, just a generalized figure.

Mr. BELL. Possibly 10 or less, sir.

Senator REID. And you will spend some time in the near future and go over your materials and give us that information?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

[Classified material provided to the Committee.]

Senator REID. Next question. Prior to Operation Homecoming or any time thereafter, do any of you gentlemen have information that there could have been or there were Americans transferred to a country other than Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or some other place?

Mr. GADOURY. No, sir.

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Mr. BELL. I don't think there's any hard evidence of that, sir. But the possibility does exist.

The mortician, he gave very good testimony, which I think the entire community of the POW/MIA community considers as credible. And he also provided testimony about at least two other individuals in addition to Mr. Garwood that he saw and the presence of those individuals has not been determined for the past few years. There is a possibility that their location has been moved.

Senator REID. Again, Mr. Bell, in addition to the other work that I have asked you to do, if you would supply to the Committee what detailed information you have regarding those two or three other examples that may exist in relation to the transferral that I just asked?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The message regarding Garnett Bell's testimony to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and the Mortician's file now in the process of being provided to the Committee contain detailed information requested by Senator Reid.

Senator REID. The last question in this line of questions that I have. Do any of you gentlemen have any information that there are people alive now in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. No, sir.

Colonel COLE. No, sir. But I don't think we can deny the possibility, given the fact that we have a number of unresolved live-sighting reports. And I hate to use the term gut feeling, but having been, if you will, out of this Committee of three, the johnny-come-lately to this issue, having been assigned to this job since only August 1990, I don't think we can close the door, sir.

Senator REID. Your gut reaction is then?

Colonel COLE. That there's somebody or someone or several numbers of people possibly living freely, if you will, in that category either in Laos or in Vietnam.

Senator REID. This then is along the lines of our first witness when we started yesterday, Secretary Cheney saying that he did not know, but anytime there is a live sighting he would assume there could be something to that. And he was going to do everything he could through you gentlemen and others to determine if, in fact, that is the case.

Do you agree with Secretary Cheney's statement?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, sir.

Colonel COLE. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. Secretary Cheney is a lot like we are, though. He does not know a great deal, not having been on the ground, not having worked as you each have. You have spent years of your life working on this one issue, about which the Committee is just now getting educated.

So you understand that not only Secretary Cheney, but each of us has to rely on people like you who are the experts to do this work for us. Do you all acknowledge that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, sir.

Colonel COLE. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. My question, then, is one similar to one Senator McCain asked, and there could have been other Committee Mem-

bers that asked the question. What you need to tell us is what more could we, the U.S. Government, do to help you do a better job? Mr. Gadoury?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, in relation to Laos, I think the fundamental problems, especially in terms of investigating live sightings, discrepancy cases, is a matter of access.

Then beyond that it is a matter of having the resources in country to do the job that we need. Of course, the most obvious example there is this helicopter issue, which is being worked on, trying to find some solution to solve that.

But access in terms of being able to get real time access to sites is something we need to work toward. And, obviously, in the case of the Lao we have only this year begun to investigate these discrepancy cases and photo allegations. And of course, it has to be a developmental process. And it has to be a process in which both sides learn to trust each other more. We're moving toward that, but we still obviously have a long way to go.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I know the red light is on. Could the other members complete their answer? Colonel Cole?

Colonel COLE. Sir, my comments are ditto Mr. Gadoury. But I would also add that we had in my little unit, we're being increased in size from 9 authorized, I have 8 on hand, to 18; we're getting 9 more. DIA has been very supportive and we're going to be getting those people.

But what I'm standing fast on and I'm receiving the proper support from my superiors is, I want people who are qualified. Sometimes in this business, particularly at least as far as the U.S. Army, in my personal experience, language is treated as a storable commodity, language ability. If a guy is going to be a Vietnamese linguist for me, he damned well better be able to go out there and operate and debrief, or I flat won't take him.

I had a case about 2 weeks ago where I was supposed to be assigned someone on temporary duty. I engaged him in a phone call and found out he had a 1/1 level in the language. I turned that man around and I got the proper support. But what I'm saying now is we're going to get those nine people, but they better be qualified people. And with those people, we'll be able to perform our mission.

Senator REID. Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. I feel basically like Colonel Cole does, sir.

We have the potential in our office in Hanoi. We've been informed we will have a possible expansion and I hope also to get qualified personnel who are highly skilled and language-trained with years of experience in investigation and case analysis. I don't know when this expansion will take place.

I understand that the Hanoi office will be working full-time on a daily basis on the discrepancy cases. And we're very anxious to get started on that.

Senator REID. Thank you a lot, Mr. Chairman. Great panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Mr. Bell, with respect to the observation you made about people being alive, did you communicate that at that time in any way?

Mr. BELL. I don't understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say you believed, you were then in intelligence and an official observer of this process, correct? You made a determination that you thought people were alive, correct?

Mr. BELL. We had information of Americans being held at that time, sir, but it was not correlated to any specific individual. In the ensuing years through refugee interviews and through cases that we've investigated in the field, I think we've been able to correlate some of the information that we had at that time to specific individuals. And not only have we correlated these reports to specific individuals, we have included this in the investigation process in Vietnam. And we have gone to the Vietnamese and asked to visit those sites.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you say in the ensuing years, are you talking about recently?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I'm talking about, from the standpoint of refugee interviewing, over the past, I guess, 9 years or 10 years, but over the—from the standpoint of the investigation process in Vietnam since September 1988.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been able to correlate it and confirm it.

Back then you had information that they were alive, correct? And you are talking about what? 1975 through 1979 or later?

Mr. BELL. 1973, 1974, and 1975 we had reports saying that Americans were still being held, but they were unconfirmed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now do you know whether or not superiors to you and the Government in Washington had reason to believe those reports at that time?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know that?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not any efforts were made to follow-up on those reports at that time?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, there were some efforts made. But due to the situation, the evacuation and so forth, and we lost access to the country and we weren't able to pursue those until we began the interview process when refugees began to flee the country in 1979, 1980.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the numbers were somewhere in the vicinity of 10 or less, approximately. Is that accurate?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this in Vietnam or in Laos?

Mr. BELL. Vietnam and in Cambodia, sir, along the Cambodian border.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any efforts that you have participated in to conduct rescue missions of people in Vietnam of supposedly held individuals or sites?

Mr. BELL. Is this during the wartime years, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No, post-wartime.

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. None at all. Do you know of any efforts the Government supported or otherwise that involved an incursion into Vietnam for rescue purposes?

Mr. BELL. Not Vietnam, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there such efforts in Laos?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they Government supported by the United States?

Mr. BELL. I'm not sure if you would term these rescue operations or what, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Reconnaissance? Would you term them reconnaissance?

Mr. BELL. That would probably be a better description. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What period of time would those have taken place?

Mr. BELL. 1981, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now in terms of the frustration that Senator Grassley talked about, are you experiencing what you would interpret as willful frustration by the Vietnamese now of your efforts?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. I've been dealing with the Vietnamese for quite a while. I've just now, after all these years, been able to get a good working relationship with them. But the frustration factor is not really that great because it's anticipated.

And generally speaking on this issue, I think the Vietnamese right now today are just as far along in this issue as they chose to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean they could chose to be further along?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We can come back to that.

With respect to Bob Garwood, have you had occasion to talk to the Vietnamese about the Garwood case?

Mr. BELL. Just briefly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been able to draw any conclusions yourself about the circumstances under which Bob Garwood was living there?

Mr. BELL. According to the Vietnamese, sir, he initially came there as a POW and decided to remain. The camp where he was held, due to our field activities in Vietnam, we've been able to ascertain that there were 32 foreigners in that camp, including mostly Americans.

Mr. Garwood apparently dropped out of sight around 1969. The people who were held with him had no idea of his whereabouts until he began to show up in the reeducation camp. During that time we began to receive reports about an American who was operating a generator, repairing vehicles, basically using his skills, English skills, to be able to read the technical manuals and put together abandoned American equipment and repair it.

At that time some analysts within the DIA believed that that was Garwood. But it couldn't be confirmed. And finally we did get some refugees who were able to look at a photograph of Garwood shortly after he came out, and then we began to get confirmations of his locations.

The CHAIRMAN. My time has expired. I do not want to abuse that.

Let me just ask you gentlemen when are you returning in country? Do you know when you are going back?

Colonel COLE. Sir, we're here, speaking for myself, as long as you want us. But tentatively we're planning to go back this weekend.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to interrupt. I know you have an important mission that is coming up and we want you to be able to do that.

But I would like, since we cannot obviously do everything here in open session, I would like you to make yourselves available to staff over perhaps this afternoon and even tomorrow so we can go into greater detail on some aspects of this while you are here. And then obviously when we come over there will be more opportunity.

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I'm scheduled to leave with two of the Borah relatives to fly back to Thailand and Laos tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will do it this afternoon in terms of you, Mr. Gadoury.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Bell, you have obviously seen an awful lot of live-sighting reports in your time.

I am trying to focus on the ones that you are focusing on here, which I know you did not give a specific number, you said approximately 10 individuals. What was so different about those reports that you saw to make you believe or you feel the evidence documented that those 10, or roughly 10, were in fact kept behind versus all the other reports which alleged the same thing, but there has not been a great deal of credence put in those reports?

What makes you focus on these specific ones? Why did you say those 10?

Mr. BELL. Well, basically, sir, because of the locations. The course of the investigation in cases led to those particular locations. And they were confirmed to have camps in those areas. The name associations.

Senator SMITH. Would you define that as hard evidence rather than opinion?

Mr. BELL. That's hard to put a definition on that, sir.

For the purposes of an investigation in the field I find it to be hard evidence.

Senator SMITH. To your knowledge are any of those 10, whether they be individuals by name or just a group, are any of those so-called 10 that you are referring to now, discrepancy cases? By discrepancy cases I mean those cases that General Vessey has now before him?

Mr. BELL. I think so, sir, yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you think or do you know? Do you know for sure?

Mr. BELL. I think two, sir.

Senator SMITH. Two of them, but not all of them?

Mr. BELL. Not all of them.

Senator SMITH. You said you feel very certain. You mentioned live Americans. I want to make sure, I believe I understood you, but I want to make sure it is clear for the record.

You referred to captive Americans, not deserters, correct?

Mr. BELL. Right, sir. I beg your pardon, sir. Now there may be a question as to the status of two of those individuals, and I'm not sure if it's deserter or what the exact status is.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those the two discrepancy cases?

Mr. BELL. One of them is discrepancy, sir.

Let me explain that further. I think it may be a combination of two individuals and one may be a deserter status while the other is a discrepancy case.

Senator SMITH. Any of you can answer this that wishes.

This misinformation that was referred to, is there any evidence that some of this misinformation that is being put out around the country that you folks spend too much time having to deal with, obviously, is there any evidence, anything we can link that back to either the Vietnamese or the Lao as being the originators of the misinformation?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I haven't seen any evidence to that effect in Laos. It seems like it's normally done at the individual level or, like I said earlier, small groups of people who have conspired to manufacture something.

Senator SMITH. Have any of you ever seen actual money, hard currency, exchanged in return for any of this information?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I've not seen any money, although I have had people who have come to me and have told me that they purchased remains, for example, or dog tags from someone else.

And in cases like that they refuse to turn over remains because they wanted to get their money back at least.

Senator SMITH. The three of you and certainly your predecessors have to have the most frustrating jobs, as I analyze what you are saying, on a day to day basis you are analyzing reports, live-sighting reports, past and present, regarding whether or not these reports are accurate or valid in terms of live American prisoners of war.

Yet, you really, because you cannot get total access, as I believe Senator Grassley or Senator Brown pointed out, because you cannot get total access to the country, there is really no way that you can be absolutely certain. And I will leave sources and methods out for a moment. But to the best of your knowledge—let me rephrase the question.

To the best of your knowledge, there is no absolute certainty, with the exception of the 10 that I will leave out that Mr. Bell referred to, for a moment, with those exceptions there is no absolute certainty to the confirmation of any of those reports that you have seen since you have been in your positions. Is that correct?

Colonel COLE. That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. Let me just ask you in terms of definition for evidence, hard evidence.

If I traveled to Laos and I came out as a U.S. Senator and told you that I personally interviewed an American prisoner of war. He gave me his name, he gave me enough information that would establish that he clearly was the individual he said he was, in your mind, in your opinion, Mr. Gadoury, is that evidence of a live American prisoner in Laos?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, as an interviewer, I probably tend not to make a judgment. But I would try to get everything that you have to document it and then send it back to the analysts and let them take it from there to analyze it.

Normally, the procedure is that once the initial report is made, there would be a follow-up interview.

Senator SMITH. In other words, if I, as a U.S. Senator, told you that I personally talked to an American prisoner of war and gave you all the information, you would have to move that to some other analyst?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, as a U.S. Senator then I would say as a source you have more credibility than some person who just crossed the Mekong River last night.

Senator SMITH. What I am trying to establish here is what evidence is. And what you are telling me is that is not acceptable evidence on its own merit, that anyone of us, a U.S. Senator, who said they saw a prisoner of war in Laos, I want a straight answer on this, you are saying in terms of your evidential standards that that would not be acceptable. Is that correct?

Mr. GADOURY. As the interviewer, I wouldn't make that determination. Although certainly the course that the interview would take would be dependent on my own personal evaluation of the person who was providing the evidence.

Senator SMITH. Where we go from there to establish that as evidence? What else do you need?

Mr. GADOURY. Well, some of the normal procedures—

Senator SMITH. I would like specifics, what, what do we need?

Mr. GADOURY. Well, we use polygraph, we have used polygraph machines in the past.

Senator SMITH. OK, I passed the polygraph three times, four times. And Senator Brown is with me. Then, what? Is that acceptable?

Mr. GADOURY. I don't have the definition of what's acceptable.

Senator SMITH. Can somebody answer?

Mr. BELL. Sir, in the field we're dealing strictly with raw information and field analysis.

Senator SMITH. I am over my time, but I want an answer here. I just want to establish what evidence is.

In other words, Senator Brown and Senator Smith both passed five polygraphs, said we have seen an American prisoner in Laos, and you have not yet told me that that is accepted evidence. I want an answer yes or no. Is that evidence of a prisoner of war in Laos?

Mr. BELL. I would say that would be evidence, sir. You're an American citizen. You give us a statement. I would say that is evidence.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Cole?

Colonel COLE. Evidence, sir.

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, it's evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kohl arrived and he has not had a chance to question. So I would like to let Senator Kohl go and then we will go back to the other order.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bell, you said in response to a question from Senator Kassebaum that you knew of people in Vietnam who claimed that they had remains but wanted money for them.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. What have we done about that?

Mr. BELL. We have approached the Vietnamese for assistance. And the Vietnamese have informed us that there is no possible

way that they can obtain the remains because they also have a program that they do not pay for remains.

Senator KOHL. That sounds like—

Mr. BELL. The Vietnamese have suggested a program where we jointly examine remains with our anthropologists in the Hanoi office. And if the remains are identified as an American, then that person be paid a specific amount of money to reimburse him for his expenses.

Senator KOHL. Why have we not followed through on that?

Mr. BELL. This has been reported, sir. But it is U.S. Government policy that although we willingly receive information and remains alleged to be American, we do not make payment.

Senator KOHL. And so for that reason we have not followed through? For that reason we have not followed through on the claims of the people who say they have remains but want to be paid for them? Because we will not pay any money for remains, therefore, we have not been able because of our policy, to find a way to follow through on that?

Mr. BELL. We followed numerous reports down to a person who claims to have remains. But they are unwilling to turn over the remains without payment. So the remains are still in their possession. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. And we have made no demand of the Vietnamese government that they see to it that those remains are turned over to us?

Mr. BELL. Most of these particular reports have not even been addressed yet, sir. Most of these reports are classified. Most of these reports were collected by the JCRC and refugee camps. Some of these people have been willing to allow their name to be used, some of the people have asked that they contact the individual, that U.S. officials contact the individual in Vietnam, but to not release the person's name as being someone who acted as an intermediary.

But the few reports that we have addressed, we have gotten little response from the Vietnamese. We have had some success in obtaining remains which were confiscated by public security personnel in Vietnam.

Senator KOHL. Well, it seems to me in terms of our responsibility to the families that are involved, it seems to me the sort of a situation in which families here in this country feel that we are not doing enough for them.

If someone claims to have remains and is prepared to turn them over for whatever payment and we say we will not do that and we cannot do that, then it is not hard for me to understand and I suppose for you to understand how anguished families would be over that kind of a condition that we attach to obtaining remains.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I understand how the families feel. But I understand the people in Vietnam, because in the past we did have a reward program during the time the war was going on.

Up until the time that Saigon fell there was a program for payment. The people know that. And the people feel that if they wait till the conditions return to normal again, that there will again be another program for payment.

Senator KOHL. Why do we not deal through the Vietnamese government and let them handle the question, but obtain those remains for us on behalf of the families involved?

Mr. BELL. Because U.S. Government policy says we do not pay for remains.

Senator KOHL. Let Vietnam pay for the remains.

The CHAIRMAN. The Vietnamese counter-argument to that would be that they have 200,000 MIA's of their own and they cannot even get their remains. And they do not have the money. So you run into, we have been through that a little bit with them.

The problem you also get is that once money enters into the equation, there are so many bones in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos that are extraordinarily hard to distinguish between foreign, indigenous, animal, whatever that you will have then created an incentive for any kind of bone to be masqueraded. And it becomes a major problem.

So I think the policy has been reviewed. And many people feel that it is a tough situation. I think the Senator is on the right track by insisting, though, that the government of Vietnam ought to be called on to help those individuals be forthcoming. And I think that is absolutely a good point.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let us try and clear up this issue a second about what is conclusive or not. It is not up to you to make the decision as to whether the testimony of two Senators who were polygraphed as correct or not? Is that correct? It is not in your area of responsibility.

Colonel COLE. Sir, you are 100 percent correct. In the intelligence information report format it clearly states on the report. And this is not just in the POW/MIA business. This is in the DIA HUMINT reporting system world-wide. This is not evaluated intelligence.

Senator McCain. And the fact is, from the years of experience you all have had in the business, if two Senators did testify to that and passed polygraphs, that it would be accepted by your superiors as conclusive evidence. I mean, let us face reality. So I think there is a legitimate question as to what constitutes evidence or not.

But to say that evidence of two Senators who were polygraphed would not be accepted by the DIA as conclusive evidence, I think, is just inaccurate.

Let me go back again because Mr. Bell has raised a very serious issue.

Mr. Gadoury and Colonel Cole, you do not believe that there was Americans alive at the conclusion of the war, the United States involvement in IndoChina, is that correct, from your previous statement?

Mr. GADOURY. I'm not saying I don't believe that. I'm saying I have not personally seen any evidence of that.

Colonel COLE. My opinion is identical.

Senator McCain. Neither of you have seen any evidence that would convince you?

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Senator McCain. But Mr. Bell who obviously has his experiences, which are of great value, does believe.

Mr. Bell, I would like to get a little specific. Outside of McKinley Nolan, can you give me one example, specifically, of a case you believe an American was alive?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. But I'm not sure if we should discuss it here.

Senator McCain. OK. But you can?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, this will not come out of your time, but I just instructed staff to spend some time with Mr. Bell, Mr. Gadoury, and company before they go back. And we will go through a formal deposition.

Senator McCain. Mr. Bell, let me also make this clear.

Since that period of time you have not seen any hard evidence since that couple-year post-war period. Is that correct?

Mr. BELL. I really can't remember, sir.

Senator McCain. In other words, say in the last 7 years, have you seen any hard evidence that indicates to you—

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. When was the most recent case where you have seen evidence that has led you to believe Americans are alive?

Mr. BELL. It's a combination of evidence, sir.

Senator McCain. The latest being?

Mr. BELL. A combination of reporting.

Senator McCain. The latest report being this year, last year, the year before?

Mr. BELL. Possibly in the last 3 or 4 years, I would say. I would have to look the report up.

Senator McCain. The last 3 or 4 years you have seen some evidence that Americans are alive in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BELL. That were alive, sir. I don't have any evidence Americans are alive now.

Senator McCain. But were alive during that post-war period?

Mr. BELL. No, sir, that the report was received during that period.

Senator McCain. During which period?

Mr. BELL. The last 3 or 4 years, sir.

Senator McCain. The last 3 or 4 years you have reason to believe there was Americans still alive?

Mr. BELL. That were alive, sir.

Senator McCain. When?

Mr. BELL. After the POW release, sir.

Senator McCain. For how long?

Mr. BELL. I'm unable to determine that, sir. Possibly 2 years, 3 years.

Senator McCain. And obviously this information was relayed up the chain of command?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Is it your view that the reason why there was not sufficient pursuit of this hard evidence as you believed it to be or it was, was due to mindset to debunk a feeling that we want to put this whole war behind us and we do not want to look at these cases?

Or was it a combination of that and the fact that the United States basically was out of the area, as you mentioned earlier, as of

1975, and did not have the ability to pursue the evidence that you described? Or was it any other factors besides that?

Mr. BELL. No, sir. We're still pursuing those reports.

Senator McCAIN. At the time, why did we not pursue them at the time?

Mr. BELL. Because the information was inadequate and we did not have access to Vietnam at that time to begin the investigations.

Senator McCAIN. Do you believe there were any other reasons?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I look forward to discussing the information that you have about this particular incident.

By the way, Mr. Bell, how much of your time is taken up in the office in Hanoi with people who come in off the street and say I have this evidence, I have this information and I would like to sell it or not, that you believe is just because they have other reasons than to try to give you information which is necessary to resolve this issue?

Mr. BELL. That's difficult to say, sir, because we have active periods and inactive periods. During the time that we've been open, the people who have that type of information are becoming more aware of our presence and the number of people coming to our office has increased.

We've had live-sighting reports. We have also had reports of remains and graves and crash sites. And several of these reports are associated with valid names and identification media, I.D. cards, dog tags, what have you. And our forensic anthropologist has examined the remains and made a summary report on that and retained those remains to be reviewed jointly and possibly taken back to CIL-HI for further examination.

The people who claim to have the remains in their homes or in the outlying provinces are similar to the same situation that I discussed earlier with Senator Kohl. They will not bring the remains in, the entire remains in, unless they receive some type of remuneration for their expenses incurred as they call it.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GADOURY. May I add something to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GADOURY. In terms of Laos, we get a great number of people who bring information in. A lot of it as far as we can tell does not correlate. Usually there are dog tag names associated with it, it's not credible information usually, because the dog tag name is not a name that is on the list.

There are a smaller subset of people who bring information which looks like they probably have been to a crash site and they probably have taken remains away from the crash site and put them someplace else in hiding until such time as they can determine who might be paying this reward or they might be able to cash these remains in.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, I am sure I speak for the Committee, and I do not mean to be presumptuous in saying that, but the notion that you know who is holding remains and that those remains are being held pending some payment is unacceptable.

And clearly the government of Vietnam and our Government had better sit down and talk about this and resolve that. I think all of us would feel that the government of Vietnam has an obligation if it indeed has accepted this issue as a humanitarian issue which we continually hear, to see that for humanitarian reasons those remains are returned without any further demand for payment. And I think everybody would feel that very strongly with respect to the issue of the evidence.

In that time period, I would like to just try to get something straight in my mind just very quickly, Senator, let me ask this question. Secretary Kissinger wrote a letter on 2/1/73 in which the United States promised to pay for post-war reconstruction in North Vietnam \$3.25 billion over 5 years. Operation Homecoming took place a month later, 2 months later, March of 1973. A month after that the Senate voted to bar aid to North Vietnam unless Congress approved. And there was Congressional opposition to the aid.

A week later the Defense Department issued a statement, quote, "There are no more prisoners in Southeast Asia. They are all dead." Now I take it that you are saying, Mr. Bell, that you disagree with that finding, that statement of the Defense Department is in error, according to you. Is that right?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it in that sequence of time that you believe these 10 or so people, there was evidence that they were still alive?

Mr. BELL. Subsequent to the POW release, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Mr. Gadoury, I did not want to pursue the credibility of Senators. I was hoping we would have something a little firmer to focus on.

But I did want to revisit your comment to see if I can get a better understanding of it. Am I to understand that you have not seen any statements from people who were eye witness accounts that say there are POW's left in Southeast Asia?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I've talked to many people, hundreds of refugees, people outside the camps, along the borders, travelers, what not, and there have been a lot of those cases that have related to dog tag stories with maybe remains associated, maybe not. And then there have been a number of hearsay stories, probably a fairly significant number of hearsay accounts of MIA/POW's.

And in my 6½ years in Bangkok, probably only two or three people that I've talked to directly who have given me what they termed to be first-hand information about POW's in Laos. And this was, I want to add, before Stony Beach was brought into Bangkok in 1987. There was a period of time where I was the primary interviewer and the person pursuing the information relative to Laos and Thailand as a full-time job.

Senator BROWN. You say you have seen a couple, but that is about it?

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, sir. But I need to add to that that those people were pursued, they were re-interviewed, they were polygraphed, and they were determined after that whole process not to have credible information.

Senator BROWN. I take it what we are seeing is those several who flunked the polygraph test or could not be confirmed by the polygraph test.

Mr. GADOURY. One person I was directly involved with, he absolutely flunked the test, did not pass the test. There was deception clearly indicated. The other person in which I participated in the polygraph, the test was neutral and it was determined that—in fact, I was there as he was switching his story almost 180 degrees, but the polygraph was straight. He had some difficulties, I guess, in his own mind determining what was true and what was not true. And the bottom line was he was not a credible witness.

Senator BROWN. Near as I can tell we do not have polygraphs for the Senate.

One of the areas I thought might be worth following up is we have had some folks who were refugees from Laos related to the Hmong tribesmen. And as I understand, they not only played a significant role in the conflict, but there is also a fair number of them who are refugees in Thailand. Have you had occasion to talk to a number of those?

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, sir. Many of the people I've talked to have been Hmong refugees.

Senator BROWN. The ones we have talked to indicate that it was fairly common belief among at least the refugees that they knew that there were Americans held in Laos. Have you heard the same thing?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I've talked to a few Hmong who have given me information about Caucasians in Laos. And generally those people, the information that has been provided by those people has been later correlated to possible sightings of Soviets in the area around Xiang Khouang, the airfield up at Point Savon for example, where there are known to have been Soviet advisors, things like that.

I have never talked to a Hmong person who gave me any clear information or definite information about an American, no, sir.

Senator BROWN. So you have heard the hearsay, but you have not been able to check it out?

Mr. GADOURY. We have checked out every person that we've talked to—every person that we've talked to, gotten information, it's been reported and followed-up on if necessary.

Senator BROWN. I am not sure which one of you might be the appropriate one to respond, Colonel or Mr. Bell, but in a number of publications there has been a recounting of the activities of the Vietnamese government following the French-Indonesian conflict, a suggestion that indeed they held back French POW's in the interest of gaining payment of some kind. In fact, there was suggestion that there was payment.

As far as you know, is that an accurate account? Did they indeed hold back POW's expecting payment?

Colonel COLE. I can't answer the question, sir.

Mr. BELL. They had several Frenchmen who remained, but I'm not sure of the status and I don't know of any payment that was made, but there were quite a few Frenchmen that remained there until the early 1970's.

Senator BROWN. Are you aware of them being held against their will?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator BROWN. So none of you have any knowledge of that background that's been printed in a number of areas?

Colonel COLE. I've seen the articles, sir, but I just can't speak for them.

Senator BROWN. You all have varying degrees of contact with the area, but obviously among the three of you, a great deal of contact. Have you ever picked up a suggestion by a representative of the Vietnamese Government that in exchange for payment of some kind or a trade of some kind they might be willing to release POW's?

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator BROWN. Not even suggestions of any kind like that?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Senator BROWN. That there might be something that could be done that would result in POW's?

Mr. BELL. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator BROWN. What kind of feedback do you get in informal discussions with Vietnamese that you meet in the field in terms of this question?

Mr. BELL. The general feedback we get from the Vietnamese in the field regarding the live-sighting issue, sir, is that there are no Americans remaining in Vietnam, without question.

Senator BROWN. Same in the Laos area?

Mr. GADOURY. Yes, sir. The officials that I've worked with in Laos are generally very forthcoming and helpful to the extent they can. My feeling is that they are very sincere and try to help us, as they have permission from their own Government and once an agreement has been made to carry out a field operation.

Senator BROWN. If that's the case, why the reluctance on their part to allow access?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I think that's something that would be addressed at a higher level. I'm talking about at the operational level, once the decision has been made and agreement made between the U.S. and Lao Government.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senators. Senator, let me just say for housekeeping purposes we will wrap this panel up not too long from now. We will then move to the veterans' perspective, and it's my hope to start with the families right after lunch, or shortly after lunch, so we will get to the families almost immediately this afternoon. I know I'm flipping things around a bit, but if people will bear with us, I think that would allow us to have the sequence we sought.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, could you tell us, are you going to break for lunch or not?

The CHAIRMAN. We will break for lunch. It's now 12 noon. I think we need to finish this round and then have the veterans' perspective and then, depending on when we break, we will most likely come back at 2 p.m. and either begin with the families or

shortly thereafter move to families and then wind up with the last panel, Mr. Nagy and company.

Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bell, has there ever been any evidence of the Vietnam Government directing any misinformation program on the POW/MIA issue?

Mr. BELL. I think you'd have to check with the DIA special office for that, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. What you're saying is, you don't know of any?

Mr. BELL. Not any confirmed.

Senator GRASSLEY. Or it would be wrong for you to tell us that?

Mr. BELL. A combination of both, sir. I don't have any confirmation of that, and that's not my area.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you know if there's any evidence of it, even though you can't confirm?

Mr. BELL. I believe the DIA POW/MIA outfit may have some evidence of that, sir, but you'd have to check with them.

Senator GRASSLEY. For all of you on the panel—let me start at that end of the panel so you don't think I'm only directing everything toward Mr. Bell. What recommendations would any of you give that would help us as this Committee—no, I don't mean just this Committee—but our entire Government continues investigating live sightings.

I'd like to have you be as candid as possible. Let me say, why be candid? Because this is your opportunity to give some advice on what can be done to fix the system, if it's broken.

Mr. GADOURY. Well, sir, in Laos, like I said earlier, I think it's fundamentally a question of access, and I think we're talking ultimately of real-time access, and then having the resources to bring the teams in and do the job and get to where we need to get to.

But one of the problems we've already been running into, as we've only recently started doing live-sighting investigations and discrepancy case investigation in Laos, is that the infrastructure in Laos is poor to nonexistent in many of the areas that we need to get to, and as an example of that, when we went to Attapeu Province a few months ago in the middle of the rainy season we just—as the local officials indicated to us, and we saw clear evidence of it as we were flying out in our helicopter to Mang Mai, the capital of Attapeu Province, there was widespread flooding.

The roads were washed out. In some cases the bridges were out. When we landed in the capital, we were told that we couldn't even get across the river because the ferry landing had washed out and there was no way to get any of the three vehicles which the province possessed across the river to get onto the road, and if we did we wouldn't be able to travel very far.

Senator GRASSLEY. Before Colonel Cole answers, just for clarification purposes, I think what you just told me is that things that need to be changed to make our live-sighting investigations better come with changes that will be made in Vietnam with the Vietnamese Government. Is there anything you have to suggest that our Government can do differently?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I was addressing Laos.

Senator GRASSLEY. Laos, Vietnam, or any of the countries you're talking about. Is there anything in our procedure, as far as what we have done as an American Government for the last 16 years, that can be changed or improved?

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I think we have the mechanism to conduct the investigations on our side, and all we're waiting for is that access and the ability to get to those places where we need to go.

Senator GRASSLEY. Things, the way they're handled in the bureaucracy—no suggestions on improvement in that area that could help us to do a better job?

Mr. GADOURY. Frankly, sir, I don't have any suggestion at this point. I think the mechanism is there. We just need to have the cooperation to utilize that mechanism.

Senator GRASSLEY. Colonel Cole, maybe if you could address what I asked to be clarified about, as well as whatever you wanted to say?

Colonel COLE. Sir, I've been in the job 14 months. I've seen tremendous improvement in the last 4½ to 5 months under Bob Sheetz in the POW/MIA office, Mr. Nagy in DIA overall. We've got this train on the track. All we need is those qualified people that I mentioned in response to Senator Reid's question a few moments ago.

My only personal, if you will, thought on this to add is that yesterday we heard that we're going to as yet undergo another reorganization CINCPAC JTF. As one of the operators down at the lowest level, all I ask is, whatever we've got going now not be disrupted by the coming organization or reorganization. We got the apparatus in place, we're getting the qualified people, let's go with it.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Bell?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I think I agree with everything that Colonel Cole just said, and I'd like to add that in addition to not disrupting what we've got going, I think it's important that we have some quality control, experienced type of personnel in the analytical function.

Right now, for example, in my Hanoi office I have an analyst that's 25 years old, and he is the analyst for the Hanoi office right now, and he is a bright young man but he has no experience. He's been in Vietnam maybe a month, and for the type of work that we do there, I think we need some experienced personnel.

The discrepancy cases and live-sighting cases should be done, in my opinion, by the DIA, and they should work closely with us on not only the investigations themselves but also the follow-up and the coordination with Colonel Cole to obtain additional information from sources no longer under Vietnamese control in refugee camps.

Senator GRASSLEY. Colonel Cole, of the 102 new personnel that Secretary Cheney referred to yesterday, how many will you get who will be hands-on investigators of live sightings?

Colonel COLE. Nine people out of that total, sir.

May I just add another sentence here, sir? Yesterday it was briefed to you by Mr. Ford it was going to be seven. The reason he didn't know about the two additional people is I've got two extra slots I'm going to be picking up from Mr. Sheetz, but those will all be investigator debriefers, so I'll have nine additional people out of that total, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grassley. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'll try to be brief.

Do you have auxiliary help? For example, do you use the natives, for lack of a better word—the Vietnamese and Laotians—to do interpreting or anything like that?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. We have a pool of translators, and what we are using the translators/researchers for are historical publications of great volume. In other words, we look to these translators to screen the material and try to pinpoint publications from Patin historical documents that relate to particular units that were assigned to areas—specific areas during the war.

By doing so, we can determine which units were in the area and then make requests for cadre who were assigned to those units who might be potential witnesses to provide leads.

Senator REID. The answer is the same from the two of you?

Colonel COLE. Yes, sir, except with the possibility of Cambodian ops. We're just getting into this. We turned in a suggestion last week of how, from the live-sighting perspective, a new office should be established. We realize this has to be a task force approach, but we don't have anyone in Cambodia so far.

We don't have an office, but our plan at least from the live-sighting side is we have several Cambodians in the refugee camp at Site II who have been working for us for a number of years. All of those people are eventually going to be repatriated. We're hopefully going to be able to bring them down to Phnom Penh when and if the approval is given to go ahead with an office.

Senator REID. We have heard you, Mr. Bell, and others talk about the fact that because we have not been willing to pay, nor has the Vietnam Government been willing to pay for the remains of people, that we have not been able to determine if in fact they are remains of people, and in fact if they're people, whether they're Vietnamese, American, or whatever, right?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. The question we haven't asked is, how much money would it cost to get those remains if in fact someone was willing to pay for them?

Mr. BELL. We have heard a number of figures mentioned, sir, but nothing definite.

Senator REID. Give me an idea what you think it would take? \$50? \$1,000? What would it take?

Mr. BELL. I just couldn't put a price on that, sir.

Senator REID. Anyone else?

Colonel COLE. No, sir.

Senator REID. So you have no idea?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

Senator REID. Even though you've spent all that time in South-east Asia? What do you think if we said, okay, we're going to give you some money, how much would you need? How much do you think it would take, based on your experience?

Mr. BELL. I've heard figures mentioned from a few dollars all the way to 10 taels of gold, which would be close to \$5,000, sir, so I really don't know. It just varies from person to person.

Senator REID. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid. Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. Mr. Bell, you said in your testimony that you've worked on intelligence teams that gathered information that are now in the files of some of the MIA's/POW's. Is any of that information that you gathered classified?

Mr. BELL. It's been a long time since I've seen that information, sir, so I'm not sure. At that particular time we were actually in direct support of the Paris peace talks from the national level, and the way I understand the system, any report at that time which correlated to a specific individual is placed in his file. Any report which could not be correlated was placed in the numerous volumes that you see today. I think there's 14 volumes of uncorrelated reports.

Senator KOHL. So you don't know whether or not the information you gathered may or may not be in a classified category?

Mr. BELL. I assume it's still classified, sir.

Senator KOHL. Do you recall that any of that information was so important in terms of classification that now, after all these years, it could not be released to the families?

Mr. BELL. To be honest with you, sir, except for the 105 live-sighting investigations that are now still active, I don't see any reason to classify any of the other information.

We need to use the information in Vietnam in our investigations, and we're not authorized to have classified information present there, and I have already suggested that especially the majority of these reports that were collected in refugee camps during the time that we openly advertised the Joint Casualty Resolution Center as the only humanitarian organization within our Government devoted to POW/MIA, and put up posters and made loudspeaker announcements and interviewed these people in public, I think the only thing that needs to be sanitized or declassified from those reports is the name of the individual who provided the information.

Senator KOHL. So you're saying with the exception of those 105 sightings, all the other information in your judgment should be declassified?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. Some of it has, some of it hasn't?

Mr. BELL. That's correct, sir.

Senator KOHL. If you were to make a recommendation you would say, declassify whatever it is that has not been declassified?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, except for those live-sighting reports that are still out there.

Senator KOHL. And some of that information might help clarify some of the anguish and concern by families that are trying to find out everything they can about the MIA's?

Mr. BELL. Sir, I noticed in the opening session of the Committee yesterday we were informed that your Committee would also have investigators, and possibly two teams of investigators, and if this information is declassified and made available I think that will speed up the search. I think it will be important to get a different perspective, a different viewpoint, concerning the value of the information.

We, as investigators, look forward to seeing someone else's opinion on this information, and maybe it will be helpful to us in doing our work.

Senator KOHL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. We are going to wrap up this panel, because we do want to try to stay on schedule here.

Gentlemen, there are additional questions. The record will remain open either for the submission of written questions or with a certainty that we would like to sit down with you to follow up, and staff would just like to make some further inquiries in the next day or so. So we will do that this afternoon with you, Mr. Gadoury, and we will do it at the earliest convenience with you, Mr. Bell.

Mr. Bell, I probably don't have to say this. You are a person of strong convictions and of enormous commitment and dedication. I cannot imagine anybody possibly influencing you or who ever succeeded in changing an opinion that you hold as a matter of commitment and of your own observation. But clearly if anybody over the course of these next days suggests that somehow you might have been mistaken in your observations or in what you said here, I hope you will feel free to let the Committee know immediately that such an overture has been made.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. I'd like to explain again, sir, that this is a position that I have taken and this is not a final analytical position.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that, and that is why more analysis is necessary. But it is your deeply-held belief; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is based on your personal observations of evidence at the time, correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, accompanied by the results of our activities that we have been involved in.

The CHAIRMAN. And subsequently you have been able, by virtue of the work you have been doing these most recent years to be able to confirm what your initial observations were?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It stands as you have stated, and this Committee will obviously want to look further, and there are a lot of other people and a lot of other things to look at. But we appreciate enormously your candor and your work.

We have only scratched the surface of much of what I think you have to say. We will continue privately and quietly, but I just want to thank you all very, very much. The public has no sense of what it's like to be out in the boonies sometimes, as you are, with a rucksack and living in pretty rough circumstances, day in and day out. I know what a pleasure it is to get back to Hanoi to be able to get a shower or something. And Hanoi is pretty rudimentary.

So you are really, all of you, in Laos, in the jungle or wherever it is that you go, it is often at enormous risk and at continuous discomfort. I just want you to know that we are deeply appreciative of those efforts and very, very respectful of them. We wish you well as you continue this difficult quest. Thank you very, very much, gentlemen.

Mr. GADOURY. Sir, I would submit that the risk we take is certainly not greater than the risk that the people that we're looking for took at one time.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate that, and we appreciate your recognition of that also. Thank you all very, very much.

If we could ask the veterans panel to come forward, I think we can proceed forward with the next panel before we break.

Gentlemen, if you could take your seats, we are going to swear all witnesses, so I would ask that all of you rise in order to be sworn.

[The witnesses were sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. We would ask you, if you would, to try to adhere to a time limit on your statements, if possible, and we will try to hold everybody to about 7 minutes, if that is reasonable. Is that fair? The clock will tick. Is there any order you have decided on? We will just begin here with Mr. Wallace and will run down.

Welcome. We are delighted to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. WALLACE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Select Committee, thank you for inviting the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States to appear before this important body. The 2.9 million members of the VFW, to include our Ladies Auxiliary, consider the recovery and return of over 2,200 of our comrades from the Vietnam War to be of the highest priority.

In your invitation to me to testify, you asked if the Veterans of Foreign Wars was satisfied with the government's handling of this important issue. The simple answer to your question has been, and is now, no. We are not satisfied with the government's effort to recover our missing comrades.

Since 1968, the VFW has been in the front ranks on this issue. Over successive administrations and Congresses, we have repeatedly pleaded and pressed for more attention, greater resources and higher priority for this issue. And, each year, we were told the government was doing all it could. Yet here we are in 1991 and the issue has not been resolved. Only 310 missing Americans have been accounted for since 1973 and we still have not accounted for over 2,200 men still missing.

My answer is no, we, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have not been satisfied with the U.S. Government's efforts. Over these past 20 years, we've been told by various government officials of so-called strategies to force Vietnamese cooperation on the POW issue. There have been at least two United States-Vietnamese joint cooperation plans to recover our men, and most recently we have been briefed on roadmaps which will supposedly help get our men back—a lot of talk but little action and no results. No, the Veterans of Foreign Wars has not been satisfied with these efforts.

How could anyone be satisfied, when for nearly 20 years none of these strategies, none of the joint cooperation plans, and none of the roadmaps have produced the results the families of our men and their comrades have been led to hope for and expect?

We have been stunned this past year by a renewed and growing controversy over our government's efforts to recover our missing men. The latest controversy likely stems from the charges brought by the report issued by Senators Helms and Grassley charging that our government ignored evidence of live Americans and indeed worked to discredit such evidence.

Further controversy has been generated by Colonel Millard Peck's allegations that a "mindset to debunk" retards the sense of urgency our government should have about our POW/MIA's. More recently, the public disclosure of a series of photos purportedly of Americans still captive in Southeast Asia has added more fuel to the controversy.

Again, the simple answer to your question is no, we in the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States are not satisfied with the government's effort to recover our missing men.

Amid the controversy, what has the government done to explain its efforts, refute these charges, defend itself and restore public credibility in its efforts?

Further, the government continues to shroud its efforts in what we believe to be an unnecessary veil of secrecy. Few pieces of information seem insignificant enough to avoid the secrecy stamp. If we are to believe our government, we must also believe that the POW information buried in their classified files is so sensitive that its declassification would have dire consequences and perhaps even pose a clear and present danger to the national security.

Otherwise, why would the government continue to classify the overwhelming majority of the information gathered on this most important issue? I do not believe the government can regain credibility on this issue or adequately defend itself so long as the very information needed for honest evaluation is kept from public view.

The fact is the government cannot defend itself because it has failed to organize and manage an effective program to recover our men. There are obvious examples of failure.

On July 31, 1991, the Defense Department announced it was nearly doubling the number of personnel assigned to the POW/MIA effort and forming a new office in the Pentagon to handle only POW/MIA matters. Yet, three months later, no POW/MIA directorate has been opened in the Pentagon and no additional personnel have been assigned to that office.

Mr. Chairman, I need to point out that the Congress also carries the burden of failure for its oversight role. Despite numerous hearings and investigations of this issue, the Congress cannot assure us the POW/MIA issue is either well managed or close to being resolved.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I went to Vietnam last July at your request. In Bangkok we were briefed by members of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and others involved with our POW/MIA's. This briefing and subsequent discussions left me with the clear impression of the inadequacy of the government's POW/MIA effort.

The JCRC team in Bangkok is hardworking and obviously undermanned. Some of the team lacked language training. Due to personnel and other shortages, their visits to refugee camps are irregular and infrequent. When live-sighting information is obtained, the lengthy and time-consuming reporting channel prevents rapid

investigative response and would do so even if the team were adequately manned to undertake an immediate response.

We all recognize, I believe, that the fate of the 2,273 men still missing is not going to be resolved in Washington. It can only be resolved by determined investigation and field work on the ground in Vietnam, in Laos and in Cambodia.

But my recent trip proved the current government effort is not adequately manned, or managed to resolve these cases within the next few years.

So again and in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States is not satisfied with the manner in which our government has and is currently handling the POW/MIA issue.

After listening to this morning's testimony, I want to add that we are also not satisfied with Vietnam's cooperation. We consider Vietnam's cooperation should include, number one, sharing all information they have collected about live-sightings of Americans, American remains and crash sites; number two, unrestricted and timely access to U.S. investigators conducting live-sighting investigations; three, expedited return of remains supposedly warehoused; four, increased joint U.S.-Vietnamese field investigations; and timely completion of the remaining discrepancy cases and Vietnamese support and cooperation with the Laotian and Cambodian governments encouraging them to assist with U.S. efforts.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wallace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. WALLACE

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More recently, the public disclosure of a series of photos purportedly of Americans still captive in Southeast Asia has further seriously challenged Government credibility on this issue.

Again, the simple answer to your question is no, we in the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States are not satisfied with the Government's effort to recover our missing men.

Amid the controversy, what has the Government done to explain its effort, refute these charges, defend itself and restore public credibility in its efforts?

Further, the Government continues to shroud its effort in what we believe to be an unnecessary veil of secrecy. Few pieces of information seem insignificant enough to avoid the secrecy stamp. If we are to believe our Government, we must also believe that the POW information buried in their classified files is so sensitive that its declassification would have dire consequences and perhaps even pose a clear and present danger to the national security. Otherwise, why would the Government continue to classify the overwhelming majority of the information gathered on this most important issue? I do not believe the Government can regain credibility on this issue or adequately defend itself so long as the very information needed for honest evaluation is kept from public view.

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As you know, Mr. Chairman, I went to Vietnam last July at your request. In Bangkok we were briefed by members of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and others involved with our POW/MIA's. This briefing and subsequent discussions left me with the clear impression of the inadequacy of the Government's POW/MIA effort.

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But my recent trip proved the current Government effort is not adequately manned, or managed to resolve these cases within the next few years.

So again, I must tell you the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States is not satisfied with the manner in which our Government has and is currently handling the POW/MIA issue.

Each year since 1968, our members have expressed their concerns and views about the POW/MIA issue in our resolutions.

This year in the midst of controversy, ten resolutions concerning our POW/MIA's were passed at our National Convention. These resolutions, which are summarized and attached to my statement, call for an investigation of the POW/MIA issue, revision of the Missing Service Persons Act and disclosure of classified information concerning our POW/MIA's.

These resolutions also clearly state our objections to diplomatic recognition of, or economic aid to and trade with Vietnam or other Southeast Asian countries until we have obtained the fullest cooperation of these countries in the recovery and return of our missing men.

I also call your attention to our resolution to seek new, more active efforts to resolve the fate of the over 8,000 men still missing from the Korean War.

PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION

RESOLUTION No. 401

AMERICA'S PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION: A NON-NEGOTIABLE MATTER OF HONOR

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that the VFW remains determined to resolve this important issue and supports the President's pledge of highest national priority to resolve the status of Americans still missing and unaccounted for in Indochina; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the VFW urges the U.S. Government to further accelerate government-to-government contacts in an attempt to obtain the immediate release of any Americans who may still be held captive in Indochina and the return of American servicemen and civilians who have died in Southeast Asia and whose remains have not been returned; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that while we continue to oppose lifting the economic embargo and the establishment of full diplomatic recognition, it is in the best interest of resolving the POW/MIA issue as quickly as possible to establish a non-diplomatic U.S. Government presence in Vietnam. This U.S. presence could serve as the base for the continued search for and investigation of our missing men as well as other strictly humanitarian matters; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that as such opportunity occurs, VFW National Officers should periodically visit Vietnam and Laos to verify that the situation does, in fact, require a U.S. presence in order to facilitate the recovery of our missing comrades and to directly express the VFW's concern and determination to resolve this issue.

RESOLUTION No. 402

REINVESTIGATE THE POW/MIA CONTROVERSY

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we believe it is absolutely vital to restore public credibility and confidence in the Government's POW/MIA efforts; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that despite the diversion of attention, we urge the President to establish an independent public commission and to reopen a full public investigation of the allegations of the Helms/Grassley report and the U.S. Government's past and current efforts to recover our POW/MIA's; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the investigation should also consider declassification and release of such POW/MIA information which would help rebuild public confidence without disclosing intelligence data to others.

RESOLUTION No. 406

CONCERNING THE KOREAN WAR MIA ISSUE

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that the VFW remains determined to resolve the status of Americans still unaccounted for in Korea through lawful and appropriate channels; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the VFW urges the U.S. and Republic of Korea governments to continue to exert the maximum economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea and to speak out forcefully and publicly when necessary until we resolve this long-standing humanitarian issue; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the VFW, in keeping with United States law and in consultation with the Korean and U.S. governments, seek new, more active efforts to resolve the issue of Korean War POW/MIA's.

RESOLUTION No. 407

SUPPORT PUBLIC AWARENESS PROJECTS

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that the National Organization will:

- (1) ensure routine distribution to the field of pertinent, credible and responsible information on a routine basis;
- (2) encourage participation in this program by veterans' groups of other friendly nations such as the NATO allies and Far Eastern allies;
- (3) encourage exchange of information among State POW/MIA Chairmen, to include publishing up-to-date address lists; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that each Department exercise maximum initiatives to maintain the vitality and thrust of the POW/MIA program at Department levels by encouraging such actions as:

- (1) display of black POW/MIA flag, subordinate to the U.S. Flag, at any function at which it is proper to fly the U.S. Flag;
- (2) work closely with family and concerned POW/MIA organizations at all major events and rendering cooperation and support to them;
- (3) encourage support in information exchange at Post levels;
- (4) appoint an interested member at Post level to act as the POW/MIA project officer; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the National Organization of the VFW supports the annually announced POW/MIA Recognition Day.

RESOLUTION No. 426

SUPPORT PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR POW/MIA'S

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we continue to support General John W. Vessey as the Special Presidential Envoy to Vietnam and urge his continued participation in all policy discussions concerning this issue; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that General Vessey and/or General Robert C. Kingston continue to review the findings of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Review Group concerning all aspects of the intelligence effort devoted to the POW/MIA issue; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that we urge the Vietnamese government's cooperation with us and urge them to further expand this cooperation so that the fate of our missing men can be quickly resolved.

RESOLUTION No. 431

APPROPRIATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LENDING AGENCIES

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that future Congressional appropriations to international lending agencies be contingent on such agencies' compliance with strict standards which would exclude loans to nations that give aid and comfort to hostile groups or which are demonstrably hostile to the United States, including communist and communist-dominated countries and countries which do not cooperate in our search for POW/MIA's or past wars.

RESOLUTION No. 433

AMEND THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONS ACT

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we ask our Congressional Representatives to support Congressman Roland's bill to revise the Missing Service Persons Act.

RESOLUTION No. 437

STAND BEHIND MILLER/MCCAIN DISCLOSURE BILLS

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we stand firmly behind the disclosure of information concerning United States personnel classified as Prisoners of War or Missing in Action; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that we petition Congress for passage of such legislation and urge the President of the United States to press the Governments of the Soviet Union, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos for a full accounting of all our POW/MIA's from those wars.

RESOLUTION No. 440

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION/ECONOMIC AID AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE POW/MIA ISSUE

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we strongly oppose any proposal that grants diplomatic recognition to communist Vietnam and Cambodia or economic aid to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia without first obtaining their fullest cooperation concerning American prisoners or Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.

RESOLUTION No. 449

IRAQ MUST ACCOUNT FOR KUWAITI MIA'S

BE IT RESOLVED, by the 92nd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, that we urge the U.S. Government to take such action as necessary either unilaterally, or through our allies, or the United Nations that will force Iraq to account for those Kuwaiti citizens still missing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Sommer.

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOMMER, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. SOMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I might just add I think each of you, as you speak, you might just mention what branch of the service you served in and where you served.

Mr. WALLACE. I was with the U.S. Marine Corps in 1967-68.

Mr. SOMMER. I was with the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1968.

Mr. Chairman, because of the length of our statement and the fact that we're summarizing, I would appreciate it if we could have it placed in the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full statement will be placed in the record.

Mr. SOMMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you are aware, this witness had the opportunity to represent the American Legion as part of a factfinding delegation on a trip to Vietnam in July of this year, organized by your office and led by Congressman Lane Evans, co-chair of the Vietnam Veterans in Congress Caucus. The primary focus of the trip was to explore the feasibility of establishing an independent veteran organization-supported office in Vietnam for the purpose of supplementing the work of the U.S. Government office and keeping the spotlight on the operation of the U.S. team.

I would like to make it clear that what I'm about to say with respect to my remarks reflects only the opinions of the American

Legion and not any of the other representatives that were on the trip.

The American Legion felt compelled to participate in such a venture because the process to resolve the POW/MIA issue is moving intolerably slow and there's a growing perception among Americans that deception again is being practiced by those responsible for handling POW/MIA investigations. It has also become apparent that there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of some officials who are responsible for obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW's and MIA's.

Following a series of what were initially thought to be rather extensive briefings at the State Department and Pentagon, the majority of our delegation departed Washington on June 30, arriving in Bangkok the evening of July 1. Additional briefings were conducted on July 2 at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

The next week would be spent meeting with various officials at all levels of government in Vietnam. Extensive sessions were held with representatives of the Office for Seeking Missing Personnel. The director of that office accompanied us to Danang, Hue and Saigon as one of our handlers.

While in Hanoi, the group met with Nguyen Co Thach, who was then foreign minister. In addition, we were then received at the Presidential Palace by newly-appointed Secretary-General Do Muoi. There was a common thread among the information provided by every government official with whom we spoke, what one might consider to be a party line. Each stated emphatically that there are no living American prisoners in Vietnam. Each said that normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam should not be linked with the POW/MIA issue.

To a person, they reiterated that the POW/MIA effort is a humanitarian issue and not a political one. There were also consistent promises that the Vietnamese government would fully cooperate with an independent veterans' group office and that such an office would have free rein in traveling in the north or south of the country.

Unfortunately, as one might expect, it was obvious to this witness that all of the statements made by the Vietnamese cannot be taken at face value. This became even more obvious when we were told that the American prisoners of war that were released in 1973 had been treated under the Geneva Conventions in general and specific Vietnamese regulations dealing with humanitarianism and leniency.

We were advised that the Vietnamese treated those POW's with lenience, and those who returned had explained the leniency with which they were treated. This certainly does not track with the tales of horror that we heard relating to the torture, humiliation, deprivation, starvation, and outright hatred that the vast majority, if not all, of the repatriated prisoners of war underwent.

Another interesting facet of our meetings was that government officials from Hanoi provided information about 12 American MIA's who allegedly died while in captivity or were killed in action.

The information was provided to us in order to illustrate what they felt would be the complications involved in the investigation

of these cases and the reported frustration experienced by the Vietnamese, with respect to the requirements and criteria set forth by the U.S. team. Our own Government had not provided us with this kind of information. We actually received more hard information from the Vietnamese than we have from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other American entity involved with this issue.

Mr. Chairman, the most frustrating and incomprehensible aspect of the entire POW/MIA issue is the pattern which has evolved, surrounding the handling of intelligence data and other information relating to live prisoners of war, both historically and presently. Over the past several years an increasing number of stories have surfaced regarding the abundance of available information relating to American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. Taken separately, one who is skeptical might pass such reports off as sensationalism or tripe. However, in reviewing the available body of information relating to this issue, the belief that there are POW's being held in Indochina cannot and must not be summarily dismissed.

The most recent article relating to the handling of intelligence during and after the Vietnam War, Soviet involvement in the interrogation and appropriation of American POW's, and U.S. Government suppression of information relating to both, is On the Trail of the MIA's, which appeared in the October 27, 1991, edition of the Los Angeles Times magazine. Several previously published books also contain references of varying degrees to the discrediting of live-sighting information resources, locations and movement of prisoners that are not acknowledged by U.S. officials, reports of Americans held captive after 1973 on which no apparent action was taken by U.S. officials, et cetera, et cetera.

In addition, we've seen copies of reports, memoranda, and other correspondence issued by U.S. intelligence agencies which square with the charges set forth in these publications. Add to all this the report by the minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the assertions leveled by Col. Millard Peck and you come up with rather compelling evidence that all is not right with the world.

Mr. Chairman, almost immediately after our return from Vietnam in July, a photograph of three individuals reported to be American POW's surfaced. Surfacing in the news media heightened the American Legion's concern about the manner in which the POW/MIA issue is being handled. The photo was said to be in the hands of Government analysts for several months.

This witness was appalled at the reports, because in all of the briefings and discussions we had prior to leaving for Vietnam with those who are supposed to be knowledgeable and responsible on this issue, there was no mention whatever that this photo even existed, much less that it was being analyzed.

Subsequently, a number of additional photographs were publicized in the media. The American Legion was contacted by a representative of a group of individuals on July 23, who requested a meeting for the purpose of discussing proof of the existence of a live American POW being held in Laos. A meeting was scheduled and held on July 24. At that time, a large number of photographs

taken over a long period of time and other information relating to an individual identified as Donald Gene Carr, who was lost while flying in a reconnaissance aircraft over Laos in 1971, were reviewed and discussed.

Among those at the meeting were Mr. Carr's brother, Matthew. After reviewing the photographs and other information, we feel that it is sufficient to resolve reasonable doubt as to whether or not Donald Carr is alive. In early August we were contacted by those who were in possession of the Carr photos for the Legion's opinion as to whether or not the information should be turned over to the Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis and investigation. We advised that the only way a response could be elicited from the Government would be to submit the photos to DIA.

On or about August 9, the information was turned over to the DIA. We understand that the Carr photographs have been analyzed by the Sandia National Laboratory and an inclusive, although somewhat favorable, report has been issued. As a matter of fact, we have a copy of that report and would be happy to share it with the Committee.

The Government has admitted that the photograph could be Donald Carr. However, so far as the American Legion is concerned, the Government has moved neither far enough nor fast enough in an attempt to do anything positive about the case.

This concern was legitimized yesterday, when during Mr. Carl Ford's appearance, it was learned that apparently nothing further has been done with the Sandia Laboratory report that was issued in August. So far as the American Legion is concerned, there is no valid excuse, no excuse, why further analysis could not have been requested and completed in the subsequent 3 months. It's just another example of that which fuels the perception that the POW/MIA issue is not being handled in the manner in which it should and that all is not being done to resolve this important issue.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my summary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sommer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOMMER, JR.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. The American Legion appreciates the opportunity to appear before you today to present its views, concerns, and recommendations regarding the current status of the prisoners of war and missing in action in Southeast Asia, and the efforts of the U.S. Government to resolve this issue of highest national importance.

At the outset Mr. Chairman, may we express our thanks for the accessibility that has been demonstrated by the Committee and its staff. It is especially enlightening that the organizational meeting on September 12, and subsequent sessions have been open to the public. This demonstrates a perception of openness relating to the manner in which the Committee will conduct its work, and we trust that this spirit will continue. The American Legion considers the responsibilities with which the Committee has been charged to be of paramount importance, and the thought of dealing with these issues in the open is refreshing.

Mr. Chairman, we fully understand that the Committee plans to address the various aspects of the POW/MIA issue in phases, beginning with what is currently being done, and working backward. The American Legion agrees that this is important because the here and now includes what is being done—or what theoretically should be done—to follow up on live-sighting reports and other intelligence relating to individuals who may well be held prisoner in Indochina.

However, since we do not know whether or not we will be invited to present testimony at future hearings, this statement contains a compendium of information relating to the entire issue. Because of the fact the Committee is just commencing its

work, the Legion offers the following suggestions as to issues to be considered by the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. These will also be addressed in more detail in the body of this statement.

1. It is recommended that the Committee call in every piece of paper relating to the 1,400 live-sighting reports for its analysis.

2. It is important that the "Acid Test" used by the Defense Intelligence Agency to distill the total number of live-sighting reports down to the ones held to be "believable" be thoroughly reviewed.

3. The methodology used in collecting information and compiling live-sighting reports needs to be examined. This should include scrutinization of the timeliness with which these reports are addressed.

4. It is recommended that the Committee review the structure and operation of the DIA Special Office for POW's and MIA's, including a determination of the line of responsibility—or chain of command—relative to the Special Office.

5. The Committee should have access to satellite photographs currently in the possession of the National Reconnaissance Office, which provide the location of reported POW camp sites as well as other geographical information.

6. The report rendered by the Tighe Commission in 1986 should be reviewed. This includes the process by which the majority and minority reports were finally published, and the reason for any changes made in the report. These reports have, so far as we know, never been released to anyone outside the DOD/DIA structure.

7. It is recommended that the logistical support and resources provided the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the POW/MIA Office in Hanoi be analyzed to ensure that these functions have the strength necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the responsibilities with which they have been charged.

8. It is recommended that a determination be made as to whether or not all records contained in archives and repositories throughout the United States which contain information on search and rescue missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces in Southeast Asia have been researched, and if so what has been done with the information that has been secured.

9. It has been charged on numerous occasions that individuals within the U.S. government have intimidated, coerced, discredited, and ignored sources who have provided data concerning live POW's. It is important that these charges be thoroughly investigated.

10. A determination needs to be made as to why information concerning the POW/MIA issue has consistently been withheld by DOD and remains classified. This would include a review of whether or not DOD is complying with security classification procedures, and if the mandatory review process established within DOD is being implemented by DIA with regard to review and release of documents that are twenty to twenty-five years old.

11. During the hearing of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee on July 25, testimony was presented that the Secretary of State had ordered the destruction of records and documents relating to POW's and MIA's by four sub-elements of the Department. The validity of this statement certainly needs to be determined; and if it is found to be true, the Committee should pursue an investigation of all details relating thereto.

12. It is recommended that the Committee ascertain whether or not security has been violated through the provision of classified information relating to POW's and MIA's to the Vietnamese government.

13. The Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii has received substantial criticism regarding its methods employed in identifying remains and the subsequent reports to families of MIA's. A review of these charges and the methodology used by CILHI needs to be pursued.

14. Beginning in mid-July a number of photographs have surfaced and many have been published in the media. Some of the individuals in the photographs have tentatively been identified by family members as American servicemen who were shot down over Southeast Asia. Other photographs were clearly a hoax. An apparent attempt has been made to categorize all of the photos as a "hoax" based on one that was very obvious. A review of this situation, and the manner in which the photographs have been handled by DIA needs to be conducted.

15. The allegations contained in the resignation memorandum submitted by Colonel Millard Peck are serious and need to be thoroughly reviewed. The Defense Department has stated that a review was conducted but that no written report exists.

16. The findings set forth in the report prepared by the minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should be reviewed and analyzed.

17. A substantial number of books, reports and articles have appeared recently, setting forth allegations of available intelligence data that was collected during the Vietnam war and subsequent years being disregarded, ignored, or suppressed by the U.S. government. An urgent need exists to fully investigate these allegations.

The American Legion will continue to develop information and provide the staff with additional recommendations regarding issues to be considered and other subjects, if the Chairman feels that it would be worthwhile to the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, this witness had the opportunity to represent the Legion as part of a fact-finding delegation on a trip to Vietnam in July of this year, organized by your office and led by Congressman Lane Evans, Co-Chair of the Vietnam Veterans in Congress Caucus. The primary focus of the trip was to explore the feasibility of establishing an independent, veteran organization supported office in Vietnam for the purpose of supplementing the work of the U.S. government office, and keeping the spotlight on the operation of the U.S. team. The American Legion felt compelled to participate in such a venture because the process to resolve the POW/MIA issue is moving intolerably slow, and there is a growing perception among Americans that deception is being practiced by those responsible for handling POW/MIA investigations. It had also become apparent that there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of some officials who are responsible for obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW's and MIA's.

Following a series of what were initially thought to be rather extensive briefings at the State Department and Pentagon, the majority of our delegation departed Washington on June 30, arriving in Bangkok the evening of July 1. Additional briefings were conducted on July 2 at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

The next morning we departed by air to Hanoi. Following arrival in Hanoi and checking into our hotel, we met with Assistant Foreign Minister Dang Nghiem Bai at the Government Guest House. Bai is also Director of the Department of the Americas in the Foreign Ministry. After introducing several other officials and exchanging greetings, we went over the schedule for our trip and began preliminary discussions on the POW/MIA issue.

The next week would be spent meeting with various officials at all levels of government in Vietnam. Extensive sessions were held with representatives of the Office for Seeking Missing Personnel. The Director of that office, Ho Xuan Dich, accompanied us to Danang, Hue, and Saigon as one of our handlers. While in Hanoi, the group met with Nguyen Co Thach who was then Foreign Minister and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In addition, we were received at the Presidential Palace by newly appointed Secretary General Do Muoi, who had been serving as the Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers prior to the 7th Party Congress. It is interesting to note that our request to visit Do Muoi was only faxed to Hanoi during the last evening we were in Bangkok. He spent a total of ninety minutes with our group.

There was a common thread among the information provided by every government official with whom we spoke, what one might consider to be a "party line." Each stated emphatically that there are no living American prisoners in Vietnam. Each said that normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam should not be linked with the POW/MIA issue. To a person, they reiterated that the POW/MIA effort is a humanitarian issue and not a political one. There were also consistent promises that the Vietnamese government would fully cooperate with an independent veterans group office, and that such an office would have free reign in traveling in the North or South of the country.

Unfortunately, as one might expect, it was obvious that all of the statements made by the Vietnamese cannot be taken at face value. This became even more obvious when we were told that the American prisoners of war released in 1973 had been treated under the Geneva Convention in general, and specific Vietnamese regulations dealing with humanitarianism and leniency. We were advised that the Vietnamese treated the POW's with leniency, and those who returned have explained the leniency with which they were treated. This certainly does not track with the tales of horror that we heard relating to the torture, humiliation, depravation, starvation, and outright hatred that the vast majority, if not all, of the repatriated prisoners of war underwent.

Another interesting facet of our meetings was that government officials from Hanoi provided information about twelve American MIA's who allegedly died while in captivity or were killed in action. The information was provided to us in order to illustrate the complications involved in the investigation of these cases, and the re-

ported frustration experienced by the Vietnamese with respect to the requirements and criteria set forth by the U.S. team.

Our own government had not provided us with this kind of information. We actually received more hard information from the Vietnamese than we have from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, or any other American entity involved with this issue.

The foregoing is but a brief sketch of the details of the trip. The exploratory trip was extremely worthwhile, a large body of information was gathered, and The American Legion stands ready to send a representative or representatives to Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos, if it is deemed necessary.

Prior to the visit to Vietnam, a number of events took place that raised the level of sensitivity regarding the manner in which the entire POW/MIA resolution issue has been handled. National media, on May 22, carried stories explaining the protest resignation of Col. Millard A. Peck from his post as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. Col. Peck's accusations with respect to the manner in which the POW/MIA issue is being handled by the government were appalling.

In a letter to the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, also under date of May 22, then National Commander Robert S. Turner requested a complete and open investigation of these allegations. Additionally, he advised Secretary Cheney that he would appreciate being kept fully informed on the progress and results of the investigation into the POW/MIA situation.

A reply to Past National Commander Turner's letter under date of June 20 was signed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Duane P. Andrews. It basically referred to an attached press release entitled "DOD Finds No Evidence of Peck Allegations." In a second letter to Secretary Cheney, Mr. Turner, referring to Assistant Secretary Andrews' correspondence, stated that since no substantiating information was enclosed, there is no basis on which The American Legion could determine whether the investigation was complete and accurate. The request to be furnished a copy of the report of investigation was reiterated. A response to the second letter of request was issued over Secretary Cheney's signature and provided an expanded version of the information contained in the press release. However, no formal report of the investigation into Col. Peck's allegations was forthcoming.

We recommend, as stated previously in our suggestions, that this Committee pursue a report of the full investigation for its thorough review.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Staff issued a report on May 23, 1991, entitled *An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA's*, as you are aware Mr. Chairman. The conclusions of the report parallel the allegations of Col. Millard Peck, namely that the U.S. government has manipulated the POW/MIA issue to avoid an effective search for missing military personnel. It states that the U.S. government policy of dealing with live-sighting reports is flawed, thereby ignoring reasonable evidence which could lead to finding missing personnel. It cites seven specific DIA procedures for discrediting reports to avoid a good-faith effort to find POW/MIA's. It depicts a reproduction of a censored CIA document from 1988 that summarizes three live-sighting reports of U.S. POW/MIA's in North Korea.

The minority staff report states that it was a matter of policy to issue falsified statements of KIA instead of MIA for U.S. personnel captured during covert operations. The report goes on to say, among other things, that U.S. authorities originally asked North Vietnam for the return of 5,000 U.S. military personnel, but settled for only 591; and although the PATHET LAO stated that they were holding U.S. military personnel in March 1973—estimated at 100—no prisoners of the PATHET LAO were ever returned or accounted for.

Mr. Chairman, almost immediately after our return from Vietnam in July, a photograph of three individuals reported to be American POW's surfacing in the news media heightened The American Legion's concern about the manner in which the POW/MIA issue is being handled by the U.S. government. The photo was said to be in the hands of government analysts for several months. This witness was appalled at the reports because in all of the briefings and discussions we had prior to leaving for Vietnam, with those who are supposed to be knowledgeable and responsible on this issue, there was no mention whatever that this photo even existed, much less that it was being analyzed.

Subsequently, a number of additional photographs were publicized in the media. The American Legion was contacted by a representative of a group of individuals on July 23, who requested a meeting for the purpose of discussing proof of the existence of a live American POW being held in Laos. A meeting was scheduled and held on July 24. At that time a large number of photographs taken over a long period of time and other information relating to an individual identified as Donald Gene

Carr, U.S. Army Special Forces, who was lost while flying in a reconnaissance aircraft over Laos in 1971 were reviewed and discussed. Included among those at the meeting were Mr. Carr's brother. The next day we received a faxed copy of a tentative report by Dr. Michael Charney, a noted emeritus professor of Anthropology who had analyzed a photograph taken in 1961 at Donald Carr's wedding and another allegedly taken in 1990 in Laos. After explaining the methodology he used to analyze the photos, Dr. Charney stated in the report that there was sufficient evidence that the two photos are of the same person, Donald Gene Carr. A final report was supposedly completed by Dr. Charney, however we have been unable to secure a copy to date. After reviewing the photographs and other information, we feel that it is sufficient to resolve reasonable doubt as to whether or not Donald Carr is alive.

In early August we were contacted by those who were in possession of the Carr photos for the Legion's opinion as to whether or not the information should be turned over to the Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis and investigation. We advised that the only way a response could be elicited from the government would be to submit the photos to DIA. On or about August 12, the information was turned over to the DIA. We understand that the Carr photographs have been analyzed by the Sandia National Laboratory and an inconclusive although somewhat favorable report issued.

The Government has admitted that the photograph could be Donald Carr. However, so far as The American Legion is concerned, the Government has moved neither far enough nor fast enough in an attempt to do anything positive about the case.

Unfortunately, there has been a veiled attempt to lump most of the photographs together and label them as a hoax, rather than addressing them individually. Each has its own set of circumstances and information relating thereto. Therefore, each must be analyzed and investigated on its own merits. To add to this problem, copies of photos from a Soviet magazine have been thrown into the mix by an individual or individuals unknown to us. Obviously this provides ammunition to those who are attempting to discredit all of the photographs.

Mr. Chairman, the most frustrating and incomprehensible aspect of the entire POW/MIA issue is the pattern which has evolved surrounding the handling of intelligence data relating to live prisoners of war, both historically and presently.

Over the past several years an increasing number of stories have surfaced regarding the abundance of available information relating to American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. Taken separately, one who is skeptical might pass such reports off as sensationalism or tripe. However, in reviewing the available body of information relating to this issue, the belief that there are POW's being held in Indochina cannot and must not be summarily dismissed.

The most recent article relating to the handling of intelligence during and after the Vietnam war, Soviet involvement in the interrogation and appropriation of American POW's, and U.S. Government suppression of information relating to both is "On the Trail of the MIA's", which appeared in the October 27, 1991 edition of the *Los Angeles Times Magazine*.

Previously published books such as *The Bamboo Cage*, *Kiss The Boys Good-by*, *BOHICA*, and *After the Heroes' Welcome* also each contain references of varying degrees to the discrediting of live-sighting information sources, locations and movement of prisoners that are not acknowledged by U.S. officials, reports of Americans being held captive after 1973 on which no apparent action was taken by U.S. officials, etc. etc.

In addition, we have seen copies of reports, memoranda, and other correspondence issued by U.S. intelligence agencies which square with the charges set forth in these publications. Add to all of this the previously mentioned report by the minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled *An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA's*, as well as the assertions leveled by Colonel Millard Peck, and you come up with rather compelling evidence that "all is not right with the world."

However, those individuals who come forth as activists in the POW/MIA issue are immediately tarred with labels such as "Rambo's", "loose cannons", "mavericks", or some other such negative cognomen, and attempts are made by the Defense Intelligence Agency and others to discredit them. Granted, some activists have employed methods of operation which may appear to be questionable. And maybe—just maybe—there are those involved in the POW/MIA issue who's motivations may be suspect.

But by and large, it seems apparent that the goals and objectives of these individuals are to obtain the release of American POW's, the fullest possible accounting of those missing in action, and the return of the remains of those who were killed in action or died in captivity.

The perception is very clear that the U.S. Government is *not* doing all that it could or should be doing to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

Available information as recent as July, 1991 showed that out of 1,483 live-sighting reports, 103 have been placed on the active list—or accepted—by DIA. The 103 had gone through the entire process established by DIA for sorting out what it considers to be valid vs invalid reports. Of course all live-sighting information is classified; thus unavailable for interested parties to review.

It is also impossible to determine what—if any—action is being taken to investigate live-sighting reports. In July we were advised that the investigation of live-sighting cases in Vietnam had not begun, but were to commence in the near future.

The American Legion trusts that through the Committee's hearings and investigations, much more definitive information will become available about what is or is not being done to follow-up on live-sighting reports. The perception on the street is that more is being done in the way of damage control than actual analysis and investigation of live prisoners of war.

Mr. Chairman, another area of concern to The American Legion is the issue of weak identification procedures and less than scientific methods employed by the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), which is the organization charged with identification of remains of MIA's from Southeast Asia. A considerable amount of attention has been focused on CILHI since the mid-1980s, when reports of misidentification, burial of empty caskets, commingled remains, and positive identifications based on insufficient skeletal remains resulted in Congressional hearings and, in some cases, lawsuits against the government. Rather than getting into a detailed discussion regarding these issues in this statement, we have submitted our files on CILHI to the Committee for its review; and we trust that a full examination of the charges that have been made through the years will be carried out as part of the overall POW/MIA investigation. The families of those who are missing deserve no less.

The final subject we shall illustrate in this statement is the rapidity with which the process to normalize relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam appears to be moving.

In an October 23 letter to President Bush, National Commander Dominic D. DiFrancesco wrote that The American Legion was appalled but not entirely surprised at hearing Secretary of State James Baker's announcement of that morning in Paris that the United States is ready to open talks with Vietnam on the subject of normalizing relations. The letter went on to say, in part, that we are familiar with the "Roadmap" that was presented to Hanoi earlier this year, and The American Legion does not believe for one moment that the terms of the proposal relating to Vietnam's cooperation on the release of prisoners of war and resolution of those former servicemen listed as missing in action have anywhere near been met. National Commander DiFrancesco stated that we are hard pressed to understand why there is such a great interest in the normalization of relations . . . unless, of course, diplomatic ties with Vietnam are attractive because of oil.

Some experts expect Vietnam to emerge as a middle-ranking oil producer in the next ten to fifteen years. Once Washington recognizes Vietnam, all leverage for resolving the POW/MIA issue will be lost. The American Legion cannot stand by and watch our country abandon its POW's for oil or any other commodity.

It was most interesting to note that during a State Department briefing about Southeast Asia on October 31, Assistant Secretary Richard Solomon and Deputy Assistant Secretary Ken Quinn emphasized how active American oil companies have been in urging rapid normalization. This is the first instance in which we have heard this discussed publicly, but were not surprised to learn that our intuition proved to be correct.

Mr. Solomon indicated the United States could possibly move to Phase II of the "Roadmap" by the end of this year, among other things, permitting oil companies to commence contract talks with Hanoi, but not to sign contracts.

Mr. Chairman, should Big Oil be successful in convincing the U.S. Government to lift the sanctions and restore diplomatic relations, of what use would American POW's be to the Vietnamese? The answer is none. Their value so far as bartering is concerned would be nil. The easiest and cleanest thing the Vietnamese could do would be to eliminate them in order to save being caught in a lie.

National Commander DiFrancesco ended his letter to President Bush by stating that "the Legion does not oppose the establishment of a U.S. presence in Vietnam or the provision of some humanitarian assistance if those actions will help the POW/MIA issue. However, normalization should occur only after all POW's and MIA's have been accounted for. To do anything less than that would be a betrayal to their families and to all Americans who answered their nation's call to fight for

South Vietnam's freedom during the war. It would also send a strong signal that the U.S. Government has no interest in resolving this issue."

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our statement. Attached herewith is a copy of Resolution No. 291 adopted by the Delegates to The American Legion's 1991 National Convention, entitled "The American Legion Policy on Activities Relating to Southeast Asia POW's and MIA's."

RESOLUTION No. 291

SUBJECT: The American Legion Policy on Activities Relating to Southeast Asia POW's and MIA's

COMMITTEE: Foreign Relations

WHEREAS, There are 2,273 American servicemen and civilians who have yet to be accounted for in Southeast Asia subsequent to the end of the Vietnam War; and

WHEREAS, The POW/MIA issue has been of paramount concern to The American Legion as evidenced by the strong mandates adopted by its policy making bodies and active efforts to keep the spotlight on the importance of securing a full accounting of all POW's and MIA's carried out by Legionnaires across the nation during the past twenty-plus years; and

WHEREAS, Photographs and other evidence have been shared with The American Legion by families and interested individuals which lead us to believe that live prisoners are being held in Southeast Asia; and

WHEREAS, The American Legion has called for increased efforts by the U.S. Government to ensure that this issue is treated as a principal national priority, and for the Government to accelerate efforts in every honorable way to obtain the immediate release of Americans still held prisoner, the fullest possible accounting of those missing in action, and the repatriation of the remains of those who were killed in action or died in captivity; and

WHEREAS, The American Legion has historically supported Government-to-Government negotiations as the most reasonable way in which to resolve this humanitarian issue; and

WHEREAS, The Executive Branch claims it considers the resolution of the POW/MIA issue a matter of highest national priority; and

WHEREAS, It has become apparent to The American Legion that there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of some Government officials who are responsible for obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW's and MIA's; and

WHEREAS, The Department of Defense has classified the majority of information available on live-sightings, status reports, and other data relating to those who are still missing, creating a veil of secrecy surrounding its findings in POW and MIA cases which is both unnecessary and self defeating; and

WHEREAS, There are increasing numbers of allegations from Members of Congress, knowledgeable government officials, families of POW's and MIA's and others exposing a perceived effort within the Defense Intelligence Agency to discredit sources of information relating to the POW's and MIA's, to fail to follow-up on relevant reports, and to misrepresent information on the status of certain of these individuals; and

WHEREAS, The Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii have received criticism regarding the propriety of interviewing refugees and other possible sources of information, and the methods employed in identifying remains, respectively; and

WHEREAS, The magnitude of these assertions combined with the paucity of progress that has been made in the repatriation of POW's and the remains of those who paid the supreme sacrifice led The American Legion to send an official to Vietnam to explore the feasibility of establishing an independent office to supplement and keep the spotlight on the U.S. Government's POW/MIA office in Hanoi, and

WHEREAS, The American Legion believes unequivocally that the POW/MIA issue must be handled with more openness and sincerity, and that there is a need for increased accountability in the manner in which information relating to each case is documented, analyzed and pursued by the U.S. Government; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, By The American Legion in National Convention assembled in Phoenix, Arizona, September 3, 4, 5, 1991, that The American Legion assist the families of POW's and MIA's in ensuring that any evidence, reports, photographs, or other information relating to their loved ones is given effective, expeditious and sincere consideration by the Department of Defense; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The American Legion urge the President of the United States to charge the Secretary of Defense with the primary responsibility of interpreting policy and exercising overall direction and control of POW/MIA activities through the service secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, thereby eliminating involvement by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The American Legion urge the Secretary of Defense to establish an office for the Recovery of Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, which should report directly to the Secretary and receive support as requested from other Department of Defense elements; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The American Legion support legislation that would allow the release of information relating to live-sightings and other data pertaining to POW's and MIA's deemed not to compromise the national security of the United States; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The National Commander of The American Legion appoint a special POW/MIA committee for the purposes of thoroughly reviewing all available information relating to that issue, and investigating all possible avenues of obtaining a full accounting for those who are held prisoner of war are missing; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The American Legion monitor the operation of the U.S. Government office in Hanoi for a reasonable period of time, with a view toward supporting the establishment of an independent POW/MIA office if considered necessary; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That The American Legion urge the President to study the feasibility of transferring the responsibility of identifying remains from Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, to the Smithsonian Institute; and, be it further

RESOLVED, That if it is deemed appropriate, American Legion officials be authorized to travel to Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, for the purpose of gathering information relative to the ongoing POW/MIA investigations and the manner in which they are being conducted; and, be it finally

RESOLVED, That The American Legion, while continuing to oppose full diplomatic recognition of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the POW's and MIA's are accounted for, also maintain a degree of flexibility with respect to the possible establishment of a U.S. presence in Vietnam and the provision of certain humanitarian assistance if such actions could be helpful in finally resolving this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sommer.
Mr. Burch.

STATEMENT OF J. THOMAS BURCH, JR., CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS COALITION

Mr. BURCH. Mr. Chairman, I'm Tom Burch. I'm the chairman of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. I served as a U.S. Army Major, 8½ years of active duty. I served in Vietnam between May of 1967 through December 1968, with the 5th Special Forces Group Airborne.

Mr. Chairman, in order to save the maximum time of the Committee, we'd ask that the full remarks of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition be admitted to the record, together with a preliminary report we gave to the Committee, Preliminary Ideas on Select Committee Agenda, if that could be admitted to the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered.

Mr. BURCH. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for this third opportunity to testify before a Committee of the U.S. Senate on the POW/

MIA issue. We are now a federation of 58 Vietnam veteran and veterans issue or groups, and we include such groups as BRAVO, Vietnow, Veterans of the Vietnam War, National Alliance of Families, and Homecoming II, and Operation Rescue, some of which are going to be testifying before these proceedings are complete.

We submit that the issue of most concern to the greatest number of grassroots Vietnam veterans is the POW/MIA issue. We submit that the centerpiece of the U.S. effort at resolution of this issue must be the recovery of alive American prisoners. Unfortunately, this objective is thwarted by a process or a policy that all prisoners are dead, notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary.

The first step toward resolution is intelligence collection, yet nowhere is the effort more deficient. On October 25, 1985, then National Security Advisor, Robert McFarland, told a forum, what you need to do is have better human intelligence in Vietnam. Now, we don't and it takes a long time to get it, but I won't pretend to you that we've done enough to even start.

Dave Simons, a retired special operations professional spent several months in Thailand on behalf of the Coalition in late 1985, at his own expense, for the purpose of assessing our tactical intelligence capabilities as pertaining to live POW's. His conclusion was that there was not such capability. For example, there was no built-in—there is a built-in delay in the initial intelligence collection from the refugees. There is no ongoing offer to officers or civil authorities of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, on an individual basis to induce them on their own to defect and bring a live American POW with them.

And last, we have paid spies and informers for over 200 years. Why stop now? There is nothing wrong with paying for information or service or risk. You don't buy a good spy cheap.

In short, the effort to collect intelligence has been passive. Rather than retain ground agents to penetrate the remote corners of Southeast Asia, the administrators of the highest national priority have preferred to wait for refugees to report sighting information. Even then, the follow-up has often been slow.

Once intelligence is collected, it must be analyzed. An immediate but generally overlooked problem is that the usable proof test for the existence of live POW's, the satisfaction of which standard would trigger decisive action by the U.S. Government, is unlikely to be satisfied in any event. The criteria are so rigid that if hypothetically an American prisoner were to escape and report the continued detention of fellow prisoners, that report would not satisfy the criteria.

Ourselves, we find it remarkable commentary on the quality of effort that the POW/MIA establishment must find it continually necessary to have itself investigated in this regard, regardless of how many times it attempts to exonerate itself. But, indeed, those are the reports and related materials which are available, paint a picture of substantial shortcoming in the effort.

Having failed to aggressively collect intelligence and having failed to properly analyze what it has collected, the Government concludes officially that "the information available to us precludes ruling out the possibility that Americans are still being detained

against their will." And the Government proceeds on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive.

In practice, the Government has done everything possible to negate that assumption. It has been repeatedly stated in veterans' forums and elsewhere, that the United States has no credible evidence that anyone is held in captivity now or even, in some accounts, at any time since withdrawal of our forces in 1973. The media has been whispered off the track with anonymous comments that there are no live POW's.

Given this attitude and the timing of several of the quoted leaks to coincide with critical negotiating sessions with the Vietnamese, it is difficult to understand how the Government can effectively negotiate for the return of live prisoners, when it lacks the confidence of its own negotiating position. Basically, they're telling the Vietnamese they want information about live Americans at the same time they're publicly saying that they're all dead.

The Government publicists' preoccupation with remains is worrisome to the vast majority of us Vietnam veterans. But even if one assumes that there are only dead Americans, the negotiation effort has historically been inept. One would think that the negotiators would stop by presenting all discrepancy cases to the Vietnamese. The United States has never presented a full list of discrepancy cases to the Vietnamese.

In 1972, U.S. intelligence identified at least 180 unreturned men whose fate was the subject of confirmed enemy knowledge. Mr. Chairman, none of—some of those names have been presented to the Vietnamese, but never the whole 180, about half of them. The POW/MIA Interagency-Group is said to be in charge of coordinating a policy on the highest national priority. What is remarkable about this group is the list of absentees. Neither the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the Drug Enforcement Agency have membership on that committee.

That brings us to a salient question. How much raw information is in the possession of agencies other than the Defense Intelligence Agency or JCRC? For example, one, we have previously charged before the Senate Rules Committee that in June 1991 massive destruction of POW-related materials took place in the State Department. We have met with the Vice Chairman and Staff Director concerning this matter on the committee, and we hope that proper follow-up will ensue.

Two, as we indicated in our 1986 testimony before the Senate Veterans Committee, the FBI has done photo resolution of alleged POW's. What do its records show, and if the records were moved, where are they now?

Last, given the allegations of former National Security Agency intelligence experts, what do NSA records show or the Armed Services Security Agency's?

We of the Vietnam Veterans Coalition are prepared to work cooperatively with the Committee. While we are pleased with the selection of the Senators serving on the Select Committee and the top committee leadership staff, we have a concern that the investigative approach appears to be directed to making an analysis of Defense Intelligence records, rather than being able to deal directly with the totality of the issue.

A comprehensive investigation can only be assured—only—by augmenting the current staff with a team of professionals, such as FBI- and Secret Service-trained investigators to root out all the facts.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MEMORANDUM

To: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
From: J. Thomas Burch, Jr., Chairman, National Vietnam Veterans Coalition
Re: Preliminary Ideas on Select Committee Agenda
Date: September 19, 1991

I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

It will be necessary for the Select Committee, which has a specific, limited life-span (until December 1992) to 1) establish immediately a plan of action and specific goals; and 2) stake out its jurisdiction.

The primary goal of the Committee should be to obtain a final accounting for the 2,000+ missing from the Vietnam war. This is the proposed plan of action of the Vietnam veterans movement which we request the Select Committee to adopt.

II. OVERVIEW

There are two broad spheres of concern in this issue. One is what the Indochinese (and by extension the Soviets and Chinese) know about the unaccounted for. The other is what we know about them, and who knows, and who has that information. These two spheres obviously interact, and resolution of this question will require exploring both.

The Select Committee should be able to make recommendations for a base-line policy determined by what it discovers and reports over its lifespan. Such a policy should protect future American servicemen from ever being pawns in protracted international endgames.

III. PRIORITY

The first priority should be given to review the most compelling evidence that Americans are still being held alive in captivity.

Furthermore, possibilities exist that former American POW's are alive and are being held in Soviet Gulags from World War II; in Korea, China and the Soviet Union from the Korean War, as well as the possibility that there should be more accountability of the missing from Operation Desert Shield.

IV. AREAS OF ANALYSIS

A final, nonpartisan, coordinated effort involving the Hill and veterans' groups is needed to satisfy all parties that the Government has, this time, done its utmost to put this matter to rest.

This Select Committee must not repeat the oversights and failures of past efforts to assess the issue of POW/MIA's. It is important to note that no previous committee has produced a comprehensive study of all facets of the issue. The Whitmire Report (1974), the Montgomery Report (1976), and Pentagon Reports have all failed to include objective forensic analyses of evidence. Past investigations overlooked or failed to coordinate evidence and intelligence reports. Scientific analysis of evidence has been inadequate.

Previous errors in judgment cannot be reiterated. In the past, there was no cross-referencing of evidence or intelligence coordination. There have been no formalized investigations and no independent scientific analysis. Further, there has been no analysis of why the various governments would keep POW's as hostages. Below are guiding questions that ought to be pursued:

1) Does the U.S. Government have valid information concerning live POW's?

a) Review all live-sighting and second-hand (hearsay) intelligence reports of U.S. POW's held in Southeast Asia, and the USG's action and analysis on each;

b) Review all satellite imagery of prison re-education facilities taken since February 1, 1973, all hand-held photography, all SIGINT, ELINT, or other intelligence information relating to the presence of Americans/caucasians in captivity in Southeast Asia; and,

c) Review finished intelligence estimates of the numbers of U.S. POW's still held in Southeast Asia after April 1973; including the Tighe and the Gaines report.

2) If the U.S. Government has valid information concerning live POW's, then has the U.S. Government failed to act on such information?

a) Review the *documentation* of each of the seven internal DOD "investigations" that have been conducted by DOD; and

b) Review the historical and *documentary* evidence that U.S. Government knowingly left U.S. servicemen in captivity at the conclusion of World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Second Indochina War. Specifically, the lists of the names of these individuals believed to be still in captivity after the conclusions of these wars need to be reviewed. These lists exist in the records of the U.S. Government.

3) Has the U.S. Government acted improperly to intimidate, coerce, or discredit sources which have valid information concerning live POW's, or mislead family members or Members of Congress?

a) Review the substance of Colonel Peck's allegations raised in his memorandum of resignation. According to Colonel Peck, while he was the Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War Missing in Action (POW/MIA), he was "not really in charge" of his own office and that "this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and give illusion of progress through hyperactivity;"

b) There should be an evaluation as to whether such records of Missing Men have been tampered with.

c) Review the role of executive branch personnel who have had responsibility for this issue, and appropriately evaluate their actions.

The Select Committee needs to identify and analyze the flow of data from the field to the analyst and the instructions from management to field personnel. There needs to be an assessment of the interaction among a) personnel records, b) combat reports, c) outside witness reports (first-hand sightings, or other credible information), and the evaluations to which these factors led, whether by the Department of Defense or, as in the case of some detainees in China and the Soviet Union, the Department of State.

V. TECHNICAL SUPPORT STAFF FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MIA/POW AFFAIRS

Since American citizens and Vietnam veterans and their families have lost confidence in the objectivity and veracity of DOD investigations of the POW/MIA issue, the current investigation cannot be conducted by military investigators. By assembling a team of nonmilitary scientists and forensic experts, the Senate Special Committee can ensure the credibility that past investigations have lacked. We have in the Federal Government and local law enforcement highly qualified experts whose services and knowledge can prove invaluable to this Committee.

A staff must be established and assembled utilizing the experts with investigative and scientific skills rather than political plum filling. Amateurs, volunteers, and retirees with good intentions must step aside. Professionals who possess the skills to perform the in depth scientific research and investigations are required from this point forward. The success of the Senators on the Committee to once and for all resolve this issue conclusively will have to be based on the very best staff work.

VI. SUGGESTED STAFF STRUCTURE

A. Staff Coordinator

Before any documents are gathered, before any investigations begin there must be someone with hands-on experience and knowledge who is able to moderate the objective. This position requires someone who can be responsible for determining the suitability of his counterparts. This capacity will also require someone familiar with the methodology and functions of governmental bureaucracy, i.e., where to go and who to see and the skill to not be shelled by anyone. This position of staff coordinator dictates the individual have the ability to not only coordinate a staff and work with them, but also have the expertise to prioritize and tabulate the cases (prompt resolution taking priority) and have the contacts to draw on Government resources to supplement committee staff effect.

The staff coordinator and his deputies would appoint experts or arrange to have them temporarily reassigned or obtained on detail from numerous Federal agencies,

in the following areas: imaging science, photography and videography; document verification and handwriting analysis; polygraph, and audio tape enhancement; latent fingerprints. Linguists (Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian); an historian and research assistant and special investigators are needed. Additional information with regard to the actual contributions such experts could make will be provided upon request.

In summary the staff coordinator must:

- A. Be cognizant of disciplines and functions of government bureaucracy.
- B. Coordinate the staff specialist/experts.
- C. Prioritize and tabulate the cases for prompt resolution taking priority.

B. Investigators

The National Vietnam Veterans Coalition knows of competent investigators who would be within their own environment working on this investigation and can be hired or detailed through the FBI, DIA, CIA and local police.

C. Linguists

We cannot justify or have faith in interrogation that is conveyed through a third-party when linguists are at hand. We need to use top grade translators. We must present ourselves as we wish to be acknowledged: disciplined and organized.

D. Scientific Researchers

This is not time for analysis by novices. We have within our realm scientists in the field of: polygraph, handwriting, imaging science, voice print and audio tape enhancement. Most scientists and investigators can be found as existing government employees, and detailed to the Select Committee at no cost. Everything the Pentagon, State Department, Attorney General's office, FBI, DIA and CIA have in their possession relating to MIA/POW's should be turned over to the Technical Staff Coordinator. All evidence must be scrutinized by this technical staff. No finding should be made public until all expert analysis is complete.

With regard to Americans missing from earlier periods—World War II and after, Korea, and other episodes—we need to establish systematic inquiries with the help of the State Department and private organizations in the U.S. and abroad to identify Americans in Soviet and Chinese incarceration. At the same time, we need to require the Departments of State and Defense to open the files and provide names of Americans about whom they have been asked. Traditionally, these departments have absolutely stonewalled inquiries about this.

VII. SENATE HEARINGS

Open hearings should be conducted to the maximum extent feasible. Maximum effort should be given to witnesses who have first hand knowledge of live American POW's (such as Robert Garwood) and are intimately familiar with supposed deficiencies in the current analysis system (e.g. Col. William Peck and LTG Eugene Tighe).

VIII. FINAL REPORT

There is almost universal dissatisfaction at present with the handling of the POW/MIA issue. If the Select Committee cannot identify problems and stumbling blocks or propose solutions that might lead to the fullest possible accounting, S82 will have been in vain. Consistent with the growing sentiment of the final need for openness, the final report of the Select Committee should be unclassified.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burch follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. THOMAS BURCH, JR.

Mr. Chairman, we thank you for this third opportunity to testify before a committee on the U.S. Senate on the POW/MIA.

We are now a federation of fifty-eight (58) Vietnam veterans and veterans issue groups, more than a few of whose representatives will be testifying during these hearings. For it is this issue which has proved to be the one of paramount concern to the greatest number of grassroots Vietnam veterans.

We submit that the centerpiece of the U.S. effort at resolution of this issue must be the recovery of live American prisoners. Unfortunately, this objective is thwarted by a process, or a policy that all prisoners are dead, notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary.

The first step toward resolution is intelligence collection. Yet nowhere is the overall effort more deficient. On October 25, 1985, then national security advisor Robert McFarlane told a forum: "What you need to do is have better human intelligence in Vietnam. Now we don't. And it takes a long time to get it, but I wouldn't pretend to you that we've done enough to even start."

Dave Simons, a retired special operations professional, spent several months in Thailand in late 1985, at his own expense, for the purpose of assessing our tactical intelligence capabilities, as pertaining to live POW's. His conclusion was that there was no such capability, e.g.

—"There is a build-in delay in the initial intelligence collection from the refugees."

—"There is no ongoing offer to officers or civil authorities of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia on an individual basis, to induce them on their own to defect and bring a live American POW with them."

—"We have paid spies and informers for over 200 years. Why stop now? There is nothing wrong with paying for information or service or risk. You don't buy a good spy cheap."

In short, the effort to collect intelligence has been passive. Rather than retain ground agents to penetrate the remote corners of Southeast Asia, the administrators of the "highest national priority" have preferred to wait for refugees to report sighting information. Even then, the follow-up has often been slow.

In 1986, the Pentagon angrily defended the admission that the Bangkok office of the Joint Center for Resolution of Casualties only had three people to check out possible live-sighting reports from hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees in eight countries: there was no need for more personnel to screen a largely static pool.¹

Yet, Jim Barker, a former refugee worker in the Philippines, shortly thereafter described to the media² his experiences dealing with refugee reports, some of which were reported eyewitness sightings. Believing that the witnesses had no motivation to lie, he concluded that the reports added up to as many 100 Americans still alive, but "I don't see evidence that our government is taking much action." In May, 1987, we caught up with Mr. Barker and asked one simple question: how many reports would it take before a debriefer would be sent out to the refugee camp? His answer: it could take up to a dozen live-sighting reports to trigger interest.

Perhaps to deflect criticisms of this nature, the "Stony Beach" collection program was established in 1987. Where three individuals were allegedly more than adequate to address the matter only one year earlier, an ensemble more than ten times that size has been put into place in Thailand. Yet, this new program did not alter the fact that the collection effort is still largely passive. Where is the ground effort inside Indochina proper? When one reviews the recent statements by Col. Millard Peck, one sees that nothing has still been done in this direction.

The disinterest in the collection effort is tellingly demonstrated by the recent decision to add 100 slots to the POW/MIA effort. Only five of these slots are allocated to even the Stony Beach mission. The remainder are destined for the Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Central Identification Laboratory and other rear-echelon functions. Once intelligence is collected, it must be analyzed. An immediate, but generally overlooked, problem is that the "usable proof" test for the existence of live POW's, the satisfaction of which standard would trigger "decisive action" by the U.S. is unlikely to be satisfied, in any event. The criteria are so rigid that if, hypothetically, an American prisoner were to escape and report the continued detention of fellow prisoners, that report would not satisfy the criteria. Beyond that, the shortcomings in the analytical effort are too well known to bear reiterating in depth—from Gen. Eugene Tighe's "mindset to debunk" interview, through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff Interim Report, through Col. Peck's resignation letter. Against the weight of these, and other criticisms, it is trumpeted by supporters of the status quo that seven or eight investigations of DIA have found no coverup, which is somehow supposed to prove that DIA is working well.

Ourselves, we find it a remarkable commentary on the quality of effort that the POW/MIA establishment must find it continually necessary to have itself investigated in this regard, regardless of how many times it exonerates itself. And indeed, those of the reports and related materials which are available paint a picture of substantial shortcoming in the effort.

¹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. "Critique of ABC 20/20 May 29, 1986 Program, 'MIA's: The Story That Will Not Die'", (undated), p. 3.

² E.g., Jacksonville (NC) Daily News, August 30, 1986.

Thus, the House Task Force on American Prisoner and Missing in Southeast Asia, having investigated some of the earliest charges in 1984, "discovered that, in some instances, especially in the past, government agencies exhibited a less than perfect track record following through on the POW/MIA issue" and found significant manning shortages, especially in the lack of native Vietnamese and Laotian speakers, to conduct POW/MIA intelligence evaluation.³

When Gen. Leonard H. Perroots assumed command of the Defense Intelligence Agency, he commissioned Col. Kim Gaines to conduct an investigation of the Special Office. Yet, Gaines found that the office was afflicted with a "mindset to debunk" POW/MIA reports.⁴ It is also rumored that the findings led to a personnel shake-up.⁵

The most famous of all the reports, although classified, is the Tighe Report.⁶ The POW/MIA establishment jettisoned its formulation that there was a "strong possibility" that there were POW's still alive (a formulation that was verbally equated in the presence of several of our officers by one of Gen. Tighe's panel members to a definitive statement of the continued existence of live POW's). Moreover, the recommendations for improvement of the DIA Special Office were quite lengthy.⁷

Finally, the Pentagon has issued a press release refuting Col. Millard Peck's recent charges upon his resignation from the Special Office,⁸ wherein we learn, after five paragraphs of firm insistence that there is "no foundation" to any of his charges, that this "thoughtful officer," in fact, has "made some helpful suggestions," as a result of which "Members of the POW/MIA Interagency Group should use a more formal process to request support from the office. And a procedure will be established to decide the priority of competing requests for POW/MIA intelligence information." And: "Where Col. Peck's allegations would strengthen the process, we have initiated appropriate changes."

Having failed to aggressively collect intelligence and having failed to properly analyze what it has collected, the government next concludes officially that "the information available to us precludes ruling out (the) possibility" that "Americans are still being detained against their will" and that the government proceeds on "the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive." In practice, the government has done everything possible to negate that assumption. It has been re-

³ Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, "Prisoners of War/Missing in Action in Southeast Asia: Recent Developments and Future Prospects," August 8, 1984, 38-352 O, pp. 58-61 ("Task Force Reports Findings on Hendon's Allegations").

⁴ Hearing and Markup Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, The Tighe Report on American POW's and MIA's, October 15, 1986, 67-473, p. 20 (answer by Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.). Aware of the report, the Coalition advised the staff of then Rep. Robert Smith to seek this report at the same time he was seeking certain other internal reports from the Defense Intelligence Agency. We were informed that when the request was made, DIA denied there was any such report; when a separate public citation to the existence of the report was cited to DIA, it was allowed that, yes, there was a report, but that it wasn't in writing. We now understand that a copy of the written report is in an adjoining office in the Senate office complex. For other discussion of the shortcomings revealed by the Gaines report, see the discussion of the Tighe Report, infra.

⁵ The Pentagon denied these rumors, stating, in part, that an Analysis Branch Chief who was relieved was thereby freed up "to focus more attention on firsthand live-sighting reports and the collection, analysis and evaluation of available and incoming data." Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Next of Kin Newsletter, May 28, 1986, p. 7. The individual in question is now one of the first two officials to be posted to Hanoi.

⁶ Cf. New York Times, September 30, 1986, "P.O.W.'s Alive in Vietnam, Report Concludes;" Hearing et al., "The Tighe Report on American POW's and MIA's," supra note 12.

⁷ On September 30, 1986, Gen. Perroots held a press conference at the Pentagon for foreign correspondents concerning the Tighe Report. On the second page of the official transcript of that press conference, he described "recommendations for improvements" as including "additional analytical and administrative personnel that were needed; automation of all files: increased physical work space; better integration of agency intelligence efforts; reassignment of peripheral workload, expansion of the data base, tasking of generic research projects, reorientation of the analytical approach; and better follow through on priority requests in the program/budget review process."

He added that most of these recommendations paralleled the findings of his "internal review process," apparently referring to the Gaines Report.

⁸ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release, June 19, 1991, "DOD Finds No Evidence of Peck Allegations."

⁹ See, e.g., Department of Defense, *POW/MIA Fact Book*, July, 1985, p. 14; *ibid.*, July, 1991, p. 8.

peatedly stated, in veterans forums and elsewhere,¹⁰ that the United States has no "credible evidence" that anyone is being held in captivity now, or even (in some accounts) at any time since the withdrawal of our forces in 1973.

The media has been repeatedly whispered off the track with anonymous comments that there are no live POW's.¹¹ Given this attitude and the timing of several of the quoted leaks to coincide with major negotiating sessions with the Vietnamese, it is difficult to understand how the government can effectively negotiate for the return of live prisoners—it lacks the confidence of its own negotiating position.

The government publicists' preoccupation with remains is wearisome to the vast majority of us Vietnam veterans. But even if one assumes that there are only dead Americans, the negotiating effort has historically been inept. One would think that the negotiators would start by presenting all "discrepancy cases" to the Vietnamese. Yet, the only apparent efforts to do so were Henry Kissinger's 1973 presentation of 76 cases to the Vietnamese¹² and General John Vessey's submission, with more limited authority as a negotiator, of 70 such cases in 1987.¹³ (We have been told verbally by State Department officials that it is General Vessey who has placed the emphasis on discrepancy cases. If that is the case, one must truly wonder what his predecessors thought they were doing.) Among the implications of these statistics is that the United States has never presented a full list of discrepancy cases to the Vietnamese: in 1972, U.S. intelligence identified at least 180 unreturned men (as of 1973) whose fate was the subject of "confirmed enemy knowledge."¹⁴

The POW/MIA Interagency Group is said to be in charge of coordinating policy on "the highest national priority." What is remarkable about this Group is the list of absentees: neither the CIA nor the National Security Agency is represented (nor, for that matter, the Drug Enforcement Agency).

¹⁰ See, e.g., the comments by Col. Joseph A. Schlatter, then chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, on the video "Seeking Answers," produced by the National League of Families, ca. December 1989 ("We do not have in the intelligence community any credible or convincing evidence that Americans are still alive today."); Schlatter wrote a letter to "Joyce Cook," a leading POW/MIA activist using a pseudonym, on March 30, 1988, in which he stated: "Further, there is no proof that living American prisoners remain in captivity."

¹¹ As a limited sample of such quotes, see: New York Times, September 4, 1985, p. A8, on the first Childress mission to Hanoi ("Despite movies that portray Americans being held in Vietnam, State Department officials said there is no evidence to indicate any are alive."); New York Times, January 8, 1986, p. A4, reporting from Hanoi on the Armitage mission ("While the United States has largely agreed that there is almost no likelihood that any missing Americans are still alive, . . ."; Newsweek, Jan. 20, 1986, reporting on the aftermath of the Armitage mission ("Few officials in Washington believe any MIA's are still alive."); New York Times, August 3, 1987, p. 1A3, on the occasion of the first Vessey mission to Hanoi ("Few United States officials—and no Hanoi-based European diplomats—believe that any Americans are being held captive in Vietnam."); Time, April 30, 1990, "Vietnam, 15 Years Later," p. 20 ("Although no U.S. official will say so publicly, the widespread conviction is that there are no more live Americans").

¹² Stars and Stripes, October 12, 1987, p. 1 (two Congressmen publicly released the list; see also Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives, Access to Classified Live-Sighting Information Concerning POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia—Is New Legislation Needed?, April 20, 1988, 96-815 (hereinafter "Hearing re Access"), p. 254 et seq. Rather astonishingly, the Defense Intelligence Agency, requested by the committee to respond to the allegations contained therein, wrote: The notion of a so-called "Kissinger list" is incorrectly generated from Henry Kissinger's attempts to persuade the Vietnamese to be forthcoming in supplying information on the missing. At that time, he passed some negotiation narratives (the number is unknown but believed to be less than 100) to the communists . . . (There was no record made of what cases were provided.) Hearing re Access, p. 277. This in the face of both quoted testimony from Kissinger's Secretary of State confirmation hearings ("some 80") and the release and publication of the list of 76 cases in question! If DIA is unable to access confirmation hearings for a Secretary of State or even a press conference by two Congressmen, reported in the media, small wonder that it cannot locate MIA's!

¹³ The Coalition has obtained a copy of the Vessey list. Suffice it to say, there is considerable overlap between the two lists. According to Gen. Vessey's testimony in the House on July 17, another 49 such cases have since been presented.

¹⁴ This was the so-called classification of "Category One" MIA's, in a range of five categories, from "confirmed knowledge" to "remains unrecoverable." DIA has since taken the position that these categories "are irrelevant to the ongoing accounting effort" and they were only a "rough estimate." Hearing re Access at 277. It is difficult to understand why an intelligence estimate in 1972 is no longer valid or relevant—there has been no change in the status of the enemy's knowledge of any Category One MIA since 1972. If still unreturned, he (or, in two cases, she) was either alive or dead at that time, within their knowledge, and must be detained alive or dead today.

Which brings us to a salient question: how much relevant information is in the possession of agencies other than the Defense Intelligence Agency or JCRC? For example:

1) We have previously charged before the Senate Rules Committee that in June and July 1991, massive destruction of POW-related materials took place at the State Department, we have met with the Vice Chairman and Staff Director concerning this matter, and we hope that the proper follow-up will ensue.

2) As we indicated in our 1986 testimony before the Senate Veterans Committee, the FBI has done photo resolutions of alleged POW's. What do its records show? And if the records were moved, where are they now?

3) Given the allegations of Jerry Mooney, and now Terry Minarcin, what do the NSA records show? Or the armed forces security agencies?

We of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition are prepared to work cooperatively with the Committee. While we are pleased with the selection of the Senators serving on the Select Committee and the top Committee leadership staff, we have a concern that the investigative approach appears to be directed to making an analysis of Defense Intelligence records rather than being able to deal with the totality of the issue. A comprehensive investigation can be assured only by augmenting the current staff with a team of professionals, such as FBI and Secret Service trained investigators, to root out all the facts.

Senator SMITH [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Burch.
Mr. Duker.

STATEMENT OF BILL DUKER, CHAIRMAN, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA STANDING COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA; ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL S. EGAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA

Mr. DUKER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Bill Duker. I was a Navy hospital corpsman, assigned to the Marine Corps in Vietnam in 1970. The question we are asked today is, have the actions of the U.S. Government agencies involved in the POW/MIA issue demonstrated a level of effort commensurate with the now 10-year old Presidential declaration of highest national priority and the Government's stated assumption that there are live Americans still in Southeast Asia. Regrettably and tragically, the answer is no.

The American public has been provided with very little information on which to base its opinion as to whether any progress has been made since Operation Homecoming 18 years ago. This lack of information is due to the fact that all but the smallest amount of data remains classified and access to this data is limited to only a few lines.

Mr. Chairman, it would be unrealistic for us to accept a full accounting of all 2,273 still listed missing. However, we do expect, at a minimum, the fullest possible accounting. It seems that those designated governmental agencies assigned to investigate crash sites, interview witnesses, review archives, et cetera, have succeeded in increasing the number of remains returned.

We believe the same agencies have failed to expend the same amount of effort investigating the reports of live sightings. How do we come to this conclusion? We must listen, read and study as much information as humanly possible. Where does this information come from? As stated earlier, very little factual information is released by the Government. This leaves the public with only one other option and that is to pursue answers through nongovernmental sources. The sources include not only the electronic and print media, or congressional committees, resigned directors of one of

those agencies assigned to investigate the issue, an ex-POW, family members, past members of military intelligence, refugees, former Members of Congress, even a long-distance runner. And what do these sources tell us?

They tell us the Government has failed to live up to its declaration of highest national priority. Many will tell us the Government is obstructive, uncooperative, corrupt and guilty of an extensive cover-up. The Government and some of its organizational supporters would characterize these charges as representatives of the lunatic fringe. Either the Government and its supporters have the information the rest of us lack, or they refuse to believe our Government could possibly be guilty of such allegations. Here again, the absence of information makes a rational judgment impossible.

Tragically, there are those who seem susceptible to advancing their own agenda on this issue, rather than truly seeking a resolution. For those whose only motive is profit or influence, our reaction is one of disgust. Unfortunately, some of the Government's supporters would like to paint all those who are critical of the Government's effort with the same broad brush. This is just as wrong as stating that everyone working for the Government on this issue is guilty of deceit.

In our opinion, the public has lost confidence in our Government's efforts to achieve its stated goals. To restore this confidence, the Government must release more factual information and act on that information in a much more timely manner. Vietnam Veterans of America supports legislation to declassify POW/MIA information, as long as that declassification protects the privacy of the families and safeguards U.S. intelligence methods and sources. Vietnam Veterans of America also affirms that the repatriation of all live Americans merits priority over the return of remains.

This is not meant to diminish the importance of retrieving and identifying remains. This, of course, should continue, but not at the expense of pursuing the return of live Americans.

We feel this Committee has a great opportunity to determine why America has achieved its highest goal to bring live Americans home. And is this failure due to a conspiracy or a cover-up, as many feel? If so, this Committee should find out who is responsible, and let justice prevail.

The lack of information, information only the Government possesses is causing such deviciveness, so much distrust, so much pain, that the very legitimacy of the Government is called into question. This Committee can find the truth, and must find the truth. Anything less than the truth dishonors all those who sacrificed their freedom and their lives. It also dishonors their families, their fellow veterans, and ultimately this country and everything it stands for.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL DUKER

The unknown fate of 2,273 U.S. service personnel and others still unaccounted for continues to be one of the most painful and divisive legacies of the Vietnam War. All Americans, but especially family members and fellow Vietnam veterans, have been denied the certainty as to how (and in many cases, if) their loved ones and

comrades-in-arms died. Thus, the Vietnam War lacks an important sense of closure that must occur for individuals and a society to complete the necessary grieving process and to heal the persistent emotional wounds of war.

The past 2 years have witnessed a remarkable acceleration of the pace and scope of potentially significant developments on the POW/MIA issue. After analyzing these developments, we concluded that there is reasonable cause for hope that substantial progress toward resolution of the POW/MIA issue may be achieved in the next few months and years. By "substantial progress" we mean:

- 1) Answers regarding the fate of those not yet accounted for; and
- 2) Greater commitment to public accountability and public information that may help restore public confidence in our government's commitment to handling this issue as a matter "of the highest national priority."

The specific events which lead us to hope for substantial progress on this issue are the following:

- 1) Action by the U.S. Senate to establish this Special Committee to investigate the issue.
- 2) Progress on legislation in the U.S. Congress to declassify information regarding the POW/MIA issue.
- 3) The heightened public awareness and concern brought about by media coverage of the Peck resignation, the Helms Report, and purported photos of live American POW's.
- 4) The willingness of the Vietnamese Government to permit access to wartime archives and records to investigators assigned to the U.S. Government's POW/MIA office that opened in Hanoi in early July.
- 5) The addition of 88 (to the previous 134) Department of Defense personnel to the POW/MIA effort.
- 6) The Soviet Union's withdrawal of all aid and subsidies to Vietnam, further inducing the government of Vietnam to take more seriously U.S. concerns on the POW/MIA issue.
- 7) Recent changes in leadership in the government of Vietnam and reforms that have been implemented in the past 2 years toward a more open domestic economy.
- 8) Significant progress toward what hopefully will become a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.
- 9) Success in the opening of informal discussions between the U.S. and North Korea, yielding the first return of remains of U.S. service personnel since the end of the Korean War.

We have been asked by this Committee to focus our testimony on one question: Have the actions of the U.S. Government agencies involved in the POW/MIA issue clearly demonstrated a level of effort commensurate with the now 10-year old presidential declaration of "highest national priority" and the government's stated assumption that there are live Americans still in Southeast Asia?

Regrettably, all but the smallest amount of information regarding this issue remains classified. Only a few U.S. Government agencies and the Congress have access to this classified information. Under these circumstances, the best we can offer in answer to this question is based on our general sense, after years of closely following the POW/MIA issue, that the government has failed to match its rhetoric with concrete deeds.

In particular, the American public has been given little, if any, clear indication as to what progress has been made in the last ten years, or for that matter in the eighteen years since Operation Homecoming.

When we ask the relevant government agencies for a "progress report", we are given only a recitation of numbers. And these numbers, like statistics, can be very misleading. Although it may seem to some like heresy to say so, it is unreasonable to set the goal for accountability at the total number of 2,273, if by accountability we mean the return of all live Americans and the repatriation of all remains. Veterans with combat experience know full well what modern munitions can do to the human body. Similarly, the density of the jungle where this war was waged can hide remains in remote areas for decades, or forever. The tactics of taking and then giving up terrain during the war made recovery of all those who died in battle impossible.

Most Vietnam veterans genuinely want to believe that there are some among those unaccounted for who still survive. We know how indestructible the human spirit is, even under unthinkable harsh conditions. We need only recall the stories of those who returned in 1973 to be reminded that it is possible to survive. When we ask the government agencies what is the possible number of those who may still be alive, the government has been either unwilling or perhaps legitimately unable to

say. Once again, however, due to the lack of sufficient factual information released by the government, the American people have little basis on which to draw a reasonable conclusion. In our experience, this lack of information has fostered speculation and suspicion about the government's efforts.

Has the government devoted effort commensurate with "the highest national priority"? On the one hand, virtually all factually reliable information is classified and distribution is limited to a very small circle. On the other hand, the American public is exposed through broadcast and print media only to non-classified information, much of which is of doubtful origin and is all too often sensational rather than substantive. Such information is often little more than speculation, supposition or inference based on only a small portion of verifiable facts. At times, such information appears to be misinformation that is simply passed on by private groups and individuals whose motives are sincere, but whose capabilities to verify or correlate information are limited.

There are other instances when it appears that unverifiable information is promulgated by some whose interests lie not in resolution of the issue but in promoting some other political or financial or emotional agenda. It is common knowledge, for example, that there are in Southeast Asia unscrupulous profiteers who deal in dog-tags, bones, and fabricated information. These profiteers have duped many refugees into thinking that emigration to the United States will be expedited by their possession of these items or information.

It is bad enough that Southeast Asian refugees are unwitting victims of this fraud. It is worse, however, when this fraud reaches far beyond Southeast Asia, gaining wide circulation among the American people, whose growing mistrust of government has been fed over the last twenty-five years by the Vietnam War itself, Watergate, and allegations of ethical misconduct by elected officials. In this environment, how can any of us have confidence in the diligence of our government's efforts to account for those still missing.

Moreover, those very U.S. Government agencies, having been so reticent about sharing verifiable information with the American people, are often distracted from potentially more productive tasks as they attempt to track down sources of fabricated information to determine authenticity. It appears to us that secrecy itself, when too broadly invoked without some outside review, has led to further charges of lack of diligent effort (or worse, "conspiracy", or "cover-up") against our government.

Thus, the government's unwillingness to share factual information has collided with the American public's right to answers regarding the fate of those who have been unaccounted for since the end of the war in Vietnam. It is this collision that continues to evoke suspicion and distrust, which only adds to the continuing pain and grieving of family members, fellow veterans and all Americans and to distract attention and commitment of vital intelligence resources from resolution of the issue.

In our opinion the only way to break the cycle of false hope, cynicism, suspicion, and despair on the part of the American people, and the distraction of government intelligence resources due to false information is to offer public access to the maximum extent possible consistent with authentic needs to protect legitimate intelligence sources and the rights of the families.

Let us add here that, based on our many contacts with these government agencies, we believe that there are many honest, conscientious men and women who are sincerely committed to finding answers to the fate of those still unaccounted for. They have committed their lives to this quest for answers. They clearly understand that their goal is the return any Americans who remain alive in Southeast Asia and the repatriation of as many remains as humanly possible. But their reputations have been repeatedly impugned by charges of "cover-up" and conspiracy. Whether or not such charges have any foundation in fact against some individuals will hopefully be determined by this Committee. We hope that such a determination will also clear the reputations of those conscientious men and women who have worked so hard on this issue.

At the beginning of this testimony, we defined "substantial progress" on the POW/MIA issue as: 1) answers to a significant number of cases and 2) greater commitment to public accountability and public information. Both of these points are essential to "substantial progress." It is our view that, even if hundreds of additional cases of those missing were to be resolved in the near future, the controversy and the divisions that the POW/MIA issue has evoked will not subside until public confidence is restored. And, in our view, public confidence will only be restored when the public is certain that its government is committed to being forthcoming with factual information and act on this information in a timely manner.

Vietnam Veterans of America has, since 1983, supported declassification of POW/MIA information. VVA supports current legislation to declassify—namely provisions for declassification have been included in the House Intelligence Authorization Bill and in the Senate Defense Authorization Bill—based on the assurances in the legislation to respect legitimate concerns for protecting U.S. intelligence methods, the privacy of the families, and the freedom and safety of the source of the information.

Vietnam Veterans of America further affirms that repatriation of any live prisoner of war merits substantial priority over the return of remains and other issues that are the subject of negotiation between the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments.

In conclusion, we feel it necessary to say what too many have avoided saying. It is our hope that, at some point in the future, the government agencies will have shared with the public all that can be known and disclosed on the POW/MIA issue. It is our hope that public confidence in these government agencies will then have been restored. At that point in time, all of us—family members, Vietnam veterans, political leaders, and the American public—must come to the humbling conclusion that everything humanly possible has been done to locate and return these missing servicemen.

Those 2,273 still listed as unaccounted for, as well as the 56,000 others whose names are engraved on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, sacrificed their freedom and their lives so that we, the survivors, may live in peace. To permit the divisiveness of the Vietnam War to continue any longer dishonors these dead and missing.

Mr. Chairman, this concluded our statement.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, thank you very much Mr. Duker.
Mr. Andry.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. ANDRY, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS

Mr. ANDRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Joe Andry. I was in the Army 1969 to 1970; served in Vietnam in the infantry.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. On behalf of the more than 1.4 million members of the Disabled American Veterans and its Ladies' Auxiliary, may I say that we deeply appreciate being given the opportunity to present our views on what has become a thorn in America's heart—the issue of America's 90,000 unaccounted for prisoners of war and missing in action from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I wish to commend you, Vice Chairman Senator Smith, and all the Members of the Committee for your commitment to assess our Nation's ability to investigate alleged accounts of American POW's. Additionally, the DAV deeply appreciates the Committee's decision to investigate the U.S. Government's handling of POW/MIA matters since World War II.

As Chairman of the DAV's POW/MIA Advisory Committee, and as a combat-disabled veteran who lost an eye and a leg during the Vietnam War, I can assure you that the POW/MIA issue is one of great, emotional and symbolic importance to the membership of the DAV, and to me, personally. It is also an issue deserving the full attention of our Nation—and finally some answers.

In pursuit of these answers, the DAV feels strongly that this Committee must have a dual primary mission. The first part of the mission should focus on an aggressive pursuit of live sightings in Southeast Asia. The second part of the Committee's mission—and one we in the DAV feel is of equal importance—should be an encompassing investigation into why our Government still has not accounted for some 90,000 soldiers, sailors, airman, and Marines since the end of World War II.

Regarding Vietnam and Southeast Asia, the DAV strongly urges your Committee to aggressively investigate what specific political, diplomatic, and military actions led the U.S. Government to apparently "close the books" on our POW/MIA's after "Operation Homecoming" in 1973. We also urge the Committee to carefully scrutinize the actions our Government has taken—or failed to take—to resolve this issue during the past 18 years.

It is also critical, we feel, that this Committee conduct a thorough review and evaluation of raw intelligence materials from the appropriate Government agencies to determine the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. intelligence community regarding the POW/MIA issue.

Regarding World War II and Korea, the DAV also urges this Committee to carefully examine our Government's political, diplomatic, and military actions to determine why 78,500 men remain unaccounted for from World War II, and 8,177 men remain unaccounted for from the Korean War. The Committee should also explore evidence that seems to indicate that the Soviet Union, prior to the fall of Communism, purposely held American prisoners as political pawns following World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Mr. Chairman, let me say we don't expect this Committee to take on mission impossible by trying to account for every, single POW or MIA. But we do believe that every effort should be made to determine why the Government has been unable to do a better job of accounting for these soldiers. Furthermore, every effort should be made to determine what plans our Government has made to prevent this intolerable situation from happening again.

It is also my duty, Mr. Chairman, to inform you that the DAV membership feels so strongly about the POW/MIA issue that the delegates at our most recent national convention unanimously adopted two resolutions that deal specifically with this issue.

The first resolution urges our Government not to establish normalized relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the POW/MIA issue is resolved. The second resolution urges our Government not to lift the trade embargo with Vietnam until the POW/MIA issue is resolved.

Mr. Chairman, it is the feeling of the DAV that if a man or woman is good enough to put on the uniform of this country, and willing to make the sacrifices necessary to defend this country, that our Government should do whatever it takes to bring those warriors, or their remains, home. To do anything less would be a moral tragedy that goes against the grain of everything this Nation stands for.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Again, I thank you for extending us the opportunity to participate in today's proceedings, and wish you and the Committee God Speed in your efforts to remove this thorn from America's hearts.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andry and the information referred to follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. ANDRY

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As chairman of the DAV's POW/MIA Advisory Committee, and as a combat-disabled veteran who lost an eye and a leg during the Vietnam War, I can assure you that the POW/MIA issue is one of great emotional and symbolic importance to the membership of the Disabled American Veterans and to me personally. It is also an issue that deserves the full attention of our Nation and an issue that deserves answers.

In pursuit of these answers, the DAV feels strongly that this Committee must have a dual primary mission. The first part of the mission should focus on an aggressive pursuit of live sightings in Southeast Asia. The second part of the Committee's mission, and one we in the DAV feel is of equal importance, should be an encompassing investigation into why our government still has not accounted for some 90,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines since the end of World War II.

Regarding Vietnam and Southeast Asia, the DAV strongly urges the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to aggressively investigate what specific political, diplomatic, and military actions led the U.S. government to apparently "close the books" on our POW/MIA's after "Operation Homecoming" in 1973. We also urge the Committee to carefully scrutinize the actions our government has taken to resolve this issue during the past 18 years.

It is also critical, we feel, that this Committee conduct a thorough review and evaluation of raw intelligence materials from the appropriate government agencies to determine the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. intelligence community regarding the POW/MIA issue.

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Mr. Chairman, it is the feeling of the DAV that if a man or woman is good enough to put on the uniform of this country and willing to make the sacrifices necessary to defend this country, then this country's government should do whatever it takes to bring those warriors, or their remains, home. To do anything less would be a moral tragedy and go against the grain of everything this Nation stands for.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Again, I thank you for extending us the opportunity to participate in today's proceedings and wish you and the Committee God Speed in your efforts to remove this thorn from America's heart.

RESOLUTION No. 355 Legislative

IN SUPPORT OF THE CREATION OF A DAV POW/MIA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NATIONAL COMMANDER AND THE CREATION OF A PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON POW/MIA'S

WHEREAS, the fate of American military personnel who are classified as Prisoner-of-War (POW) or Missing-in-Action (MIA) is of utmost concern to the Disabled American Veterans; and

WHEREAS, our Nation must never cease its efforts to secure the repatriation of all POW/MIA's who may still be alive, the return of the remains of all those who are deceased and the gathering of all related information; and

WHEREAS, the DAV should have a special POW/MIA Advisory Committee whose sole function would be to monitor this most important issue, act as a liaison with other public and private entities similarly involved and generally ensure that our organization is informed and in the best position to make appropriate POW/MIA policy decisions; NOW

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Disabled American Veterans in National Convention assembled in New Orleans, Louisiana, July 28-August 1, 1991, calls upon our National Commander to appoint a POW/MIA Advisory Committee; AND

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we strongly urge the President of the United States to appoint a special Presidential Commission on POW/MIA's.

RESOLUTION No. 356 Legislative

SEEKING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ANY AMERICANS WHO MAY STILL BE HELD CAPTIVE FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, THE KOREAN WAR AND VIETNAM WAR AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF ANY AMERICANS WHO DIED DURING THESE WARS

WHEREAS, the members of the Disabled American Veterans are deeply concerned for the thousands of American servicemen still unaccounted for in the aftermath of World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War; and

WHEREAS, numerous efforts by high level American delegations including Members of Congress have visited Southeast Asia in continuing efforts to solve the mystery of the whereabouts and fate of these brave men without success; and

WHEREAS, the brave families of these missing Americans continue to live in uncertainty and anguish regarding their missing sons and husbands; and

WHEREAS, there are still today more than seventy-eight thousand unaccounted for following World War II, some eight thousand from the Korean War and over two thousand two hundred in Southeast Asia from the Vietnam War who have not been forgotten; NOW

THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Disabled American Veterans in National Convention assembled in New Orleans, Louisiana, July 28-August 1, 1991, urges the U.S. Government to ensure that this issue be considered as one of America's highest priorities, accelerating efforts to obtain the release of any American who still may be held captive and obtain the fullest possible accounting of those still missing and the repatriation of the remains of those who died while serving our nation; AND

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we urge passage of Congressional legislation that would direct the heads of federal departments and agencies to fully disclose to the American public information concerning United States personnel classified as prisoners-of-war or missing in action from World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War; AND

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that we urge the U. S. Government not to establish normalized economic and diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam provides the U.S. Government with the fullest possible accounting of over two thousand three hundred personnel classified as prisoners of war or missing in action from the Vietnam War.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Andry, thank you, gentlemen.

While I was not here for all of your testimony, Mr. Burch, Mr. Duker, as you see there's a hollow opening back there and we can hear. And I am sorry I missed part of it.

First of all, I want to thank you for taking the time to come here. I want to thank those of you who have made the journeys to Vietnam in pursuit of answers to this question. I want to thank

you for your cooperation—both with me, personally, as well as with the Committee. A lot of good suggestions have come forward from you and from the groups and organizations you represent—many of which I think you know have been incorporated into the approach of the Select Committee.

Over the course of the next months, I think we have worked out a good relationship where we will continue to be in communication with you and through you, to your memberships, and to the larger Veterans community which is so much involved in this.

I also think we have succeeded in working out a beneficial relationship between yourselves and the Defense Department. And you gentlemen should tell us whether or not that is working. But I believe that Secretary Ford and the Department have now made themselves available in ways they have not been previously—that they are available for briefings on demand, so to speak.

And there is no question that Senator Smith and I are convinced that you can play a very important role in helping to re-establish credibility. The fact that you are here today, saying what you said, is a huge message, in and of itself—when five, major, nationally chartered Veterans groups come before a Select Committee like this, and voice a frustration of their membership of millions of veterans in this country, and voice it through resolutions, as well as through the other efforts that have been made—there really is a big sign being painted on the wall that people in Government might take note of. Whether there is justification for every aspect of your disgruntlement or dissatisfaction is probably a legitimate question for the Pentagon or somebody else to ask. There may be some misinterpretations. There may be some mis-communications. There may be some misunderstandings that have resulted in these feelings.

But what is important is the bottom line—the feelings exist; the breach of the relationship is real. And so no matter what distance has been traveled in years by-gone, the reality is that in order to heal this Nation, as well as to provide a united front in the resolution of this issue, there has to be a new communication—there has to be a reaching out.

My question to you first of all, is do you believe that based on Secretary Cheney's testimony yesterday; based on the reorganization effort which General Christmas and others have articulated; based on the forthcoming testimony and admission as to prior fault put forward before this Committee by Secretary Ford—do you believe now that there is the makings of a new relationship, and/or that your pleas and complaints are being responded to?

Mr. Wallace.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think there's any doubt about that. We do believe that there is a new level of cooperation. But we are always skeptical, because we've been told that for so many years. We want to see the proof actually happen.

Mr. SOMMER. I would have to agree with Bob. We've had these things laid out and some nice statements have been made. But we have to see whether these statements are going to be put into action, and whether there will actually be more communication with the Veterans organizations and other people involved with this issue—whether there will be more information provided to the

families, and to more things done to address the concerns that we've set forth in our statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody else want to tackle that?

Mr. BURCH. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department doesn't work with the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, we're extremely concerned about this destruction of documents matter. We alleged that it happened, not only in the State Department but DIA and the White House. We will give the Committee all the information we have. But people who are informants on that don't want to leave their jobs on it. That's why we want this professional staff of the FBI and Secret Service Agents that we have met, with your very excellent Staff Director and the Vice Chairman about to be augmented in your Committee. Because it has to be professionally done to weed that out.

And if that's true, a lot of important, critical documents have been destroyed. That's a huge implications of that, and they will have to be reconstructed and brought to the Committee. You're not going to get that out unless you get this professional staff available to you, sir. We'll give you that information, but we don't want to destroy these people's career with an inept effort.

So we ask you very seriously to consider that proposal, so we can bring that information forward to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say to you that the Committee is going to require that you bring that information forward. Because if the Committee now has in its hands evidence of a potential felony having been committed, it is our obligation to pursue that. And it is also our obligation to pursue it because there is no other way we can get to the bottom of this.

Now, I can assure you that we have hired what we hope, and what we consider to be extraordinarily capable professional staff.

Mr. BURCH. Sir, if I could, because I have been through this—this is the third time before a Committee. We did this with the Veterans Affairs Committee. We knew at that time it was a Mr. Muir who did the photo resolutions for the FBI. The information we had done to the room he was in. He had two files, one of confirmations of pictures that they knew were men in the photograph analysis, or they confirmed them, or one file of rejections. And the same thing, we came to the Committee—we often do in conference—we said please, protect the source, because that would be the best evidence, confirmation by the FBI that these men were there. They did not protect it. They leaked it. They transferred that person. They transferred the files. They never called him before the Committee. We don't want that to happen again, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me assure you that that is not going to happen. We have brought to the Committee a general counsel that I worked with when I was a prosecutor in the District Attorney's Office, and subsequent to my departure here in that office. He is a private attorney today. He is a litigator. And he understands the workings of an investigation as well as anybody. And that is why he has been brought to this Committee.

In addition to that, we have a number of other lawyers and professionals who have been hired for their skill and expertise. For us to be able to pursue it, it is critical that this information be shared with us. And you are going to have to trust my word, and Senator

Smith's word that it is going to be handled properly. Obviously, we do not want anybody's life disrupted or compromised. But the time has come for these kinds of allegations to be laid on the table, and for the sources not to be hidden from the Committee, at least.

There is no way the Committee can proceed without that kind of information being put in front of it. So I ask you, and anyone else who has that kind of information—and you can hold this Senator and Senator Smith accountable, and I am sure you will if something happens. But we are going to have to proceed down that kind of road. And we rely on your cooperation to make that happen.

Now, I have written the Secretary of State, as per your original allegation. We have not yet had a response from the Secretary of State. But we expect your people to be forthcoming to us in order to permit us to follow through on that allegation.

Mr. BURCH. You have an excellent General Counsel. We will be able to work with him. He has the right kind of background.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Are there any other comments?

Mr. DUKER. Mr. Chairman, all we've ever asked is for this Committee to receive the truth; to receive the answers that you need to do the job. We are not looking for a witch hunt. We want this Committee to receive those answers. That's what we want. That's what we looked for.

Mr. Andry.

Mr. ANDRY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to—in addition to what all the other organizations have said—if they were encouraged by the action that's been taken, we just hope to see some results this time.

Mr. DUKER. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.

With respect to the various groups' attitudes on the degree to which the Government has been forthcoming, is there a sense among you that the declassification process, and the openness will do a lot to break down the barrier that has existed, and a lot of the suspicion that has been created?

Mr. WALLACE. There's no question about that, Senator. You know and I know that if you go to a doctor and you don't get the report the next day, you start wondering, your mind starts wondering.

Since the Vietnam War has ended, we haven't gotten those answers. We don't know what's there, because the information is classified. And you're never going to get it. I think that moving to declassify the information is a step in the right direction—it's something the VFW has called for and supports, the Senate bill, that's in the process of going forward. And we hope that it happens immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you all, before I turn it over to Senator Smith—we need your help. We rely on you, and we need the families help. There is a lot of high emotion in this issue, and there's a lot of ability for people to take a kernel of truth or a tiny bit of evidence and make it into something that it might not be—for a lot of different reasons.

The Committee is going to be very careful about that. But we need your help to keep the communication process open so people are not jumping to conclusions and are not creating conspiracies where there are not any. And I hope we can rely on you as we pro-

ceed here, to be one of the channels of communication; to be able to make sure that people are understanding how we are approaching this and what we are doing; and also what ought to be interpreted appropriately, as what—

Mr. WALLACE. I can assure you the support of Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Mr. SOMMER. Additionally, Mr. Chairman, I can assure you the support of the American Legion. We certainly find refreshing the openness with which the Committee and the staff has been working since your organizational meeting. And we look forward to continue to cooperate with you and the staff in the give and take, and provide any information we can.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to assure you that we are determined. And I have met with Secretary Ford and others, and they are determined. And I am convinced of this. And I said this yesterday. I believe they understand the problem. And I believe yesterday was an important departure point, because, in effect, they admitted that mistakes have been made in the past, but that they are trying to deal with where we are going now and in the future. And that is the first time I have heard that in 15 years, I must say to you.

So I thought that that was an important departure point. And what it means is that I think we can break-down the barriers of classification. We can open it up. And in many cases, we are going to need your help in terms of making sure families are fully apprised of what we are doing, to the degree that we are limited and cannot do it or so forth, but we are going to try to.

And we have one person assigned on the staff to act as a liaison to the families. And I want the families to understand that, that that access is also open to the Committee. But we are going to need to have open communication here, so that hopefully each month will bring a greater sense of openness and cooperative effort here. And we can dispel the sense that everybody is part of the problem. And I do not think we are.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

First of all, I would like to read a short message from Senator Grassley, because he could not be here. He was here all morning.

I had to meet with constituents, and regret I was unable to attend this portion of the hearing. Yet, I want the members of this panel to know their contribution and grassroots effort on this issue were the key factor in getting Congress to refocus on this issue.

Thank you for your contribution and your testimony. I certainly would lend my support to those words as well, that you, gentlemen and the organizations that you represent have certainly been beyond belief, really, in terms of the public support for some resolution, any resolution of this issue, and listening to all of you, in listening to your responses to some of Senator Kerry's questions—I just want you to know, and I am speaking for myself, but I believe I speak for everyone on the Committee, and perhaps some, even in the Executive Branch—that given all the past history, that we have to earn your respect. We have to earn that—we know that—we, being all of us in the Government who, in whatever way, in whatever manner, so to speak, have been remiss in not resolving

this issue. And we do not expect that it is going to be provided to us, unless we earn it.

And it is not so much that, as it is that there is, I believe, a commitment on the part of every Member of this Committee. Senator Kerry and I have talked about it at great length, that there are a number of things that we have to do here. But we cannot correct mistakes in the past. We cannot undo them, but we can take action to see to it that future mistakes do not happen again. So in that sense, I suppose we could say correcting them—we are not the panacea, this Committee. We are human beings. There are 12 of us here. We are going to try to do a good job. It is a bi-partisan effort, as you know. Staff is bi-partisan—non-partisan, is a better word. We have made that commitment—Senator Kerry and I have made that commitment to each other. We hardly knew each other 2 months ago. But it seems like I have known him now for 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to take that affirmatively. [Laughter.]

Senator SMITH. We are driven on this thing. I just want you to know that. We are driven and committed to resolving this. And I think it is important to look at where we are going.

The focus here, first of all, is to find out what, if there are live Americans in South East Asia. That is the number one focus—nothing else is as important to us as that. The second is, as you said, Mr. Wallace, to declassify information which should not be classified. And I have been fighting for that for those 7 years I have been in Congress, have had some minor successes on it on the House side. And I have supported that—subject to sources and methods. I have not had a lot of cooperation from many, both in and outside the Government, frankly, to do that. But I believe that that is a key answer, a key resolution to this problem that you are going to dispel a lot of these concerns if, in fact, we can get information out there that does not have to be classified.

For the life of me, I have never been able to understand why we take a position in 1973 that everybody is dead. And then we proceed to classify all information which says they are alive. Then, we now take a position—which is the official position, as I understand it from the Government—that there may be. We operate under the assumption that there are American—live Americans in South East Asia. Well, if they are all dead, how can you operate under that assumption? You either operate under the assumption they are all dead, or you operate under the assumption they may be alive. That is a conflict. Nobody yet—any of the witnesses—have yet addressed that, as far as I am concerned, in an adequate manner in terms of which it is. It is one or the other. That ought to be the Government policy. It is not—it is a mixed policy. It does not say anything.

So therefore, I want you to understand, too, what we get. And I do not—I am not discrediting anybody, do not mean to. But we get an awful lot of kooks out there who provide us a lot of stuff that is just pure hogwash. And we run down a lot of—a lot—of rabbit holes, with absolutely no hope of ever finding the bottom of the rabbit hole with a rabbit in it, at all. And that is very frustrating for us. Because it takes a lot of our staff time. And many—and much of the information which comes to us, I think, that—the good information that comes to us, comes to us as a result of the frustra-

tion with the process, not being able to trust somebody—maybe you knew one particular Member of Congress you do not trust so you come to me, or you do not trust me, you go to somebody else. Or you do not trust the Pentagon so you come to us. Or you do not trust the Congress, so you go to the Pentagon.

But I have to say—and I agree with Senator Kerry—that based on the remarks that have been made—and this is a big movement for me to say this, based on the testimony yesterday gave by Secretary Cheney, by Carl Ford and others, and some witnesses here today, I believe that there is a turn-around; that there is an effort being made now, a true effort, to share information, to get the truth out to resolve this issue. But the focus should be to do it, again focusing on declassification, getting the truth to the families, whatever the truth is; getting the remains to the families, if there are any.

But the most important issue is finding out whether or not there are live Americans. And that is what the focus of this Committee is. That is what we are going to try to do. And I appreciate your testimony. I know the Committee does, because you have been involved in it. You are dealing with the grassroots people. You are dealing with people in almost every case—in all cases, people who have served in Vietnam, or somehow served their country in some war who want an answer, that want answers. And we are going to try to find them.

And I think that this Committee has the resources, has the commitment to get the answers. And if we get the cooperation: A) from our own Government, which I believe is forthcoming now; and B) from the governments in South East Asia, which is where the answers are, I think we can resolve it. And I know the Vietnamese have been—are sitting in the audience now, and have been there. And I just say to them, point blank, we know you have answers. And we expect you to provide them and the Lao. And I hope that that will happen.

I do not really have any particular questions of any of you gentlemen, but if you have any further comments that you would like to make—I do want to respond very quickly, Senator Kerry, to what Mr. Burch has said.

As I indicated to you, Mr. Burch, we will follow-up on that evidence. And it is very difficult for Senator Kerry and I to say in an absolute that we can protect all leaks—we are going to—we are certainly going to do our best to do that. We understand that there are other human beings who are involved in staff, and so forth. And sometimes these things happen.

But I will tell you, if it does, whoever leaks it—if we find out who it is—will pay for it dearly. So we hope that we can deal with it. If you have that kind of information, and you say you have, we will pursue it to the full letter. Believe me, we will.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

I just have one quick question—Mr. Andry, you raised the issue of normalization and the embargo, et cetera. I think there is unanimity here that we must move down the road to full cooperation before there is any kind of normalization. I have never heard a counter-argument, at least in this Committee. We all feel that very strongly, that that is an important lever.

But with respect to the question of the embargo, many have argued, and I must say I have been sort of subject to the belief that it would greatly enhance the resolution of the POW/MIA issue to get Americans into the country.

My attitude is, I have gone over there now several times. I have met with the foreign diplomats of other countries there, and they sit there and say to me, Senator, you know, as I recounted yesterday, they think we are a little crazy we do not have more people running around the country if we are really concerned about finding somebody.

And it just occurs to me, if you have a businessperson over there—I mean I can think of some Vietnam veteran business people who would like to go over there and do some business. But at the same time, as business people, if they are sitting down at dinner some night, and they are exchanging, breaking bread with people, we just have a different relationship. It seems to me that if somebody is alive over there, the chances of finding them are augmented ten-fold, 100-fold, by having more opportunities for flow of information about who may have been where, when. And if you are sitting down with somebody who was part of the war, who was sort of a contemporary in their forties or fifties, and you are doing business, and you talk about the war, and you say geez, you know, are there any Americans here? Now there is just a much greater chance that somebody is going to say hey, you know, 15 years ago I remember seeing this man—and you are going to have more eyes and ears.

So my notion has been that you do not give up everything because you still normalization. But you gain something in terms of the human exchange that could help resolve this issue. Do you react differently to that, Mr. Burch?

Mr. BURCH. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having a chance to do that. We think one of the biggest reasons this issue is not resolved is the money issue. We feel the Vietnamese believe that they were promised war reparations they didn't receive. And our Government has a policy against money for hostages—a well-known policy. And POW's might be hostages.

We feel like the only lever that's left if that policy remains in place is the negotiations over lifting the trade embargo, and the credits that go with the World Bank and Export Bank and all with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to you, you clearly do not have to give credits. And I would be against giving credits until you go further. But credits, IMF, World Bank do not necessarily go hand in hand with businesses getting in there and beginning to get your commerce personnel increased.

Mr. BURCH. Well, you may have a special situation like with AT&T. But Mobil Oil is trying to negotiate them out. They are under-cutting the efforts to get POW's out because that is a very large, economic issue. So there are certain degrees of that, Senator. But we believe that we want this Committee first to know if these men are alive, before our Government lifts the trade embargo so you have all the information—our Government has all this information. After all, if we found out they were holding 500 people, and have held them under torturous conditions, I don't think any

American in this country would be for doing anything with them. I think we ought to have the facts first, and then they can move in those directions, if appropriate.

But we are opposed to lifting the trade embargo until such time as we got this issue resolved. And we think by lifting it, that they will get what they want economically. And then, lastly what we have, and we are concerned about the fate of these men, we are afraid they might kill them if that happens.

The CHAIRMAN. What were you going to say, Mr. Andry?

Mr. ANDRY. Mr. Chairman, something similar to that—but, we look at the policies as far as our Government has. And it just seems that it is always taken and gotten in the way of, they will not have a policy if it doesn't interrupt the diplomatic relations.

And I think one other thing, it is a leverage that can be used as far as trying to get an accounting for our missing. Yes, it is true that there be other people over there and everything like that. But they could take them up to the hills, we don't know.

Mr. SOMMER. Mr. Chairman, speaking for the American Legion, we have changed our policy somewhat as a result of our recent, national convention. We have no opposition to a certain amount of humanitarian aid being provided, and we have no opposition—we see maybe a need for some flexibility in the establishment of more of an American presence in Vietnam—if these things will help solve and resolve the POW/MIA issue.

However, we are opposed to normalization of relations until that issue is totally resolved.

Mr. WALLACE. The Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mr. Chairman, is opposed to the normalization or lifting the embargo with Vietnam until we see concrete evidence that the Vietnamese are cooperating on this issue. And I listened this morning to Mr. Bell, who is on the ground. And Mr. Bell said he doesn't feel that they are giving all the information they possibly have. And other witnesses have said the same thing.

So until we see that, and we see concrete evidence, the Veterans of Foreign Wars is adamantly opposed to normalization, lifting the embargo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say to you that I think that Mr. Bell—and I think this morning—were very helpful in laying out some of the things that the Vietnamese need to do in order to meet a qualification of cooperation. And I would certainly agree that that has to be met. And they need to do that.

Again, I reiterate, my principal rationale here is one of enhancing the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. If they are cooperating, and you move in the next months down the road, and you say to yourselves, hey, we could resolve the POW/MIA issue in 3 months, rather than a year and a half, I am in favor of the 3 months. I am in favor of tomorrow. And I want to do whatever gets us that resolution as fast as possible.

So you sort of weigh, I think a little bit, those equities. And who knows where you come out? It is a judgment call.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think there's any question. You've been to Vietnam a couple of times, and we went in July. And the economic situation over there, they are in dire need of help. So I can't understand why they wouldn't want to cooperate fully to get that nor-

malization, to follow what the roadmap came out with and said, to do this, and do that, and let's go—let's start doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, and I suppose that's the test, and that's what's going to make the next month very interesting, because it is all on the line. The Select Committee is watching, you are watching, they have a need, we have a need, and hopefully that will help all of us to resolve this.

Mr. ANDRY. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of DAV I would also like to say we gave 58,000 lives over there, and some 2,200 to 2,400 POW's. And from our standpoint, we don't think we should give them anything else.

Senator SMITH. Let me respond to this point just briefly. I know we are ready to break for lunch here, and I will only take a minute.

It may have been during our hearing yesterday, and I am not certain whether it was during, or just after or just before—according to the AP wires this morning, Ambassador Trinh Xuau Lang, Ambassador to the U.N. from Vietnam was quoted, quote "meeting the press". And it is very interesting what he says, and I think I want to read this in the record.

Because of the fact that I believe there is just as much confusion as to just what the policy is by the Vietnamese, as there is on our side. And I am not sure we have a policy, whether it is to normalize or not to normalize. And I think—I am not sure what the policy is. And listen to this, if you can understand it and see what you think.

Question, from the reporter: "What are you saying"—to Ambassador Lang—"that it's the U.S. side that's stalling the conclusion of accounting for these discrepancy cases?" Ambassador: "As you know, the U.S. side put it in such a way that normalization of relations between the two countries depends on the pace and the scope of the resolution of the MIA issue. On our side, we understand. We can't understand that issue in a different way, that means the resolution of the MIA issues depends also on the pace and scope of the willingness of the American side to achieve normalization of relations." Question: "Does that mean that you have information you are withholding?" "I don't want to comment on that," the Ambassador says. Question: "Does your Government have it within its power to resolve this issue quickly?"—your government being the Vietnamese Government—"Yes, I can assure you." Question: "So once your Government makes a decision to resolve this issue, it will be resolved?" Ambassador: "Yes, but it depends on the American side, too." Question: "The point is, your government has the information and the material it needs?" Answer: "We are prepared to give full cooperation on the resolution of this issue—not conditional to the normalization of relations between the two countries. Whether you're prepared to normalize or not, it doesn't matter. Because that's a different issue." Question: "So what you're asking is, if the United States removed that prisoner issue as a condition to normalization?" Answer: "Yes, because they said that the pace and scope of normalization depends on the resolution of the MIA issue. So we understand that normalization of relations depends on the resolution of the MIA issue." Question: "In other words, you're saying that if this was removed as a condition, regardless of wheth-

er relations were normalized, your Government would cooperate?" "Yes, on our side."

It sounds to me like a hamster in a wheel.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounded like Pogo.

Senator SMITH. So I just am not sure that the Vietnamese understand. And this is a policy matter that we all may have some disagreements on, probably not the scope of this Committee. But to me, it ought to be made clear. I agree with Mr. Andry, that we gave 58,000 lives. You want business, and you want aid, and you want trade, and you want normalization, then cough up the information you have, and all of the information. When you get it here on the table—and I say it to the Vietnamese who are sitting here—when you give us that information, we'll talk.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to break for lunch.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will be back at 2:15 p.m., and we stand in recess until then.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed until 2:15 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The Select Committee on POW/MIA will come to order.

This afternoon we have several panels; a panel divided within a panel and two separate panels. The first panel will be the Families' Perspective. And we will have two different groupings in order to have testimony on the families perspectives.

I would like to thank all of the members of the families who have been here, as they have been through so many of these hearings for such a long period of time. And I appreciate enormously both their patience as well as their extraordinary understanding of the difficulties that we faced over the course of this time.

At the end of the morning session, Senator Smith read a comment that had been made yesterday by the Ambassador to the U.N. from Vietnam, Ambassador Trinh Lang. And it obviously created some concern with the Committee yesterday when we first heard it.

I said to the reporter yesterday, we were going to try to find out exactly what it meant. And the Ambassador has submitted a statement which I will just very quickly read. He said: "I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate that for Vietnam the MIA issue is a purely humanitarian one. We have never considered it a political issue. We have never considered the resolution of this issue conditional to the normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States. Whether there is normalization of relations or not, we will continue to extend full cooperation to the United States in resolving this issue. We fully understand the sentiments of the American people about this matter. Vietnam has time and again stated, and I would like to solemnly state here today, that there are no living American prisoners of war in Vietnam. As we have stated before, we are ready and willing to extend to full cooperation and assistance to any MIA family wishing to come to Vietnam to discuss the case of their missing loved one with officials of our government and to conduct their own investigation. I wish to clarify my response to several questions put to me by a reporter yesterday. I was asked if I thought the U.S. side was stalling the conclusion of accounting for the discrepancy cases. In answering that question, I stated that for the U.S. side normalization of relations depends on the pace and scope of the resolution of the MIA issue. That is the U.S. position. But it is not the Vietnamese position. We do not link humanitarian issues with political issues. My government will continue to provide full cooperation on the matter of American MIA's without regard to normalization. As a practical matter, however, it is our view that normalization of relations would assist in the resolution of this matter. I was also asked if we

had it within our power to resolve this issue quickly. My answer was in the affirmative; that is, we believe this issue can be resolved most quickly given continued full cooperation between the United States and Vietnam."

So that will be, or is now, a part of the record. And the Ambassador has asked me to say to any Members of the Committee that he is available here to meet with them if they have any further follow-up questions regarding this issue or would like to put to him any of the issues that were raised in the course of the morning session. And I would, obviously, submit that the Committee has really already laid out some of those concerns that came from the morning panel. And I think it would be well for the Ambassador to perhaps pass those on to his government and to express the concern of the Committee with those issues.

Ann Mills Griffiths, thank you very much for joining us this afternoon. We welcome your testimony. You, obviously, have had a long affiliation with this. And we appreciate your coming here to share your thoughts with us.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Thank you. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today representing the 3,822 POW/MIA relatives currently who comprise the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. Since inception in 1970, the League has focused solely on achieving our threefold objective.

The CHAIRMAN. Pull the mike down a tiny bit and a little closer. Thanks.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. And that objective is the return of all prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for the missing and the repatriation of all recoverable remains of those who served our Nation in Southeast Asia.

In the interest of time, I would request that the full text of my statement and some other materials that I think the Committee would have interest in be included in the record. They are just factual.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Griffiths follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since founded in 1970, the National League of Families League has dealt with five successive administrations. During the earlier years, we witnessed official lies and deceit, as well as establishment of commissions or committees to get us off their backs or to "resolve this issue once and for all." We've dealt with declarations that our relatives were dead, based upon presumption rather than evidence, and cringed as the major media endorsed such findings while we demonstrated in front of the White House.

In 1981, after years of impatience and frustration, we began to see that President Reagan was going to keep his promise to try to rectify what was an outrage. The President, the Vice President, Secretaries of Defense and State, National Security Advisors and others in government began to make major addresses on the issue, most of which were not covered by the national media. A strategy was developed and approved, and policy level negotiations were initiated with Vietnam and Laos

on POW/MIA. The administration raised the issue with the Soviet Union, PRC, the ASEAN countries and all western diplomatic missions in Hanoi.

The POW/MIA Interagency Group became truly functional as a policy-making body, rather than a token gesture to appease the families. Though scheduled for phase-out in the late 1970's, the Defense Intelligence Agency's special POW/MIA office was upgraded and manpower increased threefold, including a special team formed and permanently stationed in Southeast Asia to investigate reported first-hand sightings of Americans. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory were similarly upgraded.

Throughout this period, the families were encouraged, not because we believed government efforts were perfect, but because we could then channel at least most of our energy on one front, not two. We could support a real strategy and focus our sights and actions on those who still hold the answers, or the ability to obtain them, the Indochinese governments. We've come a long way since the end of the Vietnam War, overcoming obstacles which often seemed insurmountable.

The partnership and priorities that evolved were endorsed by President Bush who was directly involved and supportive during the Reagan/Bush years. President Bush reappointed General Vessey as POW/MIA emissary to Hanoi to continue the priority effort. Does this mean that the process always runs smoothly? Of course not, but the League helps correct the problems, and responsible over-sight by Congress has been and is our staunch ally.

The difference from the past is that the process has integrity and priority. Slow as it is for all of us, progress is being made. The U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi offers great potential. We are again encouraged, not by false promises, speculation or wishful thinking, but by the knowledge that individuals of dedication, skill and professionalism are undertaking this mission on our behalf. If they receive serious cooperation, they will succeed. The expanded agreements with Laos, if fully implemented, also offer significant potential.

COUNTERING THE NEGATIVE

Greater challenges lie ahead, ranging from public education on the basic facts of the issue to current domestic and international factors which, if ignored, could lead us back to where we began. The priority in place since 1982 has subjected the issue, the families and the American people to unscrupulous activities: Self-appointed pied-pipers have led some into the caverns of endless exploitation. Our own office was forcibly taken over by a Vietnam veteran whom the Select Committee called to testify, and the League has been sued for allegedly interfering with his fundraising efforts by speaking the truth.

Eight congressional and executive branch investigations or inquiries have found no basis to support charges of conspiracy, cover-up, manipulation or malfeasance by those responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. Government's priority and policy. Each such requirement squandered valuable assets and resources, which should have been focused fully on resolving the issue, and brought domestic divisiveness rather than results.

New organizations, many professing to be acting for the families, claim that this issue can be resolved easily, but offer no viable alternative to current policy, nor has any family's uncertainty been ended as a result of their efforts. Self-described private experts and "investigators," who probably should themselves be investigated, mislead the public and subject POW/MIA families to emotional exploitation. Sensational books, Hollywood films and purportedly factual documentaries on national networks take the money and run. And, much of the media, touting banner headlines, neglect to seek the basic facts.

Some newly involved visitors to Hanoi become instant experts, advocate improved relations based on their perceptions of an allegedly reformist Vietnamese leadership, and imply that the issue is irrelevant, our own fault or trumped up vindictively as an obstacle to normalization of relations.

THE FACTS

The League strongly believes that the families, the American people and the Congress must have the courage to deal only in facts. The facts are . . . first, that discrepancies exist; Americans known to have been alive in captivity have not yet returned, alive or dead. Second, unfettered, immediate access is required to seriously investigate live-sighting reports which I am doubtful that the Vietnamese would ever provide and should be the subject of serious oversight. Third, several hundred Americans can be accounted for rapidly if the Vietnamese leadership decides on a path of full and open cooperation, to include repatriation of remains being held. (I

should note that our forensics experts can distinguish between remains stored for a long period; those buried, buried and stored, etc.) Fourth, real access, rather than rhetorical claims of openness, is required to obtain answers from archival records research. Fifth, nearly 85 percent of the 528 Americans missing in Laos and almost 90 percent of the 83 unaccounted for in Cambodia were lost in areas controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war; Vietnam can and must provide historical data to assist in accounting for them. This credible information is available to the Committee in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Building steadily since 1981, the U.S. Government has an impressive record of dedicated effort to resolve the issue. Does the process always function smoothly, or as rapidly as we all desire? No! It is often slower than I believe necessary and nearly always more frustrating. Internal disagreements are most often based on divergent views concerning strategy or the relative knowledge base of newly involved officials. In that sense, the process is useful in that all serious proposals are considered and new officials become educated.

The real measure—results—depends on those who control the territory and the answers. Serious responses to U.S. initiatives by Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh could rapidly achieve the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans. The lack of greater results is simply not due to lack of priority, effort, resources or dedication by the U.S.

VIETNAM: THE CHALLENGES

Some in the U.S. business community and even in the Congress are lobbying hard for unilaterally lifting the U.S. economic embargo on Vietnam. What would this mean for leverage to achieve U.S. objectives? Now that international agreement has been reached on the Cambodia settlement, how will it impact on U.S. efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue? Will Vietnam finally see it in their interest to come forward fully, or are they waiting for splits to develop and history to repeat itself?

Current U.S. policy, supported by the League, was conveyed to the Vietnamese on April 9th of this year. Within this "roadmap" to improved US/SRV relations are conditions related to implementing the Cambodia settlement agreement and reciprocal steps the U.S. is prepared to take in response to specific Vietnamese actions to resolve the POW/MIA issue as fully and rapidly as possible.

On October 23rd, Secretary of State Baker announced that the U.S. would immediately lift the 25-mile restriction on Vietnamese diplomats accredited to the United Nations in New York and take steps to change trade embargo rules to permit US-organized travel to Vietnam by individuals and groups. Most importantly, Secretary Baker proposed that talks begin in New York concerning the issues and modalities associated with normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Vietnam.

These reciprocal steps were to be taken at the time of the signing of the Cambodia settlement agreement and with concrete evidence that specific POW/MIA steps are being implemented. Reciprocity by the U.S. appears to have been geared primarily to Vietnamese cooperation on the Cambodia settlement; facts demonstrate that the POW/MIA criteria had not been met. Nevertheless, the League welcomes and strongly supports Secretary Baker's clarification that the pace and scope of discussions on normalization will "be governed by" Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA. This position must be held in subsequent phases of the roadmap or I believe any domestic consensus will be impossible.

In this context, it is important to understand that Vietnam has neither accepted nor rejected the roadmap. In view of the specific POW/MIA conditions in the roadmap, agreed to on an interagency basis, it is imperative that any further movement toward normalization of relations be closely monitored to ensure full compliance with stated criteria. Despite Hanoi's unwillingness to commit their government to implementing POW/MIA criteria in the roadmap, concrete Vietnamese actions are crucial to achieving U.S. objectives on the issue, and U.S. leverage has never been higher.

In our view, given Vietnam's negotiating history, reciprocity, rather than providing incentive in advance, is the key to obtaining Vietnam's cooperation on this issue. Promises have been made before, and broken. Early last month, General Vessey obtained agreements which simply reinforced earlier Vietnamese commitments. The primary difference was the political environment surrounding our visit. Hopefully, coming from premier Vo Van Kiet, Vietnam's promises this time will be implemented. If my comments appear skeptical, that is because history has taught the families that promises can be very hollow, and high level meetings are only that, unless there are measurable results. And, similarly, the U.S. cannot rely on Vietnamese assertions.

U.S. expectations on accountability are based on reliable DIA data and scientific evidence from the CILHI, reinforced by information obtained through the joint investigation process. Despite Vietnamese assertions to the contrary, there is simply no question that hundreds of Americans could rapidly be accounted for if Hanoi makes the decision to cooperate fully. Any softening of these basic facts could skew Hanoi's long-standing perceptions as to what the U.S. expects to achieve in terms of accountability.

Since the roadmap was provided to Vietnam in April of this year, not a single American has been accounted for as a result of US/SRV efforts. Thus, the importance of provisions in the roadmap which help ensure that there will be no further misunderstanding as to what is required to effect the pace and scope of improvements in our bilateral relations. The necessity now is to ensure that both governments implement the roadmap with integrity. A renewed opportunity exists with the recently established U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi, particularly regarding access to important records and documents which can facilitate results. It is our sincere hope that Vietnam will make the decision to respond fully, and soon.

LAOS: WHERE WE STAND

The level of POW/MIA cooperation with Laos has continued to increase over the past several years; however, further expansion is required. This past year, joint activities have taken place more frequently than ever before, into several areas which were inaccessible during earlier years. Recognizing that nearly 85 percent of the 528 American losses occurred in areas of Laos controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war does not negate the need for greater effort to account for those missing in Laos, especially the discrepancy cases of Americans known at one time to be alive in Lao control.

Encouraging developments have included first-ever investigations, as yet inconclusive, into such last known alive cases. Despite limitations in terms of resources and personnel, the Lao Government reacted swiftly to unplanned requirements, such as investigating the photo incidents. Particularly helpful was their successful effort to locate and make available the individual depicted in the photo identified by the Borah family as their missing relative. Subsequent Lao agreement to a similar investigation on the photo identified by family members as Capt. Donald Carr, USA, is also a welcome development. In view of these unplanned interruptions to the agreed schedule, it is significant that two additional field operations are to be conducted before the end of this year.

Statistics regarding joint US/Lao POW/MIA bilateral efforts reveal that field operations are the primary means for obtaining results. There is no evidence that the Lao Government had a systematic program for collecting and storing information and remains. While there is no guarantee that further US/Lao activities will be successful, 43 of the 48 Americans previously missing in Laos were accounted for through cooperative field operations, while only five in Vietnam have been so resolved.

Accounting for most of the Americans missing in Laos will require Vietnam's cooperation to provide records and documents pertaining to incidents which occurred in areas their forces controlled during the war. Until such data is provided, field operations would be much more difficult and less successful; however, numerous crash sites are known to U.S. officials and can be pursued without awaiting Vietnam's provision of records.

While bilateral relations with Laos have been strengthened through a broad range of cooperation, efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue remain an important element of the ever-improving relationship. Expanded cooperation, to include more frequent field activities, will undoubtedly require further U.S. assistance to augment Lao personnel and resources dedicated to the effort. If such is required, the U.S. should willingly provide appropriate assistance to facilitate the joint effort.

CAMBODIA: A BEGINNING

After years during which no positive reaction to the League's 1987 provision of narrative case files on all Americans missing in Cambodia was received, Phnom Penh authorities have recently begun cooperation. The steps thus far have been encouraging. Their prompt response and cooperation in investigating photographs identified by family members as their missing relatives was welcome and appreciated.

On a more comprehensive scale, it is our hope that a process similar to that underway with Laos can be undertaken. As with those missing in Laos, relevant records and documents will be required of the Vietnamese since nearly 90 percent of

the 83 Americans unaccounted for in Cambodia were lost in areas under Vietnamese control during the war.

After waiting for any signal of willingness from Phnom Penh to pursue resolution of the American losses in Cambodia, it is reassuring to the POW/MIA families directly affected to witness these recent positive steps.

CONCLUSION

Confirming the fates of America's POW/MIA's is obviously the highest priority of all involved, especially the families. Nevertheless, we do not believe such confirmation should be pursued in isolation. While the League's position is that POW/MIA's are still alive, we recognize that unilateral Vietnamese repatriations of remains impact directly on the live POW issue. If remains returned are identified as those of an American last known alive in captivity, the number who may still be alive decreases accordingly. The League has long maintained that all avenues to account for our missing loved ones are complimentary, not mutually exclusive.

These are the important questions on which efforts should be focused. Historical perspectives can be written after the issue is resolved. The League advocates and deeply appreciates responsible Congressional oversight of efforts to resolve this issue. There should, however, be no further squandering of time and energies chasing privately generated illusions or investigating repeatedly disproven accusations of conspiracy and coverup.

The opportunity which now exists will not come again, nor will it continue indefinitely. We urge all who are striving to account for America's POW's and MIA's, our missing relatives, to understand this reality. The conspiracy and cover-up crowd must not be permitted to continue to erode the confidence of the American body politic, nor must naivete or unfounded assertions, public or private, be permitted to destroy the basic facts of the issue.

The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic; we don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, executive and legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial. We expect adherence to established policy and implementation with integrity, not comments from unnamed "senior officials" which dismiss facts and principle in the perceived interest of political or economic advantage.

The road to resolving this issue has been difficult and bumpy, but productive in many respects. Family members who have received answers which ended far too many years of uncertainty recognize the value of our collective efforts. While much remains to be done, there is reason for optimism that cooperation will increase and greater results will be achieved through the government-to-government process, as long as the U.S. Government proceeds with integrity. Vietnamese responsiveness is only predictable in that context. We ask the Congress to continue its important oversight, as will the League.

In conclusion, we would only hope that the Committee, through their efforts, will settle on the body of facts that we know to be true and ensure that Administration policy adheres to their public statements to follow the roadmap to achieve the answers. By doing so, I believe you can find the "one" within all of us who are seeking the end to uncertainty on this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions and those of the Committee Members.

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF INVESTIGATIONS PERFORMED REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF USG CONSPIRACY AND COVERUP ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE

- 1) 1982-83—Inspector General
- 2) 1984—House POW/MIA Task Force
- 3) 1984-85—Inspector General; ordered by General John Vessey, Jr., while serving as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 4) 1985—House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
- 5) 1985—Internal DIA Review—Analytical review, i.e., analysts from other operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency reviewed the operations of the POW/MIA Division.
- 6) 1986—DIA Internal Review
- 7) 1987—Tighe Senior Review Group—LTG Eugene Tighe, USAF-Ret., former Director, DIA, with selected ranking, respected individuals as members of the group.
- 8) 1991—DOD Inquiry; ordered by Secretary of Defense Cheney.

All of the above investigations concluded that there was no basis to the allegations of a government conspiracy or coverup on the POW/MIA issue. It should be noted that in addition to the above, the POW/MIA special office of the Defense Intelligence Agency is under constant supervision by the House and Senate Select Committee's on Intelligence as well as the House POW/MIA Task Force.

RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

SEPTEMBER 10, 1985.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HAMILTON, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, submitted the following

ADVERSE REPORT

[To accompany H. Res. 226 which on July 17, 1985 was referred jointly to the
Committees on Armed Services and Intelligence]

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 226) directing the Secretary of Defense to furnish certain information to the House of Representatives relating to American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, having considered the same, report unfavorably thereon and recommend that the resolution do not pass.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On July 17, 1985, House Resolution 226 was introduced by the Honorable William M. Hendon and referred jointly to the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The resolution directs the Secretary of Defense to furnish to the House, not later than ten days following adoption of the resolution, full and complete information regarding all Defense Intelligence Agency case files and analyses concerning reports of live Americans in Southeast Asia from March 23, 1977 to the date of the adoption of the resolution.

Upon the introduction of the resolution, the Committee staff was directed to meet with appropriate officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency to assess the manning, funding, methodology, and operations of the DIA's POW/MIA Division. The Committee staff was also tasked to assess the professionalism and quality of the Division's finished analyses of POW/MIA-related intelligence. In particular, the staff examined a representative sampling of POW/MIA "live-sighting" files. Finally, the staff examined DIA security procedures and practices in responding to Congressional requests for information concerning POW/MIA matters.

At his request, the staff also met with the sponsor of the resolution, Mr. Hendon, to receive his evaluation of DIA's performance and capabilities with regard to live-sighting cases. Finally, the staff met with the Honorable Gerald B.H. Solomon, Chairman of the Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

On September 5, the Committee conducted a hearing in executive session to hear from officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency, from the Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, from the Honorable Gerald B.H. Solomon, a member of the Subcommittee and the Chairman of the Task Force, and from the Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Vice Chairman and formerly Chairman of the Task Force. After hearing the testimony of

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these witnesses and their responses to Members' questions, the Committee ordered the resolution reported adversely.

BACKGROUND

The Committee's understanding of the concern which underlies the introduction of House Resolution 226 is that free and convenient access by any Member of the House to the files of the DIA live sightings of POW's and MIA's in Southeast Asia convince Members of the House that there were Americans being held prisoner in Southeast Asia and persuade them there was an institutional bias at DIA against accepting this fact. The method for achieving these ends would be to require the transfer of DIA's live-sighting files to the House. In so long, the resolution would bypass the mechanism of the Task Force and its sponsor, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, together with the security procedures and working relationship that those bodies had developed with the DIA for the oversight and review of DIA activities.

The Committee reviewed in detail the role of the Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. The Task Force, as indicated above, operates under the aegis of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Task Force has the principle responsibility for overseeing the work of the intelligence community in handling POW/MIA cases—work for which the DIA is the lead agency. The Task Force is made up of interested members of the Foreign Affairs and of any other Members of the House interested in the POW/MIA issue.

The Task Force may review the file of any POW/MIA case and question DIA officials concerning it. Hearing and subpoena power are held by the Subcommittee, which sponsors regular hearings on POW/MIA developments and frequent and thorough examination by the Task Force of DIA files. In addition, the Task Force promptly investigates all allegations and issues concerning POW/MIA matters as they arise. For instance, the Task Force in 1984 investigated the claim of the sponsor of the resolution, Mr. Hendon, that there had been a cover-up of information of live prisoners in Southeast Asia. That review covered some 80 case files cited by Mr. Hendon. The conclusion of the Task Force was that there had been no government coverup. The Task Force also said that it "generally satisfied that all options available to DIA were exercised" in the cases which it reviewed. The Task Force also made suggestions for improvements in DIA capabilities and practices. These recommendations were adopted.

DIA testimony and that of the Congressional witnesses established that the policy of the administration assumes at least some Americans are still held captive in Southeast Asia. Intelligence collection priorities and DIA resource allocations are the highest ever assigned to the POW/MIA topic. DIA efforts are directed at impartial assessments of live-sighting cases based on a full range of intelligence collection activities. DIA's POW/MIA Division personnel, most of whom are Vietnam veterans, thoroughly investigate and cross reference each report. No live-sighting case is closed, regardless of its classification as resolved or unresolved.

It is the policy of the DIA to respond to the request of any Member of the House for information on POW/MIA cases. DIA provides briefings and permits the review of materials under circumstances which protect the classified intelligence information from which they are derived. All the Congressional witnesses stated unequivocally that DIA had responded fully and without exception to all requests from the Task Force and Subcommittee for information on all POW/MIA matters. It was also the testimony of these witnesses that the Subcommittee and the Task Force believed strongly in the need to protect classified intelligence files and conducted their proceedings in a manner that ensured this end. At the same time, witnesses made clear that all cases where DIA believed there was unresolved live sightings were briefed not only to the Task Force and Subcommittee but also to the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The Committee was greatly impressed by the amount of work done by the Task Force, particularly its operational philosophy of leaving no stone unturned in its review of POW/MIA matters and its unequivocal rejection of suggestions that there had been a cover-up within the Administration or DIA of credible information about Americans held prisoner in Southeast Asia. Either the Subcommittee or the Task Force have conducted a total of 41 hearings with 101 witnesses, producing 2,409 pages of testimony on POW/MIA matters, since the fall of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia. The Committee believes that the work of the Task Force, which is largely unsung and often protracted, deserves the thanks of the House.

In addition to making a very positive assessment about the diligence and effectiveness of Task Force oversight of DIA and intelligence community performance on

POW/MIA matters, the Committee also examined the alternate framework which would be established by the resolution of inquiry for Congressional review of POW/MIA live-sighting cases. The Committee determined that the effect of the resolution would be to bypass the Task Force and the Subcommittee. The resolution provided no security framework for the appropriate handling and storage of DIA files. The Committee considers this deficiency to be a significant one. POW/MIA cases involve not only legitimately classified intelligence information but information affecting the privacy of the families of those who are unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Such information requires rigorous systematic protection.

The Committee's review convinced Members that both the Task Force and the Subcommittee conduct careful and adequate oversight of POW/MIA matters. The Committee's examination, its regular review of DIA activities, and the Task Force's judgment on DIA performance on POW/MIA matters convinces the Committee that DIA performs unbiased, professional, and thorough analyses of POW/MIA live-sighting cases. Finally, the Committee concluded that the alternative offered by the resolution of inquiry posed important security problems and a lack of guidance for House review of POW/MIA live-sighting files. In view of these conclusions, the Committee voted to report H. Res. 226 adversely.

COMMITTEE POSITION

On September 5, 1985, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a quorum being present, ordered the resolution reported adversely by voice vote.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the Committee's findings and recommendations concerning House Resolution 226 are contained in the body of this report.

FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this resolution does not provide new budget authority or tax expenditures.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the Committee has received no report from the Congressional Budget Office.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(A) of rule XI of the House of Representatives, the Committee has not received a report from the Committee on Government Operations pertaining to the subject of this resolution.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
WASHINGTON, DC, 20301,
March 24, 1980.

Ms. ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS,
Executive Director,
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia,
1608 K St., NW,
Washington, DC 20006.

DEAR Ms. GRIFFITHS: This is in response to your letter of 19 February 1980 in which you expressed concern that Colonel Earl P. Hopper, Sr., AUS-Ret., was not provided certain refugee reports he had requested for use in his son's status review board hearing, and asked that the reports be declassified. Unfortunately, this cannot be done.

I believe it is very important to protect the intelligence contained in these reports because of potential impact on the development of U.S. national policy toward the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; but, more so because their release at this time would provide the Vietnamese with a gauge of the extent and success of our intelligence effort in this matter and would enable the SRV to counter any future *demarche* our government might make concerning our unaccounted-for personnel. The Yen Bai sighting report falls under the same heading. I'm sure the League is probably equally concerned that the disclosure of refugee reports on live sightings might have a disastrous effect on our mutual goal.

In closing, Ann, please know the Defense Intelligence Agency will continue its efforts to resolve every possible facet of our investigation of U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

EUGENE F. TICHE, JR.,
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF.
Director.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF POW/MIA FAMILIES 1982—PRESENT

Advocated the change of U.S. Government position on live prisoner issue from "no credible evidence" to "information available precludes ruling out the possibility," operating on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held. This led directly to increased intelligence assets, additional JCRC and CILHI personnel and resources, and upgraded priorities across the board on the issue.

Set up first high level POW/MIA meeting since 1970's between U.S. and Vietnamese officials, facilitated high level dialogue with Lao officials; participated in all policy level POW/MIA delegations to Vietnam and all such critical missions to Laos.

Provided Cambodian officials (for the first time) case file narratives of all Americans unaccounted for in Cambodia.

Through the POW/MIA Interagency Group, participated in the drafting and development of official policy documents to ensure the issue was integrated into national diplomatic, intelligence and economic policy.

Led effort to initiate a mass mailing to refugees in the U.S. who were not screened for POW/MIA information during the 1970's.

Provided knowledge and continuity to ever-changing U.S. Government officials responsible for POW/MIA policy and implementation, doing what was required to maintain factual and sustainable strategy.

Recommended, pushed and secured adoption of free military transportation (COIN ASSIST), discontinued in the 1970's, for families to attend each League annual meeting.

Consistently advocated primary next-of-kin (PNOK) rights to privacy and to decision-making on matters affecting their individual case.

Gained early Reagan Administration approval of full disclosure policy to primary next-of-kin (PNOK) on all information that pertains or may pertain to their missing relative; adopted into law, 1988.

Led effort with military services to update family contact information, permitted to become completely out of date in the 1970's, and obtain medical records and information for CILHI (Central Identification Laboratory) to be used for comparison with anticipated remains repatriations through government-to-government efforts.

Led effort to improve the review process for remains identification, including private (2nd opinion) consultant reviews, PNOK input and an Armed Forces Identification Review Board.

Build a strong bipartisan Congressional coalition on POW/MIA.

Recommended and gained acceptance for Defense Department publication of a POW/MIA FACT Book and a Next-of-Kin Newsletter to the families.

Reviewed scores of POW/MIA case files at PNOK request; recommended countless necessary follow-up actions on individual cases which were adopted for implementation, both internally and in negotiations with Laos and Vietnam.

Advocated and gained approval to delay entombment of the Vietnam Unknown until all relevant medical records for comparison were present and remains could not be individually identified.

Prepared and proposed public awareness program on POW/MIA, based upon facts of the issue; subsequently adopted by the U.S. Government.

Included ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines) into relevant POW/MIA activities and elicited their support to intervene with Hanoi.

Conceived and participated in countless major public awareness events that influenced Hanoi's cooperation, from "Real People" in the early 1980's, through each Recognition Day, this year with proclamations from all 50 States and thousands of League POW/MIA flags flying across the Nation and on ships at sea.

Secured, with Senator Bob Dole, permanent display of the League's POW/MIA flag at the U.S. Capitol Rotunda until the fullest possible accounting is achieved; sought and obtained approval for flying the League's POW/MIA flag over the White

House, Departments of State, Defense and Veterans Affairs, the Selective Service Headquarters and the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial on Recognition Day. Launched national campaign to counter misinformation which was discrediting the seriousness of the POW/MIA issue and serving as the basis for fraudulent fund-raising.

HIGH LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO THE POW/MIA ISSUE*

(CHRONOLOGICAL—COPIES AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST)

October, 1991

Secretary James Baker, Secretary of State, Signing of the Cambodian Settlement Agreement—Paris

September, 1991

Secretary Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

July, 1991

President Bush, Letter to the POW/MIA Families, 22nd Annual Meeting, National League of Families

Secretary Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, 22nd Annual Meeting, National League of Families

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs, 22nd Annual Meeting, National League of Families

Honorable Bob Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State, 22nd Annual Meeting, National League of Families

December, 1990

President Bush, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA Families

November, 1990

Secretary Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Veterans Day Ceremony

August, 1990

President Bush, National Convention, Veterans of Foreign Wars

July, 1990

Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense, 21st Annual Meeting, National League of Families

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Presidential POW/MIA Emissary to Hanoi, 21st Annual Meeting, National League of Families

Secretary Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State, 21st Annual Meeting, National League of Families

Vice President Quayle, 21st Annual Meeting, National League of Families

May, 1990

Vice President Quayle, Memorial Day Ceremony, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Arlington National Cemetery

December, 1989

President Bush, Holiday Letter to the POW/MIA Families

November, 1989

President Bush, Texas Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Veterans Day

BGEN Colin Powell, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington Cemetery, Veterans Day

September, 1989

Secretary Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Presidential POW/MIA Emissary, West Point Academy, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

July, 1989

Secretary Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, 20th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

Secretary Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, National Vietnam Veterans Memorial/20th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

President Bush, 20th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs, 20th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

Secretary Edward Derwinski, Secretary for Veterans Affairs, 20th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

March, 1989

President Bush, Dedication of the League POW/MIA flag in the Capitol Rotunda, (letter)

January, 1989

President Bush, Inaugural Address

December, 1988

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA Families

November, 1988

President Reagan, Veterans Day Ceremony, Vietnam Veterans Memorial

September, 1988

Vice President Bush, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

Secretary Frank Carlucci, Department of Defense, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

July, 1988

Vice President Bush, 19th Annual Meeting (letter), National League of Families

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Presidential POW/MIA Emissary to Hanoi, 19th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

President Reagan, 19th Annual Meeting, National League of Families

December, 1987

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA Families

September, 1987

Secretary Casper Weinberger, Department of Defense, National POW/MIA Recognition Day

July, 1987

President Reagan, 18th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families (letter)

Secretary George Schultz, Department of State, 18th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

LTC Colin Power, USA, National Security Council, 18th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

Secretary Casper Weinberger, National League of Families (letter)

December, 1986

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA Families

July, 1986

President Reagan, 17th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families (radio broadcast)

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

December, 1985

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA Families

July, 1985

Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Council, 16th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

Vice President Bush, 16th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

December, 1984

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the families

July, 1984

President Reagan, National POW/MIA Recognition Day, The White House

May, 1984

President Reagan, Memorial Day honoring the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Vietnam

December, 1983

President Reagan, Holiday letter to the POW/MIA families

July, 1983

President Reagan, 14th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families (letter)

Secretary George Schultz, 14th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

January, 1983

President Reagan, 13th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families
Judge William P. Clark, National Security Council, 13th Annual Meeting of the National League of Families

June, 1982

Judge William P. Clark, National Security Council, Radio interview with WGN Chicago (Rick Rosenthal)

*All of the above were conveyed publicly, in remarks, except as stipulated.

ANN MILLS GRIFFITHS

Mrs. Ann Mills Griffiths serves as Executive Director of the National League of POW/MIA Families, a position held since 1978. The League, a charitable organization comprised of over 3,800 family members of missing American servicemen and civilians, is dedicated to securing the return of all prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for the missing and the return of remains of those who died in Southeast Asia.

Prior to taking the reins of the League's leadership, Mrs. Griffiths was a member of the League's board of directors for 4 years, serving as legislative chairman. Since formed in 1980, she has played an active role in the U.S. Government's POW/MIA Interagency Group, established to formulate policy to resolve this humanitarian issue.

Her countless contacts with high level U.S. officials include meetings with Presidents Reagan and Bush, the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense and successive National Security Advisors. Mrs. Griffiths has had numerous meetings with senior officials of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the countries of ASEAN. She was instrumental in facilitating high level negotiations between Vietnam and the United States in 1983 and has participated in U.S. Government policy-level POW/MIA delegations to Hanoi since 1982.

Acknowledged as expert on the POW/MIA issue, Mrs. Griffiths frequently meets with Members of Congress, appears before Congressional committees, addresses national and international audiences, participates in appropriate policy seminars, publishes articles and newsletters and is a frequent spokesman on network and cable television news programs.

Mrs. Griffiths has been instrumental in building the League from a small POW/MIA family group into a nationally prominent, non-profit organization which influences U.S. Government policy to resolve the humanitarian POW/MIA issue. In managing the League's affairs, Mrs. Griffiths, assisted by her staff, supervises League operations, a successful direct-mail program, and plans and implements the League's yearly convention which includes the highest levels of the U.S. Government. With the assistance of her staff and over 40 volunteer League officials, Mrs. Griffiths also coordinates a nation-wide public awareness program on the issue.

Mrs. Griffiths' brother, Lt. Commander James B. Mills, USNR, has been missing since September 21, 1966, when his Navy F4 was lost on a night mission over North Vietnam. Born in Oklahoma, raised and educated in California, Mrs. Griffiths resides in the metropolitan Washington, DC area.

JAMES B. MILLS

MISSING IN ACTION, SEPTEMBER 21, 1966, NORTH VIETNAM

Lt. Commander James B. Mills, USNR, was born August 31, 1940. He moved to California in 1946, finally settling in Bakersfield in 1954.

Lt. Commander Mills graduated from Bakersfield High School where he compiled an excellent academic record. He participated in numerous extra-curricular activities, served in successive student government positions and earned letters for 4 years each in football, basketball and track, awarded as one of 20 outstanding seniors in a graduating class of over 800. Lt. Commander Mills attended Bakersfield College for 1 year before transferring to the University of California at Berkeley, where he majored in Business Administration, receiving his BA in 1963.

After graduation, Lt. Commander Mills attended Naval Officers Candidate School at Newport, Rhode Island, pre-flight training at Pensacola, Florida, additional flight training at Glenco Naval Air Station in Georgia, Survival School in Florida, and completed training at Miramar Naval Air Station in San Diego, California.

His first tour of duty was aboard the USS Midway as a Radar Intercept Officer on a Phantom F-4B, completing 148 missions over North Vietnam. Lt. Commander Mills was just beginning his second tour of duty aboard the USS Coral Sea when his plane disappeared about 20 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone between Thanh Hoa and Vinh, North Vietnam, on September 21, 1966.

Lt. Commander Mills is the son of the late E.C. "Bus" Mills and Lois P. Mills of Brea, California. His brother Bill, and family, reside in Texas. His sister Ann Mills Griffiths is serving her thirteenth year as Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, a position held by her father in 1974-75. His other sister, Judie Mills Taber, and family live in La Habra, California; she serves as Regional Coordinator for the National League of Families.

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was incorporated in the District of Columbia on May 28, 1970. Membership is comprised of the wives, children, parents and other close relatives of Americans who were or are listed as prisoners of war, missing in action, killed in action/body not recovered in Southeast Asia, and returned Vietnam POW's. The League is a non-profit, non-partisan organization financed through contributions from the families, concerned citizens and organizations. The League's sole purpose is to obtain the release of all prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for the missing and the repatriation of all recoverable remains of those who died serving our Nation in Southeast Asia.

The League originated on the west coast in the late 1960s. The wife of a ranking POW, believing that the U.S. Government's policy of keeping a low profile on the POW/MIA issue and encouraging the families to refrain from publicly discussing the problem was unjustified, initiated a loosely organized movement which eventually developed into the National League of Families.

In October 1968, the first POW/MIA story was published. As a result of that publicity, the families began communicating with each other. The group grew in strength from 50 to 100, to 300, and kept growing. Small POW/MIA family groups flooded the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris with telegraphic inquiries regarding the prisoners and missing, the first major activity in which hundreds of families participated.

Eventually, the necessity for formal incorporation was recognized. In May 1970, a special ADHOC meeting of families met in Washington DC, at which time the League's charter and by-laws were drafted.

A nine-member board of directors meets regularly to determine League policy and direction and is elected yearly by the membership which now stands at over 3,800. In addition, ten regional coordinators are responsible for activities in multi-state areas and state coordinators are in most of the fifty states.

The League's national office is staffed by three full-time employees. The executive director, an MIA sister who is the organization's chief executive officer, is responsible for management of the League and implementation of policies established by the membership and board of directors.

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We, the undersigned natural persons of full age, do hereby associate ourselves as a non-profit corporation pursuant to the provisions of the District Columbia Non-profit Corporation Act and adopt the following articles of incorporation:

ARTICLE I

The corporation shall exist for so long as its purposes remain unfulfilled and its name is National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (hereinafter referred to as "the League").

ARTICLE II

The purposes of the League are to assist all Americans who are missing or captured in Southeast Asia and their families (1) by securing humane treatment in accordance with the requirements of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and as recognized by general humanitarian standards for those Americans captured in Southeast Asia; (2) by obtaining identification of all those who are being held captive by the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao and any other hostile forces; (3) by obtaining proper medical care for all; (4) by making the American people and the people of the world aware of the unconscionable plight of those Americans who are missing or captured in Southeast Asia and their families; (5) by facilitating and promoting communication of information of mutual interest among all families of missing and captured Americans; (6) by facilitating and developing activities with other private or public groups or organizations and governmental agencies which are working to achieve the same humanitarian objectives; (7) by maintaining and supporting the morale of all captured and missing Americans and their families; and above all (8) obtaining at the earliest possible time the release of and a complete accounting for all captured or missing Americans in Southeast Asia.

ARTICLE III

The League shall have such powers as are provided by bylaws and these articles of incorporation, including the power to acquire, own and dispose of property and the power to do any lawful acts necessary or desirable for carrying out the League's purposes. Notwithstanding any other provisions hereof the League shall not engage in any activities that are inconsistent with the qualification of the League as a charitable, humanitarian, non-profit, non-partisan corporation exempt from federal income taxation in accordance with the provisions of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or any successor thereto, and no part of the net earnings of the League shall inure to the benefit of any private person.

ARTICLE IV

The League shall have such classes of members, with such voting rights, as may be provided in the bylaws, shall set forth the manner of election and the qualifications, rights and duties of members, including the manner in which operating funds shall be obtained, and shall provide for an annual meeting of the members.

ARTICLE V

The affairs of the League shall be managed by a board of directors. The number of directors and the manner of their appointment shall be set forth in the bylaws, except that the initial board of directors is named herein.

ARTICLE VI

The initial board of directors, who shall hold office until their successors are duly elected and qualified in accordance with the bylaws, are as follows:

Mrs. Donald C. Rander
126 Honeysuckle Court #22
Baltimore, Maryland 21222

Mrs. James Powers
1121 Eastin Avenue #5
Orlando, Florida 32804

Mrs. Stephen Hanson
24112 Birdrock Drive
El Toro, California 92630

Mrs. Robert C. Davis
23 East Broad Street
Box 365
Burlington, New Jersey

Mrs. Bruce Johnson
138 Denver Street
Salina, Kansas

Mrs. Kenneth North
Box 136
Wellfleet, Massachusetts 02667

Mrs. Arthur S. Mearns
2376 Lyric Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90027

Mrs. Jeremiah Denton
3125 Watergate Lane
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23452

Mrs. James B. Stockdale
547 "A" Avenue
Coronado, California 92118

Mrs. Bobby G. Vinson
2607 Childs Lane
Alexandria, Virginia 22308

Mrs. Gordon M. Perisho
Old Orchard Road
Quincy, Illinois 62301

Mrs. Arthur Cormier
12 Sunset Road
Bay Shore, Long Island
New York

Colonel Edwin L. Brinkmann
90 Country Club Drive
Shalimar, Florida 32579

Mrs. Samuel Johnson
3204 Greenbriar Lane
Piano, Texas 75074

Mrs. James F. Egan
Farview Drive
Mountainside, New Jersey 07092

ARTICLE VII

The initial bylaws shall be adopted by the initial board of directors.

ARTICLE VIII

The address of the initial registered office of the League is suite 512, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, 20036, and the initial registered agent at such office is Charles W. Havens III.

ARTICLE IX

The names and address of the incorporators are as follows:

Ronald A. Jacks—1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20036
Charles W. Havens III—4316 Windom Place, NW., Washington, DC 20016
Maryanne K. Brockley—1100 22nd Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037

ARTICLE X

The members shall have the power to amend or repeal any provision of these articles of incorporation or the bylaws, in the manner set forth in the bylaws and consistent with all applicable laws and regulations.

ARTICLE XI

First: No substantial part of the activities of the corporation shall be carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Notwithstanding any other provision of these articles, the corporation shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on (a) by a corporation exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or (b) by a corporation contributions to which are deductible under section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Second: Upon the dissolution of the corporation, the Board of Directors shall, after paying or making provision for the payment of all of the liabilities of the corporation, dispose of all the assets of the corporation exclusively for the purposes of the corporation in such manner, or, to such organization or organizations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, religious, or scientific purposes as shall at the time qualify as an exempt organization or organizations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as the Board Directors shall determine. Any of such assets not so disposed of shall be disposed of by the U.S. District Court of said District, in which the principal office of the corporation is then located, exclusively for such purposes or to such organization or organizations, as said Court shall determine, which are organized and operated exclusively for such purposes.

Third: The corporation is not organized nor will be operated as a private foundation as defined in Section 509 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In addition and even though the corporation is not a private foundation within the meaning of Section 509 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 the corporation will (a) distribute all of its income in accordance with paragraph second, above, in such manner as not to subject the corporation to any tax under Section 4942(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969; (b) will not engage in any act of self dealing as defined in Section 4941(d) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969; (c) will not retain any excess business holdings as defined in Section 4943(c) of the Tax Reform act of 1969; (d) will not make any investments in such manner as to subject it to tax under Section 4944 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969; (e) will not make any taxable expenditures as defined in Section 4945(d) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we the undersigned incorporators have hereunto set hands and seal this 28th day of May, 1970.

s/ Maryanne K. Brockley (Seal)
s/ Ronald A. Jacks (Seal)
s/ Charles W. Havens III (Seal)

City of Washington
ss:
District of Columbia

I, Elizabeth M. Quinten, a Notary Public, hereby certify that on the 28th day of May 1970, personally appeared before me Maryanne X. Brockley, Ronald A. Jacks, and Charles W. Havens III, who being by me first duly sworn, declared that they signed the foregoing Articles of Incorporation of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia as incorporators, and that the statements herein contained are true.

s/ ELIZABETH M. QUINTEN,
Notary Public, DC.

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

LEAGUE POSITIONS

On Live Prisoners

The League's position is that Americans are still held based on the history of the issue, known discrepancy cases and the weight of intelligence information which supports our view. The League's position places the burden on Hanoi to provide answers and is not in conflict with the U.S. Government position.

On the Fulllest Possible Accounting

As stated in the League's charter and bylaws, the fullest possible accounting is critical to achieving answers for the families and directly impacts on the live prison-

er question. The two tracks must be pursued simultaneously, as a matter of highest national priority, using largely separate but complimentary assets.

On Current Priority and Policy

The League strongly supports current priority and policy, recognizing that the U.S. Government has adopted all initiatives proposed by the League. The League urges the U.S. Government to continue to recognize the importance to the United States of honoring and implementing the President's commitments by devoting the resources necessary to resolve the fates of Americans unaccounted for as thoroughly and rapidly as possible.

On Cooperation with Laos

The League recognizes the significant increases in cooperation which have occurred during the past 2 years and commends recent US/LAO agreements to expand the joint POW/MIA program by investigating cases of Americans last known to be alive in Lao control and implement other concrete actions in areas of Laos where U.S. teams were previously not allowed. The League urges the U.S. and Lao governments to rapidly implement these important agreements, and urges the U.S. Government to expand the level of assistance to meet humanitarian concerns of the Lao people and to upgrade the bilateral relationship between the two countries in keeping with long-standing U.S. assurances that serious cooperation on the POW/MIA and narcotics issues would lead to that development.

On Cooperation with Vietnam

The League supports U.S. policy regarding normalization of US/SRV relations, publicly known as the "roadmap," which contains specific steps required of Vietnam on POW/MIA before U.S. reciprocity on Hanoi's agenda. It is crucial that this process be monitored to ensure that POW/MIA conditions are adhered to and implemented fully by both governments. To achieve more rapid results, Vietnam must seriously implement their commitments by increasing unilateral efforts to immediately provide all information and remains available and by expediting the joint accounting process. The U.S. Government should continue, within legal and policy constraints, to address humanitarian concerns of the Vietnamese people.

On Cooperation with Cambodia

Encouraged by the recent responsiveness of officials in Phnom Penh to U.S. requests for cooperation, the League calls upon Phnom Penh to expand unilateral and bilateral efforts to account for Americans missing in Cambodia, including repatriation of any and all American remains.

On Cooperation with China

Recognizing that six Americans are still unaccounted for in territorial waters of the People's Republic of China and despite numerous efforts by the U.S., answers on their fates have not been obtained, the League urges the U.S. to seek immediate cooperation of the PRC to provide any and all information available.

On Release of Classified Information

The League supports U.S. policy of "full disclosure" to ensure the provision of all relevant information to the primary next-of-kin. The League strongly opposes public release of classified reports pertaining to Americans still held captive in southeast Asia. Public release of sensitive data aids counter-intelligence and destroys any hope of effective U.S. Government action to obtain the release of those involved, as pledged by the President.

On Bipartisan Support

The League calls upon the Republican and Democratic leadership to continue current bipartisan policy and priority to resolve the POW/MIA issue, recognizing that resolution can only be achieved through serious U.S. Government efforts to increase the cooperation of the governments of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and China.

On Use of Misinformation/Allegations

The League condemns any exploitation of the POW/MIA issue. Misinformation, unfounded allegations or claims without proof, including fund-raising appeals using false or distorted information, undermine the seriousness of the issue and must be countered with facts. The League condemns exploitation of the POW/MIA issue taking place at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial and calls upon the Department of the Interior and all veterans organizations to take appropriate action to eliminate this desecration.

In Irresponsible Private Efforts

The League is strongly opposed to offers of rewards which historically have been counterproductive to achieving our goals. Such offers have elicited strong Vietnamese and Lao government denials that Americans are still held captive, thus undermining serious U.S. attempts to generate responsiveness on the live POW question. In addition, the logical result of such offers is the tightening of security on any and all Americans held. The League opposes irresponsible private forays which interfere with legitimate efforts to confirm the existence of POW's as well as government-to-government negotiations to account for those still prisoner, missing or unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.

On Conspiracy and Coverup

The League rejects charges of conspiracy and cover-up by the U.S. Government on the POW/MIA issue. Current priority assets, particularly within the Defense Intelligence Agency, must not be further squandered on responding or reacting to such unfounded allegations.

RESPONSES BY ANN MILLS GRIFFITH TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS FOR THE HEARING ON JULY 17, 1991

1) Could you tell us when you first met Col. Peck and if you had any dealings with him prior to his becoming head of the Special Office for POW/MIA's at the Defense Intelligence Agency?

I first met Col. Peck just prior to the July 1990 National League of Families' 21st Annual Meeting. I had no prior dealings with him, nor did I know him, prior to his selection as Chief of DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. The first substantive discussions occurred after the annual meeting.

2) How many times in the course of a day, or a week, did you deal directly with Col. Peck?

I would estimate an average of 3-4 contacts per week with Col. Peck during his approximate 8 month tenure as chief of DIA's POW/MIA office. On occasion, depending on specific questions which rose within the IAG, the contact would be more or less frequent, on a case-by-case basis.

3) How would you characterize your overall working relationship with Col. Peck?

Largely educational, as is common with newly assigned USG officials. A great deal of effort was made to provide Col. Peck with historical background, the functional operations of the IAG in the policy context of DIA's critical support to the issue, plus referrals to other officials, both current and former, who could assist in providing such background.

4) Did Col. Peck ever convey to you his dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Special Office?

Yes, in the context of complaints that his office was handling matters not strictly intelligence-related, such as inquiries from the Congress, public, families or veterans, which, in his view, should have been handled by others. Based upon his misunderstanding of the IAG process, he complained that DIA should have a more direct role in establishing overall policy, rather than providing intelligence support to policy-development.

5) Did he ever convey to you his displeasure with your role as a member of the IAG? If he did, when, and what were the circumstances?

No. To the contrary, he often appealed for assistance in understanding the IAG process, taskings and other matters, and for intervention on DIA's behalf to promote their position on questions which came to the IAG. He also consistently sought to form a "partnership" between himself, me and Col. Cliff Stanley, USMC, then the special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Matters, noting that in his view some undefined "they" were after us and we had to stick together.

6) In his letter of resignation, Col. Peck asserted that you were "adamantly opposed to any initiative to get to the heart of the problem" and that you have "interfered in or actively sabotaged POW-MIA analyses and investigations." Would you respond to this allegation?

It is false and absurd. To the contrary, I assisted as appropriate in all instances. As an MIA sister, it is incredible that anyone would make such an allegation; anyone who knows me or my many years of involvement in this issue could never believe such an outrageous accusation.

7) Is it true that, as Col. Peck asserts, you rewrite or edit all significant documents produced by the Special Office for POW/MIA's at DIA and that you "insert (your) own twist or meaning to what was originally prepared?"

As part of the IAG, I provide input to whatever is circulated for coordination and approval. I have never altered or changed facts written by DIA or analytical judgments based upon such facts. What I have done is urge additional follow-up as I felt was needed and, with IAG members, integrate DIA objective data and assessments into policy documents.

8) Did you ever reprimand, openly criticize, or threaten Col. Peck in any way? When, and what were the circumstances?

No. I am not in a position to reprimand or threaten Col. Peck. After many attempts to help Col. Peck grasp his new responsibilities, I, along with all others in the IAG, became increasingly concerned with Col. Peck's inability to deal with the issue, his basic lack of understanding of the issue and DIA's critical role, meshed into the policy process of getting real answers. These criticisms were generally discussed among the senior IAG members and with Lt. General Harry E. Soyster, USA, Director of DIA, as well as Mr. Dennis Nagy, Executive Director of DIA. All shared these concerns.

9) Did you ever oppose any effort by the special Office to set up an operation for POW/MIA's from World War II and Korea?

No. In fact, the League began distributing information on the Korean situation in the early 1980's, and I have supported CIL operations in Asia concerning both WWII and Korea. I have expressed concerns, given recent calls for a new research effort on what could only be termed a massive undertaking of archival sources, that assets and resources recruited for resolving the Indochina POW/MIA issue could be deflected. I also noted that as a matter of principle, the Korea and World War II family members should have access to information on the same basis as Vietnam War POW/MIA families, but all should recognize the difficulties involved in locating and retrieving information which goes back so many years.

10) Have you, in the course of your work, ever called DIA analysts directly and given them direct taskings? How often did this occur and what were the circumstances? Under what authority did you do so?

I maintain contact with every department/agency involved with this issue from the desk officer level up. After IAG meetings or when I received critical information on the issue, I frequently attempted to alert those whom I knew would have responsibility for implementing policy decisions or to act upon new information. The intent of such calls was to accelerate response time. In such cases, which were frequent, I would call Col. Peck. If he was not available, which was frequent, I would alert the responsible analyst. On many occasions when Col. Peck was available, he would refer me directly to his analysts. In addition, Col. Peck would occasionally call for me to explain in greater detail what policy directives meant or what was expected from DIA. My attempting to do this is not a question—it is my responsibility to the issue.

11) At any point, did you tell DIA analysts to ignore Col. Peck, or did you try to go around him in any way? When did this occur and under what circumstances?

As noted above concerning the process, I have received calls from DIA analysts or others at DOD requesting clarification on what Col. Peck might mean by the taskings given to them. From time to time, given the complexities of the issue, serious analysts were confused about what was expected, and the complexities were exacerbated by Col. Peck's lack of understanding.

12) Did you at any time undertake to have any person fired from the Special Office for POW/MIA's? Did you ever threaten to have anyone fired from that office—or ISA? What were the circumstances?

No. I am in no position to fire anyone in DOD, including DIA.

13) Did you ever attempt to scuttle an investigation in Laos—or anywhere else in Southeast Asia—to resolve a POW/MIA case?

No. I believe, however, that you are referring to the case involving a former Lao General, Singkapho, who provided information which warranted follow-up. In fact, my sole objective was to ensure either a direct interview by a trained POW/MIA specialist or another means of receiving the relevant information which could help resolve the case in question. In view of the critical need to have access to the information and, at that time, reluctance by the Lao Government to arrange a direct interview, written questions were supplied with a request for response during the April 1991 trip to Laos by PDASD/ISA Carl Ford and me.

14) Did you ever tell Col. Peck that you would have General Vessey fired?

No. While General Vessey and I are not always in full agreement on the approach to be taken, it was I who proposed General Vessey for selection by President Reagan. General Vessey's integrity and dedication to his mission are unquestioned. The point of contention was General Vessey's concentration on selected "compelling discrepancy cases," to the virtual exclusion of others, and concern that the Vietnamese would perceive efforts to determine fate on these specific cases as having resolved the issue. The resumption of a geographic approach to field operations, rather than pursuing only the initial 119 "compelling discrepancy cases" offers greater potential for resolving the issue, rather than focusing all efforts on determining fate of the selected few.

In general terms, the IAG has discussed the tenure of the special emissary, recognizing that as cooperation moves forward, the process should become institutionalized and the need for a special emissary would decrease. When named, the rationale was to break an existing stalemate and seek renewed cooperation. If Hanoi decides to seriously cooperate and facilitate the efforts of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi, the point may be reached where attention by a special emissary will no longer be required. General Vessey has repeatedly stated that he did not consider his role as special emissary an extended one and again told the families at the League's 22nd Annual Meeting that he would continue as long as his participation was useful to the process.

15) What has been the nature of the feedback you have received from family members regarding Col. Peck's allegations?

The families' reaction ranged from outrage and disbelief, to concern and suspicion; however, all questioned why Col. Peck would lash out in such a manner. As a result, it was especially helpful to receive clarification from Director of Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. General Harry E. Soyester, USA, during our 22nd Annual Meeting. He made clear that he had removed Col. Peck from his position as Chief of the POW/MIA Office and that Col. Peck knew of his removal prior to writing his letter of "resignation."

16) Are you presently satisfied with the way that the Bush Administration is handling the POW/MIA problem? Do you believe they are still treating it as an issue of the highest national priority?

The League will never be "satisfied" until the fates of our missing loved ones are resolved as fully as possible; however, we do hold the view that the U.S. Government is pursuing current policy in keeping with the President's pledge that resolution of the issue is a matter of highest national priority. Implementation of policy is an evolutionary matter, and tremendous improvements have been made over the years; however, there is always room for close scrutiny to ensure that all avenues are being exhausted.

17) Is there anything the Administration should be doing that it is not doing?

The League supports current, overall policy and implementation which, in our view, is pursued as a matter of highest national priority. Secretary of Defense Cheney and Under Secretary of State Kimmitt reaffirmed policy and priority during the League's 22nd Annual Meeting, July 12-14, 1991.

Some areas which, in our view, require additional attention include: 1) adopting a more aggressive public affairs approach, including additional manpower to handle functions external to policy and implementation; 2) more rapid responses to the Congress to convey Executive Branch positions on pending legislation; 3) improved Interagency Group coordination; 4) given potential adoption by the Congress of what is termed the "truth bill," additional manpower to handle Korea and World War II archival research for information releasable to the families; 5) insertion of a line item in the DOD budget to cover POW/MIA requirements, including field operations.

18) What is the present League position on normalization of relations with Laos and Vietnam?

The League strongly supports upgrading relations with Laos to the ambassador level, a step long overdue and in keeping with pledges made since 1983. POW/MIA and counter-narcotics criteria, established by the U.S. Government, were long ago met by Lao Government actions. In our view, the word of the United States has not been upheld, and opportunities for further expansion of bilateral cooperation to achieve U.S. objectives are being overlooked. Maintaining lower level diplomatic relations with Laos inaccurately depicts the status of the bilateral relationship which now includes greatly expanded cooperation across the board, including on the two

primary U.S. objective—POW/MIA and narcotics issues. It is time for full normalization of relations.

The League takes no position on the political question concerning resumption of bilateral relations with Vietnam; however, the League supports provisions in the "roadmap" which protect the interest of the POW/MIA issue. In our view, reciprocity, rather than incentive, is the key to obtaining Vietnam's cooperation on this issue; promises have been made repeatedly, and broken. The "roadmap" ensures that there can be no misunderstanding as to steps required on POW/MIA which, if fulfilled, will impact positively on Vietnam's agenda—lifting elements of the U.S. economic embargo.

19) What is the current status of the joint Lao/U.S. investigations on discrepancy cases and grave site recoveries? Has there been an expansion of surveys and excavations of aircraft sites, as was promised by the Lao during your May visit there?

Expanded agreements between the U.S. and Laos, reached during the date April 1991 visit to Laos by PDASD/ISA Carl Ford and me, offer significant potential for increased results in accounting for Americans missing in Laos. Since the first of this year, joint field operations have been conducted in 3 provinces not previously accessible to American POW/MIA specialists, including the first ever joint investigation into incidents involving Americans known to have been captured by the Pathet Lao. More recently, joint operations were conducted in Khammouane and Xieng Khoang Provinces, both of which had not previously been accessible. While these are very encouraging developments, there is concern over deletion of portions of the planned schedule. For the most parts reasons given are plausible; however, additional effort should be made to explain the need for full implementation and regaining momentum to complete the scheduled activities, all of which were planned to maximize time and resources in the field to the best advantage.

20) Will the League have any representative in the POW/MIA office in Hanoi? Will it play any other role in the operation of the Hanoi office?

No. The families have full confidence in the professionalism and expertise of the skilled personnel assigned to the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi, as well as those augmenting that effort to ongoing field operations. The League has no plan to be involved in such efforts, nor do we believe other private individuals should insert themselves, despite what may be commendable intentions. The families are concerned that interference by untrained personnel into this difficult process will endanger the potential for success.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040,
September 26, 1991.

Ms. SUE SCOTT,
Chairman, Board of Directors,
National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia,
2401 Chelsea Court,
Troy, Michigan, 48064.

DEAR Ms. SCOTT: Secretary Cheney asked me to provide a detailed response on his behalf to your letter of August 13, 1991, concerning the Department's review of allegations by Colonel Millard Peck. The results of the inquiry into Colonel Peck's allegations were presented to Secretary Cheney orally. I will summarize our inquiry process and its key findings for you to share with your members.

As soon as Secretary Cheney learned of Colonel Peck's allegations he asked me, as I am responsible for oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to work with Mr. O'Donnell, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, in looking into Colonel Peck's complaints. Mr. O'Donnell immediately met with Colonel Peck. Colonel Peck was unable to provide Mr. O'Donnell any specifics that would flesh out or support his sweeping charges. I then set up a 3-person team and charged them to conduct an in-depth management inquiry to determine the significant events that led to Colonel Peck's memorandum, the subsequent actions by DIA management, and the substance of the various allegations contained in Colonel Peck's memorandum. The members of this management inquiry team were senior personnel from my staff and from the staff of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. They have extensive managerial and intelligence experience and are independent from the POW/MIA oversight and management structure.

The inquiry team examined Colonel Peck's allegations and developed a plan and a list of questions designed to ascertain whether the allegations were supported by facts. They interviewed participants in the POW/MIA resolution process and exam-

ined work reports, internal memoranda, mission and duty functions, and case files. Much of the documentation reviewed during the inquiry reflected confidential communications between supervisors and subordinates or consisted of internal memoranda for the record that must be protected to ensure that agency personnel can continue to discuss sensitive issues without fear of disclosure and classified files. Several of the interviews conducted during the inquiry were conditioned with a promise of non-disclosure and non-attribution.

The management inquiry into Colonel Peck's allegations was thorough and found the following circumstances. Lieutenant General Soyster, the Director of DIA, selected Colonel Peck to head the Special Office for POW/MIA on the basis of his prior outstanding service record and his evident familiarity with the region, developed during three distinguished wartime tours of duty in Vietnam. Colonel Peck assumed his position as Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA in mid-July, 1990. By October 1990, the senior leadership of the DIA was aware that Colonel Peck was not effectively managing the POW/MIA Office or providing quality intelligence support to the POW/MIA Interagency Group. As Colonel Peck had been on the job only a short time and had an outstanding military and combat record, his supervisors attempted unsuccessfully to help him adjust to the job. The freeze on the movement of Army personnel during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led General Soyster to keep Colonel Peck in place even though he was not satisfying his customers.

In early January 1991, General Soyster instructed his staff to find another suitable position for Colonel Peck. General Soyster did not view this as a prejudicial move—just a case where a good officer had been put in the wrong job. On February 8, 1991, General Soyster told Colonel Peck that it was just not working out and that he had found him a good job more in line with his skills. He proposed, as Colonel Peck is a French speaker who had trained with the French Army, that he transfer him to a liaison position with the French Army in Germany. Colonel Peck said he did not want to move from the area. As General Soyster was fully involved with support to Operation Desert Storm he instructed his staff to continue to look for a job for Colonel Peck in the Washington DC area. On February 12, 1991, Colonel Peck handed his superiors a letter that contained broad and unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety in the conduct of POW/MIA activities. Subsequently, as Colonel Peck's effectiveness had not improved, General Soyster relieved him from his duties on March 27, 1991. On March 28, 1991, Colonel Peck attached a letter of farewell to his staff on the door of his office along with a copy of his earlier letter with some personal references blacked out.

The management inquiry team could not find any facts that support Colonel Peck's various allegations of impropriety in the POW/MIA resolution process. They did find that Colonel Peck disagreed with the policy of the U.S. Government on the POW/MIA resolution process. Both Colonel Peck and the inquiry team identified some shortcomings in the management of the Special Office for POW/MIA and the new chief of this office already has corrective management actions underway. Ironically, in November 1990, Colonel Peck was asked by his immediate supervisor to make some of these same management improvements and he did not do so.

Of particular interest, I am sure, to your Board of Directors are the conclusions reached by the management inquiry regarding Colonel Peck's allegations against the Executive Director of the National League of Families. These allegations were carefully examined and they were found to be without foundation. Colonel Peck was unable to produce any facts supporting his allegations against your Executive Director.

I hope the above has clarified the record of our inquiry for you and your members. I am hopeful that the rate of progress demonstrated in recent weeks in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will continue and lead soon to the fullest possible accounting of our missing servicemen and civilians.

Sincerely,

Duane P. Andrews.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I intend to focus here on the League's views regarding current U.S. government efforts, as I was requested to do.

Before beginning that assessment, I would like to comment on statements frequently heard that this issue has taken on a life of its own. What is often neglected here is the real reason, and that has been Vietnam's manipulation of information, withholding of remains and qualified denials regarding whether Americans are still held prisoner.

Since the end of the Vietnam War, Hanoi's denials have consistently been qualified, either because Americans are still held or to promote that belief here in this country. And the statement that was just read, once again, I believe it said, no American prisoners of war in Vietnam. And it has been an evolutionary thing since my first visit in 1982, and certainly long before that.

Qualifications have often included statements to the effect that the central governments know of no Americans, leaving open the possibility, of course, that U.S. personnel could be held—could be held or living in remote areas unknown to the central governments.

What is important is to ensure that the Indochinese countries do not view the return of Americans who may be located as destructive to bilateral relations with the United States. Any perception that there would be retribution by the United States for locating and returning Americans would likely be a death knell to these individuals.

I have frequently been asked why Vietnam would withhold remains. While speculation on Hanoi's mentality has never been a very productive exercise for Americans, it is clear that no other issue would have brought senior U.S. government officials to Hanoi during earlier years. Had it not been for this issue, such contacts just would not have occurred.

Vietnam obviously perceived it in its own interest as best being served by qualifying denials of live prisoners and manipulating provision of information of remains to bring in those senior officials, such as Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Armitage, and subsequently the naming of a Presidential Emissary.

In addition, some have commented that the U.S. is now suddenly serious and moving forward with great intensity, as if there had been no earlier priority or commitment. That is not true. Recent increases in personnel and frequency of negotiations and field operations are not simply because of recently publicized photographs, compelling as they are. The expanded U.S. activity is due to a changed political environment related to the Cambodia settlement and increased willingness on the part of the Indochinese countries to permit in-country activities.

The League strongly believes that the families, the American people and the Congress must have the courage to deal only in facts. The facts are: First, that discrepancies exist; Americans known to have been alive in captivity have not yet returned, alive or dead.

Second, unfettered, immediate access is required to seriously investigate live-sighting reports. While I am doubtful that the Vietnamese will readily provide such access, this should be the subject of serious oversight by this Committee.

Third, several hundred Americans can be accounted for rapidly if the Vietnamese leadership decides on a path of full and open cooperation, to include repatriation of remains being held.

I should note that our forensics experts can distinguish between remains stored for a long period of time, those buried, those buried and stored, et cetera.

Fourth, real access, rather than rhetorical claims of openness, is required to obtain answers from archival records research.

Fifth, nearly 85 percent of the 528 Americans missing in Laos and almost 90 percent of those missing, the 83 unaccounted for in Cambodia, were lost in areas controlled by Vietnamese forces during the war. Vietnam can and must provide historical data to assist in accounting for them. As you know, that kind of credible information does exist in DIA and is available to the Committee.

Building steadily since 1981, the U.S. Government has an impressive record of dedicated effort to resolve the issue. Does the process also—always function smoothly or rapidly as we all desire? No. It is often slower than I believe necessary and nearly always more frustrating.

Internal disagreements are most often based on divergent views concerning strategy or the relative knowledge base of newly involved officials. In that sense, the process is useful in that all serious proposals are considered and new officials become educated.

The real measure, results, depends on those who control the territory and the answers. Serious responses to U.S. initiatives by Hanoi, Vientiane and Phnom Penh could rapidly achieve the full-est possible accounting for missing Americans. The lack of greater results is simply not due to lack of priority, effort, resources or dedication by the U.S.

Some in the U.S. business community, and even in Congress, are lobbying hard for unilaterally lifting the U.S. economic embargo on Vietnam. What would this mean for leverage to achieve U.S. objectives? Now that the international agreement has been reached on the Cambodia settlement, how will that impact on U.S. efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue? Will Vietnam finally see it in their interest to come forward fully, or are they waiting for splits to develop and history to repeat itself?

Current U.S. policy, supported by the League, was conveyed to the Vietnamese on April 9th of this year. Within this roadmap to improved US/SRV relations are conditions related to implementing the Cambodia settlement agreement and reciprocal steps the U.S. is prepared to take in response to specific Vietnamese actions to resolve the issue as fully and rapidly as possible.

On October 23, as you heard from Deputy Assistant Secretary Quinn, Secretary Baker announced that the U.S. would immediately lift the 25-mile restriction on Vietnamese diplomats accredited to the United Nations and take steps to change the trade embargo rules to permit U.S.-organized travel to Vietnam by individuals and groups.

Most importantly, Secretary Baker proposed that talks begin in New York concerning the issues and modalities associated with normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. These reciprocal steps were to be taken at the time of the signing of the Cambodia agreement and with concrete evidence that specific POW/MIA steps were being implemented.

Reciprocity by the United States appears to be—have been geared primarily to Vietnamese cooperation on the Cambodia settlement. Facts demonstrate that the POW/MIA criteria had not yet been met. Nevertheless, the League welcomes and strongly supports Secretary Baker's clarification that the pace and scope of discussions on normalization will, quote, be governed by, quote, Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA. This principled position must be

maintained. As Senator McCain noted in the article I just read, this position must be maintained in subsequent phases of the roadmap, or I believe any domestic consensus to move forward on normalized relations will be impossible.

In this context, it's important to understand that Vietnam has neither accepted nor rejected the roadmap. In view of the specific POW/MIA conditions, agreed to on an interagency basis, it is imperative that any further movement toward normalization be closely monitored by this Committee and others to ensure full compliance with the stated criteria.

Despite Hanoi's unwillingness to commit their government to implementing criteria in the roadmap, concrete Vietnamese actions are crucial to achieving U.S. objectives on the issue. And U.S. leverage has never been higher than it is right now.

In our view, given Vietnam's negotiating history, reciprocity, rather than providing incentives in advance, is the key to obtaining Vietnam's cooperation on this issue. Promises have been made before and broken.

Early last month, General Vessey obtained agreements which simply reinforced earlier Vietnamese commitments, with the exception of the possibility of joint venture helicopter support, which, in my view, is crucial.

The primary difference was that these agreements were reached in a different political environment that surrounded our visit at the time. Hopefully, coming from Premier Vo Van Kiet, Vietnam's promises this time will be implemented.

If my comments appear skeptical, that's because history has taught the families that promises can be very hollow, and high level meetings are only that, unless there are measurable results. And, similarly, the United States cannot simply rely on Vietnamese assertions.

U.S. expectations on accountability are based on reliable DIA data and scientific evidence from the Central Identification Laboratory, reinforced by information being obtained through the joint investigation process. Despite Vietnamese assertions to the contrary, there is simply no question that hundreds of Americans could rapidly be accounted for, as Secretary Cheney stated, if Hanoi makes the decision to cooperate fully. Relating to this is the unquestionable fact that Vietnam has easy access to remains of Americans in large quantities.

In 1982, they took me and three other League officials to 17 Le Nam De Street in an effort to convince me that the so-called warehouse was empty. Of course, it would be empty since they took me there. But subsequent repatriations also confirm their continued access to remains. Thus, I can only conclude that stored remains were moved to another location or perhaps to several.

I should also point out that U.S. intelligence judgments indicate that Hanoi has ready access to remains still interred in locations known to them. Any softening of these basic facts could skew Hanoi's longstanding perception as to what the United States expects to achieve in terms of accountability.

Since the roadmap was provided to Vietnam in April of this year, not a single American has been accounted for as a result of

US/SRV efforts. A requirement to resolve discrepancy cases of Americans known to have been alive is as yet unfulfilled.

The remains of only 5 Americans have been repatriated as a direct result of field investigations into the first priority discrepancy cases. A total of 22 Americans of this initial 119 have been accounted for, most through unilateral repatriations. This is logical considering the circumstances of these cases were mostly last known alive.

In another 35 cases out of that original 119, joint investigation as confirmed death, but also lead to the judgment in nearly one-half of those that remains not yet returned were recovered earlier by the Vietnamese.

As I noted, no remains of Americans have been returned since the roadmap was presented in April of this year. Thus, the importance of provisions in the roadmap which help ensure that there will be no further misunderstanding as to what is required to effect the pace and scope of improvements in bilateral relations. The necessity now is to ensure that both governments implement the roadmap with integrity.

A renewed opportunity exists with the recently established POW/MIA office in Hanoi, particularly regarding access to important records and documents which can facilitate results. Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai's recently publicized commitment to give full access to classified records has not yet been fulfilled. However, recent developments indicate that procedures are being worked out to permit DIA's Hanoi-based research specialist to work with his Vietnamese counterparts to exploit this and other important historical records.

Again, actions to follow-up are required before a valid judgment can be made. Thus far, access has been insufficient. However, I am optimistic that it is beginning to improve.

A frequently asked question is what expect—what is expected by the United States as the far as the fullest possible accounting. The United States database on Vietnamese knowledgeability is the starting point. It indicates, as I said, that Vietnam could easily and rapidly account for hundreds. This would be supplemented by new data from the Vietnamese. And, if so, then hundreds more could be accounted for, perhaps without repatriations of identifiable remains, but with plausible explanations of what happened to these Americans.

Since gaping holes still exist, including incidents involving Americans last known in captivity and not yet returned, alive or dead, an numerical judgment now would be premature. Once more of these cases are resolved and confidence buildings in the joint process the U.S. would be likely in a much better position to make such a judgment.

Turning to Laos, the level of POW/MIA cooperation with Laos has continued to increase over the past several years. However, further expansion is required. This past year joint activities have taken place more frequently than ever before into several areas which were inaccessible during earlier years.

Recognizing that nearly 85 percent of the 528 American losses occurred in areas of Laos under Vietnamese control during the war does not negate the need for a greater effort to account for those

missing in Laos, especially the discrepancy cases of Americans known at one time to be in Lao control.

Encouraging developments have included first-ever investigations, as yet inconclusive, into such last known alive cases, including at the former Pathet Lao headquarters in Xam Nua—Xiangkhoang—Xam Nua in the Khammouane Province area. Despite limitations in terms of resources and personnel, the Lao government reacted swiftly to unplanned requirements, such as investigating the photo incidents.

Particularly helpful was their successful effort to locate the individual depicted in the photograph identified by the Borah family. Subsequent Lao agreement to a similar investigation into the Carr photograph is also a welcome development. In view of these unplanned interruptions to the agreed work schedule, it is significant that two additional field operations are to be conducted before the end of this year.

Statistics regarding joint U.S./Lao POW/MIA bilateral efforts reveal that field operations are the primary means for obtaining results. There is no evidence that I am aware of that the Lao government had a systematic program for collecting and storing remains and information.

While there is no guarantee that further U.S./Lao activities will be successful, I believe I am correct in stating that all but 4 of the 44 Americans previously missing in Laos were accounted for through joint field operations, while only 5 of the 265 from Vietnam have been so resolved.

Accounting for most of the Americans missing in Laos will require Vietnam's cooperation to provide records and documents pertaining to the areas over which they maintained control. Until such data is provided, field operations would be much more difficult and less successful.

However, numerous crash sites are known to U.S. officials and can be pursued without awaiting Vietnam's provision of data. And it is encouraging that both governments have agreed to trilateral discussions at a technical level, hopefully soon to be arranged, to work out the modalities of that really bilateral, but in a way trilateral frame work, trilateral frame work, for cooperation.

While bilateral relations with Laos have been strengthened through a broad range of cooperation, efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue remain an important element of the ever-improving relationship. Expanded cooperation, to include more frequent field activities, will undoubtedly require further U.S. assistance to augment Lao personnel and resources dedicated to the effort.

I was interested to see Secretary Cheney mention that in his view that resources and personnel were more the reason for the minimal number, comparatively speaking, of joint activities with Laos, and it was not a lack of commitment, but in fact a lack of resources and personnel.

But if such assistance is required, the U.S. should willingly provide appropriate assistance to facilitate as much as needs to be facilitated for U.S./Lao efforts. And I have seen them do so consistently.

It is important to note that U.S./Lao cooperation to resolve this issue is a matter of continuous and effective interchange in Vien-

tiane through the American Charge d'Affaires, Charles Salmon. Of course, Charge Salmon is extremely knowledgeable and involved in pursuing all bilateral issues. But he has taken a special interest and a very active and important role in generating expanded POW/MIA activities with Laos.

Regarding Cambodia, after years during which no positive reaction was received to the 1987 provision which the League facilitated of narrative case files, Phnom Penh authorities have recently begun cooperation. The steps thus far have been quite encouraging, particularly to the 83 families with loved ones missing in that country, because for so many years there was absolutely nothing.

The prompt response and cooperation in investigating photographs identified by family members as their missing relatives were also welcome and appreciated.

On a more comprehensive scale, it is our hope that a process similar to that underway with Laos can be undertaken. As with Laos, Vietnamese records will be required.

Confirming the fates of America's POW/MIA's is obviously the highest priority for all involved, especially the families. Nevertheless, we do not believe such confirmation into the live prisoner issue should be pursued in isolation. While the League's position is that POW/MIA's are still alive, we recognize that unilateral Vietnamese repatriations of remains impact directly on the live prisoner issue.

If remains returned are identified as an American who was last known alive, the number who may still be alive decreases accordingly. The League has long maintained that all avenues to account for our missing loved ones are complementary, not mutually exclusive, and should be pursued simultaneously, and all with priority.

These are the important questions on which efforts should be focused. Historical perspectives can be written after the issue is resolved. The League advocates and deeply appreciates responsible Congressional oversight of efforts to resolve this issue.

There should, however, in our view, be no further squandering of time and energy chasing privately generated illusions or investigations repeatedly disproven accusations of conspiracy and coverup.

The opportunity which now exists will not come again, nor will it continue indefinitely. We urge all who are striving to account for America's POW/MIA's to understand this reality. The conspiracy and cover-up theories must not be permitted to continue to erode the confidence of the American people, nor must naive or unfounded assertions, public or private, be permitted to destroy the basic facts of the issue.

The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic. We don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, Executive and Legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial. We expect adherence to established policy and implementation with integrity, not comments from unnamed senior officials which dismiss facts and principle in the perceived interest of political or economic advantage.

The road to resolving this issue has been difficult and bumpy, but productive in many respects. Family members who have received answers which ended far too many years of uncertainty rec-

ognize the value of our collective efforts. While much remains to be done, there is reason for optimism that cooperation will increase and greater results will be achieved through the government-to-government process, as long as U.S. Government—as the U.S. Government proceeds with integrity in implementing the roadmap.

Vietnamese responsiveness is only predictable in that context. We ask the Congress to continue its important oversight, as will the League.

In conclusion, we hope that this Committee, through its efforts, will settle on the body of facts which constitutes that information which is just irrefutable and that we all really know to be valid. In doing so, I believe that you all will be able to find the one in all of us who are seeking the end to uncertainty on this issue, for the families and for our Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions and those of the other members.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Griffiths. I was struck listening to your testimony by the degree to which it really was sort of almost a technical recitation of where each of these countries stand and where the analysis stands, rather than really where the process is, if you will. I mean, you seem to be saying with respect to Vietnam, Laos, et cetera, these are the numbers, et cetera.

But I guess that prompts my first question to you, which is: Is the League happy with the process? Does the League believe that this is and has been treated as the highest national priority?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Not as the highest national priority, but as a matter of the highest national priority. That is—

The CHAIRMAN. Has it always been treated as a matter of the highest national priority?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. It certainly has not. The League used to demonstrate in front of the White House and the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe, in that context, that it is important for the Committee in evaluating how much is being done to find somebody who might be alive today, that we understand the probabilities of the likelihood of somebody being alive today?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree that in order to understand the probability that somebody is alive today we have to have a baseline, we have to have a beginning point, which is—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. —what is the probability that people were alive in 1973, 1974, or 1975.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. You accept that?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Absolutely, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Department of Defense announced in 1973 that everybody was dead.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's right. We didn't accept that. We don't think you should.

The CHAIRMAN. And we shouldn't either?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Now as a beginning point, then, did you ever or do you now have any way of trying to help us to under-

stand how many might have been alive, what your sort of operative concept is as to what the possibilities were in 1973 and 1974?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, our current policy and our position and my personal view is that Americans are alive. Quite obviously, if that our current view, we do believe that there were Americans who were alive at the conclusion of hostilities and when Senator McCain and the others came home in 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. But what I am asking you is, do you have any—Bill Bell this morning said that his best sense was there might have been 10 or 11 or so, and that's his current concept, and based on subsequent information that seems to confirm that. Did you or have you come across any confirmational numbers that suggest to you what the operative number might have been at the beginning?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Unfortunately, I have not come across confirmational numbers. We have the body of evidence, which is people that were known to have been alive who have not been returned alive or dead. And that is largely the basis on which the League of Families throughout the years has maintained that Americans are still held.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be the current discrepancy case docket, so to speak?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. The last known alive discrepancy cases, that's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. And the additional—the—Also the unresolved first-hand sighting reports that are being pursued, which lend credence certainly to that body of evidence that existed at the end of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are satisfied that that is the operative area of current concern, then? I mean, you wouldn't assert that there are cases that ought to be, at this point, put on that list or that there are some that never were included that should have been. You are satisfied with that grouping?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Oh, absolutely.

Well, it depends on if you—if you consider the 119 the sum total. The 119 is not the sum total. I think it's—I don't know if I can remember the exact numbers. I am sure DOD was going to provide them to you. It is something close to 200, I believe, that were last known alive discrepancy cases, maybe not quite that many, but closer to 200 than 119.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are satisfied that that has been legitimately and properly worked down to the number that they are currently operating?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I know a great deal of effort has been put into analyzing and scrubbing and scrubbing and scrubbing that list. Now, that does not, in my view, and I don't think I've—I have certainly never heard anybody in the government say that others could not still be alive. For instance, a lot of these cases are, quote, unknown cases. Unknown people came back in 1973. So there are many cases that are truly missing, like my own brother, that is a missing case. And he—you know, the chances are not as good. He was a 1966 shoot-down. They weren't doing many favors, as the Senator can attest to, in those days. And there was no evidence

that he survived his incident. So his chances certainly are less likely than somebody who say in 1972, alive on the ground.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what is your sense, Ann, if you can help us understand, what has happened that some families feel more adamantly than others or have been treated, perhaps, differently than others and have such significant questions today?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, I think a lot of it is based on not only the skepticism, but the well-founded knowledge that we have that a lot of the families were lied to in the earlier years. And it wasn't until 1982 that there was even a policy of full disclosure to the primary next of kin.

And then that policy was made into law with Senator Smith's amendment or bill, I think it was originally a bill and became an amendment, in the House side and then subsequently what is taking place now on full disclosure. The—The League fought hard for full disclosure. We didn't have the information. We had to all file FOIA Acts in the late 1970's and—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was going on? If I can interrupt you, because my time is almost up. Excuse me for doing that. What was going on? What was happening that, as you say, people were declared dead, you didn't believe they were, you had to fight under the Freedom of Information Act—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. —to get information.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. And, as you say, people were lied to. What was happening? Was this an effort to shut this thing away?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes. Well, it is a complex answer, actually, because, first of all, this war, the Vietnam War, was very divisive in this country. And, of course, part of it was a secret war. We weren't there. Part of the lying; concerned families who were told their relatives were missing in Vietnam, when in fact they were in Cambodia or Lao. There was a multitude of misrepresentations, distortions, and outright falsehoods. That is part of the past, but that is an inherited thing that all of us had to deal with.

So when you start getting information that is different from what you got earlier, even though you welcome the new information, you compare the two and they are not the same. I mean, the President of the United States admitted that this issue was not handled properly in the past. There is no question that it wasn't. There was no political will. This country didn't want to hear the words Vietnam and the Vietnam veterans can—you know, attest to that. They certainly didn't want to hear POW/MIA.

So that was a 7-year period in there where we had to focus almost all of our efforts on trying to get our own government's attention, to make our own government take the issue seriously. Now, we fought hard to do that. And, at that point, the League was smaller than it had ever been because it is very hard to get support. The media certainly wouldn't pay attention, because it just was not the popular thing to do.

Subsequent to that when people started to get a better realistic grasp on dealing with Vietnam and certainly after President Reagan came into office the priority was raised. We knew it would be. He had a commitment from the time they came back all of the

way through before he was ever a candidate. So we knew he would bring in some seriousness and it was an evolutionary policy, an evolutionary process, that brought us up to where it is worthwhile to have 88 additional people and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. It wouldn't have done any good in the earlier years when they wouldn't even let us in.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. My time is up. And I want to pass the baton, so to speak. But I do want to say that the Committee, and we have all talked about this privately, this is not going to be a quote, witch hunt. We are all determined about that. And I don't want this Committee turned into that.

And we are not trying to go back for the purpose of trying to do anything except understanding that if we can't lay it on the table, as I think you have now, and as we must continue to, we are not going to be able to establish baselines, we are not going to have an understanding of probabilities, and we are not going to be able to draw conclusions.

So we are determined to do that with that view in mind. And I think it is very important to be able to make that inquiry appropriately.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I do, too. I think—What the Board of Directors is concerned about, and many of the families are, we lived through a Select Committee Investigation. We lived through a Presidential Commission. In both instances, it took us years to overcome the damage that was done to the credibility of this issue.

There is concern that the body of facts in the middle will get lost. And that is our concern. There are viable facts here. You have started this investigation. We encourage you to make it fully open to interview everybody in the world and get to the bottom of this. What concerns us is that the Committee, using only U.S. information because you can't get what we don't yet have from the Vietnamese, Lao, or Cambodians.

It will be impossible for this Committee to decide today if Americans are still held, because you don't have the information that we have been trying to obtain. Those prior Select Committee and Commission did exactly that. And they concluded that nobody was alive based on assertions of the Vietnamese and not a factual objective effort. So we have legitimate concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. We don't want the body of evidence to be lost.

The CHAIRMAN. That's why you are here today. That's why we are having these baseline hearings at the beginning. And we hope we will heed your warnings and frame this thing in a way that we don't lose the body of the evidence. And we look to you and others to help us do that.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going to pass and yield my time to Senator Grassley. I will leave it up to the Chairman, do you want to give it to him now or when his time comes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am comfortable doing whatever both of you gentlemen want to do. Do you want to go now, Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. I will take my turn after Senator Brown.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Ann, you have talked with the leaders of a number—

The CHAIRMAN. I have just been reminded that I neglected to swear the witness, and I need to do that for all further testimony. I apologize for that. It is my fault. If you could just stand. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I certainly do. It's a law, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator BROWN. Ann, I understand you have talked with the leaders of a number of the countries in Southeast Asia about this issue. Early in your testimony you mentioned what sounded like a loophole in the way they talk, my phraseology. Something to the point that the central governments know of no POW's being held.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator BROWN. The implication being that perhaps others may be aware, or maybe there are people outside of the control of the central government, who know where POW's are.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Have you ever had anyone suggest that alternative to you from those governments?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Not as directly as what you are raising the question to me now, Senator, but what I am saying is that the official positions of the Vietnamese government have been evolutionary and have always been conditional or leaving some sort of, as you put it, loophole.

American prisoners of war to the knowledge of the government, or American prisoners of war in Vietnam. And they have done that with Congressional delegations as well. So is that to mislead us? Is that to continue a belief when they are not alive or is that because, in fact, they do.

I have a good example. Robert Schwab, for instance. And clear back to the Select Committee, the Montgomery Select Committee, when that Committee travelled to Vietnam, they were told that there were no Americans being held captive and Tucker Googleman died in prison after their visit. Now—according to the record.

With Robert Schwab, many people have said this was the American who sailed over to follow his heart and sailed into Vietnam to rescue his fiancée. Some of us never gave up the hope that he might be alive and we pursued that very hard. Others have said the Vietnamese denied that anyone was alive. They never denied that Robert Schwab was alive. I am just saying what they did say is, well, we are unaware that he is alive and being held here, but we will check with authorities in the South. I mean, there was always a caveat there. We have found caveats throughout. Now, is that intentional to mislead or is it because they are still holding?

Senator BROWN. Well, with Bobby Garwood—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right.

Senator BROWN. —clearly they had indicated they did not hold American POW's—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Correct. That's another obvious.

Senator BROWN. —prior to his being released. Do you recall how they explained that when he was released?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Explained their previous denials.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Basically, I think they said that we—something like, we considered him one of us, that—I mean, it was kind of like that. I don't know the exact phrase.

Senator BROWN. So, presumably, someone they considered one of them would no longer fall into the classification, in their mind, of a POW?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Presumably not.

Senator BROWN. Well, the letter from the Ambassador says, quote, no living American prisoners of war in Vietnam. Potential loopholes there?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Sure.

Senator BROWN. One, that they could be outside of the country?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. In another of the Indochina countries, possibly, not called a prisoner of war, may be living freely. Half of the DIA first-hand sighting reports that are under continuing investigation are, quote, living freely. And that isn't a judgment the U.S. government makes as to whether or not that person is living there of their own volition. That would be done according to policy after the individual returned.

But that is kind of the breakdown that DIA has, captivity cases, living freely cases, and the other, in Vietnam, prisoner of war. But I can assure you that the Vietnamese certainly have been asked for knowledge of any Americans under any circumstances who may have elected to remain there, who may have committed what they consider to be crimes according to Vietnamese law there for criminals. We have asked them for people in any category and even—I once used the example, even if my own brother had elected to stay in Vietnam, my family, my mother, would like to know that he made that decision of his own volition. But still no response.

Senator BROWN. Well, the bottom line is, your belief is they haven't issued a flat denial yet, a flat total denial.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I haven't seen a categorical one, but I don't think it would be helpful if they did. That backs—I mean, it is sort of like the time that I remember Walter Cronkite was going into talk to Pham Van Dong and the one thing we asked him not to do was to put a microphone in front of him and say, are you holding prisoners. Quite obviously he would say no. And that makes it even more difficult then for prisoners to be removed.

I think it very important on the live prisoner issue that should they locate someone outside their control that there not be appropriate attitude of recrimination, that such individuals that the U.S. would work sensitively with them to effect immediate return.

Senator BROWN. Last question. I do not know if you have seen the May 23rd, 1991, Report on Examination of U.S. Policies toward POW's. It was issued by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. We have it.

Senator BROWN. You have not seen it?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, no, we have.

Senator BROWN. You have?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Simply, for the record, there were some grumpy comments about you.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's usual, Senator.

Senator BROWN. Including the statement, "She apparently has access to top secret code worded message traffic for which she is supposedly not cleared and she receives it well ahead of DIA intelligence analysts."

Just to clear up the record, do you have access and are you cleared?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Isn't that in the Colonel Peck alleged resignation letter?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I say alleged because, Senator—I mean, General Soyster told all the families at our national convention that Colonel Peck was removed from his position and did not resign. I have a top secret clearance, not a code word clearance. And I would be embarrassed if I were the Chief of POW/MIA Office to admit that as little time as I have to read, I get message traffic before he does. I just can't imagine that is true.

Senator BROWN. You do have clearance?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator BROWN. You do see these messages?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. To the extent that I have time. Unfortunately, I don't have the time I wish I had.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. I would like to follow Senator Brown and get this matter cleared up. In fact, what Colonel Peck wrote, and he's talking about you, "The Director of the National League of Families occupies an interesting and questionable position in the whole process. Although assiduously churning the account to give a tawdry illusion of progress, she is adamantly opposed to any initiative to actually get to the heart of the problem, and more importantly, interferes in or actively sabotages POW/MIA analysis of investigations."

"She insists on rewriting or editing all significant documents produced by the office, then touted as the DIA position. She apparently has access to top secret code word message traffic for which she is supposedly not cleared, and she receives it well ahead of the DIA intelligence analysts. Her influence in jerking around everyone and everything involved in the issue goes far beyond the war and MIA protestor gone straight scenario."

"She was brought from the outside into the center of the imbroglio and then cloaked in a mantle of sanctimony, routinely impedes real progress and insidiously muddles up the issue. One wonders who she really is and where she came from."

Following up on what Senator Brown said, that's the end of his quote, have you ever had access to secret government documents on the POW/MIA issue?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Regularly.

Senator REID. How do you get those?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. From every agency of the government. As a member of the Interagency Group, I have a top secret clearance.

Senator REID. Have you ever asked to rewrite a DIA position?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No. What I think—well, first of all, Colonel Peck was there for such a short time, I don't think he had a very good grasp on interagency coordination and differentiated between policy documents or the kinds of things like press guidance and

policy positions that everyone puts their comments on who is a member of the IAG.

As far as for instance, the outrageous slander that I would impede efforts to resolve this issue, particularly on the live prisoner issue, is just outrageous and it's false and I can't imagine why he would say it except to say what the—Secretary Andrews said and General Soyster has said. He was the wrong man for the job. I'm sure he was frustrated.

Contrary to him, I wish I had the authority that is being ascribed to me. I don't think we would have quite as many mistakes and as much bureaucratic in-fighting and discussion as sometimes takes place in the Interagency Group.

Senator REID. Have you ever interfered with a POW/MIA investigation?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

Senator REID. I think it would be important to us then if you would give us your background before coming direct to the League of Families, and then tell us what your duties encompass as Director of the League of Families.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. My duties encompass?

Senator REID. Yes. What is your background?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. My background?

Senator REID. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I'm not an intelligence analyst. I have a background sheet that I provided for the record, background on the League. I have the letter from Secretary Andrews to our Chairman of the Board responding to Colonel Peck's allegations.

I understand you all were successful, which pleases me greatly, in getting them to agree to release their inquiry on Colonel Peck's accusations or their internal inquiry on that matter. That's something that the League had requested as well, so I'm very pleased that they've decided to provide that.

I've been Executive Director of the League for 13 years.

Senator REID. Is that a full time job?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Oh, yes, more than full time.

Senator REID. What kind of a staff does the League have?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right now, let's see, 1, 2, 3. Only 3.

Senator REID. How is it funded?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Publicly—contributions, donations. It's a non-profit 501C3 organization.

Senator REID. What did you do before you became Director of the League?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I worked on the Hill shortly for Congressman Bill Young of Florida. Before that I was a housewife and mother, now grandmother of 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Senator McCain.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Oh, I forgot. Excuse me. I was on the Board of Directors for 4 years. My duties within the League, I forgot to mention those. My brother has been missing for twenty-six years. My duties as League Executive Director are to represent all of the families, not individual cases. I am instructed to implement the policies adopted by the Board of Directors and/or membership.

I do not develop my own policies and that is my instructions. Within that context I work, in fact, helped found, the Interagency Group, the only member still existing on the Interagency Group, and that Group is to develop policy for resolving the issue.

My obligation within that is to provide the views of the families within policy established by the Board and the membership.

Senator MCCAIN. Just to follow up on Senator Reid's question, what rationale was used, since you are a non-government official, you are a Director of the National League of Families, that would give you access to the classified top secret information?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Actually it was at the very end of the Carter administration at the time, and there was justifiable suspicion on the part of all of the families about the fact that we had not been provided full information. This was long before, of course, the policy decision to full disclosure. And it was, I believe, the IG was first formed in 1980, probably early 1980, and the rationale earlier, before that formation, General Tighe is the one who gave me first—first gave me access to classified information and it was largely at that time to follow up on DIA's performance as far as their professionalism and pursuing and resolving firsthand live-sighting reports.

Senator MCCAIN. Are you satisfied with the provisions that are included in the Defense Authorization Bill concerning full disclosure?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I am with one provision, and that is—and that's a position of the families, it's not my personal position. I happen to agree with it, and that is that information be provided to the primary next of kin. There's a—as in all things affecting all of us in legal matters, there is a primary next of kin, kind of like a chain of command, and the primary next of kin and the secondary next of kin are not always in agreement.

A wife may differ with the child, for instance. So the Board's concern and the families' concern was to ensure that the rights and prerogatives of the primary next of kin are not violated by public disclosure or just loose handling or indiscriminate dissemination of information over which they feel as primary next of kin of the missing men should be up to them to make that decision.

Senator MCCAIN. And I'm sure you appreciate our point of view on that issue. We have ventilated it pretty much.

You heard Mr. Bell's testimony this morning?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, I didn't, Senator, but I did hear about it.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Bell basically—I hope I'm accurately stating his view, that following the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia there could have been as many as 10 Americans alive. Whether they are still alive now is another question, but there was hard evidence, in his view, at the time that would give him that view.

Do you share that view generally or specifically?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Certainly generally. I have not seen such hard evidence other than what I responded to the Chairman awhile ago, and to me that's pretty hard evidence about people that we knew were alive, some of them pretty close to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords.

We've never put a number on how many because we don't have that evidence. If there is such hard evidence, I have not seen it

during all of my years with access to classified information that would definitely prove Americans were alive at the time that you all came home, other than what I've said.

The CHAIRMAN. When did your access begin?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Initially it was only—it was secret, not top secret, and it was, I think—General Tighe is the one that authorized it; 1978 maybe, 1979. Admiral Tuttle was there. I can't remember.

Senator McCAIN. So that really is a very crucial period. You were not at that time up to speed on the information—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Oh, no, and as you know, there are volumes.

Senator McCAIN.—that Mr. Bell describes?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No. He would have been; he was in a position to know.

Senator McCAIN. Is it your personal view, not the view of the Board, that the numbers of Americans alive left in Southeast Asia are, assuming that there are, we both operate on the assumption that there are, would be in the tens or the hundreds?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. My personal view. It's very hard to define, you know, to say how many you think there are, especially either one of us, Senator, with the position of having access to classified information, to speculate on numbers.

For instance, if I said tens and there were really two hundred and fifteen, then what would be the obligation on the part of the Vietnamese to return more than one hundred if we said only tens?

I just think it's unwise to speculate on numbers. I don't think they're massive numbers.

Senator McCAIN.—I understand. We have solicited from the panel of witnesses this morning, those who were having to do the job in the field, recommendations and proposals in order for this issue to be rapidly resolved. In other words, for the Vietnamese government to be in full compliance with the process for resolution of this issue.

Since you obviously have some concerns, and in light of the letter that Chairman Kerry read, we would like to have your input also, and I know that the Chairman and the Vice Chairman will pass those on to the Vietnamese Ambassador and perhaps we can lay out exactly what we expect from the Vietnamese government and that will help us over time to make a full determination as to whether they are being cooperative or not cooperative, roadmap aside, as to whether they are or not; since there is some difference of opinion, not that the Vietnamese, whether they are being fully cooperative or not, but to what degree they are cooperating.

I think, for example, General Vessey might have some gradient of difference in view with you as to the degree of cooperation, so we would appreciate that.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, I think that if you look at the roadmap, the way that it's strictly written, I think that it's well written to achieve the fullest possible accounting there can be, and we fully support that.

I think where we had concerns is that there would be any softening of the basic data base—

Senator McCAIN. Fine, but you misunderstand my question. I would like your recommendations, either in writing or whatever

you choose, as to what the Vietnamese need to do, in your view, to be fully cooperative in helping resolve this issue.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. OK.

Senator McCAIN. We would appreciate that.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. OK. I'll be glad to provide it.

Senator McCAIN. In fact, if you would like to say verbally—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I can say it right now.

Senator McCAIN.—some of the things that—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. OK. As outlined, immediate repatriation of all recovered or recoverable remains, full access, free and open access for our live-sighting investigators to be able to go not with written advance notice of where they want to go, but actual access, that it's viable, that's going to hold up to scrutiny of the families, the American people, the Congress and everybody else.

You can't give them notice of a prison you want to go to 24 hours or 2 days in advance and expect that to be viable.

Full access to the archival research, which I think will do a great deal to account for missing Americans, including many that we will probably not be able to get recoverable remains, and then there was one other point.

Well, I can't think of the other one right now, but I will put that in writing if I think of another one.

Now, that's what they need to do. Our government needs to make sure that they implement the provisions of the road map as stated, without any decreasing of the strength of the provisions in the roadmap.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCAIN.

Senator Grassley is recognized for 10 minutes for his time and Senator Smith's time.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you very much.

Ms. Griffiths, last time you and I had a chance to visit was in my office. Colonel Schlatter asked me to visit with you. I found the information you gave me very good. At that particular time I said I was after original information. I do not have any reason to question the truthfulness of what you told me then or your sincerity then, and I have no reason to question that now.

When you and I separated at that particular time, I told you I thought access to information was what was absolutely necessary for me to fulfill my constitutional responsibility of oversight, to see that money was spent the way the Congress decided it should be spent, and that laws are being carried out the way we write those laws.

So here we are again today, only at a much greater expense in the pursuit of that information that it takes us to do our job adequately, to see that the law and money appropriated by the Congress is adequately spent, and you are part of that process.

My topic of discussion with you today will be along that same line. I was first going to ask you, but I think you clarified very well, about the fact that you have had 26 years of interest in this issue, and for the last 13 years you have been very much deeply, very actively involved.

Yesterday in my opening statement I made a point about how sometimes when we are deeply involved in an issue, one tends to lose sight of the forest for the trees, and I am not necessarily suggesting that this applies to you.

You are an MIA family member yourself and I do not, nor do I think, anyone questions your dedication to resolving this issue. In fact, you expressed a view that I expressed a couple times yesterday about working with the Vietnamese government and not putting them in a squeeze. I think I share with you very well wanting the Vietnamese to be open, if there are people over there, so we will not be in a situation where we cannot get our men out.

There is one thing that puzzles me and I would like to get it out on the record and let you have an opportunity to respond. Shortly after our visit in my office, or about that same time, I wrote to the Defense Department to get access to live-sighting reports, the very reports that have been discussed before this Committee over the past 48 hours.

It took me 2 months to get a response. I received a letter from Assistant Secretary Henry Rowen. He said that I could not see the reports because they are classified. Now, obviously that is ridiculous to you, ridiculous to people on this Committee, anybody in the Senate, but that was the response.

The response basically said that a U.S. Senator cannot review information because it is classified. I am just saying what it said.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. OK.

Senator GRASSLEY. Now, for the next 2½ months I fought quietly to get a more reasonable response. I kept hearing from inside the Pentagon that there was fierce opposition to my access for some reason, and for some reason I heard that that fierce opposition was coming from you.

Now, I can assure you, Ms. Griffiths, that I did not believe that. Why would any person in your position as the head of an organization that is looking to get the same results that this Committee wants ever want to deny access to a U.S. Senator in the pursuit of that same information to help families get an answer to whether loved ones are dead or alive?

Besides, I know, for instance, that you personally have access to this information. So why would you want to deny it to a Senator?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Is that—That's the question?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I don't. I don't want to deny it to the Senator. Our position has always been that there are responsible committees of Congress, we advocate and welcome.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, after 2½ more months of failure to get a reasonable response, I finally stopped beating my head against the wall and I went to the Senate floor and I read Mr. Rowen's response to my colleagues in a speech on the Senate floor, and then within 24 hours I suddenly had the access that I wanted.

The reason I got access is because it sounded pretty silly in the public domain out there that DOD would deny any Senator access to information just because it is classified.

So within 24 hours I had access. Forty-eight hours later a memo from you to Paul Wolfowitz fell into my possession. It is dated

August the 2nd, 1990, and I would ask you if you are familiar with that memo.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I'm familiar with it, but I don't have it with me.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. I am going to put it in the record, but in this memo you blast whoever made a decision to grant access to a Senator. My name is not—I don't believe my name is specifically mentioned. You said that granting me access is tantamount to co-operating with a witch hunt.

[The information referred to follows:]

LETTER FROM ANNE MILLS GRIFFITHS TO PAUL WOLFOWITZ

FROM: Ann Mills Griffiths

Subject: Access to Classified POW/MIA Material

Date: August 3, 1990

On August 1, letters from ASD/LA Dave Gribbin were sent to Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC), and Charles Grassley (R-IA) giving them full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue. In addition, Mr. Gribbin suggested that the Senators may wish to invite staff of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, with the appropriate clearances and with responsibility for the POW/MIA issue, to accompany them to review of the classified material.

An additional August 1 letter was sent to Representative Beilenson stating that Congressman Bob Smith (R-NH) would be provided the same opportunity, along with staff of the Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, under the same clearance criteria. Mr. Gribbin's decision to pursue this course (which I understand was strongly opposed by ISA, DIA and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army) has far reaching ramifications about which I feel you and the Secretary should be aware.

As you know, the President, Vice President, Secretary Cheney, you Bob Kimmitt and others have firmly committed the U.S. Government to pursuing resolution of the POW/MIA issue as a matter of highest national priority. These pledges were taken at face value and gratefully received by POW/MIA families. If implemented, this course makes a mockery of the Bush Administration's commitments.

On any matter of highest national priority, sensitive information is not subject to indiscriminate release outside of the parameters established by the Congress itself, i.e., the respective Select Committees on Intelligence and responsible staff members with appropriate clearances. This path, if followed, sets a precedent for similar access on other issues; such a step would not be considered, much less approved, on Cambodian, Soviet, Chinese, Middle East or other matter of importance to the U.S. In short, the President's and Secretary's pledges will be viewed as nothing more than hollow tokenism.

Mr. Gribbin's communications authorize access to individual Members of Congress who have been loudest in proclaiming that USG officials are not pursuing this issue with integrity or priority. (Examples are enclosed.) Their records are replete with implications, or outright assertions, that the USG is involved in a conspiracy to cover up evidence that Americans are being held captive in Southeast Asia.

I have no concern that Members of Congress or staff will uncover anything which would lend credence to the charges of conspiracy against which we have collectively fought since the 1983-86 time frame. On the contrary, while problems are continuously identified and remedied, there is a great well of talent in DIA's Special POW/MIA Office.

My concern is that if this decision is implemented, the above message—that the POW/MIA issue is one solely of rhetorical priority—will be made clear throughout the U.S. Government. Equally or more important, Hanoi will perceive that stated U.S. policy on this issue is no longer valid and that resolution of the fates of America's POW/MIA's is not an issue which they need to seriously address.

Beyond these significant policy considerations, there will be a severe negative impact throughout the intelligence community. One can anticipate immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files currently held by DIA. Department of State, the FBI and DEA, as well as friendly foreign intelligence services and others with ongoing investigations and cooperative programs will cease all cooperation on POW/MIA related matters. Sensitive sources and methods will be exposed which will have an adverse effect on source coopera-

tion and reporting. Strategies will be exposed and negotiations will be compromised by revealing the extent of U.S. knowledge and intelligence gaps to those from whom we are seeking information.

As outlined in Mr. Gribbin's letters, DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will necessarily be available to assist the Members of Congress and staff during their review of the material. This will usurp critical manpower from important and serious efforts to accomplish the objectives stated by the President and Secretary Cheney. The current level of personnel in DIA's POW/MIA office was established as a result of the Reagan/Bush priority, hard earned and absolutely mandatory. Squandering their time and efforts to participate in a "witch hunt" against themselves does nothing to help resolve the issue and, in fact, lends credence to those most involved in accusations that a "mindset to debunk" exists in that office.

Finally, indiscriminate release such as Mr. Gribbin has now invited will potentially subject POW/MIA family members to further, tragic exploitation by "activists." I am appalled by this action from an individual who obviously knows little about the issue but is seeking to render to Congress by sacrificing principle and the integrity of the President and Secretary Cheney. He clearly has no understanding of what this will mean in the broader sense, not to mention POW/MIA.

Senator GRASSLEY. You said the following things would happen if a Senator had access, and I am not going to read the whole memo because I have asked to have it included in the record, but just a few sentences.

"If implemented, this course makes a mockery of Bush Administration commitments." Next, "The President and Secretary's pledges will be viewed as nothing more than hollow tokenism. If this decision is implemented, the message that the POW/MIA issue is one solely of rhetorical priority will be made clear throughout the U.S. Government. Hanoi will perceive that stated U.S. policy on this issue is no longer valid and that resolution of the fate of American POW/MIA's is not an issue which they need to seriously address."

The last quote, "One can anticipate immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files currently held by DIA. Department of State, the FBI and DEA, as well as friendly foreign intelligence services and others with ongoing investigations and cooperative programs will cease all cooperation on POW/MIA related matters. Sensitive sources and methods will be exposed, which will have an adverse effect on source cooperation and reporting. Strategies will be exposed and negotiations will be compromised by revealing the extent of U.S. knowledge and intelligence gaps to those from whom we are seeking information."

Now, this kind of makes it sound like the sky is falling, all because one little insignificant Senator was asking for information to live-sighting reports.

So this is what I would like to have you explain: Why did you write this memo to Paul Wolfowitz, why do you believe a U.S. Senator should be denied access to the same information that you have access to as a private citizen, and why do you believe a U.S. Senator getting access would cause the sky to fall, and I think you would agree that none of this really happened, after I spent 4 days—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Senator, I'm sorry, you misinterpreted it. It was never directed at you alone. It was a process that they were talking about of opening up everything in DIA's files without the kind of committee—outside of the committee structure of both Houses, of the Senate.

It had nothing to do with you. I have no objection whatsoever, under the rules and regulations of the Senate and the House, for your looking at classified information. That is your right, that is your obligation. It was the whole process that we were talking about here and they were not thinking it through for just full and open dumping of information, and I don't remember all of the details of it, but I know it had nothing to do with individual members of either House.

I do not believe that you all shouldn't have classified information.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I did not read the first sentence of the memo, but it says, "On August 1st, letters from Assistant Secretary of Defense, Legislative Affairs, Dave Gribbin, were sent to Senators Jesse Helms and Charles Grassley, giving full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue," and then the rest of your memo.

So you were writing because we asked for the information?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No; it was also to invite staff of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, with the appropriate clearances and with responsibility for POW/MIA issue, to accompany them to review all of the classified material, right? This is the same one?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. There was a longstanding policy, which I knew to be in existence, that the appropriate committees with responsibility on this issue would be provided full access to any and all information under the control regulations that you all have, which I know little about.

I also know that indiscriminate providing of some of that information, outside of the Committee structure, has ended up on the street. Family members have been exploited badly on this issue, even by some former Members of Congress.

There is absolutely no opposition that the League has or I personally have under the regulations and rules of the Senate and the House to you all having information, any of it. I would assume that you would not violate your own rules.

I do know a lot of family members, I would say, who are a little bit concerned for them to—for others than those that they—those that they approve of to have access to their own personal files.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, let me conclude by making an observation. Based upon the comments you just made I can't help but interpret it any more than there were certain Senators you didn't want to have access to this information, because it was in direct response to the letter that Jesse Helms and I had written.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I can review those if you would like, and provide you a written response, Senator.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, let's let it go at that. I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, because my time is up, by making one observation. Ms. Griffiths also says in her memo that DOD, in cooperating with my request, quote, "lends credence to those most involved in accusations that a mindset to debunk exists in that office," end of quote.

Now, just yesterday I sat here and listened for the first time, as Chairman Kerry pointed out, to administration officials say that a mindset to debunk may, in fact, be part of the problem.

If I may return to a comment that I made at the outset, I mentioned that sometimes those of us who have worked so long and so hard on an issue, because of our dedication, can be too close and lose perspective.

I don't say this necessarily applies to Ms. Griffiths, but I think that we need to be consciously aware of this possibility all the time, and I believe members of this Committee are well-advised to keep this possibility in the back of their mind as they try to sort out the truth on this issue.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question, but before I ask my question, I would just like to ask your consent that a statement by Ann Fischer whose brother is listed among the missing in action and whom I referred to yesterday be included in the record.

[The statement referred to may found in the hearing of Tuesday, November 5, 1991.]

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, absolutely. I don't know if it is too late to try to take it back to that period, but if it can be, it will be; otherwise we will have it in the record.

Senator KOHL. Thank you so much.

Ms. Griffiths, what I have found is that there is considerable—among the people we are talking about, the families of POW's, MIA's, there seems to be considerable concern about your relationship with them and its depth, its meaning, its totality.

Now, I don't know why. I just became involved in this whole issue fairly recently, so I do not have any axe to grind. I mean, you are the person who has been involved for how many years?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, on the Board for 4 years and League Executive Director for 13, brother missing 26.

Senator KOHL. Right, right. But what I have found is that there are even some splinter groups which have been formed apparently—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's correct.

Senator KOHL. —as a result of feelings of dissatisfaction with respect to the service that your group has offered, and it is pretty clear to me that you are the central person in that group.

Now, what would you say to these people? I mean, many of them, I suppose, are listening on television and have the same depths of feelings as you do.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Sure. I understand.

Senator KOHL. And they probably would like to hear from you about some of the concerns they have, to alleviate them, to respond to them if they were sitting here and you had just a few minutes to talk to them in response to those things that have caused them to form their own offshoot groups. What would you say to them?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, two things, one to them and one to you. The League is, as I said, 3,822 members. It's a democratic organization that elects a Board of Directors every year. In no organization, particularly one as emotional as this one, as this issue, all League members have a close relative that is missing, and there are varying views.

Each case is different. It's sort of like you're an elected Senator. I doubt that you got one hundred percent of your vote of your constituents, and that's just the way it goes. I don't make the policy of the League, I implement the policy the best way I can.

If there are those who are unhappy with it, there is a process for rectifying it, and that is through the election of the Board of Directors and their selection of Executive Director.

I would point out that a few years ago, when there was one of the controversies, I submitted my name to the membership as—not that it would be binding, because I'm selected by the Board, not elected as the Board members are, but to find out their views and had it been a bylaw, would have passed, because it was over two-thirds majority of all the voting members who voted.

So there's going to be different views. I think what's important to look at is that the consensus policy is what is League policy, and I've submitted that along with these documents as well. It can't please everyone, but the Board and I, the staff, are always open to suggestions.

We bring things to the Board. They're elected by the membership at large as at large delegates. If they have problems with the policies of the League, then that's the way they go about changing it, and I certainly understand that all family members are equally interested in getting their missing loved ones accounted for, but I can't account for the differences and views and it's certainly their right to start any, quote, splinter organization.

I have yet to hear any viable proposals from any splinter organizations, as you termed it, that offer an alternative that would get the fullest possible accounting for our relatives, and therein lies part of the problem. I don't know of a better solution, neither does the Board of Directors and neither does a good majority of our membership, know a better solution than what is being proposed.

What is being worked now, all that's missing, is greater responsiveness, not more effort. Does that answer your question?

Senator KOHL. Well, this is just your opportunity to address that problem to them.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. OK. I don't know what else to say.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kohl.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. First, Mr. Chairman, my apologies for being late and to you, too, Ms. Griffiths. I tried to juggle a couple of other hearings and so I feel even remiss in asking a question, but I guess coming in a bit late into this exchange with Senator Grassley, you had access to classified material because of your role as an appointee of President Reagan on the Interagency Task Force?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, it was an administration decision that dates back to actually the end of the Carter administration when the Interagency Group was formed.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you then in that role have access to any of the Vietnamese archives? I mean, most of that, I assume, is in Vietnamese?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But I would think that some of the archives there might also have some English translated reports.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. It's only been recently. We've been trying to get access for our linguists and specialists such as you all heard from earlier for a large number of years because we know—what we do know about their system is that their collection and retention of records remains information was extensive, thorough and highly successful, and so that's something that we've been seeking for quite some time.

General Vessey was able to move that forward further and there are indications now where our qualified linguists and research specialists are going to be able to get documentation.

I'm not an intelligence analyst. I don't—contrary to Mike Peck's assertions, I don't analyze intelligence reports either, but they are getting that kind of access that I think is going to be crucial to achieving the objectives.

Have I personally looked at it? Only what has been provided, excerpts.

Senator KASSEBAUM. On our own classified documents, how do you ascertain what it is you want to see or don't want to see or how do you factor in that access?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, it depends on—as I was telling them earlier—

Senator KASSEBAUM. I don't want you to repeat it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, no. I just don't have the kind of time. How I know what to look for is I'm involved in the whole formation of the roadmap, for instance, and the presentation and policy level dialogue with the Vietnamese, the technical level meetings and I think someone testified earlier, maybe it was at the Solarz hearing, that technical talking points are drafted out in CINCPAC, come in for the Interagency to look at them and then they go back out, incoming live-sighting reports, follow ups by DIA, ongoing dialogue in reports that come in from the field office in Hanoi.

I mean, it's a multitude of things, largely limited by my time limitation.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I don't want you to have to repeat what maybe has already gone through, and perhaps you have already answered, but I know you address Laos in a special section here, if anybody has asked you about that, and if you see greater access there now as well, and any—if you have noticed an ability to be able to more freely account for activity in Laos.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I think of the relatively minimal percentage. It's roughly 18 percent or so of the 528 Americans that are missing in Laos, that the precursor of the current Laos government might have some knowledge. They are not known to have retained and collected a great deal of information.

They do now control the country, however, and the large percentage of—almost 85 percent that occurred in areas controlled by the Vietnamese, we are seeking Vietnam's cooperation to provide the data base that they have to match with our people's data base, to enable then joint investigations to take place, particularly the initial group of those, some discrepancy cases along the border that General Vessey had presented to them earlier.

I do see in Laos serious efforts and it's in relative terms. You're talking here of going from very little, one a year, to really seven

joint activities in the last couple of years, I think seven, maybe less, and it's going to be seven or more this year.

With their limited resources and assets and personnel, that coming from almost zero is a lot, especially with access to additional provinces it should be much more, but I see them really making a strong commitment and really trying hard. They just need help every step of the way with personnel, resources, assets, assistance.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I'm now about out of time and maybe this was pursued—

The CHAIRMAN. Take a little—if you want to—

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just to pursue again the fraud issue—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, if you want to take a little extra—

Senator KASSEBAUM. —that I raised this morning, has that been asked?

In your capacity as Executive Director, do you report to the Defense Department? I don't know who you might report to if you believe there is some fraud that members and the families have uncovered.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes—well, no, not—it's been actually reported more to Congress. The Congress has asked us on many occasions, particularly the House Task Force and the Solarz Subcommittee have asked inquiries about that and on some occasions, you know, really there's nothing that happens.

It's not fraud so much as it's distortion or misinformation or a combination of that or emotional appeals, some of which are not based totally on fact or partially or whatever, so it's a combination of things, and earlier the House Subcommittee had looked into this to some degree, but I don't think anything further happened of it.

It comes to us frequently, we always just send copies so that everybody is aware of the latest thing that's going on, including to the Congressional Committees. We've been sending the staff of this Committee a great deal of information that comes in by fax and that kind of thing.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Griffiths, if I could go back to this memorandum, you did write that memorandum that Senator Grassley quoted?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. It looks like mine. It's got everything cut off, but those are my initials.

Senator McCain. This was August 2nd, 1990, according to this memorandum, and you were basically complaining about the letter sent from Mr. Dave Gribbin to Senators Jesse Helms and Charles Grassley, giving them full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, I can't remember what we—

Senator McCain. You were expressing your concern if this memo is true?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's correct.

Senator McCain. They did receive the clearance though from Mr. Gribbin, right, and they pursued as—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes. It was something to do with what was in his letter, the way that it was worded that opened things up more than two individual Senators within the regulations of your own House.

What I'd like to do, Senator, is provide the copy of that letter, that correspondence, for the record. I would like to do that.

[The letter referred to may be found on p. 351 of the appendix.]

Senator McCAIN. Fine, but your memorandum says, "Giving them full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue," right?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I guess so.

Senator McCAIN. You said, in addition, et cetera, "The Senators may wish to invite staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services, with the appropriate clearances and with the responsibility for the POW/MIA issue to accompany them to review the classified material."

That's your statement of what Mr. Gribbin's action did; is that correct?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I guess. I think so.

Senator McCAIN. I mean, that is how you describe it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. Then you go on down and make this a very—make a very strong statement against it. Now, this is your memo, as you say. You go on down in the third from the bottom paragraph and you say, "There will be a severe negative impact throughout the intelligence community. One can anticipate immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files currently held by DIA." Has that happened?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

Senator McCAIN. It has not happened?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I think the point of this, Senator, if I could respond?

Senator McCAIN. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. They were—There is a policy the Defense Department has for release of documents. What they were doing on this issue is not treating it with the same seriousness as which they treat other issues that you all consider serious and of high priority.

It was a process problem, not individual members. Our view was it should be done—

Senator McCAIN. I understand that, Ms. Griffiths. You described that, I think, in your first paragraph. Not only was it Senator Grassley and Senator Helms, but also invite staff, et cetera, et cetera.

My point is those things did happen, Senator Grassley had access, staff had access, Senator Helms had access, which they have been previously described.

In your memo then, you go on to say, "If this happens," which it happened, "that there will be a severe negative impact throughout the entire intelligence community."

My question to you is, because those things happened that you were concerned about, as you expressed in your first paragraph, and you predicted "One can anticipate immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files currently held by the DIA," my question to you is did those things happen.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I have no way of knowing.

Senator McCAIN. Well, you have access to the files.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I haven't gone back and gone through every file, so I don't know.

Senator McCAIN. Well, I think you would know, would you not, if the immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files, I think you would know whether they were pulled or not; would you not?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, not unless I went back and looked through them. Let me put it this way—

Senator McCAIN. Well, let me go on. If you do not know, fine. "If the Department of State, the FBI and DEA, as well as friendly foreign intelligence services and others with ongoing investigations and cooperative programs will cease all cooperation on POW/MIA related matters." Has that happened?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. If they dump—it was—no.

Senator McCAIN. That has not happened?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No. Have they ceased all cooperation?

Senator McCAIN. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, they have not, that part of it.

Senator McCAIN. As you anticipated?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. You're missing the point of what the memo was and maybe it was a poor choice of words. What I'm saying is, for anyone to go and declassify or to just open up their records—if DIA had NSA, CIA and everybody else's records in a file and gave it to someone, someone with clearance, not just—I don't mean members of the Senate, but wouldn't it be—there is a process for doing that with which all serious issues are pursued. We wanted the issue treated seriously.

Senator GRASSLEY. Can I clarify something?

Senator McCAIN. Ms. Griffiths—Go ahead, please.

Senator GRASSLEY. You said that I had asked things to be declassified. I have never asked anything to be declassified.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I didn't say that.

Senator McCAIN. Ms. Griffiths, let me go back to the opening paragraph. "On August 1, letters from ASDLA, Dave Gribbin, were sent to Senators Jesse Helms and Charles Grassley giving them full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue. In addition, Mr. Gribbin suggested that the Senators may wish to invite staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, with the appropriate clearances and with responsibility for the POW/MIA issue to accompany than to review of the classified material."

In addition, a letter was sent to Congressman Bob Smith, et cetera. So you said, "I understand we're strongly opposed," et cetera, "has far reaching ramifications about which I feel you and the Secretary should be aware."

I believe you are talking about the August 1 letters that were sent to Senator Grassley and Senator Helms in the first paragraph of your letter.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's correct.

Senator McCAIN. OK. Those things happened. Then you later on say, "If these happen, then I anticipate lack of cooperation," et cetera, et cetera. My question to you is, did those things happen? Did all cooperation cease between the Department of State, FBI, DIA, as well as friendly foreign intelligence services and others

with ongoing investigations and cooperative programs, will cease all cooperation on POW/MIA related matters; did those things happen?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Not to my knowledge. I don't know.

Senator McCAIN. I guess finally, did it usurp critical manpower from important and serious efforts to accomplish the objectives stated by the President and Secretary Cheney?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes,

Senator McCAIN. It did usurp?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Sure. Anything like that will.

Senator McCAIN. It did? The fact that Senator Grassley and Senator Helms and these other staffers had access to this usurped critical manpower from important and serious efforts?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I don't know how many of DIA's personnel were assigned to sit there as they went through all of these things. It was a significant number.

Senator McCAIN. OK. Finally, being a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am rather familiar with Mr. Gribbin and you say, "I am appalled by this action from an individual who obviously knows little about the issue," which may be correct, but is seeking to pander to Congress by sacrificing principle and the integrity of the President? Mr. Gribbin is not that kind of person, Ms. Griffiths, and if I were him I would be very offended at that depiction of the actions that he took without any evidence to the contrary.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Hindsight is much better. I agree.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, before we go vote, I get to say one thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. I don't know Colonel Peck, never seen him, don't know if he is going to come and testify before us, but I do not think we can just discount his statement about you based upon this memo that you prepared.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, I suggest, Senator, that—first of all, I did say I would provide an explanation for the record with the letters that go with that, and, second, the inquiry that you've requested, that I understand, Assistant Secretary Duane Andrews has said that what he will provide will probably give you clarifications.

Senator REID. I hope so, because—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I hope so.

Senator REID.—this is exactly what Colonel Peck is saying or what he said, is what you have in this memo to whatever his name is, Wolfowitz.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Wolfowitz. No, sir, that was not—I don't consider that at all the same.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can, before I run off and vote also, hopefully Senator Smith will get back, let me raise a different light on this, Ms. Griffiths, if I can.

One of the great concerns here that has been expressed by many people, and you expressed it in the memo, is the notion that there is a conspiracy, that people want to cover up, and what you write in this memo in one paragraph is the following.

You say, "Mr. Gribbin's communications authorize access to individual members of Congress who have been loudest in proclaiming that U.S. Government officials are not pursuing this issue with integrity or priority."

That is underlined incidentally. Is that your underlining?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. It's underlined in the copy I have and it is sort of selectively underlined. I assume that is your underlining, but I am not going to say that with certainty. But what you seem to be implying is that because they are doubting, they are among the doubters of the effort to try to get at this that they somehow should be singled out as not getting it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. But whatever the purpose is, whatever the purpose, the impact is what is important. This is the kind of response that has just raised the hackles of everybody and suggests to people that somebody has something to hide.

Can you, sort of looking at this now, say yes, I see that?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do see that?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes. I should never have sent that, I realize that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's hold the—sir, this is not—I have not spoken out previously, but we do not want demonstrations here on any side whatsoever of this issue. This is too serious.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. My point in this, Senator, was that there is a process through the Committees of the Congress—

The CHAIRMAN. No, I understand. I can truly read your point.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. The League wants this issue treated seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct, but my point is, and you have acknowledged it and I appreciate that candor, is that we have a history of this. This is precisely what has got people so tangled up in a quandary about the credibility factor, rather than the response, "Senator, come on over. My God, yes, we want you to see this and, of course, we want you to evaluate it."

A document appears that suggests to the contrary, how dare we let people who are doubting our effort see this. Now, what happens as a consequence is that that just feeds the frenzy.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. And I'm afraid that—I mean, as this Committee goes along, what we are going to find is sort of a process of that. Now, you yourself started out in this and I do not doubt for an instant, and I am not going to suggest it, I mean, you clearly have the same intention as everybody else. If somebody is alive there, you want to get them back and you want to do it tomorrow.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I am sure there are a lot of people so intentioned over the years, but who for defensive or turf reasons or whatever or did not want their integrity doubted or did not want someone else looking at the issue, and so that mindset to debunk that we have heard about kind of possibly crept in there.

I think that is what we have to look at. Now, I am intrigued, because you have made a very important statement here, a number of very important statements, and incidentally, you are very articu-

late and you clearly know this issue as well as anybody and you have invested an enormous amount in it.

What I want to try to get at a little bit is sort of that history during those years that you had some difficulties, too, so we can understand it, because I think it is terribly important for this Committee to be able to sort that out.

Now, I am going to recess us momentarily here. I know it will be very short. Senator Smith will be back, probably we will cross in the hallways, so if people could sit tight, we will pick up in just a couple of minutes. As soon as we finish any further questions with you, Ms. Griffiths, we are going to put the other family panel on and then we will close out with the final Defense Intelligence Agency panel.

So we will recess for a very, very brief moment.

[Recess.]

Senator SMITH [presiding]. I think we need to resume. I am hearing there may be another vote around 4:30 p.m., so hopefully we can finish. Senator Kerry is on the way back.

I just want to follow up on a couple of points. I think the memo was fairly well covered. I guess I would just ask, I don't know if you were here—you were not here, I guess, yesterday, but one of the things that I think we have all said is that we would like to, in examining some of the mistakes of the past, we would like to try to correct things for the future so that we can make—try to move on and that was pretty much the gist of my opening statement, rather than to do battle with each other.

Do you feel now any concern or do you have any problem with any information, all information that you have seen, or any and all information you have seen coming to this Committee as under the direction of Secretary Cheney?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No. As long as it's with the procedures and regulations that you all have, you know, for committees of the House and Senate.

Senator SMITH. When you first became involved with the issue, you, like a lot of us, got involved and you are much before me, because of—obviously because of the loss of a brother, but when you first became involved in it as a activist of the League, not as a family member per se, but getting involved in it in a formal way, you were concerned that things were not being done right.

I mean, that is what you have said in your testimony over the years, that you did not—in fact, I think, as I have a comment here that you said, and I think this was September of 1987, where you said in a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Hearing, and I do not recall whether I was there or not, but it was an answer in response to a question that John Rollin asked you.

"Do you believe we left Americans behind in 1973?" and you said, "Yes, I certainly do. There's no disagreement that Americans survived after the war."

Now, do you make that statement based on information, factual information, or intelligence that you have seen? Is that why you make that statement?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I make it on the basis—well, first of all, we in the League, but also I personally, believe Americans are alive now, Americans that—POW/MIA's. To make that statement, to have

that view, we have to believe that they survived the end of the war.

We don't have—we can't prove it. That's why we say we believe it or it's our view, it's our position. What we know is the body of facts about people that were alive, who haven't come back, the continued reports that come in that indicate they could be that are under priority investigation.

So it's not on a basis of—like, for instance, what Mr. Bell was talking about, Bill Bell. He would have been in a position to know intelligence information at the end of the war. We certainly were not. We were being, in fact, misinformed at the end of the war.

Senator SMITH. OK. Here's what I am trying to get at. As basically someone at the time who was critical because you felt that not enough was being done to account for the men, this is prior to your involvement directly, you were critical of the process, as a lot of people were, and that would include Mr. Bell's time on the watch, and it is not necessarily Mr. Bell personally, but just the process, people were not accounted for—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. They weren't being supported in the field, that's for sure.

Senator SMITH. Right. Exactly.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. With the political backing.

Senator SMITH. Right. That is my point. Not to cast any aspersions on those gentlemen at all.

Now, what have you seen—are you satisfied, since you have been involved and you have seen intelligence over the years, are you satisfied that whatever those mistakes were have been corrected in the sense that the way we operate now, we are, in fact, seeking answers?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I'm never satisfied. I mean, there's always—it's been a constant state of improvement, change, evolution. They have a whole lot of new people being assigned. I know that there are professional people in the positions.

I think we've got a better chance now; in fact, probably the final shot at getting this issue resolved in view of the political circumstances, which is what I think this Committee can help with.

Senator SMITH. I agree and I think we want to try to work together to do that, and what I am saying is—maybe I am not making myself clear. What I am trying to say is if you were building a house and the foundation is—if you want to build a third story or second story and the foundation is sinking, there is not much point in putting the second story on.

We have heard a lot of testimony about adding people, adding layers of people. The question is, are those layers of people weighing down the process or are they helping to resolve the process, and I think that is very important.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I mean, numbers of people are not in themselves the answer to this problem. I just want to make sure that whatever the mistakes that you saw, that you felt were made, and something motivated you to get into this thing, as an insider now in the process, do you feel that those things have been corrected and that we are, in a sense, building on a strong foundation rather than a weak one.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, for instance, the new Joint Task Force concept, I think the two-tiered approach has definite advantages, meaning that Bill Bell and his researchers and others that are assigned to the Hanoi office will have a continuing and ongoing investigation on all of the last known alive discrepancy cases.

I think that's positive because it's been kind of in and out, and, of course, the office has only been there such a short time, so I think the two-tiered approach, pursuing those on a continuous basis and constantly feeding back and forth with the Vietnamese and doing that investigation, that's a positive step, as is using field investigations where you have a core discrepancy case, but pick up everything else at the same time.

I think that's going to give us more answers more quickly, even if there's nothing as far as direct results in the field other than information, because so much of that information is leading to the fact that remains were previously picked up if, in fact, a man was dead.

So I'm concerned though, any other layers of bureaucracy are always difficult. I think that the assets and resources that CINCPAC has immediately available can be helpful so long as the knowledge and the direction of what they're trying to do—I mean, without the Bill Bells of this world and Bill Gadoury when it comes to Laos or Colonel Cole when it comes to, you know, the intelligence—

Senator SMITH. But those gentlemen or their counterparts before them were there then and nobody—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

Senator SMITH. Well, they were there—somebody was there—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Are you talking about pre-1982 or are you talking about 1982 to 1985 or 1985—

Senator SMITH. No, I'm talking about pre-1982. Let me just go back to a statement that George Brooks made of the National League in 1985. "From the very first instance in November of 1977, when information of a live sighting was made available to the DIA and they refused to interview that refugee, although he was less than two hundred miles from the Pentagon, suspicion started to rise about how dedicated our government agencies really were in this matter."

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's correct.

Senator SMITH. Now, obviously I do not want to read the whole statement, but those kinds of things are what obviously motivated many in the League to move forward and to become involved to a larger extent.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. We had an information collection—

Senator SMITH. All I want to know is what has changed, what has changed? What has changed in the process now that makes you say that by building more foundations that we are building on solid ground? What do you see differently that is going on today that was not going on in 1975, 1976 or 1977?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Today what I see going on differently is a greater responsiveness from the Indochinese governments because of political reality and circumstances which now exist. I see many more personnel and resources being devoted to the problem because there is now a need where there wasn't in 1985 and 1986.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me. Let me see if I can just pursue it and bear with me, Mr. Chairman.

In 1973, I believe it was Roger Shields, but I may be wrong, said that everybody was dead. I mean, that was—Senator Kerry mentioned that this morning. Everybody was dead and this was just a few days or a few weeks after the Accords.

That was then the official policy of the U.S. Government. Obviously that upset the families.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Therefore the families got involved to a larger extent than they had before and formed the League, indeed, or formed the League even prior to that.

Now we say that the next level up from they are all dead is we are not going to rule out the possibility that. Now, what brought you from that position on this end to the position now that you saw directly in the intelligence?

In other words, the same intelligence that was there 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, you cannot change that, whatever they had, they had. We might have added to it or criticized some of it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I understand.

Senator SMITH. But the point is it was there. Something happened to cause you to say that that was wrong, that that conclusion was wrong, because you still maintain, as you said here in 1987, there is no disagreement that Americans survived after the war.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. In our view.

Senator SMITH. Right. So what is it that caused—so in other words, the policy was wrong in 1973 to say that they were all dead.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Right.

Senator SMITH. Somebody said it even though we have testimony today that for the first time that I have heard from those who worked the issue, that, in fact, they did not think they were dead, but Shields said it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Chappy James mostly.

Senator SMITH. He was a very high ranking government official.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Unnamed Pentagon.

Senator SMITH. So something had to cause you now, over the years, to change—to not accept that and to say not only did you not accept it, but that the probability—the possibility exists, that we are not ruling out the possibility, that there are people alive.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. That's the U.S. government position. We go beyond that, but absolutely something changed. The data base in 1973 to 1977, that is what we base our position on, has always been there. The discrepancy cases of men were thought to be alive.

The Chairman (presiding). Has any of that data base been destroyed or altered?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Not that I'm aware of.

The CHAIRMAN. You still have access to that same data base?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No, I'm talking about—

The CHAIRMAN. The data base of 1973 to 1977 that suggested to you—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. But the data base I'm talking about, Senator, is the discrepancy cases of people that we know were alive on the

ground. I don't go through individual family members' files or individual men's files unless the family asks me to.

Senator SMITH. Just one specific question. Did you have any direct involvement in the Singkapo case?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. The what?

Senator SMITH. Singkapo case.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. General Singkapo?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Only urging the Laos to allow U.S. officials, experts, linguists, access to talk with him.

Senator SMITH. He was talked to, as far as you know?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. What did he do, recant his story?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I'm sorry?

Senator SMITH. Did he recant his story of seeing Americans?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I don't know to what extent that information is still classified. You'd have to ask that question of DIA that I assume is coming up after me.

Senator SMITH. What was your involvement in that matter? Just tell me how you were involved in anything to do with that case.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Asking the Laos to allow the experts access to General Singkapo.

Senator SMITH. In Laos? In other words, you met with the Laos here and asked them to do that in—

Ms. GRIFFITHS. And also in Laos. I mean, Carl Ford and I went on one trip and one of the things we asked the Laos to do was to allow the experts to talk to General Singkapo over what knowledge he might have on the live sight 1985 incident.

Senator SMITH. One of the criticisms, and I do not know if it is a personal criticism of you, one of the criticisms of the League is that the League and the U.S. Government are, in fact, not one and the same thing, but, in fact, under your hat are.

Now, when you go to interview the Laos or talk with the Laos about interviewing General Singkapo regarding an alleged sighting of an American, do you go as the League of Families or do you go as the U.S. government?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I go as a family member who is a member of the IAG and it depends on the trip. I took a trip to Laos this past August and I went as the League Executive Director, not a member of the IAG, although it certainly was with the knowledge that I was IAG.

Senator SMITH. I know you are compensated by the League. Are you also compensated by the U.S. government?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

Senator SMITH. No compensation from the U.S. government at all?

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No. In fact, I even have to pay for my meals when I'm on the plane with General Vessey. Now, I don't have to pay for part of the gasoline to fly the plane, but I have to pay for my own meals.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. But, Senator, to follow up on the—there are different trips that—when I go with General Vessey, obviously I'm

going as a member of the IAG, but representing the views of the families as a member of the IAG.

I would also like to clarify that the access to information is basically because I'm a principal member of the IAG. That's what has always been the basis, but to represent the views of the families as far as what we feel needs to be done to get this issue resolved as quickly and rapidly as we can.

Also, I never—I do not have like the classified information in my office. I read at State or read at Defense or read wherever, because I don't have what they title that secure holding facility.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, what I would like to try to do, unless there are questions, we clearly have areas that we could continue with Ms. Griffiths. This is not meant to be exhaustive of our opportunities to talk with her obviously, and I know she is going to be available and working with us closely.

So unless there are questions that people think we ought to go, we have another part of this panel and I do want to be able to give sufficient time today because they have waited almost 24 hours now as our DIA folk.

Is there any objection to that? Senator Grassley, are you satisfied? Senator, is that all right with you if we move on?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Can I just say that I did want to say that I appreciated what you had to say, Senator Smith, in your opening statement, and I did read them all, and the appeal for everybody to try to work together and not have recriminations about past things and I think that's a good way to pursue this, and the Committee—and I welcome whatever you find.

I just hope that it moves—serves to move forward getting the results we're looking for, and that's the principal measure of effectiveness. I was prompted when Senator McCain was mentioning the memo, which I will dig out the research and find out more about it, but who was it—it may have been Senator Dole or Senator Danforth in the Gates Confirmation Hearing, said, "If you've never made any mistakes or you haven't written anything or you haven't taken any risks, then you don't count for much and you're not worth having," and I think we all make mistakes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Griffiths, let me just say to you that I appreciate that and obviously we all do. Every one of us sitting up here can point to a hundred of them, probably a hundred a week, but the key here, and I want to keep emphasizing it, is that the Committee has to do as much of this as openly as we can. We have made that promise and we must.

Number two, if everybody is forthcoming here, I do not think you have seen any Senators jumping down anybody's throat, I do not think anybody is going to sit here and try to say, "You guys made a terrible judgment." I mean, things will stand as they stand, the record will be the record.

The important point is to have a record that does speak for itself and to have a record that is clearly intelligible and where people say, "This Committee asked all the questions, got the information, was not denied," and so forth.

Now, already in the first 2 days, we have had inquiry that has never taken place before this. I mean, for all the years of inquiry,

nobody has ever talked to the people who were on the ground, nobody has ever—we have just begun to scratch that surface, but I said that this will be different. I think it already is different and we are going to continue to make it different, and the key is not to hold back because somebody says, "I do not want the Committee to be able to say a mistake was made ten years ago."

Ms. GRIFFITHS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mistakes were made 10 years ago. We all know it.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. We sure do.

The CHAIRMAN. And the key now is to just readily admit them, and I am confident that if we do that, we are going to help the Vietnamese to understand our own seriousness here and the Laos and so forth, and that will help to enhance this process.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. Well, there are three requests I would make that I know you've already requested, and that is—in fact, my Board has voted, to request public release of the Tighe report, public release of the roadmap and public release of the inquiry on Colonel Peck.

The CHAIRMAN. We absolutely intend to do that. Let me just say to you, Senator Smith and I have met with General Tighe, that General Tighe has agreed to come and testify. He is not here this week simply because he is not well, as people know, and it just is not possible this week, but he will be coming, and there is no player in this who will not either be deposed or interviewed or serve as a witness over the course of this time.

— So all the names from Garwood to Hendon to whomsoever, whoever is not in this, they are going to be inquired of or there is no way this Committee can ultimately pretend that we have exhausted the possibilities.

Ms. GRIFFITHS. I think that's good. I wish you luck.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you; appreciate it. We thank you very, very much; appreciate it.

[Witnesses sworn.]

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA ANN O'GRADY, PH.D.

Dr. O'GRADY. My name is Patricia O'Grady. I'm the daughter of Dr. Richard O'Grady who was captured in 1967. I would request that since I was required to make only a 5-minute statement, that additional information could be submitted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever additional information you have will be placed in the record as if placed in during your full testimony.

Dr. O'GRADY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And if you want to introduce any of that in any way, we certainly want you to be able to explain it.

Dr. O'GRADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Committee Members.

I testify before you today on behalf of my father, Col. John O'Grady, who is finally known to have been captured alive. This information could have been obtained many years ago. But after 24 years, I can finally tell you how many cigarettes were in his pack and I can also tell you where his actual captors live today.

Yet this information was not released to me directly or readily. This information was only released to me accidentally, despite contradictory testimony that you have heard, I can document fully that every claim made by Senator Helms and Colonel Peck is absolutely true. Do you care? You still give the families only 5 minutes to bear the burden of providing to yet another Committee that these men are alive while the Department of Defense works overtime "proving" that they are dead.

In June 1990 the Vietnamese filed a report that stated that Colonel O'Grady had been shot down and "buried." I still do not have a copy of that report. However it was widely circulated without my knowledge throughout U.S. Government agencies. This burial information was reported as fact by our Government even though nobody ever bothered to contact the original source. This information was reported as fact even though a search of the alleged burial site revealed that, and I quote the JCRC report, "No burial had ever taken place there."

This false burial report was used to reclassify my father as one of the 31 discrepancy cases that General Vessey referred to in hearings before the Congress on July 17, 1991 as KIA/BNR, fates resolved. Resolved, Senators, based upon an uncorroborated statement made by a Vietnamese official. Are these men so unimportant? Is our Government so inherently dishonest that you no longer require any real evidence to resolve a case?

JCRC does not even have to scrape together a few pig bones or human fragments or pieces of tooth anymore. They can simply find some pitiful family member willing to bury fraudulent remains or they can simply report that O'Grady was "buried." Why waste the taxpayers money or give the families any false hope that you really seek the truth? Why not just the Vietnamese a list of resolved cases for them to initial?

Why not? Because our POW's will not die so conveniently. My father's case was closed officially for 7 months. Then unexpectedly the first-hand source of the burial report contacted the JCRC team and volunteered that his report had been based exclusively on hearsay. Then he volunteered the names of the men who actually captured my father.

The actual captors, Senators, were not Vietnamese. They were members of a small ethnic faction who live in a remote mountainous region outside of official Vietnamese control. The evidence in the document that I have comprehensively analyzed for you and submitted for the record asserts that my father was never transferred to Vietnamese control. Two additional eyewitnesses confirmed that he was not turned over to the Vietnamese the next day and that the reports of his death and burial were based on village gossip.

The Vietnamese subsequently promised a witness and I.D. card that would somehow document their burial claim. But nothing was produced. Why? Because they don't have it. They lied because we do not encourage them to tell the truth or to return live Americans; only to account for dead ones.

We continue to encourage the Vietnamese by our policies and practices of long standing to provide false information that proves them dead. The Vietnamese changed their report after the new in-

formation from my father's captives. They got this information because we invited them to interview the captors with us. No U.S. official has ever spoken to these individuals without the Vietnamese present.

My Government jeopardized my father's recovery by providing the Vietnamese direct access to its ethnic captors and by providing them access to highly sensitive information. Do you think they might fear retaliation?

The Vietnamese did not know where my father was until we took them to find out. Do you think this group would be willing to admit in the presence of the Vietnamese they never turned this pilot over? If these individuals had ever been contacted without the Vietnamese present, he might have been recovered.

I would like the same privilege, Senators, as the Vietnamese. I would like to speak to my father's captors without the interference of the Vietnamese. But no one will give me the names of my father's captors. If the Vietnamese are free to contact them, why can't I?

At Ban Ha Noong, my father was probably transferred to one of 9 known Laotian POW camps in the area. He may be one of the Americans that is held in wild, remote, mountainous areas outside of Vietnamese control. The Vietnamese have gone on the record admitting that such men may be held outside of their control in such areas on numerous occasions. But I may never know because the "cooperative Vietnamese" have denied Americans any further access to this area. They ordered the American team to leave the area and stopped the Americans from attending the joint final exit interview.

Still the charade continues. Fingerprints and dental records disappeared. Journalists are attacked. Legitimate pictures are discredited. Still you work feverishly to normalize relations and lift the trade embargoes so that AT&T can conduct business.

Let the epitaph of our POW's read betrayed for 30 pieces of silver.

You hide behind us proclaiming that you will normalize "so we can get access." You could give me access today. But you won't. You will just continue to account for POW's like dollars and cents, manipulating figures.

Hundreds of families have stories just like mine. Yet there is not enough time for each of them to come forward and speak. Even when we appear before you, we must prove our loved ones are alive by a standard not required of the U.S. Government to prove them dead.

There are numerous actions that you could take to stop this fraud and deceit. But it seems that you are more interested in pork rinds and oil interests. If you don't care, we do. The day the trade embargo is lifted and normalization occurs is the day that you will see tens of thousands of families and veterans and citizens who want honest recovery of our men, marching through the halls of Congress and in every city and town. Our POW's depend on it.

Thank you, Senators.

[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Grady follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICIA ANN O'GRADY, PH.D.

Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, I testify today for my father who is FINALLY KNOWN to have been captured ALIVE. This information COULD have been obtained many years ago! After 24 years, I can tell you where his ACTUAL CAPTORS live today.

Yet, this information was only released accidentally. Despite contradictory testimony, I can chronicle extensive dishonesty and concealment and document that every claim made by General Tighe and Colonel Peck is absolutely TRUE!

Do you care? You still give the families only 5 minutes to bear the burden of proving to yet another Congressional Committee that these men are alive, while the Department of Defense works overtime "proving" that they are dead.

In June, 1990, the Vietnamese filed a report that stated that O'Grady had been shot down and "buried". I still do not have a copy (JCRC Liaison 1304392), but it was circulated throughout U.S. government agencies. This "burial" information was reported as fact even though nobody bothered to contact the original source. This information was reported as fact even though a search of the alleged "burial" site revealed that "no burial had ever taken place" there.

This false "burial" report was used to re-classify my father as one of the 31 discrepancy cases that General Vessey referred to as KIA/BNR "fates resolved" [but further effort is required to recover remains] (Prepared Testimony, House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 17, 1991).

"Resolved"—based on an uncorroborated statement made by a Vietnamese official. Are these men so unimportant, is our government so inherently dishonest that we no longer require ANY real evidence to "resolve" a case? JCRC does not even have to scrape together a few pig bones or tooth fragments anymore. They can simply find some pitiful family member willing to bury fraudulent remains. Or they can simply "report" that O'Grady was "buried". Why waste the taxpayers money or give the families any "false hope" that you really seek the truth? Why not just send the Vietnamese a list of "resolved" cases for them to initial?

Why not? Because OUR POW's WILL NOT "DIE" SO CONVENIENTLY!

My father's case was closed for seven (7) months. Then unexpectedly, the firsthand source of the "burial" report volunteered that his report had been based exclusively on HEARSAY. Then, he volunteered the names of the actual CAPTORS!

The actual captors were NOT Vietnamese. They were members of a small, ethnic faction who live in a remote, mountainous area outside of official Vietnamese control. The evidence asserts that my father was NEVER transferred to Vietnamese control, 2 eye-witnesses confirmed that he was NOT turned over to the Vietnamese and that the "reports" of his "death and burial" were based on village gossip. The Vietnamese subsequently promised a witness and an ID card that would somehow document their "burial" claim. But, nothing was produced. Why? Because they don't have it! They lied because we do not encourage them to tell the truth or to return live Americans, only to "account" for dead ones. We continue to encourage the Vietnamese to provide FALSE information that "proves" them dead.

The Vietnamese changed their report after they got "new" information from the captors. They got this information because we invited them to interview the captors with us. No U.S. official has ever spoken to these individuals without the Vietnamese present!

My government jeopardized my father's recovery by providing the Vietnamese direct access to his ethnic captors and to highly sensitive information. The Vietnamese did not know where my father was until we took them to find out!

Do you think that this group would be willing to admit, in the presence of the Vietnamese, that they never turned this pilot over? Do you think that they might fear retaliation? If these individuals had ever been contacted WITHOUT the Vietnamese present, he might have been recovered.

I would like the same privilege as the Vietnamese. I would like to speak to my father's captors WITHOUT the interference of the Vietnamese. But, no one will give me the names of my father's captors. If the Vietnamese are free to contact them, why can't I?

At Ban Ha Noong, my father was probably transferred to one of 9 known Laotian POW camps in the area. He may be one of the Americans that is "held in wild, remote mountainous areas outside of our [Vietnamese] control".

I may never know because the "cooperative" Vietnamese have denied Americans any further access to this area, they ordered the American team to leave the area and stopped the Americans from attending the "joint" final exit interview.

Still the charade continues! Fingerprints and dental records disappear, journalists are attacked, legitimate pictures are discredited. Still you work feverishly to nor-

malize relations so that AT&T can conduct business. LET THE EPITAPH OF OUR POW'S READ: BETRAYED FOR THIRTY PIECES OF SILVER!

You hide behind us proclaiming that you will normalize "so we can get access". Don't lie! You could give ME access today, but you won't. You will just continue to "account" for POW's like dollars and cents—manipulating figures.

Hundreds of families have stories just like mine. Yet, there is never "time" for each of them to come forward and speak. Even when we appear before you we must prove them alive by a standard not required of the government to prove them dead.

There are numerous actions that you could take to stop this fraud and deceit. But, it seems you are more interested in pork rinds and oil interests. If you don't care, we do! The day the trade embargo is lifted and normalization occurs is the day that you will see tens of thousands of us marching through the halls of Congress and in every city and town! The POW's are depending on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me just ask you now, do you have, I do not know where this 5 minutes came from and I apologize for whatever that—nobody has been given only that and I do not want you to feel short-changed. So if you have any further time, I want to make sure that you exercise it because there was no effort that I know, no conscious decision here to have a lesser time.

Dr. O'GRADY. Senator, I appreciate that. And if I had been made aware of that ahead of time I would have provided a much more detailed.

The CHAIRMAN. That is OK. We will get into it in questions. We are going to give you all the time you need to tell this story.

Dr. O'GRADY. Essentially I did. I simply would have provided more detail relative to the actual case that I have presented regarding my father.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be asking you about it and we will give you that opportunity fully. Mr. Apodaca?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. APODACA, CAPTAIN, U.S. AIR FORCE

Mr. APODACA. Yes, sir. My name is Robert Anthony Apodaca. I'm the son of Maj. Victor Joe Apodaca, Jr., who was shot down on June 8, 1967 over North Vietnam.

I would like to provide you a corrected copy of my written testimony and request that it be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be entered into the record.

And, likewise, I want you to know there is no pressure here.

Mr. APODACA. I would like to go ahead and read my written testimony to you now.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to testify before your Committee. I would also like to thank my chain of command for allowing me to take time off to appear here today.

Prior to beginning my testimony, I would like to emphatically state that any opinions expressed by me today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense policy. My testimony today will be centered primarily around my father's case and my personal interaction with the various Government agencies concerning this case.

To start off I would like to include as background information a copy of what the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the JCRC, calls the narrative of my father's case. It is included as attachment No. 1 to my testimony.

I had been notified by the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office that this narrative has been provided to the Vietnamese on at least three occasions, 1 November 1986, 4 August 1987, and 25 January 1988. To provide a little more background my mother was a member of the National League of Families many years ago but is no longer active in the issue and has remarried.

When she remarried that made my older brother the primary next of kin and it made me the secondary next of kin. I might add my brother has given me authority to speak on his behalf on this issue.

It wasn't until 1984 that I started becoming more actively involved in the issue, always yearning to find answers to a list of questions that kept on growing each time I learned something. In order to prepare for this hearing I reviewed a copy of all the records the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office has on file in my father's case. It was provided to me in micro-fiche form.

In reviewing these documents the information can be grouped into about three areas, letters and documents dealing with when my father was shot down in 1967, letters and documents changing his status to presumed killed in action in 1973, and in correspondence between family members and the Casualty Affairs Office requesting more information.

This last group is the largest, but it really doesn't start until the mid-1980's when family members found out they could begin requesting more information.

In looking at the structure that is available to family members to work with the Government it is organized so that each branch of military service has its own Casualty Affairs Office which takes care of its own people.

In my particular experience with the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office, they responded to all my requests fairly quickly. This can be seen in the third group of information that is documented on microfiche and previously mentioned. But I have seen the problem where the Casualty Affairs Office is at the mercy of all the other agencies involved, such as the JCRC, the DIA, the FBI, et cetera.

Since the Casualty Affairs Office is just a focal point for the family members, they are dependent on these other agencies for the information which is then passed on to the family members. To be specific, in one instance I made a request for information and received it in the mail in 2 days. Yet in another instance it took 3 months to receive the information that was requested as the other agencies were slow to respond to the Casualty Affairs Office.

An example of how this affects the Casualty Affairs Office and the family members follows. After receiving notification from the JCRC, the Casualty Affairs Office notified me on 27 April 1989 that the Vietnamese for the second time were returning my father's remains. His alleged remains were in box number 19 out of 21 remains repatriated. According to the Casualty Affairs Office documentation they had not received any official follow-up report from JCRC or CILHI as of 1 August 1989.

Well, as of today, 923 days later, I still haven't received any official word on this alleged set of remains. And I don't think the Casualty Affairs Office has either.

Who should be the watchdog for this? Should I have to call every day to ask if there is any new information?

I would like to clarify the above example. It insinuates that the Casualty Affairs Office is responsible to provide the follow-up report. I have since learned that it was the Mortuary Affairs Department of the Air Force that was responsible to provide the follow-up information on remains.

But the problem remains the same. I still haven't been contacted.

I feel, though, that I'm one of the lucky ones. I've heard from family members whose loved ones are in other branches of the military services that the Air Force has the best Casualty Affairs Office. The other military branches rotate officers in and out every few years. When you're only spending from 1 to 3 years in a job, you use 75 percent of your time learning the job and becoming familiar with the cases and the family members and you don't really have any background knowledge of history on how an individual case has progressed.

For the Air Force, the Casualty Affairs Office has had responsible individuals who have been there for many years keeping the corporate knowledge available in the office to serve the family members.

I've also made information requests from the Defense Intelligence Agency's special office for prisoners of war and missing in action. And they've reacted quickly each time. I visited their office several times and have had the opportunity to meet with Col. Joe Schlater, Col. Millard Peck, and Robert Sheetz. I was treated with courtesy and respect. Even though I dropped in at the last minute, I was still seen by the branch chief. I do perceive that that office was extremely overworked, having to perform many tasks other than a function of primary intelligence analysis.

I've also seen their working conditions, too many people in too small an area. In the short time I've worked with them it seems to be that the DIA should not be the focal point for the POW/MIA issue. Instead a management branch should be created that the JCRC, CILHI, DIA, Casualty Affairs Offices, et cetera would report to. This would allow the DIA to get back to its primary function of analyzing intelligence information. And it would also provide a branch that could coordinate all the efforts on the POW/MIA issue, being the focal point that Congress or whoever could turn to. It could also serve as the watchdog to ensure that leads are followed up on, preventing those reports that take over 900 days to get out.

Turning toward the issue of normalization, I feel that we have something Vietnam wants. And if we give it to them too quickly we will not have any recourse on resolving the POW/MIA issue. I've listened to Vietnam make promises before and I've seen them break those promises. Until they earn my trust again, I personally would not give them anything until I received something concrete from them.

The U.S. Government should not react too hastily on this, despite whatever Vietnam or greedy corporations want.

The last topic I wish to address is the stickiest one for me. I would like to restate that any opinions expressed by me today are

my own and do not necessarily reflect U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense policy.

I would like to talk about the words "highest national priority." I've heard these words used to describe the POW/MIA issue. But I personally haven't seen the action behind them. Earlier this year I was actively involved in a highest national priority, Operation Desert Storm. I participated in it every day. I saw it on television every day. I read about it in the newspapers every day. So did every other American. You could not help but be involved in Operation Desert Storm, a highest national priority.

I don't know if this is a good comparison, but if the POW/MIA issue has the highest national priority why are hundreds of remains still in Vietnam today? Why are agencies allowed to not follow through on reports? Why can't we find the fingerprint records for almost 25 percent of those still missing? And why can't we find the identity of three people in a picture?

Let's be realistic. I would not be so upset if the Government had called this a "high national priority." But they didn't. For years it has been the "highest national priority." And for years I've wondered.

In conclusion, I would like to remind this Committee that this testimony deals with my personal involvement in my father's case in the recent past. I was too young to be actively involved in the beginning of this issue and was not subjected to the official lies that other families still clearly remember. While I feel in most instances my father's case has been handled in a reasonable manner, there are many families out there who cannot say the same.

What kind of proof will it take for the Government to react? How fresh does the trail need to be? We need to change our policy from a reactive one to a proactive one.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before this Committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Apodaca follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. APODACA

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I thank you for this opportunity to testify before your Committee and I would also like to thank my Chain of Command for allowing me to take time off to appear here today. Prior to beginning my testimony, I would like to emphatically state that any opinions expressed by me today are my own, and do not necessarily reflect U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense Policy. My testimony today will be centered primarily around my father's case, and my personal interaction with the various government agencies concerning this case.

To start off, I would like to include as background information a copy of what the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) calls the "NARRATIVE" of my father's case. It is included as attachment 1. I have been notified by the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office that this narrative has been provided to the Vietnamese on at least 3 occasions: 1 Nov 1986, 4 Aug 1987, and 25 Jan 1988. To provide more background, my mother was a member of the National League of Families many years ago but is no longer active in the issue and has remarried. When she remarried, that made my older brother the Primary Next Of Kin and it made me the Secondary Next Of Kin. It wasn't until 1984 that I started becoming more actively involved in this issue, always yearning to find answers to a list of questions that kept on growing each time I learned something.

In order to prepare for this hearing, I reviewed a copy of all the records the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office has on file for my father's case (provided to me in microfiche form). In reviewing these documents, the information can be grouped into three areas: 1) letters and documents dealing with when my father was shot down in 1967, 2) letters and documents changing his status to Presumed Killed in

Action in 1973, and 3) correspondence between family members and the Casualty Affairs Office requesting information. The last group is the largest but doesn't start until 1986 when family members found out they could request more information.

In looking at the structure that is available to Family members to work with the government, it is organized so each branch of military service has its own Casualty Affairs Office, which takes care of its own people. In my particular experience with the Air Force Casualty Affairs Office, they have responded to all my requests fairly quickly. This can be seen in the third group of information that is documented on the microfiche previously mentioned. I have seen a problem where the Casualty Affairs Office is at the mercy of all the other agencies involved, such as the JCRC, DIA, FBI, etc. Since the Casualty Affairs Office is just a focal point for the Family Members, they are dependent on these other agencies for the information which is then passed on to the Family Members. To be specific, in one instance I made a request for information and received it in the mail in 2 days, yet in another instance it took 3 months to receive the information that was requested, as the other agencies were slow to respond to the Casualty Affairs Office. An example of how this affects the Casualty Affairs Office and the Family Members follows.

After receiving notification from the JCRC, the Casualty Affairs Office notified me on 27 Apr 1989 that the Vietnamese, for the second time, were returning my fathers remains. His alleged remains were in box #19 out of 21 remains repatriated. According to the Casualty Affairs Office documentation, they had not received any official follow-up report from JCRC or CILHI as of 1 Aug 1989. Well, as of today, 923 days later, I still haven't received any official word on this alleged set of remains and I don't think the Casualty Affairs Office has either. Who should be the watchdog for this? Should I have to call everyday to ask if there is any new information? I would like to clarify the above example. It insinuates that Casualty Affairs is responsible to provide the follow-up report. I have since learned that the Mortuary Affairs department of the Air Force is responsible to provide the follow-up information on remains. But the problem remains the same, I still haven't been contacted.

I feel though, that I am one of the lucky ones. I have heard from family members whose loved ones are in other branches of the military services that the Air Force has the best Casualty Affairs Office. The other military branches rotate officers in and out every few years. When you are only spending from 1 to 3 years in a job, you use 75 percent of the time learning the job and becoming familiar with the cases and the family members, and you don't really have any background knowledge or history of how an individual case has progressed. For the Air Force, the Casualty Affairs Office has had responsible individuals who have been there for many years, keeping the corporate knowledge available in the office to serve the family members.

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POW/MIA issue, but I personally haven't seen the action behind them. Earlier this year, I was actively involved in a "Highest National Priority", Operation Desert Storm. I participated in it everyday, I saw it on television everyday, I read about it in the newspapers everyday. So did every other American. You could not help but be involved in Operation Desert Storm, a Highest National Priority. I do not know if this is a good comparison, but if the POW/MIA issue has the highest national priority, why are hundreds of remains still in Vietnam today, why are agencies allowed to not follow through on reports, why can't we find the fingerprint records for almost 25 percent of those missing, and why can't we find the identity of 3 people in a picture? Lets be realistic. I would not be so upset if the government had called this a "High National Priority", but they didn't. For years it's been the "Highest National Priority" and for years I've wondered.

In conclusion, I would like to remind this Committee that this testimony deals with my personal involvement in my father's case in the recent past. I was too young to be actively involved in the beginning of this issue and was not subjected to the "Official Lies" that other families still clearly remember. While I feel in most instances my fathers case has been handled in a reasonable manner, there are many families who cannot say the same. What kind of proof will it take for the Government to react? How fresh does the trail need to be? We need to change our policy from a reactive one to a proactive one. Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before this Committee.

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

NAS BARBERS POINT, HAWAII 96862

CASE 0727-0-01 AND 02

NARRATIVE

On 8 June 1967, Captain Victor J. Apodaca, Junior, and First Lieutenant Jon T. Busch were crew members aboard an F-4C fighter in a flight of 2 aircraft. The aircraft, serial number 63-7425, was hit by antiaircraft fire and disappeared in the vicinity of grid coordinates XE343517, near the southern edge of Dong Nhen village, Binh Tri Thien (formerly Quang Binh) Province, Vietnam. During his last radio contact, Captain Apodaca reported his aircraft was at an altitude of 4,800 meters and heading east northeast. Shortly thereafter, the other members of the flight heard weak electronic beacon signals for approximately 20 seconds. They could not pinpoint the source of the signals. Search and rescue units, forced from the area by intense ground fire, were unable to establish contact with the missing crew members. A former People's Army of Vietnam soldier, who witnessed the occurrence, has said that one of the crewmen parachuted from the aircraft, was captured, and was killed by the local militia from Chanh Hoa II Hamlet. This hamlet is approximately 11 kilometers south southeast of Thanh Yen at grid coordinates XE638392, Binh Tri Thien Province.

Pertinent data are as follows:

NAME: Apodaca, Victor Joe, Junior
RANK: Captain, U.S. Air Force
DATE OF BIRTH: 31 May 1937
RACE: Caucasian
HEIGHT: 1.78 meters
WEIGHT: 88.3 kilograms

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, both of you, for your testimony.

Let me try and clarify just one comment that you made, Dr. O'Grady. This is, as I have said, a framework. This is 3 days during which everybody who has some role to play here is going to kind of lay out the parameters, if you will, of their case, and so indeed, you are representative of hundreds of families, and I do not want anybody to think that all you are going to be able to say to us or that we are going to listen to, must be dealt with during these first 3 days.

We have one person designated on this staff who is going to be a liaison to you, to the families, but every member of the staff is prepared to receive any evidence whatsoever from anybody, and that is the purpose of the Committee, and I think you will find us reaching out to you, and very, very open to all testimony, and so indeed these 3 days are going by like a blur, and I find myself with hundreds of questions that I do not have time to ask, but that is the purpose of it, to set the framework, and I hope you understand that. I do not want any family to believe that their testimony is not going to be heard or welcomed. All of it is.

Now, a second thing that I would say is that we are necessarily dependent on the kind of information that you provide us, and so we are going to go into some detail, not all of it today, but over the course of the next days.

Now, you mentioned in your testimony that no one would give you the names of these people. Have you asked for these names?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, Senator, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Who have you asked? I might add also, incidentally, tomorrow, or as soon as we have time—and I hope it will be tomorrow—the administration is going to respond to many of these complaints and comments that are made, and so we intend to get action on this kind of thing right away.

Dr. O'GRADY. After the report was finally released to me—one of the reports generated by JCRC in this matter was released to me, I thoroughly analyzed the information that was provided to me and I generated a letter to the Casualty Affairs Office requesting great detailed information that would further clarify this—my father's case.

One of those requests was specifically for the name of the captors. In the original document the name of the captors are sanitized. However, I do have their political affiliations both during the course of the way and currently. I also know exactly which hamlets they live in. I do not think it would be very difficult for me, if I went to Vietnam, to find those individuals, particularly since they were very forthcoming and reportedly very accommodating, very cooperative, and very anxious to talk to U.S. Government team members regarding my father's case.

However, the actual names are still—have not been provided to me despite August 23 request.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the only request you made?

Dr. O'GRADY. I made a number of verbal requests by telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. Who have you requested?

Dr. O'GRADY. We are directed to make contact through the Casualty Affairs Office, Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Frampton. That is who I directed my request to. I was told it would have to be forwarded to JCRC for response. This morning, as I walked into the hearing room, I received a document from Mr. — or a packet of documents from Mr. Atkinson that have been provided to him by JCRC. I haven't had time to review them, but my brief cursory review suggests that the captors names have still not been provided.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned also that records have disappeared.

Dr. O'GRADY. I believe I said the record had been changed. I can speak to records disappearing in my father's case and other cases,

not so much disappearing but being purged from files, but I think the statement was that information had been changed subsequent to the Vietnamese participation in the interviews with my father's captors. Is that what you're referring to?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I thought I'd written down a note as you said that records disappear, and I had a question mark. I thought you had mentioned that records had disappeared.

Dr. O'GRADY. I think I generically suggested that. Fingerprints have disappeared. Let me find my exact reference.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you—

Dr. O'GRADY. Fingerprints and dental records, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think these things have disappeared as a matter of a willful intent to deny you access to this, to cover up something, or do you think they have disappeared because of a kind of bureaucratic bungling process?

Dr. O'GRADY. Senator, I have had to do a lot of soul-searching to come to terms with whether or not I could believe that everything my father fought for and was lost for has been denigrated by the belief that this is willful and intentional, and for a very long time I tried to convince myself it was unintentional and it was a matter of incompetency, of ignorance, and failure to follow through, and lack of resources and lack of money and lack of analytical and professional skill.

I have come to the conclusion after 24 years and hundreds of hours of research much to my great distress, because my children have to live in this country, that it is willful and it is intentional, and I could give you specific examples as to what I base that conclusion on.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like you to share those with us.

Dr. O'GRADY. One that comes to mind again, and there are others as well, but one that comes immediately to mind is a case of a number of family members who were provided with pieces of teeth, or particles of teeth, as indication that their person had died and as identification, formal identification.

When they went back to see if they could compare dental records to those teeth with independent forensic anthropologists involved, it was found the dental records could not be located. This was not just in the most recent future, but dates back with family members I have spoken to as far back as 1985.

The National League of Families at one time called for all family members to provide the dental records that they had on file to the National League of Families so they could be maintained, and now those records, either within Government files or within the National League of Families, cannot be found. It is too many disappearing. Too much information can't be found, can't be located.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the dental records as a group provided and brought together?

Dr. O'GRADY. Many family members did tell me when I was a member of the National League of Families board of directors that yes, they had. Sometimes they were only copies of dental records.

The CHAIRMAN. They were provided to the League, but you're saying they're not there with the League any more, is that what you're saying?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is my understanding, and also not available through other courses.

The CHAIRMAN. I've exhausted my time. Let me come back in another round. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, there isn't anything this Committee or any other human being could do to make right any wrongs that you have had to deal with over the past 20-odd years, but I think there is one thing that we can do, and that is to—No. 1, to see that it doesn't happen again to anybody else, and No. 2, to try to put together some type of a process, a policy, so that whatever information is there about your father, that it be provided to you, and I can give you my personal assurance that that will be done if I have anything to say about it, speaking for myself. But that does not undo what has happened.

I just want to ask a couple of questions. First of all, to you, Dr. O'Grady, on the record, the initial report that your mother received was what, that your father was killed or captured?

Dr. O'GRADY. The original report we received in 1967, my father was—very minimal information was provided to us at that time. We were led to believe both in all verbal contacts and all written communications that my father had died.

Senator SMITH. That was communicated to you from the casualty officer, that your father was killed?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, that is correct. However, I discovered—in 1985 I began my own research—that what we had not been told is that my father had been originally categorized as a category 2, that there are categories—and I believe, Senator Kerry, you asked about databases and baselines, and as a researcher and a professor I always believe you cannot answer any question unless you establish a working hypothesis based upon some baseline information, and the baseline information that was very helpful to me in my case is the fact that he was categorized as a category 1. That means, suspected to have been captured. But this information was not discovered until 1985 by my independent research.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me for interrupting, but were you subsequently told at any time by anybody in the U.S. Government, the casualty office or any place else, that your father was subsequently captured, that they were wrong? Were you ever told that he was captured?

Dr. O'GRADY. No. The first time I have ever known my father to have been known to have been captured alive, although I greatly suspected it based on my own research, was in August 1991.

Senator SMITH. Does the Government concur with your findings that he was captured or do they dispute that?

Dr. O'GRADY. The Government provided the information that confirmed his capture to me.

Senator SMITH. In a letter, first of all regarding the search and rescue missions—and I will stand corrected if I'm wrong, and maybe somebody can refresh me, but I believe that General Vessey testified that in fact some of those records were destroyed, and I don't recall what reason he gave, whether it was inadvertent or direct, I don't know. The record should stand on that. But that may answer some of the—or at least one of the concerns that you raise.

But in a letter—and I want to follow that up at some point, not in the testimony here, but to look into what happened there. In a letter you wrote to me on April 20, 1988, you mentioned aside from the search and rescue debriefings which you said, which you mentioned—you also mentioned a couple of things which I would like to know if subsequent to that letter to me have ever been followed up with.

You mention, No. 1, that former POW John Drumisi, his debriefing, is likely to have knowledge of your dad. Did anybody ever provide you with that briefing, debriefing, or put you in touch with John Drumisi?

Dr. O'GRADY. No, Senator, no one did.

Senator SMITH. Did you ask for that information?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. I asked for that information on numerous occasions. I even broadened my request to include all POW debriefings of the men known to have been captured alive within 10,000 meters of my father, and I provided the names of those particular individuals. I also asked for any homecoming egress reports, which continue to be classified, that might have mentioned my father in captivity, and other documents related to that, yes. But I have never been provided any of that.

Senator SMITH. You requested it but were never provided it?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Was the reason for the denial given?

Dr. O'GRADY. I was told the homecoming egress reports are still classified information. I was told all POW debriefing reports are still classified information. I was told the search and rescue report in my father's case were classified information, and I could not even be provided the names of the members—or the other pilots on his mission when he was lost.

Senator SMITH. This is very important to me, so please try to recall if you can, and if you can't, then get it for the record. Obviously, as John McCain well knows, the POW's came home in 1973. They were debriefed soon after that. John Drumisi was obviously one of those people debriefed.

How soon after John Drumisi's debriefing were you told, or did you know before that, or if not, how soon after that were you told that your father, based upon some comments that Drumisi had made, may be alive, and may, indeed, have been captured?

Dr. O'GRADY. Senator, I was never told by any U.S. Government agency or individual that my father was ever alive, and when I asserted that my research suggested that he was—

Senator SMITH. They then verified that?

Dr. O'GRADY. No, they did not verify that. I persisted and said that if I could be given this information I believed I could verify it.

Senator SMITH. I just want to be sure. I thought you said that they did verify it? In other words, they dispute the fact that you think your father was alive, or they supported it?

Dr. O'GRADY. Up until 1991, August of this year, they have disputed that my father was in fact captured alive.

Senator SMITH. But now they say otherwise?

Dr. O'GRADY. Now they say, based upon the fact that they have finally found his actual captors and they interviewed them in detail, who gave them detailed information about my father's cap-

ture, right down to, as I mentioned in my testimony, he had 7 cigarettes left that they smoked on the way down the hill.

Senator SMITH. But still no contact with Drumisi?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. And no contact with any of his captors, or no information directly related to you and the captors, as I understand it, the captors, the alleged captors names were provided to the Vietnamese, is that correct?

Dr. O'GRADY. Not only were the alleged captors names provided to the Vietnamese, Senator Smith, but the Vietnamese were taken to my father's captors to participate in the examination of the captors. In my view, that's like taking the prime suspects to help cross-examine the eye witnesses.

Senator SMITH. I just want to touch one final point, and I will be very brief, and I apologize to my colleagues. The statement you also mentioned, the fourth item in your letter, the statement of a marine sergeant by the name of Walker, who claimed he was an early returnee—I assume by that they meant some of those who came out prior to 1973 who had been held in a POW camp with your father—which was purged from your file sometime after 1976.

Now, you know for a fact that some statement by Marine Sergeant Walker regarding your father was in your file and then removed?

Dr. O'GRADY. I know for a fact that that individual contacted the casualty office at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas, NV, in the late 1960's, that he claimed to have been held in a camp in Laos with my father. At that time, we were told that this claim was false, that that could not possibly be true, and it was discounted.

However, it was in the file and remained in the file through approximately 1976. It was released to my grandfather, who has subsequently died, in his attempt to secure information using the FOIA—Freedom of Information Act—and I do have a copy of that. In all subsequent requests for my father's file, dating—my personal request under FOIA from 1985 forward, that document does not appear.

I recently requested a copy of the microfiche to find out if it was just an omission in terms of xeroxing. It doesn't appear on the microfiche any longer, either. I would say the U.S. Government would have a difficult time even finding that particular piece of evidence, but I do have it in my possession.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. I would yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Help me with a little background in your father's case, Dr. O'Grady. From reviewing the files, do you know where the information about his capture came from?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. In fact, I spent a great deal of time putting all of the information JCRC had provided to me. In June 1990, a Vietnamese member of the JCRC team told American members of the JCRC team that they had done research in the MR4 Air Defense Archives in Vinh City, Vietnam, and had come across a report that my father had been shot down by the—I believe it was the 21st Battalion Air Defense Unit. I have that in the record—and that he had been buried at a particular location in a village called Wai Ling. The—

Senator BROWN. They had your father identified by name?

Dr. O'GRADY. By name in the MR4 Vinh Air Defense Archives. There was an original source of that information from the town of Wai Ling named in that original report. Now, I still do not have that original report, and so I have essentially derived that information from the second report that was provided to me.

At that time, that information as to his death and burial was forwarded to a number of U.S. Government agencies, including the White House, the Vientiane Embassy, the Secretary of Defense JCS CINCPAC in Honolulu DIA and CIL-HI. However, I have still not been provided with a copy of that original report, and most distressingly to me, even though the source of that burial information was available, he was never contacted by the JCRC team in June 1990 to corroborate and independently verify those statements. They were simply accepted and reported to those Government agencies as fact.

The case was then officially closed, and I suspect that my father was considered to be a case resolved. As General Vessey testified, 31 were, even though there were no bodies, they have to look some more to find the bodies.

This was presented as fact despite the fact that a JCRC excavation team went to the alleged burial site named in the report and found no evidence of burial whatsoever. Again, the case was closed until January 1991, 7 months later, when the same JCRC team was in a town in the general vicinity, gathering information on a different case.

The original source of the "death and burial" report had come to that town to seek out the JCRC team members to tell them that he was the one that filed that report and would like to be interviewed, so because he was quite easily available, they did interview him, and that is when they discovered that the original report, or the report filed in the MR4 archives in Vinh City, were based exclusively and solely on hearsay by the original source's own testimony.

Well, then he gave them the shocking information that, well, I can't tell you anything first-hand, I know who can, and he gave them the names of the men from his village who he knew had actually—were members of the local militia who had gone up, surrounded my father, and captured him, taken him down into the village of Wai Ling where he spent the night in a salt house and—a State-operated salt house—and was seen again by 2 additional eye witnesses who were just curious because they had never seen an American before, and who saw him again the next day, still in the control of the local militia and still on a stretcher.

There was indication that he had been wounded. He was described as bleeding at the time of capture. Both captors reported that by the time nightfall came, the bleeding had stopped. The next day, the 2 additional eye witnesses reported his uniform was caked with blood, but it was dried blood, and that he obviously had survived the night, and so his injuries were not immediately life-threatening. If they had been, he could have been transported to a hospital approximately 10 miles north of Wai Ling that was known to have been—was a known hospital in that area, and he was not transported on the evening of his capture.

Senator BROWN. Did the team attempt to interview other people in the region? It sounds like they talked to 4 people altogether.

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct. Based upon the original sources of information, they contacted the 2 captors that he named, and I'm not sure whether or not the 2 captors provided the additional eye witnesses, or whether the original source, but also there was total of 4 persons interviewed, that is correct.

Senator BROWN. But no one knew the disposition? No one knew what had happened to him after those reports?

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, that's where the testimony of the eye witnesses and the captors gets somewhat unclear and contradictory, and the last time he was seen alive by anybody who was interviewed by the JCRC was about 10 a.m. on April 11, 1967, in control of the local militia, being carried on a stretcher in the village of Wai Lan, and then rumor—what is reported as a rumor was circulated that he was taken by truck to a transport, to a point—allegedly to the hospital. However, the truck unexpectedly stopped at Ba Ha Nung, and—for a few moments, and then turned back. Then a rumor was circulated in the village he had died and been taken back to Wai Ling to be buried. The evidence is much more overwhelming that he was transferred at that point, as opposed—

Senator BROWN. And your statement refers to a Laotian POW camp?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. I have a CIA document with me that does identify non-Laotian POW camps in that immediate vicinity, just across the border. You have to understand my father's loss location was on the border of Laos and Vietnam, in an area known as the Megea Pass. Senator McCain might be more familiar with that than I am. He was so close to the border of Laos, his captors reported he was seemingly attempting to maneuver his parachute across the border into Laos, but did not make it and was technically captured in North Vietnam by ethnic nationals.

Senator BROWN. The sergeant that you mentioned reported that he was in the POW camp with your father. Where was that camp?

Dr. O'GRADY. This information was very sketchy. It includes about approximately three sentences that say, Sergeant So-and-so, an early returnee, has come forward and claimed that he was held in a camp in Laos with your husband—it was directed to my mother at that point—however, we have determined that his story is not able to be substantiated.

Senator BROWN. Is there a location and a time?

Dr. O'GRADY. No. There was no additional information.

Senator BROWN. Was there any follow-up?

Dr. O'GRADY. There was no evidence in the file at any point.

Senator BROWN. Did they give you the information that would enable you to contact the sergeant?

Dr. O'GRADY. I'm still trying to track the sergeant. I've also requested on numerous occasions, through every channel available to me, a list of the early returnees from Vietnam, and I have not been able to access that list either so that I could at least verify that he was in fact an early returnee.

The CHAIRMAN. Who have you asked for that?

Dr. O'GRADY. I've gone to the Casualty Office as directed, I believe I have attempted through various Congressmen—McCloskey

at one point, Congressman Rowland at that point. I've asked for assistance through the National League of Families directly—again, it seems to be a casualty, a U.S. Air Force document. I believe I also contacted Secretary of the Air Force in an attempt to see if that could be provided to me.

Senator BROWN. Dr. O'Grady, you would like the names of the contacts on the ground?

Dr. O'GRADY. The names of the captors that are now known.

Senator BROWN. The names of the captors that are now known, you would like an ability to get in touch with the sergeant to query him further?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct.

Senator BROWN. You would like a followup done by U.S. Intelligence both with records that might be available from POW camps, from people knowledgeable of those, and also any records that exist with regard to the Laotian camps themselves, and hospitals, I take it?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct.

Senator BROWN. You, I assume, would like some assistance in visiting Vietnam yourself?

Dr. O'GRADY. I would very much like to go to Vietnam myself. I think at this point in time I'm the only family member who can go and speak to my father's captors, the men who last saw and knew my father to be alive directly.

Senator BROWN. What else should we be focused on?

Dr. O'GRADY. Senator, I hesitate to continue to ask specific requests on behalf of just my case, because I believe that I could obtain the information I need, and we could cure all of the other families' needs that have long been denied, as well, by some basic policy changes and specific methodology recommendations, and I would be happy to list those for you.

That would cure not only my concerns but also accomplish the same for many other families in exactly the same circumstance, and I cannot tell you how many others could come here and tell you information has been purged from the file, information has been altered, information is inconsistent, information is inaccurate, and so we need not a piecemeal case-by-case basis of resolution, though I certainly appreciate that. We need a structured approach that is effective immediately.

Senator BROWN. We need the specifics, if you're willing to supply them.

Dr. O'GRADY. Certainly. I can go on record right now with 12 recommendations, if you would allow the time.

Senator BROWN. I think that would be very helpful, and I would certainly yield to the chairman's discretion on time. I know he's under some constraints, but frankly, one of the frustrations here is people expressing problems with the process and yet not having the specifics brought out so that we can follow up on them. I think what you've got there is exactly what we need.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator's point is very well taken, and we have the time to receive it. I mean, if you feel it is something you want to state publicly, that's fine, or if you could submit it privately to us—we obviously want to make it part of the record. I would be happy to do whichever you're more comfortable with.

Dr. O'GRADY. If you feel you have the time, I certainly would like the opportunity to address not only the specific recommendations that I would make to you, but also the issue of the discrepancy cases.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to assure you we have the time, so go ahead.

Dr. O'GRADY. I will begin with my recommendations. The only caveat that I would add is that every time I come to these hearings I think of about 10 or 15 more, and so these are the ones I have prepared prior to attending these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they've given us a year's existence, so you can follow up.

Dr. O'GRADY. They are in no way prioritized, so please consider any and all of these as possible avenues of pursuit.

First of all—and you have spoken of this today—immediately declassify any and all information pertaining to the POW/MIA issue, including—not limiting—but not limited to all live-sighting reports made by refugees, CAS teams—controlled American source teams—military intelligence, and private agencies, and all others.

Senator McCAIN. Dr. O'Grady, that's part of the Defense authorization bill.

Dr. O'GRADY. All POW debriefings and homecoming egress reports, all documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency, all military command intelligence data collected by CINCPAC, all uncorrelated live-sighting reports, all communication satellite transmissions held by the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and every other Federal agency, and all uncorrelated POW information held by every other and any other agency as well.

Now, we fought the battle for declassification for a very long time, but at this point in time that would not be enough, because much of the information been withheld from me has not been withheld as a matter of national security, or even as a matter of, it's classified. Reports I speak of were never classified. They were just, as a matter of policy, not provided, and there are a number of policies that prevent information from getting onto the record as a matter of policy.

The discrepancy cases, the names of the discrepancy cases for whom General Vessey is currently negotiating are not a matter of public record. How can we verify who is being asked for? More importantly, how can we verify who is being omitted from the negotiations who should be being asked for? That's my first recommendation. We can look at not only the declassification of material, but policy changes that put on the public record all information that is necessary to recover our men.

Second, again, in that same line, direct General Vessey to stop conducting the POW/MIA negotiations in secret, and to put the names and record of resolution before the families, the Congress, and the American public. Dr. Kissinger conducted negotiations for the original "discrepancy list" in secret.

The names of those men submitted as "discrepancy cases" in 1973 were not released to the public until 1987. Not until 1987 were the families and others made aware of hundreds of discrepancy cases not included on Kissinger's list. General Vessey's current dis-

crepancy list is also secret. The numbers of "discrepancy cases" he references on different occasions is inconsistent, and the criteria for resolution of the cases is not on the record, nor are the names of those cases now considered resolved.

I have recently renewed my request that the list of 31 cases that are purportedly resolved without remains returned, that General Vessey testified to on July 17, 1987, be released. How do we know whose case has been resolved unless he will release that list?

Also, immediately acknowledge that General Vessey's negotiations are limited to men lost in North and South Vietnam, as he testified on July 17, 1987, and are ineffective in the matter of men lost in Laos or transported to Laos, such as my father.

Take immediate action to induce or compel Laos to release the name of hundreds of men known to have been captured alive in Laos and who still survive in Laos.

Immediately reactivate the cases of all category 1 and category 2 POW's, including those in Laos, and using the most sophisticated, computerized research techniques cross-reference all uncorrelated live sightings of prisoners and prison camp locations, including all Bright Light reports, all refugee reports both intra and inter-country, all CAS team reports and other intelligence data collected by any military agency or Federal department or office, and require a comprehensive report as to these findings.

I have been told on numerous occasions we do not have the capacity to cross-fertilize databases. That means if, for example, a report of a live POW should come to CIA, it cannot be entered into a computer bank that essentially cross-references and cross-fertilizes a DIA computer bank. That, after 24 years, Senators, is unbelievable to me.

Immediately establish, outside of the control of any Federal agency or branch of Government, an immediate and comprehensive investigation that will honestly accomplish the return of live Americans and the generation of professional and honest reports, ensuring unlimited and unconstrained access to all the information without challenge and resistance, and the consideration of independent counsel to investigate any possible criminal violations.

Immediately communicate publicly to the Vietnamese Government the trade embargo will not be lifted nor normalization established until all American soldiers who stayed behind after the war and all Americans who may be held outside their control, and all other Americans either voluntarily or involuntarily residing in Vietnam would be immediately released.

Immediately arrange for all family members who are relatives of category 1's, category 2's, and category 3's, to testify before Congress of the cumulative record of deception and dishonesty so that it can be exposed.

In addition, to immediately arrange for a family member, any family member who alleges an official file contains information that is or has been incomplete, inaccurate, concealed, altered, or purged, to testify in open hearing.

To immediately arrange for any family member who has challenged or been forced to accept an unscientific or fraudulent identification as "resolution" to testify in open hearing.

To immediately arrange for any family member who now has or has ever had official or unofficial information that their loved one was captured alive to testify in open hearing.

Immediately halt the "joint resolution" process orchestrated by the JCRC until such time that an honest, scientific, comprehensive methodology and plan is detailed and developed, until such time the Vietnamese are fully forthcoming with accurate information on all cases, until such time as the professional credentials, training and expertise of all team members can be validated, and until such time as there are sanctions identified for unethical and criminal violations committed by any team member.

Suspend the joint process in all cases that are likely to have involved capture by an ethnic minority or transportation to Laos.

Immediately pass an Act of Congress that retroactively restores Captain Carr and Colonel O'Grady and all of the other known and suspected POW's to prisoner-of-war status until they are proven dead beyond any reasonable doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Dr. O'Grady, what do you do now? What is your line of work?

Dr. O'GRADY. I'm a professor at the University of Maryland Eastern Shore in psychology and education.

Senator McCain. Were you once a member of the board of directors of the League of Families?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. I was elected to the board of directors of the National League of Families and served in 1985 through 1986.

Senator McCain. Why did you terminate your service?

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, I didn't voluntarily terminate my service. Based upon what I consider to be questionable election procedures and voting processes, I was not reelected.

Senator McCain. So you've not had further involvement with the League of Families?

Dr. O'GRADY. That's not true at all. After I was no longer formally associated with the National League of Families, I felt that I had seen enough as a board member that dismayed me to such an extent that I felt an obligation, a moral and ethical obligation to those family members who don't have the skills that I have, who don't have the education I have, and the background, to assist them in detailed research in terms of each of their individual cases.

Through that process, I also attempted to provide those families with alternative sources of information and resources that were not only not provided by the National League of Families but actively thwarted by the National League of Families.

Senator McCain. So you feel the National League of Families—maybe I should ask your description—is not doing its job, or carrying out its mission, is that correct?

Dr. O'GRADY. Absolutely.

Senator McCain. Did I just hear you say they were thwarting the efforts to resolve these issues?

Dr. O'GRADY. The National League of families I do not believe represents the interest of the men or those individuals who seek the recovery of live Americans by any of their actions, by any of their procedures, by any of their policies.

Senator McCain. Do you believe the National League of Families is actively working against the goals?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. My experience as a board member is that there was an active and deliberate plan that did prevent the process from going forward. It kept family members deliberately in the dark in terms of critical information.

Senator McCain. Would you do me the favor of providing that information to the Committee as well?

Dr. O'GRADY. I kept a detailed journal while I was a member of the board of directors of the National League of Families, and I can provide detailed documentation of those incidences, occasions, events, and activities, that substantiate my claim.

Senator McCain. We would appreciate that.

Dr. O'GRADY. I'd be happy to do that.

Senator McCain. Are there others that share your view, do you believe?

Dr. O'GRADY. When I was a member of the National League of Families I was—I made an effort to contact family members. As a member of the board of directors, I did not have access to the membership directly. I was told I could not access the membership through telephone communication or written communication, that that list was private and confidential and held only by Ms. Griffiths.

I then requested that I would pay for the mailing personally if she would mail those letters, if she didn't want to provide me with a list as a board member, to the families directly.

That was also denied to me, and so I tediously and painstakingly constructed my own list and did in fact attempt to communicate with family members, and based upon my contacts with a large number of family members, particularly those known and suspected captures, I can say with confidence that a majority of those families do not support the National League of Families or the policies or practices of the National League of Families, or Ms. Griffiths when she acts independent of that organization.

Senator McCain. What is your theory, Dr. O'Grady, as to why this organization, which is composed of some family members, might be actively thwarting a resolution of this very painful and personal issue?

Dr. O'GRADY. Because of the extensive involvement and personal commitment and interest in the Government's established policies in this matter, I think the line between objectivity and personal interest has been crossed.

Senator McCain. And that is by the entire board?

Dr. O'GRADY. No. Specifically by Ms. Ann Griffiths, who is the executive director, and as implemented by a board of her choosing.

Senator McCain. Obviously, since you've been in contact with many other family members, you also can provide us with access to their specific complaints and areas that they have not received the cooperation that you feel they deserve?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, Senator McCain. One of the things I tried to do is—or, one of the things I did do independently was conduct a survey of family members and ask them if any information had been concealed from them, withheld from them, purged from their files, inaccurately reported, or whatever, and gave them approxi-

mately eight to ten categories and asked them to just briefly respond and provide the documentation to me, and so yes, I do have detailed information in that regard. I have reviewed many case files for families.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much.

Captain Apodaca, is your aunt Elena Apodaca?

Mr. APODACA. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. She resides in Tucson, AZ?

Mr. APODACA. That is true.

Senator McCAIN. She is an outstanding and wonderful person, and one who shares your commitment to resolving this case, as far as Captain Apodaca is concerned—or Major, I believe.

Mr. APODACA. He was promoted to major after his shoot-down date.

Senator McCAIN. We also are interested in your problems and difficulties you have had, and we hope we can get those resolved, and we appreciate your commitment to serving this country as well, captain, and I know that he is very proud of you.

Dr. O'Grady, could I just return 1 minute to this issue of the people who you believe captured, or evidence that you have captured Captain O'Grady? You say that these were indigenous personnel?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, that is correct. The JCRC report states that there is no doubt that this information is correlated to my father and that these were indigenous personnel. In fact, Senator, one of the individual—one of the captors when he was interviewed was difficult to understand, because the Vietnamese translator who the JCRC team utilized could not understand the dialect.

Senator McCAIN. Do you know how these JCRC people came across these individuals without the knowledge of the Vietnamese themselves?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. The source of the original burial report—in the MR-4 archives there was report filed, and it has been there for 24 years, I suppose, that this member of—this individual indigenous person who was in the village where he was captured filed a report as to what he heard had happened.

Senator McCAIN. To who?

Dr. O'GRADY. In the Vietnamese records.

Senator McCAIN. If he filed it with the Vietnamese, then the Vietnamese must have known that he had that knowledge.

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, that is my point. For many years the Vietnamese had in their files a report of his death and burial that had never been provided.

Senator McCAIN. That is to say the Vietnamese did not know about these people. That doesn't make sense, doctor.

Dr. O'GRADY. No. I don't want to confuse you.

Senator McCAIN. I'm sorry, I'm easily confused. I apologize.

Dr. O'GRADY. I am, too. In this particular case, the Vietnamese had a record of an alleged death and burial—of death and burial that had been filed when—your question was, why did the JCRC team pursue it?

Senator McCAIN. No. How did they know?

Dr. O'GRADY. When that original source came to them when they were investigating a different case and contacted them and said,

I'm the one who filed that report, but—and I would like to be interviewed.

They said well, OK, since you're here we'll interview you, and during the course of the interview he said, well, that report I filed was all hearsay. I didn't see anything, I just heard things, but I do know who captured him, and you could talk to them, and they live here, and here are their names, and that point JCRC was prompted to go to the village of his capture and track those individuals down.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Now, when they were offered the opportunity to interview, they did interview, correct? The recovery team conducted the interview, they didn't say no, we don't want to interview, they interviewed?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, they did interview.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did pass on the information?

Dr. O'GRADY. Seven months after they obtained it and summarized it.

The CHAIRMAN. But they did, they voluntarily—I mean, if there was—

Dr. O'GRADY. No. No Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm trying to understand that.

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, let me understand that the only thing the Vietnamese voluntarily passed on a member of the JCRC team was a hearsay report from the Vinh archives that said he had been buried. They told that to the American team members, and the American team members passed that as fact to everyone except the family members.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what do you suggest the American team members should have done if they were given that information at that time?

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, the standard by which my research is held to, if I am provided with a report from a library or an archive and the original source of that information is named, then the first thing I do is contact that original source and interview him.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the source named in this case?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So what you're saying is, they didn't do the original research?

Dr. O'GRADY. No. They did not independently corroborate the information provided by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. That may go to sort of methodology but not to intent. I mean, if they were engaged in some kind of cover-up or effort to prevent you from knowing, they would never have conducted the interview or never have passed the information on.

Dr. O'GRADY. That's a separate issue. What I'm first—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is it separate? Isn't it central to what you're saying? Aren't you saying information was kept from us, things were destroyed?

Dr. O'GRADY. You're confusing two issues. The first issue is the methodology. Clearly, the procedural methodology did not reflect the highest national priority, did not reflect an absolute commitment to confirm information passed by the Vietnamese. That's failure No. 1. Failure No. 2 is taking the Vietnamese with them to interview the captors. That's failure No. 2 in the joint process.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that such a failure? I mean, first of all—I mean, the requirements are probably—I think they are—that you're going to travel with somebody with you. I mean, the Vietnamese are going to go with them.

Dr. O'GRADY. Well, that is the policy that is currently in practice. Joint JCRC team resolution means just that, the Vietnamese and the Americans working together.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you suggesting the Americans are somehow going to be corrupted by the presence of the Vietnamese, that they're not going to ask legitimate questions?

Dr. O'GRADY. I am suggesting that ethnic—the ethnic faction, the minority, would be very unlikely in the presence of the Vietnamese to provide any forthcoming information regarding my father because they were under orders during the course of the war to turn over pilots captured to the Vietnamese. In this case, I do not believe they did that, and would be unlikely to admit that in front of the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. But in fact the Americans did conduct an interview, did they not, with the Vietnamese?

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes. Jointly, the Vietnamese and Americans conducted an interview.

The CHAIRMAN. And you believe they didn't get the information during that?

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct. All they got, Senator, was information regarding the fact that he was captured.

The CHAIRMAN. But again it is methodology? You're not insinuating that there was an effort not to get to the truth?

Dr. O'GRADY. That's correct, until I get to the third failure. The third failure is, after the interviews the report was prepared and summarized, if you can call it summarized, in February 1991. It was circulated—I'm sorry, that's not true. The 1990 report of death and burial was circulated.

I don't know exactly what happened to the 1991 report. There is no transmission or transmittal information available. There's no cover sheet. That report was put into a file—the fact that now he is known to have been captured alive by ethnic nationals in February 1991.

Nobody has that report. DIA doesn't have that report, they only have the death and burial report that was summarized and provided in 1990. I do not have that report, I did not get that report until 7 months later, and the way that I get it is in this manner. I called up the DIA to ask if there was any new information on my father. They said to me, why are you asking? We have a report here that says he died and was buried, and his case is resolved. I said, you do, and they said, yes.

I said well, do you have a message transmission number, because I knew if I could get that I could track that document, and when they provided that to me I then immediately contacted the casualty office to get the information from JCRC, that particular death and burial report.

In the process of that, 7 months later, they also provided the evidence as to the interview with the captors, after I had threatened to contact congressmen, go to the media, and to take legal action if that information was not provided to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to the differences between you and the league at this point, it would be hard for any of us to believe that the league would not want to resolve these issues or have any living American come back. I take it you believe that they want that to happen?

Dr. O'GRADY. I believe that Ann Griffiths, as she purports to represent the families of the National League of Families, has not taken a proactive stance to ensure—

The CHAIRMAN. But let me get at this. I mean, I want to make certain—I accept the differences at face value. We all have to. They're unavoidable. But the question is, are they differences about approach, differences about judgments, about evidence, differences of judgment about intention, or is there something larger going on here, and I think what you are saying to me is that you felt she wasn't proactive, or the league wasn't proactive.

Dr. O'GRADY. Ann Griffiths, Senator, controlled the information flow. She controlled all the information on live Americans and it was prohibited and prevented from being provided to the family members directly. She also prevented independent and other individuals who had a different point of view from even being heard so that family members could make an independent judgment, on dozens of occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. But your allegation is that while that happened you don't—I take it you don't believe that happened because she doesn't believe that the issue is legitimate, or doesn't want to get the facts? Clearly she believes that, correct?

Dr. O'GRADY. I think she wants the issue resolved.

The CHAIRMAN. But has a different opinion of how it gets resolved?

Dr. O'GRADY. I think her definition of resolution is different. I think certainly her commitment to the return of live Americans as opposed to the recovery of remains is certainly different, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A different opinion as to approach and methodology?

Dr. O'GRADY. No, it goes beyond approach and methodology. It goes to deliberately preventing the exercise of democratic process. The families are not given all information from which they can make a personal judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. And the motive for that is what I am trying to get at. It is not because they are always hovering around here, as you know. These are very serious accusations about destruction of evidence and avoidance of truth and coverup and so forth.

What I am trying to ascertain, and I believe you have probably said it, is while there may have been some turf protection here and there may have been some differences about what constituted a legitimate approach that you are not alleging, I take it, that somehow Ms. Griffiths or other members of the league were in cahoots with an effort to prevent the truth from coming out.

Dr. O'GRADY. I am saying, Senator, very clearly that Ms. Griffiths participated in deliberate concealment of information by and with various agencies of the U.S. Government. As to motive, that's very, only speculation unless you want to qualify me as an expert witness in psychology.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds like you may be able to be qualified.

Dr. O'GRADY. I have my personal opinions as to motive. But I don't think that's really appropriate to speak to at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are going to further this inquiry. Senator Grassley, do you have any further questions?

Senator GRASSLEY. Just the point she just made. And maybe if she does not feel comfortable discussing it, I would not force you to do it.

But I would like to have that personal opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say that as I said earlier before you came back, Senator, this is the beginning of this inquiry. We are going to talk with families who have this kind of evidence.

Senator GRASSLEY. So you are saying it would be more appropriate at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. I think time-wise it would be. But I want to guarantee that will go through that.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you mean beyond these 3 days of hearings?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Senator GRASSLEY. So let me ask, Dr. O'Grady, you would be more comfortable having us handle that at that point. Is that right?

Dr. O'GRADY. In terms of giving you my personal opinion as to motive or in terms of documenting some of my claims?

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I assume that your personal opinion is based upon your ability to document some claims.

Dr. O'GRADY. That is correct.

Senator GRASSLEY. I would like to have the point of view made and then take time to document it later on.

Dr. O'GRADY. My personal opinion was that self-interest superseded the interest and recovery of live American POW's.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if all members are amenable to it, what I would like to do is move to the next panel. There is no truncation of this, I want to assure you. You have laid out the parameters of some very important inquiry for the Committee. We knew this was an area we were going to have to go into and were prepared to. And so we will get back to you.

And we would like you to submit all of the documentation, if you would, and begin the process, if you will, with those families who have similar documentation and problems.

My suggestion, and I do not know who is here representing Carl Ford's office, this is something we are going to take up with the Secretary as we go along here. But I do not want to wait a year for us to draw conclusions here that are fairly obvious in the early days, which is that there is a communications, public relations problem, if nothing more.

And I think it would be very advantageous to this entire process if a structure was immediately put into place to permit the accessing of the information and review of information with the families because if you do not do it, we are going to wind up forcing that and going into it in an adversarial way, which I think the Committee would just as soon avoid.

And so it would, I think, be of enormous importance for the Department to think about how it is going to reach out to these families, listen carefully to each of those complaints and problems, and try to begin the process of, if you will, rectifying it and creating a

new relationship there. And I think that we will certainly be working and trying to make that happen.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further questions of either witness.

But I would like to just put a couple of points in the record here because I think they relate to what has been said.

First of all, regarding the League of Families and the U.S. Government role, I think it is clear that there is a great deal or there is a tremendous amount of difference, a tremendous difference of opinion as to what the proper role of the League is. And I think everybody knows what the proper role is, but that has become without question in anybody's, or impugning anybody's motives, it has become clouded because the League has been drawn into the process.

The League now is represented as part of the U.S. Government. There is not necessarily a conflict here, but there is a difference, a very clear difference, in the role of each. And if in fact family members are not receiving information, whether it be about live Americans or about deceased relatives or any other information, if in fact the person who represents them before the Government, before the court, if you will, is a part of the court, then credibility is diminished. And we can go beyond that, some have gone beyond that. But that is clear.

And I just want to enter a document into the record and this is not meant to slam any particular administration, there are numerous documents out for the Reagan administration as well, but a document dated March 7, 1979. It was a memorandum from David Ahren, excuse me, for David Ahren from Michael Oskenberg, subject: League of Families meeting with the President.

Now at this time, then POW/defector/deserter, whatever those chose to call him at the time, Robert Garwood had made some overtures in Vietnam that he wanted to get out. And I just want to quote a couple of lines from that because I think it explains why Ann Mills Griffiths wanted to get, on behalf of the family, and why the families wanted her to get before the Government. What happened subsequent to that, we can debate. But it is very clear what happened.

For well over a year the National League of Families of American prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia have sought a meeting with the President. The NSC has consistently turned down these requests.

Two reasons now exist for altering my recommendation to the President and for responding favorably to the most recent League request. A live American defector has been sighted in Hanoi and has indicated that he wishes to return to the U.S. The Vietnamese have previously given no indication that there were any live Americans in Vietnam, although they clearly knew about this case. The defector has also claimed that he knows of other Americans apparently who are alive in Vietnam.

And it is politically wise, perhaps, for the President to protect himself on this issue by reasserting his continued interest in a full accounting.

Memo, internal, in the White House.

You see, you really cannot blame families for the concerns that they have. This is devastating stuff. We cannot change what happened. But, by God, we can make sure it does not happen again. And we ought to make sure, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly will

work to do it, to see to it that we can put a policy in place very soon to see that this kind of nonsense does not continue.

I want to make one final point and then I will be quiet. There was, this is a related issue. Dr. O'Grady talked about categories, category 1, category 2, category 1 being confirmed capture or confirmed knowledge of what happened, suspect, doubtful, unknown, unrelated, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

In 1982 there were 166 confirmed, category 1, categories. And there was category 2, which is suspect knowledge, 1,123. Now something happened between 1982 and 1991 that somehow diluted this number down to 64 or 65 discrepancy cases. I never received any adequate explanations as to just what the heck that means as to why this has happened.

Anybody, I know if my father was one of those 1,123, I do not care what you called it, category 2, 1, discrepancy, whatever it is, my father is missing and why is he not a discrepancy case. So I think it is important that we start looking at some of the semantics and put this stuff back together in some common base of definitions that we all understand so we are all working with the same dictionary here.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I could not agree with you more. I think both points are very well taken.

And the Committee is not going to be concerned about what happened under which administration. The obvious effort here is to try to just lay out what did happen. I think one of the points that is raised here is very important and the Committee is going to need to understand it and we need to look at it. It is the standards that have been applied here and how some of the judgments have been made.

I think everybody agrees some of these judgments are really tough. And if you have 2 wingmen or something who saw a plane go down and the plane exploded and there was no parachute and so forth, you have got to make some judgments. And nobody is going to contest that. Am I correct, Dr. O'Grady?

Dr. O'GRADY. Those are not cases at issue.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly my point.

Dr. O'GRADY. Yes, as long as there is a working hypothesis as to what the standards for identification as a discrepancy case are clear and objective.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we need to understand better. I think there needs to be more airing of that in order to help everybody. And I think it will help those in the field and it will help those back home trying to make choices and decisions.

And again, that is part of the opening up here. And we are going to open that up. And we are going to look at it.

Dr. O'GRADY. Senator, could I just add one more piece of information relative to what Senator Smith stated?

Beyond the more difficult judgments, there are certain definite judgments. Certainly there would be no debate, I would imagine as to category 2, category 2's, and many category 3's. Let me just give you some examples of some of the numbers confusion done with smoke screens and mirrors that I have encountered in my own research. I will be very brief.

But let me just tell you, and I finally got the Kissinger list released to me. And there were a total of 70 names. I also have the original list and the narrative. So it is interesting that one narrative was provided although the name was omitted from his original list.

I then went back to my own data base and cross-referenced those names with all of the men that as of 3/86 when this list was approximately released, whose names did not appear on the Kissinger list who were known category 1's, confirmed knowledge or capture. There were, and I know you're interested in data bases, 99 of those men at that time in addition, if you include other men who meet such criteria as radio contact on the ground seen in captivity alive, pictures in captivity, good parachute, no evidence of crash, difficulties. You can identify at least, and I'm not an expert, and I was able to find these men, you can identify at least another 110. That's over 200 right there.

And that's based upon my research. And I don't have the staff and the resources and the capability and the time or the money that the Department of Defense has had for a very long time.

And in addition I will tell you I have some other confusion you might be able to help me with. I was reviewing General Vessey's testimony of September 30, 1987 to which I had referred. Now at that time he referenced 224 total discrepancy cases. He broke them down like this, 70 known POW's, seemingly consistent with the original Kissinger list, 28 having died in captivity, 58 probably captured, 156 likely knowledge. And then further broke it down, 137 in North Vietnam, 59 in South Vietnam. Those numbers don't even add up to 224.

But more importantly, on July 17 he then quotes in his testimony, 119 discrepancy cases. So we've lost about 100. And then further breaks the list down as of 22 remains returned, 4 fates resolved with no remains. Again, we don't know who they were or what criteria was used to resolve those cases—31 fates resolved, remains not available. My guess is that they couldn't find them as in my father's case. And 62 fates still unknown.

Now, again, the figures, I have been looking at figures using my computer for years. And I can't come up with consistent figures. CINCPAC lists don't correspond to Department of Defense and other Department of Defense list or DIA lists or other lists. And if you could un muddy just the numbers for us, remembering those represent men, they represent fathers and brothers and husbands. They are not just numbers. And when we see 100 of them missing from one testimony and on day 2 another, we wonder who did they lose again.

Please help us find out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a fair inquiry. And as you know, yesterday I inquired about the data base and was not given a complete answer on that. And we will be talking about it shortly. And we will pursue that.

Are there any other questions?

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I have been able to watch most of the testimony from my office and I am sorry I missed it. It has been most interesting. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Mr. APODACA. Mr. Chairman, I would like an opportunity to state a few things if possible?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. APODACA. I was invited here because my father's case is—I think I was invited here because my father's case is one of the 62 discrepancy cases. And I've always kind of wondered why. You've got the narrative included as part of the attachment. I've gone over all of the files. And there's not that much information in them past that narrative. It pretty much contains all the details right there.

And I've heard of files that have a lot more information in them, more than my father's. And I keep wondering why it is a discrepancy case. I just have a gut feeling that there's a lot, there is some, more information out there that I'm not finding out about that somebody knows about, why it is discrepancy case.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made that inquiry of your Casualty Office?

Mr. APODACA. I always request and the Casualty Affairs Office provides me a copy of all the records they have. And they are at the mercy—

The CHAIRMAN. Have you sought a briefing as to whether or not there is additional information?

Mr. APODACA. No, I have no credible evidence, just a gut feeling. I've got to think something else is out there or why is there—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, one of the things, as I said, we are going to try to do, I emphasize try, is unscramble the numbers issue, try to get some accountability on where we began with numbers and how we moved from the beginning on down the road to different numbers, what standards were applied to make the determinations about these cases that moved them from one category to another.

Now my hope is, and I think Carl Ford is absolutely genuine on this, I have no reason to believe otherwise, there will be forthcoming a flow of information such as I think we have not seen before.

I am told there will be a declassification. And there is strong commitment on this Committee in the private conversations we have had that other than the source and methods issue, which every Senator wants to legitimately protect, that the information ought to be forthcoming. And that families ought to get that information.

Mr. APODACA. There's a huge data base of information out there that hasn't even been correlated to any specific individual, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed.

Mr. APODACA. They published 15 volumes of information in 1978 of information uncorrelated. Now it's been, what is that, 13 years now since that information. Has anybody gone back through that uncorrelated information? We have many new technologies now available. Technologies where we can take photographs and imagery and analyze that and make it into a high resolution. And you could possibly correlate it then.

I don't know what effort has been made on that part. It's going to take a huge processing capability. Take all the information, load it into one data base, let one area manage this issue instead of JCRC having theirs, CILHI having theirs, DIA having theirs. It's got to be managed and coordinated in a much better process.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the people that have something to do with it are sitting here and listening. And we are appreciative of that. And I am confident that they will take—

Mr. APODACA. One option or recommendation that I can come up with.

I would like to talk about the League just for a few seconds. The League of Families, you know, it's a group of very personally involved, very emotional people, like a huge family. And like any family, you're going to have arguments and differing views. I know most people at one time have hated their brother or sister for a while.

But recently, I've become heavily involved with the League. I was just voted in by the family members this past July as a member of the board. The board has a very diverse membership now. Family members have voted people who have differing views, who believe in different methods and different policies.

And the first board meeting was full of debate on some of these different policies. This allows different viewpoints to be heard. And I think some family members are getting some representation. There is a democratic process. They elect the people in there and the board members are trying to get those viewpoints heard.

But one thing I would like to state is that the board of members must act with family members' concerns and best intentions. And that's one thing that I've tried to do. And I do see problems where family members feel that they're not being heard. But I know from being at a meeting that they are being heard, but it's not the policy that the board voted on. And the board tells Ann Mills Griffiths what to do and she follows that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see if all of that begins to move in a new direction in the next days. I have a suspicion that it will. And I am confident that it can.

Thank you both very much. I think it is very, very helpful to us and we will be working with you in the months to come.

Dr. O'GRADY. Thank you both very much on behalf of Colonel O'Grady.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate it. Thank you very much.

If we could ask the last panel to please come forward. We have Mr. Dennis Nagy, Acting Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War Missing in Action, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Charles Trowbridge, the Deputy of the Special Office of Prisoners of War. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. Would you raise your right hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

STATEMENT OF DENNIS NAGY, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY BOB Sheetz, CHIEF OF THE SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PRISONERS OF WAR MISSING IN ACTION, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND CHARLES TROWBRIDGE, DEPUTY OF THE SPECIAL OFFICE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. You have been extremely patient, although I must say I think it has probably been helpful to listen to some of the panels and get a feel for

where we are heading here and what some of the observations of the witnesses are.

We welcome your opening statements, and obviously would appreciate to whatever degree you can summarize. The full statements will be placed in the record, if you can do that.

Mr. Nagy?

Mr. NAGY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee.

I have submitted a written statement for the record and in a moment I will take some time to summarize that statement.

First, however, I feel compelled as you know—

The CHAIRMAN. Could you pull the mike a little closer?

Mr. NAGY. First, I feel compelled as you know, having sat through now most of the first 2 days of testimony before this Committee to note that I've listened carefully to what the families have had to say, the veterans, our own personnel who operate within the field, and DOD policy-makers. And I've had time to think about that some more.

All of this testimony reaffirms in my mind the compelling reasons why we must continue to apply our absolutely best efforts toward making significant progress on this issue. I have personal reasons why this is compelling to me as an individual. Friends of mine are contained in the lists, Joe Ross, Larry Tatum, and a variety of others.

There is no holding back in terms of my personal efforts and desires with regard to seeking resolution of these issues.

As the Acting Director of DIA, an agency whose name has been mentioned frequently during the testimony so far on these 2 days, I feel a particular responsibility to speak with candor and clarity about the role of DIA, both what DIA's role is and what it isn't. I hope that my testimony and that of my colleagues today and in the days ahead will work toward accomplishing that end.

As noted, I brought with me the Chief of our Special Office on POW/MIA Affairs, Mr. Bob Sheetz. Mr. Sheetz has many years of experience within the intelligence community and as an investigator. He has just recently returned from his second visit to Thailand. On that visit he was accompanied by Colonel Bailey, Bob Trowbridge, who is sitting on my left—I'm sorry, Chuck Trowbridge—who, as you all know has many years of experience working in this area, both as a uniformed officer and as a civilian employee of DIA.

Since my appointment as Executive Director of DIA some 18 months ago and during my brief tenure as its Deputy Director and Acting Director, I have worked to insure that DIA is carrying out its responsibilities for accounting for POW's and MIA's fully and completely. The agency deeply comprehends the special nature of this mission and its importance to the American people.

Moreover, the agency understands completely the need for us to share with the families of these missing men and the American people both our successes and our frustrations. As the Secretary of Defense promised yesterday, the agency stands ready to support this Committee's efforts to bring together all of the facts on this issue as openly as possible.

I am heartened by the opening statements of the Committee Chairman and Members. And I must join with those who have preceded me in stating that DIA wishes to be a full and active participant in these deliberations in the hope that we can set aside past differences and work together toward a resolution.

Much has already been said about the nature of DIA's mission and the procedures we use to ascertain the validity of all reports of live sightings of Americans in Southeast Asia. I believe that it is essential for me to state again both what the agency's role is and what it is not.

The essence of DIA's role is the analysis of reports on the potential existence of live Americans held against their will as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The most urgent of these are what have come to be known as live-sighting reports. Before I go further I should note that there is often confusion about what is meant by the term live-sighting report. Such a report comes from first-person sources who believe that they have seen individuals alive in Southeast Asia who are or could be Americans.

To determine the facts, these reports require extensive analysis, the tasking of additional collection systems, interviews with the sources, and investigation on the ground in Southeast Asia. Often it is felt by families and other Americans that by its very title, a live-sighting report is a valid indication of the survival of an unaccounted for American.

As much as we would all like to believe this to be the case, it's not. DIA's job is to determine the facts pertinent to the report and to follow the leads to their logical conclusion. Unfortunately, none of the reports so far have led to the recovery of a live American. Nonetheless, DIA will not rest until we have done our best to resolve all of the unaccounted for cases.

As the analysis and other activities relative to a report are undertaken, DIA is charged to inform members of the Government and the families as quickly as possible of the report and our actions. During this process, when the determination is reached, DIA is to keep policy and decision-makers and the families informed. This is often a long and painstaking effort that sometimes seems overdrawn.

But I must remark that there is no room for error in this mission and that I believe it is our responsibility to be thorough and complete. I believe that during the testimony it has been made clear that that was not often the case or not always the case in the past.

While this analytic work is underway, DIA is rightly called upon by others in the executive and legislative branches to support their POW and MIA activities. The agency is also asked to support the families directly and to assist POW/MIA organizations. In addition, the agency carries out its mission by providing intelligence support in the recovery of remains and by serving as the intelligence advisor to the inter-agency group on Indochina POW/MIA affairs, as well as to the President's special emissary to Vietnam, General Vessey.

In the future DIA will also play a role in support of the Pacific Command's Joint Task Force as noted by Secretary Cheney and by General Christmas.

I want to assure the Committee that DIA is dedicated to this mission and to the role it plays in support of the families and the American public. I can assure the Committee that I will personally see to the provision of all possible information to the families.

As to what the mission is not, DIA is not chartered as a policy-making agency and does not establish U.S. Government positions on POW's and MIA's. Our role in the POW/MIA issue is analogous to that of the intelligence community in the arms control arena, that is one of providing intelligence in support of U.S. arms control policy.

In terms of the final resolution of the unaccounted for cases that we address, it is important to note that the final decision as to DIA's analysis rests with an inter-agency policy review group and that no case is completely closed until the return of confirmed remains or, of course, a live American.

I must say that I was pleased yesterday to hear the introductory words spoken by you, Mr. Chairman, and by Senator Smith concerning the sincere desire of this Committee to bring together all of us involved in this vital matter. I believe the DIA has labored honestly in the past to carry out its mission, for some periods with inadequate resources and in the heat of controversy. Those circumstances have been counterproductive to the effective work of DIA's analysts.

I believe, as Senator Smith noted at the opening, that these hearings mark a new beginning. I can assure the Committee that neither I, nor General Clapper, once he is confirmed as the new Director of DIA, will permit DIA to lessen its efforts to help resolve this issue.

We look forward to working with the Committee in a full, cooperative manner, establishing clearly that DIA is both professional and effective in carrying out its POW/MIA responsibilities.

I'll take a few moments to address the new aspects of DIA's efforts. In the past, first-hand sighting reports could only be analyzed through the labors of file studies and indirect collection because we were denied direct access to ground locations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia where the sightings were reported.

Now, however, with various diplomatic approaches beginning to bear fruit, DIA is getting the kind of on the scene access that will allow prompt, first-hand investigations. We have, as the Committee discussed with Colonel Cole this morning, an operational element based in Bangkok, known as Stony Beach. It has begun to vigorously carry out in country missions.

This element was established in 1987 ostensibly to interview refugees. It currently has 8 professional assigned to 9 actual billets. And as was noted this morning, it is being expanded with 9 additional staff members, reflecting in large measure the access that's now available.

In addition, DIA has added 18 more positions to its Pentagon staff, bringing the number of DIA people addressing the issue to 58 in Washington and 17 on board, or will be on board shortly, hopefully 18, in Southeast Asia. I need to note that we are just now beginning to fill these new positions.

We have established an operational element in our office in the Pentagon to insure quick reactions to all incoming reports and we

have a standing policy with that new branch which insures that any report directly related to a family member is provided to that family member as quickly as possible.

We're working with professionals assigned to the new office in Hanoi, and as the Secretary noted yesterday, we are moving directly to investigate reports in Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, I'm keenly aware of the challenges facing my agency and the Government regarding this issue. In some quarters, DIA's image vis-a-vis the issue is not what it should be. I believe that the image does not reflect the reality of DIA's serious efforts in the past, the dedication and quality of its people, nor the enhanced current and future endeavors. I have no doubt that the DIA has not done as good a job over the years as it might have.

Internal DIA management reviews of this effort conducted since 1983 have clearly shown room for improvement. Since then, as I've already noted, we have increased the Pentagon staff, in fact, since 1983, from 12 to 58, have established the Stony Beach element in Bangkok, and are now increasing its size, and stand ready to carry through on our commitment to the mission that Secretary Cheney confirmed yesterday. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. All three of us stand ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nagy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DENNIS M. NAGY

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of this Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to explain the role of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in support of the U.S. Government effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting for the prisoners of war and missing in action (POW/MIA) in southeast Asia.

Since my appointment as DIA's executive director 18 months ago, and during my subsequent time as the agency's deputy director and now as its acting director, I have come to appreciate fully the urgency implicit in our POW/MIA mission. I am keenly aware of the U.S. Government's obligation to its fighting men and women to take all necessary measures to recover or fully account for all POW's and MIA's. Moreover, I understand completely the necessity for us to share with the families of these missing men and the American public as a whole both our successes and our frustrations in achieving this full accounting.

Before proceeding further, it is critical that you understand DIA's role in the POW/MIA issue. DIA is an analytic organization; it does not establish U.S. Government policy on POW/MIA's. The agency was assigned the mission to fully apply all appropriate intelligence sources and methods to determine if Americans are being held against their will in Southeast Asia.

DIA aggressively pursues this vital mission by:

- fully investigating live-sighting reports and supplying the agency's findings to policy and decision makers;

- providing intelligence support to the fullest possible accounting mission, directing our efforts toward assisting in the recovery of remains of those lost on the battlefield and, in the absence of recoverable remains, toward confirming their fate; and

- providing intelligence support to national decision makers as the intelligence advisor to the interagency group on Indochina POW/MIA matters, as well as to the President's special emissary to Vietnam, General Vessey.

DIA spares no effort in pursuit of this mission, and this Committee, the families of the missing and unaccounted for, and the American people need to know that the personnel DIA has managing and executing this vital effort are among the most dedicated and hard working in the entire intelligence community.

In fact, on December 4, 1990, the director of Central Intelligence awarded DIA's special office for POW/MIA's a national intelligence meritorious unit citation in recognition of its exemplary performance, consistent excellence, and superior professionalism.

Additionally, DIA's special office sustained this high level of performance throughout operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm when agency POW/MIA an-

alysts and technicians established a current operations cell in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This cell contributed thousands of extra hours in providing current intelligence on the circumstances of loss or capture and the locations of imprisonment of U.S. and coalition forces. As you know, all of the missing from the recent crisis and conflict in the Persian Gulf have since been accounted for.

Among the 59 intelligence officers and support personnel assigned to DIA's special office, 25 are current or former members of the uniformed services. They also represent a combined 305 years of uniformed service experience, and have 90 years of service in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, I can assure you, these intelligence professionals are dedicated, motivated, and diligent in their pursuit of the U.S. Government's POW/MIA policy goals. That we will not waver in our effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting is a matter of trust, not only between DIA and the families, but also between us and our brothers and sisters under arms. We would not associate ourselves with anything less, or conspire—as some have suggested—to cover up our findings.

At this point, I want to explain how DIA investigates live-sighting cases—a subject you have indicated is of major concern to this Committee. In the past, first-hand sighting reports could only be analyzed through the intelligence process since the U.S. Government was denied access to the ground locations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia where sightings were reported. Now, however, with various diplomatic approaches to these governments beginning to bear fruit, DIA is getting the type of ground access that will allow prompt, on-the-spot investigations. In coordination with our field operatives, we are gradually establishing procedures to obtain the answers we need. In short, we want to be in a position to ask pertinent questions, then follow up immediately by inspecting appropriate facilities or locations ourselves to ensure all the facts have been gathered. This mission presently resides with DIA's Stony Beach detachment, based in Bangkok. The detachment commander, Colonel Cole, will explain this process in greater detail during his testimony.

In addition to the collection effort just discussed, DIA also utilizes all of the rather significant data collection means available to the U.S. intelligence community to investigate live-sighting reports. I can assure you that all of our intelligence systems and capabilities are being employed with the highest tasking priority in an effort to resolve every, single, first-hand, live-sighting report.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that with regard to the POW/MIA issue, DIA is an analytic intelligence organization, not a policy-making body for the U.S. Government. Our role in the POW/MIA issue is analogous to that of the intelligence community in the arms control arena, i.e., one of providing intelligence in support of U.S. arms control policy. As regards the POW/MIA issue, DIA with the other components of the U.S. intelligence community, provides intelligence support to the overall efforts of the U.S. Government to achieve the fullest possible accounting for every POW or MIA. DIA remains fully committed to supporting this highest national priority. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement for the record. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the other Members of the Committee have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Nagy. I appreciate that and we do want to get to the questions. Let me ask you first of all about the database issue that has been raised. Why is there not one database?

Mr. NAGY. Let me ask Mr. Sheetz to answer that question directly. Mr. Trowbridge may also be able to add to that in terms of the diversity of the effort.

Mr. SHEETZ. There is one database within DIA. All our source reporting, all the reporting on what we've come to categorize as camp reporting, all the firsthand live-sighting reports, all the dogtag reports, all of that material is contained within one computer system, so that when we make a query in that system, we are able to address all of those databases.

The CHAIRMAN. Address the databases of other agencies?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, the JCRC database.

The CHAIRMAN. So the comment that was made, Dr. O'Grady talked about the cross-fertilization and so forth, is that accurate or inaccurate?

Mr. SHEETZ. Well, I'd just like to clarify it a bit. Every intelligence report that comes in to DIA from CIA, NSA, from our own field element at Stony Beach, all those reports ultimately get added to our database, so when we make a query, that query will pass against all the data in our file. Periodically, we exchange tape files with the JCRC. They give us their crash site and gravesite information and other kinds of reports that they get, and to the extent we've been able to sanitize material to the level that we can give it to them, we do that in database format and pass that to them in magnetic media.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any information regarding POW/MIA that is outside of your base?

Mr. SHEETZ. I can't speak for outside the intelligence agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would all CIA, NSC, obviously the DIA, what other agency might—any, I suppose, State?

Mr. SHEETZ. Every State cable.

The CHAIRMAN. What about NSC, CIA?

Mr. SHEETZ. Well, NSC, the National Security Council is not a reporting element. They don't generate intelligence reports. The NSA, the National Security Agency would.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have records on this, for instance, in the 1970's, would that have ever been accessed to your database?

Mr. SHEETZ. Every report that is issued by NSA would be in our database. Now, you may in closed session—

The CHAIRMAN. Any report issued? What about intelligence? For instance, Brent Scowcroft is recently quoted as saying he does not believe there is anybody alive. Now, where does he draw that conclusion from, and we will ask him eventually, but do you have any sense of that?

Mr. NAGY. I have no information as to how Mr. Scowcroft has drawn that conclusion. Let me mention with regard to the National Security Agency that in executive session we can address those kinds of issues. Generally what we do is we receive the published reports from the National Security Agency and those are entered into our files. We do maintain extensive day-to-day contact with the analysts. But rightly so, the National Security Agency has certain processes that it follows in terms of reporting and—

The CHAIRMAN. Could your current database be expanded?

Mr. SHEETZ. I think you can—you could always want more data, but I'm not aware of any source of information that we're not tapping into that we ought to be tapping into. I mean—and if some are identified, I'd be pleased to have that brought to our attention and we'll take a look at it.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me, Senator Kerry, for interrupting you. I just want to see if I could ask you, when you say database, have you put in previous information or have you just started at point A, 1982 and gone up, or have you put all the stuff in the computer, all the live sightings from 1973 on up?

Mr. SHEETZ. Senator Smith, it's my understanding that every report that DIA has received back to, I believe, 1975, but it could go back further. Mr. Trowbridge can probably answer that.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. When you say everything entered into the database, there are hard copy files, but what's in the database and that's automated, for instance, is source information or identifying

reports, and certain data from those reports are automated, so the database consists of both an automated database and also a hard copy database. But to answer your question, anything that is in the office, we could query the database, the automated database, and go to those source files.

Mr. NAGY. What we're saying is, it is not a virtual memory. It is not all the reports, a picture of all of the reports in an automated fashion.

Senator SMITH. Location, name of individual, alleged POW or whatever?

Mr. NAGY. A number of data elements.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That's all in the database, sir.

Mr. SHEETZ. I would add to that, Senator Smith, that every critical field that would be useful in terms of indexing and cross-indexing, I'm certain or hopeful, at best, is in the database and should we find something in working with you and the Committee that you think ought to be added to that database, we'll be happy to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Trowbridge, how long do you go back with this issue?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I reported to the office in December 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. 1971.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any purging of information that has taken place in the course of your service?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. There has been information that was historical data that has no bearing on analytical work. Just for the saving of space, it has been categorized and archived in Suitland, but it's all indexed. There has been no purging. It's been archived and it's available for recall if we need to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is your testimony that no data that was ever received with respect to any case has ever been subsequently deleted or changed?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Sheetz, when you came to the office, can you share with us what sort of condition the office was in when you took over? What year was that, when did you take over?

Mr. SHEETZ. Well, I took over April 8 of this year, just after the departure of Colonel Peck.

The CHAIRMAN. What shape was it in when you took over?

Mr. SHEETZ. It was, very honestly, in a state of turmoil. The circumstances surrounding Colonel Peck's departure were controversial and there's no use saying anything else but that, and there was a lot of media attention on the office and you could almost say it was rather beleaguered. I set about being an intelligence professional. I set about doing immediately some things that I thought needed to be done. I took an immediate look at all the intelligence requirements that the office had on the books. A lot of people don't understand how the intelligence process works.

You just don't sit there and wait for reports to come in. You have to identify your requirements. You have to get them tasked with appropriate priority. You have to identify the collectors, get them energized, and only then will the flow of intelligence come in to you in such a way that you can be satisfied that you're getting

the material that you need to be getting. Those requirements had not been reviewed for some time prior, at least in the 9 months prior to my reporting. So I did that.

I went around and met with all my counterparts throughout the intelligence community at FBI, CIA, other places. That hadn't been done for some time either. I went out to JCRC and to CIL-HI and met with the commanders of those two commands, who we work very closely with, and that hadn't been done for some time. And finally, I got out to Southeast Asia and met with our Stony Beach collectors and did an assessment of their resource position and made recommendation to Mr. Nagy that their staff needed to be doubled in size so that they could adequately cover all the refugee camps to solicit firsthand sighting reports.

Most people don't realize that we collect those ourselves. I mean, if we had some sort of a conspiracy under way and a cover-up, we wouldn't even be collecting those. DIA collects almost 90 percent of the firsthand sighting reports ourselves. So those are some of the things I did in the first 6 weeks or so, upon reporting to the office.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that begs some other questions, but I want to turn to Mr. Trowbridge for a minute. Going back to 1973, after Operation Homecoming, were you aware of intelligence information that would lead one to believe that Americans were still alive in Southeast Asia, either being held or moving freely?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. Based upon the information we held in that time frame, I was not aware of any. There was very little reporting at that period of time. We were still in-country. The POW's had just come home in 1973. There was very little reporting relative to live sightings anywhere in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. Everything that we held in the office from that period of time up through 1975, was reviewed by the Select Committee. In the House, I believe it was a 15- to 18-month period of time and they reviewed that information, and they came to the conclusion that they didn't see any either.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in a position to see that data at that period in time?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. We were a small office at the time, but I was the branch chief of that office.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you hear Mr. Bell testify earlier today?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. Would he have seen different information? Would the information that he saw and was forwarding, in fact, have gone to you?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Senator, if it was in the system and the system worked, it should have come in to our office. I have no idea what Mr. Bell is talking about. My interest is just as piqued as yours is at this point in time.

The CHAIRMAN. I started a little early here and I have had a little longer. So why do I not give up some of my time here to Senator Smith, well, it is almost up anyway. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Nagy or Mr. Sheetz, with the great opportunity for tunnel vision or armchair quarterbacking, or looking backward, essentially two entities were harmed, I thought, by the Peck allegations. Mike Peck certainly was, and the agency certainly was,

at least in the public perception. If you had it to do over again after receiving his letter, what would you have done differently?

Mr. NAGY. At the time, Senator, as you're well aware, we were in the midst of Desert Storm. The office was directly assigned to the command element. All 3 of us at that time, myself as the executive director, Admiral Sheaffer as the then deputy director, and General Soyster were deeply involved in that operation and one other important activity. And this is not by way of excusing what I'm about to say at all, but it's the facts of the matter.

We were also involved in the process of working with Mr. Andrews and others on the restructuring of the defense intelligence community, resulting in the memorandum that was signed out by the Secretary on the 15th of March. Both activities occupied the leadership of the agency much of the time, 12, 13 hours a day, and throughout the weekends. When we received the letter—I need to say that as a backdrop—when we received the letter, Mike Peck handed that letter to me and the director, as he has stated that he did, in a sealed envelope, one to each.

I went back to my office and read that letter and called my assistant, whose name I think has been mentioned here, whom I was using because of our other activities to assist me in working with the POW/MIA issue, and I asked her to read the letter as well. We both felt a great concern for this letter. I talked with the director later on that day at a meeting we normally held at 1700 every day and suggested if he hadn't read it, he needed to read it and that we needed to talk with Mike concerning what was in that letter and what he meant.

Frankly, we focused on his request for retirement in the days that followed.

Senator SMITH. I am sorry to interrupt you, but with only 5 minutes, I am trying to jam in a bunch of questions and I do not doubt any of that. There have been two statements made here, one that he resigned, and a letter of resignation, I thought, meant resign. But somebody else, and I cannot recall which witness it was today, said he was fired. Now which is it, was he fired or did he resign?

Mr. NAGY. Senator, he was fired.

Senator SMITH. Well, was he fired after you received his resignation letter?

Mr. NAGY. No, sir. He was informed that we were going to replace him on the 8th of February. We received that letter from him on the 12th.

Senator SMITH. And what was the reason—if you got the letter—if you decided to fire him prior to the resignation letter, then what was the reason why he was being fired?

Mr. NAGY. The reason he was being fired was in our opinion two-fold. One, he was not running the office adequately. He was not carrying out the task that we expected of an individual in his position, and two, we were getting reports from General Vessey, from Carl Ford, from a variety of other sources that they did not feel themselves well supported.

Senator SMITH. I am asking these questions not to look back for any recriminations, but to try to look ahead as to how we can look ahead here.

I read his letter. There are some things, there is some language in the letter like conspiracy and other things that there is a broad range of disagreement on. I will grant that, but as I read it, trying to be objective about it, I believe that the thing that comes through more than anything else was frustration, number one, but also I felt that he was also addressing the issue of two things.

One, the issue of mindset to debunk, an often-used phrase, and also it was addressing the tasking, the ad-hoc tasking, the obfuscation, if you will, that took place, maybe not by anybody's direction, but maybe because of misdirection. I felt that those two things, when you read that letter, if you are sophisticated enough to know what is going on in there or at least a little about the issue, those things came out.

Conspiracy, that is a major charge and you can dispute that. But those things came through, and to support that, as I saw it, and I do not want to go back into the debate we had yesterday with Mr. Andrews, but to support that was the Tighe report and the Gaines report, both of which addressed mindset to debunk, both of which addressed ad-hoc tasking, and both of which addressed the need to make major changes. That is what Mike Peck said in his letter and when I asked you the question about whether you would have done anything differently, would you have done this much, do you feel that the press release that was issued by Mr. Andrews, which says that his allegations were false, do you feel that is an accurate reflection of Mike Peck's comments?

Mr. NAGY. It is an accurate reflection of the investigation that was conducted so far as I'm aware. With regard to the two specific points you raised, that being the mindset to debunk, which as you note is not a term originated with Mike Peck, but in fact dates back in several other reports that occurred before and with regard to ad-hoc taskings.

Mike Peck and I talked about the ad-hoc taskings for a couple of months beforehand. I had repeatedly asked Mike, simply because I couldn't draft it myself, to put together a memorandum that I would sign that we would send out to all of the parties that tasked us, telling them we were going to streamline the process assigning the tasking responsibility to a central office and attempt to fix the problem, which was true. And that was a valid problem.

Senator SMITH. My final question, and my time is expired.

Mr. NAGY. But just briefly, if I could.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead.

Mr. NAGY. We finally did get that memorandum and that memorandum was signed by me in the middle of March, and we sent that out to each of the offices that were concerned.

Senator SMITH. The final point, just state for the record. I know you have, as I understand your process over there, after analysis you have a senior review group that looks over what you have analyzed prior to, I assume, it being bucked up to the interagency level or at policy level. Who makes up that group, I mean specifically by name, who are those individuals?

Mr. SHEETZ. On firsthand sighting reports, sir?

Senator SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHEETZ. There made up of representatives from each of the intelligence agencies, NSA, CIA, State Department, I&R, Intelli-

gence and Research at State. We have representatives typically from the Chairman's office, from Carl Ford's office, NESAs, and we request a representative from National Security Council come as well. Chuck, did I miss anybody?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, you didn't, but I'd like to clarify that. These are individuals that are on call to fill that board, not all of them are there. In other words, we don't call all this membership in at one time. There's various members at different boards out of those agencies.

Senator SMITH. But I assume it would be some information that needed to be looked at. I mean, you would want a second look. I mean, it is not urgent but something—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. For instance, any board has usually got 4 or 5 representatives from these outside agencies, such as CIA, I&R, as Bob mentioned.

Senator SMITH. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, my friend. Thank you all for being here and thank you for being here at this late hour, and you have been patient for a couple of days now. We appreciate that very much.

Mr. Nagy, was there a mindset to debunk that you know of at any time?

Mr. NAGY. I think Senator Kerry and Carl Ford addressed this issue well in earlier testimony. It's hard for me to imagine folks like Chuck Trowbridge, who have been in the office as long as they have and others, being frustrated dealing with all of the thousands of cases that they've dealt with, without the success of a returned American from their labors, to not have a sense—and this is my personal opinion now—to not have a sense that perhaps this effort is harder than anybody ever expected and that might color the way they approach it.

Mike Peck and I talked about that attitude. I read the previous reports, all of them said that. I suspect there was an attitude of that amongst the men and women within the branch. However, I've got to note that from the mid-1980's until the time when Mike had charge of the office, we had increased it from 12 to 42 positions. So many of the folks working in that office were new, relatively new.

I don't believe that they carried with them the same baggage, so I felt that it was a mixed problem, one that we had been working on. I also felt that Mike, if he felt that seriously, needed to work on changing the attitude within the branch if it, in fact, existed.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Sheetz, you heard a lot of the allegations that Dr. O'Grady made. They were transmitted to us and we would like to transmit them to you and get a response to those allegations, and maybe a response to some of her recommendations that she and others have. We would appreciate that.

Mr. SHEETZ. It's very powerful testimony. We'd be pleased to look at it.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE TO DR. O'GRADY'S TESTIMONY

The following is a summary of the most serious allegations raised by the testimony of Dr. O'Grady as they appear in the transcript of the hearing. The Department of Defense Response follows each specific allegation.

[Dr. O'Grady] stated that records were "purged" from her father's files.—information had been changed subsequent to the Vietnamese participation in the interview with my father's captors.

No information is changed as a result of Vietnamese participation in witness interviews. All of the statements and evidence remains a part of the investigative file. Analytical judgments may change as more information is received, collated and analyzed. That is the nature of the analytic process.

No records were purged from Colonel O'Grady's files. USAF casualty is unaware of any record of "Sergeant Walker's" report ever having been included in the O'Grady casualty file.

Records had disappeared—fingerprints and dental records—through willful and intentional acts.

No fingerprint records nor dental records have disappeared through willful or intentional acts. No dental records on file at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory have ever disappeared. Each set of dental records is carefully maintained and the data therein input into an automated database for comparison and retrieval as forensic examinations require. Lieutenant Colonel Johnnie Webb, the Commander of the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, is present and available to answer any Members questions in this regard.

The fingerprint records of 897 of the 2,271 POW/MIA's are contained within the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI is the sole U.S. Government agency charged with maintenance of fingerprint records. FBI Director William Sessions, in a letter to Congressman Solarz, explained the reasons why a number of fingerprint records either did not access into their system initially or were inadvertently purged after administrative presumptive findings of death were entered in individual cases. Director Sessions also explained the efforts the FBI has undertaken to ensure that no further fingerprints are improperly purged. Director Sessions letter is attached.

[The letter referred to may be found on p. 639.]

Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has requested the Service Secretaries to examine the feasibility of requiring that a hard copy fingerprint card be maintained within the field personnel jacket of every individual on active duty in the Armed Forces. This review is currently underway by the services.

Identifications made with teeth and fragments of teeth but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be compared to.

There is no substance to this allegation. In every case in which dental material has been used to form the basis for an identification of remains by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, dental records were available to support that identification. There have been instances where ante-mortem dental X-rays were not available in the dental record, however, the information contained within the individual's dental chart established the factual and scientific predicate for the identification. There have been no cases where dental identifications have been made in the absence of a dental chart and dental X-ray. The Central Identification Laboratory's forensic odontological methodology and procedures are accepted within the forensic science community and by the American Academy of Forensic Sciences. It should be noted that no other forensic identification laboratory in the world has as many independent procedural safeguards to assure valid identifications. Independent and outside expert forensics experts are consulted at every step of the way within the CIL-HI's identification process.

National League of Families at one time called for all family members to provide the dental records that they had on file so that they could be maintained . . . and now those records, either within Government files or within the National League of Families, cannot be found.

No dental record provided to the Central Identification Laboratory by either the National League of Families or the individual family of an unaccounted for American have been "lost." The Central Identification Laboratory maintains strict accountability of dental records provided by the families and by any other individual or organization. This allegation is totally false and without any factual basis.

We were led to believe both in all verbal contacts and all written communications that my father had died. . . . And the baseline information that was very helpful to me in my case is the fact that he was categorized as a category 1. That means, suspected to have been captured. But this information was not discovered until 1985 by my independent research.

Dr. O'Grady's father was carried in a Missing in Action Status until 15 March 1977 when his status was changed to deceased. The basis for her father initially having been placed in a Missing in Action status was his apparent successful ejection from his aircraft, good parachute and other aircraft sighting his parachute on the ground, suggesting he survived his incident of loss. Additionally, Radio Hanoi announced that 4 planes were downed over Quang Binh Province and Hay Tinh Province and a number of pilots were captured on 9 and 10 April 1967. Colonel O'Grady was the only pilot lost over Quang Binh on 10 April 1967.

Pursuant to the Missing Person's Act, 37 USC Sec. 555, prior to the end of his first year in a missing status, Colonel O'Grady's status was reviewed by the Air Force. Given the circumstances of Colonel O'Grady's loss, the Air Force chose to retain him in a missing status and his family was so advised. He remained in that status until his status was reviewed, at the request of his wife. Mrs. O'Grady sent the USAF a letter stating that her family needed to be released from the limbo status and requested that Colonel O'Grady's case be reviewed for a status change to Killed in Action. The subsequent review was made pursuant to the next-of-kin request.

Until Colonel O'Grady's status was changed pursuant to the family request, the Air Force never led the family to believe "from the outset" that Colonel O'Grady was deceased. In fact, the evidence was substantial that Colonel O'Grady survived his incident of loss.

The first time I have ever known my father to have been captured alive, although I greatly suspected it based upon my own research, was in August 1991.

The evidence provided to the family suggested, from just after Colonel O'Grady was lost on 10 April 1967, that he may have survived his incident of loss. This information was provided by the USAF Casualty Affairs Office to the family. The status of Colonel O'Grady was not changed until a request was made by the PNOK to review his status.

I asked [POW Debriefings] of the men known to have been captured within 10,000 meters of my father and I provided to names of those particular individuals. . . . But I have never been provided any of that.

Prisoner of War debriefings are not releasable to families, nor indeed, to the former Prisoners of War themselves. Executive Order 11652, dated March 8, 1972, was the basis for classifying major portions of the POW debriefing information. The information the POW's provided concerning military plans, weapons and operations; the vulnerabilities and capabilities of certain systems and plans; and intelligence sources and methods met the criteria of Executive Order 11652 and was classified. Later under the criteria of Executive Order 12356, dated April 2, 1982, it was determined that the information was still currently and properly classified.

POW debriefings also produced confidential information obtained under a non-disclosure promise. POW's were promised that their complete and candid statements about the conditions of their captivity and the events surrounding their capture, captivity and release would not be disclosed. Release of this confidential information would violate confidentiality agreements and constitute an unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy.

Two options to the policy exist:

- 1) Family members of Americans missing and unaccounted for in Indochina have been provided a detailed summary of the POW debriefs. The summaries have included all releasable information concerning missing family members.

- 2) Returned POW's who have requested release of their POW debriefing information have been allowed a one-time security clearance and provided access to read and review the debriefing files in a controlled environment. The authorization to review files did not constitute authority to copy, record or retain the debriefing file.

Pursuant to the policy stated above, POW debriefs were properly withheld from disclosure. As no summaries were provided to the family of Colonel O'Grady, no information relative to his fate was contained within the debriefs that Dr. O'Grady requested.

I know for a fact that the individual (a Marine sergeant named Walker) contacted the casualty office at Nellis AFB in the late 1960's, that he claimed to have been

held in a camp in Laos with my father. At that time we were told that this claim was false, that could not possibly be true, and it was discounted.

There was a POW who was named Walker who was captured and released in Southeast Asia. Seaman Michael J. Walker was captured on 5 February 1970 in Cambodia. He was released after 23 days. He spent his entire period of captivity in a Cambodian naval facility near Phnom Penh. There was no formal debriefing conducted but there is no record that he or the others with whom he was captured were held with or near other American prisoners.

That Seaman Walker would have had an opportunity to observe Colonel O'Grady in Laos is impossible. Walker never left the Phnom Penh area and was never confined in Laos. Colonel O'Grady was shot down over North Vietnam. There is no intelligence information whatever, from any source suggesting that Americans who were shot down over North Vietnam were ever transported to Laos or were later detained in Laos. Similarly, there is no credible evidence to suggest that Americans shot down in North Vietnam were ever transported to Cambodia.

There was no Marine named Walker who returned from captivity, either at Operation Homecoming or as an early releasee. Additionally, no American Prisoners of War, to include Colonel John Dramei, reported seeing Colonel O'Grady in captivity. Colonel Dramei specifically stated that he saw no Americans during his trip to prison camp after his shoot-down.

I have also requested on numerous occasions, through every channel available to me, a list of the early returnees from Vietnam, and I have not been able to access that list either.

The USAF Missing Persons and Casualty Affairs Office has no record of a request from Dr. O'Grady for this information. The information will be compiled from among the services and it will be provided to her.

Dr. O'Grady made a number of suggestions about improving the Government performance on POW/MIA matters. The following points were raised by Dr. O'Grady and provided with her points are the Department of Defense comments:

The discrepancy cases, the names of the discrepancy cases for whom General Vessey is currently negotiating are not a matter of public record. How can we verify who is being asked for? More importantly, how can we verify who is being omitted from the negotiations who should be being asked for?

The discrepancy cases, the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony before the Committee, are not an exhaustive list. DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of illustrative cases which we could provide to the Vietnamese to demonstrate that a category of cases existed which suggested Americans might still be alive in captivity in Vietnam. The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative. These cases were selected in order to shed light on the live prisoner issue. There are cases in addition to the 119 individuals which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Not all of the 119 discrepancy cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of the discrepancy cases involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

There are three subcategories of discrepancy cases:

Last Known Alive

Those cases in which the U.S. has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces.

POW At Homecoming

A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POW's but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POW's" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation.

Knowledge of the Incident

Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese, there are 64 additional instances where the individuals were "last known alive" and 13 cases where the individuals were classified by the Service Secretary as a POW. These cases, in addition to the original remaining 119 in which fate has not been determined, will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this Committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.

Immediately acknowledge that General Vessey's negotiations are limited to men lost in North and South Vietnam . . . and are ineffective in the matter of men lost in Laos or transported to Laos such as my father.

General Vessey is the Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs. As his title suggests, he is responsible for negotiating with the Vietnamese on matters concerning America's unaccounted for in Vietnam. General Vessey has time and again raised the issue of Americans lost in Vietnam-Laos border areas with the Vietnamese, suggesting that tripartite negotiations would be required to resolve the fates of those individuals lost along the border. Further, he has repeatedly pressed the Vietnamese to provide information on individuals lost in Laos in areas controlled by PAVN forces. Americans lost in areas under PAVN control account for nearly three fourths of the Americans unaccounted for in Laos.

Take immediate action to induce or compel Laos to release the names of hundreds of men known to have been captured alive in Laos and who still survive in Laos.

We have repeatedly requested that the Lao release a list of all Americans held captive by the Pathet Lao. The Lao have not provided such a list. Neither wartime intelligence nor current intelligence suggests that "hundreds" of Americans were captured alive in Laos. No current intelligence exists that confirms that any Americans remain alive and captive in Laos. If Dr. O'Grady possesses such information, the Department of Defense would be pleased to receive it from her.

I have been told on numerous occasions we do not have the capacity to cross-fertilize databases. That means if for example, a report of a live-POW should come to CIA it cannot be entered in a computer bank that essentially cross references and cross fertilizes a DIA computer bank.

All intelligence reports involving POW/MIA's are provided by the reporting agency to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Upon receipt all such reports are entered into the DIA database. In addition, DIA and JCRC exchange data tapes frequently to assure that the two data bases contain the same information. Despite Dr. O'Grady's assertion, the capability exists and is used on a daily basis by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of Defense would be pleased to explore this allegation further if Dr. O'Grady would provide the names of one or more of the individuals who have provided this information to her on "numerous" occasions.

Immediately establish, outside the control of any federal agency or branch of Government, an immediate and comprehensive investigation that will honestly accomplish the return of live Americans and the generation of professional and honest reports, ensuring unlimited and unconstrained access to all of the information without challenge and resistance, and the consideration of independent counsel to investigate any possible criminal violations.

The Department of Defense is unaware of a modality that would permit an investigative body, outside of any Government agency or branch of government, to investigate the Department of Defense or to carry out the other functions she describes. The Department of Defense welcomes the opportunity to continue to cooperate with the Committees of Congress with oversight over the POW/MIA issue.

Immediately arrange for all family members who are relatives of category 1's, category 2's, and category 3's to testify before Congress of the cumulative record of deception and dishonesty so that it can be exposed.

The Department of Defense does not oppose this suggestion. The Department would, however, request equal time to respond to allegations raised in such testimony.

In addition, to immediately arrange for a family member who alleges an official file contains information that is or has been incomplete, inaccurate concealed, altered, or purged, to testify in open hearing.

The Department of Defense does not oppose this suggestion. The Department would, however, request that anyone who provides such testimony be required to make precise and specific statements of fact as to what material they allege was provided to them incomplete or what materials may have been concealed, altered, or purged and by whom or what agency.

Immediately pass an Act of Congress that retroactively restores Captain Carr and Colonel O'Grady and all of the other known and suspected POW's to prisoner of war status until they are proven dead beyond any reasonable doubt.

There is insufficient evidence to change the status of either Captain Carr or Colonel O'Grady. The Department of Defense has complied with the applicable law, the Missing Person's Act, in both cases. If a change of the law is warranted, the proper forum is Congress.

Ann Griffiths, Senator, controls the information flow. She controlled all the information on live Americans and [the information] was prohibited and prevented from being provided to the family members directly.

Ann Mills Griffiths has no control over information provided to the families by the Department of Defense. First, information on specific cases is transmitted by the reporting agency to either DIA or JCRC. That information is provided by DIA directly to the service casualty officers for distribution to the Primary Next-of-Kin. Ann Mills Griffiths is not in the chain of distribution and is not provided the information for distribution. She may review information in her capacity as the National League of Families representative to the Interagency Group, but she has no say over whether the information will be provided to the family. All such information is required to be provided to the families pursuant to Federal law. This allegation is without factual basis.

I am saying, Senator, very clearly that Ms. Griffiths participated in deliberate concealment of information by and with various agencies of the U.S. Government.

Dr. O'Grady provided no factual basis for this allegation. She provided no concrete examples of such "deliberate concealment." Ann Mills Griffiths is not a Defense Department employee and she has no say over what material will be provided to the families. To the best of our ability, we attempt to provide to the families all information relevant to their cases on a timely basis.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Trowbridge, you are obviously the corporate memory. How many years now have you been associated with the issue?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. It will be 20 this December, sir.

Senator McCAIN. So you have been there when it was very small and you have seen it grow large, and you have seen the ups and downs of this issue, sometimes painfully so.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I have seen the good and the bad, and I feel like the flak bearer drawn across the sky for a long time.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Trowbridge, during your years, did you have much contact with Mr. Bell?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Other than reading reports and things, I have not had much personal contact. I know Bill through the years fairly well, but to say that we worked on a daily basis, no.

Senator McCAIN. Did you ever hear him mention that he thought there was some hard evidence at some time that Americans were alive?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. What he said today took me totally by surprise. I'm very interested to find out what he had to say.

Senator McCAIN. And interested on what he bases his statements?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Because you never saw any evidence or any accumulation of evidence that would have convinced you that there was a likelihood of Americans being alive?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. And I would like to go back to the statement I made, I think it was in answer to Senator Smith about information in the 1973 time frame. In the 1973 time frame there was nothing, I don't recall anything that would support that and then I talked in terms of going up to the 1975 time frame, before the Select Committee reviewed that information. I was speaking in terms of right after Operation Homecoming, and I interpreted the question to mean when the POW's came home, did we have anything that would indicate that they didn't all come home, and my answer there was, I don't recall anything of that nature.

Now, subsequent to that we were still in-country, of course, and there was the fall of Saigon. There were Americans that were in captivity after that point. We did track them, we did have that information, and they did return. So I just want to make that clear. I was talking strictly in terms of the prisoners at Homecoming. But no, I don't know where Mr. Bell is coming from on that. I'm anxious to see what he has.

Senator McCAIN. Now, Mr. Trowbridge, during this period of time you served under many directors, and there are at least two, General Tighe, if I remember right, and Admiral Tuttle.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Both of whom, amongst I do not know how many directors that you have had—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I can't remember either, so—

Senator McCAIN. Two of them—

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Senator, Admiral Tuttle was not a director of the agency, but he was a part of the agency at the time.

Senator McCAIN. Then one director, in the case of General Tighe, and one associated with the agency, Admiral Tuttle, who both now state that they believe that there are Americans alive in Southeast Asia, due to, as I understand it, the weight of evidence, or the cumulative weight of evidence, is my best understanding. I understand we are going to have General Tighe, who can probably describe his views a lot more succinctly than I can, but did you have any conversations or dealings with them that gave you an idea as to why they formed the opinions that they did?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I can't quote General Tighe word for word, but just before he did retire, there was testimony and, I believe, his testimony was that we didn't have evidence. As I say, I can't recall the exact words, but when asked his personal opinion, I think that's where he came in and said I believe there may be somebody there, and then he expanded beyond that in the following years. Of course, he'll have to speak to that. I can't.

Senator McCAIN. And you, even though in absence of hard feelings to not have, and this a very unfair question to you, Mr. Trowbridge, and I apologize before saying it. Do you have a personal opinion that there might be Americans alive in Southeast Asia? And the reason why I ask is that I am not sure that there is anyone besides you that has been constantly involved in the issue, perhaps Mr. Bell, nearly so as you and he have been.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I'll answer it in these terms. Are there prisoners there, I don't know. I've looked—my personal opinion is the same as my professional opinion. I've looked at an awful lot of reports over the years and I've gotten excited over ones, over the

years, and the ones I got most excited about are the ones that turned out to be something that was orchestrated. Somebody did a good job of putting a story together. However, I haven't seen anything that would convince me that American prisoners of war are still being held there.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I hope that one of my colleagues will ask you about your experience with some of these concocted or manufactured stories, because I am sure you have had an interesting experience with that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, we will be glad to come back and give you more time to do so. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Trowbridge, I would ask you first, I believe, and I think some of the information that I wanted for background has probably been pretty well covered. You said you had been with the agency since December 1971, so obviously, you have been there a long time, and I suppose that Mr. McCain states it right, that you are kind of the corporate memory, the institutional memory for the organization.

Before December 1971, what were you doing?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I was a naval officer, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. Naval officer. Could I ask you what qualified you at that time in December 1971, to be an intelligence analyst?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I was the branch chief. You say an analyst, I wasn't an analyst. However, as far as my background is concerned, I was a naval aviator. I got into the intelligence community. My first schooling in intelligence was in 1964. I served as staff officer for intelligence and operations on staff. I was on 7th Fleet staff ashore in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968. We were their eyes and ears for shore. And, again, there I was an intelligence officer. I went to CINCPAC staff where I was an intelligence officer dealing with reconnaissance requirements, both at the national and the tactical level in Vietnam. Then I came to this position.

Senator GRASSLEY. No prior analytical experience?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. While you say no prior analytical experience, I had a long experience in the intelligence community when I was in 7th Fleet staff in Vietnam and it certainly was my duty to provide the commander intelligence information that was gathered. I was there and I interfaced with the 7th Air Force and that information was provided up to the fleet.

Senator GRASSLEY. And the POW office where you work, how many bona fide intelligence analysts are there?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I don't have the exact number right in front of me, but maybe Bob knows.

Mr. SHEETZ. No.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, if you want to answer, Mr. Sheetz, please do. I just want the statistic, that is all I am after.

Mr. SHEETZ. We've a total of 58 billets in the organization right now. Six of them are what I would call the management team. We have six clerical and administrative support people, 29 analysts and 17 intelligence technicians, and enlisted personnel who perform sort of a mixture between analytic and technical support work. That adds up to 58.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think, Mr. Trowbridge, you probably answered this, but let me ask it my way. I do not expect a different answer, if you assume you have spoken to it before. In any of your analysis of live-sighting reports or other information, have you ever concluded that an American serviceperson is being held against his will in Southeast Asia—all of Southeast Asia?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. As a prisoner of war?

Senator GRASSLEY. Being held, yes, as a prisoner of war.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I don't believe we have, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Now, you say strictly a prisoner of war. I would rather say against his will. You know, I do not know—I am not a lawyer. I do not know the true legal definition of prisoner of war, but somebody being held against his will.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Not to my knowledge, sir. Now, we had reports, as I mentioned just a little earlier, after Operation Homecoming there were individuals that were still in the country. There were—was an American presence there until 1975. There were individuals that were captured. We did have reporting that equated to these individuals. Some of them were moved through Vietnam to North Vietnam. We knew where they were. We had reporting that we equated to these individuals. We did have someone in Laos at the time and we did equate reports of these individuals. So that is my answer.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. I am willing to accept that judgment. I want to follow up and this is just to clarify it from the standpoint of your responsibility. I assume that you are aware that if you or any one of your colleagues in the organization have ever made even one mistake in analyzing live-sighting reports, it could mean that we have left someone over there against his will. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I think about it every day, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Again, this is probably repeating, but just to emphasize, I think, what Mr. McCain brought up, and this is without any discussion with him. Well, I guess I did not ask this question of you, so I am asking of you, Mr. Trowbridge, do you believe that there is a problem in DIA with regard to the mindset to debunk?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir, I don't. Mr. Nagy addressed that a little, and I would be more than glad to address that issue with you. So often the Defense Intelligence Agency gets this handle of debunking information. We have received approximately 1,500 sighting reports. We presently have a little over 100 on the books that are unresolved. We have a fair number of those reports—I think it is about 68 percent—where the individuals have come in and given us this report, the analytical work has been done, and we have equated that information to someone that is accounted for in one form or another.

In other words, the reporting had to do with somebody that went down during wartime, the information where they talk about an individual being captured is right on the money. They have told us the truth. They tell us about somebody in Vietnam, say in that period of time, 1975 time frame, sightings of individuals that are being held, and when we equate that to the individual we know who the individual is. Again, they are accounted for or they came

home. Maybe they were a missionary, someone that was working there.

Senator GRASSLEY. Maybe I could save you some concern, because what I think maybe you feel implicit in my question when I talk about a mindset to debunk, I do not necessarily say that that is a bad motive. I would say that it could be a case where, as I said a couple of times yesterday, it may not be possible to see the forest for the trees, you know, that sort of a thing where sometimes you could be so close to a situation, and with no bad motive, just maybe not read something correctly. I guess I would ask you to answer the question yes or no, if you know that is where I am coming from when I ask you this question.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I certainly know where you're coming from sir, and I think an analyst makes a judgment based upon their experience, and they look at the situation, they look at that particular report, and if it is not a good report, then that is what you want out of your analyst, he should say that. Now the mindset to debunk, how can we debunk reports if people are coming in and telling us the truth and we've equated those reports that people are telling us the truth. As I said about 68 percent. We also have a portion of them where somebody actually did come in and tell us a lie. But all of that information is then provided in front of another board to review.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, let me accept your answer, and only finish that part of my question by saying that yesterday Mr. Ford was talking about the fact that a mindset to debunk may be part of the problem, and I guess I would conclude that if Carl Ford is correct, then directly or indirectly that reflects on you and other analysts in the DIA. And I just think that is something that you have got to think about. Again, I do not equate any bad motive to that.

Mr. NAGY. Senator, if I could say something, and not detracting from your time, my explanation to Senator McCain was a personal view with regard to how people worked and minds operate in stressful situations, and these have been stressful situations for these individuals for many years. I don't believe there's an analyst within our shop, not one, who comes to work every day saying to himself, well, if I get any reports today, I'm going to put those down, because I don't think there's anybody over there, and it doesn't matter what the report says. I don't think they are conscious at all, or operate that way in any way whatsoever. These are, in my view, honest, dedicated men and women who function as well as they can within a very difficult environment. I know what Mr. Ford said yesterday, I know what I said earlier with regard to the way attitudes develop over time with the pressures of the job.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think you are repeating, and legitimately so, the point I made about the forest for the trees. Let me ask Mr. Sheetz a question. Is it DOD's policy to give classified information to the Vietnamese or have we, in fact, given some classified information to the Vietnamese pertaining to POW/MIA matters?

Mr. SHEETZ. That's a hard question for me to answer because I've not been over there in the Hanoi office and I'm not personally aware of—I haven't been there to see what has been passed to the Vietnamese. Certainly, I have seen case narratives that were prepared expressly for the purpose of passing information to the Viet-

namese. Descriptions of the loss incidents, map segments with critical positions plotted, pictures of the lost and unaccounted-for individuals. I know all those files were passed to the Vietnamese, and I would be certain that in some instances probably material was extracted from classified, and properly sanitized and passed, in that loss information that was given to the Vietnamese. That happened long ago, but I have seen those files.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Trowbridge, DOD policy has been stated by Secretary Cheney and Assistant Secretary Ford, that family members can have access to all information in their loved one's files except sources and methods. Do you agree that this is the policy?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. NAGY. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Has either of you ever denied a family member access to information that he or she has a right to according to this policy?

Mr. SHEETZ. Not with knowledge. I could have made a mistake, but not with knowledge.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I will answer exactly the same, sir. There is no need to deny any of that information to the families beyond sources and methods.

Senator GRASSLEY. If a family member asked for information, and just happens to show up at your doorstep and asks to see, say, a casualty file, do they get it right away? Can they see what is in it right away?

Mr. SHEETZ. We are required by procedure to work through the service casualty officers. There have been times when family members have come in, in what you might call exigent circumstances, that those procedures have been short cut. I might add that—

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I should not interrupt you, I am sorry.

Mr. SHEETZ. Dealing with the family members is at one time the most important and one of the most draining parts of my job. Draining in that—and I think useful—but draining in that I take phone calls from family members who are extremely emotionally distraught at times. And Senator, I have to tell you it's absolutely gut-wrenching. My heart goes out.

Senator GRASSLEY. But what they want is information, and I guess the only thing that bothered me in what you said, is what you immediately said after I asked my question, when you say according to procedure. I do not know exactly what that means. I am sure you do know what it means, but it may be that according to procedure, that there is something wrong with that aspect of your policy that gives the families the feeling that they are getting the runaround. What we are really after here is that we need to get families immediate access and whatever this runaround is they talk about, not have it. I can understand the necessity for sources and methods, but beyond that, I cannot, and I am sure they do not.

Mr. NAGY. Senator, we have no reason to withhold anything other than sources and methods, and in fact if we have, we shouldn't have, and I can guarantee you we won't for as long as Mr. Sheetz and I are in a position to see to it that that's the case. With regard to the procedures, these were not established by DIA. DIA functions within the process, as you say.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is Secretary Ford now establishing that procedure? I mean, Secretary Ford could dictate that this is not going to go through the casualty office and we are going to have the capacity right there to deal with it.

Mr. NAGY. Certainly, Senator. The Assistant Secretary could either change the policy himself, or ask the Secretary to change the policy. As you know, we function through the casualty offices within the services.

The CHAIRMAN. I think what we have suggested here today is, respectfully, that it may be necessary, you were here when I made the comment earlier, to get a more streamlined and accountable process so that—what the Senator from Iowa is saying is, do not let the procedure stand in the way, create a procedure that does not stand in the way.

Senator GRASSLEY. I hate to suggest this, but you ought to get a bunch of politicians in there. We are good at handing out things. Let me ask maybe one final question. How long a period must pass before a family member gets access to new live-sighting information, and I guess to answer that question I would like some citing of policy governing that.

Mr. NAGY. I mentioned that in my opening remarks. Let me ask Bob to outline the policy that we have in place now with regard to that question.

Mr. SHEETZ. Most firsthand sighting of reports—Senator, do not mention a particular individual's name. Most of the firsthand sighting reports that come in require an analytic job—to equate those to a particular case. What we try to do is once we make that relationship, that analytic judgment, that equates it at that point. Then it is incumbent on us to do whatever sanitization or whatever processing that is required to get it in the form that we can get it to the families. There are times when we are perhaps overworked and that doesn't happen as quickly as it should. One of the things we just did within the last 2 months was reorganize the office to create a new branch called the Current Operations Branch, which basically is responsible for reading every piece of traffic that comes into our office. And any piece of traffic that comes in that we can immediately correlate to a particular case, the watch officer who is on duty at that time is responsible for making a copy of that report and immediately putting it into the process of getting it to the casualty officers. Where things, I think, do sometimes breakdown is in reports that cannot be immediately correlated, and they have to go through an analytic loop to get correlated, but I will admit that this is an area that needs more management attention and a higher standard of excellence, and I promise to give that to you.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. We have been here almost 9 hours today, and I think similarly yesterday, and I would like to try to move into a couple of sort of snappy answer questions if we can, and move this along a little bit.

I am troubled. We have got a situation where in 1973 we had Operation Homecoming and people came home. The Defense Department said there is nobody else alive, they are all dead, that was the policy. And yet families said no, they are not all dead. Today, 20 years later, we have got how many discrepancy cases?

Mr. SHEETZ. General Vessey presented 119 cases to the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. 119 cases, 20 years later, in which there was cause to believe we could not know what to believe. But there was a reason in a number of those cases to say that a person was last alive—that we acknowledged they were last alive—accurate?

Mr. SHEETZ. There were some other cases in that 119 that were not last known alive, but generally speaking that's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So 20 years later we have knowledge of last known alive. But the Defense Department announced that they were all dead and you are saying that we had no intelligence in 1973, 1974, or 1975 that suggested there were discrepancies then, and they only became discrepancies later?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, let me try and clarify that for you. You said snappy answers—when you get into discrepancy situations and numbers it's going to take a long time, but I'll answer you with a snappy answer. As far as the intelligence was concerned, reports that we equated to individuals still being held in captivity at that time, the answer was no. The discrepancy cases that we're talking about today—were individuals that were last known alive.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we not know that they were last known alive then?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why is that not evidence of somebody being alive? How can you say they are all dead?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I never said they were all dead, and I don't see how you can prove they were all dead.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you agree with the statement then that they were all dead?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I didn't make that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you agree with the statement?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I didn't agree with it then, I don't agree with it today.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you did not agree with it then?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I don't remember specifically saying that to anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Defense Intelligence Agency stand up and say, do not do this, we have evidence some people may be alive?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well I think it was well-known to everybody what the situation was on last known alive individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean? Does that mean it was well-known that there might be some people alive? Is that what it means?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Then how could a policy have been articulated that said they were dead?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I didn't make that policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how could you then not have had evidence that people were alive? You said earlier there was not evidence. It seems to me that if somebody was last known to have been alive, and you do not know that they were dead, and we do not know 20 years later that they are dead, presumably 19 years ago we know to an even greater certainty that they might be alive.

So the question is, what happened to them? Why was there not an effort, I mean that is what is leaping out at everybody, this is not that complicated. You have said that there was evidence that those folks might have been alive, correct? Is that correct, Mr. Nagy?

Mr. NAGY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. The circumstances surrounding the incident, the last we knew of them they were alive.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what did we do to collect that data or to further that effort back in 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well we certainly did. Any information that was collected or anybody that reported information relative to that—came into our office. Did we have any in-country assets to follow up on that at the time? Absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. You see it strikes me, respectfully, that this is more of a burning issue today than it was then. That we are more concerned about trying to find those guys alive today than we were 19 years ago.

Mr. NAGY. If I'm right, it seems that way to me too, but I think we need to place this in the context of the environment at the time, which I think Mr. Ford and others have done, or attempted to do. The environment then was to pull away from the rest of the world, to a degree. A number of changes were made within intelligence, for example, that reflected that, where we diminished significantly the assets we had devoted to the Third World.

I think there was an attitude with regard to Vietnam that has been talked about even today, that we wanted to disassociate ourselves as a Nation from that terrible time. I'm afraid that as you look back, the questions you ask are unanswerable by us here, because it was a matter of not only national policy, but almost a national fervor to move away from that.

The CHAIRMAN. And maybe that is the answer. Maybe, respectfully, I would say to you that that is the answer, that that is why the families had to create an effort and an entity that stood up against the Government and against that attitude.

Mr. NAGY. I have no doubt about that sir, with regard to the attitude of the families. I can only say that I believe that to the degree that you can recover, you can't, from the immediacy of the situation following the homecoming. That the Government should have acted to a greater degree to be certain, that the kind of assets that we have now applied against the problem would have been best applied then. I can't recover from that, and I can't apologize enough to the families personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a very fair and, again, one of the most honest statements that we have heard, and it is the kind of honest statement that we need to hear, and I appreciate it. It strikes me that what may be happening here, Mr. Trowbridge, is that Bill Bell is responding, as he did then, to that information, but that the agency, for whatever reasons back then, and they are well described—there was a retrenchment and so forth—did not view it the same way, so there was a difference, just as there is a difference within the league about how to do methodology, there was a difference then in perceptions. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I would say yes, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to this sort of debunking concept that was raised a little bit earlier, you are all familiar with the Dooley case, are you?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. You would have to refresh my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me refresh you with it. This comes from the report of the minority of the Foreign Relations Committee. This is a situation where a Navy pilot, Lt. Comdr. James E. Dooley, was shot down on October 22 1967. He was conducting a bombing run near Hanoi. He was flying an A-4E. He crashed just south of Do San, Haiphong Province in North Vietnam. A fellow pilot saw his aircraft after it was hit. They watched it go down gradually until it hit about 1 mile offshore in the vicinity of Do San. They did not see an ejection, but there was limited observation by fellow pilots because of the weather and because of the swiftness of the incident, so there was some uncertainty. He was listed as KIA, body not recovered. He was not returned or accounted for during Operation Homecoming.

In 1987, a North Vietnamese refugee was interviewed by U.S. intelligence personnel at a refugee camp, and he described the shoot-down of an American jet aircraft that he had witnessed in 1968 while in the area of Do San in Haiphong Province. According to the source, he said he saw the pilot bail out with a tricolored parachute, try to swim out to sea to avoid capture. The pilot fired a pistol at his pursuers before he was captured. The refugee said the captured pilot was stripped of his one-piece flight suit, placed in the sidecar of a motorcycle, driven across Do San airfield, and taken away by North Vietnamese officials to a waiting automobile. Early DOD evaluation of the fisherman's information concluded that he probably witnessed the shoot-down of a pilot, J.M. Hickerson, who was shot down 2 months after Dooley in the same general area. Hickerson was captured, he was repatriated from North Vietnam in 1973.

After Operation Homecoming, however, information began to surface that Dooley was alive. In 1973, a U.S. POW who was repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on a wall of a prison cell in Hanoi. Two Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnam custody in 1973 identified his photograph as a fellow inmate. Finally, a Communist propaganda photograph of U.S. pilots captured in Hanoi, dated after Dooley was shot down, apparently showed a partial profile of a person who strongly resembled Dooley.

Now in 1989, the former prisoner POW Hickerson, in a written statement described the details of his parachute landing and capture, and he was disturbed—Hickerson was disturbed—that the fisherman's eyewitness account of the shoot-down of an Navy pilot was wrongly attributed to him. He said that he landed on the inside of a peninsula at Do San, could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured, as the fisherman described. Furthermore, he wrote, he did not fire his pistol before he was captured. He said his parachute was all white, not tricolored as the fisherman stated. He stated that when he was shot down he wore a Marine utility uniform consisting of pants and shirt, and not a one-piece flight suit as the fisherman described. And finally, he was

taken to prison riding on the back of a bicycle, and not in a jeep or not in a motorcycle or car.

These contrasting differences, however, did not result in a DOD change in the conclusion regarding the shoot-down or the status of Dooley. Apparently Colonel Childress noted in the file that Dooley was listed with a presumptive status of dead, body not recovered. His case was presented to North Vietnamese officials in 1984 during the technical meeting that took place then, and so the question I guess is, that with respect to a case like that, first of all, is that sequence true, does that refresh your recollection about that case, or are any of you familiar with that?

Mr. NAGY. I'm not familiar enough to answer your question sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you, Mr. Trowbridge?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No sir, I'm not. The Dooley case I remember looking at at the time. I can't sit here and argue the merits as to why we did one thing or another.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not there was a re-evaluation?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I know we took a look at it. I can't tell you where it stands today.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea why the Dooley case might not be—this raises, you see, this question of how we have got something listed that is not even perhaps on the discrepancy list, but that perhaps ought to be. Now maybe there is a rationale, maybe something did happen to Dooley subsequently, and obviously the Vietnamese might know it, but if it is not even being presented to them as a case, how do we know?

Mr. NAGY. Senator, let me offer to provide all that we know with regard to this case to the Committee within the next day or so.

[The Dooley case file, including classified material was provided to the Committee.]

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate that, but obviously it raises a larger question which the Committee cannot walk away from and which we need to work on together, and that is the question of how many of these cases exist like that. And I think what we are going have to do for this Committee to be effective, and for families to have their questions answered, is we are going to have to look hard at this issue of what those classifications are, how they get there, and whether or not we need to do some reevaluating with respect to them and include them in this process as we go along from here. And I think an openness to that reevaluation process and so forth, will lend, again, a lot of credibility to this. I do not have the answer to this. It may be that you guys have evaluated the hell out of it, that you have got 25 different reasons why it was not recategorized, and that is precisely what I think we need to know now. Does that make sense?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHEETZ. I might just note that each and every one of the 2,273 cases, the ones in Vietnam, are going to be made part of the 2-year work plan that CINCPAC is putting together for on-the-ground verification and investigation in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. That is great to hear, that will help do it.

Mr. SHEETZ. If we have somehow made a mistake, not only will the review of this Committee be useful in going over those, but ev-

everyone needs to understand that the Defense Department plans to investigate on the ground in Vietnam each and every lost—every missing, unaccounted-for individual.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very significant statement, and a very ambitious and significant project, and clearly the changes in Vietnam welcome that. And I think there will be an enormous opportunity to do it, and so the key issue then will be, obviously, sufficient assignment of personnel, so that Bill Bell and company are not going crazy trying to fulfill that obligation in changing circumstances without an ability to follow through on it. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. It is getting late, and you gentlemen have been very patient. Let me indulge you just for a few more minutes just to pick up just briefly in a comment on the line of questioning Senator Kerry was talking about, 1971, 1972, 1973. It is the intention of the Committee to call witnesses who were in the policy roles of that time to answer those questions which obviously I believe were more appropriate that they answer them probably than you.

The only connection might be, Mr. Trowbridge, was the fact that you were there at the time. You kind of transcend all of these administrations, and it just seems to me that if you had any feeling that there was no justification for saying everybody's dead, that considering the severity of the issue, it would seem like—and I am not saying you would have to make it publicly because soldiers do not do that, but you can do it through channels—and there was nothing that you felt had to be sent up through channels that would dispute the fact of that statement, based upon your intelligence where you were at the time.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is correct, sir, but to say you had intelligence that would say everyone is dead, there is no intelligence that would say everyone is dead.

Mr. SHEETZ. Senator, could I please add something? It's really a critical point. It seems to be a point in the minds of the Committee here on what happened back there in 1973 and the incidents that occurred up to that point. I might add here that the loss incidents and the information that is reported, that is the basis for the making the decisions on last known alive, that is not even intelligence information, sir. That information comes from the operational community, so I would just point out that DIA wasn't the only organization and Chuck Trowbridge, though he is the last remaining analyst and manager from that period, that is not just intelligence information, that's operational information.

Senator SMITH. I understand that. I was just trying to see from your perspective, since you were there.

I mean, when you look back through the press reports, I mean, the papers, any of them, they're very credible—The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Post—all the stories, as you well know, you've all seen the clips.

They just simply go along, prisoners, prisoners, prisoners, and then boom, everybody's dead, that's the end of it, and then it just seems to me that I don't know how—and I used to coach high school baseball. If I told my team to go out and lose every day, you guys make sure you lose this game, make sure you lose this game—I mean, it would seem to me if any mind set to debunk occurred, it started there.

If it's not there now, then great. But I certainly have not ruled out the possibility that it didn't exist at some point in time because of policymakers, not necessarily because of individual analysts. But I want to move off of that quickly with a couple of quick points.

Mr. Trowbridge, have you ever seen any intelligence from—and we're in open session here, but aerial photography or related matters that would give you any indication that there were American prisoners of war during the war or after the war in Laos or in Vietnam?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. We had good indications that there were Americans in the reporting. Now, if you want to just talk about aerial photography, there were some individuals that thought we had good imagery of some folks in a location where there were some individuals located, and we looked at that very seriously and hard, and we looked at that with General Tighe, as a matter of fact, and the answer was no.

Senator SMITH. Now, you can—if you wish to clarify this now, fine, and if not we can do it in executive session, but I was told that the individual—and I won't mention his name, but you will know who it is—who was the expert on this type of imagery was absolutely convinced that the imagery that was presented was in fact caucasian, or were in fact caucasians, and that when the Tighe report brought that matter up, that another view then was offered which said that was not correct. Is that accurate, as far as you know?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. There was a report relative to imagery that was in the Tighe report that did not make its way into the final report. That was an error. General Tighe and his group sat in on that presentation as to what our findings were relative to that, and the reason it's not in there is they bought off on it.

Senator SMITH. In other words, something that had stood there, an imagery analysis that had taken place that had stood there for a number of years was reviewed during the Tighe report and another view was taken that was different? I mean, I just want to establish that that is in fact what happened. Is that accurate?

Mr. NAGY. I think it would probably be better if we address this in a forum where we could talk this all the way through. I am concerned that Chuck may not be thinking of the same facts that you are.

Senator SMITH. I will accept that. We will do it there.

Just a couple more questions, and it seems like I've known you forever, Chuck. We have had our differences, as you know, over the years. We've had some things we've agreed on, but one of the things where we've disagreed is Garwood, and I just want to ask you a couple of questions, specific questions on Garwood.

To the best of your knowledge—and anyone else can answer this—did you know at the time, any time after 1973, after Operation Homecoming, did you have direct intelligence knowledge from any source that Robert Garwood was alive in Vietnam?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Do you mean, until the time he came home?

Senator SMITH. At any time between 1973, after Operation Homecoming, and 1979 when he surfaced?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. In the 1973 time frame I would have to say no. We had indications that he had moved north, but actually where

he was, we did not know that, and I don't think we knew that, and I can't specifically say 1979, until he came home. I guess I would have to say I really don't know, but I don't think we had any information until just before he came home, or until the time he came home.

Senator SMITH. So you had—and I want to be very clear, and I'm not trying to trick you or anything. I just want you to be honest with your answer. You had no knowledge that you felt was good intelligence, good information, good evidence—whatever you want to call it—that Robert Garwood did exist in whatever capacity in Vietnam from 1973 until such time as we were informed that he wanted to come out via the note in Hanoi?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is why I hesitated there, sir. We did start to get some boat people out, and in my mind I can't remember whether we had a refugee that may have come out and indicated that he was up in that reeducation area or not. I just can't recall at this point in time, but if it was it was very close to his coming out.

Senator SMITH. So nothing at the lower end of it?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir, not to my recollection.

Senator SMITH. So we didn't track Garwood, we didn't know where Garwood was on a month-to-month or week-to-week or year-to-year basis?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. We had no idea?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. You indicated to me, and I believe to a couple of other Congressmen in a meeting, I believe it was, in—I can't remember which Congressman's office it was. I know he passed away, the Congressman from Alabama, a couple of years back, that after the debriefings with Garwood that you did not believe him. You used the term, fabricator.

Would you just state for the record, without—not a long explanation, just why you did not believe Robert Garwood's story about live Americans, and I would just qualify that by saying I think you will agree, and if you don't, say so, but based upon the 7 or 8 days that I sat in on numerous hours with you and Garwood, he did give you a great deal of information which I will not go into here in public session, but he did give you information that you felt was valid. Is that not correct, that part of the question?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, as you well know, you were instrumental in making him available to us on two occasions. We spent extensive time with Mr. Garwood in those interviews. We have an agreement with his attorney, to the best of my knowledge, not to discuss that in public, and we will make all of that information available to this Committee. I think Mr. Ford said that to you the other day.

Senator SMITH. OK. That's all the questions I have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that you're talking about his attorney at the time, Mr. Waibel?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. During the interviews.

Senator SMITH. That was Vaughn Taylor.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley, do you have any more questions?

Senator GRASSLEY. I do not have any more questions, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the Garwood interview, when he was immediately—when he was flown out of Vietnam, were you folks part of the decision-making with respect to any debriefings, or how he would be met, greeted, and dealt with?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No, sir. We expressed our desire to get to Mr. Garwood as soon as possible. In other words, we wanted to get to him as soon as he stepped off the airplane. Our concern was what he may have known about anybody that may still be there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you express that concern and put it in a request? I mean, did you try to see him immediately?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir, we did. We were denied that access.

The CHAIRMAN. Who denied you that access?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I think it was twofold. His attorneys didn't want us to have access to start with, and then there were some policymakers. I think it was the Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the decision made that he would need attorneys? I mean, I understand when he got on the airplane and was greeted by an Air Force crew, he was served champagne and treated very well. Is that accurate?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Sir, I can't address that.

The CHAIRMAN. I further understand that when he got off the plane, rather than being met with more champagne he was met with an arrest and reading of his rights.

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. I can't address that, either. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have no knowledge of—well, when was the first time that you did get to debrief Bob Garwood?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. After his court appeals went through the whole court system, and it was many years later. I think it was through the good offices of Senator Smith that we did get to him finally.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is fair to say that here is this person who came out of Vietnam, whatever his status was, who was not debriefed by United States officials for years afterward?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Well, I wouldn't say that, exactly. As you will see in the file, he was talked to by the Marine Corps. He was talked to by some Members of Congress that headed the POW/MIA task force from the House side very early on.

The CHAIRMAN. But not from an intelligence perspective?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. No. They did ask the questions relative to the prisoner issue, though, and they are part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say in retrospect that that is a gap, that that is a mistake, that this man should have been debriefed the moment he stepped off the airplane?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. In my mind it is, or we wouldn't have been faced with the situation that we were many years later with Bobby Garwood.

Mr. NAGY. I think we've learned that lesson, in a sense. As you know, with the other returnees in other circumstances and situations, such does take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, every single one of the Operation Homecoming returnees were debriefed immediately upon stepping off, and so we knew the lesson before that, didn't we?

Mr. TROWBRIDGE. Yes, sir. We wanted to talk to him.

The CHAIRMAN. He was treated differently.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me, John, I think that is again—and it's not necessarily your area, but just to put on the record, I think that is what concerns me.

Garwood stated, contrary to what has been said in the press, that he had information on live Americans, but when he was arrested, charged with desertion, court-martialed and all that stuff, his attorneys at the time advised him not to talk.

But it just seems to me, if you wanted to put together some type of logical information, if you just, 6 years before, had declared everybody dead as a policy and somebody comes out alive, your policy doesn't look too good.

It just seems to me that when I think—now, you have to remember, knowing the Garwood case as well as I do, Robert Garwood couldn't speak English when he came out, No. 1. No 2, he was in a terrible mental state. No. 3, he was placed under arrest, received no psychiatric help, no offer of medical attention to speak of, of any kind, that the other people who came home got, so he was, to put it very bluntly, scared to death.

Now, I think these are mistakes, obviously, and we tried to correct some of those by interviewing Mr. Garwood, but we lost 6 years—12, actually, but 6, and his memory was pretty good, as—it had to be gouged a little bit, but I think there's a lot of misinformation out about Garwood, and I think that misinformation has contributed to his lack of credibility.

But the bottom line is that he was at one time a POW, he was a POW that did come out. Now, what he did—again, you have to start getting into the time frame of what he did when he did it. If he was a POW, and he wasn't let go, and he collaborated with the enemy in 1974, maybe you or I would have done the same damn thing if you thought your country left you, and so I think all of that, and—I'm going to end the discussion here.

The bottom line is, the thing that I'll never understand and nobody's ever explained to me, and somebody's going to have to at the policy level when they come in here, is why it was so important to court-martial Robert Garwood in a severe psychiatric and mental condition, in addition to not even being able to speak English. Why was that more important, that interviewing Mr. Garwood like we did, everybody else about possible American prisoners of war?

Somebody made a decision, and I haven't been able to find out who it is yet, but I'm going to try. Who made that decision? I think those kinds of decisions is what you guys look bad today and you ought to be mad as hell about it, and you ought to speak out about it. You ought to be not afraid to speak out about it.

If you know anything about it, you ought to put it on the record and say it, because those kinds of decisions dumped on you guys, you're taking a lot of crap today in the DIA, all of you, and I know how hard you work. I know because I've spent—how many days did we spend down at Ocracoke on Garwood?—and we weren't just fishing, either.

So we know this, but you ought to respond, and if there's somebody out there that deserves some of this heat for doing it, and that can take it off of you, then we ought to make them come forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that as I have said previously, as a part of trying to understand how information has been treated and how we have got from here to there, we are going to go through all of that. And this has been an interesting day with respect to a lot of this.

Let me come back to the current status because a significant focus, obviously, of the Committee is on our capacity to do this now, on our ability to follow through now. And we all acknowledge that there were mistakes made and we are going to try to chronicle them as we understand it.

But are you satisfied that you have the resources today, the commitment today, the capacity today so that we do not have to go through a reevaluation of the intelligence evaluation process again? Are we where we have to be?

Mr. NAGY. Let me answer that, Senator.

In terms of the process as we saw it 2 months ago and we began to make the decisions with regard to increases in manpower, I think that here in Washington we have sufficient manpower allocated to the job according to that criteria. With the chartering of your Committee, with the other changes that we see coming, as they should, in our view with regard to relationships with the families, the provision of the material, of a variety of other actions which we all agree are necessary and appropriate, I feel that 58 here in Washington is probably too small a number.

The CHAIRMAN. So you think you need some more folks?

Mr. NAGY. I would think so in terms of this if we are to continue the normal analytic process and provide service to the families as they deserve it and to you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I would concur with that. I think you do. And I think it has got to happen notwithstanding the expense because the expense of not doing it in terms of good faith and people's perceptions is just that much more costly. And obviously, the families are under the impression that this is a matter of the highest national priority. One day longer is too long. And we ought to be Desert-Storming the evaluation process here in order to guarantee we do not have to wait any longer.

If we can do it for that, if we can do it for the oil in the desert and so forth, we can sure do it for our fighting troops that we have questions about.

I hope you are going to put this in writing. And I hope it is going to be on the Secretary's desk or whoever is appropriate so that decision is made.

This Committee is going to be here. And I do not want to come back in 2 months or 3 months and say, well, what happened; we did not follow through on it. So I think that you need to think about what ought to happen for the data base, for cross-evaluation, for the ability to go through these cases, for the ability to support General Christmas and this new structure, and for the ability to support the people in Vietnam itself.

Mr. NAGY. I would only add that we are in a time of declining resources and DIA's resources overall have declined, particularly in the 1992 fiscal year.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have to make the request for this. I am quite confident the Secretary of Defense did not come here yes-

terday to promise that this is a high priority without being willing to do that.

And I do not mean to be trite at all, but if we are able to find \$180 billion for the S&L's we can find the personnel to complete this task after 20 years.

With respect to the photographs, four of the five have been discredited. There is one photograph or two photographs that remain outstanding and in question, the Carr photograph and the Robertson, Lundy, Stevens photograph.

Mr. SHEETZ. There is a new Stevens photograph we have under investigation as well.

Mr. NAGY. That is still working.

The CHAIRMAN. What specifically can you tell us with respect to the three-person photograph? What is your evaluation of that at this point?

Mr. SHEETZ. After a lot of on the ground work this summer and continuing efforts on the ground now and in Vietnam, and indeed, around the world, we are unable to say where that photograph originated.

The families remain fully committed that their identifications are operative. I mean, those are their men in their view. And as long as they feel that way, we have to keep that as a number one priority.

The CHAIRMAN. Now when you say you have to keep it as a number one priority, several families have identified, have they not?

Mr. SHEETZ. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, you have competing families claiming these people.

Mr. SHEETZ. There have been two other families that have indicated that the middle individual appears to them to possibly be their missing family member.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have, I take it, in the enhancement, these men carrying weapons. Is that accurate?

Mr. NAGY. Senator, if I might, you do not even need to enhance the photograph to see the possibility or what appears to be three rifle butts down in the lower left-hand corner of the photo, two or three. I mean, they appear to be rifle butts.

The CHAIRMAN. And the individual who provided the other photographs that have been since discovered in the Soviet magazines, provided this? You have not yet been able to locate him, is that correct?

Mr. SHEETZ. One of the key individuals is basically, he's unavailable and our information—

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Cole, I think, has some input on this.

And Colonel, if you want to come up, that is fine.

Mr. NAGY. Would the Colonel still be under oath, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel COLE. Excuse me, Senator. The ceramic tile merchant in Kampongsom who went underground after our initial investigation interview in late July, we believe is a key player in this. The Thai police are assisting us in locating this man. They believe they're going to find him, it's just a matter of time.

We think he's a key part of it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And has he been involved in prior supply of photographs?

Colonel COLE. Not that we know of, sir, just with this particular group.

Now there are his colleagues in Trat' in Thailand where you make the smuggling runs from Kampongsom to Trat', back and forth. There are some known previous, if you will, scam artists involved there. There's an x-ray technician who has been involved on other cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Have Thai authorities agreed to bring charges against these people?

Colonel COLE. Sir, we have not asked for charges. We have not proceeded that far on the legal standpoint. We've only asked for their assistance in making this man available for questioning, sir.

That probably is a possibility. But we haven't gone that far, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that advisable as a policy? I do not know if you want to comment on that.

Colonel COLE. Sir, I'm not prepared to comment now simply because I'm not sure it is a violation of Thai law. I haven't researched the legal implications yet. We can pursue that if it looks like that is our only recourse.

Mr. SHEETZ. I think we are just pleased that the Thai authorities are willing to work with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me express the gratitude of the Senate and the Committee; obviously, I think the Thai authorities are to be thanked for their willingness to be helpful here. And I also know the Cambodians were particularly helpful. And I think those are extremely promising signs and we are delighted with that kind of cooperation, obviously. And I think it makes a great deal of difference.

Well, gentlemen, the hour is late and it has been a long day. You are not, any of you, going anywhere, we hope, soon. And so we can pursue other matters as we will. And as you know, there are some matters we left unexamined here.

I want to say for the public record that the fact that the Committee leaves something unexamined at this point in time does not mean that it will not be public if appropriate at a later point in time.

I have said since the beginning that the Committee is committed to the notion of openness. Obviously, we are not going to help this if we start becoming part of the problem by secreting things away. But the Committee is going to try to guarantee, as Senators and members of one of the branches of Government, that we are not destructive of the process by seeing things released that do compromise national interest somehow. National interest in terms of sources and means and not in terms of prior defined interest 15 years or 20 years ago.

And I think the composition of this Committee is such that people can have a good sense of trust that the Committee as a whole is not going to operate contrary to that interest.

Do you have anything you want to add to clarify? I know Dr. O'Grady made some fairly strong comments. I do not know if you want to address any of those at this point in time, any of you.

Mr. SHEETZ. I think whatever comments we would want to make would probably be best saved for the wrap-up session tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. We appreciate that very much. We are very appreciative to you for the time you have put into this and Mr. Trowbridge, a lot of years and a lot of effort. And we certainly respect that very much.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned until, I believe, 9:30 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 7:35 p.m. the Committee adjourned, to be reconvened at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, November 7, 1991.]

POW/MIA POLICY AND PROCESS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:30 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry, (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Smith, McCain, Brown, Grassley, Kohl, Helms, Kassebaum, Reid, Robb, and Daschle.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA will come to order.

Mr. Usry, before you sit down, why don't you just save some time here, and raise your right hand?

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. USRY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. We are conducting today the third day of our initial hearings on the POW/MIA issue. And I repeat very briefly that the purpose is to set out the parameters and lay the foundation for this investigation.

I think we have had a very interesting and informative first 2 days. And today we hear from a number of those who are critics of the process thus far, and we will finally wind up with a return panel from the Administration to address some of the statements of concern and allegations that are made by those who are critics of the process. And then I will have a word to say about where the Committee goes from here.

Senator McCain, do you have any opening comment you wish to make?

Senator McCAIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Usry, if you would identify yourself and share with us your opening statement, please.

STATEMENT OF TRACY USRY, CHIEF INVESTIGATOR, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, REPUBLICAN STAFF, POW/ MIA ISSUE

Mr. USRY. Mr. Chairman, my name is Tracy Usry. I'm the Chief Investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Staff, responsible for the POW/MIA issue.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, let me thank you for the opportunity today to address you.

As I said previously, I am presently employed by the Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee as an investigator. Since September 1989, I have been the chief investigator responsible for the legislative inquiry regarding the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action issue.

The investigative staff for this inquiry are highly trained professionals with a total of more than 68 years of investigative experience in the Executive Branch, including criminal investigative experience, as well as more than 17 years of experience in intelligence analysis. In addition to investigative staff, there are minority staff, as well as concerned individuals providing assistance in this inquiry.

This inquiry was initiated in September 1989 when Senators Helms and Grassley were concerned as to why a good portion of their constituents, as well as others, felt the Government's handling and position on the POW/MIA issue was suspect.

As one family member indicated, and I quote, "I don't trust the government. They lied to me in 1968 when my husband was declared missing and they have been lying to me ever since," unquote.

Our investigative effort resulted in the publication of "An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW and MIA's." Our conclusions in this report include that "any evidence that suggested that an MIA might be alive was uniformly and arbitrarily rejected, and all efforts were directed toward finding and identifying remains."

Further, we had previously found "the executive branch has failed to address adequately the concerns of the family members of POW/MIA's and has profoundly mishandled the POW/MIA issue."

Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to request that this report that I reference, prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Staff, be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[The material referred to may be found on p. 106-226 of the appendix.]

Mr. USRY. The report was a result of interviewing in excess of one hundred people, reviewing in excess of 3,000 documents, which consisted of classified, declassified and unclassified government documents such as First-Hand Live Sighting Reports, both classified and declassified; the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Uncorrelated Live-Sighting Reports," published in 1978; classified as well as declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports; classified and unclassified Department of State reports; reports both classified and declassified from the various military intelligence organizations within the uniform services; unclassified internal memos from Presidential administrations, dating from 1972 forward, as well as individual casualty reports provided by families of those missing in action.

In most instances, when the staff requested assistance from the Defense Department, the assistance was belated and begrudging at best. It routinely took in excess of 30 days for the reply, when in most instances the reply was in the negative.

The most controversial example was access to the classified first-hand live-sighting reports. Access was initially denied on the grounds that it was a request to review classified documents. Yet the Senators, as well as pertinent staff, had clearances far exceeding the material to be reviewed.

Access became such an issue that Ann Mills Griffiths, the Executive Director of the National League of Families wrote a memo to the Defense Department stating that access to these documents should be denied.

It would seem strange for anyone to take such a stand since all that was intended was to ensure that the government was doing everything that it could on the issue. This is the stated purpose of the National League of Families.

Additionally, some of the critics of the government's actions on this issue are members of the National League of Families. I might add that Ms. Griffiths, although not a member of the government, has routine access to these documents.

When access was finally granted, the conditions of access were so restrictive that we were able to review the live-sighting reports only during a 4-day period. The Defense Department decreed that Senators and staff could review the documents only so long as the Senators themselves were present.

This is directly contrary to normal Defense Department procedures in which DOD staff normally review documents and prepare a report or identify pertinent information for their superiors to review at a later date.

The results of those live-sighting documents indicated the following: Analysis of live-sighting reports in many instances were closed prematurely when additional work could have affected the negative conclusion; the summary and conclusions prepared by the analyst in many instances did not always accurately portray the information in the raw intelligence; arbitrary conclusions were made, not based on the pertinent facts of the case; Congressional inquiries made on behalf of constituents were not accurately answered.

In some of the cases reviewed, the answer on the part of DIA had little resemblance to the available information in their files. Certain personnel within the POW/MIA office of the DIA reached conclusions on issues regarding live-sighting reports to which they were not qualified to do so.

Because of budget and time constraints, we were unable to investigate further certain relevant problems, which I'd like to add, or provide to you.

The first is, attempts by the administration to infiltrate private activist groups; illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists of this issue by the Department of Defense; questionable identifications by the Armed Services Graves Registration Office; questionable liaisons between administration, activist and identified members of organized crime; the failure of DIA to address the MIA/POW issue for World War II and Korea; sanctioned rescue missions by the Department of Defense after 1973; problems with the operation of the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, including the utilization of unscientific methods to identify remains, USACIL personnel lying to previous Congressional Committees;

and a premature closure of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command concerning USACIL.

The substantiation of even a portion of the allegations would have been an embarrassment to the Department of Defense.

In summation, I would like to state for the record that I believe this issue can be resolved successfully. It is imperative that this Committee review what the government historically has failed to do or has done poorly; for in the past exists the answer to the question, "Did we leave men behind?"

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Usry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TRACY USRY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, let me thank you for the opportunity to address you today.

I am presently employed by the Minority staff, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee as an investigator. Since September 1989, I have been the chief investigator responsible for the legislative inquiry regarding the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issue. The investigative staff for this inquiry are highly trained professionals, with a total of more than 68 years of investigative experience in the Executive Branch, including criminal investigative experience, as well as more than 17 years of experience in intelligence analysis. In addition to investigative staff, minority staff as well as concerned individuals provided assistance in this inquiry.

This inquiry was initiated in September 1989, when Senators Helms and Grassley were concerned as to why a good portion of their constituents as well as others, felt the Government's handling and position on the POW/MIA issue was suspect. As one family member indicated "I don't trust the government, they lied to me in 1968 when my husband was declared missing, and they have been lying to me ever since".

Our investigative effort resulted in the publication of "An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA's". Our conclusions in this report include that "any evidence that suggested that an MIA might be alive was uniformly and arbitrarily rejected, and all efforts were directed toward finding and identifying remains." Further, we had previously found "the executive branch has failed to address adequately the concerns of the family members of POW/MIA's, and has profoundly mishandled the POW/MIA problem."

Mr. Chairman, I request that this report, prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican staff be entered into the record.

The report was a result of interviewing in excess of one hundred people, reviewing in excess of 3,000 documents, which consisted of classified, declassified and unclassified government documents such as: First Hand Live Sighting Reports, both classified and declassified; the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Uncorrelated Live-Sighting Reports," published in 1978; classified as well as declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports; classified and unclassified Department of State reports; reports both classified and declassified, from the various Military Intelligence organizations within the uniform services; unclassified internal memos from Presidential administrations, dating from 1972 forward, as well as individual casualty reports provided by families of those missing in action.

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It would seem strange for anyone to take such a stand since all that was intended was to ensure that the government was doing everything that it could on the issue. This is the stated purpose of the National League of Families. Additionally, some of the critics of the government's actions on this issue are members of the National

League of Families. I might add that Ms. Griffith, although not a member of the government, has routine access to these documents.

When access was finally granted, the conditions of access were so restrictive that we were able to review the live-sighting reports only during a 4-day period. The Defense Department decreed that Senators and staff could review the documents only so long as the Senators themselves were present. This is directly contrary to normal Defense Department procedures. DOD staff normally review documents and prepare a report or identify pertinent information for their superiors to review at a later date.

The results of the review indicated the following:

1. Analysis of live-sighting reports in many instances were closed prematurely, where additional work could have affected the negative conclusion.
2. The summary and conclusions prepared by the analyst in many instances did not always accurately portray the information in the raw intelligence.
3. Arbitrary conclusions were made, not based on the pertinent facts of the case.
4. Congressional inquiries made on behalf of constituents were not accurately answered. In some of the cases reviewed, the answer on the part of DIA had little resemblance to the available information in their files.
5. Certain personnel within the POW/MIA office of the DIA reached conclusions on issues regarding live-sighting reports to which they were not qualified to do so.

Because of budget restraints, we were unable to investigate further certain relevant problems, including the following:

1. Attempts by the administration to infiltrate private activist groups.
2. Illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists of this issue, by the Department of Defense.
3. Questionable identifications by the Armed Services Graves Registrations Office (ASGRO) board.
4. Questionable liaisons between administration, activist, and identified members of organized crime.
5. The failure of DIA to address the MIA/POW issue for World War II and Korea.
6. Sanctioned rescue missions by the Department of Defense after 1973.
7. Problems with the operation of the Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (USACIL-HI) including:

Unscientific methods used to identify remains;
USACIL-HI personnel lying to previous Congressional committees; and
Premature closure of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command. The substantiation of even a portion of the allegations would have been an embarrassment to the Department of Defense.

In summation, I would like to state for the record that I believe this issue can be resolved successfully. It is imperative that this Committee review what the government historically has failed to do, or has done poorly. For in the past, exists the answer to the question "Did we leave men behind?"

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Usry.

Let me just say that I think that everyone respects your commitment to this issue. You have certainly put a lot of time and energy into it.

One of the questions I have, having looked at the report, is, and I do not want to say this sweepingly about the report, but there are some statements that I think sort of leap to a conclusion that may be overly encompassing in nature.

Let me give you an example, for instance. On page 5-3 to 5-4 you talk about the issue of the prisoners left in Laos, and you make the following statement, quote, "Notwithstanding the fact that no U.S. POW's held by Pathet Lao forces have ever been repatriated." I believe that is on page 5-4, down in the last paragraph.

"These statements were made notwithstanding the 80 men cited by Henry Kissinger held by the North Vietnamese, and notwithstanding the fact that no U.S. POW's held by the Pathet Lao forces have ever been repatriated."

But, in fact, it is true, is it not, that nine Americans were turned over to the U.S. in 1973 from Laos, who were nominally Pathet Lao prisoners? Those were counted as repatriated from Laos.

Mr. USRY. Sir, it's my understanding that the nine people—the nine prisoners that were repatriated were, in fact, taken by Vietnamese military and then transferred to Hanoi for the release.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were nominally Pathet Lao. I mean, what I am saying is, you see, this is where the confusion enters into it. They were considered to be, I believe, held by Pathet Lao and were considered—I see heads shaking over here. That is not accurate?

Mr. USRY. Sir, those particular nine prisoners were taken—actually taken prisoner, it's our understanding, by the North Vietnamese in Laos, and therefore really were never in the hands of the Pathet Lao.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Well, the larger point is that we have met with Ambassador Sullivan a few days ago. He will be testifying incidentally down the road here. But what he really said was that, quote, "The Pathet Lao were a figment of Hanoi's imagination, a Potemkin regime, just a few people who ran operations. The North Vietnamese really ran everything. The POW's shot down in Laos were transferred to Vietnam and nine were held just to say that the Pathet Lao had some. The border was really irrelevant."

Did you examine that perception of what really existed then?

Mr. USRY. No, sir. We didn't go into the in-depth specifics as to what political party was actually operating at the time in Laos. From the information that we reviewed, it indicated to us that although there were North Vietnamese Communists and Pathet Lao in Laos, those particular nine people were, in fact, prisoners of the North Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, see, I think there is a lot of confusion about it, which is what we have to sort through, and I think that without talking to Sullivan or without talking to other people, it just strikes me that there is an incompleteness.

I am not challenging the whole report at all. I think you have some very, very sound and good stuff in here and there is no question obviously about the relationship that has existed, sort of adversarially, in trying to get this information. But I think this raises some questions which the Committee is going to have to do further work on before one can really draw a conclusion.

I, at least, am confused about who held whom with respect to Laos and what the reality of the Pathet Lao was at that time, and I think the Committee is going to have to try to sort that out before we can make a declarative statement that X were turned over or none were turned over, because it is not clear to me that we really know yet.

Do you sense the disparity there? I mean, if Bill Sullivan, whom I am sure you recognize as pretty knowledgeable about the area, since he was over there and was part of the talks, et cetera, says these guys were not real and you are talking about a country of 70 million people versus 3 million people, and we all know the North Vietnamese had massive numbers of forces up there, and basically we are controlling the entire border area, there was really a fiction about the existence of Pathet Lao.

So I think that needs to be sorted out, is all that I am suggesting here.

Let me ask you if, based on what you heard yesterday and the day before, and based on what Secretary Cheney has set forth, Secretary Carl Ford has set forth, the DIA through Mr. Nagy and company has set forth, are you encouraged now that there is, in fact, a different relationship and that there is an ability to get the answers that you and others have been seeking?

Mr. USRY. Sir, I don't know if you're aware of it, but I'm a retired Army officer with 22 years in the Army. And, in those 22 years, I have seen repeatedly where the people at the head of the organization or the head of the command have routinely pledged undying support and cooperation in every way, and I'm sure that they greatly mean that.

However, when that gets down to worker level, sometimes that degree of cooperation is watered down. I certainly believe what Secretary Cheney said, what the Defense Intelligence Agency said, and what everyone else or anyone else that testifies here on the part of the Administration says concerning support.

However, when it gets down to the lower level, sometimes that cooperation is watered down and that has been our experience already in the past 2 years, when we did this inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. So the proof will really be in the pudding, obviously?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you sense that the framework that has been put in place with General Christmas and the new command structure and the assignment of personnel is adequate to do the job at this point?

Mr. USRY. I believe that is a portion of what is necessary to do the job, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What more do you think is necessary?

Mr. USRY. Well, I think that the work set forth by this Committee, along with the cooperation pledged by the Defense Department and the Administration, hopefully, will be what's necessary to resolve the issue.

Without looking at what has come to pass, and what has dropped through the cracks, regardless of what is done now, that is not going to resolve those problems in the past which impact on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. USRY, one of the results of your review indicated that arbitrary conclusions were made, not based on the pertinent facts of the case. Is the case of Lt. J.G. James Dooley, one of the examples that you give in your report, what leads you to the result that indicates that arbitrary conclusions were made, not based on the pertinent facts of the case?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Well, Mr. USRY, you just happened to have touched on a personal experience of mine and I can tell you you are way off base. You state in your live-sighting reports—as part of your rationale for saying that Lt. Comdr. James Dooley was alive—that there was an improper evaluation. For example, two Thai spe-

cial forces released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate.

Mr. USRY, are you aware of the fact that we were in constant communication with these two Thai special forces; in fact, they were with us at the end?

Mr. USRY. I don't understand what you mean by us, sir.

Senator McCAIN. By the other American POW's.

Mr. USRY. No, sir, I was not.

Senator McCAIN. You were not aware of that. Were you aware that if there had been any information concerning Lieutenant J.G. Dooley or then Lt. Comdr. James G. Dooley, they would have communicated it to us?

Mr. USRY. No, sir, I'm not aware of it.

Senator McCAIN. You were not aware of that. Well, if you were not aware of that fact, Mr. Usry, you did a very incomplete job, because you could have asked any one of the POW's, former POW's, or anyone who was involved in the issue, and learn that our primary goal was to keep track of all the names of anyone that we had any information about.

So your allegation that the two Thai special forces identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate is false. "Finally, a propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi dated after Dooley was shot down shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley." What photograph was that?

Mr. USRY. Sir, if you would submit that question for the record, I would be more than happy to answer it after I consult my notes.

Senator McCAIN. You made a very serious allegation here, Mr. Usry, and I am surprised that you would not even know what photograph it is.

Mr. USRY. Well, I think the difference between your information and my information, sir, is, one, your information is firsthand and mine is secondary, dependent upon other people.

However, you have only brought in two examples concerning the Dooley issue and there are more than those that caused us to come to the conclusion that we did.

Senator McCAIN. "A U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi." Who was that POW?

Mr. USRY. That information has not been provided to us because the Department of Defense, at the time we were doing this inquiry, would not share any information concerning POW's with us unless there was a Senator present with us at the time we were going through the documents.

The Senators' schedules precluded us from looking at those documents for more than a 4-day period.

Senator McCAIN. So your allegation—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield for a minute? I'm confused by that.

Senator McCAIN. So his allegation basically, Mr. Chairman, has been relayed to him with no basis in fact.

Mr. USRY. I don't agree with that statement at all, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. What facts do you have to back up your allegation that a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi?

Mr. USRY. Besides that information, which was provided to us by family members, there was additional information provided to us by the particular prisoner that the instance was accredited to, and in the interview with him, the circumstances described were so out of whack to what actually happened to him that what we're saying is that what was attributed to—I believe it was Commander Hickerson, could have very easily also have been attributed to Lieutenant J.G. Dooley at the time of his loss. The arbitrary conclusion was, based on JCRC or Defense Intelligence Agency who had indicated to Mr. Hickerson, when he shared some years later his experiences and said that it was not him as DIA had indicated, made the comment to Mr. Hickerson was, "Well, that may be, but we're going to attribute it to you anyway and it really doesn't matter."

Senator McCAIN. That has nothing to do with my question, Mr. Usry. That was very illuminating. It has nothing to do with my question. My question was: Where did you get the information that a U.S. POW, which you state as fact in your report, said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi?

Mr. USRY. That's in the information that's provided to the family members, and I would be more than happy to research that and provide you an answer for the record, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. In other words, you do not know at this moment?

Mr. USRY. I don't know every nuance of this report in my head at this particular time, since it was published in May, no, sir.

Senator McCAIN. I have now covered three or four of your allegations. You have no information about them, but you are willing to publish them as fact, when clearly you do not have a basis in fact.

Mr. USRY. Sir, I don't believe I said I did not have the information. I believe that I said I would be more than happy to research the information in our files and provide it to you.

Senator McCAIN. "The information that Dooley was alive began to surface. In 1973, a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on," you do not have that information right now?

Mr. USRY. No, sir, because I have 10 file drawers full of information, and, again, if you submit that for the record, I would be more than happy to research that and provide it to you.

Senator McCAIN. You have 10 file drawers, but you have had enough information to make a report from the Minority Staff to the American people, alleging these as fact, and yet you have to provide the answers for the record, one, that a U.S. POW had been repatriated, said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi; two, Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate.

Do you have any factual information on that?

Mr. USRY. With me?

Senator McCAIN. Any knowledge of that fact.

Mr. USRY. Again, I will address the statement I made earlier.

Senator McCAIN. I see. And, finally, "A Communist propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi, dated after Dooley was shot down, shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley." Do you have any knowledge of that?

Mr. USRY. I have the photograph.

Senator McCAIN. You have the photograph?

Mr. USRY. I do.

Senator McCAIN. Where is that photograph?

Mr. USRY. It's up in my office.

Senator McCAIN. Yet neither the DIA nor any government agency has that photograph, according to them.

Mr. USRY. Well, that may very well be the case, keeping in mind that not all information concerning all missing prisoners goes to DIA because there's a lack of the faith in the way they have operated in the past.

Senator McCAIN. I see. It goes to you?

Mr. USRY. Some of it does on occasion, yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. Like your trip to Thailand that you just took?

Mr. USRY. That's correct.

Senator McCAIN. Tell me about that trip, would you, Mr. Usry?

Mr. USRY. Are there anything specific you would like to know or would you like to start from the beginning?

Senator McCAIN. I would like for you to answer the question. I said tell me about the trip. That is what I would like for you to do, Mr. Usry.

Mr. USRY. Sir, I would be more than happy to provide you the briefing that I provided to the Secretary of Defense which led to the trip, if you're interested.

Senator McCAIN. The Secretary of Defense says that absolutely nothing was gained from that trip.

Mr. USRY. Well, that's his opinion, sir. I don't necessarily agree with that. There is still a questioned photograph.

Senator McCAIN. That necessitated a trip to Thailand?

Mr. USRY. That's correct.

Senator McCAIN. What did you do there, Mr. Usry?

Mr. USRY. We contacted the individual who provided a photograph which, after forensic examination, indicated it might possibly be, or in the words of the forensic anthropologist, "was, in fact, Lieutenant Commander Stevens." The individual was polygraphed and the results were that he wasn't telling the truth about anything other than he had obtained the photograph from a Vietnamese.

Senator McCAIN. So at least according to Secretary Cheney, he was lying?

Mr. USRY. That's correct.

Senator McCAIN. I see. Mr. Chairman, the witness obviously, in my view, is acting in such an adversarial fashion that I am not really going to get any good answers from him, so I will not ask any further questions.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. USRY. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make a statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. USRY. I believe that I offered you the opportunity to have the same briefing that I had provided to Secretary Cheney to start the information concerning the trip to Thailand, and I'm prepared to do that. I am here presently just for that reason. So I don't understand how this is an adversarial comment.

Senator McCAIN. Who did you offer it to, Mr. Usry?

Mr. USRY. I just offered it to you, Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. You mean right now?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCAIN. I see. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. You make a historical case for the Soviet Union being involved in accepting American POW's from Vietnam. What evidence do you have to support this, because I have asked a number of the witnesses we have had the last few days if they have any information to this effect, and they say no?

Mr. USRY. Part of the information comes from statements made by a Mr. Gerald Mooney, who is a former NSA analyst.

Senator REID. What statements did he make?

Mr. USRY. He's provided affidavits off and on for the past several years that he tracked a group of prisoners that were, in fact, bound for Moscow and he made that—

Senator REID. Bound to Moscow?

Mr. USRY. Bound to Moscow from Southeast Asia, yes, sir.

Senator REID. What do these affidavits say?

Mr. USRY. Basically that he tracked a group of prisoners and that because of their particular skills they were transferred to Moscow. That same information has recently come out in an October 27 publication in the L.A. Times in their Sunday Section of the L.A. Times Magazine that again states the same thing, along with another individual who was at the time employed by the National Security Agency, and his name is Terry Minarcin and he makes the same statement.

Senator REID. These statements are that there were prisoners of war in Vietnam and because of their specialized skills, they were sent to the Soviet Union?

Mr. USRY. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. How many prisoners were sent?

Mr. USRY. Right now I'd be pulling it off the top of my head. However, I believe that it was mentioned somewhat in excess of 200, but I'm not accurate on that, and I'd have to look at the documents again and provide it for the record.

Senator REID. This man worked for whom, did you say, that gave all these affidavits?

Mr. USRY. They were analysts in the military—

Senator REID. You mentioned one man's name.

Mr. USRY. That was Jerry Mooney. He was an analyst in the military, specifically the U.S. Air Force, and at the time he was assigned to various posts with the National Security Agency, both in Southeast Asia and then later at Fort Meade, MD.

Senator REID. Are any of these affidavits that he prepared based upon personal knowledge of these prisoners? Meaning, did he see any of the prisoners?

Mr. USRY. No, sir. They're based on the radio intercepts that he would be responsible to analyze, and those radio intercepts involved communications within the North Vietnamese military organizations.

Senator REID. Then you indicated that there was an article last month in the L.A. Times?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, on October 27, the Sunday edition.

Senator REID. That was based upon Mooney's information?

Mr. USRY. Mooney and Minarcin. Minarcin was a subordinate of Mooney, working for Mooney at the time.

Senator REID. They both agree?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. Do you know where those two men are now?

Mr. USRY. I believe that Mr. Mooney is in Montana and Mr. Minarcin is in the State of Washington.

Senator REID. They're both out of government service?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, they're both retired—or I don't know whether Minarcin retired or just left the service, but Mr. Mooney did, in fact, retire from the Air Force.

Senator REID. Does Minarcin say anything different from Mooney or did they both say basically the same thing?

Mr. USRY. There is a little bit difference, and the reason for that is Minarcin ended up staying involved in the issue longer than Mooney did, but basically it's the same information.

Senator REID. Has there been anything done, to your knowledge, to follow up on whether or not these men are credible?

Mr. USRY. In what way? By our Committee, sir?

Senator REID. By anybody that you know of.

Mr. USRY. I'm not aware of anyone else, other than different activist organizations and the media interviewing either Mr. Mooney or Mr. Minarcin, besides myself.

Senator REID. Because the statement, as you know, is alarming. To think that there would be 200 prisoners of war shipped off to the Soviet Union of whom now some 20 years later we have no knowledge whatsoever, even though relations during the past 10 years have changed dramatically between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. USRY. I would have to agree with you on that. Even more alarming, sir, is the fact that Vietnam is not the only time that the Soviet Union has received our prisoners of war. There is an overabundance of information concerning American prisoners of war being taken by the Soviet Union after World War II.

Senator REID. I have read that report. Of course, the charge of this Committee is not with what went on in the Second World War, it is what has gone on during the past 20 years in Southeast Asia, and I think that's what we have to focus on.

My question is that it is alarming, or for lack of a better word, startling, to think that, in effect, we would not be able to see, hear from, talk to any one of those 100 to 200 people who were in the Soviet Union, which is now a society that is not behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. USRY. I agree with you, Senator.

Senator REID. So do you think that the Mooney and Minarcin statements are factual?

Mr. USRY. I have no reason to doubt what they have said thus far. I see no reason that they could gain anything personally from making that kind of statement, other than total embarrassment, if it were proved to be untrue.

Senator REID. How do you account for the fact that there is no independent evidence, or that no one has seen, talked to, or heard from these 200 plus people in the 20 odd years since that time?

Mr. USRY. Sir, I don't know that that's necessarily the case honestly. Not having seen what is available within the archives or in the intelligence communities within the administration, I don't know that, in fact, that has not occurred.

Senator REID. What motive would anyone working for this government, military or otherwise, have to subvert or conceal that information? What would be the reason?

Mr. USRY. If little else, certainly embarrassment, and the only reason to reach this conclusion is from looking at the information from the previous wars, specifically World War II, although this is not what the Committee is looking at.

It was quite apparent that there was an overabundance of information that American prisoners of war were taken at that particular time by the Soviets. Other than an occasional inquiry on the part of a Congressman due to a constituent's concern, little or nothing came of it. There certainly is an overabundance of information to indicate that.

So for that same thing to have occurred in Vietnam by our government is not unreal, because I would think that they have already established a historical precedent in the way they handled it.

Senator REID. I'll conclude, Mr. Chairman.

It is your statement that the only reason for concealing this would be some type of a conspiracy or silence because it would embarrass the government if any knowledge came out that there were prisoners in the Soviet Union?

Mr. USRY. I would certainly state that it would be an embarrassment to this government if that were, in fact, true. I would like to add that in that same Sunday Magazine printed October the 27th, there were interviews with KGB officials or former KGB officials that indicated they were, in fact, involved in the interrogation of American soldiers.

Again, I'd have to research it for the record, but I believe one of the KGB officials who is a former colonel, indicates that he was still interrogating American soldiers or knew of the interrogation of American soldiers in Vietnam as late as 1974.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. USRY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I might add, one of the great difficulties here is that here we have sitting next to me a former POW, who spent an awful long time there, who knows about as much about this as anyone from firsthand experience, and he was never interrogated by Soviets, nor were any of the people that he knew of interrogated.

Is that correct?

Senator McCAIN. Cubans, but not Soviets that we know of.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other hand, that does not mean that in certain areas there were not Soviets. I have read the article, it's a very interesting article, and the Committee is going to pursue that whole question of the Soviet angle to determine whether in those Laotian camps where the Soviets were present, because they were

across the border, there was not a capacity for some people there to have done it. It is a legitimate question.

I do not want to suggest—all I am saying is that it is a puzzle—ment that it was so reserved to a particular locale.

Mr. USRY. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Mr. USRY. I believe you will also find some of that similar information in the files of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Daschle.

Senator DASCHLE. I think there is an important procedural question that we have to consider here. We are charged, among all of our responsibilities, with trying as best we can to separate conjecture from fact, and I think that it is extremely important. We are already putting everybody under oath, and I think the second thing we ought to do for the record, with all of our witnesses, when they make statements that they present as fact, that we ask that all relevant data to support their statement of fact be entered as part of the record.

I think that it is critical, in this case, that it be done. I am not sure we have satisfied my desire to do that in this case. I would hope that all of the requests made for additional data and all the information volunteered by Mr. Usry, be made part of the record at the earliest possible date.

I always think of things as being put in the record at some date in the distant future. In fact, I would like to see it tomorrow. I would like to see it as soon as you can provide it, because it may have a lot to do with other questions that I may want to ask other witnesses.

So, to the extent that you can get us that information you say is in your office or wherever, I would like to be able to follow up. I think we ought to demand of all witnesses, when they say they have things available—I would tell them ahead of time, "If you think you have justification for the things you are saying, we do not want you to leave it in the office when you come before the hearing, we want you to bring it with you."

You were not briefed, I am sure, in that regard, so I am not faulting you for doing that, but I hope future witnesses, even if it takes a wheelbarrow, I want them to bring it to the microphone so we do not have to say, "Well, we have it in the office and we are going to have to wait to get it back."

I would like to see it brought and I would like us to be able to analyze it. I would like us to ensure that when things are said as a statement of fact, that there is some kind of justification for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Daschle, your point is extremely well taken, and, in fact, it has been previously discussed by the Committee, and let me just inform you that it is because Mr. Usry works for the Senate and, in fact, he was in his capacity as working for the Senate that he has set forth this report, that it is being made part of the record now in this way.

However, this is why we have said that most of the work of the Committee will not be done in hearings: most of the work of the Committee will be done from this point forward through depositions, interrogatories, interviews and so forth, so that when people come to the hearing this Committee will have a story that it feels a

certainly about telling based on documentation that the Committee will have reviewed at that time.

What we are doing here is really setting out the parameters of this, but I think it is a fair inquiry.

Mr. Usry, let me ask you this—

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, could I—

The CHAIRMAN. It disturbs a lot of people that there are items that the DIA is not aware of or does not have or that there are things that have come through separate files that perhaps are not available elsewhere, so I take it that you will turn over to the Committee any documents or any supporting materials or any evidence that you have that would shed light on this issue as a whole?

Mr. USRY. Absolutely.

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, my concern—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb wanted an intercession. Let me just recognize Senator Robb. This will not come out of your time, Senator Daschle.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It again was a procedural question. It seems to me that it might be advantageous to excuse this witness and allow him to return when he has the material.

I think he clearly ought to have all of the information that Senator McCain asked for and any other information that is going to elicit the kind of questioning—

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good suggestion and I would be happy to do that.

Mr. Usry, since your materials are local, why do not we interrupt at this point in time, if all members are agreeable, you could—

Senator DASCHLE. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection. I think it is an excellent idea, but I have a couple of other comments I want to make in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours.

Senator DASCHLE. My concern, frankly, is that if statements are made as statements of fact and they go unchallenged under oath, that lends even greater credibility to the statement. I think that we all have to be very concerned about this.

My experience in the past has been that, people come to various committees and subcommittees, under oath they say something and then that statement is used later on. "Well, he said it under oath, it has to be true. No one challenged him, there was nobody to confront that."

So, I think it is important that we have the opportunity to analyze this.

Mr. Usry, you made some other statements—and I hope when you do come back we can address them. There are two concerns here: One concern obviously is your deep dissatisfaction with the position by the government with regard to the status of POW's, MIA's, and I understand your concern in that regard.

You make a number of other statements that have far broader ramifications that I think also are important to discuss, and that is, the way the government has conducted itself in this process. You make several charges that I think, if they are true, have to be addressed.

Number one, attempts by the administration to infiltrate activist groups. That is a very significant charge. Second—

Mr. USRY. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator DASCHLE. Well, no, let me finish and then you can answer all of them, with whatever time I have.

Illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists. That is a pretty significant charge.

Mr. USRY. I agree with you.

Senator DASCHLE. What I am asking, in the context that I have just stated my concern, is, we had better have ample documentation.

Third, and the one perhaps that troubles me the most here, is questionable liaisons between administration, activists and identified members of organized crime. I have to tell you, of all the things you have said, that one is perhaps most troubling of all.

Before we are willing to take any of this as fact, and I am not challenging your veracity at all—

Mr. USRY. I understand.

Senator DASCHLE. All I am saying is that before I am willing to say under oath that I accept what you have said under oath, that I just want to make sure you have ample documentation to make charges like that.

Mr. USRY. Sir, I would just like to make one statement concerning what you have just read to me. Keep in mind that those are the issues that we were aware of, that there was some degree of concern that that had, in fact, occurred, but we were not able to complete that during the time frame that we were running this inquiry.

Senator DASCHLE. But you are stating them as fact.

Mr. USRY. No, sir. I don't believe I'm stating them as fact. Let me readdress my statement. What I stated was, "Because of budget restraints we were unable to investigate further certain relevant problems including the following:"

Senator DASCHLE. But you call it a relevant problem. Now, that is a real problem.

Mr. USRY. I agree with you.

Senator DASCHLE. There is a difference between a problem, acknowledged to be a problem, and a charge that somebody may have made, an accusation, is there not?

Mr. USRY. No, sir, I don't believe so—well, let me rephrase that. I believe there is an extreme difference between stating that there is a problem and levying a charge. What I had indicated in my statement was that those were problems that had been brought to us, and that we had not had the opportunity to fully investigate.

However, some of what—

Senator DASCHLE. What you are saying is, they are accusations that may or may not be founded?

Mr. USRY. No. In some instances they have already been founded. I would address one in which I indicated infiltration of activist groups by the administration, and later this morning, I believe you'll hear testimony from Mr. Sampley, in which he was hired to do exactly that. Here is a copy of his statement concerning that.

Concerning No. 2, that's a documented occurrence that the Department of Defense Inspector General did, in fact, look at and

agree it had occurred. However, it was never further pursued by the Department of Defense because their indication was there was no harm meant or done.

Concerning No. 3, that, in fact, is a relevant problem. We have seen indications in which there are questionable identifications and there are family members readily available to provide you that information.

Senator DASCHLE. Since this is your testimony, I am hoping that you will provide the documentation.

Mr. USRY. That's not a problem here at all.

Senator DASCHLE. OK.

Mr. USRY. Now, the only question I would ask is that so far I have questions from Senator McCain and yourself concerning certain portions of this report. Considering that the entire documentation relevant to this report is about four file cabinets full, I need to know exactly what you're interested in seeing or would you just rather that I brought everything down here, because it is quite a bit of information.

Senator DASCHLE. You and I have been around files long enough to know that there is a lot of stuff that may not be as relevant as others. I want you to pick what you think to be the most relevant, the best supporting data that substantiates the charges and accusations that you have made in your testimony.

Mr. USRY. All right, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. We did not get to No. 4, Mr. Usry.

Mr. USRY. No. 4, questionable liaisons between administration, activists and identified members of organized crime. We have information and we have some documentation and know where further documentation exists to reflect on that particular problem, yes, sir, we do.

Senator DASCHLE. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Committee in agreement that it would be advisable to follow up on Senator Robb's suggestion and have Mr. Usry come back with the materials later in the day when we could review it?

Senator GRASSLEY. That's OK with me, except that for what I have to ask him now and to discuss with him, if there is any further information he cannot give me, I would rather have my response in writing, so I want to go through my series of questions before he leaves the table now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley, that is your privilege. The Chair will recognize you now.

Senator GRASSLEY. First of all, I think the entire Committee needs to know how I first got acquainted with Mr. Usry. He was an employee of the Defense Department at a time when a report that was not supposed to be outside the Defense Department came to me, at least came to my attention.

It was a report on an investigation of Mark Smith, which is not relevant to this point that I am trying to make, but just so you know that over a period of 26 months now, 26 months, that eventually gets us around to a point where it is costing the taxpayers 1 and 9/10s million dollars to keep this Committee going.

I called up the Defense Department and said that I knew about this Mark Smith report and that Mr. Usry was involved in some of

the investigation of it, and I needed Mr. Usry to come to my office to do nothing more than tell me what was in a government report, that is all I wanted.

I just wanted somebody personally familiar with it to brief me on it, nothing more, because at that point I did not even know that I needed that sort of briefing to know where to proceed.

He was supposed to be in my office a certain morning and somebody called my office and said they are not going to let him come until they brief him first, which is—that may be bureaucratese, but I believe that that's their way of saying to me that he cannot talk to me until somebody in the Defense Department says what he can tell me about the Mark Smith report.

So I sent word back that if he is not in my office by a certain time, I am going to go out there and I am going to meet with him. He was not in my office by that time, so I went out to get him.

The General had absented himself from his office and I talked to some low level person—I should not say low level person—I talked to a colonel.

I thought that I was going to have a big battle with the colonel, but I said, "I am in pursuit of my legislative and constitutional functions of seeking information and all I want is some information, I want nothing more, and I think Mr. Usry can contribute to that information."

I said, "I want him to brief me in my office. Can he come with me to my office?" I was shocked that they said he could, because, you know, back in 1983 I had this same problem with Chuck Spinney, and DOD was not going to let him come and talk to me, or just brief me in his office. So eventually we had to have him before two committees and eight television cameras to get the information that could have been given to me in the privacy of my office.

So I am not unfamiliar with dealing with the Defense Department on just getting basic information. Mr. Usry came to my office and briefed me and then we got into a lot of other matters and eventually Mr. Usry ended up being detailed, I believe—am I right—to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or is there something in between there?

Mr. USRY. That's correct, sir.

Senator REID. Just so I can understand it, at the time you were asking him to come to your office, was he in the Army?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Were you in the Army or a civilian employee?

Mr. USRY. I was in the Army.

Senator GRASSLEY. Anyway, I didn't know anything about Tracy Usry before then and I am not saying that I know a lot about him now. I am just saying that that is how we got acquainted and I want that to be known for the record, because that is just one example, another example, of the Defense Department just not wanting to share information.

Then, of course, I related yesterday how it took 6 weeks to get to view files in the Defense Department that they usually are willing to bring over to S407, for us to view here in the Hart Building or in the Capitol Building. We had to go over there.

Mr. Usry was one of four people, cumulative, that had 68 years of investigative and intelligence analyzing experience that was over there those 4 days I went through the files.

Mr. Chairman, can I continue, since I am the only one that wanted to question him?

The CHAIRMAN. How long do you think you are going to be in the questioning?

Senator GRASSLEY. I would say 7 or 8 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, technically we really have reserved time of 5 minutes, which other Senators have been adhering to.

Senator GRASSLEY. Then what I would like to do is go to my second round then. In other words, whatever time I use now, I will not use when he comes back before the Committee. I am not asking for more time than other members have, I am just asking for—

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is recognized.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. In regard to what Mr. McCain asked you, yesterday the Chairman raised the Dooley case before the panel of Mr. Nagy, Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Trowbridge. Neither of them knew any of the details of the Dooley case, even though they are responsible for such a case, and even though the report has been out for 6 months, and they are not unlike Mr. Usry, in response to Mr. McCain. They asked to provide details for the record and I do not think this is an unreasonable request. But on the other hand I think that matter is taken care of by the fact that the Committee is going to have Mr. Usry bring all of these materials to the Committee.

So I think that that will be satisfied.

Mr. Usry, you have a unique perspective of this issue compared to most of us here, because of your background as a criminal investigator. Now, of course, you are not conducting a criminal investigation; is that right?

Mr. USRY. That's correct.

Senator GRASSLEY. You were simply using the methodology of criminal investigation, as I understand it?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

Senator GRASSLEY. You have now been in the political world for 2 years since you were first detailed to the Foreign Relations Committee staff. Given your experience and given your impressions of politics and how Congress investigates issues, I would like to know what advice or recommendations you would give as we embark upon this 1 year investigation.

Mr. USRY. Well, I would like to start by saying that the Senate—and I would have to limit my comments to the Senate side, because that's basically where I work, is not unlike any other large bureaucracy. Certain things take a little bit longer than maybe they should, but that's understandable, given the large and diverse responsibilities that this particular House has.

The one thing that I would urge more than anything else, and one of the things that I have seen in the past, and it's certainly not meant to in any way, shape or form embarrass anybody or speak ill about anybody or diminish an individual's capabilities, but the one thing that I would state that is most necessary in this issue for a 1 year Committee is that you must ensure that you have the best people available to do the work.

This is not a Committee in which people need to learn how to do research or to be educated in the investigative process, because if that's the case, their education will certainly be worthwhile, but it will diminish the effectiveness and the timeliness of this Committee. The greatest statement that I could make and assistance that I could offer is to ensure that the people that are on the Committee, the staff personnel, have that requisite experience in order to go through this issue, which is very, very complex, as well as voluminous, in what needs to be reviewed, so that at the end of your year you'll be able to answer the questions that are the reason why you are in existence.

Senator GRASSLEY. In your testimony you state that one of the conclusions of your May report is that the DIA rejected information about live MIA's and that all efforts were geared toward returning remains of lost ones.

I would like to have you elaborate on that and how widespread is the evidence of that conclusion.

Mr. USRY. In the 4 days that myself and others reviewed the live-sighting reports, one of the overriding problems that I noticed was an incompleteness in the files, a failure to have an organized file, and as such, be able to methodically go through and determine what needs to be done to resolve a live-sighting case.

Above and beyond that, I saw conclusions reached which had no basis in fact from the raw intelligence provided. I might add that that was not the case in every instance. However, that certainly was the case in many instances and my concern was we were not talking about somebody losing money or property not being recovered.

In this instance, when there is a mistake, and when they're perpetual and they're the same mistakes all the time, and they affect the possibility of an individual being alive and being left in Southeast Asia, that is a legitimate concern.

It seemed to me that wherever there was a possibility of either being positive or negative on an issue, whether a glass is half full or half empty, the attitude taken was that it was a half empty glass and therefore was not relevant to an actual live-sighting report.

In other instances, I saw just plain ignorance of the facts provided in the raw intelligence and a conclusion reached that in no way was supported by the intelligence at hand. I'd like to give one example, if I can, without going into specifics that might violate any clearances.

There was information provided by a source who had seen six what he felt to be live Americans left over from the Southeast Asian war, somewhere in Laos, and he saw them for about a 3 minute period of time, if my memory serves me correctly, and they were poorly dressed, emaciated, gesturing for help. They were bound, and he indicated that he had seen these people for the duration of driving in front of them and then passing them and then watching them in his rear-view mirror.

The analysis and conclusions reached at that time were that these people were either Soviet advisors or they were volunteers, probably from the Mennonite Church in Laos. I asked—by the way, these people were being guarded, and I asked why, in effect, would

volunteers or Soviet advisors be guarded by Laotians, and I was told that the reason for that is there's some hard feelings concerning basically Caucasians in that part of the world and that it was for their own protection, which seems to me to make a lot of sense, except that they were emaciated, they were poorly dressed, they were gesturing for help and they were manacled or bound in some way.

The particular analyst at that time told me that the individual who had provided this information withdrew that portion of his statement in which he said they were bound. There was no original statement that I could see on the part of the individual that had made the report.

There was simply a summary of information provided by whom-ever talked to him. I understand in many instances that these people are illiterate and therefore cannot read or write, but if you're dealing with something of this magnitude and you are professional enough to maintain the proper type of documentation in order to resolve an issue, certainly at a minimum you would have tape recorded this individual's information so that you could refer to it later.

When I asked the individual and he said he reneged on that portion of the statement, as the analyst had indicated to me, I asked him where in the report it said that, and it was not there.

Yet based on that information, they said that that particular individual did not see live Americans that could possibly be left over from the Southeast Asian War.

In another example, an individual passed a polygraph on three separate occasions as to what he had seen. Yet his information was arbitrarily ignored, simply because the analyst at that time, who had no understanding or training in the polygraph field, stated that since this man was a marijuana user he passed the polygraph.

Certainly that is a contributing factor, if, in fact, he had smoked or ingested marijuana at the point in time just prior to the examination. However, it's been my experience in the past 18 years that when a polygraph examiner administers an examination, he ensures that that has not occurred or can tell by what the particular instruments can reveal as far as heart rate, breathing and galvanic skin response.

Yet based on those conclusions and that individual saying that the only reason this man passed a polygraph examination is that he's a known drug user, the information that that individual had was disregarded.

In my 18 to 20 years experience in the investigative field, very rarely do you have people of high morale, high moral concerns, and people in good positions that provide that type of information.

The type of information that would normally be provided concerning live Americans routinely will come from refugees, truck drivers, known drug users, probably child molesters in some instances. That does not negate the validity of their information. In this case that was arbitrarily ignored.

Those are only two instances and I saw many more.

Senator GRASSLEY. My last question; whether or not DOD has ever issued a formal response to the Senate Foreign Relations Minority Report?

Mr. USRY. If they have, I'm not aware of it.

Senator GRASSLEY. Your judgment as to why you think they have not or have been reluctant to?

Mr. USRY. It's my feeling that if they ignore it, they feel it will go away. The less mess or action you take with it, the quicker it will be forgotten and therefore not something you will have to address later.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. USRY, before we excuse you temporarily until later, let me just emphasize why Senator Daschle and others of us are concerned and why it is so important, and I think you understand this importance.

Mr. USRY. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There are a lot of families, a lot of people listening, a lot of folks who hang on every nuance of every single assertion with respect to this issue. Now, in your report here, which I read yesterday incidentally, it says, and I read from your report, "In 1973 a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Doolley's name written on a wall of a prison cell. Two Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnam custody identified his photograph. Finally, a Communist propaganda photograph shows a partial profile," and so forth.

I have information here on the actual debrief of Captain Hickerson. While you assert that he was not swimming and so forth, let me read to you from it.

He told debriefers, quote, "He collapsed his parachute, he found himself face to face with about 100 civilian personnel. He immediately separated from the parachute and started running out into the shallow water. After going a short distance, he detached his seat back and commenced swimming seaward."

Now, in your report you assert that he was dropped near the land and was not near the water, but here in his own report he says he was swimming seaward. "About this time rifle shots started splashing in the water around him. At this point Hickerson saw he was about to be captured, so he pulled out his survival radio and sent the message to his wing man. He then stopped, put up his hands and surrendered to the DRV swimmers."

In his debrief he goes on to describe how he was stripped of his clothing, blindfolded, hands tied behind his back, put on the fender of a motorcycle, taken to the fishing village. Later that day he was also moved in the sidecar of a motorcycle, during which time he was seen by crowds of people who threw rocks and sticks at him.

So, in point of fact, you have asserted certain things of fact that do not correlate to his own debriefing. Now, that raises the whole question before this Committee of trying to follow up on each and every one of the assertions that come to us at a later point in time, and I think it underscores why it is so critical to have what Senator Daschle said, and to be able to verify these kinds of items.

Mr. USRY. I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. So with that in mind—excuse me. I think Senator Kassebaum had one question.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Sorry, Mr. Chairman, I came in late and I would just agree. I think it is terribly important, as a matter of

fact, today to be able to have some of the documents that I guess are there to kind of back up the assertions on the infiltration and the ties to organized crime. The sad thing is this is all being played out on television, and once those statements are made, unless there is something concrete to go on, it is out there and I think that is just a problem. I would back that up.

But I have a question, Mr. Chairman, on the results of the review that you gave concerning the fact that the live-sighting reports were closed prematurely, that arbitrary conclusions were made not based on pertinent facts of the case and so forth. There are five there, the results that you found, but you did not give any real reason why you think this was so.

I would be curious why you believe that files were closed prematurely and so forth. What was your evaluation of this? Is it that there was a mindset to debunk the whole question of concern about whether there were live prisoners still there?

Mr. USRY. I think that there were several factors that impacted on that. As I had indicated earlier, one of the problems was I believe that those personnel responsible for the analysis of information, in some instances, were just not capable of understanding what leads might need to be pursued in order to resolve an issue rather than just close it out prematurely.

Above and beyond that, I believe that the attitude again, as I had indicated earlier, between a half full and a half empty glass was that, in fact, they looked at things as a half empty glass. Therefore where there was a choice, the choice was that this did not, in fact, apply or relate to live Americans that possibly were from the Southeast Asian War.

In the 4 days that we reviewed the documentation we looked at approximately 400 live-sighting reports, give or take. Because of the constraints placed on us by the Defense Department in the review of the documentation, which were: no notes, nothing would leave this office, the only time you could look at these was when you were in the presence of a Senator, and those notes that we made stayed at the Defense Intelligence Agency POW/MIA office.

Above and beyond, what we were looking at initially were cursory examinations for the most part, to see whether there was any indication that analysis was incorrect or premature in reaching a particular conclusion. A great many of those cases that we would have looked at again in depth, we were unable to do so.

However, as always when you review this type of work, there are those that interest you right away and therefore you read through them before putting them in another pile, and I based my conclusions on those particular cases that I reviewed in depth. I would say there were at least a hundred of those that I reviewed in depth.

I would also add that not in every instance was there bad analysis. In many instances there was relatively little information or it was a very cut and dried situation that was easy to analyze.

One of the additional reasons I say that cases were closed prematurely is there was one situation in which a refugee had provided information and then subsequently was moved from one relocation camp to another and settled in a foreign country.

This particular refugee went amok at a particular point in time in this other country and attacked some other people. Therefore he

was jailed. The analyst indicated that the individual was no longer available for interview or subsequent polygraph examination, yet there was nothing in that file to indicate there had been any cable, telephone conversations or correspondence with the appropriate authorities in this foreign country to see whether or not that individual could be made available for further interrogation or interview.

So that again is one of the reasons why I said there were premature closures.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you believe, Mr. Usry, as you have quoted a family member saying that they don't trust the government and that the government has been lying?

Mr. USRY. Having been an employee of the government, either as a military member or civilian since 1969, I would have to tell you there are many instances in which I have seen the government make mistakes, and rather than admit that mistake, do more to cover up what eventually becomes a lie, yes, ma'am.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Sad commentary, I think, and it is one that I think we have a real responsibility, Mr. Chairman, in making sure that we have every bit of documentation that we can to back up those statements. Thank you.

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me comment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. That should not shock you, Mrs. Kassebaum, that people in government lie. Politicians lie all the time. We are part of the government, too, and we do not set a very good example. If we would all follow the rule that if you always tell the truth, you never have to know what you told somebody else, there would not be any lying, but we do not set a very good standard for the rest of the government employees ourselves.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But we are adding to an atmosphere here where we are designated to try and bring the very best conclusions that we can and get to the bottom of this, which I believe that we can. You have made that statement yourself, but somewhere we have done a disservice if we do not address this loss of trust.

Senator GRASSLEY. It has to start with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I can interject, I think both Senators are correct. I think Senator Grassley is accurate. This Senator has had the sad experience of having three individuals plead guilty or be indicted in the last couple of years for lies that they made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I am referring to Claire George, Elliott Abrams and Alan Fiers, and the lies were in answer to questions that were asked by this Senator.

So, indeed, I am not surprised, I do not think anybody here is surprised that that happens. On the other hand, what Senator Kassebaum said is absolutely true. It is a sad commentary. I think that is what she was saying. This Committee has an obligation to guarantee that we are not going to be part of the problem, that we are not going to sit here and simply accept something as a fact if it is not or if it is not shown to be, and that the purpose of this Committee is to separate fact from fiction, and that is why, Mr. Usry, I do not want you to feel that you are being picked on.

There is not any witness coming before this Committee for whom we are not going to have to do research and so forth, and as I say,

and I repeat it, these 3 days of hearings are really an exception to the way in which we will be presenting evidence.

The hearings are designed to set out the parameters of this issue for the Members of the Committee and for the public and they will establish the foundation from which we will proceed. After this, our staff is going to have an extraordinary amount of work, to sit down, to correlate, to establish the data base, to do the cross-tabulations, to begin to go through the 2,273 cases, which is precisely what the Defense Secretary, through Mr. Nagy and Mr. Ford, have said they are going to do, that each and every case is now going to be subject under General Christmas' new structure to a reexamination. We are going to have to separate fact from fiction here, and that is precisely what the effort is going to do.

I guarantee to you that I do not want this Committee, at the end of its tenure, to have people pointing fingers at it that suggest that we did not do that or that we have simply added to this problem.

So Senator Daschle is correct and I think everybody feels that very strongly. There is no desire by any of us to become the next tar babies on this issue.

We have a vote on.

We will return in a few minutes from the vote to hear Colonel Bui Tin, but before we do, Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a brief note, I want to take exception to a comment just made by my colleague from Iowa. I do not think he meant to impugn the integrity of all people in government, saying that everybody lies, either on the elected side or the other side, but to accept that standard or to accept it by silence, I think would be a big error. There are too many people that have spent a lifetime trying not to be in that position to be tarred by those who have fallen into that particular trap. I do not think that my colleague meant to impugn those—but I think it needs to be said.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator's point is very well taken and a good note on which to recess for the vote. We will be back in about 10 minutes and we stand in recess.

Mr. USRY. Thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Hearing will come to order.

Colonel Bui Tin, could I ask you, please, to stand and take the oath?

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. TIN. I do.

Mr. LONG. I am an interpreter and I need to be sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to swear you in, also.

You are accompanied by a translator, Dr. Pho Ba Long. And he has been secured by the Committee. Doctor, do you swear that you will translate fully the truth to the best of your ability so help you God?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, would you bring the microphone close to you?

Let me say at the outset that we are very pleased to have you here. I know you understand English and speak pretty well, be-

cause we have had a conversation. If you want to try to do your testimony yourself in English, obviously, we would appreciate that. And, if you have any difficulties, the translator can assist.

Your being here to testify is, in itself, an historical occasion because of the role that you played in the war and because of your knowledge of the full history, if you will, of the 1970s and transition period.

It is also significant in the respect that it is my understanding that, during the war, you were one of, at one point, John McCain's, Senator McCain's, interrogators. Is that accurate?

Mr. TIN. (Shaking head.)

The CHAIRMAN. So it is a rather remarkable event now to be sitting here. And I know Senator McCain has met with you and you have talked, and that is, in and of itself, an extraordinary meeting.

As you know, Colonel, the effort to get to the truth in this matter is of deep concern to all Americans. And whatever you can do to help us shed light on this matter would be of great importance and much appreciated.

We will be talking with a number of Vietnamese people who took part in the war over time. And I think that is another thing that will make this inquiry somewhat different from previous ones, is the breadth of the inquiry. You are really here today as a beginning of that.

Let me, if I may, simply turn to your statement, because I know you are going to explain some of your history and background and rather than spend further time doing that myself, we would like to hear from you.

Mr. TIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you bring the microphone very close.

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF BUI TIN, VIETNAMESE DEFECTOR, FORMER COMMUNITY PARTY MEMBER AND EDITOR; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. PHO BA LONG, TRANSLATOR

Mr. TIN. Mr. Chairman, Senators, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to thank the Committee, the U.S. Government, and most importantly the American people for your kind invitation and for the honor of appearing before you to testify on this extremely important subject.

As you know, I am Bui Tin, a 64-year-old former Senior Colonel in the Vietnamese Peoples Army. I was the former deputy editor of the Vietnamese Communist Party's daily newspaper, Nhan Dan, and also the editor in chief of the Sunday Nhan Dan.

Forty years ago, when I decided to devote myself to fight for independence and freedom for my country, I was then happy to join the Vietnamese Communist Party. Today, those who want to pursue this same goal should leave the party or, as in my case, be expelled by the party.

My individual story was told in detail in my article that appeared in the Sunday Washington Post in October 1991. I want the Committee to know that I have not applied for political asylum. I have just asked to prolong my stay in France.

Furthermore, I am determined that I will return home to work for democracy in Vietnam. I am very glad to be here, and let me state categorically, before the Senate Committee and all present that, firstly, there are not any MIA's or POW's alive in Vietnam today, and, secondly, I call upon Americans to support full diplomatic relations with Vietnam as soon as possible to encourage democratic reform.

Although I was expelled from the party and I am now regarded as a traitor by my government, my position is the same with Hanoi—Hanoi government on these 2 issues. However, my motivation is far different.

Regarding normalization, I believe that it will help to promote democracy in Vietnam. It will also encourage a democratic movement from the people and reform from the party. More importantly, normalization will create opportunity for our people, especially the Community Vietnamese, to learn about an America that is far different from the one that they knew during the war years. Only the hardliners and the stubborn security in Hanoi want to prevent the normalization with the U.S.A.

The U.S. policy of isolation toward Vietnam will strengthen the hardliner position and put them into the Chinese camp. The Chinese use of Vietnam card is a dangerous threat to us all, and it will interfere with democratic development. Above all, it is against the aspiration of the Vietnamese people.

Regarding the MIA issue, I am a soldier for 37 years. I have experienced the pain and sadness of seeing my comrades disappear without any information about their tragic end. In Vietnam, there are 200,000 missing in action, and we have never found their remains. In my own family, 2 out of 5 are still missing.

Being a soldier and also a member of an MIA family, I would like to take the opportunity to share the sadness and pain of the American POW and MIA families. One of the first actions I did when I came to the U.S. was to visit the Vietnam Memorial and pay my respects and pray for those young men.

However, about this emotional issue, I believe that the Hanoi government wants to cooperate and are being honest enough. However, because they have lied many times on many issues, this time they are not trusted regarding this issue. In reality, Vietnam is a closed society. People live by rumors and speculations.

Many in Vietnam still believe that once they find remains or give information about live Americans they will get a visa to go to the U.S. and receive a \$1 million reward. A number of peasants go out every day to—

Mr. LONG. Dig.

Mr. TIN. Yes.—every day to dig at cemetery or anywhere they believe they can find MIA remains, with the hope that they would find American bones.

One woman—one woman in the Delta stored hundreds of bones in her house, but they turned out to be either animal bones or Vietnamese bones. People have provided fake information to America. Some even said that they know about live Americans. But, in reality, no one has told us they themselves have seen with their own eyes or spoken with these Americans.

During the war years, I was a full member of the Four Party committee in Tan Son Nhat Air base and also the spokesman of the North Vietnamese army. At that time, I had the right to read all the documents and the secret telegrams from the politburo on this issue.

In addition, I had special authorization from the General Vo Nguyen Giap, then Defense Minister, to go to any camps, to meet with any officers, and to interview any POW's and read their files. My rank, then Lieutenant Colonel, required the officers of the camps to consider me their boss. Therefore, they had to cooperate with me at all times.

This is to say, the government or any leaders could not hide any information on MIA or POW from me. In 1964, by the instruction of Chairman Ho Chi Minh, each province had its own flag in a campaign. On the flag, there are 2 numbers: The number of all American planes shot down, and the number of all Americans captured.

And each prisoner and plane shot down must be reported to the Cuc Dich Van, the Center for Propaganda for Enemy, belonging to the Defense Ministry's Political Department. The local unit chief officers must send a report of every captured prisoner to this center every day, and the total every week and month.

Once a POW is put in jail, he then had his own file in which detailed information was kept, such as what he had to eat, if he was sick, what medicine he used. The cadre had to report his behavior and thought process. And I believe that the files are still in Vietnam.

About this issue, I can say that I know as well as any top leader in Vietnam and, in my opinion, I state categorically that there is not any American prisoner alive in Vietnam.

There is the only single case of Robert Garwood who lived freely in South Vietnam in Hanoi and returned to the U.S. Some people may argue that if there is one Garwood, there would be many Garwoods. And, if there were some French left over after Dien Bien Phu in 1954, there would have to be some Americans left over after 1975. In my unit after the Japanese withdrew in 1945, there were 2 Japanese who volunteered to help Vietnamese resistance. All of them, Japanese and French deserters, returned home later after their governments ordered clemency.

As a journalist, and a curious man who had much interest in this issue, if there were any American alive and willing to live in Vietnam, I would have known about them, and people would have speculated and spread rumors. I would have gone there and talked to them and written an interesting article for my paper. I believe the Japanese and the Chinese could live with the Vietnamese, but it is very hard for the American to do so, because of the visible appearance.

Not only under oath, but more importantly, on my honor as an officer, I categorically state that there is not any MIA's or POW's alive in Vietnam today. As for Laos and Cambodia, I do not know the situation as well as in Vietnam. But I trust that the Laotian and Cambodian governments are not interested in keeping any Americans.

I have heard that some Cubans and Russians interrogated some American prisoners and treated them badly. But I do not know any information about Russia and Cuba keeping Americans.

I want to include as an attachment to this statement my three point proposal to the U.S. Administration, the Congress and other organizations concerned with the issue to consider. Last week, for the purpose of reconciliation, I gave my diary to the Pentagon. In this diary were all my personal notes of the conversations held in the Hanoi Hilton with about 150 POW's.

The war is over 16 years for the Vietnamese and 18 years for the American and we have never ended the last chapter. Let us forget the past and work for the future together. Let us put aside our own interests to work for the interest of our two peoples. Let the two people embrace each other.

I want to end my statement by calling upon those in Vietnam, if they are honest, to fully cooperate on this issue. They should open the door widely and welcome any delegations to enter Vietnam to search for the truth. To those in the USA who still believe that Vietnam still holds MIA and POW's, work for quick normalization, and go freely to Vietnam to search for the truth.

Those who want to use this emotional issue for their own purpose either political or for their own benefit are criminal in front of the souls of the American and Vietnamese who died for the cause in which they believed. This is why I am here today.

Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BUI TIN

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Those who want to use this emotional issue for their own purpose either political or for their own benefit are criminal in front of the souls of the American and Vietnamese who died for the cause in which they believed. This is why I am here today.

Thank you for your attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Bui Tin. That is a remarkable statement and, obviously, an important one in the context of what we are trying to do here today, but it is also an important one historically.

When did you leave Vietnam? When did you decide that you had to break with the government there?

Mr. TIN. I left Vietnam last September.

The CHAIRMAN. Last September?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it not true—

Mr. TIN. 1990.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Colonel, in 1975, is it not true you are the person, who in the Presidential Palace in Saigon, received the surrender of the government, of the fall of Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. Yes. At that time, I am the highest ranking official.

The CHAIRMAN. The highest ranking person who was in the south?

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, unfortunately, we are just at the point of another vote. I apologize for that. We are going to recess and come back and pick up the questioning. So we stand in recess for about 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Hearing will come to order.

I commented earlier on the historic aspects of Colonel Bui Tin being here. And in deference to that reality, I am going to yield my time, and I think colleagues will agree to yield, to Senator McCain to lead off.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the opportunity of seeing Colonel Bui Tin again. I was informed by him at our first meeting when he first came to the United States a short time ago that he had visited me a couple of times back many years ago, so it is very nice to see Colonel Bui Tin under different circumstances than our last, or previous meetings.

Mr. Chairman, I won't take a lot of time, because I would like to hear the questions from the other Members of the Committee. But I also agree with you. I think this statement is a very powerful and important one that, frankly, to some degree transcends the POW/MIA issue. I think it is a statement for freedom and democracy for the Vietnamese people. It is a statement of unfulfilled promises of

the Vietnamese when they reunited their country of letting the Vietnamese people determine their own future themselves.

And, frankly, it gives me some hope and optimism that freedom and democracy will come to that country for which I think a case can be made that the Vietnamese struggled for many centuries.

So, Colonel, we welcome you. And I will not take too long, maybe with the second round.

Colonel, how close was your relationship with those who were conducting the POW affairs; in other words, that had direct supervision over the American POW's?

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, would you pull the microphone close, again, please?

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

I am a journalist. And from 1963, I have the intention to write out one book on the prisoners of war, American prisoners of war, because it is very, very interesting for the public in Vietnam. And so, in 10 years, I have very close relationship with all four camps of prisoners around Hanoi.

And I have, at that time, special authorization as deputy chief editor of the Sunday Nhan Dan, it's the daily newspaper of the People's Army. The officers of those four camps is Major. Myself at that time I was a Lieutenant Colonel.

And also the department in charge of the POW is belonging to the Department for Political Affairs in the Defense Ministry.

Senator McCAIN. In other words, the party part of the army?

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

And so I have a very close relation. And plus this department and the place of the newspaper is very near by. They are only some 100 meters. I go every week at those camps and just visit the special department to collect the news on that.

Senator McCAIN. Do you know of any effort or any plan or any proposal or any action that was either contemplated or carried out that would entail taking American POW's and sending them to the Soviet Union or any other country?

Mr. TIN. In my knowledge, there is some prisoner of war to be—was being interrogated in Hanoi by some Russian and Cuban. But not any to send abroad, to send in any—another country, to send in the Soviet Union.

Senator McCAIN. Do you have any knowledge of any American who left—

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. To go to another country?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator McCAIN. You have no knowledge?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator McCAIN. Do you believe that you would have known if any American prisoner was transferred to the Soviet Union or China or any other country?

Mr. TIN. No. No any—not any American prisoner was transmitted abroad in another country.

Senator McCAIN. My question is: Would you have known if it had taken place?

Mr. TIN. I think that if any would be sent abroad, I would be allowed to know that, because I am very near by the red department, political department of the Defense Ministry.

Mr. REID. I didn't understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he said that he thinks that he would have been in a position to know because he was very close to the political department that had responsibility for that. Is that accurate?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McCAIN. This may be slightly off the subject, but why did the Russians want to interrogate certain prisoners?

Mr. TIN. It is very simple. It is very simple, because the Soviet was very interested in the new world, electronical world. And so I think that is very interested to know what is on the war—on the war, specially, in the electronical.

Senator McCAIN. Well, this leads us to the B-52 involvement near the end of the war. Were the Russians interrogating those people that were captured at the end of the war?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think this is so.

Senator McCAIN. But, to your knowledge, there was never anyone who was kept apart because of any special qualifications that they had?

Mr. TIN. I don't know that. I don't know that.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, the reason why I asked that question is because there were electronic warfare officers who were crew members of the B-52's, for the record, and there is some question about the whereabouts of some of those who had that special skill. And that's why I am pursuing this particular line with Colonel Bui Tin.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Senator McCAIN. But you have no reason to believe that these officers with special qualifications in electronic warfare were treated any differently, except that they were interrogated by Russians?

Mr. LONG. Not only the Russian, but also the Vietnamese are very intent to know about this electronic knowledge.

Senator McCAIN. I understand. But to have the Russians be so interested that they personally interrogated American POW's I think is an important point.

Mr. TIN. Yes, yes.

Senator McCAIN. My time has nearly expired. If there were Americans who were kept prisoners in remote parts Vietnam or in Laos—

Mr. REID. Mr. Chairman, I would like to give my time to Senator McCain.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give him extra time. There is no problem with that.

Senator McCAIN. If there were prisoners in, say, the Central Highlands or in Laos, is it possible that those POW's could have been kept without the knowledge of your government, say by hill tribesmen, Hmong, others?

Mr. TIN. I don't think that, because the discipline in the army is very high at the war time. And also the kind of emulation between all of the provinces to shoot down American planes and to capture

American pilots. So all the news is directly, very quickly transmitted to the Defense Ministry, to the general staff.

Senator McCAIN. This brings me to my next question.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, could you bring the mike down a little lower. It is very good when you get close to it. We can hear better. Thank you.

Mr. TIN. And in the remote jungle area, I think that there are many American pilots who parachute in this area. But they are very, very difficult to search that, because on my knowledge, about 10 years ago there was one helicopter, military helicopters of Vietnam, who is excellent in the sky in the southern Lao, there 10—about 10 military men on it. And of this 10 military men, there about 5 Russian officials and the—They met to search, but not—they not find any trace, any sign, of helicopters or any man of those.

Senator McCAIN. You brought with you when you came from Paris some documents which were given to the Pentagon which you think can help us resolve this issue; is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. And this Committee will receive copies of that; is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I have—I have with me—I have with me one book I have written and printed in 1975 in Hanoi by the publishing house of the army on the pilots in the Hilton Hanoi. And also I have with me about 12 note, special notes, that I have written out when I interviewed American pilots in Hilton Hotel Hanoi.

Senator McCAIN. And those will be turned over to the Committee; is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, the Pentagon is translating those currently and they will be made fully available to the Committee.

Senator McCAIN. Good. And I would suggest, Mr. Chairman—in fact I know it is redundant for me to say, that we will make these documents available to the interested parties as rapidly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Senator McCAIN. I want to assure our friends who are here.

But isn't it also true, Colonel Bui Tin, that there is a lot of information that the Vietnamese government still has in the form of documents from the provinces, documents by the Army units, anti-aircraft units, documents that the Vietnamese air force has that they could provide us, the United States, with which could help us resolve this issue? Isn't it true that the Vietnamese government still has very important documents in archives that they have not provided us with that they should provide us with if they are going to cooperate? Is that a true statement?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I have suggested a three point proposal. The firstly is to allow missions, Americans in this mission, to go anywhere to meet with everyone in search of especially 62 case, it's expensive to reach a conclusion for each case. And, secondly, I propose that the Vietnamese government allow the American side to be in touch with the archive of the Defense Ministry, the archive of the Department of Political Affairs, the archive of the Department in charge of the POW, Cuc Dich Van, and the file also of many military hospitals and many provinces, because now, after the war,

each province have issue, written out, one history on the—against the American war, history, each history, very concrete history, and so including many pictures. And so I think that is very helpful. And, in plus, I ask that the Vietnamese side allow American side to be in touch, in contact, with several Colonels in charge of the Cuc Dich Van, in charge of those camps of prisoners and also many translators at that time, because each camp, there are a translator. And these translator know very, very well each case: When they arrive, what is the state of—his is representative of where, when is his—he declare and so on. And once those Colonels will be contacted by American side.

The third point is, that by the means of media, mass media, in Vietnam, by example, by television, by radio, by newspaper, to make clear to the public in all of the country that to propose our people in search of the news about American lives and especially on American remains. Because in my knowledge there are several peasants who collect the remains of Americans, but they don't meet with the government, because they was afraid that reward coming from American is not give him all. So—

The CHAIRMAN. They are afraid that the reward would not be given to them.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They think there is a reward that would be coming.

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes. But all know that. And so I think that there are some original malice at the time of war, they was to brought some American died in somewhere, they can remain in search of those remains.

Senator McCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a comment. I think that Colonel Bui Tin's suggestions should be passed on to the Vietnamese government and I think it would be very interesting to see their response, because if they do agree to his conditions, I think it would go along way.

Colonel Bui Tin, I am not looking forward to meeting some of those people that need to be interviewed. In fact, I think I will decline. But I certainly understand why they should be.

And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the very great indulgence that you and the rest of the Committee have shown now. I could make one more comment, because I understand you may have to leave in a couple of minutes.

We are not done with the first 3 days of hearings, but, in my view—in my view, Mr. Chairman, we have gotten off to a very good beginning. I think it has been balanced. I think the staff is to be congratulated. I think you and Senator Smith are to be congratulated. And, obviously, we have a long way to go. That's why we are in business for a year. But I think we have made a very, very good beginning. I know that I speak for a lot of people in expressing my appreciation to you and Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. I appreciate that, and I know Senator Smith does.

I want to thank all of my colleagues. I think the attendance and the interest has been superb. And I think it has been an important part of helping us get off on the right foot.

Colonel, I do have to run to a meeting shortly and Senator Smith will Chair in my absence. I will be back before the end.

Were there some Americans who stayed behind after their service, or after the war, for a period of time?

Mr. TIN. To my knowledge, after the Japanese war, there were several Japanese willingly to stay in Vietnam, two, there is instructor trainer, they train in militaries. And, after the French War, there are some member of the French Communist Party, the deserters, to remain, and especially they are working in the service of propaganda for the enemy rank, and remain. And it is after 1960, they back in France. There are some American also.

But, in this war, I think that there are no American alive remain after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say no live Americans remained, could there have been some Americans—We have talked and you told me that there were some deserters living in the Saigon area around Tan San Nhat; is that accurate?

Mr. TIN. Yes, because—before 1973, before the Paris Agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the Paris Agreements?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think about there are several deserters who is around Tan San Nhat air base who has Vietnamese wife there. But not after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. After 1973, you say they left Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. Yes, they left.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Bob Garwood case, you say there were no Americans living, they left, and yet Bob Garwood was there until 1979?

Mr. TIN. I don't know where is this case specially. But I have some rumor that all of the people in Da Nang know very much the case of Garwood from 1977 to—1977 and 1978.

Mr. REID. I didn't understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. What he said was, he didn't know the case very well, but that he heard rumors that all of the people in Da Nang knew of the existence of Bob Garwood, certainly in the period of 1977 to 1979. Is that fair?

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you didn't know about Bob Garwood—

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. —why is it not possible that you might not have known about some other Bob Garwood?

Mr. TIN. I think at long time certainly they don't think this secretly, the appearance of American in any—in any place. The contact is a mystery for a short time, for some month only or some—But so long, you see, now it is after about now—18 years after the Paris Agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is that it is hard to keep a secret, that if there were another Bob Garwood, people would know; is that what you are saying?

Mr. TIN. This is right.

The CHAIRMAN. If you didn't know about Bob Garwood from 1973 until 1979—

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —could there not have been another Bob Garwood during 1973 to 1979 that you didn't know about? I mean, it is possible; isn't it?

Mr. TIN. I don't think that, because the problem of the POW and MIA in the last 10 years become a very important—important issue. Before, no people is interested in that.

The CHAIRMAN. What if somebody had decided they wanted to stay, I mean, what if they felt their country had left them because they were declared dead in 1973 and they chose to live there and said we don't want you to tell America about us because we don't want to be tried as a deserter or hassled or whatever; could that have happened?

Mr. TIN. I think that is not—It is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. TIN. Not possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that not possible?

Mr. TIN. Because, in Vietnam now the rumors of the foreign, especially an American alive, certainly spread very, very quickly. It don't take secretly.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying that an American could not easily live in Vietnam today without everybody knowing it; is that what you are saying?

Mr. TIN. Yes, it is true. Because the communication now is very spread and very quickly. People travel in the country, many—there is many reporter, many newspaper. And if there is a suggestion of one American, a very big noise, a very, very big noise in the country.

—The CHAIRMAN. Let me yield to Senator Smith who will Chair now for a period and I will return. I have some more questions.

Senator SMITH [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to yield my time for the moment to Senator Brown because I know that he has to leave in a few minutes. So, Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Colonel, I was hoping that you might share some of your background with us, your education and where you got your commission and your training.

Mr. TIN. Yes. From a childhood, I attend French lycée in Hoa.

Mr. LONG. French college.

Mr. TIN. Yes. In French college, in Hoa. And I have received a baccalaureate in Hoa.

Mr. LONG. That's a high school degree.

Mr. TIN. A high school degree. And, after that, I enter in the army immediately after the Japanese coup—

Mr. LONG. The Japanese special coup that took over from the French.

Mr. TIN. The French. In March 1945. And after I attend Viet Minh organization. It's a secret organization of Viet Minh for the independence. And after I attend, the August is the revolution. And I enter in the army, in the People's Army, in September of 1945.

And, after that, I was in the army until—until 1982. I moved to the Nhan Dan newspaper, daily.

Senator BROWN. You grew up in the Hoa Phu Binh area?

Mr. TIN. I grew up in Hoa, and after in Hanoi.

Senator BROWN. And you went to high school, you got a high school degree in Hoa?

Mr. TIN. Yes, high school degree.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned that there were some French that stayed behind after Dien Bien Phu.

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes. Some French remain after Dien Bien Phu.

Senator BROWN. Were any of them held against their will that you know of?

Mr. TIN. None.

Senator BROWN. So the only ones that you know of—

Mr. TIN. I think one, yes, on the agreement, it said for volunteer.

Senator BROWN. Basically Marxist who were there for philosophical reasons.

Mr. TIN. Yes, from political reason.

Senator BROWN. I noticed you were in the military—

Mr. TIN. Excuse me. Most of them have adopted the name—the surname of Ho Chi Minh. For example, the case of Ho Chi Phan, Ho Chi. He is originally German, originally. But he adopted the new name of Ho Chi Minh.

Senator BROWN. The background that we have seen on you indicates that you were an officer in the army that went into Cambodia.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. In that period, do you remember hearing anything about American POW's, Americans in Cambodia or Laos?

Mr. TIN. I enter in Cambodia just the 7 of January 1979, and so on the first day, I am in the royal palace at noon of this day. And I never—and I remained there more than 3 years, more than 3 years. And I realized that any, any news of any American prisoner who are in Cambodia.

Senator BROWN. The article I read on you also indicated that you were involved in planning for the movement of troops from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1964. Can you tell us anything about that?

Mr. TIN. Yes. This is after the assassination of President Kennedy, and after the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, I am sending to the South to—a special team to investigate on the spot on how the situation had changed in that time, and to plan the enter of great military units from the North to the South. I have men in the streets for more than 1 year in the highlands, in the provinces of Ban Teung, Quang Nghe, and many other provinces.

Senator BROWN. So you personally went to the South to help plan—

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator BROWN. No.

Mr. TIN. It is a team, a team. A team of about more than 10 Colonels, of high ranking Colonels.

Senator BROWN. Of the troops that went to the South, what route did they take?

Mr. TIN. I have all of these—Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Senator BROWN. In Laos?

Mr. TIN. Yes. We go by car from Hanoi to Vinh Linh, to nearby demilitarized zone, demilitarized zone, on April 17, and after that

by walking, and walking about 1 month, arrive at the Highlands. And after I have two through the—Route 1.

Senator BROWN. This period, 1964, 1965, and 1966 was when I had a chance to visit your old home area in the northern part of South Vietnam, the Da Nang area or the area we called I Corp. At that time many in the U.S. were convinced that no troops, no personnel from the north ever moved to the South.

Mr. TIN. I always say that Vietnamese soldiers has fighting on our own soil.

Senator BROWN. On the prisoners that might have been captured by Vietnamese troops located in Cambodia or Laos or South Vietnam, was there a policy that they be brought to Hanoi, or were they held at various spots?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think that on Laos—on Laos, they consider that there are many of American plane that was shoot down, hit on the sky of Vietnam, but many parachute on Laos. You see?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mr. TIN. They hit on the sky of Vietnam and after they parachute in Laos. In that case, the Laos would render those pilots to Vietnam side. I think that is some case in Xam Nua and in some province from nearby Vietnam.

Senator BROWN. So the policy was to bring them to Hanoi?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Not leave them in Laos?

Mr. TIN. No, no.

Senator BROWN. The reports we have, then, of detention camps, prison camps in Laos, I assume they must have been temporary?

Mr. TIN. I don't hear about that. But I think that is temporary, I think this is. Because if they hit the—the plane was hit in Vietnam, a good chance that he has parachuted in Laos, the Lao ran this to Vietnam.

Mr. REID. What about one that is hit over Laos; where did they stay?

Senator BROWN. The pilots or navigators that might have come down in Laos, would they have been returned to Hanoi as well?

Mr. TIN. I think that, no. It is according to the Laos—belong to the Laos.

Senator BROWN. They may have stayed in Laos?

Mr. TIN. Yes, that's right.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned the publicity or the awareness of the POW issue in this last decade in Vietnam.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Is there an awareness of the reward that is offered for returning live POW's? Have you heard of that?

Mr. TIN. No. It is not they mention—they don't mention the figure of reward. And there are many speculation about one millions of dollars each case. But we don't mention any figure on the mass media. So I propose that should be made public, the reward for each case. It is encourage people to be in search of this case.

Senator BROWN. Colonel, we all very much appreciate your coming to testify today.

Mr. TIN. Thank you.

Senator BROWN. The years since the war have been ones that have been difficult for Americans. But we are enriched with many Vietnamese who came as refugees to this country.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. They are some of our brightest and hardest working citizens. We are glad you have come. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Brown. I am going to take a 2-minute recess here while the stenographers change over.

[Recess]

Senator SMITH. We will reconvene here. Colonel Tin, excuse me for the interruption.

Senator KASSEBAUM, you are next.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Tin, I think Senator McCain emphasized again the important parts of your testimony, where you commented on what steps you would like to see the Vietnamese Government take to allow access, really free access everywhere.

I would like to just ask you how forthcoming do you believe the Vietnamese Government would be today to the suggestion you have made and that Senator McCain had reiterated would be quite an enormous step forward?

Mr. TIN. I think that they are in the situation when they are more or less pushed into the—to cooperate with us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you believe that they would be forthcoming in allowing unimpeded access to files?

Mr. TIN. I think that now there are new leaders. They're not being sort of tied down by old errors and that they are looking for help from the different agencies of the American Government. So I think they would have a more cooperating attitude.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You had great knowledge, of course, of the documents and the archives, and you made, I thought, an interesting comment about how the discipline was very high and, therefore, very accurate records were kept. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes, they're very disciplined.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I wonder if you could comment at this point on what condition these records are in now in the archives, and when was the last time that you saw them?

Mr. TIN. These archives are very well kept by the Defense Department.

Senator KASSEBAUM. These records are all very much intact?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. From the various camps, are they all part of a central system of records?

Mr. TIN. I think that after the camps are being dissolved and no more camps, most of these—all of these documents are being sent to the Center for Enemy Propaganda. That although they don't have computers, they are being very well kept in files.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. You mentioned in your testimony that as far as Cambodia and Laos, you do not know the situation there. I just would like to ask you as someone who was very involved in the negotiations regarding the prisoners—in the book, Kiss the Boys Goodbye, you were mentioned there—insisting in this account that the United States must deal for prisoners held in

Laos with the Pathet Lao. And that, "We clearly reiterate our position that the question of persons captured in Laos is within the sovereign power of Laos and beyond the competence of the four-part Joint Military Commission."

Then it goes on to say, "Despite evidence to the contrary, Secretary Kissinger said he had been told there were no POW's in Cambodia." I guess, Colonel Bui Tin, what I would like to ask you is, as someone who was very involved at that point, and a former member of the government, what do you believe is the level of influence today of the Vietnamese Government on the Lao/Cambodian Governments?

Is there an opportunity to explore further with them what the situation is? Because obviously this is where it seems to me there has been a real bottleneck as well and we have been unable to in any way establish the same relationship as we have with the Vietnamese Government.

Mr. TIN. Some time ago it's easier for the Vietnamese to talk to these two governments. As in Cambodia, we have a whole system of experts overseeing most of the—all of the ministries and the agencies. For the last 4 years, they have all withdrawn. In Laos, the army has withdrawn a long time ago, and recently all the experts are gone, too. They have followed a very different path from the Vietnamese.

However, in Cambodia the Hun Sen Government is still very sympathetic to the Vietnamese Government. However, at this time, it is very true that they are very independent of the Vietnamese. Recently they even changed the name of the party and they say nothing any more about socialism. And the influence of Hanoi over Phnom Penh is day by day lessened.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess Colonel, you are saying that at this juncture you would believe the Vietnamese Government does not have much leverage either with the Lao or Cambodian Governments to be more forthcoming, regarding the prisoner war missing in action issue.

Mr. TIN. It is true.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about the pilots that were shot down over the skies of Vietnam, but the pilots would bail out in Laos. They would be taken to Hanoi. Is that right?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Prisoners that were shot down over the skies of Laos and parachuted or crashed-landed into Laos and were still alive, did they stay in Laos?

Mr. TIN. I am not very sure about that.

Senator REID. The reason that I asked the question is, one of the real accounting problems we have is that we have a large number of pilots shot down over Laos that we cannot account for.

Mr. TIN. I think one of the very hard cores is, as I mentioned about this helicopter that was brought down and there were people Russian in there who have never been found, because the forest is very, very dense. In 50 meters, you hardly can see each other.

Senator REID. When did you leave Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. Last year in September.

Senator REID. In your statement that you gave, you indicate that the local unit or chief officer must send a report of every captured prisoner to the center every day and the total every week and every month to the Center for Propaganda for Enemy belonging to the Defense Organization. In short, you have said that for every prisoner of war, there were very complex, detailed records kept for each prisoner.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Whether he was sick, how much food they ate.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Those records, I would assume, are still someplace in Vietnam. Is that right?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think that.

Senator REID. Where would they be?

Mr. TIN. In the Defense Ministry, in the—Department for Political Affairs and in the special department in charge of the prisoners of war and also on different province, because they have draft, and now they have written out, each province, their own history.

Senator REID. Yes. So in addition to the records kept on the individual prisoners after the conflict was over, the different provinces were ordered to prepare a history. So we have the history, plus the individual record of person that was captured. Is that true?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. So those should be available someplace.

I know that your statement is that you want us to try to get things moving along as quickly as possible, but General Vessey said that he was told that a lot of these records had been eaten by termites.

Mr. TIN. I think that at least the people will still remember, because each prisoner is a historical event in the mind of the people.

Senator REID. But what I wanted are the written records, and does he think that they have been eaten by termites?

Mr. TIN. It's possible, in certain places.

Senator REID. How would you define your responsibilities after you got out of the army? You ran a newspaper, is that right?

Mr. TIN. I'm a deputy editor of the party's newspaper.

Senator REID. Would it be fair to state, using an overworked term, that you were a propagandist for the party?

Mr. TIN. All the party's newspaper are obviously considered as a propaganda organ.

Senator REID. I have no further questions.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, if I may just ask a question regarding Senator Reid's asking about the condition of the records. I am sorry. I thought I understood—and I asked about the condition of those records—that you stated they were in good condition. Did I not hear that?

Mr. TIN. I think at least in the Defense Ministry it should be, while in the provinces at the different localities, nobody can say what are their conditions. I know that they are very serious of keeping records so they can write the provincial history.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess, to follow on for just a moment, I thought also you had said those provincial—the records from the

provinces and the camps as they were closed had gone into the central archives.

Mr. TIN. In the provinces it is not very sure that all are being sent.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I see.

Mr. TIN. In the camps, yes, but in the provinces, no.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator MCCAIN. Just a follow up to that, Colonel. In other words, all records are not centralized at the Ministry of Defense?

Mr. TIN. I think that each camp has to return the documents to the initiating agency, for example. Oh—I'm sorry. The camp must return the localities where the prisoner has been held, to return these houses, physical facilities, to the old agency that they took over to turn into a prisoner camp. Then the documents concerning the prisoner of wars were being sent to the Enemy Propaganda Center, because they are conscious that the issue of American prisoners of war are very important issues.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me make a stab at it, can I, Mr. Chairman?

There are records that were kept in Hanoi which are very accurate and, you believe, undamaged. Is that true?

Mr. TIN. That's very possible.

Senator MCCAIN. There are other records which, for one reason or another, were kept in the provinces, which you cannot assure the Committee are in good condition?

Mr. TIN. Even in the provinces, sometime there's 1 or 2, or maybe 10 prisoners, and these are being very—considered important issues, so it's possible that they still keep certain documents.

Senator MCCAIN. But you believe that there is a great deal of evidence and records that are kept in Hanoi and in the provinces that can help us resolve this issue?

Mr. TIN. Yes, certainly.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, if there was one person today in Vietnam who could give us the most information on the records that you speak of, who would it be?

Mr. TIN. Two translators, interpreters from the Center for Enemy Propaganda, and Mr. Nguyen Minh Y, presently of the rank of Major. Mr. Y knows Senator McCain very well. Mr. McCain while in the camp has a Vietnamese name, Mr. Cai. Each American prisoner of war has a Vietnamese name. The second person is Mr. Dung, who is also an interpreter. He is no longer in the army. He is working at the Ho Chi Minh City in the foreign affairs.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. Senator Grassley, I will turn to you in just a moment. I had not had a round here, so I want to just ask a few questions.

In your statement, Colonel, you indicated that you are now regarded as a traitor by your government—former government.

Mr. TIN. Yes. By the government, but many people in the government do not regard me as such.

Senator SMITH. Do you consider yourself a defector?

Mr. TIN. No. Very few people think that way too, with me.

Senator SMITH. You were a hero in Vietnam, 37 years in the army. You led the tanks into Saigon. What about your family? What has happened to your family now in Vietnam? Where are

they? I mean, you do not have to tell me if it is a secret, but are they safe?

Mr. TIN. It is very, very harassed. My wife has in many times asked to come and questioned whether she received any letter from me. And she is still a party member, and the party has given her an order that she and all the children should not have any communication by letters with me.

My daughter is a doctor, and ophthalmologist in the central medical center. She is 34 years of age this year. She is in a surgical ophthalmology center. She has been fired. Now she is selling glasses in the hospital.

My son-in-law has received a grant from the Harvard School, Harvard University, but is not allowed to exit the country. All my friends have been—have been received—ordered not to write to me.

Senator SMITH. Just one follow-up question on that point and I will move to another subject. Your family is being housed by the government—are they being housed by the Vietnamese Government?

Mr. TIN. It's a rented house that we rented from the government.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, I would like to go back to a couple of the areas that Senator McCain touched on, regarding your statement about interrogation of POW's by the Soviets. I am not asking you to list names. Please do not if you know, but we will get that later. But do you know first-hand, or second-hand knowledge names of American POW's who were interrogated by the Soviets? Do not mention the names if you know them.

Mr. TIN. I don't know. I only know those who have knowledge of electronics.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me?

Mr. TIN. Electronics. The prisoners of war who had an expertise in electronics would be interrogated by the Russians.

Senator SMITH. Do you know first-hand—do you have first-hand knowledge or hearsay knowledge of names of those American POW's who were interrogated by the Russians?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator SMITH. None at all?

Mr. TIN. None at all.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any idea when they were interrogated?

Mr. TIN. I think it's about December 1972, concerning the B-52.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever speak directly to those POW's after they were interrogated by the Soviets?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where we might get the names? Again, you do not have to mention the name if, in fact, there is some reason for not doing it. You can give it to us in executive session. But do you know the name of any individual or individuals in Vietnam today who would know the names of the American POW's who were interrogated by the Soviets?

Mr. TIN. Possibly in the defense intelligence section.

Senator SMITH. During the war, when a prisoner was captured by either the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao, can you describe for me the relationship between the two of you in terms of that prisoner? Say the Pathet Lao took a prisoner; you wanted that pris-

oner to be sent back to Hanoi. Was that done willingly by the Pathet Lao, or did you have to extract the prisoner?

Mr. TIN. The army in Laos is very disciplined. They would do that, and friendship between the two nations are good. And they are willing to send them back.

Senator SMITH. At about the time of the peace accords, you stated and it was quoted in some papers: "We are insisting that the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of prisoners take place to no relation to the POW's held by the Pathet Lao, said Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation." That was during the time, 1973, at the time that the accords were being signed. When you said no relation to the POW's held by the Pathet Lao, when you made that statement, did you have direct knowledge of POW's held by the Pathet Lao?

Mr. TIN. I had no knowledge at that time of any POW's in Laos. It is according to the idea of General Le Wan Hoa who asked me to prepare such a statement. I was answering the questions.

Senator SMITH. So General Hoa instructed you to make that statement?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I will yield at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Colonel, again, could you maybe come close to the microphone. When did you go to Paris to be part of the discussions?

Mr. TIN. Was that the discussion during the Paris conference? I have been never in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. So, in 1973, I am sorry, I thought there was a period there you were. Only at the Camp David talks?

Mr. TIN. Yes. David Camp.

The CHAIRMAN. So that was the only period you were in discussions.

Mr. TIN. I was at Tan San Nhut.

The CHAIRMAN. But in 1973, you were a combatant in the south, correct?

Mr. TIN. I come to Tan San Nhut from Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year?

Mr. TIN. Immediately after the signing of the Paris accords.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1973?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. He was part of the team involved in the exchange of POW's and the North Vietnamese came to Tan San Nhut.

The CHAIRMAN. For what period of time were you in Hanoi prior to that, before you came down to Tan San Nhut?

Mr. TIN. All of 1972 I was in Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. All of 1972?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And part of 1973?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And after going to Tan San Nhut, did you return to Hanoi?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was a continuum of your presence in Hanoi, during that period?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the period you say you had access to the records and the record keeping about POW's. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, during that period of time after the signing of the accords, the bombing of Cambodia continued and the flights over Laos continued. Correct? And what happened to the people who were shot down during that period of time?

Mr. TIN. I have not heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know if anyone was lost?

Mr. TIN. I only know about the activities of the American air force through Newsweek and other newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. But there was a secret war that continued after the 1973 signing of the accords. Correct?

Mr. TIN. I know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not any American prisoners were taken during that secret war?

Mr. TIN. I never heard of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. You never heard about it?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean that you do not know, or does that mean you never had occasion to see anything? Can you be more explicit?

Mr. TIN. I have not seen, nor have I known.

The CHAIRMAN. During the war, the Soviets had some people in Laos. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Would you repeat?

The CHAIRMAN. During the war, 1971, 1970, 1969, 1972, the Soviets had some people in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. Yes. A number of experts. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There were prisoner of war camps in Laos, were there not?

Mr. TIN. Not after 1973. I don't know if there was anything after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to 1973, regular forces of the People's Army of Vietnam were in Laos. Correct?

Mr. TIN. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Those forces of the People's Army of Vietnam controlled the camps in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. I don't think so and most of the work they did is to build roads in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point I am getting at is that the Soviet personnel who were in Laos conducted some interrogation of people who were captured in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. I have not heard such a story.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible that they did? Is it possible that the Soviet special personnel were involved in interrogating some of the electronic surveillance flights that were shot down?

Mr. TIN. I'm not very sure, but it's possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened to those Americans captured in Laos who were turned over to the People's Army in Laos?

Mr. TIN. I don't think so. If they did they would have bring them directly to Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the instructions within the military?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I believe those are the instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there documents that show those orders and those instructions?

Mr. TIN. I understand there is, but I don't know where there is any instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are there written documents of these orders?

Mr. TIN. No. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any records that you know are available in Vietnam now that would indicate the standing orders?

Mr. TIN. It's possible they exist in the archives, but it's not directly to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. So you do not know. You have not seen them, you cannot say where they are, or even if they exist?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard of the—or are you familiar with what is known as the 101st International Liaison Group that captured people in Laos?

Mr. TIN. No. Whose group is that, belong to who?

The CHAIRMAN. The 101st International Liaison Group.

Mr. TIN. I have heard very vaguely of that. There is some kind of a organization, but I'm not very sure of such news.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you hear of it?

Mr. TIN. Recently, about 4 or 5 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. And what did you hear about it?

Mr. TIN. A number of so-called heroes who wants to go Thailand, from Thailand to go into Laos and try to organize a search to make themselves known, that is what I heard about it.

I'm not sure that these are very reliable stories.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand what that was, heroes?

Mr. TIN. Rambos, if you will, Rambos. That's another translation. The direct translation is people who want to call themselves heroes, who want to go from Thailand into Laos to make themselves a big name.

The CHAIRMAN. To do what?

Mr. TIN. To search for the missing in action.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have a Vietnamese translation for Rambo?

Mr. LONG. Not yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Sylvester Stallone will be very upset to hear that. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to the issue of Bob Garwood and the possibility of others being there in 1975 when the government of the south fell. You were in Saigon, correct?

Mr. TIN. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There was considerable disorganization nationally, is that not right?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And there were not really good communications in all parts of the country. Is that accurate?

Mr. TIN. Is it between North and South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, between all of the provinces and the central government.

Mr. TIN. I think it was only a few weeks, but after that it's all reestablished.

The CHAIRMAN. It was reestablished?

Mr. TIN. We can even telephone from the central government to the district government.

The CHAIRMAN. Now when I was in Vietnam recently and talked with the General Secretary and the Foreign Minister, they indicated that after the government fell in the south there were some foreigners still there who were placed in camps, who were held. I think foreign journalists, perhaps some other foreigners.

Mr. TIN. I understand there are some foreign people, but I don't think they were placed in camps. I don't believe they are in prisoners' camps. There was a French general who has been sent out of the country. He has been extradited, but he has never been arrested. A number of American journalists. I met quite a number of camera people and American journalists. A few, a short time later they leave Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is in fact what was indicated to me, that they subsequently left. But the question is could there have been any Americans who chose to live there at that point in time?

Mr. TIN. I have no news from them and I don't believe they are. I am a reporter and I'm very inquisitive, very curious to go into the new provinces to look for news, to find intelligence. And I never heard of those Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you immediately travel to any of the provinces after the fall of the government?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I went to Metok and Hatchien and Chodel and Tienin, all over the provinces.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never heard anything of any American who was being held anywhere?

Mr. TIN. No. I never heard of any news at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley?

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask any questions. I would like to just make a couple of statements.

They are kind of repetitive of something I have said before. For the benefit of the Colonel, I am not going to argue with him whether or not there are any Americans or other POW's in Vietnam.

I just would like to tell him that the purpose of this Committee is that there are a great number of people in this country who feel that there may be. This Committee is formulated for the purpose of finding out what our Government knows before we worry about what the Vietnamese government knows or does not know or the extent to which they are cooperating with us.

But for the benefit of the Vietnamese government and also for the benefit of the Colonel, I would suggest that if the Vietnamese government might be in a position of governments generally, that when they make a statement they find it difficult to deny it or back out of it.

I want to assure the Vietnamese government, I want to assure the Colonel that as far as I am concerned I would be one who if there is an American POW who comes out of Vietnam, to say that this is a very beneficial step toward normalization of relations. I, for one, would not as a Senator chastise or punish the Vietnamese government because of their willingness to help bring people out even though for a long period of time they have said that there are none there.

So that would bring me to the point of the existence of this Committee. I do not presume that people in Hanoi believe that this Committee was set up for the purpose of bringing charges or complaints against the Vietnamese government. If it were, I want to allay any suspicion they might have and say that this Committee was set up because under our system of government we have people who believe that our Government has not pursued this the way that they should. I am skeptical about that myself, but not accusatory. This is our effort to further our public's right to know and to get this information out. It is not to be punitive in any way or to build a case against the Vietnamese government.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a valuable statement. We appreciate it. Are there any further questions?

Mr. TIN. I have a statement that is exactly the meaning of my coming here.

The new leadership in Vietnam are not being tied down by the past. They have the opportunity to cooperate completely and fully with America. My recommendation to your commission are in that direction. Whatever the suspicion, we should lay it on the table. For example, refugees who come here have seen, who declare have seen so many people, who have seen a number of hundreds of remains. Let them go home back and show the places, point out the places.

And those of the live sightings, we should bring it out on the open table and exchange. That is the only way and the truth is always difficult.

The Vietnamese proverb says that even a needle that is very small, by the end it will come out. So that in the quest for truth there needs to be cooperation. That was my spirit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think Senator Smith has a few more questions.

Senator SMITH. You have been very patient and we appreciate it. We are about ready to end this.

Just a couple of questions kind of scattered around here. We had some information in the late 1960's that there may have been a couple of deserters in the Danang area that did not come back. Do you know anything about deserters in Danang in 1968 or 1969 or in that period of time?

Mr. TIN. I have come to Danang many times, and also Hue, that was my native province. I never heard of such news. If there were, in the case of one live American, the people of Danang, the rumor would be all over the place and the whole country would know about it, especially for the last 5, 6 years, the question of a live American in Vietnam has been such an issue among the boat people who left. Before they left they would like to look around and see if there was anything they could bring out. And people who

want a visa into this country would like to look around and find something. And the inquisitive troops belonging to the newspaper, he calls it an army of newspapermen, are very inquisitive about this incident.

And so many of the foreign reporters who came into the country and has been criss-crossing the place, French, Japanese, Americans, they all come to Hanoi and they met me. They also are very inquisitive. They want to see and hear. And we have not found any news.

Senator SMITH. You, in your statement, you said there are absolutely no live Americans in Vietnam.

Mr. TIN. In my knowledge, yes.

Senator SMITH. Absolute, but to the best of your knowledge, there are none?

Mr. TIN. Because I am very curious. I am a journalist and cover the program more than 30 years.

Mr. LONG. I am repeating. I am not translating.

Senator SMITH. Regarding, again, and if you have an answer to this question, I would prefer that—well, let me ask it this way.

Do you know, and if you do know, do not mention the name at this time, do you know who in Vietnam today would know if any American POW went to the Soviet Union?

Mr. TIN. Certainly.

Senator SMITH. You know who would know?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Would you be willing to provide that to the Committee?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you know anybody in the Soviet Union who would know?

Mr. TIN. In 1977, I was part of the delegation, a military delegation, headed by General Giap and we went to Moscow. That was the first group after the victory. I have talked to many generals and colonels. Their general feeling was that they were happy that we had been victorious.

However, but most of their advice to the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese never followed. That was April 1977.

In May 1977, I also went to Beijing for the same military delegation headed by General Giap. The generals, the Russian generals and Soviet generals and Chinese had the same opinion that the Vietnamese never followed their advice, always had a very independent attitude.

That means that the Vietnamese never followed exactly the recommendations from the Soviets and from the Chinese. For example, the military delegation from China to Vietnam always advised that we should never use battalion in Vietnam in the war because if we did the American fire power would destroy us. And the Soviet generals always tell us that it is very difficult for us to try to equal our fire power with the Americans. Never think of a general offensive militarily. You should think about diplomatic relationship discussions.

I brought this up to show that the Vietnamese are very sensible to independence. The Vietnamese have their own attitude. They are not following the Soviet or the Chinese. The only thing is to

receive arms and munitions and not allowing the desire or the opinion of the other countries to influence them.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, two final quick questions.

To the best of your knowledge, either directly or indirectly, do the Vietnamese have a mortuary of American remains in Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. I don't believe so.

My friend, Mr. Nguyen Tuc Hai, he died, he was a classmate. He was the director of the Center for Enemy Propaganda. We studied together in Hue for 7 years. He is directly responsible for this issue. He died 3 years ago because of a liver ailment.

He always said to me that as soon as we have about 10 or 12 remains, we would pass it on right away to the Americans because the Americans also were having pressure on that. Then we have to send people out to collect the remains.

Senator SMITH. A last question. In the so-called discrepancy cases that General Vessey is now talking to the Vietnamese about, those cases in some cases are about missing American servicemen who had been captured and filmed, interrogated, all of these things on the record.

Yet, we still do not know, the Vietnamese tell us they do not know what happened to them, given your knowledge and testimony today about the sophisticated records that they have, how do you explain the fact that the Vietnamese could not tell us what happened to a man who had been captured, filmed, interrogated, seen by other POW's, how could they not know what happened to him?

Mr. TIN. I suggest that these kinds of cases we should leave it, put it on the table with the new Defense Minister, with the new General Staff and the Politburo and all this evidence should be publicly shown to them. Then they must surely come to certain results.

Senator SMITH. Well, they do not. They have not.

Mr. TIN. To find out up to what stage of resolution these issues has been solved.

Senator SMITH. I yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask, real quickly, two questions? One, Colonel Bui Tin, how do you explain the fact that a very significant percentage of prisoners who were shot down over Vietnam were returned, yet there were very few who were shot down over Laos who were returned?

Mr. TIN. I have heard—I have been thinking about this issue. The Laotian soldiers is very kind, because they are Buddhists, except those from the Meo Hmong tribe. I think that they do not have any wicked attitude toward the prisoners. I think the real cause are the Lao forests, the tropical forests.

Senator MCCAIN. Colonel Tin, finally, obviously the Vietnamese placed great value on the prisoners of war, and it was in their interest to keep them alive. What value, what use did the Vietnamese Government want to make of the prisoners of war?

Mr. TIN. I have been witnessing the policy, the humanitarian policy in the camp toward the prisoners. We have direct instructions from the late President Ho Chi Minh to give them higher ra-

tions than the troops because they have been exposed to a better standard of living.

Senator McCAIN. Not to interrupt, but what reason? Was it to use as a negotiating chip at the bargaining table? Was it to use for publicity purposes to help win the war, or what other reason?

Mr. TIN. I have no feeling and no thinking that they are using the prisoners of war for political reasons. I don't believe they have held the remains for negotiation or for bargaining.

I understand that some of the leadership is very stupid and very low educational level, but they have enough intelligence and wisdom not to use this remains as bargaining chips, and they believe—they know, they understand that this is one of the priorities of Americans in the negotiations.

Maybe down at the district level, perhaps those people at the lower levels say, we have 200,000 missing in action, why do we have to worry about a few Americans? These are at the very low level.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an important issue. What you're saying is that in the general population in Vietnam there is not as much support to look for or find the remains. Can you be more explicit?

Mr. TIN. These people do not believe in this kind of reward because it doesn't come from the Government. This says, \$2,400,000 reward for American prisoners of war delivered by the International Red Cross.

People only believe in this when they have the mass media communication by the Government, so that if the Government communicates that there is a reward for a certain limited period of time, then it is possible that the militia who has buried those remains, they may try to go and bring them up. These kinds of cards, these kinds of communication, only force people to go and dig up the tombs of hundreds of people in certain cemeteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Just a personal question. Where were you in 1968 and 1969?

Mr. TIN. I was in Quang Tri Province.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm relieved to know that.

Colonel, thank you very much for taking the time to be here with us. I know you delayed your trip back to France in order to be here today.

I don't know if you would like to spend a minute, but some of the team from Vietnam is here. Mr. Bill Bell is here, and he might want to have a minute or two to talk to you a little bit, so if you could spend some time with them, I think that would be very, very helpful.

We thank you for your testimony. The Committee will take a recess until the hour of 2 p.m., at which time we will hear from the authors of two books and then move into some of the photograph testimony later this afternoon.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, are we going to finish these panels today?

The CHAIRMAN. We will finish these panels today. We are going to try to move a little more rapidly if we can this afternoon. We will commence at 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. There's a great deal to try to cover, so we want to try to move right into it as rapidly as we can. I would like to ask both of you if you would stand so I can swear you before you get too comfortable.

[Witnesses sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Our witnesses are Monika Jensen-Stevenson, who is the author of the book, *Kiss The Boys Goodbye*, and Nigel Cawthorne, who is the author of the book, *The Bamboo Cage*. Both have obviously spent time researching this issue, and we welcome your testimony this afternoon, thank you. Ms. Stevenson, why do you not start off?

STATEMENT OF MONIKA JENSEN-STEVENSON, AUTHOR

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It's a great honor to appear before this distinguished group of Senators. I know that many of the Senators on this Committee have worked long and hard to finally bring to justice an issue that has so strongly affected our country and has for so long been neglected. I was told that I only had 5 minutes so I'm going to make this very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we have given anybody less than 7, and I don't want anybody to be an exception to this rule. I'm happy to give you the 7. The reason we're trying to hold the openings down is not to exclude the testimony, because we're going to put the full testimony in the record. It is really to allow more time for questions and more time to be able to talk, and obviously if there is something you want to say—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is what I was going to say. I hope you will feel free to ask me any questions and ask tough questions if you want.

I came here at my own expense here today because I and my husband have spent the last 6 years of our lives researching and writing a book about the subject you will address. The conclusions we drew were ones that I would have thought inconceivable 10 years ago.

I am here because the response to the book has made it overwhelmingly clear that the many people who concern themselves with this issue need desperately to have one segment of the U.S. Government champion their right to know the truth about what happened to American soldiers who were taken prisoner in a war that everyone wanted to forget about as soon as it was over.

This issue, as we see it, is about trust between citizens and their Government on that most important contract when soldiers risk their lives for their country and the country promises certain protections in return. Sadly, in my view, that trust has been badly abused by the Government agencies who have controlled the POW issue.

When I began this story for 60 Minutes program, I was an experienced reporter. I was not naive. I felt that almost nothing would shock me, but I was shocked to find that my Government, which I believed had a common objective with the families of the missing

and veterans, was deliberately lying and putting an incomprehensible resistance to the people whom they were most obligated by moral, legal, and constitutional mandate to protect.

We found, my husband and I in the writing of the book, that the interagency group which controls this issue not only lied with impunity, they did so with the full conviction that they had a moral right to do so. We wanted to find out why, but the best answer we ever got was that it was necessary for reasons of national security. Whatever that meant in that context, it did not include the American soldiers who were caught by a vicious enemy in war situations that embarrassed this country.

The soldiers lost in Laos, for example, were protected by no national security umbrella, they were simply designated nonexistent. The official Government position has always been that there is no credible evidence of prisoners left behind in Laos or anywhere else in Southeast Asia. With the best will that can only be described as a blatant lie, yet it is policy.

We came across large amounts of credible evidence, evidence collected by the most expensive and the best technology in the world, as well as that reported by competent and loyal human agents, many of whom were our former allies and risked their lives, their limbs, and also lost prisoners in that conflict, evidence that was described on my 60 Minutes segment by Gen. Eugene Tighe, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as a miracle.

Now, if the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in all those critical years knew that it was a miracle, we believe that the interagency group controlling POW's also knew it, yet almost all of that evidence, a lot of it, has been inexcusably retired, left to disintegrate and be destroyed. That is a fact which will make this Committee's job very, very difficult.

Another devastating lie is that if men are still alive, they are there by choice. My husband knows something about that. He saw French prisoners long after the French Indochina War was over and filed a report with the Canadian Government. The Vietnamese displayed these prisoners to my husband as converted communists, but it was clear that they were prisoners, and that they were under extreme duress.

Like Bobby Garwood in Vietnam, abandoned by their country, they had no way of telling the truth about their real position without forfeiting their lives. We believe the POW-controlled group knows that about Bobby Garwood and the other American prisoners that they have reports on.

Another lie is that the Vietnamese never offered to return prisoners. We, too, have talked to the Vietnamese, my husband more extensively than I, and we have talked direct to people who were direct witnesses to meetings where the Vietnamese made an offer of prisoners for money. One was made to the Woodcock Commission in the late 1970's.

The truth is that lies have become U.S. Government policy on prisoners, and that's a policy that is more generally known as plausible deniability.

I would like to give you just one very graphic example of what happens to credible intelligence and what happens to our institu-

tions. One of our sources is a retired CIA man of high rank who personally saw prisoners in Laos in the early 1980's.

He reported this to the appropriate agencies, and he knew which ones they were. The negative response spurred him to look into that policy, and what he found was a deliberate, organized attempt by some intelligence officials to misinform and harass the families of the missing who were most vocal in their disaffection of Government policy.

He brought very specific charges to the Justice Department. When we tried to find out what happened to those charges, they had disappeared. All that one investigator could find was a self-serving document that cleared DIA of all wrong-doing. The investigator then asked the Department of Justice for the full file. The official said he would have to take this up with another Government department, and later the official withheld the complete file because of a third agency's objection.

Is this what American justice has sunk to, that a third agency without identifying itself can interfere with critical matters affecting the lives of prisoners of war that are brought before the Department of Justice?

I know that many of the readers of our book find this unacceptable, and we hope and they hope that you will not only address this problem but that you won't allow this investigation to be made ineffective by the same kinds of abuse, abuse of secrecy, and that you will rectify this kind of activity.

I have been asked to bring up one more matter by the people who have been working quietly and diligently on the issue of live prisoners. They are concerned that perhaps this Committee will address itself too much to the issue of remains and not live prisoners, and they recognize that you have a full year's investigation ahead before you can issue any definite statements about prisoners, but they are urging that you issue now a public statement which says, if there are Americans alive in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who were taken prisoners during the Vietnam War or because of activities growing out of that war, the Select Committee will welcome them home.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE STORY

I was pregnant with my first child when this story began with an episode I produced for CBS TV News' *60 Minutes*. Soon my daughter will be 6 years old. I am aghast at how she has gone through so many stages since I produced that segment about men who might be dead or alive. For Americans who are among the missing, though, whole life-times have passed. Their children are fully grown.

My *60 Minutes* report, aired during the Christmas season of 1985, looked at the possibility that U.S. government spokesmen were not telling the whole truth about men and women of the armed forces being left behind in Vietnam when they said that there was no credible proof that prisoners had been kept by the enemy. President Richard Nixon had promised, on January 23, 1973, that with a ceasefire imminent "all American prisoners-of-war [POW's] throughout Indochina will be released" with "the fullest possible accounting for all those who are missing-in-action [MIA's]." MIA's are American servicemen who were involved in specific battles with the enemy, but who were not acknowledged officially to have been either killed in action (KIA) or taken prisoner by them. In many cases, I found later, their capture and imprisonment was monitored by U.S. intelligence.

I had stirred up a hornets' nest. From all over the United States, and later from abroad, came letters and telephone calls from Vietnam veterans, families of the

missing, and serving officers who said they were relieved that finally a powerful news outlet had the courage to deal with a great national scandal.

The last thing I had in mind while preparing the television news-magazine segment was to expose an American scandal. I was so innocent that when I got calls from a National Security Council colonel in the White House to drop the story, weeks before I had completed the necessary interviews, I failed to take his threats seriously. My knowledge of Vietnam was limited to what I had read in the newspapers at the time (much of it forgotten) and to wearing a POW bracelet while I was a student at the University of Wisconsin. The emotional impact went no further than my distress over the disappearance of my friend Lance Sijan, a Phantom pilot who behaved with incredible heroism after he was shot down near Hanoi. For me, "the longest war in American history" had no clearly defined beginning or end.

However, when I began to research the story, I found that much of the background of the POW/MIA issue was already on the record. There were said to be 2,497 unaccounted for by the 1980s, but the figure fluctuated. I quickly learned that President Nixon's promise had not been kept. When prisoners were officially released in the early months of 1973 the enemy gave virtually no accounting of the missing in action. The North Vietnamese released 591 men—far less than anyone expected.

Among those unaccounted for were prisoners lost during the secret war in Laos. It had been a long though unacknowledged war. When French rule ended in 1954, the enemy had used terrorism and treachery. He routinely exploited neutral territories in Laos and Cambodia to smuggle weapons into South Vietnam—against international agreements. But the U.S. had responded in kind since 1958, 6 years before Congress passed the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution that formalized U.S. entry into Vietnam. The secret "war" in Laos continued throughout the Vietnam conflict.

In January of 1973, just before the Vietnam peace accords were signed, the Pentagon books carried the names of 317 men missing in Laos. At the same time U.S. government spokesmen were quoted as saying they believed the number was much higher. The Communist Pathet Lao spokesman, Soth Petrasay, told reporters that the Pathet Lao had a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held. He insisted that they would be released only if there was a separate truce agreement between Laos and the United States. Some headlines of the day tell the story: "Pathet Lao says no truce, no American POW's," "Fate of U.S. POW's still a mystery," and "U.S. demands list of POW's in Laos." But the Pathet Lao, were not part of the negotiations for the release of prisoners.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger insisted to the public that prisoners in Laos would be returned by Hanoi. He maintained this stance despite the fact that Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese, also insisted the United States must deal for prisoners held in Laos with the Pathet Lao. Tin said, "We clearly reiterate our position that the question of persons captured in Laos is within the sovereign power of Laos and beyond the competence of the four part joint military commission." Despite evidence to the contrary, Kissinger said he had been told there were no POW's in Cambodia.*

Just before the release of the last group of prisoners from Hanoi under peace terms in March of 1973, the Pathet Lao, in a statement laced with undertones of malice, agreed to the release of 9 Americans captured by the Vietcong in Laos. Their agreement was redundant. All 9 had been captured by, and were in the hands of, the North Vietnamese. No single prisoner captured by the Pathet Lao was ever released. On April 14, Roger Shields, the Pentagon's Prisoner of War Task Force chief, said "there were probably no more live American soldiers loose anywhere in Indochina." Families of the missing claim it was a statement he would later say had been forced on him. Shields said, further, that there was no evidence that any POW's (with three exceptions) had been executed during the war years. So where were the 371 and possibly more men known by the U.S. government to have been captured by the Pathet Lao? There was no answer from any of the governments involved.

The families of these men had become alarmed when, on June 8, 1973, a North Vietnamese defector named Nguyen Thanh Son surfaced. He told AP, UPI, and NBC correspondents that he had seen 6 prisoners. He believed they were Americans who had not yet been released. An American officer present at the interview requested that news services play down the details. Soon after I began questioning families of MIA's about this press conference, I received a copy of a State Depart-

* On March 17, 1976, 3 years after Kissinger had proclaimed there were no prisoners in Cambodia, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters said, "In Cambodia, several personnel known to have been captured prior to April 1975 have never been accounted for."

ment declassified telegram which persuaded me that the National Security Council move to stop my story was not the first time attempts had been made to silence the media. The telegram, sent from the U.S. embassy in Saigon to Washington, said, "in follow on [defector Nguyen Thanh Son] . . . AP mention was consistent with embargo request, while UPI and NBC after talk with embassy press officer omitted item entirely from their stories."

Missing from the group of men who were returned by the North Vietnamese were over 50 men known by the U.S. government to have been captured and held prisoner at one time or another. Beyond that there was a large number of men suspected of having been captured by the North Vietnamese. Many returning prisoners had seen such men being taken captive or displayed to Vietnamese villagers, but they had never been seen in the prison system. I would learn later that the U.S. government had a list of over one thousand such men—a list that included detailed knowledge of their capture, physical condition, and whereabouts until 1975, when Saigon fell. The United States was able to obtain such information on its prisoners through electronic eavesdropping and its extensive network of Vietnamese agents.

Other prisoners who were not acknowledged were all those whose existence had not been verified by returning prisoners. According to some intelligence analysts who tracked prisoners, the U.S. government knew that many were kept in remote prison camps, although it listed such men in the MIA category. Some of those prisons and camps were especially geared for technical talents—highly skilled American servicemen who had expertise in fields like electronic warfare, about which the North Vietnamese and their Soviet and Chinese allies needed information. Some of those special talents were put to work in highly secret North Vietnamese war projects; others were farmed out to the Soviet Union or China. Amputees, the emotionally disturbed, and other seriously maimed prisoners were kept in special camps from which not one prisoner returned. Most astounding, some prisoners were actually hidden in the main prison compounds in Hanoi. One such man, Air Force Col. Norman Gaddis, who was shot down on May 12, 1967, did appear on the 1973 list of returnees—unexpectedly. He had never been accounted for by the Vietnamese. Yet for almost 4½ years he was kept in a section of the prison known as "Heartbreak Hotel". In all that time no other American prisoner had seen him. If he had not finally been spotted by other prisoners after the Vietnamese moved POW's and consolidated them in several key locations because of the attempted Son Tay raid to rescue prisoners on November 21, 1970, Gaddis would probably have ended up an MIA.

I learned of another group who never came home. Hearing of 60 Minutes' plan for a segment on MIA's, a few families contacted me about a subject they had held close to their hearts for 12 years. Their men had been sent on missions, primarily in Laos and Cambodia, after the peace accords were signed on January 27, 1973. Some of these men had voiced their objections to base commanders, because they feared that if they were caught by the enemy in contravention of the Geneva Agreements, they would be charged as war criminals. The families who came to me had excellent intelligence information that their men had not been killed in action but had been captured.

After the ceasefire, the U.S. had demanded from the Vietnamese and the Laotians lists of all prisoners on their records. It was made clear that the Vietnamese were expected to return all prisoners captured by their allies. I was shocked when I was told that some of those prisoners, captured in Laos after the ceasefire and known by the U.S. negotiating team, through the efforts of U.S. intelligence eavesdroppers, to be alive and in captivity, were first penciled in on the list of prisoners that were demanded from the Vietnamese and then crossed off. To acknowledge them would have meant acknowledging the continuing involvement of the United States in covert wars in Laos and Cambodia. I was told by the families that some Department of Defense officials were so disturbed by this that they registered their objections in writing. Those documents, I was told, were classified.

It was easy for me to understand why the Pathet Lao would continue to hold prisoners who had not been negotiated for by the U.S. government or who were caught in contravention of the peace agreements. It was harder to understand why the Vietnamese would hold on to prisoners after the peace was signed. Then I learned this was not the first time the Vietnamese Communist government had kept prisoners long after a conflict ended. French POW's were sold for many years after the French-Indochina war, for cash and other concessions. They were called "pearls."

A former foreign service officer in Vietnam, considered to be one of the foremost experts on the French POW/MIA experience, testified before a 1976 House Select Committee that 200 French POW's were released by the Vietnamese some 11 to 14 years after the war. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam had never admitted holding

them. She suggested to the Committee that American government representatives speak to the Vietnamese not about prisoners, but about deserters, or better yet, "war criminals," since the Vietnamese had categories for such men, but none for prisoners. The French had paid an unrevealed but supposedly large sum for French remains and the maintenance of French graves and cemeteries in Vietnam, she said.

It seemed that the U.S. government had expected to bargain for prisoners, but somewhere along the road, abandoned the idea. Article 20 of the Peace Agreement stated:

The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the U.S. will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post war reconstruction. . . .

President Nixon reinforced that pledge with a secret promise of 4½ billion aid dollars in a letter to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on February 1, 1973. That letter was not released until 4 years later. The promise of reconstruction aid was never kept, largely because Congress, angered by reports from returning prisoners of war of torture and mistreatment by Hanoi, would never grant such aid. Because of Watergate and his attendant resignation, Nixon lost all possibility of arranging fund transfers from other programs. The promises that were not kept rankled the Vietnamese Communists. Time and again they were to hint during negotiations that the prisoners issue was tied to the promised reconstruction aid.

Over the next 12 years, scores of Vietnamese refugees told stories of prisoners who were held back as "pearls," but who were never bargained for by the U.S. government. There were stories that the Vietnamese aired statements made by U.S. government officials who claimed there were no more prisoners in Southeast Asia, in order to humiliate and torture prisoners who had been left behind.

The fact that prisoner returns were intimately connected to payment of reconstruction funds was clearly understood by the 1976 House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. On December 13 of that year the members concluded their report, *Americans Missing in Southeast Asia*, with the following statement:

That the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has called for selective implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement specifically article 21 dealing with American reconstruction aid to Vietnam in exchange for POW/MIA information under article 8b. (p. 239).

Over the years that knowledge received little attention from committees on Capitol Hill. Perhaps lawmakers were too busy, but it seemed to some families as if a war of attrition was being waged against the men who had been left behind. No matter how much solid intelligence was obtained that men were alive and imprisoned in Vietnam, some government official or committee would find a way to negate it—even when those intelligence chiefs in charge of the issue declared that they too believed men to be alive and imprisoned in Indochina.

What started as possibly an error of judgment, or an act of political expediency, grew with the passing years into a conviction that national security would be hurt by the disclosure that U.S. intelligence capabilities, which were formidable, had failed to serve the men who fight.

Hundreds of refugees reported seeing American prisoners in all parts of Communist Southeast Asia in the early postwar years. Some of those refugees had spent time in prison with Americans. A few of them took their responsibility to report what they had seen seriously enough to testify under oath before congressional committees. Analysts at the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), often took seriously one part of a witness's testimony only to debunk that part having to do with live men. For example, in the early 1980s, a former Vietnamese colonel of Chinese descent testified in disguise before a congressional committee about a warehouse of remains of over 400 Americans in the heart of Hanoi. He explained the Vietnamese would cold-heartedly pull out some of those remains and return them to the United States when diplomatic concessions were required. The colonel, known as "The Mortician," passed lie-detector tests, and his story about the remains

* On February 21, 1973, a peace agreement between the Laotian Provisional National Union government and the Pathet Lao was signed. The agreement also took note of a promise of aid from the U.S. government. Article 1, Sec. c. read: "The two parties take note of the declaration of the U.S. Government that it will contribute to healing the wounds of the war and to post-war reconstruction in Indo-China. The Provisional National Union Government will hold discussions with the U.S. Government in connection with such a contribution regarding Laos."

became part of DIA formal history. Yet a retired DIA official told me that The Mortician had been just as truthful about live prisoners. He had testified that he personally saw groups of prisoners on numerous occasions before he fled Vietnam in 1979. That part of his testimony, even though he had passed all interrogations and lie-detector tests with flying colours, was determined to be a fabrication.

There was an effort to steer anyone with an interest away from the subject of living men. It took me a long time to see that the issue was larger than the roughly 2,500 MIA's admitted to by the U.S. government.

My real education began after the *60 Minutes* broadcast. The show had presented two sides of an argument. One was that there was no credible evidence that anybody had been left behind from among loyal, serving Americans. This was the government case, but officials covered themselves by adding, "If any are still there, getting them back is a priority—unless they're deserters and traitors." The opposing view was that our intelligence on prisoners was voluminous but never put to use; two highly qualified Special Forces men said the intelligence was suppressed.

My husband had many friends in the military and intelligence. So did I. He also had a great deal of experience in Southeast Asia. He could assess the growing complaints reaching my office that secret intelligence was not serving those it was meant to serve. Vietnam marked the blossoming of covert warfare. If the men who fight these wars cannot depend on the intelligence services, they have justification for asking awkward questions.

Those who contacted me were driven by anger and concern for the defense of their country. Their misgivings had crystallized around the POW/MIA issue because many proffered detailed knowledge of how American intelligence on prisoners had never been acted upon. I might have dismissed their allegations if I had not received those curious NSC threats; and if, after *60 Minutes* ran my segment on prisoners, a Pentagon publication had not appeared, exclusively devoted to branding as liars all those who had appeared on the program to state their belief that, based on the best possible current intelligence, prisoners were still being held by the Vietnamese and their allies.

Kinfolk of the missing, and the doubting vets, lacked the resources of a national broadcast-news network. I could call upon such resources, but I was to experience a milder and briefer version of the nightmare of frustration experienced by these Americans. Intelligence documents were declassified, then hastily reclassified when the critics pointed out discrepancies and demanded answers. Some vets with experience in electronic intelligence in Southeast Asia had started to build complex information networks. By 1989 these networks were described by one former intelligence officer, Col. Earl Hopper, Sr., as "better than the intelligence resources at DIA"—even though the Defense Intelligence Agency had the task of coordinating all intelligence on the missing. Colonel Hopper's son, also a colonel, was still among the missing.

The DIA director, through the toughest war years and long afterwards, was Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, who told me flatly that he had seen the best possible evidence of Americans still alive. For speaking out, he was publicly humiliated.

He was not alone among senior officers whose audacity was punished when they failed to toe the official line. Yet they had to confide to somebody. They peeled away my innocence. First I learned never to ask direct questions when mysterious references were made to outfits like ISA, MACV, SOG, CCN, or SLAM.* Bit by bit, I discovered these were units with roots in a special secret service created in 1958, nominally under the South Vietnamese president, and supported and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

I found that intelligence on prisoners had been efficiently collected; so much so that today, more than 14 years after the U.S. evacuation of Saigon, all Vietnam is laced with grapevines of human intelligence on prison camps—on who is in them, and on who runs them. Yet despite the intelligence and despite the existence of a special unit designed to rescue them, no American military prisoner was ever officially brought out. POW's and MIA's seemed to be getting lost in what many military men considered an ever-increasing isolation of intelligence agencies.

A friend of my husband, with intelligence experience going back to World War II, suddenly resigned from the CIA. He had quarreled with the Director, Bill Casey, the year before Casey died in 1987. Casey, he said, tampered with intelligence reports, and slanted them to suit White House thinking. It wasn't in the spirit of the words at the entrance to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, which quoted the biblical promise that "ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free."

* For further details on these units see pp. 181-2 and the glossary.

My husband's friend had held one of the most sensitive posts. Now he was discarded, implying serious problems in the agency. This was a difficult conclusion for my husband to reach. He had liked Casey as CIA director.

A new director, Judge William Webster, appeared before Senate Intelligence Committee hearings on April 8, 1987. The Committee, judging Webster's fitness for the new task, asked him what his philosophy on intelligence might be. Webster said he could add nothing to what my husband had written in his book *A Man Called Intrepid*. "Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an essential weapon, perhaps the most dangerous. Safeguards against its abuse must be devised, revised, and rigidly applied. . . . The character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. . . ."

Americans really have little opportunity to know if they have abdicated a small part of their freedom to people they *should* trust. They dutifully refrain from poking their noses into national secrets, confident that those who guard them are doing the best possible job with the greatest integrity. The armed services, in turn, need the best possible intelligence to carry out their duties. They deserve first consideration. If an American is taken prisoner, he should know that he will get the full and non-political attention of his country's formidable intelligence resources. Admiral William Crowe said at his retirement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the autumn of 1989, "We need first and foremost the best possible intelligence." He should have added, "And the integrity to act upon it for the good of all the people." Without integrity, secrecy can become a license for opportunists to distort and corrupt the system. It suddenly struck me that, for once, ordinary Americans could get a sense of how effective these intelligence services were from the way the POW/MIA issue had been handled.

My husband knew something about such things. He had extracted a Canadian fighter pilot from China, where Communist officials swore they knew nothing of the flier's existence. He had talked to French prisoners in Communist Vietnam, long after Hanoi and Paris jointly agreed that none existed.

What we could not understand, as we went along, was the intelligence bureaucrats' fear of re-examining their own performance. Were there deep reasons for hoping the issue would die in time, just as death in time must release all Americans left behind? Or was it merely a military morale problem?

One ordinary American who felt she could break the usual conventions of secrecy was Ann Holland. Her husband, Melvin, had vanished at a super-secret base in Laos. He was not in uniform, and technically there wasn't a war there. Ann had obeyed all the demands made upon her by the U.S. Air Force officials to stay silent. Then she discovered that nothing at all was being done for her husband; and she would not be jeopardizing any rescue operations, which she thought were in progress, if she made waves. She was like a growing number of Americans who gladly surrendered a part of their independence in the interests of "national security," but who decided that, on this issue, they had every right to ask questions in public and demand replies from public institutions.

She wrote me after seeing the *60 Minutes* segment: "The pain the families have had to live with. . . . The nights, the sleepless nights. . . . I would find my youngest child wandering through the house looking for something. Looking in closets, cupboards. . . . and when I asked what he was looking for, he didn't know. . . ."

Her children have grown up with a ghost for a father. Ann would write me again: "Two of my sons now serve in the Air Force. If I quit asking questions now, who will be there for them if their time comes? This is our country and if the people running it aren't doing their very best, then they need to be reminded of what this country stands for. We do not leave men behind who gave all they had to give when they were asked, believing we would give all we had to give to get them back."

Not all my sources put things down on paper. I taped many conversations and to give a sense of just a few of the stories of courageous Americans like Ann, they are quoted to illuminate both the issue of POW's and the abuses of secrecy. Some of our sources were afraid to be identified. In the end, however, most decided to risk their careers or harassment, and agreed to let me use their names.

I am not by nature secretive, or cautious. But since that seemingly innocent entry into a secretive world 5 years ago, I have learned not to take things at face value. One of my tutors was Ross Perot, who is much more than a Texan entrepreneur. He displayed a grim resolve to get to the bottom of the POW/MIA issue from the moment he realized the numbers of prisoners returned in 1973 were inexplicably small.

I called him one day about an inquiry from a "federal government investigator." The man wanted to question me about possible crimes involving U.S. officials in Southeast Asia. He gave me his office phone numbers and his official designation.

Perot used his resources to probe. He called me back. "If there's such a government department, I'll buy you the biggest steak in Texas," he said.

Perot had to pay up. We discovered there was an investigative service buried within the General Accounting Office in Washington, DC. It had no authority, though, to dispatch agents to find out what I might know. I rejected the man, who had asked me to cooperate in "a matter of national security." He then showed his true colors. "You'd better be sure to tell the truth in your book," he said. I had never told him I was writing a book.

So many of our sources had similar stories to tell. Calls in the night. Veiled warnings. I didn't believe them. Not in the beginning. In the end, I kept going for the same reason that motivated Ross Perot. It was "the right thing to do."

It seemed the right thing to do because so many of the POW/MIA families and the veterans of the war had never had the opportunity to tell their side of the story. Since 1981, the government, including the official organization designed to deal with the issue, had said that the issue of POW's and MIA's had the highest priority, but that there had been no credible evidence of men left alive in captivity that was strong enough to act on. They had many outlets for telling their side of the story and they had the advantage, because so much of the material on POW/MIA's remains classified.

The secrecy that cloaks the issue has led many people to conclude that there are some in the government who don't want the truth to come out. The natural question that arises is "Why?"

There are undoubtedly many reasons behind the reluctance of officials to look seriously at the allegations of those most directly involved in the issue. Some of those responsible have been caught up in bureaucratic inertia, some have acted on directives that they thought were legal and appropriate, others have acted from a moral and professional belief that the POW/MIA issue could be resolved properly only if national-security concerns were paramount, and some have seemed motivated primarily by a desire to defeat Vietnam and its allies in Cambodia, and have tied the POW/MIA issue to the resolution of that situation. Some have possibly believed that activists might compromise government efforts to get men back—either through rescue missions or relocation. Some have engaged in Iran-Contra-like activities, demonstrating the same confusion of motives that were revealed during those hearings. Just as with Iran-Contra, it is almost impossible to say which bureaucrats and which government departments were responsible for specific actions.

However, pinpointing motives and pointing the finger at individuals was never the object of this book. That is the job of the appropriate government agencies. We wanted to give voice to those Americans who had not been heard and who seemed to have good cause to criticize and to demand an overhaul of a system that stalled whenever they asked for a proper accounting of their friends and loved ones lost in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stevenson. Mr. Cawthorne?

STATEMENT OF NIGEL CAWTHORNE, AUTHOR

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Gentlemen, my opening statement should be my book, *The Bamboo Cage*, which says all I have to say about this issue. However, my book is not published in this country and it is extremely difficult to obtain over here, so perhaps I should summarize the main points.

The book maintains that more U.S. prisoners of war were taken than were ever admitted to. The source for this is the Department of Defense's own documents. As you know, much of the figures for casualties and body counts given during the Vietnam War are pure fiction, and in any war manipulation of such figures for morale and propaganda purposes is inevitable. The papers also show that prisoners were segregated into distinct groups, and the conditions that some of the prisoners were kept in do not match with the experiences of any man who returned in Operation Homecoming in 1973.

During the war, the National Security Agency made an analysis of what happened to pilots who were shot down. They noticed that most of the airmen downed near the main prison camps around

Hanoi and Haiphong were taken there and did not pass any installation of strategic importance on the way. Injured men were thought to be taken to China. Those with special skills or vital strategic information were taken to the Soviet Union. They did not return.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is asserting that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Jerry Mooney, largely, but what he asserts is corroborated by some of the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just curious. Go ahead.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Men captured along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in other areas where manpower was needed, were forced into slave labor. Plainly, those who had worked on projects with strategic importance like the huge underground warehouses at the southern end of the infiltration routes that were being prepared for the eventual invasion of South Vietnam could not be returned. The Communist Vietnamese could not return Americans who knew of their plans. After debriefing, their remains were given directly to the government of the Republic of South Vietnam who continued fighting the Communists for 2 years after all prisoners were supposed to have been returned.

The papers also make it very clear that American prisoners were taken, and held, by the Pathet Lao. The NSA knew this too. None of these Americans taken by the Pathet Lao were ever returned, even though the Pathet Lao said, during the war and afterward, that they were holding American prisoners.

These men, it was said, would be returned after the war in Laos was over, and the U.S. bombing of that country ceased. The U.S. bombing of Laos did not end until August 1973, 4 months after the American administration said all American prisoners of war had been returned from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

From their analysis of the radio traffic, the NSA knew that not all prisoners would be returned at the end of the war. Some had been earmarked as bargaining chips—hostages—held against the reparations the American Government had long talked of.

Perhaps the NSA knew of the situation of the French prisoners from the First Indochina War. After their defeat in 1954, the French government spent millions of dollars ransoming their prisoners. They were still being returned as late as 1979, 25 years after they had been captured. Certainly the CIA knew this. American intelligence documents show that it was known that French prisoners from the first Indochina War were still being held in the area around Ba Vi, throughout the second Indochina War—the American war—from 1965 to 1973.

Not only was it known that the Vietnamese were holding American prisoners hostage, there were even attempts to pay a ransom. On February 1, 1973, 5 days after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, President Nixon secretly wrote to Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the North), promising \$3.25 billion in reparations. However, when the prisoners, returned in Operation Homecoming arrived home, they revealed they had been brutally tortured. Their inhumane treatment outraged Congress which banned all reparations to Vietnam and later to Cambodia and Laos—despite the pleadings of the Administration. Embroiled in the Watergate scandal, President Nixon's influence did

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It seemed the right thing to do because so many of the POW/MIA families and the veterans of the war had never had the opportunity to tell their side of the story. Since 1981, the government, including the official organization designed to deal with the issue, had said that the issue of POW's and MIA's had the highest priority, but that there had been no credible evidence of men left alive in captivity that was strong enough to act on. They had many outlets for telling their side of the story and they had the advantage, because so much of the material on POW/MIA's remains classified.

The secrecy that cloaks the issue has led many people to conclude that there are some in the government who don't want the truth to come out. The natural question that arises is "Why?"

There are undoubtedly many reasons behind the reluctance of officials to look seriously at the allegations of those most directly involved in the issue. Some of those responsible have been caught up in bureaucratic inertia, some have acted on directives that they thought were legal and appropriate, others have acted from a moral and professional belief that the POW/MIA issue could be resolved properly only if national-security concerns were paramount, and some have seemed motivated primarily by a desire to defeat Vietnam and its allies in Cambodia, and have tied the POW/MIA issue to the resolution of that situation. Some have possibly believed that activists might compromise government efforts to get men back—either through rescue missions or relocation. Some have engaged in Iran-Contra-like activities, demonstrating the same confusion of motives that were revealed during those hearings. Just as with Iran-Contra, it is almost impossible to say which bureaucrats and which government departments were responsible for specific actions.

However, pinpointing motives and pointing the finger at individuals was never the object of this book. That is the job of the appropriate government agencies. We wanted to give voice to those Americans who had not been heard and who seemed to have good cause to criticize and to demand an overhaul of a system that stalled whenever they asked for a proper accounting of their friends and loved ones lost in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stevenson. Mr. Cawthorne?

STATEMENT OF NIGEL CAWTHORNE, AUTHOR

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Gentlemen, my opening statement should be my book, *The Bamboo Cage*, which says all I have to say about this issue. However, my book is not published in this country and it is extremely difficult to obtain over here, so perhaps I should summarize the main points.

The book maintains that more U.S. prisoners of war were taken than were ever admitted to. The source for this is the Department of Defense's own documents. As you know, much of the figures for casualties and body counts given during the Vietnam War are pure fiction, and in any war manipulation of such figures for morale and propaganda purposes is inevitable. The papers also show that prisoners were segregated into distinct groups, and the conditions that some of the prisoners were kept in do not match with the experiences of any man who returned in Operation Homecoming in 1973.

During the war, the National Security Agency made an analysis of what happened to pilots who were shot down. They noticed that most of the airmen downed near the main prison camps around

Hanoi and Haiphong were taken there and did not pass any installation of strategic importance on the way. Injured men were thought to be taken to China. Those with special skills or vital strategic information were taken to the Soviet Union. They did not return.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is asserting that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Jerry Mooney, largely, but what he asserts is corroborated by some of the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just curious. Go ahead.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Men captured along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in other areas where manpower was needed, were forced into slave labor. Plainly, those who had worked on projects with strategic importance like the huge underground warehouses at the southern end of the infiltration routes that were being prepared for the eventual invasion of South Vietnam could not be returned. The Communist Vietnamese could not return Americans who knew of their plans. After debriefing, their remains were given directly to the government of the Republic of South Vietnam who continued fighting the Communists for 2 years after all prisoners were supposed to have been returned.

The papers also make it very clear that American prisoners were taken, and held, by the Pathet Lao. The NSA knew this too. None of these Americans taken by the Pathet Lao were ever returned, even though the Pathet Lao said, during the war and afterward, that they were holding American prisoners.

These men, it was said, would be returned after the war in Laos was over, and the U.S. bombing of that country ceased. The U.S. bombing of Laos did not end until August 1973, 4 months after the American administration said all American prisoners of war had been returned from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

From their analysis of the radio traffic, the NSA knew that not all prisoners would be returned at the end of the war. Some had been earmarked as bargaining chips—hostages—held against the reparations the American Government had long talked of.

Perhaps the NSA knew of the situation of the French prisoners from the First Indochina War. After their defeat in 1954, the French government spent millions of dollars ransoming their prisoners. They were still being returned as late as 1979, 25 years after they had been captured. Certainly the CIA knew this. American intelligence documents show that it was known that French prisoners from the first Indochina War were still being held in the area around Ba Vi, throughout the second Indochina War—the American war—from 1965 to 1973.

Not only was it known that the Vietnamese were holding American prisoners hostage, there were even attempts to pay a ransom. On February 1, 1973, 5 days after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, President Nixon secretly wrote to Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the North), promising \$3.25 billion in reparations. However, when the prisoners, returned in Operation Homecoming arrived home, they revealed they had been brutally tortured. Their inhumane treatment outraged Congress which banned all reparations to Vietnam and later to Cambodia and Laos—despite the pleadings of the Administration. Embroiled in the Watergate scandal, President Nixon's influence did

not carry the weight it might have done otherwise. And Congress did not know of the President's secret agreement with Pham Van Dong—not one penny of which has ever been paid.

The Paris Peace Accords talked of the release of all prisoners of war, not just the American prisoners who were being held by the Communists. As the 60-day release period ticked by, the Communists quickly suspected that their prisoners of war were not being returned—with good reason. The American and allied troops had long been cavalier with Viet Cong suspects. The government of South Vietnam were no more humanitarian.

Frank Snepps' book, *Decent Interval*, speaks eloquently of the fate of one North Vietnamese who had been a prisoner. Nguyen Van Tai, a former Deputy Minister of public security in the North, had come south in 1962 to take charge of resistance in Saigon. He was captured. He helped engineer the assault on the U.S. compound in 1968. He was captured in 1970 and held in solitary confinement, in a chilled, windowless white room, for over 4 years where a series of interrogators tried to break him.

However, in 1971, a year after his capture, attempts were made to exchange him for American prisoners being held by the Viet Cong. These attempts failed.

In 1973, when the release of prisoners was supposed to have taken place, he was not returned. He was held—in the same conditions—for another 2 years, until 1975, when the fall of the South seemed inevitable. Then, as the Communist troops massed at the gates of Saigon, he was loaded onto an aircraft and thrown out over the South China Sea.

I believe that some people have already told this Committee that the new Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not to be trusted. Because, as military director of the Viet Cong he was responsible for the execution of at least 3 American prisoners held by the Communists. Terrible though this was, this is no time for recrimination. Intelligence documents from 1973 confirm that the Vietnamese Communists made a deliberate policy decision not to return all their prisoners. The Laos also made it plain that they would use the same tactic as the Vietnamese, when it came to demanding reparations from the U.S.

There is also evidence that attempts were made by the U.S. Government to prevent the press and broadcast media from reporting that Americans were still held in Communist hands long after they were supposed to have been released.

There is a seamless carpet of evidence from 1973 up to the present day, that Americans are still being held in captivity, against their will, in Southeast Asia. Letters have been smuggled out. Photographs have emerged. Names, service numbers, aircraft identifiers, zip codes have been reported. Hundreds of refugees say that they have seen white and black men in captivity in Vietnam and Laos. Sometimes these people are identified, and, occasionally, it has been possible to track prisoners by name, as they are moved from camp to camp in Southeast Asia.

It has also been alleged that boat people and other refugees volunteer this information to ingratiate themselves to the American authorities. They know, from bitter experience, that any information on POW's gets them into trouble.

It has also been said that they do it for money. But rewards whose publications have elicited thousands of reports of live sightings have not been collected.

Often, refugees don't even realize the significance of what they have seen. They were told during the war that American pilots were bandits, criminals. They were not surprised to see such criminals still in captivity. Besides, people fleeing the Communist regimes of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have other things to worry about than the fate of American servicemen.

The Vietnamese government, at low levels, have often talked of the prisoners they have held. High ranking defectors and long-term prisoners of the Vietnamese regime have been released at critical moments—like the change of an American administration—and tell of Americans still being held.

The evidence from all these sources tells the same story—that American prisoners are still being held in Southeast Asia. When I put this evidence before the Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi in 1989 and asked them for another explanation, they did not answer me. They simply told me that I was a friend of Vietnam. I hope I am a friend of America, too.

I have been asked to testify before this Committee because I am, quote, "strongly critical of the U.S. Government action to account for POW's and MIA's." That is not so.

My aim is simply to discover the truth of the matter, whether American servicemen are still being held in captivity in Southeast Asia or not. I think the agencies responsible for accounting for the MIA's have done a sterling job, given that the U.S. Government does not want to know the truth.

If the Defense Intelligence Agency proved that they were there, what could the American Government do about it? They could not pay the reparations that were promised to the Vietnamese in 1973 for the men's release, because Congress won't allow it; nor could they ask Congress to pay the money without having to admit that the guys were there in the first place.

The American people, seemingly, don't want to know the truth, either. More than 30 American publishers have told me that. The Vietnamese government can hardly be expected to own up after all this time. They have few enough friends as it is. They would be branded as barbarians, and shunned as an international pariah.

My job in writing the *Bamboo Cage* was to collect all the available evidence and evaluate it. The case is just overwhelming. I'm a writer, not a politician or a diplomat. I have written down the simple truth as I have found it. I have tried to present the evidence to the American people so that they could make up their own mind. That, I understood, was the American way.

There are Americans still alive in captivity in Southeast Asia. It is beyond doubt. What America does about it is up to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I know Members will have a lot of questions.

Let me just pick up on your last statement. You say there are, beyond doubt, Americans being held in Southeast Asia. What is the strongest piece of evidence that you have of that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think that if one looks at the evidence, piece by piece, one doesn't get anywhere. You don't see the wood for the trees.

If the question is the weight of the evidence that all testifies to the same thing—

The CHAIRMAN. But give me the weight of the evidence, or build this—you have spent years with it. It is in your head. You have written a book. Give me a quick picture. I mean, what is the sort of weight of the evidence that says that they are alive today, right now?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Plainly, one can't testify that they haven't all been killed in the last 5 minutes. The question is that it's a seamless, carpet of evidence that comes from during the war and beyond. It just—there is no time—at no time does it stop.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. I understand what you are saying. I am just trying to help you make your own case. But I want you to make it. I mean give me sort of the pieces of the thread—this should just rattle out, I would think. I mean there is the evidence of who; there is the picture of this; there is the live-sighting—I mean, what is it that lets you draw that conclusion with that kind of conclusiveness?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think from reading and analyzing intelligence documents; from reading and analyzing the testimony of refugees; from speaking to former intelligence officers; from speaking to former congressmen who have seen evidence; and speaking to the Vietnamese—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you tell me any Vietnamese person who says they know somebody is alive today?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I believe there are people who are named in my book, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you believe there are, or there are? I mean can you direct me to them?

Senator REID. What was your question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. What Vietnamese people—I am saying, what Vietnamese people today could say that there is somebody alive in Vietnam?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Today?

The CHAIRMAN. Or last week, or last year.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I'm sorry, it has been 2 years since I have written this book and it is difficult to remember. But certainly there are named people in my book who say there were, and there are people there.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to the numbers issue.

How do you arrive at the judgment that more people were taken prisoner than we recorded or than we admitted.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Simply from looking at your own records, I think that they are the most glaring discrepancy. There was an incident on the DMZ in 1967, I believe, when the Marine Corps reported that eight people were missing. But on that day, according to the Pentagon's records, there was only one person missing that day. A Vietnamese who was captured said there were 29 people captured that day.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that ever reconciled, do you know? I mean, having been out in battle, I can well remember what happened in a

spot report, and then what you learned when the dust settled a couple of days later. I mean you realize that somebody you thought was missing and you reported missing turned up; or you realized that some people that got separated appeared.

I mean, was there any reconciliation effort with respect to those, or have you just taken the raw reporting of those days?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No, no, these are records. One comes from the Marine Corp's evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, you're not the only person who has suggested that the numbers are off-kilter. And the Committee is not—I mean we're going to have to try to run that down. Because there are families that have also suggested the numbers are out of kilter. We're going to try to look at it. I am just trying to understand your determination and methodology.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. The Marine Corps reporting was from the Marine Corps history, which wasn't simply the first day's report. They had gone back to the battlefield and done an accounting there.

The CHAIRMAN. And did they subsequently report those people as, indeed, missing or captured, or what?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. They were listed in the Marine Corps history—it says they are missing from that day.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was never—you are saying, factored into the total numbers that were reported by the United States as a whole?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have those discrepancies been cross-checked with DIA or with the appropriate services?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know that to a certainty?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Well, I certainly haven't done that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you haven't done it. All right, now Ms. Stevenson, you talked about the lies. I would like to try to focus on that. I have read your book, and I am interested particularly in some conversations you have had with Mr. Childress and other things that took place.

But if you were going to say, Senator, here is the most glaring lie, the most obvious sort of example that you could tell the Committee in a short framework, and so we can really hang on to it and understand it, what would you pick?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, what I said in my statement, that there was no credible evidence, and I have no problems—I've had extensive conversations with General Tighe. I've had extensive conversations with people in the Pentagon who are working on this issue. I've had extensive conversations with people in the agency. I've had extensive conversations with people who are working for ISA or they were involved in a rescue effort. They all tell me that. I trust them. I believe they told me that without really compromising themselves.

But when they say it is so, I believe it—particularly when General Tighe says it. Because I found him always to be a man of the utmost integrity. There is nothing in his record that would lead me to believe that he lied.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say General Tighe said it, we have met with General Tighe. We have had a conversation. He is going to be here to talk to us publicly. But what is it you say he said? What is the conclusion you draw?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That there is an amazing amount of credible evidence. We also spoke to a good number of the people who were on his commission, including Gen. Robbie Reisner, who we have absolutely no doubt, based upon the intelligence, that they saw, that there is not only credible evidence, that there is proof-positive that men were alive when that commission looked at the material that was current intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Ms. Stevenson, in order to help the Committee to try to make this the last inquiry we have to make—I recognize author's privileges, and they are different, obviously, from those of somebody testifying in court and so forth, in terms of source identification—can you identify sources, to the Committee, so the Committee can talk to people in confidence?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have identified sources already, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the minority investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is a separate effort, completely. Can you identify them to the Senate Select Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can, in almost every instance, except for when I ask permission to identify people to that other Committee. And I would have to go back and ask if it is all right to give the same information to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that please?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Certainly, if you will let me know what you would like.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, we have a Member of the Select Committee.

Senator GRASSLEY. I just want to help you on this point.

At one point, when this Committee was getting underway, you wanted to discuss with me about an attempt by her to call you, about sources. And that was why she was trying to call you at that particular time, to give you those sources. She wanted to be fully cooperative with this Committee.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I also want to make sure that I'm not stepping on any toes. And I want to make sure that it is done in the right way.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. So I will leave the procedure for it up to you. But certainly, I would be willing to turn over all sources.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it, and, in fact, we did communicate. I talked to Ms. Stevenson. She was in Bangkok. In fact, we met when we went to Bangkok.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would also like to point out that our book has the most incredible scrutiny by lawyers, by one of New York's top law firms. And everything had to be documented, and they checked with everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, my last question—because my time is up, but—you have both said with certainty that people are alive. And this is the sort of Catch-22 circular argument, Hobson's Choice, whatever you want to call it, that we get into in this thing.

Vietnam is saying let us normalize, put your people into the country, go wherever you want. Now, assuming—and I have never made an argument for normalization until this is resolved. But let us assume, solely for the purposes of this argument, that one normalized tomorrow. And people were then streaming all over the country. The presumption is that if people were alive, and they were holding somebody, that would be the worst thing for them. I mean they are asking to have us come in and go everywhere. Because we are going to discover somebody.

Does that not mean that they are not going to allow that to happen? I mean, they are not going to—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, Senator, I think it is a lot more complicated than that. There are a couple of things to consider with this. I think it has always been historically possible for communists to hide prisoners. I think there are plenty of examples of the Soviets and the Vietnamese, et cetera.

But aside from prisoners, I mean the official position when my husband saw French prisoners in Vietnam, is that there were none. At one point they found—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have just answered the question. Your husband saw French prisoners. So when Americans go in there, presumably they would see American prisoners.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But they were passed off in the same way that the gentleman this morning explained that they were communists, that they were converted communists. And my husband knew that they were not, because they were really under duress. They had to check every minute, even to lift up their eyes.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, but the point I make is that somebody saw them. If Americans start going into the country, the likelihood is somebody is going to see them.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, the other thing to keep very aware of is that the prisoners are moved back and forth, across the border areas of Laos and Cambodia, that is well known. I will answer your question now. I will answer the same question that you asked Mr. Cawthorne.

Why am I most certain? Because I have spent the last 2 years living in Southeast Asia. And I have no problems believing the people who have seen them. These are people who have not asked for any money. As a matter of fact, some of them are people who have renounced all material goods. They are incredibly moral, upstanding, decent people who proved that, as far as America goes, during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well are you talking about—who are you talking about?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm talking about Asians.

Senator McCAIN. Which—can you give us those names?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think you will know why I am not prepared to openly give you those names. If you can work out a way to protect our men, yes. We are not naive about this, are we? We know what would happen if I announced names right here.

The CHAIRMAN. But when you say—

Senator REID. I am sorry, you have me. I do not know what would happen.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. You do not know what would happen to the men who are being held in a hostile situation, when our former enemies are saying they have no prisoners?

The CHAIRMAN. But you see, that is what gets us into the exact Catch-22 circular argument. Here we are, struggling to find them, here we are struggling to negotiate their release, or whatever. Let us say we found them. What you are suggesting is they are not going to let us find them because they are going to kill them. That is what you just said, correct?

So if they are not going to let us find them and they are going to kill them if we get a hint that they are holding them, what are they holding them for? For the inevitable day when we find them so that they can kill them?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Not if they get a hint that they are holding them.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they holding them for, then?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I don't know. I think there are people who say they are holding them to see what will happen in the future. And at the moment they are very uncertain.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they are never willing to use them as a negotiating tool, if they are not ever willing to come to anybody in 19 years and say give us \$25 million, we give you these people. Eventually they are going to die, and it does not do them any good.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I think they have tried to use them as a negotiating tool. And I think that if you bring Mr. Shinkel before this Committee, and you can assure him that the people will be protected, he will bring people who were direct witnesses to offers made by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am playing devil's advocate here and I am trying to press this issue because I want to lay on the table whatever the rationales are. One keeps grappling with it. And I am going to—as I have said to people—I am going to ask these questions on both sides of the fence here to try to get at it. But it just occurs to me that there is a struggle, still, to understand how you break through that. If they are going to get killed the moment somebody knows they are there, yet there is nobody that ever sort of negotiates for them; and then you go through this process where we are searching for them, and yet they are holding them, despite the fact that we are searching for them, and if we find them they may kill them, you get into a tortured kind of circularity here.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think this Committee will be able to do that, and I think that you will get the appropriate response from people.

The CHAIRMAN. That we will be able to do what? Speak to those people?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think you will be able to speak to witnesses, people who have had direct contact with prisoners as long as they have reassurance that it will be handled properly.

The CHAIRMAN. I can guarantee you that anybody who can give us true, first-hand information of a live-sighting, this Committee will guarantee their safety.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is not me you have to reassure.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but you will give us these names and lead us to these people? Is that accurate?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I am saying that in some instances you have to have people like Al Shinkel come before this Committee, because he is one of my links to these people. I don't have the influence with them that he would have.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that we are well-beyond my time, and I apologize to my colleagues. But this is the last go-round, in a sense. And so I can assure you the Committee is going to bend over backward to examine these people, to examine their evidence, to talk to people, to keep confidences, but to find out what is going on here. Because it is critical that they be spoken to.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Can I just tell you one thing, and it will explain the situation that I am in.

Before I came here, I got a call. Before I left Thailand, I got a call from Mr. Shinkel who said can you tell me if I can trust the Committee, and if I can bring the witnesses who will listen to me to Washington? And they include, for example, the man the high-ranking Vietnamese who was there when the Vietnamese offered the Woodcock Commission 160 prisoners. He asked can I trust them? What do you think? And I said that the people I've been working with are certainly trustworthy. And I would advise that. But that's as far as I can go. I'm certainly willing to be helpful in that way.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, pardon me, but who is Mr. Shinkel?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shinkel is an individual who lives in Thailand who has had a long involvement as one of those dedicated to trying to find live people in either Laos or Vietnam.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. He's a retired Air Force intelligence man, and he has given testimony before congressional committees before—one very, very important bit of testimony that still is classified.

The CHAIRMAN. He came to see me when I was in Bangkok. And we agreed that the Committee will follow-up with him.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure about the answer of the witness. Is she saying that she will give us the names that she has, or does it require the permission of Mr. Shinkel in order for us to get the names that you have?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. In some instance, it would require his agreement, yes.

Senator McCAIN. And why would that be?

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that is because he was a source, and you made an agreement with him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right, because I'm not an intelligence person involved in this. I'm not an activist. I'm a reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, I think it's a question of the reporter-source relationship, and I respect that. And I think that is something we have to do. However, Mr. Shinkel has said to me that he is willing to cooperate, and the Committee will obviously seek to have his cooperation.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Ms. Stevenson, I just want to reiterate what Senator Kerry said, as one who has been involved in this issue myself for a number of years. As most people know, and most—if not all

of the Members of this Committee—have been involved in one way or the other. There is so much information out there. I have heard a lot of it. I have talked with you, as you know, and I have talked with others. I think I have talked to everybody I know of who believed that they had information on this issue, including the DIA for a number of years.

But if we are going to get to the bottom of it, and as I said in my opening statement, I realize we have to earn that trust. But this is the last shot. I really believe that. And I think everybody on this Committee believes it. We are really trying to get to the truth. And we are not going to leave any stones unturned. And I understand protection of sources—believe me, I understand it. Although Senator Kerry can say—and I will say—that we will guarantee, of course there is always the human possibility that something may compromise that. I am certainly not going to tolerate it, or allow it, but within those parameters of human beings, sometimes not living up to agreements, I hope that we can.

Because if we cannot, we will never get to the bottom of this. In my opinion, there is so much information out there that conflicts, that the only way we are going to be able to look at it is for somebody to put it all together, and synthesize it, and weed out what is truth and what is not.

And I would just second the motion that has already been made here that wherever you can—under whatever parameters you need to provide to protect the people—to get those people to us if you can.

I wanted to specifically ask you about one source, and obviously I do not expect you to identify the source. And I do not know whether that individual was identified to Senator Grassley or anyone involved in the other report. But the one that was of interest to me, of great interest to me, was the source that you identified as Casino Man in your book.

He said—just quoting a couple of lines from this individual in your book—now, quoting Casino Man—he said “he knew what had occurred when Site 85 fell, that is the Lima site in Laos, 1968. He knew men had been betrayed. He knew men had survived. And he knew that some had been taken prisoner.”

Then, in a later discussion with the same individual whom you identified as Casino Man, “I believe in the institution”—and this is quoting him again—“I believe in the institution of the CIA. I just think parts of it have gotten into the wrong hands. And I’ve got proof, proof this cover-up is not the work of any one administration. There has been a group of people who have controlled certain issues through four presidencies. And any big investigation into missing men would lead to its condemnation.”

Without getting in to, I would like you to first of all, to say how much credence you put in that, that individual in terms of what he said—or she, whoever—Casino Man, I assume is a man—and second, would you—if you have not already—be willing to provide that source to the Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I had his permission to provide some of the material he gave me to the other investigation. I have never felt very comfortable with him because he is just a sort of complete intelligence man. And I have trouble with people like that. And

one problem is that I really don’t know whether—when he gave me permission to give it to those people—I also have permission to give it to this Committee.

I would certainly be willing to try—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that two Members of those people are on this Committee. I hope we do not have a problem.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, is this something you can work out yourself?

Senator SMITH. If you have already given it, then there should not be a problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a problem, Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. It is no problem with me.

Senator SMITH. There are a lot of Members that want to ask questions. And I just have one more of Mr. Cawthorne.

A good deal of the information that you used in your book came from the series of volumes which were identified as uncorrelated information relating to missing Americans in Southeast Asia, allegedly published by DOD in what, 1978? December 15, 1978.

What is the status of those volumes now? Are they classified documents—to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I’m afraid I don’t know.

Senator SMITH. Does anyone on the Committee know whether they are classified documents?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator SMITH. Can you go into some detail about those documents as to what specific information in those documents was provided to you, and they are DOD documents. So if they are DOD documents, then you feel that at least the information that was gathered, you would have some reason to believe it might be accurate—at least the information that you’re referring to as incriminating, as far as live Americans are concerned?

So could you comment on that in terms of its veracity?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Well, the documents, themselves, say if the document refers to interrogation of a Vietnamese prisoner or defector, it has an assessment of what the interrogator thinks, or what the source man thinks at that time.

Senator SMITH. I am told that my staff is correct, that the documents are not classified.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I’m relieved to hear that.

Senator SMITH. I guess you are not in trouble leaking classified documents.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Monika, I must tell you how delighted I am that you have come. Your book, I think, has done more to bring this issue to the attention of the American people—and perhaps to Congress as well—than any, single effort that I am aware of. And I found your book an excellent book. I think there are an awful lot of Americans who deeply appreciate the endless hours and the time you put into it, as well as the personal sacrifice that I know it included.

I am told that you did not have an easy time getting this published. I wonder if you would share with us the problems you ran into as you sought to make the facts public.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, that is true. We started that project with a great deal of enthusiasm, with one of the largest publishers in the United States—in the world, as a matter of fact.

We got a very nice advance. They welcomed us with opened arms. I warned the publisher that we had had some problems at 60 Minutes, and that they could expect the same problems of pressure. I had gotten pressure when I worked for 60 Minutes not to do the story.

They went ahead anyway, and we worked on it for 3 years with complete enthusiasm. Then two things happened: one, letters were received from certain people in covert operations threatening a libel suit—on the surface it didn't look like a real threat, but our lawyers assured us that that is the only way it could be interpreted; and also, another book was published called *Out of Control*. A suit was initiated by General Secord and that book was taken off the stands. The author won that suit, but long after the book was destroyed.

Anyway, it was soon after these two things happened that our first publisher decided not to publish the book. We had a great deal of trouble. Well, we were not able to persuade them.

What was interesting was that in the last meeting we had with them, they were very, very adamant in asking us to identify our sources. The source that they wanted identified was Colonel Negro. And at that time, we had not identified him. He was assassinated soon after that. But they really kept pressing who that man was.

The other interesting thing was, you asked about Casino Man, Senator Smith. Right before they dropped the book, Casino Man came from half-way around the world, because they wanted to know who he was. He had requested a lawyer with a national security clearance. And he was willing to give them, everything—every bit of documentation that he had.

On the day he arrived they changed their minds. They did not want to see him. And then they dropped the book. Anyway, we were able to sell the book to a Canadian publisher, and we initiated a suit against the first American publisher on the basis of lack of fair dealings. The Canadian publisher then later sold it to Penguin, another American publisher, and it was sold to an English publisher as well.

But similar pressures were applied. It went through a very heavy legal period. And it did finally come out—thank God there are some publishers with courage.

Senator BROWN. Well, you have been through a great deal. But I think it is going to yield some dividends. We hope this hearing will be of some value in following-up—and it is following-up, I think, that may be the most important.

Now, you have mentioned a statement by the Committee that would be helpful. I want you to know that that statement is going to be offered as a motion in this Committee. We will go on record to welcome those people home. But I am wondering if you do not have other suggestions for us as to top priority things that we ought to bring and we ought to follow-up on.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, it is hard to do in the large sense. I mean I am willing to do that over a longer period of time. I think one of the crucial things—because so many people involved with

this issue have been disappointed, have come forward with information, and have had—well, their entire lives compromised. I think this is particularly true of Asians who have testified, or who have been willing to come forward.

So they are now very reluctant. And I think that that statement will be important. But I think there must be other ways that you will have to show them that they really have your support, that you will stand behind them; that if they come here something won't happen so that they will be endangered, or their families are endangered.

I think most of them, what they really want is just a kind of public recognition that they are not liars; that they are not self-serving.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned the Woodcock Commission. As I read the summary of that commission, they concluded "there is no evidence to indicate any American POW's from the Indochina conflict remain alive, for the reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of loss, and passage of time."

That, of course, was in 1977 before Bobby Garwood came out.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right. And again, I accept the word. This is really one of Mr. Shinkel's people—the one I mentioned who was a witness to a meeting where 160 men were offered. I have no reason to disbelieve that man. As far as I know, he has never asked for anything for that information. He is hurting himself by saying it—at least he would have hurt himself in the past.

Senator BROWN. Do you know of the American negotiators that were present when that offer was laid on the table?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No, but I think that is a question that you should ask this gentleman, and ask Mr. Shinkel.

Senator BROWN. Well, it is clearly an area we can follow-up and try to verify. We have the ability to call negotiators if they were there.

I have looked through a letter by Congressman Ben Gilman of New York that conveyed criticism of your books, challenging its veracity. I do not know if you have had a chance.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have not seen that. I have heard of it. People here have mentioned it.

Senator BROWN. I would appreciate if—and I have looked through it myself—if you would be willing, when you have had a chance to review it, if you would advise us of any comments you would like to make with regard to it, to those observations.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would.

Senator BROWN. The ones that I have looked at—frankly, the facts they cite seem to substantiate your book, rather than their criticism of it. But I think your observations of those characterizations would be helpful to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.

Senator Reid.

Senator REID. A Man Called Intrepid was sure great. Tell your husband that.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Thank you.

Senator REID. Tell us about the threatening phone calls from the Government officials urging you not to do your story.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, it's in the book. And just roughly, it was when I was working for 60 Minutes.

Senator REID. Who were the officials?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. The official was Col. Richard Childress.

Senator REID. You attribute your notes being stolen, that were in your briefcase, to government operators.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I don't know that for a fact. A lot of strange things happened that had never happened to me before.

Senator REID. How many books did you sell?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I believe that it is close to 100,000 altogether, between the U.S., Canada, and England.

Senator REID. If American POW's are ignored by the U.S. because it would embarrass certain CIA officers or others, why would Laos or Cambodia or Vietnam not release them just to do that, just to embarrass the U.S.?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think there are factions in those countries that wanted to do that. I think there is a conflict within them. My husband described that. It is in our book. When he was over there, he spoke to some hard-line people who made that quite clear.

Senator REID. You actually believe that as we speak here today, there are Americans who were in the military during the conflict in Southeast Asia who are alive today over there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think we ought to give it a chance. I agree with Mr. Cawthorne. I mean, I have no idea whether they were not killed off in the last 5 minutes, but I believe, since so many were alive at the end of the war, the chances are pretty good. We know from historical records that certain Soviets survived a longer time than that, so there is a good possibility, yes.

Senator REID. What is your estimate as to how many?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I really don't like to do that. I would think hundreds, but that is my personal opinion.

Senator REID. Senator Brown referred to the letter from Congressman Gilman.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I've not seen that, but—

Senator REID. Well, let me read to you from this letter, dated in January of this year. He says that he has received this book and it has been brought to his attention, and he relates here that Mr. George Brooks was advising bookstores in his area, his congressional district, that they should place it under the fiction department.

He goes on further to say, "The logic of the motive of this cover-up as outlined in your letter eludes me. As you recall, President Reagan never hesitated to blame his predecessor, President Carter, for any of the economic or diplomatic problems that befell our nation during his Presidency. It makes no sense to me in the one instance he would countenance a cover-up to protect the reputation of his predecessor.

"Likewise, I find it highly unlikely that President Carter, the man who granted amnesty to Americans who avoided the draft and was elected to the Presidency on a platform condemning the excesses of Vietnam and Watergate, would be overly eager to cover-up the role of Presidents Nixon and Ford in the war.

"Your contention that President Bush would be embarrassed by the truth belies all logic. If the President were able to return even

one live missing American to his home prior to the 1992 elections, he would be hailed as a hero by all Americans and his reelection would be virtually assured. The idea that he would rather cover-up for Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter rather than do this flies in the face of common sense."

How would you respond to these three paragraphs?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Senator Reid, I hope that President Bush does just that, I hope one returns and I hope President Bush becomes a hero.

Senator REID. But you see, you are not answering the question.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I don't know what the question is.

Senator REID. The question why would these various men who have been President of the United States, cover up for the other.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think that is a very complicated question, but I think all of those men, all of those Presidents, were advised by bureaucrats who were working on the issue throughout, many of them.

And I can only tell you again why would the strong, personal opinion of a man like General Tighe be discounted. And why would even the Reagan administration, who made it a national priority, lie about his testimony. He testified before Congress about every 6 months on this, and yet when I did a 60 Minute show in which he said that on air, they issued a public statement saying that he had never talked about this, that he had indeed only mentioned it once in 1981. What I have tried to understand is why do we discount the testimony of the most qualified people on this issue.

Senator REID. Mrs. Stevenson, hopefully this Committee will not discount any testimony. But this is the third day of testimony. We have been here now 3 days, and we have had a string of witnesses who have said, the latest being the Colonel this morning and this afternoon, who said if there were an American in Vietnam, we would know about it, and there are not any.

We are talking about almost 20 years, people being in effect hidden in Vietnam. Now, I would hope that you are right. I hope there are hundreds, 200 as you say, Americans alive over there. I hope that very much. But at this stage the facts that I have been presented belie that. The only information we have from you and Mr. Cawthorne is speculation.

Now we should follow the advice that we have been given and follow up every lead, and I hope we do that. But how—I mean, do you believe that there would be places in Vietnam where these people could be hidden for almost 20 years?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I'll give you two examples. One, my husband was there during the Truce Commission. He is a Canadian, so he was there with the Canadian delegation to the Truce Commission after the French/Indo-China conflict. And there was a strong speculation that the Vietnamese were bringing arms in from the Chinese side. They were never able to prove that until about 5, 10 years later, when it was verified. I think it is very easy in a closed society like Vietnam to hide prisoners, arms, anything else.

The other thing I want to tell you is we have recently also met with the Vietnamese—not the official negotiators, but certainly high ranking. And I said, look, this Committee is going to go into

session, and they are going to represent the American people and that's a lot different from the negotiators that you have been dealing with. Because the American people really want answers and the American people want to know, for example, what happened to the prisoners we know were alive, the ones our intelligence tells us were alive. What happened to Peter Cressman and what happened to Colonel Donahue?

Those are two examples I outlined for them. And he says, why are you bringing up these cases? The American Government has never brought these cases up with us, and we have done everything that the American Government has asked of us.

Senator REID. My time has expired Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for appearing here today. Mr. Chairman, just let me preface my questions with the following remark. I said at the onset of this hearing that I assumed that Americans were alive, and I will continue to assume it until we have as full an accounting as possible. I have assured my friends Red McDaniel, Jack Bailey, and others who are in the audience, that I intend to ask tough questions. I think it is legitimate to ask tough questions of people who have beliefs on both sides of this issue. I hope that that is well understood, because without tough questions being asked, Mr. Chairman, I do not see how we are going to get to the bottom of this issue.

So I would like to repeat. I assume that there are Americans alive until we have as full an accounting as possible, which we do not have. At the same time, there is a lot of information that we have to wade through, and the only way we are going to get to the bottom of this issue is through asking very difficult and tough questions from people who come down on both sides of the issue.

Having said that, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, in your book you state, and I quote: "Most astounding, some prisoners were actually hidden in the main prison compounds in Hanoi. One such man, Air Force Col. Norman Gaddis, who was shot down on May 12, 1967, did appear on the 1973 list of returnees unexpectedly. He had never been accounted for by the Vietnamese, yet for almost 4½ years he was kept in a section of the prison known as Heartbreak Hotel. In all that time, no other American prisoner had seen him. If he had not finally been spotted by other prisoners after the Vietnamese moved POW's and consolidated them in several key locations because of the attempted Son Tay raid to rescue prisoners on November 21, Gaddis would probably have ended up an MIA."

Mrs. Jensen, I speak from personal experience. That is totally false. We knew that Colonel Gaddis was in prison. We were in communications with him, he appeared at a Christmas church service in 1969, which was filmed by the Vietnamese. I would like to know, since I know that that statement is false from my own personal experience, I wondered where you had acquired such information?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well at the time I got that from other people who were in your situation.

Senator MCCAIN. Who?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can't give you that right here and now, but it was by talking to other people.

Senator MCCAIN. I would hope you would supply that for the record because it is just not true.

[The material referred to may be found on pps. 2-4 of the appendix.]

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I have heard the contradiction to that, and I accept the possibility. But at the moment I don't know which side is right.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if you do not want to take my word for it, that is fine.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I didn't say that, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Cawthorne, you state in your statement: "During the war the National Security Agency made analysis of what happened to pilots who were shot down. They noticed that most of the airmen down near the main prison camps around Hanoi and Haiphong were taken there if they did not have to pass any installation of strategic importance on the way."

Now, Mr. Cawthorne, in the early years of the war, 1965 and 1966, the Americans did not bomb the northern parts of Vietnam, Hanoi and Haiphong. Most of the prisoners who were in Hanoi in the Wallo prison that were captured during the early years of the war, in fact virtually all of them, were shot down in the southern part of the country—Bin, in that area. Now, they were all taken north to Hanoi.

How does that jibe with your statement—some of them, it took as long as a week to 2 weeks to get there. Is it your allegation that they did not have to pass any "any installation of strategic importance on the way"?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I also mentioned in the book that the analysts didn't begin to analyze the shoot-downs until after 1970.

Senator MCCAIN. So they did not analyze those that were shot down in 1965 and 1966?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, frankly, that does not make any sense, Mr. Cawthorne. I mean, people were shot down and captured during the first couple of years, most of them in the south. They were taken north usually by truck, and obviously, they would have had to have passed by installations of strategic importance since, as you know, it is a relatively narrow country with very few main arteries of transportation.

Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, I would like to bring up an issue which I think is important because in your book you cite a U.S. Army Major, Mark Smith—I will preface my remarks by saying I do not know nor have I ever met Major Smith although I have heard about him—and he is mentioned throughout your book as one of your key sources.

Now, I think that if you use a source as extensively as you used Major Smith, obviously, you like to look into the background because any journalist, and I'm sure you're an outstanding professional journalist likes to look at the veracity of that witness.

Now, the facts are that a hearing was held in 1986 by the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. They invited Mr. Smith and his col-

leagues to present their evidence. Mr. Smith failed to honor his commitment until a month later when he had to be issued a subpoena, and then the hearing was reported in the press and is a matter of official record in the Senate.

The view of those Senators who were on that Committee was that his evidence proved not true. In fact, according to some witnesses Major Smith invited one of the Senators to the parking lot, because there was some disagreement.

Mr. Smith said that the White House also had shown an interest in the tape. According to Mr. Smith, officials under the direction of Vice President George Bush told him to offer Mr. Gregson \$4.2 million deposited in the Bank of America in Singapore for the tape. Those are false statements said a spokesman for the Vice President. The Vice President did not authorize Mr. Smith or Mr. McIntyre or any other party to pay any money for their reported evidence.

I guess my question to you is, did you have any qualms about quoting him so extensively, given the clear questioning of his veracity by a Senate Committee—not this one?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm not sure what that last statement you read from having to do with the Gregson case has to do with—

Senator McCAIN. It has a great deal to do with his veracity.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. —with my book because that's in our book.

Senator McCAIN. No, but it has something to do with his veracity, which is the reason why I quoted it. The Vice President of the United States—now President of the United States, disagreed with him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Right. And all I can say is that I did look extensively at Mark Smith's record—so did my husband—especially as related to the charges that were brought against him. And there was a file this thick (indicating 2 inches) which clears him. We looked at all of that.

What happened in that instance were false charges were brought against him. It makes me believe that something was not handled properly in the later questioning. Now, Mr. Smith says in that particular instance that you bring up, which we did not deal with in our book—I do know about it—that the reason he did not show up for that particular Committee meeting was because the Committee did not honor its promise to keep the name of the witness he was bringing out of the public. The morning that he arrived, he saw Robin Gregson's name in the newspapers, and that is why he did not show up.

That is what I was talking about earlier when I said that a lot of people who have information about this are afraid to come before this Committee, because things like that happened in the past. There has to be an absolute guarantee when there is a guarantee. People cannot be compromised in that way because quite often their lives are at stake.

I believe that Senator Simpson apologized to Mark Smith. That is on the record in Mark Waple's files—he was a witness to that, and you can call Mr. Waple and ask him about it. He himself said that he thought he had goaded Mr. Smith beyond endurance.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much. I see that my time is expired. I will be glad to wait until the next round.

May I make just one comment, Mr. Chairman, about General Tighe.

In your book, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, you say: "General Tighe told me flatly that he had seen the best possible evidence of Americans still alive before speaking out. He was publicly humiliated."

I have known General Tighe for many years. I have seen him testify before this Committee. I have seen his remarks widely publicized throughout the country. I know no one who sought, nor did, publicly humiliate General Tighe. He is held in the highest regard by all of us, and I do not think that statement is accurate.

But I also think that it is very important that General Tighe has said consistently that he has seen no hard evidence, but the weight of all of the cases that he saw convinced him of that. And I think that it is very important that the record be clear that General Tighe, who will be able to elaborate before this Committee, stated that to this Committee and to me, or to the Foreign Affairs Committee when I was on there, and to me personally on several occasions. To my knowledge he has not changed that opinion.

I do respect his view. I know that the Members of this Committee respect his views, otherwise we would not have him before the Committee, and I know of no one who tried to humiliate him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Senator, I don't know if you've read the portion of the book where we talk specifically about the humiliation. I guess it is a matter of opinion whether that was public humiliation or not. In my husband's and my view it was, and in a lot of people's view it was.

Senator McCAIN. It is not in General Tighe's, ma'am.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I will also tell you that if you read the Bar Association Intelligence Newsletter, which is edited by Admiral Mott, where he reviewed our book, he called General Tighe and had a conversation with him about our book, and General Tighe—that is public I think—backed our book and said he had no quarrel with it, and repeated the statements that he had made to me—again, openly—on the 60 Minutes program.

Senator McCAIN. I was not commenting on whether he agreed or disagreed with your book, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson.

You were saying he was publicly humiliated, and I do not believe that is correct, nor does he believe that is the case. And I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But you read from the beginning of the book, where you're talking about credible evidence, that he has only talked about the weight of evidence. He has said, and we have records of it, that there very definitely is credible evidence. And on 60 Minutes as more than credible; he described it as a miracle.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to leave, so do you want to take a minute?

Senator SMITH. I appreciate the chairman's indulgence. I just want to say in response to two things that Senator McCain said, I, too, hold General Tighe in the greatest regard—highest regard—and I think all Members of the Committee do.

However, having personally reviewed the Tighe Report in its unedited version, I can tell you that there are people within the agency who did not hold him in the highest regard. I want to state for the record that that information—because I read it, and I cannot comment on it now because it still is a classified document, about the content of it, but it certainly was not a complimentary introduction to the Tighe Report written by an individual from the Defense Intelligence Agency. I will stand on that point.

The second point I feel—with all due respect to Senator McCain—I can only comment on what I know about this and I am not going to comment beyond that. As far as Mark Smith is concerned I was as frustrated as anybody else that the information that he thought that he would bring—we thought he would bring forth regarding that videotape—did not come forth. I was not a Member of the Murkowski Committee and therefore had no input into that all, so I do not know the facts there.

But I do know for a fact that—and I am not going to go beyond saying this—that people in the very highest levels of Government were very interested in that tape, and that I was personally involved in the negotiations for that tape myself. I will state for the Committee in executive session if they like, as to who those high level people were. But I cannot comment beyond that, other than to say that everything that Senator McCain said regarding that \$4 million was not exactly accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, Mrs. Stevenson, let me just answer your concern. I want the Committee on record and I want anybody who is thinking about coming forward to understand that this Committee is determined to keep whatever agreements it reaches with people with respect to protection of their identity or whatever, within one limit. And the limit is—and it will only be in agreement with the person—that if it is necessary in terms of public knowledge, this is not something that can go on or be kept behind closed doors forever.

Because the Committee's purpose is to shed light on this and we are insisting on shedding light. With the Pentagon opening up, it will be totally contradictory for us to shut down.

But on the other hand, if the opening up is enhanced by keeping one individual protected for some reason, clearly the Committee is prepared to do that. And we will have to defend ourselves by the information—the quality of the information we put out and the quality of the judgments we make as to whether or not we were justified in doing that. And the proof in that will not be until the end of this process.

The second point I want to make is that for those who are measuring the tone or approach of questioning here and trying to draw conclusions about somebody's view, I want to reiterate what Senator McCain said. If somebody comes in front of this Committee and says to us with a certainty, Senator, they are all dead and I know it, we are going to put that to the same test as somebody who comes here and says I know there are people alive. That is, by nature, adversarial to a certain degree, though I am determined to keep it from being adversarial in a way that suggests to anybody they are better off not coming forward. We do not want this Committee to wind up doing that.

Finally, I will say to you that it will be unusual for us to be in this kind of a predicament because we knew what we were doing when we set out these first 3 days as establishing the parameters. We recognize that a lot of this work will be through deposition and interview, and a certain amount of investigative background work that will—just like putting together any case. Before you go to court with your case, you do your preparation and a lot of that is going to be done.

So I respect your willingness to put your evidence and theories to test, and that is what is happening here.

Who is next? Senator Kassebaum. Am I correct on that? Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Just briefly I would like to say, Mrs. Stevenson and Mr. Cawthorne, that I was invited to sit on this Committee by Senator Dole. We were selected by the majority and the minority leaders. It was with great reluctance that I agreed to serve on this Committee because I do not have a background in understanding much that has gone on. I have tried to read a great deal; I have tried to understand. I think you can understand how perhaps someone coming fresh to this would be quite perplexed by some of the testimony back and forth over the last several days.

I think the hardest thing for me to understand is to hear from both of you who have spent a great deal of time and involvement in, and a great deal of research, Mrs. Stevenson, on your part, to say that you both believe strongly that there are still alive Americans there, and that this is being covered up by our Government.

Now, I am not debating the point of whether they are or are not there, but what I am trying hard to understand is what is the motivation for this.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can only tell you that I have had the same difficulties for a long time and still do to a degree because they are so hard to understand. I think a lot of it has to do simply with what happens when you have a job and you have made a mistake. I think a big mistake was made at the end of the war. I think that mistake was compounded, perhaps with a lot of people not deliberately, but once those men were abandoned and people knew about it, ever bit of evidence that seemed to come in was discredited in some ways.

I spoke to one of the children of a missing man just before, and he has a letter which I think is now blown up and being shown around, which talks about fingerprints on his father's case. He has never been able to get those fingerprints. They are now missing.

I mean, when you look at this subject, you find a long history of mistakes like that. And then when you begin to realize the intelligence of the people and their background, it's just very hard to believe that it is only incompetence that has created this long record of mistakes.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think it's quite easy to understand that politicians don't draw attention to problems they can't solve. And it seems to me this problem is an intractable problem, and you don't shout about it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I do not really agree with that. I mean it is easy to shout frequently about things you do not understand. I think it is really something that is hard to understand. I can un-

derstand that mistakes may have been made as the peace treaty was put into place and as they were trying to bring people home quickly. What I find hard to understand is that still at this juncture there would be people held there against their will.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But we cannot really look at that unless we look at the history. If men were abandoned then there is a good chance that men are still alive. In order to do that we really have to look at the intelligence.

I think it is paramount that this Committee seriously look at the Peter Cressman case. Now here is a man who was shot down and captured after the Peace Accords were signed. That is something pretty heavy to hide. That is something that I think one can easily understand why. And as a matter of fact, I have talked to people in the Pentagon who have told me about that case, who have told me that they were terribly upset about it. It was a very, very important emotional upset for them. So much so that they put it on paper, and that was classified.

Now, I think it's important that this Committee get a hold of that protest by Peter Cressman's own colleagues, or at least people who cared about him, who were in the service.

Senator KASSEBAUM. In your book, Kiss the Boys Goodbye, in speaking of intelligence, you say the intelligence on the prisoners has been officially collected, so much so that today, and this when you are writing more than 14 years after the U.S. evacuation of Saigon, all Vietnam is laced with grapevines of human intelligence on prison camps and on who is in them and who runs them. Is this U.S. intelligence that you are referring to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. In the first place, there is a basis for those prisons. Under the old system, it's the old French system and they use that same system for Americans.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But when you were speaking of an intelligence network, you were speaking of their intelligence or our intelligence?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm talking about our intelligence, the intelligence that we have on American troop prisoners.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right, but is it a network composed of Vietnamese, or of our own—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is a network of Asians, largely, who are working for American, either on an ad hoc basis, maybe they formerly worked full time and now they work on a free-lance basis.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is this information that has been available to you as you have been working over there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is information that as we researched it we came across it. It has been available since the end of the war and a lot of it came about because people—our former allies—were in prisoner with other Americans. I mean the best example of that is the Vietnamese general who was in prison with Bobby Garwood and who reported on that to President Reagan.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So this intelligence network, that still is on-going there, I would guess—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes it is, and I think it's also important for this Committee to get hold of Bobby Garwood's official debriefing. You could learn a lot from those papers.

The CHAIRMAN. We have requested that, and I have been told we will get it.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. At the same time, perhaps you should get the unofficial debriefing that General Tighe did with Bobby Garwood which is, professionally I believe, just as good.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just a last question. Do you feel that there is a distinction to be made between those that you believe may still be in Vietnam and in Laos?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do think there is a distinction. I think there is much more evidence today about prisoners in Laos than there is in Vietnam, and I think that has been probably done quite deliberately because a lot of them are in the border areas so they could easily have been moved back and forth.

I think that's an example. Some of your colleagues, some other Senators who went to Vietnam in 1986, were told that there might be prisoners. They wouldn't be under the control of the Vietnamese but the Vietnamese would help us to look for them. I think that's a very good example of what's happened. They've been moved, and some of them are perhaps totally not under Vietnamese control. But most of the evidence indicates that there is some Vietnamese control in the areas where they're being held.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you sensed any real problems with the distribution and sales of your books that might indicate some outside interference?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can only say that strange things have happened. I don't know if it's a matter of incompetence or whether there has been interference, since there has been some interference sometimes. I think that's true, too. I don't want to think that, so I steer away from it. When we were doing the promotion for the book last year, it was not in any of the major cities where we were. People who wanted to buy the book had to wait, sometimes months, to get it. They were persistent enough to have really turned the book into a success. It's that kind of thing.

Before the book came out in the United States, we were pressured, very much pressured—under the threat of no publication—to settle our suit with the first publisher. But I think it could logically happen in the business. I have no proof that there was any direct pressure.

Senator GRASSLEY. When did the Vietnamese offer prisoners to us and what were the circumstances? You briefly describe some such offer involving the Woodcock Commission. I would like to have you elaborate on that offer and on any others you might have, and most importantly, describe how you know it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is something I know through someone through Al Shinkel, and I believe Mr. Shinkel and I think the man's record really stands for itself. He was present. He was a Vietnamese official who was present when an offer made for 160 men in exchange for money. I don't know if you were here when I said that one of the last things Mr. Shinkel said to me before I left Thailand was that could he bring this man and other people to this

Committee if he could have a guarantee that they would be protected, because they were willing to speak before the Committee.

And as I said, I mentioned that I had been working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority investigation, and I certainly felt that they could work with the people here.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. The Wall Street Journal, sir, reported an offer in 1981.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right. That's another offer.

Senator BROWN. Would the Senator yield on that?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, I will yield.

Senator BROWN. I was hoping you might follow up to find out who that offer was made to.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. According to the story in the Wall Street Journal it was discussed in the Oval Office by President Reagan and the Cabinet.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt again and pin that down. Is it according to the Wall Street Journal that it was discussed by the President and the Cabinet, or other sources?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. By the Wall Street Journal.

The CHAIRMAN. The Wall Street Journal story suggested that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that story?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. It's in here. I could dig it out for you if you like.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it cited in the book?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But that's another example of where one of the witnesses got into a lot of trouble with certain government agencies and I think the person who could explain that to you the best is Mr. Ross Perot.

The CHAIRMAN. We have spoken to Mr. Perot and will further.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you talked to U.S. officials who claim to have seen U.S. POW's or anyone else who has seen POW's since 1973?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have and I mentioned that in my opening statement. You weren't here to hear that.

Senator GRASSLEY. My point is, would you be willing to put them in touch with this Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would certainly be willing to try, yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Cawthorne, would you also be in a position like Monika, to assess for access to some of your sources who have firsthand knowledge on this subject and let us know about them?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Certainly, yep.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Second round. Senator McCain, do you have further questions?

Senator McCain. Just briefly I would like to pursue this matter of the negotiations a little further. Please, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, do you know at what time frame these negotiations took place?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm sorry, which negotiations?

Senator McCain. The negotiations you referred to for 160 POW's. Do you know at what time frame that took place?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. During the time of the Woodcock Commission was in Vietnam.

Senator McCain. Do you know when that was?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. You probably have more precise dates than I do. I don't have my documentation in front of me.

Senator McCain. Your testimony is that there was an offer made for 160 live POW's?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My testimony is that is a source for that, a Vietnamese who was an official present there who was well know to Mr. Shinkel. According to Mr. Shinkel, one of the last things he said to me was that if he felt assured that this Committee would treat this witness properly, that he would be willing to come here to testify.

Senator McCain. Then it is my understanding your testimony is that Mr. Shinkel has information on an individual who states that there was—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My testimony is that I know this witness through Mr. Shinkel, and I have respect for both people.

Senator McCain. In other words, it is not just Mr. Shinkel, you have also had contact with this individual?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can only go according to my journalistic judgment, perhaps I can be proven wrong, but I believe, yes, I believe him.

Senator McCain. Now this individual was a high-ranking Vietnamese official?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well you know when you get into high-ranking.

Senator McCain. I would think you would have to be fairly high-ranking to be there.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. He was high-ranking enough to be present.

Senator McCain. I would think you would have to be fairly high ranking in order to make an offer.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I didn't say he made the offer. I said he was present when the offer was made.

Senator McCain. And who made the offer?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. The Vietnamese.

Senator McCain. Which Vietnamese?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I don't know that.

Senator McCain. You do not know?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No I don't know.

Senator McCain. And you do not know who the offer was made to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I know that it was made to whoever was officially there to receive such an offer.

Senator McCain. Do you have any idea who that was?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Specifically names?

Senator McCain. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, if I can look back at my papers on the Woodcock Commission I could give it to you. I don't have them here.

Senator McCain. These were Americans this offer was made to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There were Americans on the Woodcock Commission, that's right.

Senator McCAIN. And the offer was made to the Americans on the Woodcock Commission?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right.

Senator McCAIN. So we could contact the Americans on the Woodcock Commission as well and ask them?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would hope that you would do that, and I would hope that you speak with Mr. Woodcock. I have spent quite a bit of time talking to him.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Woodcock corroborates that?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No, he does not, but I think you will find it interesting talking to him.

Senator McCAIN. Well, as a matter of fact I have talked to him several times in the past, and I find him to be a very outstanding man who served his country very well including, I believe, as our first Ambassador to China, as well as a very respected leader in the labor movement.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. So he would be a very good witness for you to bring in.

Senator McCAIN. But he has no knowledge or denies that that happened?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Or as he puts it, he doesn't know.

Senator McCAIN. I see. But I just wanted to get it straight for the records. It is your direct information from talking with this former Vietnamese official that a meeting took place sometime during the Woodcock Commission where an offer was made for 160 live Americans in return for an undisclosed amount of money; is that correct?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. An offer was made for the men, yes. I don't know that much about the money part.

Senator McCAIN. But it was financial?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mrs. Stevenson, I know it is in your book, but I want you to relate it anyway to the Committee. First of all, how long were you at 60 Minutes?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Just short of 6 years.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you were with 60 Minutes you were a regular?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I was a staff producer, that is, I was working for CBS. I had just renewed another 6-year contract.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were a producer of the regular Sunday night shows?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, I was. I was not a freelancer. I did not come in just to do one story. I worked for 60 Minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You worked for it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is considered one of the best jobs in the business.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct. And you have under your belt the production of a significant number of segments that 60 Minutes has aired; is that not correct?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do. And I have an Emmy, and I also have a gold medal for best documentary at the International Film Festival in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, at some time, you began this story as a regular 60 Minutes project with enthusiasm and excitement, I take it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I did. I have to admit I am somewhat ashamed of my views at the time, because I had no question, for example, that Garwood was a traitor. That is how I thought of him. I initially really wanted to look at that.

The CHAIRMAN. So you began really where a lot of Americans begin with this, which is sort of doubting and questioning?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I did. I thought that Garwood was really making up the prisoner issue. I had been aware of the Bo Gritz things and I thought they were hoaxes; I really did believe that. I mean, I leaned in that direction. I wanted to be objective, and I think ultimately I became objective.

The CHAIRMAN. In the course of your investigation you began to experience, did you not, things that were different from anything you have experienced in any story you have done?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is true. I did not think I was naive, but I really believed that no agency of the Government would try to interfere with a program like 60 Minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was the interference because they felt, and maybe you cannot even answer this, was it because you sensed that they just did not agree with what you were saying, or you were going off on a slant that was wild, or was it because you were doing this at all or getting into this? Can you even tell the difference?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. They just did not want the program done. The reasons initially were that all of the people, and Colonel Childress seemed to know who I had spoken to, that all of the people I had dealt with were crazy, gold smugglers, senile, et cetera, et cetera.

When he saw that I persisted, he then verified that there were prisoners, at least in his mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want you to describe the conversation that you had with Colonel Childress. This is a conversation you personally had, is that right?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is a conversation that I personally had. It was, however, witnessed by other people in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this the telephone conversation with Colonel Childress?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do not you describe to the Committee what happened.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, when I did not respond properly by agreeing to not go ahead with the program he tried another tack, and that was to tell me that if I persisted in doing the story I could endanger the lives of prisoners who were still over there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he said to you on the telephone?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is what he said to me on the telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question in your mind whatsoever?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There is no question in my mind whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say to him?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I was flabbergasted that he would try, and I already at that time had a great deal of respect for people I

had dealt with, like General Tighe, like Red McDaniel. I invited him to come on the program and say publicly what he had said on the phone. He said he could not do that, but that I should get someone else, like Secretary Richard Armitage. I said, but we have tried to get the Secretary and he has not responded. He said, he will now. And that was right. The next time we tried Armitage he did respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your conversation end abruptly?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do not know what you mean by abruptly. It did not end on the friendliest of notes, and neither did the second conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the second conversation?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. We did an interview with Congressman Solarz after that. And Congressman Solarz made some remark about how he did not want to be sandbagged. I said we were not going to sandbag him, but, as a matter of fact, I did know from a very good source in the administration who would be the person to know that there were prisoners alive and that it was known to the U.S. Government.

He tried to grill me on that, and I said, well, I could not say, even though I had not agreed with Colonel Childress that I would keep him anonymous. At that point, professionally I thought I would do that. I said I could not tell him, but I could tell him that it was a very solid, high-ranking source that had told me that.

On the following working day I got a call from Colonel Childress demanding how I could tell Congressman Solarz about our conversation, and that in fact he had never said that at all and I had misunderstood.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you subsequently have a conversation with Richard Armitage?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. We did an interview with Mr. Armitage, and I am sorry I cannot remember his public relations director at the time, but the pre-questions were done through his P.R. person.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you learn any more in the course of that interview?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Did I learn any more about the prisoner issue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I learned that his office and he considered there was no credible evidence, that there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what they said?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is right. And I referred to General Tighe several times because I had come across his testimony in the Congressional Record. It was done in a subtle way, but the attitude toward General Tighe was certainly disparaging.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, again, from a devil's advocate perspective, is it possible that when Colonel Childress said that to you, "well, if you persist in doing this you are jeopardizing a lot of Americans," that he was speaking conjecturally, that he was saying it in the context that if there were people alive and you went ahead and did this, that this would hurt, but not that he was affirmatively saying—I mean is there any interpretive room there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There was never any doubt in my mind, but this could always be a possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. The possibility of what?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That that is what he was doing. I mean, you would have to ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. But you took it as an absolute, outright statement?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I certainly did. And I believe he made similar telephone calls to other people, like Red McDaniel, where he indicated the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. In which he indicated similarly that this makes it more difficult to bring people who were alive?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is right. There is an affidavit in the Smith-McIntyre lawsuit about that other call with Captain McDaniel.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member have any further questions of this panel?

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. In your book on page 233, you quote Danny Sheehan by saying, "I think I can prove how profits from drugs and arms finance covert wars in the name of American national security." If you would share with us here the evidence that you have on that and any availability of that evidence.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, there is a lot of evidence. I mean, I think if you want to explore that it would be useful for you to talk to people who are a lot more knowledgeable about that. I spent some time talking to Alfred McCoy, who wrote "The Politics of Heroin."

He spent a lot of time in the early 1970's personally talking to people in Laos and Thailand who were involved with that activity, including General Vang Pao. He is much more knowledgeable than I am.

What is in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority material is, for example, an interview with a high-ranking Laotian general, who also talks about that, which was background for our book as well. But, we went to people like McCoy, who are the experts.

Senator BROWN. As I read your book, there is at least a suggestion or a hint that some of the reluctance to bring American servicemen home in the Laos area is somehow related to the drug trade. Is that a fair statement?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. I mean, we did not deal with that extensively because that would be another whole book and a lot more research would have to be done. But it is certainly clear that part of that "secret war," as it is known, was financed by the sale of illegal drugs and arms.

Senator BROWN. Do you have any additional names of people who you think could give testimony or information that would help us?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. On the drug question?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, I think I could provide you with that. I just recently participated in a teleconference with many of

the people that we had been in touch with, and it would probably be easy for me to give you the list of those people.

[See p. 2 of the appendix.]

Senator BROWN. I think the Committee would be interested in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to the Senator that, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Narcotics and Terrorism, we spent a significant amount of time looking at some of those issues, and there is a long report of the Subcommittee that has a huge amount of now documented information. In fact, some of the people involved in that in this hemisphere are being used by our Government as witnesses against major drug dealers in this country, including the Noriega trial.

So, there is a large body of evidence about it over a long period of time.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have to tell you we did rely upon other direct witnesses. We have not had any sort of direct dealings with drug dealers or anything like that. But I think the work, for example, of Alan McCoy, who is a professor at the University of Wisconsin, is very solid when you look at it and you check back on the work he did.

Senator BROWN. What can you tell the Committee about rescue missions, the covert efforts to rescue the POW's?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can tell you that I spoke to people in the Pentagon who were directly involved with some of those missions, and they told me point blank that the intelligence that those initial efforts were based on was absolutely topnotch. One of the people I spoke to at the very beginning about this also was Admiral Tuttle. Another person was with ISA, which has since been discredited to some extent, but I still believe that the information we got about those early rescue attempts was accurate.

Senator BROWN. In this area also, I think the Committee would appreciate any suggestions you might have for people who would be able to provide information about those missions. You have already given us some, and if others occur to you, I think it would be helpful to us.

[See p. 2 of the appendix.]

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would hope that one of the things that this Committee would do would be to get the SEPA records of the Ron Rewall trial, where the judge determined that it could not be open to the public because of the emotional impact it would have on the families of prisoners.

We saw some of those papers and some of that testimony, and I think you would have access to all of it. I think it would be very important for you to look at it.

Senator BROWN. You have spent some time with Bobby Garwood.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Would you indicate or share with us your view of how reliable his information is and whether or not he did indeed switch sides?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My view and that of my husband, who has a lot more experience in dealing with intelligence matters, is that he was never a collaborator and he did not lie about other prisoners. I know that General Tighe has told us that he could not

possibly have made up the things that he said in his debriefing; that it so closely matched what DIA knew about other prisoners.

I think he has really been maligned. I think his life has been, to a large degree, destroyed. He has made a remarkable comeback. He has handled it very well.

Senator BROWN. Did he indicate to you how it was he came to be captured in the Danang area?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. Of course I know that too from the court-martial records and other sources. I would like to tell you a story about Garwood. We knew a lot about him, but we did a radio program in Chicago last year, last fall, a new news show and suddenly a call came in very urgently from someone California who had been just driving through the city.

He said, I just had to call you. I heard you talking about Bobby Garwood. I want you to know that he was still in the Marine Corps. I was present at that first debriefing or first talk that Garwood had with the Marine Corps, and he did nothing but talk about other prisoners.

That is just an example of the kind of information that has come in on Garwood.

Senator BROWN. The specific area that I was concerned about was, as I understood from your book, he was captured in an area near Danang, out by Marble Mountain, near the hospital air base complex.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. I do not know if you remember, but initially he was charged with desertion. At the last minute at the court-martial the person who had actually raced with him for the job, that particular driving job, they were both drivers, showed up and said, yes, it was an official assignment. And he was captured.

I have also seen copies of a photograph of him under guard, with his hands tied. That, for some strange reason, was never shown at his court-martial.

Senator BROWN. Did he ever mention how it was he was captured, though, the actual capture? I mean, I was in Danang at the time. That part of the peninsula is quite a secure area.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, he was ambushed. I mean, it is in the book. And I do not want to contradict myself by now repeating it, but we described it as he described it to us. I mean, it was an ambush.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it there are no other questions of this panel.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let me announce then—

Senator MCCAIN. If I could just make one comment. Mr. Quhyn, who was the interpreter for the Woodcock Commission, has stated to us that there was never an offer for 160 POW's. I would be interested in his statement.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. All I can say is, gentlemen, you have the option of bringing the witness here, and I hope that you do. Maybe you will disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is not up to us to disagree.

Senator McCAIN. It is not a matter of disagreement; it is a matter of evidence.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, the evidence will be when you bring the person here, then you can decide whether he is lying or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say that I think that there is going to be a lot of evidence swirling around. We have had absolutely polar opposite statements on certain things, not by your panel, but in the course of testimony that we have heard. Some of which, incidentally, is not as far apart as it may seem at first blush.

I mean, Colonel Bui Tin's testimony this morning, while he professes knowledge of and firsthand testimony to the effect that no one is alive today, clearly left room in terms of where he was and what he knew in the early days of the aftermath of the war. So that there is a lot of room here to begin to sort this out. And I think that is exactly what the Committee has to do.

I want you to understand that all of this needs to be checked out, and that is why you are here. I think what is positive is that we are going to check it out, and you have come here with that understanding.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. We need to work with you more in order to be able to do that.

Let me just ask you one quick question. How long will you be here? Are you going back to Bangkok?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be here another day or so?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it if staff could meet with you tomorrow to further inquire with respect to some of these names, places, people, and so forth, so that we can begin that process almost immediately of going after it.

The second thing I would like to announce is that we had previously scheduled the administration and certain agencies to come back this afternoon in order to respond immediately. Unless they insist that they would like to do that this afternoon because of anything that has been stated or put in the record I would prefer and I think the Committee would prefer, to slide that over until next week or to permit staff to go through the 3 days of testimony. It will permit us and them to do a better job of culling questions and discrepancies so that we can address them without a sense of being rushed.

So, my preference would be, barring their insistence to the contrary, that we would delay them until week, and simply complete the panels that are set out today.

Ms. Stevenson, Mr. Cawthorne, your books are your own testimony, obviously, and I am confident that every Member of the Committee and the staff are going to go through them in great detail. We are going to try to pare every single inconsistency against other inconsistencies and so forth, because, as I think everybody has said, this is really the last shot. And if we do not do that and try to separate what we understand to be reality or not there is no way for this Committee to begin to answer these questions.

So, we thank you for it. And I thank you. You have come a great distance at great personal expense, and we are very appreciative for that. And we would like you to just be available to the staff in the next hour so that we could pursue some of those issues.

Thank you.

We have two panels. I do not think they are going to take that long. The next panel is Mr. Jeffrey Donahue, the author of the POW-MIA Timeline, and Ted Sampley of the Homecoming II Project, U.S. Veteran News and Report.

Following that, the final panel will be made up of the most recent publicized cases of photographs of Col. Jack Bailey, on the Carr case; Hamilton Gayden on the Borah case; and Albro Lundy, Shelby Robertson Quast, and Gladys Fleckenstein, representing the Lundy/Robertson/Stevens case.

Gentleman, would you stand please so I can swear you in.

[Whereupon, the witnesses were sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Donahue, do you want to lead off.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE, AUTHOR POW/MIA TIMELINE

Dr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir. I would like to shorten my opening—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you pull the mike close to you. Without objection, your full text will be placed in the record with any accompanying materials.

Dr. DONAHUE. That is why I would like to shorten my opening statement, if I may, and then make some brief comments, and take questions on a few important issues that have been raised over these 3 days: the nature of the intelligence, the nature of the conspiracy and the coverup, the mandate for the Committee—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you identify yourself with just a little background?

Dr. DONAHUE. Yes, indeed. My resume is in my statement that I've issued. My name is Jeffrey Donahue. I'm the brother of Maj. Morgan Jefferson Donahue, missing in action in Laos since December 13, 1968. I've been involved in this issue ever since then.

I am the author of the Indochina Timeline, which I've submitted to the Committee. I'm a member of the board of directors of the National League of Families. I'm a member of the National Alliance of Families, the Connecticut Forget-Me-Nots. I've been in Laos I guess 5 times since 1988. I went to Laos extensively in 1973, 1974, 1975 I guess; Thailand many times in the interim.

I'm chairman and president of Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos, which is a Federally tax exempt charity, incorporated in Connecticut, and travel there extensively and will be going again in January.

The CHAIRMAN. And what do you do to earn a living?

Dr. DONAHUE. I have been with Union Carbide for the last 13½ years, and presently hold the position of manager of international finance and treasurer for Latin America and Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. And who funds the efforts that you undertake?

Dr. DONAHUE. Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos is purely private. We solicit donations, contributions of medical equipment and supplies from corporations and distribute them in Laos.

through the Ministry of Health, specifically the Maternal and Child Health Institute.

The CHAIRMAN. And your trips are funded through that?

Dr. DONAHUE. By ourselves and through that, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. DONAHUE. OK. But, as I said, let me shorten my comments and then turn to some critical issues. As my resume I think states, I've spent an enormous amount of time, energy, heart, money, everything, trying to account for my brother, who is missing in action in Laos since December 13, 1968. And there really is only one reason I have done this: because he and others in Laos were abandoned by their government; by the government which they willingly served in the belief that they were doing the right thing for their country.

It's very simple. How it happened was the POW's in Laos were abandoned through the mendacious conduct of foreign policy. Laos was the ultimate secret war, funded and operated by the CIA and its Thai mercenary army. In the rush to disengage from Laos and from Vietnam, the war which had torn this country apart, Messrs. Kissinger and Nixon swept the POW's off the board as if they never existed.

They did exist, and until they are brought home this country is not going to be whole.

Now, I have submitted statements, Mr. Chairman, and documents to the Committee from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Pathet Lao, the North Vietnamese, and everybody else, regarding American prisoners-of-war in Laos, held by the Pathet Lao during the Vietnam war. All affirm that Americans were alive and in the hands of the Pathet Lao.

Indeed, several of the documents from our own government not only gave the precise locations of POW camps in Laos, but also the number of Americans in those camps. For the proof of existence of U.S. POW's in Laos during the war and after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord is immutable. I think you can imagine my feelings and the feelings of my mother and father when we were watching Operating Homecoming on T.V., and no prisoners came out who had been imprisoned in Laos.

Sitting there praying and hoping that one of the pilots who came out—one of the servicemen who came out—the next one was going to be from Laos. Maybe it'll be Morgan, and we can run up and hug him and kiss him like all those other families who were hugging and kissing their returned loved ones, fathers, sons and brothers, who had come back from the two Vietnams.

No POW's came back who had been held captive in Laos. I think with that commenced a new dimension of human suffering for their families and a new erosion in the integrity of government.

I think beyond our suffering and loss of faith in our government is the greater and growing awareness by so many Americans based on the fact that servicemen were abandoned in captivity by their government. This goes beyond the polls, where some 70 percent of Americans believe that's the case, Senators. Because when we as a country lose faith in our government, then all is lost.

I think the country does recover a lot from its trials and tribulations. You know, and we move to a higher plane of economic and

political awareness. But that's not the case when we abandoned live POW's. And there is only downside for our country.

Now, importantly, I think that downside is not going to be transmuted into upside by the present process of normalization of relations with Vietnam. I would like to say a few words about that.

I would like to observe, and we can talk about this later though, that if you don't intervene as a Committee in the POW-MIA process to bring home the prisoners-of-war, I think then you'll have sanctioned their abandonment in the first place.

If we know that the POW's were alive during and after the war and unreturned, hopefully, some of them and possibly many of them are alive today. In that process, nothing is greater cowardice than for me to listen—not for me to listen, but for me to hear the cowardly statements of the Defense Department and State Department say, as they so often do, we don't have any proof that they're alive today.

To me, those statements are worthy of scorn, opprobrium and contempt, and just another way to obfuscate the truth of the POW-MIA issue.

With respect to normalization, I fundamentally believe that the process of normalization and, ostensibly, accounting for the POW's and MIA's as laid out by the State Department and Defense Department, the road map itself embodies the lie that the executive branch of government has perpetuated for so many years, that no Americans were left behind, nor are alive today.

The Defense and State Departments continue to perpetuate this lie so deliberately and so rigorously that it is incorporated into the road map such that, to me, no POW's will be brought home.

To affirm this, and I feel strongly that you should do so, you can investigate two questions with the Government, the executive branch. First, why are we not making normalization contingent upon a return of the POW's throughout Indochina? In other words, why are we giving up the great leverage we have to negotiate a return of the live POW's in exchange for normalization?

The Vietnamese are desperate for our investment, trade and diplomatic recognition. Are we not desperate for our missing men, for our POW's? Is this not the substance of negotiated deals, instead of give-aways?

To give the Vietnamese and Laotians everything they want in exchange for some undefined progress on the POW-MIA issue as is presently laid out in the road map is to forever abandon the POW's. Is that something this Committee and, indeed, the entire U.S. Senate wishes to endorse?

Second, why is the road map classified, and what are the judgmental elements of progress that are in it? The fact that they're judgmental was stated to me, including Mr. Sampley and others, in meetings with Messrs. Kenneth Quinn and Carl Ford this September. When I asked them what constituted progress on the POW-MIA issue, by which normalization would be implemented, they simply said, progress is a judgment call.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is not the way the fate of the POW's who were left behind should be negotiated. I beg you to seek the declassification of the road map so you and we, the public, may have input and, if necessary, change its direction.

The road map is not going to heal the great wound this country feels as a result of the abandonment of those who served it. You see, here the problem is but one thing. It is secrecy. The war in Laos was a secret war. The POW's in Laos were secret. The POW and MIA intelligence is a secret still classified. And the road map is a secret, highly classified.

Everything is a secret and is so only because of one thing. That is because some people are hiding the truth. For them, the truth is too powerful for this country, too destructive for the morale of armed forces, and too debilitating to our national honor for it to be told.

Thus, in the eyes of the individuals who have lied about this subject for so many years, the country is better off by the secret not being told, and by the POW's forever serving their country rotting away in Indochina.

To these incredibly morally bankrupt individuals, the secret and the lie must prevail, and the truth must never be told. But until the truth is told, ladies and gentlemen, I think that until the live POW's are brought home, there is no honor, no dignity, no morality, for this country.

The road map embodies the secrecy and the lie, and it is up to you all to change it.

Please, we cannot have an honest POW-MIA policy until we have honesty about the issue. The fact that live Americans were abandoned makes the blood boil of everyone I know, except the war policymakers involved in the secrecy and the lie.

I therefore ask this Committee to request the White House to defer normalization of relations with Indochina until you have finished your research and investigations and have issued your conclusions and recommendations. With the road map, the White House is running away from you and will persevere with the lie and abandon the live POW's.

I think this Committee is too distinguished for that. I think the POW's are. And I certainly think their families are. I would like to know, as we get into the questions and answers, what you think about that as well.

I tell you what. I'm tired. My parents are tired. My mother has a broken heart over this issue. We have spent 22 years trying to account for my brother. We have no faith in our government. And we're on the verge of losing it in our country.

I appeal to you to do the right thing and intervene in the POW-MIA process, and bring the live POW's home now. Please, help us regain our faith.

Now, I would like to close my opening statement by adding that, to me, solving the Indochina POW-MIA issue and bringing home the live POW's is an incredibly simple and straightforward process. The President puts the Secretary of State on an airplane and sends him to Hanoi and Vientiane with a mandate. Use our levers of investment, trade and diplomatic recognition, and negotiate with the Vietnamese and Laotians to bring home the live POW's.

To do so, you must also give the Vietnamese a face-saving way of giving the men back. It's that simple. And it's certainly consistent with the highest national priority.

Thank you very much.

Now, I can answer and make statements.

[Applause.]

Dr. DONAHUE. I can answer and make statements, as I would like to, very briefly, about the mandate for the Committee, the nature of the intelligence, the nature of the conspiracy of the coverup, and specifically, why the Vietnamese are holding live POW's. I can also talk about the Pathet Lao, because I have been going to Laos probably more than anybody in this room. Talk about live-sighting reports, because here's the latest pile of live-sighting reports on my brother.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Donahue follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee: As the resume submitted to you shows, I have spent an enormous amount of my time, energy, heart and money trying to account for my brother, Maj. Morgan Jefferson Donahue, Missing-in-Action in Laos since December 13, 1968. There is only one reason why I have done this: because he and many others in Laos were abandoned by their government—by the government which they willingly and honorably served in the belief they were doing the right thing for their country.

Very simply, the POW's in Laos were abandoned through the mundane and mendacious conduct of international diplomacy. Laos was the ultimate secret war, funded and operated by the CIA and its Thai mercenary army. The Indochina War tore this country apart. In the rush to disengage from it, Messrs. Kissinger and Nixon swept the POW's off the board as if they never existed. They did exist, and they exist today. Until they are brought home, this country will not be whole.

I have submitted statements and documents to this Select Committee from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese regarding American Prisoners-of-War in Laos during the Vietnam War. All affirmed that Americans were alive and in the hands of the Pathet Lao. Indeed, several of the documents from our own government not only gave the precise locations of POW camps holding Americans in Laos but also the number of Americans in those camps. The proof of the existence of U.S. POW's in Laos during the War and after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord is immutable.

Thus, can you imagine my feelings and those of my mother and father and the families of so many servicemen lost in Laos while we were watching Operation Homecoming on T.V. and no prisoners came home who had been imprisoned in Laos? Can you imagine the intensity of my hopes and prayers, saying to myself, "O.K. God, the next one is going to be from Laos—maybe it will be Morgan and we'll celebrate as powerfully as those other families who are running to the aircraft to hug and kiss their fathers, sons and brothers who had come back from the two Vietnams.

No POW's held captive in Laos came back despite all the proof. With that commenced a new dimension in human suffering for their families and loved ones. And, there also commenced a new erosion in the integrity of our government.

Some of us have kept our lives moving even with our suffering; others have not. Oh, how I weep for them and for their loved ones left behind to face mean, cruel fates in the POW camps and jungles of Indochina.

Just as sadly, that suffering inevitably warped itself into a tragic twist which I believe only you by your actions can untie: *loss of faith in our country* and a firm perception that it cannot and will not do the right thing, which is to bring home the live POW's from Laos even at this late date. Indeed, loss of faith in our country over and above our government is truly heartbreaking because we all were among the most intense lovers of our country. We were as patriotic as could be.

And beyond our suffering and loss of faith is the greater and growing awareness by so many other Americans—based on the facts—that servicemen were abandoned in captivity by their government. This goes beyond the polls, Ladies and Gentlemen, because when we as a country begin to lose faith in government then all is lost. I think this country does recover from a lot of its trials and tribulations and moves to a higher plane of political and economic awareness, but that is not the case when our government leaves behind live POW's. There is only a downside for our future.

That downside, in addition, is not going to be transmuted into upside by the present process of normalization of relations with Indochina, and I would like to say a few brief words about this. I need to first note, though, that *if this Committee does*

not intervene to bring home the live POW's then you will have sanctioned leaving them behind in the first place. If, as we know, they were alive during and after the War, then some and hopefully many of them are alive today. Nothing could be greater cowardice than for someone to say (as the representatives of the State and Defense Departments so often do), "Well, we don't have any proof they're alive today." Such statements are worthy of nothing but scorn, opprobrium and contempt and are nothing more than another way to obfuscate the truth of the POW-MIA issue.

I fundamentally believe that the process of normalization and, ostensibly, accounting for the POW's-MIA's as laid out by the State and Defense Departments—the so-called "Roadmap"—itself fully embodies the lie that the Executive Branch of government has perpetuated for so many years: no Americans were left behind alive nor are alive today. The Defense and State Departments continue to perpetuate this lie so deliberately and so rigorously that it is incorporated into the Roadmap such that no live POW's will be brought home. Two questions affirm this to me, and I feel strongly that you should investigate them as thoroughly as you can:

(1) Why are we not making normalization *contingent upon* a return of the live POW's throughout Indochina, i.e., why are we giving up the great leverage we have to negotiate a return of the live POW's in exchange for normalization? The Vietnamese are desperate for our investment, trade and diplomatic recognition—are we not desperate for our POW's? Is this not the substance of negotiated deals rather than giveaways? To give the Vietnamese and Laotians everything they want in exchange for some undefined "progress" on the POW-MIA issue, as presently is the course laid out in the Roadmap, *is to forever abandon the live POW's.* Is that what this Committee and, indeed, the entire U.S. Senate wishes to endorse?

(2) Why is the Roadmap classified and what exactly are the judgemental elements of progress? The fact that they are judgemental was stated to me and others in meetings with Messrs. Kenneth Quinn and Carl Ford this September. When asked what constituted progress, they simply said, "Progress is a judgment call". Ladies and Gentlemen, that is not the way the fate of the POW's who were left behind should be negotiated. I beg you to seek the declassification of the Roadmap so we the people may have input and, if necessary, change its direction. Again, the Roadmap is not going to heal the great wound this country feels as the result of the abandonment of those who served it.

You see, here the problem is but one thing: secrecy. The war in Laos was a secret war; the POW's in Laos were a secret; the POW intelligence is a secret; and, the Roadmap is a secret. To me, everything is a secret only because some people are hiding the truth. And, to them the truth is *too powerful* for this country, *too destructive* for the morale of our Armed forces, and *too debilitating* to our national honor for it to be told. Thus, in the eyes of the individuals who have lied about the subject for so many years, the country is better off by the secret *not* being told and by the POW's forever "serving their country" rotting away in Indochina. Therefore, to these incredibly morally bankrupt individuals the secret—and the lie—must prevail and the truth must never be told.

Until the truth is told, Ladies and Gentlemen, and until the live POW's are brought home, there is no honor, there is no dignity, and there is no morality in the armed forces and foreign policy of this country. The Roadmap embodies the secrecy and the lie and it is up to you to change that. Please, we cannot have an honest POW-MIA policy until we have honesty about the issue. The fact that live Americans were abandoned makes the blood boil of everyone I know—*except* those warped policy-makers involved in the secrecy and the lie.

I must therefore ask this Committee to request the White House to defer normalization of relations with Indochina until you have finished your research and investigations and have issued your conclusions and recommendations. With the Roadmap, the White House is running away from you and will persevere with the lie and abandon the live POW's. I think this Committee is too distinguished for that. The POW's are, their families are, and so is this country.

I'm tired, Ladies and Gentlemen. My parents are tired and my mother has a broken heart. We have spent over 22 years trying to bring my brother back from Laos. We have no faith in our government and we are on the verge of losing it in our country. I guess in this latter regard we would join my brother. Does anyone in this room think that it is his faith in his country which has kept him alive? I dare say not; rather, it probably is his faith in his creator and his family, knowing that we would not abandon him as his country has. Please, please help us regain our faith in our country. Please do the right thing and intervene in the POW-MIA process and bring the live POW's home now.

I would like to add that to me solving the Indochina POW-MIA issue and bringing home the live POW's is incredibly straightforward process: *the President* puts the Secretary of State on an airplane and sends him to Hanoi and Vientiane with a mandate: using our levers of investment, trade and diplomatic recognition negotiate with the Vietnamese and Laotians to bring home the live POW's; to do so you must also give them a face-saving way of giving the men back.

It is that simple. I think he needs your encouragement to do it.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to want to get into that. Why do we not proceed so we can have time to do that.

Mr. Sampley.

STATEMENT OF TED SAMPLEY, CHAIRMAN, HOMECOMING II PROJECT

Mr. SAMPLEY. Chairman Kerry and Smith, and all the Senators, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I am Ted Sampley. I am a former U.S. Special Forces non-commissioned officer, with two tours of duty in Vietnam, during which time I had a top secret clearance.

During my tours in Vietnam and Cambodia I was decorated six times, which included four Bronze Stars, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, and a special citation from the anti-communist Cambodian government. This special citation was a result of my being part of a handful of Green Berets who secretly trained three battalions of Cambodian troops to overthrow the Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk in 1970.

In short, many times I was in places that the U.S. Government was denying that I was supposed to be. The same as the war in Laos. The Green Berets that were serving in Laos and other people that served in Laos at that time, the American people were being told something other than the truth.

Currently, I'm chairman of Homecoming II Project. It's a civilian national POW-MIA organization, and I publish the U.S. Veteran News and Report, which is a monthly veterans newspaper. We have a readership of approximately 30,000. It goes all over the place.

The Homecoming II Project, by the way, has one of the largest collections of POW-MIA data outside the U.S. Government. We have spent years collecting it. You can take, say, someone in the United States that's wearing a POW bracelet. They can write Homecoming II, and we'll send them a bio, an accurate bio of what happened to this man. We'll give the American public information that the U.S. Government will not give about the case studies of these men.

We have spent a lot of time and a lot of money collecting this information. We're proud of it. We have shared it with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have a computer network in which anyone can sign up. As a matter of fact, the POW Network which these bios are on, are represented in here tonight in the back.

Before I get into the thrust of my testimony, I would like to make a recommendation. I've been in the POW issue—I got started in 1971 through 1973. As a matter of fact, I worked very hard in a

little group called Americans Who Care in Fayetteville, NC, while I was still in the service.

I worked very hard to bring veterans like Senator McCain and others home, who we knew were being treated in a most harsh way. Sometimes, after I read about what happened to these folks, I wonder how they can even come home and survive. Only people who have walked in their shoes can know what they went through.

The Americans Who Care sold bracelets. They passed out information. And most of the—well, all of the income was given to the National League of Families. So, in those days, I indirectly worked for the National League of Families.

Today, Homecoming II has a number of projects. We operate a vigil down near the Vietnam Veterans wall. We are under a very heavy attack by certain folks represented in the U.S. Government to try to oust us from our location down there. I took over Homecoming II approximately 2 years ago. I was appointed chairman. It is a nonpaying job.

Senator McCain, I respect what you said and I believe it. If you want to be the devil's advocate, it needs to be done. Senators, you have someone in front of you that's one of those persons that has been accused of "making money on the issue." Bring it up. Ask me about it. Ask me about funds.

You have one of these folks in the issue that is accused of being a radical. I am an activist. We do things and have done things for a number of years to try to keep the POW issue alive in front of the American public. Again, the way I've been repaid over the years is with name-calling. We've been called worms, Rambos. I think Colonel Childress named us the North Carolina Crazies. The list goes on and on in an attempt to discredit us.

But let me give you an example of what we have been doing. You talk about the reward. This is a blown up copy of Vietnamese money, and you can barely see it, but written on this Vietnamese money is the reward offer with Capt. Eugene Red McDaniel's phone number on it, to where anyone that runs across this money—we spread this around inside of Vietnam, by the way. We send some people through there.

Captain McDaniel did not ask us to do that, but since he was representing the reward, we spread it around. This is a copy of the reward message that we floated down the Mekong advertising the reward. There it is in Vietnamese, quite clear that it is a reward for a living American POW, not a set of remains. It's clearly written here.

There's another one, I believe the Colonel held it up a few minutes ago. This is where it comes from. We spread it. This little bell tells a lot. This come out of Laos. This tells the story of the excavation that the U.S. is doing in Laos and Vietnam. This is made, gentlemen, from a downed U.S. aircraft. The Lao have been going in for years. They've been taking the metal out of these crash sites, everything they could find of value, stripping it, melting it down, and making little things like temple bells out of it.

These are pictures of that salvage coming across the Mekong River out of Laos—there's Vientiane—you can see it's quite clearly U.S. salvage. Quite clearly. You all can have these pictures. You can look at them. You can do what you like. The point is that this

crash site excavation is bull, because the Lao civilians have been going through this for years.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we have the clerk perhaps collect those pictures and circulate them among the Members.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Let me get into my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you were not?

[Laughter.]

Mr. SAMPLEY. I turned in 40 copies of this. Senator Kerry and others, you asked for documentation. I hope you have this in front of you. It has a number of exhibits. Do you have my documentation? If you do not, someone has it in your office.

[See pps. 290-339 of the appendix.]

I am here today to inform this Committee and the American people that key U.S. Government officials, starting with some in former-President Richard Nixon's Administration and into George—President George Bush's Administration have conducted a program of misinformation, disinformation, discrediting, domestic spying, ridiculing against civilians, veterans groups and individuals who are concerned and believe that our Government has not been serious about resolving the issue of Americans unaccounted for and prisoners of war and missing in action.

During the Administration of President Ronald Reagan, I have good reason to believe that this activity was being orchestrated from the President's National Security Council which, as you Senators know, has no authority to engage in such activities—particularly domestic spying.

I am, therefore, respectfully urging that a special prosecutor be appointed to investigate this situation. I had an opportunity to learn first-hand the U.S. Government's methods of spying upon and dealing with the Vietnam veteran activists who are concerned about the POW issue, when I was approached in March 1983 by Col. Charles "Chuck" Allen, a retired Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel.

I was hired by Lieutenant Colonel Allen, of Fayetteville, NC, who at that time was head of operations for a specially organized group called the Center for POW/MIA Accountability. I was hired to infiltrate the veterans' group called the Veterans Vigil Society. The Veterans Vigil Society was operating a 24-hour POW/MIA "color guard" vigil near the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC.

Members of the Vigil had sworn to remain at the Memorial "until all of the Vietnam POW/MIA's are accounted for." As a matter of fact, an off-shoot of that group—I think it is called BRAVO—true to its word, still maintains a 24-hour vigil.

[See exhibit A p. 290 of the appendix.]

My assignment was to determine how much money the Vigil was taking in, where and how it was being spent, the names of its members, if they were "doing drugs", and if they had any connection to Lt. Col. Bo Gritz and to a man identified as Mike Babcock.

Allen told me that it was believed that members of the Veterans Vigil Society were helping to prepare a POW rescue mission into Laos. He said that the U.S. Government "disapproved of private forays" and if I could identify the people who were planning such a mission, their passports would be seized by the U.S. Government.

He took a small address book from his pocket and pointed to a list of names he said included FBI agents and National Park Police investigators that were also gathering information about the veterans. I wondered, in addition to being impressed by the information that he had in his hand, how a supposed civilian would have that kind of information. How does he have the names of the FBI agents that are investigating?

To infiltrate the Vigil for a week—which I did in April of 1983—I was promised \$500 in expenses, which was paid; then \$500 for the investigation which was never paid—I think because my investigation turned up nothing of significance about the Vet group. Allen told me the remainder of the money was to be paid through former Special Forces Lt. Col. Robert K. Brown, a member of the Center board of directors, and publisher of Soldier of Fortune magazine.

I later learned Brown had provided the Center with \$5,000 "start-up" money, and had at that time continued to be a major benefactor for the Center.

During either the first or second week in April of that year, I returned to Fayetteville and submitted to Allen a written report, detailing what I had found out about the Vigil. I was in Allen's office when he picked up the phone and called a man he referred to with familiarity as Dick Childress, and gave him a report about the information I had gathered.

According to Allen, the documents he provided me, the Center was an organization which was incorporated with non-profit status, and was based in—and may still be in Washington, DC. At that time, retired Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, a close associate of Brown, was head of the Center and its membership consisted mostly of retired senior military officers.

Allen told me that "the Center interacts with and maintains a working relationship with Government agencies responsible for POW/MIA affairs." Allen went on to say that the Center had a close relationship with the White House, naming Dick Childress as the Center's principal contact—who I later learned was then-Lt. Col. Richard Childress, the director of Asian Affairs for President Reagan's National Security Council, who I also later learned had been sharing an NSC office with Lt. Col. Oliver North. I was also present at subsequent dates when Allen made several other calls and reports by phone to Childress.

On one visit to Allen's office in Fayetteville, I was shown by Allen a pile of several-hundred color slides taken by Gritz's team inside of Laos. These slides, according to Allen, had been obtained without Gritz's knowledge by bribing a disenchanted team member who had stolen the film from Gritz before it had been developed. It was my understanding that copies of these stolen slides had been or were subsequently provided to Childress.

I later learned Soldier of Fortune magazine was engaged at that time—at the time I was working for the Center—on a special edition trashing MIA activist Gritz, Scott Barnes, and Col. Jack Bailey and others. I believe it's interesting to note that the same people, including Singlaub and Allen—served on both the staff at the Center and are listed as contributing editors and/or advisors to Soldier of Fortune magazine. In fact, Center for Accountability officers Allen, Singlaub, Ret. Brig. Gen. Heine Aderholt, James P. Mon-

aghan, and Milt Copulos, were cited for their assistance in trashing the others in the magazine—cited for their assistance in trashing Gritz and others in the magazine's special edition.

[See exhibit B, p. 302 of the appendix.]

It is worth noting that while Childress and others at the White House were denouncing activists like Gritz and Bailey for their efforts in Southeast Asia, Lieutenant Colonel Brown and his soldiers of fortune were making armed military excursions across the Thai border into Laos, helping to finance and arm the Laotian anti-communist fighters. They even established what was known as a Forward Operational Base on Laotian territory—all in apparent violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act. Not one word was ever uttered by Childress or any Member of the Reagan White House about this, even after Brown detailed the operation in an edition of his magazine.

[See exhibit C, p. 297 of the appendix.]

Apparently, illegal acts by Brown and his associates to arm communist guerrillas were acceptable to the White House. But the efforts of private citizens—like Colonel Bailey and Colonel Gritz and others, and Col. Al Shinkel—are not. Why, Senators?

The entire Childress/Center for Accountability effort was, from beginning to end, designed to discredit some of the most vocal critics of the U.S. Government POW/MIA issue. I'm sorry, it was designed to discredit some of the most vocal critics of the U.S. Government's POW/MIA policy. From then to now, the pattern has continued, rather than focus all available resources on resolving the problem of our missing Vietnam veterans, much of the effort has been directed toward destroying the credibility and or reputation of the critics. As a result of my experience with Allen, the Center for Accountability and the Veterans Vigil Society, I became convinced that there was something about the live POW issue that required a closer look.

I became a member, and later an officer in the Washington-based National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. I believe you received testimony from them yesterday. In August of 1984, I went to the Republican National Convention in Dallas, where a veterans parade had been organized by the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. The purpose of the Dallas event was an attempt to get a meeting with President Reagan, so that the coalition's evidence of live POW's in captivity could be handed directly to the President. I believe at that meeting, Colonel Bailey was present. The parade, which had been organized well in advance, came apart at the seams—when, as we later learned, Lieutenant Colonel Childress had made a series of telephone calls to scheduled participants telling them that we were nothing more than motorcycle gangs and rabble-rousers, and there was a great potential for a riot.

[See exhibit D, p. 302 of the appendix.]

During the summer of 1985, I filed a complaint about Childress' interference with private groups. The complaint was filed with North Carolina Congressman Walter B. Jones, who later told me that my complaint had been sent over to the FBI. To this date, I have never had a response from the FBI involving that complaint—although I have heard from them in other ways.

In September 1984, John Mead, an international businessman and former CIA associate, filed a lengthy complaint with the Justice Department accusing Childress and the Center of participating in an illegal political relationship. Specifically, Childress was accused of using the Center as his private, investigative force; abusing classified information; threatening blackmailing and carrying out character assassinations in connection with classified POW documents.

Mead filed his complaint with the criminal division of the Justice Department and Fred Fielding, legal counsel to President Reagan, and others, with no success, and no response to the allegations.

[See exhibit E, p. 306 of the appendix.]

In the fall of 1988, the National Steering Committee for American War Veterans, a Vietnam activist group of which I am Chairman—and it was before becoming Chairman of Homecoming II—we lost a campaign into Southeast Asia designed to advertise the existence of the \$2.4 million reward, put up by U.S. Congressmen, in hopes of persuading officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to defect with at least one, living American POW. The plan was simple. We had generated approximately \$5,000 in funds, which we had converted into small bills, U.S. and foreign, and we stamped them with the reward message—similar to what is being passed around in front of you, Senators.

Each stamped bill, along with a reward flier, was placed in a zip-lock bag and made waterproof, so that it would float. In early October, team members Jim Copp, a Vietnam veteran and elementary school teacher, and Donna Long, a free-lance journalist and POW activist, entered Thailand—Donna is sitting behind me—and rented small boats for the purpose of placing the waterproof messages into the Mekong River, which is the boarder between Laos and Thailand.

The idea was to get the messages as close to the Lao side of the Mekong River as possible, so that they would float to the Lao side and be picked up by the Lao population. The further idea was then as they spent the money—which they would—they would read the message each time it was spent. We hoped to draw international attention to the reward. It was a publicity stunt also, which we did to draw Lao government officials attention to the reward offer, which was our primary purpose—also, which we did.

Jim and Donna, who were 2 days ahead of the other 4 members of the team—including myself—seized the opportunity, and actually entered Laos and began handing out the reward message, money to the Lao people. Unfortunately, in one of the villages, which they entered, they crossed paths with a Lao government official who placed them under arrest. Jim and Donna were blind-folded. Senators, they were handing out money. They weren't armed. They were handing out money, with a reward offer for American POW's that the Laos say do not exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they have a visa to enter?

Mr. SAMPLEY. No, sir—Jim and Donna were blind-folded. Guns were placed at their heads. Their lives were threatened. They were tortured by being kept in solitary confinement and refused sufficient food to live on. They were, at one time, physically assaulted, and there was at least one attempted sexual assault on Donna

during the captivity. Jim lost better than 30 pounds. He was very sick when he was released. He was kept for 41 days before being finally released.

And what is not in this written testimony, the release took place—

The CHAIRMAN. I need to ask you, Mr. Sampley, because I have given you a lot longer than almost every other witness has had for an opening—I do not want to be accused of cutting anybody off, but I do want to try to move you along.

Mr. SAMPLEY. 30 seconds—Senator, included in Exhibit F, p. 333, are classified U.S. cables which define the negotiations between Childress and the Lao government officials concerning the captive pair.

[See exhibit F, p. 317 of the appendix.]

The tone of the cables was clearly more a concern of how to use the incident to embarrass the Members of the U.S. Congress who were sponsoring the reward, rather than getting Jim—getting Long and Copp released.

I would like for this, and the rest of my testimony to be placed—along with the exhibits—into the records, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TED SAMPLEY

Chairmen Kerry and Smith and Honorable Senators, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to address you today. My Name is Ted Sampley. I am a former U.S. Special Forces non-commissioned officer with two tours of duty in Vietnam during which time I had a top secret security clearance. During my tours in Vietnam and Cambodia I was decorated 6 times which included 4 Bronze Stars, the Army Commendation Medal and the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry and a special citation from the anti-communist Cambodian government. The special citation was awarded as a result of my being part of a handful of Green Berets who secretly trained 3 battalions of Cambodians troops to overthrow the Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk in 1970.

Currently, I am chairman of the Homecoming II Project, a civilian national POW/MIA organization, and I publish the U.S. Veteran News and Report, a monthly veterans' newspaper.

Senators, I am here today to inform this Committee and the American people that key U.S. Government officials, starting with some in President Richard Nixon's administration and into President George Bush's administration, have conducted a program of misinformation, disinformation, discrediting, domestic spying, and ridicule against veterans, civilian groups, and individuals who are concerned and believe that our government has never been serious about resolving the issue of America's unaccounted for prisoners of war and missing in action.

During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, I have good reason to believe that this activity was being orchestrated from the President's National Security Council, which, as you Senators know, has no authority to engage in such activities, particularly domestic spying. I am therefore respectfully urging that a special prosecutor be appointed to investigate this situation.

I had an opportunity to learn first hand the U.S. Government methods of spying upon and dealing with Vietnam veteran activists, concerned about the POW/MIA issue when I was approached in March of 1983 by Charles (Chuck) Allen, a retired Special Forces Lieutenant-Colonel.

I was hired by Lieutenant Colonel Allen, of Fayetteville, NC, who at that time was head of operations for a specially organized group called the Center for POW/MIA Accountability, to infiltrate a Vietnam veterans' group called the Veterans Vigil Society. The Veterans Vigil Society was operating a 24-hour POW/MIA "color guard" vigil near the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC. Members of the Vigil had sworn to remain at the Memorial "until all of the Vietnam MIA/POW's are accounted for." As a matter of fact, an off-shoot of that group, true to its word, is still maintaining a vigil there. SEE EXHIBIT "A".

My assignment was to determine how much money the Vigil was taking in, where and how it was being spent, the names of its members, if they were "doing drugs," and if they had any connection to Lt. Col. Bo Gritz and to a man identified as Mike Babcock.

Allen told me that it was believed that members of the Veterans Vigil Society were helping to prepare a POW rescue mission into Laos. He said that the U.S. Government "disapproved of private forays" and if I could identify the people who were planning such a mission, their passports would be seized by the government. He took a small address book from his pocket and pointed to a list of names he said included FBI agents and National Park Police investigators that were also gathering information on the veterans. I wondered, in addition to being impressed, how a supposed civilian would have that kind of information.

To infiltrate the Vigil for a week, which I did in April of 1983, I was promised \$500 in expenses, which was paid, and \$500 for the investigation, which was never paid; I think because my investigation turned up nothing of significance about the vet group. Allen told me that the remainder of the money was to be paid through former Special Forces Lt. Col. Robert K. Brown, a member of the Center board of directors and publisher of Soldier of Fortune magazine. I later learned Brown had provided the Center \$5,000 "start-up" money and continued to be a major benefactor for the Center.

During either the first or second week in April of that year, I returned to Fayetteville and submitted to Allen a written report detailing what I had found out about the Vigil. I was in Allen's office when he picked up the phone and called a man he referred to with familiarity as "Dick" Childress and gave him a report of the information I had gathered.

According to Allen, and documents he provided me, the Center was an organization which was incorporated with a non-profit status and was based in Washington, DC. At that time, Ret. Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, a close associate of Brown, was head of the Center and its membership consisted mostly of retired senior military officers.

Allen told me that "the Center interacts with and maintains a working relationship with Government agencies responsible for POW/MIA affairs." Allen went on to say that the Center had a close working relationship with the White House; naming Dick Childress as the Center's principal contact, who I later learned was then-Lt. Col. Richard Childress, the director of Asian Affairs for President Reagan's National Security Council and who I also later learned had been sharing an NSC office with Lt. Col. Oliver North.

I was also present at subsequent dates when Allen made several other calls and reports by phone to Childress.

On one visit to Allen's office in Fayetteville, I was shown by Allen a pile of several hundred color slides taken by Gritz's team inside Laos. The slides, according to Allen, had been obtained without Gritz's knowledge by bribing a disenchanted team member who had stolen the film from Gritz before it had been developed. It is my understanding that copies of these stolen slides had been or were subsequently provided to Childress.

I learned later, Soldier of Fortune magazine was engaged, at the same time I was working for the Center, on a special edition trashing POW/MIA activist Gritz, Scott Barnes, Col. Jack Bailey and others. I believe it is interesting to note that the same people, including Singlaub and Allen, served on both the staff of the Center and are listed as contributing editors and/or advisors to Soldier of Fortune magazine. In fact, Center for Accountability officers Allen, Singlaub, Ret. Brig. Gen. Heine Aderholt, James P. Monaghan and Milt Copulos were cited for their assistance in trashing Gritz and the others in the magazine's special edition. SEE EXHIBIT "B".

It is also worth noting that while Childress and others at the White House were denouncing activists, like Gritz and Bailey, for their efforts in Southeast Asia, Lieutenant Colonel Brown and his soldiers of fortune were making armed military excursions across the Thai border into Laos, helping to finance and arm Laotian anti-communist fighters and they even established a "Forward Operational Base" on Laotian territory—all in apparent violation of the U.S. Neutrality Act. Not one word was ever uttered by Childress or any Member of the Reagan White House about this, even after Brown detailed the operation in an edition of his magazine. SEE EXHIBIT "C".

Apparently, illegal acts by Brown and his associates to arm anti-communist guerrillas were acceptable to the White House, but the efforts of private citizens to locate and rescue American prisoners of war were not.

Why?

Senators, this concludes my verbal testimony in the time allotted to me. Further information concerning my knowledge of these White House-directed activities are detailed in my written statement and its attachments, which I respectively ask be made part of the record of this hearing.

The entire Childress/Center for Accountability effort from beginning to end was designed to discredit some of the most vocal critics of the U.S. Government POW/MIA policy. From then to now, this pattern has continued. Rather than focus all available resources on resolving the problem of our missing Vietnam veterans, much of the effort has been directed toward destroying the credibility and/or reputation of the critics.

As a result of my experience with Allen, the Center for Accountability, and the Veterans Vigil Society, I became convinced that there was something about the live POW issue that required a closer look. I became a member and later an officer in the Washington-based National Vietnam Veterans Coalition.

In August of 1984, I went to the Republican National Convention in Dallas where a veteran's parade had been organized by the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. The purpose of the Dallas event was an attempt to get a meeting with President Reagan so that the Coalition's evidence of live POW's in captivity could be handed directly to the President.

The parade, which had been organized well in advance, began coming apart at the seams when, as we later learned, Lieutenant Colonel Childress had made a series of telephone calls to scheduled participants telling them that we were nothing more than motorcycle gangs and rabble-rousers and that there was a great potential for a riot. SEE EXHIBIT "D".

During the summer of 1985, I filed a complaint about Childress's interference with private groups. The complaint was filed with North Carolina Congressman Walter B. Jones, who later told me that my complaint had been sent over to the FBI.

I have never received a response.

In September, 1984, John Mead, an international businessman and former CIA associate, filed a lengthy complaint with the Justice Department accusing Childress and the Center of participating in an illegal political relationship. Specifically, Childress was accused of using the Center as his private investigative force, abusing classified information, threatening blackmail and carrying out character assassinations in connection with classified POW documents.

Mead filed his complaint with the criminal division of the Justice Department and Fred Fielding, legal counsel to President Reagan, and others, with no success and no response to the allegations. SEE EXHIBIT "E".

In the fall of 1988, the National Steering Committee For American War Veterans, a Vietnam activist group of which I am chairman, launched a campaign into Southeast Asia designed to advertise the existence of a \$2.4 million reward, put up by U.S. Congressmen, in hopes of persuading officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to defect with at least one American POW.

The plan was simple. We had generated approximately \$5,000 in funds which we had converted to small bills, U.S. and foreign, and then stamped with the reward message. Each stamped bill, along with a reward flier, was placed in a zip-lock bag and made waterproof so that it would float.

In early October, team members Jim Copp, a Vietnam veteran and elementary school teacher, and Donna Long, a free-lance journalist and POW activist, entered Thailand and rented small boats for the purpose of placing the waterproof messages in the Mekong River, which is the border between Laos and Thailand.

The idea was to get the messages as close to the Lao side of the Mekong as possible, so that they would float to the Lao side and be picked up by the Lao population.

We hoped to draw international attention to the reward, which we did, and to draw Lao Government officials' attention to the reward offer, which we also did. Jim and Donna, who were 2 days ahead of the other 4 members of the team, including myself, seized the opportunity and actually entered Laos and began handing out the reward message money to the Lao people. Unfortunately, in one of the villages, which the pair had entered, they crossed paths with a Lao government official who placed them under arrest.

Jim and Donna were blind-folded, guns were placed at their heads, and their lives were threatened. They were tortured by being kept in solitary confinement and refused sufficient food to live on. They were at one time physically assaulted and there was at least one attempted sexual assault on Donna during their captivity. Jim lost almost 30 pounds in the 41 days they were held and was seriously ill when finally released.

Senators, included in Exhibit "F" are classified U.S. Government cables which define the negotiations between Childress and Lao government officials concerning the captive pair. The tone of the cables was clearly more a concern on how to use the incident to embarrass the Members of the U.S. Congress who were sponsoring the reward offer rather than getting Long and Copp released. SEE EXHIBIT "F".

Upon the eventual release of Long and Copp, no effort was made by any U.S. government official to debrief either of the captives. Instead, a State Department official told the U.S. media that there was no point in debriefing either captive and praised the Lao government for its treatment of them. Long had to demand through her Congressman (Rep. Martin Lancaster D-N.C.) that the U.S. debrief her, because during her captivity her captors discussed the POW/MIA issue with her and she had at one point seen and waved to a man she perceived to be a black American. In fact, a guard told her that the man's name was "Austin." SEE EXHIBIT "G" p. 332.

A Homecoming II Project team was later illegally arrested and fined by Thai police, who admitted that U.S. officials had asked them to harass/detain American citizens working on the POW/MIA issue. SEE EXHIBIT "H" p. 335.

These efforts to discredit POW/MIA activists started to evolve in 1969 as Nixon became the nation's new chief executive. As the new President was organizing his White House staff, various close relatives of the ever-increasing number of Americans held prisoner of war and missing in action in Vietnam escalated their demands that the United States do something to help their love ones.

Foreign films of U.S. POW's in Communist captivity were sufficient evidence for the families that their love ones were being treated in a most harsh and inhumane way. POW wife, Sybil Stockdale had been organizing POW/MIA families. The results were overwhelming. It was not long before the White House, as well as Congressmen and Senators, were being deluged with mail from family members and the mail was becoming increasingly angry in tone.

"It did not take the new Nixon administration long to figure out that here was one protest movement that could be used to its benefit," James C. Roberts of the Washington "think tank," the American Studies Center, wrote in his March, 1980, book, "Missing In Action."

Consequently, according to Roberts, in late 1969 the Nixon administration decided it should "go public" with the POW/MIA issue, to focus public attention on the terrible treatment of American POW's and MIA's by the Hanoi crowd.

Members of the White House staff of President Nixon arranged an organizational meeting in Washington DC, on May 1, 1970. On May 28, 1970, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was incorporated with an office in Washington, DC.

Faced with overwhelming disenchantment with the continuation of the Vietnam war Nixon had found a new mobilizing force: the maltreatment of American POW's by the "evil enemy."

Funding for the League of Families began with influential word from someone in the White House who touched the pockets of Defense Contractors to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars in contributions. Large donations from companies such as Grumman aerospace equipment manufacturers became common. Also in 1971, the League of Families was given the Republican National Committee contributors' list for its own use.

Technical advice was provided to the League by a wide range of experienced government officials, who kept a close eye on the POW wives, fearing that they may reverse their support of the President.

According to former League chairman, Col. Earl Hopper, a bank of about a half dozen 800-number, toll-free telephones mysteriously appeared in the League headquarters and free Air Force travel was given to POW/MIA family members whenever they wished to travel to and from Washington, DC.

The benefits to the Nixon administration were varied. For example, in April of 1971, when some POW/MIA family members, who were against the war, held a press conference in the Cannon House office building in Washington, DC, to denounce the war, pro-administration League members were flown to Washington for the purpose of having them disrupt the meeting. When the antiwar POW/MIA spokesmen got up to deliver their messages they were greeted by members of the League, who shouted about the inhumane treatment received by POW/MIA's. According to Roberts, this effort was orchestrated by White House aides.

The true intentions of the Nixon Administration toward the POW/MIA families were exposed during a meeting on April 14, 1971, between President Nixon and Senator Bob Dole, R-KS. A memorandum for the President on the meeting was drafted by an aide to presidential assistant H.R. "Bob" Haldeman. The memorandum states in part: "There was also some discussion of the Prisoner of War problems and the

Chairman [Dole as Republican National Chairman] made the point that this is a tender-box that is about to explode as there is a real danger of great numbers of POW wives reversing their support of the President. He suggested, therefore, a fairly major move for cosmetic purposes and the President asked that this possibility be explored." SEE EXHIBIT "I".

The Nixon administration used the League and the POW/MIA issue to enhance its own political agenda.

During the Ford administration, after the League of Families elected a more aggressive board of directors, the League's relations with the White House turned cool. Free Air Force transportation for POW/MIA family members to attend League functions in Washington, DC, abruptly ended. The bank at League headquarters of free 800-number telephones that had so mysteriously appeared during the Nixon administration just as mysteriously disappeared.

The Carter administration gave only patronizing lip service to the live POW/MIA effort while behind the scenes attempting to write off the POW/MIA issue by having all the missing servicemen declared dead. A memo was written by National Security Council (NSC) staffer Michael Oksenberg to NSC head Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1980, suggesting that Brzezinski write the League of Families indicating that he takes sightings of live Americans in captivity seriously. Oksenberg wrote "this is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game; and you should not be the whistle blower. The idea is to say that the President is determined to pursue any lead concerning possible live MIA's." SEE EXHIBIT "J".

Finally, during the Reagan administration, the White House worked hand in hand with its creation, the National League of Families, to espouse the official administration line on the POW/MIA issue and to trash any and all of those who dared to disagree.

The examples of this are so numerous that I would have to write reams to cover them. Rather than do this I am attaching to this statement some of the more blatant examples of this with documents that you honorable Senators will be able to judge for yourselves. SEE EXHIBIT "K".

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

I just want to give everybody a fair shot here. We do have Senators who I know want to ask you questions.

Incidentally, I am very sympathetic to being in places where you are not supposed to be, because I spent Christmas eve of 1968 in Cambodia, at a time when no one was supposed to be there, and made a couple of other incursions there with the CIA which we were not supposed to. And I am familiar with that. I am not going to question your comments there.

Most of your testimony, obviously, is not about the evidence of the live persons being there. It is evidence of interference with your activities that you presume to be indicative of a conspiracy to block information from coming out.

Now, those things have happened, and I am not going to doubt, and there is a record here, of people like Monika Stevenson and others feeling that kind of interference and sensing it, and so forth. The Committee is going to try to look at some of that. It is a lot harder.

I want to turn back for a moment, if I can, to Mr. Donahue's comments. It is a very broad and moving condemnation by a family, a family member, somebody deeply involved in this, whose bona fides cannot be contested. And you are really as critical as anybody we have heard about the government. You have said, point blank, that there has been a cover-up here that has been ongoing. And you are willing to document that.

Now, I have a number of questions about that. And these are sort of reasonable personal questions, if you will, and you probably have answers. But I want to ask them to you. Do you believe that when it comes to not coming forward with information that is

known about a live American, a fellow comrade in arms, that someone like a Bill Bell, who served years in Vietnam, who has dedicated his life to try to find somebody, is he not bona fide? Is he faking it?

Mr. DONAHUE. You and I, Senator, are talking about cover-up and conspiracy on entirely different levels. I believe the cover-up and the conspiracy is in the POW/MIA policy. And if you will let me hit five bullets we can address that, and it embodies exactly what you're saying.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. DONAHUE. The policy is the cover-up—in other words, not the documents themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, well let me come back, then. If the policy is a cover-up, President Reagan came into office: President Reagan deserves credit for having raised this to a level of concern publicly that President Carter had never given it, and prior presidents had not given it. Accurate?

Mr. SAMPLEY. I disagree.

Mr. DONAHUE. I don't know if that's accurate. I would disagree for factual reasons. He called it the highest national priority, and then let it die.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe President Reagan authorized a rescue mission, did he not?

Mr. DONAHUE. The Nomarat Raid—I don't know if he personally authorized it, but the Nomarat Raid took place, and I hope you all would review the intelligence behind it.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to review the intelligence behind it. But what I am trying to get at is, I am having trouble understanding.

I mean let me tell you what I cannot understand—I can understand what happened in 1973 and 1974. I do not understand it in terms of liking it or approving of it, or being comfortable with it. But I can take it in as something that could have happened—that we were in a rush to sever the ties, and we wanted to get out, and we were pulling back.

It was unpopular. The agreements were made. Watergate was going on. The President's power was slipping. There were a lot of reasons that things could move that way. I can sort of intellectually and emotionally lock in to what might have happened in terms of the terrible process of ignoring some realities for inadvertent reasons, and overt reasons.

What happens, though, that would make President Reagan continue the cover-up—if there was one, begun by prior presidents, and officials? Why would he raise to a level of public consciousness, this issue, and make a commitment of it, and make a public political issue of it? And then, at the same time, want to be party to somebody else's deception? Why would he not be happier showing that others, in fact, had participated in this, but he was going to be the person to bring them home?

Mr. DONAHUE. Because I think he was convinced by the career bureaucracy, which has been involved in the issue, that the consequences for doing so was too high; that the consequences for the morale of the Armed Forces, our national honor, our integrity were so great, that even he made the speech—those who may still be

serving—and I'm quoting him—at the Memorial up in Arlington, and everything else—those who may still be serving, I take that to mean we consciously, deliberately leave them behind. They are serving their country. We choose to let them serve in captivity, rather than bring them back, because the consequences for this country of bringing them back are entirely too disruptive.

By this time the process had snowballed. Don't forget, it's the United States who had declared all the United States POW's dead. It was not the Vietnamese or the Laotians.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said to us, we should negotiate, correct, for their return?

Mr. DONAHUE. I said you have all the levers to do so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, let me say to you, that I believe there is an out for the Vietnamese if somebody is alive. Most people have stuck to the notion that the government might not have a rationale for holding them, they might not be in government control. And they, themselves, have articulated the possibility.

Maybe somebody out there in the mountain area, or in the Laotian border or something, might have had an ability to hold somebody without our knowing it, as a Government, but that they, themselves, were not holding somebody. So there is a window. There is an ability to find people who are in the hands of people not in their control.

But now, when I have gone over there, and I have met now, on three occasions, with their officials, and twice over there. On each occasion, I have gone aside, late at night—I think I have had a pretty good relationship with Foreign Minister Tach. I have said to him look, is there any way for us to create, to break this impasse? Is there any way to create—is there something you want? Does somebody control these people, and is there a way?

I think others have tried that—sort of opening this door, as you say, to negotiation. Now, with all the dues, sort of homage to the sensitivities of how you do it, and not allowing anybody to be held accountable, and saving face—all of that—and the answer is, Senator, I would like to. But there ain't nobody. I cannot negotiate with you and have a secret return of somebody who does not exist.

Now, countless people, I think have tried that approach. But you run into this stone door. So when you say negotiate, how do you do that?

Mr. DONAHUE. You send over the Secretary of State with a mandate from the President, if this is the highest national priority, that is what it requires. And he has the lever of aid, trade, diplomatic, commercial—whatever relations. And you say, Mr. Baker, use those levers and negotiate. The Vietnamese are telling you that is what they want. You are completely powerless to negotiate.

The CHAIRMAN. But what if they say to Secretary Baker, Mr. Secretary, we do not have anybody, but we sure want the relationship. What do you do then? Do you go on and on?

Mr. DONAHUE. I think you have co-opted that process by encouraging normalization of relations without pre-condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me be very clear.

No one, no one that I know of has suggested normalization without this issue being resolved. That has been said again and again in this hearing.

Mr. DONAHUE. How about pre-conditions, Senator? Why don't you encourage two things: one, the declassification of the roadmap; and two, the sending over of Secretary Baker.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say with respect to the declassification of the roadmap. I am a little puzzled. I serve on the Foreign Relations Committee. I have worked a lot with Dick Solomon on this. I have talked to the Vietnamese about it, and so forth. I do not have a sense that it is classified.

Mr. DONAHUE. Sure it is, absolutely. Messrs. Quinn and Ford confirmed to me that it was. An American citizen cannot see the roadmap.

The CHAIRMAN. The conditions in the roadmap, as I understand it, concern, first, the Cambodia Peace Accords. And the second piece of the roadmap is POW/MIA.

Mr. DONAHUE. And subsequently, full commercial relations and normalization.

The CHAIRMAN. And the comment was that the pace and scope of the normalization process will be affected by cooperation on POW/MIA, correct?

Mr. DONAHUE. I think that.

The CHAIRMAN. Which means, I take it, that you cannot normalize unless you are moving down the road on POW/MIA.

Mr. SAMPLEY. They also said it was U.S. Government.

Mr. DONAHUE. You and I disagree on not the ends, we disagree on the means. The means are pure judgment call within the bowels of the Defense Department and the State Department as to what is progress.

I would like to know what the benchmarks are, and what the criteria are. Indeed, I think that is pretty much the realm of this Committee, to figure out what is going on with the roadmap, and request the White House to hold off normalization until—

The CHAIRMAN. So what you are saying is, because you do not understand exactly, in a very spelled-out fashion what the expectations are on POW/MIA, that you are saying, therefore, that the roadmap is secret?

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, we have been told it is classified, Senator—that the roadmap is classified. I cannot see the criteria. The American public cannot see the criteria. I guess you could if you subpoenaed it or something like that.

But that to me is not an acceptable standard in the sense that I believe that normalization is condition-precedent on full accounting by criteria this Committee establishes for accounting of prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia, with a roadmap ahead of this Committee. You have the cart before the horse. Indeed, if the roadmap goes through, and we normalize, indeed, we give full commercial and diplomatic relations to the POW's—I mean to the Vietnamese and Laotians—the POW's are dead. Period, full stop.

Let me make the observation that for years the Laotians and Vietnamese have been telling me and telling the United States public and telling the Government that they do not have the money or the manpower to search the remote provinces for missing Ameri-

cans. What they are really saying is look. Give us the aid, trade, diplomatic recognition that you promised us. Voila! Look what we found in the jungle out there in the remote provinces. There will be a great healing, but to—as I say—co-opt that process, by giving the Vietnamese and Laotians everything they want for some undefined progress is unfathomable to me. That is putting the nail in the coffin of the live POW's.

The CHAIRMAN. I have gone over my time. It is unfair to my colleagues here. In fact, let me stop and not go over my time anymore. I will yield my next round.

Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did you want to respond to a question?

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, I will take the next question, and I would like to say 30 seconds about the nature of the cover-up, which I believe is in the policy, and is why we are operating on two levels here.

I think the cover-up is embodied in the policy, as we briefly stated. The U.S. Government says the POW/MIA issue is humanitarian and not economic. Baloney. Fundamentally, it is economic. It has always been economic. All you have to do is look at the testimony before the U.S. Congress of the Senators and Congressmen who went over to Vietnam in the 1970's after the war, and were unequivocally told by the Vietnamese that the two issues were linked, period, full stop. It's in the record.

The second component of the cover-up in policy is that the answers to the MIA/POW issue are in Hanoi, not Washington—well, it was Washington that sent my brother over to serve, it was Washington that abandoned him, and it is Washington that is keeping him there—dead or alive.

It is not anything else. It is Washington. My God, if I read in the newspapers or see on T.V. the issue of abandoned children in this country—we all see it—our worst emotions come up. The penalties are great for that. It is a heinous crime.

But what about abandoned servicemen left behind, knowingly and deliberately by their Government? There is abandonment going on here, and so the answers aren't in Hanoi. The answer is in Washington. Someone will be accountable for them.

We keep talking about an accounting for them, but nobody is accountable for them. I hope this Committee will change that.

The next element of the cover-up is well, when somebody brings up this live group or proof of a live POW, we will move heaven and earth to bring them home. That's fraudulent on two points, because it shifts the burden of proof to me, instead of the CIA which has all the data; and two, who is Donald G. Carr? He is not chopped liver. The proof is there.

Finally—or next-to-last—we have more intelligence resources than ever dedicated to this issue—classic, Executive Branch approach: let's put more bureaucrats in there; let's put up an office in Hanoi. I hope nobody on the Committee thinks that the U.S. servicemen walking through the jungles of Vietnam and Laos at the invitation of the Laotians and Vietnamese—I hope nobody thinks they are actually going to walk into an American prisoner. That's

ludicrous. That would be an international incident of the highest order. It's not going to happen.

Senator McCAIN. If they are allowed to do so then I have every expectation, Mr. Donahue.

Mr. DONAHUE. If they're allowed to do so, as in resolution of the issue, Senator—and finally, we have looked into our files. And we can't find any proof of any live POW's.

I don't know if anybody is aware, but the CIA doesn't serve on the inter-agency commission. The CIA data is classified, and the war in Laos was a secret war. Is anybody on this Committee going to go to the CIA and subpoena their data and bring it out of the woodwork? I mean, until we do all of the research?

Senator SMITH. We intend to see that data. We hope we will not have to subpoena it. We will also be reviewing the so-called secret war.

Mr. DONAHUE. But you see, the elements, the bullet elements I gave you as to the nature of the cover-up, to me it's in the policy. Because it completely obviates your responsibility and accountability for the Government of the United States. It's humanitarian, not economic. The answers are in Hanoi, not Washington. When somebody brings us proof, we will do something about it. We have more intelligence resources than ever assigned to this issue. We have looked into our files and we can't find any evidence. Boy, if that isn't the ultimate cowardice and the ultimate obfuscation—deceit and deception—I don't know what it is.

I just hope and pray that this Committee is going to intervene in the process, fellow chairmen, and set the record straight and get the process moving. But to stick with the roadmap, which is a giveaway, rather than the levers that we have to pull, wow. I mean then we have truly abandoned the men.

Senator SMITH. Let me respond.

Speaking somewhat as a Committee, but also personally regarding the roadmap, I believe that every Member of this Committee—some with different variations on it—but I believe every Member of this Committee believes that the issue of the POW/MIA should be resolved before any normalization. I do, and I will speak for myself on that point.

Mr. DONAHUE. However, would you request the White House to defer the roadmap?

Senator SMITH. Yes, I have discussed this with officials in the Administration in terms of my belief that it is very important that the Vietnamese understand very specifically—no vague generalities—very specifically, exactly what the roadmap is, and that there is a roadblock on the map. And that is POW's and MIA's. I have expressed that very clearly. I cannot speak for the Secretary of State. I hope that he believes that. I think that the intention here is to account for these people before any normalization. However, things can happen. Things get obfuscated, confused. But from our perspective, that is where I am coming from. I intend to fight for that.

However, beyond that, the scope of this Committee really is more investigative than into the policy end of it—although we may make recommendations on policy. I just want to make a comment and ask a couple of questions.

First of all, I do not know if it was said on the record—and I came in a little late, and I apologize—but I think it should be stated for the record, at least from this Senator, that no greater love could ever be expressed by any human being than what you have expressed, and what you have done over the past 23 years, as you have searched for your brother. I know, wherever he is, he appreciates it. And in a very strange way that I have never shared with anyone, really, I came across your story—although I knew about it to some extent—in the second trip that I made to Vietnam on this issue, when the flight attendant, your former wife, asked me—then Congressman Smith—she said nice things about you—Congressman Smith, where are you going? And I told her. And she said, well, I'm Jeff Donahue's former wife. And I can tell you that he is committed to the issue, which is one of the reasons why I am his former wife. [Laughter.]

Senator SMITH. I say that with respect, and she said it with respect. I think she has respect for you. But this is very difficult. My father died in 1945 after combat service as a naval aviator in World War II. He died in a freak airplane crash in the Chesapeake Bay. I did not know what happened to him for 22 years—not because the Government held anything, but because my mother did not choose to look. And she would not let me look. But I did, after I got back, after I got to Washington as a congressman. I could have done it before, but I chose to do it then. I found out the truth. It was not pleasant, but I found it out. But at least I found out.

So although I do not have a missing relative in Vietnam, I think that I have some appreciation for what you have gone through—not enough to really understand it—but a little bit. I know that you have done a great deal of personal investigation. I think I would just like your editorial comment, if you will. I would like to make my own, and then ask for yours.

And that is, no matter what one feels about what you have done, or whether I agree with you or disagree with you, or whether I agree or disagree with your conclusions, the truth of the matter is that you, as a family member, should not have had to do what you did over the past 23 years.

It should have been done by our Government. If you can get into Laos—how many times?

Mr. DONAHUE. Laos, once this year, I am going again in January; twice last year.

Senator SMITH. How many times in your lifetime?

Mr. DONAHUE. I was also invited to Hanoi in 1976.

Senator SMITH. The point is that I think others who are in charge of working the issue, could have gotten in there with a little more effort, but that is history. We have heard a lot of mea culpas expressed by a lot of people. And we accept those. But we want to move on to find answers. That is the purpose of this Committee.

I would just like you—and I assure you that that is the focus of this Committee, live American prisoners of war, we have our differences. And we have gotten a lot of different testimony, but our goal is live American prisoners. As others have said, we assume that there are. That is what we are working on. Everything else is secondary.

What did you—in your private meetings with the number of meetings you have had with various Lao officials, specifically, what have they told you about prisoners of war, in general, and about your brother, specifically—if you have such information—or what haven't they told you maybe would be better.

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, in meeting with Laos—and I cannot compromise who they are, but all the way through the ministerial level, because I have been doing this for years, Senator, and I have developed contacts that various congressmen and senators are still trying to establish. I enjoyed reading about Mr. Murkowski trying to find one. But I have been told that POW's in Laos are in three categories: the first category, and this must be the universal sign—they go like this—

[Indicating.]

Mr. DONAHUE. —which I would take to mean POW's who are non compos mentis—they have sort of cracked under the circumstances, and they are just living as essentially meeker people there.

Senator REID. What was that again?

Mr. DONAHUE. Crazy, just crazies. And the second category is—to use the Laotian words—POW's like Laotians, they are now Laotians. We have many sighting reports of my brother and other servicemen, where my brother is reported to be married and living with two children now in a camp, but fishing, farming, tending water buffalo, things of this nature.

Then the third category is, they say, the camps in the North. And they clam up. I would take that to mean the provinces of Laos along the Chinese border and things of this nature, which are even off limits to senior Lao officials, unless the entire Council of Ministers votes approval, so to speak, for them to go. I can't crack that nut. But I'm sure as hell trying.

Senator SMITH. My time has expired. I just want to ask two quick questions: one, has any Lao government official, or any Lao that you felt had knowledge, ever said to you—admitted to you in any way, that they had American prisoners, number one; and the second question is, have you ever, in your trips over there, seen any testimony or evidence to the fact that the Soviets may have had some control over American prisoners in Laos after 1973?

Mr. DONAHUE. To the first question, yes—exactly in the context I said. And the second question, no. I don't have any information on Soviet presence. But I have never specifically pursued that line with the Laotians.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Can we have that package of live-sighting reports of your brother?

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, and I would like to mention one, if I may, right at the top, if I can read from it—I also have information about live prisoner of war named Jefferson Donahue—that is a phonetic spelling—date of birth, airplane number. And it gives the aircraft number, and it gives my parents' zip code in Florida, instead of the aircraft number. How did this guy in the jungles of Laos ever get my parents' zip code number?

Senator REID. Where did you get that?

Mr. DONAHUE. This was a live-sighting report, provided classified. This is the de-classified version provided by the Defense Department. He says, since my English is not yet very good, you can call my English teacher who helped me write this letter. Her name is, her phone, her address is—and of course, all of that is whited out. I cannot even talk to this Laotian.

Senator REID. What is the date of that?

Mr. DONAHUE. This is April 20, 1987 and I have sighting reports here which I will give you, as recently as 1991.

Senator REID. That whole pack relates only to your brother?

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, it has other names in it.

Senator REID. But each one, in some way, mentions your brother?

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir, and there are other correspondences.

Senator REID. And the Committee has that now?

Mr. DONAHUE. I am not sure if I have submitted this. I haven't submitted this entire pack, because I just got it from my father. The Committee has some of it.

Senator REID. Could I ask, Mr. Chairman, that be made a part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you submit each of those to us? We will be getting all of them anyway, but would you submit those so we have them as a back-check to what we are going to get?

[See pps. 211-289 of the appendix.]

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir, but at the same time I could appeal to you, if you could impose upon the U.S. Government to let me have the name of this Laotian so I could speak to him, since he claims to have been with my brother? The Government won't even give me the name of the English teacher who translated it for him—how tragic—which, to me, is part of the cover-up.

You know, until the American public sees honesty on the issue—

Senator REID. Mr. Donahue, I am running out of time. You have already told us how you feel.

Mr. Sampley, why do you think your reward offers have not produced any live Americans?

Mr. SAMPLEY. Information that has come back to us is that when either any of the indigenous folks—either the Lao, the Cambodians, or the Vietnamese—when they make inquiries about the reward, they think—and I believe Colonel Bui Tin said that earlier—they think that it's official Government reward. They go to these folks, these folks over here. The U.S. Government representatives tell them we don't offer rewards. We don't pay it. There is no such thing. And so the reward is stifled at that level.

What I don't understand, if a U.S. Congressman, which they have done, offers a reward that is costing the U.S. Government nothing—if the Charlotte Motor Speedway of Charlotte, NC offers a reward, what is wrong with paying it, if it's not U.S. Government money? Why does the U.S. Government shoot it down? And more importantly, if there are no living prisoners of war over there, why worry about a reward, want to say anything?

Senator REID. Mr. Sampley, it is my understanding from your testimony—it is my understanding from your testimony that you are not willing to share the data you have with the Government.

Mr. SAMPLEY. What data?

Senator REID. The data that you have that indicates there are live, POW's.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Everything that I have—sure, I mean I have five, six, seven filing cabinets full of files that Mr. Usury and Dan Parrin came and stayed a week in Kinston. They went through it. You can have the keys to my files.

Senator REID. As Chairman Kerry mentioned, our obligation is to make sure that we do not leave a stone uncovered.

Mr. SAMPLEY. I appreciate that.

Senator REID. That is why we are here at this time of night listening to everything that you want to say, and everything that Mr. Donahue wants to say, because I think we are all proceeding on this Committee as if there are live Americans in Southeast Asia.

If we are not proceeding on that basis, then we have a pretty ill-conceived result, and we cannot do that. The testimony that we have heard to this point indicates that it is 20 years later. If there are live POW's there, it is going to be—I do not want to use a miracle, but it will be—it will be very exciting if we find that there are live Americans.

So I hope that as you have indicated, you will supply whatever evidence you have with the Committee, and Mr. Donahue has indicated these live sightings and other information that he has, that he will share with us. Is that right?

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir.

Senator REID. I would hope that you will not treat us with the scorn that you have treated what has gone on before.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Senator, up until this date to this Committee, I wouldn't give anything to the U.S. Government, period. Because when you give it to them, it disappears. Then you're called a name of some sort, sooner or later. At one point, I did give a document. I had quite a bit of association with Robert Garwood at one time. I brought him down to North Carolina and he worked for me for a while. And he was in Kinston for some time. I talked him into drawing a map to exactly where he buried Captain Eisenbrough, who died in captivity. He drew the camp. He drew the exact location. He gave the camp name and number, and he drew the exact location where Captain Eisenbrough is buried. I turned it over to the U.S. Government. But before I did, I turned it over to the Kinston Free Press. They printed it, and did a little story on it, so there is a record of it.

To this day, I have heard absolutely nothing back. They give no information in return. They don't like receiving it, and you have to cram it down their throat. Ms. Donna Long, sitting right here, when she was picked up by the Communists—or the Pathet Lao—for handing out the reward money, while she was in captivity, I believe it was Pak Se or somewhere in that general area—she saw what she believed was a black American. She saw him from where she was being held—she can tell you better than I can—on the second floor of a balcony. She waved at him. He waved back. And she spoke to her guards, and she said who is that? In my testimony, I said it's Mr. Allen, but I believe the guard said it's Mr. Allison. The problem is, she begged the State Department to debrief her. They would not debrief her. They did not want to ask her any-

thing. They made comic remarks about her, and so she went back to Jacksonville, NC, and demanded, through Congressman Martin Lancaster—which is a matter of record. Congressman Lancaster made sure that the State Department debriefed her.

Why did Donna Long have to demand to be debriefed?

Senator REID. My time is gone, but let me just say this—it has not been said yet, because they cannot say it, and I can—but not only do we, as Committee Members, want to get to the very bottom of this—

Mr. SAMPLEY. I believe you.

Senator REID. But we have Members who serve on this Committee that have given a great deal in Southeast Asia. The man seated next to me, as you are aware, spent 5½ years in a prisoner of war camp, under the most unpleasant conditions. The Chairman of the Committee is a highly decorated, Navy veteran also, from the conflict in Southeast Asia. And so these men—and there are other Members of this Committee who have military records over there—they have a very personal interest that I do not have.

Senator McCain, when we are talking about prisoners of war, he knows these people, the list of people that were with him. They had a network there. So this is something that we are going to do the best we can. I think it is important to you that you start cooperating. Because this is the same Government. We are going to do the best we can to get what the CIA has, and what the White House has, and do the best in the next year to get to the bottom of this.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Senator, I have been one of the biggest critics and most vocal critics of the U.S. Government policy as anyone. But I do see a pattern here, with this Committee, that makes me want to trust you. I do want to give you anything I have. Until I see something different happen, it's yours.

Senator SMITH. I think Senator McCain is up next.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me change the rules among the three of us here, a second, because we do not have a very long time. You interrupt me, and I will interrupt you. Because both of you, obviously, feel frustration for many years and want to get a lot out. But you interrupt me, and I will interrupt you. OK? We do not normally do this, but—and I thank you for your appreciation for the tough questions, Mr. Sampley. These look like CBU's to me, in fact they say on them CBU—on your pictures.

It says, Dispenser and Bomb Aircraft CBU.

Mr. SAMPLEY. I don't understand the point.

Senator MCCAIN. The point is, those are dropped off of airplanes.

Mr. SAMPLEY. What is that?

Senator MCCAIN. I think that's a temple bell.

Mr. SAMPLEY. What is it made from?

Senator MCCAIN. I do not know. I know they used to make cigarette lighters and cigarette cases out of crashed 105's.

Mr. SAMPLEY. But my point is, Senator, that that is an example of the salvage that is coming across the river out of Laos. Those folks are going out. And these guys will tell you they are going out with donkeys, or whatever they—you carry stuff out of the hills with: They are going through, just ravaging through these crash sites, and they have been doing it for years.

You go—

Senator McCAIN. But CBU's do not necessarily come from crash sites. CBU's are dropped off of airplanes.

Mr. SAMPLEY. But that is just part of the salvage. That is what we took pictures of.

Senator McCAIN. The majority of these I could make out, are—as designated—dispenser and bomb aircraft CBU. You and I know it drops off the airplane a certain distance above the ground.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Are you implying that the Lao would go out and pick those things up but they won't take and trash a crash site and bring the metal out of an airplane?

Senator McCAIN. I am not asserting that. I am saying that what you have, what I have seen in these pictures, and all I can make out, is a CBU.

Mr. SAMPLEY. I will agree with that.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Donahue, real quick—I am in disagreement with Senator Smith. Because I believe that the roadmap does clearly state that there must be full cooperation from the Vietnamese. By the way, I understand we got the roadmap in a very round-about way. I agree with you, it should be made public to you and all of the American people—if, indeed, it says that, as I believe. I think the Chairman agrees, even though Senator Smith does not. If it does say that, that full cooperation must be extended, then do you still have a problem?

Mr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir, absolutely—I love cooperation, but all of this is entirely unnecessary. I think, in the context of what it would take to resolve the issue—

Senator McCAIN. What does it take to resolve the issue other than full cooperation?

Mr. DONAHUE. It takes Jim Baker getting on a plane to Hanoi and Vientiane, and using the levers of aid, trade, commercial relations and diplomatic relations.

Senator McCAIN. That's what Solomon did when he met with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister in New York?

Mr. DONAHUE. No, it was not conducted at that level with a mandate from the President of the United States, and the endorsement of the inner-circle—

Senator McCAIN. The roadmap clearly says that if the issue is resolve, then all aid, trade, et cetera—they have already done that.

Mr. DONAHUE. But the steps along the way, Senator, are judgmental lodged in the Defense Department and the State Department. And I have had nothing but 23 years of deceit and obfuscation from them.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Donahue, you certainly do not believe that if there is no cooperation and a resolution of this issue, that the Congress would support such a thing?

Mr. DONAHUE. Well, you know, it seems—a lot of things coming out of the Senate these days, calling for normalization of relations to Vietnam, without what I would consider something the American public is entitled to, which are the criteria and the elements of progress along the way. So why is the roadmap classified?

Senator McCAIN. As you know, we have resisted that. I do not believe that the majority of the Congress would support such—

Mr. DONAHUE. Can I make one comment to you, Senator McCain—just a brief one—the subject of Laos and POW/MIA intelligence and everything else—here I will give this to the Committee, indeed, I have already supplied it, which is CIA document Mao Lao Hoc Sat, which, you know, is the Lao patriotic front—Weekly Bulletin Containing photographs and details of American prisoners captured by the Pathet Lao.

And, of course, that's all I'm allowed to see.

Senator McCAIN. And as you also know, Mr. Donahue, we did put an amendment on the Defense Authorization Bill—you heard it mentioned earlier—that all of this information must be made available to the American people—with the exception by a request from the next-of-kin that they not—

Mr. DONAHUE. They don't do it.

Senator McCAIN. What's that?

Mr. SAMPLEY. They don't share the information.

Senator McCAIN. It is in the bill. It has not been implemented.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Wasn't there a House bill?

Senator McCAIN. It was never enacted into law, and we are seeking to have that happen. If this authorization bill passes, it will be—and I will be very interested in your comments to the degree of their compliance—but you see, I am doing all the interrupting. You go ahead and interrupt.

Mr. SAMPLEY. What I don't understand for years, I have been pounded and hit at by people saying hey, the problem is not in front of the White House. Why are you chaining yourself to the White House fence? The problem is in Hanoi. OK, we are saying we've got Hanoi where we want them right now. Why do you want to let them up? They do not have the Soviets to lean on anymore.

Let's don't let them up until they give it up.

Senator McCAIN. We do not want to let up until they give it up. I think we are in a bit of a semantical problem here, Mr. Donahue. Because I think when we say the answer is in Hanoi, there are no Americans being held captive in Washington, DC, or in the United States of America. So what we are saying here, I think, is that when the answer is in Hanoi, that we need their cooperation and their forthcoming and their allowing us, for example, to go somewhere on a moment's notice—say if you land and you are in Vientiane, and you think your brother is somewhere in the southern part of the country, and you have a helicopter, you ought to be able to go there immediately and not 24 hours, not 48 hours, et cetera.

That is the kind of compliance that I think you and I are talking about. So when we say the answer is in Vientiane or Phnom Penh, we are saying that the full cooperation and the full disclosure of our archives, et cetera, is where the answer is. But I understand, the reason why I say semantic problem is that I see what you mean also. That "the problem is in Washington."

Mr. SAMPLEY. If I could make a suggestion—

Mr. DONAHUE. Let me interrupt you—I just wish to provide the inducement, which is the levers of aid, trade, and diplomatic recognition, giving the Vietnamese a face-saving way of giving the guys back. We haven't been doing that at the highest level of Government.

We have been doing it between generals who are retired from military; sergeants and colonels going over—

Senator McCAIN. Now he wants to interrupt.

Mr. DONAHUE. —the Secretary of State or the President need to do it. That's what is a highest national priority.

Mr. SAMPLEY. I would like to make a suggestion—

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to interrupt for the whole Committee, because I need to try to keep this on a process here.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would be only happy to yield my time to anybody who wants it—

Senator McCAIN. I would just like to ask if you had finished—my point is that we may have a semantical problem here which may, I hope, in my vision of what the roadmap means, and maybe I am wrong. But my vision of what the roadmap means is we obtain exactly what you are seeking.

The CHAIRMAN. It may well be that you have articulated a way for the Administration to short-cut a lot of the folderol. And if Secretary Baker can achieve some kind of breakthrough in terms of this process that satisfies full cooperation, it may be that everybody's interest will be served.

Senator McCAIN. I thank both of you for your efforts.

Mr. SAMPLEY. Senator, let me try to get this in—and please bear with me for just right quick—this testimony that I brought up, I didn't bring it up just to dig at wounds or to hit at people in the U.S. Government. It's still going on.

But I would like to suggest that as long as this Committee is in session, and doing this investigation, that if we can do it through legislation or through the Executive Body that we pledge absolute amnesty to the Vietnamese, to any American official, to anyone involved in the POW issue about the POW issue, that they can do or say, let out any amount of information they would like, and that it would not be held against them. Let's get this information out there. Let's get these people home. Then go on about the business of normalizing, et cetera—just an absolutely amnesty plan for everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an interesting idea that has, in fact, been discussed, and I think is under consideration in terms of some formulation. But it is not a bad idea.

Senator Kassebaum, do you have any questions?

Senator KASSEBAUM. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, as we wrap up this panel, Mr. Donahue, you are a very articulate spokesperson for what you have lived through and what you have observed. I just want to tell you that I am impressed by your capacity to articulate it. And I think you have a lot to say, and have said it well, and represented that point of view very well, clearly. There is a lot of substance to what you have said. I take it at face value. I know it, from having studied this and listened to it and so forth.

I think it is a question of how one kind of works through some of the—as Senator McCain says—semantical differences, nuances. But the bottom line is very real. I think we hear you very clearly, and I understand what you are saying.

We want your information. We need your information. This is—as I have said before, and I keep repeating—scratching the surface.

So I hope you will work with us in an effort to guarantee that we do, as you say, intercede correctly, and not insensitively and stupidly as we go along here.

Senator Brown, did you have anything more?

Senator BROWN. No thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will excuse this panel, and thank you very much for appearing here today.

Finally, I would like to ask all the members of the photographic panel, each of the families, if you would come forward please to testify? And Colonel Bailey, we will lead off with you. As this panel takes its place, let me tell you what we are going to do schedule-wise here.

Because of the length of these hearings, each day we have been going from about 9:00, 9:30, 10:00 in the morning until 6:00, 7:00 at night. It really makes more sense for the Committee to proceed with the two remaining portions at a separate hearing—Department of Defense has made it very clear to me that they are prepared to go forward today. And they are ready.

It is our choice, as a Committee, to defer them, not their choice. But I think it will be better if we do defer their presentation, because it will give Members a better chance to prepare some questions, and even to submit some to them that we would like to have them address when they do respond to the various criticisms that have been made. And finally, the same with Mr. Usury's return, that was requested earlier today. It will give us a chance to review some of that document and to prepare for that.

So I think both of those items will be rescheduled. We will announce publicly when that will take place. We will try to do it next week, if possible. And if not, it will be before we recess. I assure you of that.

Could I ask if all of you would dislocate for a moment? I apologize for your getting seated and comfortable. But if you would stand, so that we could swear you in?

[Witnesses sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Bailey, I know you have a plane to catch, and we appreciate that. So we are going to lead off with you if we can, and then proceed through the families.

EVENING SESSION

The Committee continued at 4:45 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify yourself for the record and proceed with your openings.

And may I ask each of you if you could keep your comments to, is it an imposition to ask you for 5 minutes? Then we will draw more out in the questions. If it is, I want to be fair, and again, I will give you more time. But if you could try to stick to 5 minutes, I think that would be appreciated.

Is that difficult, Mrs. Fleckenstein?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. No, I think I can pretty much do it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can do it, that would be fine.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, can I just do a housekeeping thing while you are waiting?

Senator Mack has asked me to enter into the record a statement by him dated today. I would ask unanimous consent to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator SMITH. And also a written statement for the record of a Karen S. Miller regarding Maj. Donald Carr and a written statement for the record of Matthew W. Carr regarding Maj. Donald Carr.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. All of those statements will be placed in the record.

[The prepared statements of Senator Mack, Ms. Miller, and Mr. Carr follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONNIE MACK

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be an original co-sponsor of S. Res. 82, which established the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. In the past, numerous Senate committees have been involved in this issue. It is my sincere hope that the establishment of Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will provide the coordinated process by which the Senate can review and assess the methodology and operations of the POW/MIA Division of the Defense Intelligence Agency to thoroughly investigate the case of Capt. Donald Carr, as well as other live-sighting reports.

I would further like to commend the Chairman and Ranking Member for the diligent work they have performed in setting the rules and agenda for the Committee in a timely manner. Today, the Committee will examine the POW/MIA Investigation Policy and Process. The witness list for today's hearing is impressive indeed.

Since this Committee was established, I have been in contact with the Members about recently publicized photographs which have surfaced involving U.S. Army Capt. Donald Carr. These stunning photographs were allegedly, and I use that word in the most positive sense, taken in February 1990, in Laos and smuggled out. Members of the Committee will have the opportunity to see these photographs today during Col. Jack Bailey's testimony. I strongly urge the Members to listen very carefully to Colonel Bailey's chronology of how he obtained these photographs.

Take his words seriously—the Department of Defense does. In an article from the September 20, 1991 Fort Myers Florida News-Press, Carl Ford, the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs said, and I quote, "This (the photographs) is going at the top of our investigative list. Of all the photographs we have received, it is quite striking." This same article indicates that Pentagon officials believe the picture is no more than 18 months old.

Captain Carr's stepmother, Marie Barzen, lives in Fort Myers, Florida. The heartache and anguish she has been through since these photographs surfaced cannot be

adequately expressed by me. My thoughts and prayers are with her this morning, as they have been since the day Colonel Bailey brought the photographs to my office.

I again urge the Members of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to listen attentively to Colonel Bailey. It horrifies me to think that any American is still being held against their will in lands abroad. When data surfaces which is as strong as that involved in the Carr sighting, it deserves the immediate and exhaustive attention of the U.S. Senate.

I thank the Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN S. MILLER

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman and Committee Members: I come before you today in search of answers that I believe this distinguished body has the power to resolve.

The Vietnam War is often referred to as the 10 Year War. For the families, and those still held in captivity, the Vietnam War is now entering its 28th year. For too long a time, the mystery of my cousin, Maj. Donald Gene "Butch" Carr's status as a Prisoner Of War in Southeast Asia has been shrouded in secrecy under the guise of the National Security Act. Over 1,400 live-sighting reports have been turned over to various government agencies throughout the evolution of the Southeast Asia POW/MIA calamity. In all but under 200 cases, these reports have been disproved through one means or another, yet these reports remain classified government documents, again, under the guise of National Security. I am not here to debate the fact or fiction behind these refuted reports; I am here to find out what my government knows about Major Carr, and why our family has been kept in the dark so long.

Our family and the families of all the POW/MIA's are supposedly represented here in Washington by the Congressionally Chartered "League Of Families". This organization, which receives over ONE HALF MILLION FEDERALLY FUNDED DOLLARS annually, whose members travel at Government expense to their annual meetings, has not been able to raise a quorum in 5 years. THIS IS MY REPRESENTATION????? THIS IS MY FAMILY SUPPORT????? I am here to represent myself, and I will seek support from those who are ready and more than willing to give it.

This Nation's NUMBER ONE PRIORITY, THE POW/MIA ISSUE, is now passing through its third administration. The position of the Government has changed from "There are no live Americans being held against their will in Southeast Asia"; to "We can not rule out the possibility that there may be live Americans being held against their will in Southeast Asia; yet, after some EIGHTEEN YEARS, all our Government has managed to bring home is somewhere in the neighborhood of 315 sets of remains, and even some of those are questionable. Nothing has come from Laos, a Country where roughly 600 Americans were lost. At least the animal or Asian bone gimmick wasn't tried on those unfortunate families, one of which is mine.

The Soviet Union has finally admitted that it executed 9,000 Polish Prisoners in World War II. Will our Government have to admit that it was responsible for the loss of an untold number of American Servicemen by burying them along with the issue, through the endless formations of committees, until the men are all dead???? Or will this Committee not buckle under political pressure and once and for all, RESOLVE THIS ISSUE THROUGH THE RETURN OF ALL RECOVERABLE REMAINS AND THE REPATRIATION OF THOSE WE LEFT BEHIND?????

I said in the beginning of this testimony that I seek the answers to a few questions. The first is, WHERE IS MAJ. DONALD GENE "BUTCH" CARR???? Second, WHEN WILL YOU BRING HIM HOME???? Third, WHY IS IT TAKING SO LONG????

I ask you to consider all of the background information available: years of classified documents, eye witness accounts, activist's and family testimony. Please do not dismiss this information because it is contrary to present political policy. I ask you to be open minded and courageous, responding positively to the truth regardless of what agencies or political positions may be involved. This is not the time to assess for past injustices, but the time to remedy them. Return our men the freedom they risked—and lost—for their Country. Return them to the land of their birth. RETURN AMERICA'S HEROS TO AMERICA where they may spend their remaining years in the land they fought to defend.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, DC 20314,
September 23, 1971.

Mr. MATHEW W. CARR,
5524 Wedge St.,
East Chicago, IN 46312.

DEAR MR. CARR: I am writing you concerning your brother, Capt. Donald C. Carr, who has been missing in Southeast Asia since 6 July 1971.

The report prepared by the board of officers who investigated the incident in which your brother became missing has been received. The report indicates that your brother was flying a visual reconnaissance mission over enemy held territory. The aircraft took off at 1:20 p.m., on 6 July 1971, with regular ground contact being maintained every 45 minutes. Last contact with the aircraft took place at 3:30 p.m. when Donald radioed that weather conditions were deteriorating.

A ground reconnaissance team reported hearing an impact or explosion at 4 p.m., in the vicinity where the aircraft very possibly could have been flying. They did not report sighting an aircraft, however. Rescue teams could not enter the area because of heavy enemy activity. All airfields where the aircraft could have landed were checked with negative results. Exhaustive aerial search efforts were conducted for several days afterwards with no results. Intensive search efforts are still being conducted in the area. Enclosed are copies of statements from the board report.

No report has been received indicating that Donald is a prisoner. The opposing forces do not abide by the terms of the Geneva Convention and do not furnish names of our personnel whom they have captured.

Inasmuch as your brother's status cannot be determined at this time, the Department of the Army is continuing him in a missing status while further efforts are made to obtain additional information concerning him. Under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act, a member who is missing may be continued in that status for a period of one year. If he is still missing after a year has elapsed, his case is reviewed at which time a decision is made as to whether there is any basis to assume that the missing person is still living. If he may reasonably be presumed to be living, his missing status is continued. If there is sufficient evidence available upon which to base a logical conclusion that the member is no longer alive, a presumptive finding of death is issued, and all of his accounts are settled.

Inclosed is an information sheet which will be of interest to you. Your completion and return of the form concerning the release of your name and address would be appreciated.

My continued sympathy is with you in this time of anxiety and uncertainty.

Sincerely,

VERNE L. BOWERS,
MAJOR GENERAL, USA,
The Adjutant General.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, DC,
July 13, 1972.

Mr. MATHEW W. CARR,
5524 Wedge St.,
East Chicago, IN 46312.

DEAR MR. CARR: This office has just completed a further review of the records pertaining to your brother, Capt. Donald G. Carr, as mentioned in the letter of 23 September 1971.

Under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act, a member may be carried on the rolls in a missing status as long as there is reasonable doubt as to whether he is living or deceased. The law further provides that a review and determination of his status shall be made after he has been in a missing status for one year. As a result of this review, an official determination has been made in Donald's case to continue him in a missing status.

Please believe that I share your concern, and earnestly hope for a favorable resolution to this distressing situation. I will notify you immediately of any change in Donald's status.

Sincerely,

IVERNE L. BOWERS,
MAJOR GENERAL, USA,
The Adjutant General.

November 4, 1991.

The Hon. PETE J. VISCLOSKEY,
U.S. House of Representatives,
330 Cannon Building,
Washington, DC 20515.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Just a short note to inform you that I have written a letter to Maj. Charles Gittins USMC in relation to my status in my brother's case. Enclosed copies of information received while functioning as Primary Notification as designated by my brother Maj. Donald Gene Carr. I will be in contact with you if my letter is not successful in clearing up this situation of denial of access information or change of status.

Respectfully Submitted,

Mathew W. Carr.

October 31, 1991.

MAJ. CHARLES W. GITTINS, USMC,
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs,
Room 4C839, The Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301.

DEAR MAJOR GITTINS: On the basis of our meeting last Thursday and not fully prepared to cover the areas discussed I am presenting you with copies of information that should clarify my position in my brother's case (Maj. Donald G. Carr).

1. Assignment of Assistance Officer
2. Four (4) Telegrams from Department of Army
3. Two (2) Letters from Verne L. Bowers, Major General U.S.A., The Adjutant General
4. Copy of my adoption papers
5. Copy of Major Carr's Divorce Degree

Upon reading and review of the above listed enclosures I believe that you will rectify current misleading applications. Twenty years is a long time, perhaps some of my terminology is now outdated i.e. Primary Notification, as designated by my brother. It was my responsibility to notify involved family members, Mother, Father and Son of his Missing status to M.I.A. and K.I.A. initiated by his former wife in March of 1976 (you have a copy of that Casualty Report) on behalf of their son Donald G. Carr Jr. Points 4 and 5 are presented to indicate legacy involved parties. According to my attorney the applications applied in July of 1971 are still in effect today.

My intent is to insure that my brother, because of his possible mental problem, the best possible care and therapy. I still feel that I can be an asset to the forthcoming search and as an involved civilian debunk any talk of the overused term of cover-up or lack of effort. I am willing to assume all my personal expenses. Do contact me if there is the slightest possibility of this happening and any provisions I must meet to make it fly.

To a Successful Venture,

Mathew W. Carr.

DEAR LIL BROTHER: Well, it's been a week since you have been reported missing in action. One might wonder why I am writing a letter you may never read. It's like this, maybe I finally realized that it's alright for brothers to get sentimental over their lives together.

Since the news of your "missing in action," life has been one hell of tension, we all jump at the phone or knock at the door. My heart goes out to all those who have been suffering for months and even years with this situation.

Uncle Sam has provided us with a friend of yours as the "Survival Attendance Officer". You must be pretty important, they had two groups started on your case. When news first came, it was like a bad dream. I was hearing things being said; but they were not registering in my mind. Initially I was too busy assisting the Sergeant, who gave us the first notification. Needless to say, Mom has taken the news very hard. We went and broke the news to Dad, he also was shocked but expressed confidence in your ability to survive. I also talked to Carol and assured her of your intentions toward your son Donny. Yes, Friday July 9, 1971 was a busy night for us all.

By now most of all our relatives and friends are aware of the situation. All have been great and sincerely hope for your safe return. The ironic thing is that you hardly find any front page news about the war anymore. As yourself said in one of your letters, the war seems to be ending. I want to tell you something I probably should have said before, I am very proud of what you are doing, the best way I can describe it is that you are a real "Pro".

I am sure you realize that you are no longer being hid by the shadow of what your big brother did. Many in our country do not appreciate the service and dedication of you and yours.

I hope you won't mind if I ramble around. Very often in life we take a lot of things for granted, there are times when a kind word or gesture would have made the day a little better. I think my writing this letter will enable me to better endure the passage of time till we receive news of you. All who know you have expressed confidence in you and that if humanly possible you will be OK.

I am writing this letter at 2 a.m., I went to sleep earlier however, the words you are reading were flowing through my mind. It is not intended to set any wrongs-right, however I do need someone to express my thoughts and feelings. I know I am expected to be a steady influence here at home and I know I have been. This is very difficult to do when you finally realize something you have taken for granted may be taken away forever. Let's face it Lil Brother, we grew up together through many trying times. Though 8 years separated our age I feel there was a closeness that few had because of our shaky family life. It isn't easy to find words to express a feeling of compassion between two grown men. You must read between the lines and realize that those expressions are there.

Well I am going to draw this letter to a close; before I sign off I want you to know that all of us are hoping and praying for your safe return.

Big Brother

P.S. Keep your ass down.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask, if I may, if you would allow me to follow Colonel Bailey with my statement? I will keep it within your limits, I believe, because it is related to his testimony, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. I have no objection to that at all. Are you ready, Mr. Bailey?

Mr. BAILEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now are these set up so that everybody can see them on the Committee?

[Referring to photo display.]

STATEMENT OF JACK E. BAILEY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF (RETIRED)

Colonel BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee—

The CHAIRMAN. Could you pull the mike a little closer? Thank you.

Colonel BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to express my experiences and opinions about the conduct of the U.S. Government in the area of recovering American prisoners of war left behind in Southeast Asia.

This is a field in which I have had extensive experience. I have 26 years in the POW/MIA field. I served in the armed forces of this country during three wars. I flew 256 missions, combat missions, as a fighter pilot in the Vietnam War, during which time I became interested in the plight of aircrews shot down but not rescued.

After retirement from the Air Force I have dedicated my time and efforts toward the discovery of information about POW's who were left behind by the Government of this country almost 20 years ago to disengage with honor from the war in Southeast Asia they were unwilling or unable to win.

Since that time I have spent many years in Southeast Asia and I have cultivated hundreds of contacts with individuals who have given me intelligence concerning the fate of prisoners still being held by our former enemies. Some of that information was deliberately false, fabricated for the purpose of being sold for profit. Other intelligence is, in my opinion, inviolate and worthy of investigation by the governmental agencies supposedly created for that purpose.

In the past I have given valid information concerning POW's to appropriate governmental agencies. It is my belief that there was no investigation made in any of these cases. In the majority of instances, I have never received any sort of communications back from the agencies I had contacted, not even an acknowledgement that the information was received.

While there are numbers of cases worth discussing I will limit this statement to the facts of the case of Army Special Forces Capt. Donald Gene Carr, presently a matter of prime interest.

In 1989, I made contact with a source of information who indicated to me that he had contact with American prisoners of war being held in Laos. After numbers of meetings with this man, referred to as Mr. X, we devised a detailed operation to bring two American prisoners out of captivity and into friendly hands. A great deal of thought and coordination went into the creation of this plan involving the method of extraction, form of transportation, security, and the payment of a substantial amount of money from private sources for the delivery of those prisoners.

As a means of providing proof of the existence of these POW's, I sent Mr. X into Laos with a camera and articles of clothing. Mr. X gave the clothing to a prisoner and took this photograph, which most of you have seen. He returned the unexposed film to me. Among the pictures that resulted was one of a man we now know as Donald Gene Carr.

After receiving the film I didn't see him or hear from Mr. X again for almost 2 years and assumed that something had happened to him or had otherwise gone wrong to cause the plan to be compromised. It wasn't until last week that I discovered what the problem was.

Shortly after developing the Carr picture in 1990 I showed it to a senior DIA member of the American Embassy who I was informed was involved in POW/MIA affairs. I am aware of no action that was taken by the Government at that time.

After several months of investigation and a comparison with pictures given to us by family members we concluded that the man in the Laos picture was Special Forces Capt. Donald Gene Carr.

In July 1991, Judge Norman Turner, a former Air Force fighter pilot and I prepared a package of information concerning the Carr case. In conjunction with this I released the original negatives given to me by Mr. X to an investigator at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who arranged to have scientific comparison of the photos made by forensic pathologist, Michael Charney, of Colorado State University. Dr. Charney also concluded that the man in the photo was Carr as did family members and men who has served with Carr.

The photographs were released publicly in July 1991. Within a week of that the Senate Select Committee was approved. At that

time the Department of Defense became interested in the case and asked me to brief them on the Carr matter. Against the advice of a number of friends involved in this issue, I agreed to do so, although almost anyone who has dealt privately in searching for POW's distrusts the Government in general and the DIA in particular in this area.

I felt that I should make an effort to cooperate with the Government one more time. I did so with misgivings.

At this first Pentagon briefing in August I gave to the DIA my original negatives of the Carr matter except for those pictures showing the face of Mr. X, the man that took the picture. I did not release the true name of Mr. X. And when interrogated by DIA concerning the location at which the photographs were taken I indicated the site of a position that I had been informed was a POW holding location, but I did not give them the true location at that time because I was not confident in their motives.

I was invited back to brief Secretary of Defense Cheney in October 1991. Although I was still uncomfortable with the record of the DIA in the area of POW investigations. I decided to cooperate fully since I felt that there would be integrity at that level of Government. My feeling was that we had to trust somebody, that we had to work together.

In that briefing, therefore, I released all of the remaining information available to me at that time concerning the Carr case including the remaining original negatives and the names of Mr. X. At this time I indicated to Secretary Cheney the true position of the site at which I was informed Carr was held at the time the photograph was taken. I was informed that the DIA would cooperate with me and that I was to be considered part of the team.

I told Secretary Cheney and others present at the meeting that based on information I had received I thought that Mr. X would be in Bangkok by the time I returned to Southeast Asia the next week. I was asked on several occasions by DIA personnel if Mr. X would submit to a polygraph test. I told them that it would be up to him.

Within a few days after the briefing, even as I made plans for a return trip as part of the team, I learned that negative information was being released about me and the Carr case by someone within DOD. I was told that people from DOD were saying that the pictures were probably taken in Thailand and that I was not cooperating with them. I was also informed that the DIA was investigating the case by looking into the Bangkok Zoo. I don't know if that is true or not.

I am now informed that earlier this week Secretary Dick Cheney testified that I told members of the DOD that I didn't know where the Carr photos were taken and that they might have been taken in Bangkok or somewhere else. Apparently he also testified that I promised him I had a witness in Bangkok ready to talk to his people when they arrived there. Both of these statements are false.

It is true that I was not able to produce Mr. X in Bangkok during the week that the DOD was able to dedicate to this highest priority in the land. I tried to make contact, but I have to point out that we are not dealing with livestock or retail goods here. It took me many hard years in Southeast Asia to cultivate the level of

trust necessary to obtain the evidence I have tried to present. Furthermore, people that are able to move across borders to obtain such information live and move in a shadow world at the edges of society.

The lines of communication in that part of the world are relatively primitive. The phone systems in Bangkok are approximately at the level of the United States in the 1950's. In the remote areas of Thailand they are almost non-existent. My primary method of communication into the up-country regions of Thailand consist of buying a bus ticket to a remote area and sending an agent there with an oral message and instructions to try and find a telephone to call back and answer.

Mr. Chairman, I find it appalling that after almost 20 years of inaction and only when it became apparent that members of the Defense Department would be compelled to testify before this Committee, interest has suddenly been stimulated to aggressively investigate a prisoner of war matter, in this instance, the Carr case.

During my latest trip to Thailand during which I was part of the team, according to Mr. Cheney, there was no question that a sense of urgency existed in the minds of those DOD/DIA personnel who traveled there at the same time.

Judge Turner and I were constantly reminded of the time constraints resulting from these hearings. We were repeatedly asked what could be done to make it happen. While these travelers from Washington enjoyed their lodging in the Imperial Hotel, we did our best in more spartan surroundings to make it happen at our expense. Monies were paid and bus tickets were bought, but in this instance, Southeast Asia was not ready to perform at the belated cue of the DIA within their self-imposed time constraints.

The single most important lesson anyone from the west can learn in dealing in Southeast Asia is that patience is a prerequisite to any sort of success to be gained there. This sort of ignorance of the ways of that part of the world is among the roots of our failure in the Vietnam War. Ho Chi Minh had patience we didn't have.

One individual connected to the Carr case was produced for questioning by the DIA. This man who we call Mario was one of our original points of contact with Mr. X. But I did not consider him to be a major factor in the Carr operation itself at that time. This turned out to be an error in judgment on my part.

After the photographs were developed the operation to bring out two American POW's was to proceed irrespective to any attempted identification of the subject in the picture. Mr. X left to continue the final stages of the plan and I waited to hear from him. Last week Mario told me what happened to cause the operation to be ended.

While I was waiting for the message from Mr. X to proceed with the mission, Mario was contacted by a man from the American Embassy in Bangkok. This man told Mario that I and my primary Thai contact in Bangkok had received a large sum of money for the operation, but that we had kept it for our use, not sharing it with the other people. This man from the Embassy told Mario that my Thai contact had bought a large and valuable piece of land north of Bangkok with the money, that we were cheating Mario, Mr. X and

the others involved in the plan and that we intended to cut them out entirely.

As a result of the false information provided to Mario he contacted Mr. X and the other members of the operation, telling them that everything was off and that they were being cheated by myself and my Thai contact. As a result of these actions I never received any further communication about the mission from Mr. X and concluded that something beyond my control had occurred.

While this is true, I was astonished by what that something was.

After talking with my Thai contact and myself last week, Mario realized that the man from the Embassy had lied to him. Mario then became very apologetic, saying he was sorry and that he had misunderstood. Mario feels very bad about this occurrence now, but not half as bad as I do.

Mario told us that the man from the Embassy knew about the operation from some other source. He gave Mario the sum of 150,000 Baht, \$6,000; 50,000 one time and 100,000 another. And he said he wanted Mario to work for him and not for me. Mario stated that he gave the man some information, but refused to work for him further even though the man told Mario he would buy him a BMW automobile if he did, plus he had already been given that amount of money.

When Mario still refused the man from the American Embassy said that if Mario revealed the man's name, he could not be responsible for the fate of Mario, his daughter or his mother. Mario took this to be a threat against the lives of himself and his family. He believes that the man from the Embassy has friends in Thailand who are capable of carrying out this threat. The man from the American Embassy coerced Mario to swear an oath to Buddha that he would not tell the man's name. Mario told us that he has moved his daughter out of his house to another location to preclude her being kidnapped or killed. He is now in fear for his life.

This information was given in the presence of Judge Turner and myself and three members of the DOD/DIA who were questioning him. Mario was asked at the time what the name of the man from the Embassy was. He said he could not tell the name. No further questions were asked about this subject at all by the DIA men.

After the meeting with the DIA people—

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask you to speak into the mike a little more, Mr. Bailey?

Colonel BAILEY. After the meeting with the DIA people was concluded, Judge Turner and my Thai contact and I took Mario out to dinner. During the meal we tried to convince him to tell us who the man was, and he broke into tears and said he couldn't tell us because the man's friends would kill him.

Just before I left to return to the United States to attend this hearing, we met again with Mario at his house. After extensive discussions, Mario did in fact reveal the name of the man from the American embassy to us, which we will give to you in closed session.

From this meeting with the DIA and DOD personnel, it appears certain that there was a deliberate sabotage of the Carr operation by the introduction of misinformation in the form of lies about me and my Thai contact. There is, in fact, land owned by my contact

north of Bangkok. There was an inheritance years ago from that person's father. There was no money received by me or by anyone else in the Carr case, except what I had paid out of my own pocket for the taking of photographs, period. No money was to be paid until there was a release of the POW. The statements made by the man from the Embassy to Mario are absolutely lies from beginning to end.

There are many pitfalls in any sort of operation such as the one planned for the recovery of prisoners in the Carr case. While it cannot be proved that that operation would have ultimately succeeded, it can be stated with certainty that this man from the embassy of the United States of America cut off any chance of the mission's success by a deceitful and arguably treasonous act to kill it by lies, robbery, and threats to a Thai citizen in his own country by a representative of the Government of the United States.

The final issue I would raise for the consideration of this Committee is whether or not American prisoners of war have died as a direct result of the actions of this agent of the U.S. Government in Thailand.

Thank you for taking the time to hear me, and to hear my statement.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Bailey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACK E. BAILEY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF, (RETIRED)

Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to express my experiences and opinions about the conduct of the U.S. government in the area of recovering American prisoners of war left behind in southeast Asia.

This is a field in which I have had extensive experience. I have served in the armed forces of this country during three wars. I flew combat missions as a fighter pilot in the Vietnam war during which time I became interested in the plight of air crewmen shot down but not rescued.

After retirement from the Air Force I have dedicated my time and efforts toward the discovery of information about POW's who were left behind by the government of this country almost 20 years ago in their haste to disengage "with honor" from the war in southeast Asia they were unwilling or unable to win.

Since that time I have spent many years in southeast Asia and have cultivated hundreds of contacts with individuals who have given me intelligence concerning the fate of prisoners still being held by our former enemies. Some of that information was deliberately false, fabricated for the purpose of being sold for profit. Other intelligence is, in my opinion, valid and worthy of investigation by the governmental agencies supposedly created for that purpose.

In the past I have given valid information concerning POW's to appropriate governmental agencies. It is my belief that there was no investigation made in any of these cases. In the majority of instances I never received any sort of communication back from the agencies I had contacted, not even an acknowledgement that the information was received.

While there are numbers of cases worth discussing, I will limit this statement to the facts of the case of Army Special Forces Capt. Donald Gene Carr, presently a matter of prime interest.

In 1989 I made contact with a source of information who indicated to me that he had contact with American prisoners of war being held in Laos. After numbers of meetings with this man, referred to as "Mr. X", and a number of other individuals, we devised a detailed operation to bring two American prisoners out of captivity and into friendly hands. A great deal of thought and coordination went into the creation of this plan involving the method and route of extraction, form of transportation, security, and the payment of a substantial amount of money from private sources for the delivery of those prisoners.

As a means of providing proof of the existence of these POW's, I sent Mr. "X" into Laos with a camera and articles of clothing. Mr. "X" gave the clothing to a prisoner and took his photograph. He returned the unexposed film to me. Among the pictures that resulted was one of the man we now know as Donald Gene Carr.

After receiving the film I didn't see or hear from Mr. "X" again for almost 2 years and assumed that something had happened to him or had otherwise gone wrong to cause the plan to be compromised. It wasn't until last week that I discovered what the problem was.

Shortly after developing the Carr picture in 1990, I showed it to a senior DIA member of the American Embassy who I was informed was involved in POW/MIA affairs. I am aware of no action that was taken by the government at that time.

After several months of investigation and a comparison with pictures given to us by family members, we concluded that the man in the Laos picture was Special Forces Capt. Donald Gene Carr.

In July of 1991, Judge Norman Turner, a former Air Force fighter pilot and I prepared a package of information concerning the Carr case. In conjunction with this I released the original negatives given to me by Mr. "X" to an investigator of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who arranged to have scientific comparisons of the photos made by forensic pathologist Michael Charney of Colorado State University. Dr. Charney also concluded that the man in the photo was Carr as did family members and men who had served with Carr.

The photographs were released publicly in July 1991 within a week of the time that the Senate Select Committee was approved. At that time the Department of Defense became interested in the case and asked me to brief them on the Carr matter. Against the advice of a number of friends involved in POW/MIA affairs I agreed to do so. Although almost anyone who has dealt privately in searching for POW's distrusts the government in general and the DIA in particular in this area, I felt that I should make an effort to cooperate with the government one more time. I did so with misgivings.

At this first Pentagon briefing in August I gave to the DIA my original negatives of the Carr matter except for those showing the face of Mr. "X". I did not release the true name of Mr. "X". When interrogated by DIA concerning the location at which the photographs were taken, I indicated the site of a position that I had been informed was a POW holding location but I did not give them the true location at that time because I was not confident in their motives.

I was invited back to brief Secretary of Defense Cheney in October of 1991. Although I was still uncomfortable with the record of the DIA in the area of POW investigations I decided to cooperate fully since I felt that there would be integrity at that level of government. My feeling was that we had to trust somebody. In that briefing, therefore, I released all of the remaining information available to me at that time concerning the Carr case, including the remaining original negatives and the name of Mr. "X". At this time I indicated to Secretary Cheney the true position of the site at which I was informed Carr was held at the time the photograph was taken. I was informed that the DIA would cooperate with me and that I was to be considered "part of the team". I told Secretary Cheney and others present at the meeting that based on information I had received I thought that Mr. "X" would be in Bangkok by the time I returned to southeast Asia the next week. I told him that I would bring him into contact with people from the Defense Department if possible. I was asked on several occasions by DIA personnel if Mr. "X" would submit to a polygraph test. I told them that would be up to him.

Within a few days after the briefing, even as I made plans for a trip as "art of the team", I learned that negative information was being released about me and the Carr case by someone within DOD. I was told that people from DOD were saying that the pictures were probably taken in Thailand and that I was not cooperating with them. I was also informed that the DIA was investigating the case by looking in the Bangkok Zoo. I don't know if that is true or not.

I am now informed that earlier this week Secretary Dick Cheney testified that I told members of the DOD that I didn't know where the Carr photos were taken and that they might have been taken in Bangkok or somewhere else. Apparently he also testified that I "promised" him I had a witness in Bangkok ready to talk to his people when they arrived there. Both of these statements are false.

It is true that I was not able to "produce" Mr. "X" in Bangkok during the week that the DOD was able to dedicate to this "highest priority in the land". I tried to make contact but I have to point out that we are not dealing with livestock or retail goods here. It took me many hard years in southeast Asia to cultivate the level of trust necessary to obtain the evidence I have tried to present. Furthermore people that are able to move across borders to obtain such information live and move in a shadow world at the edges of society.

The lines of communications in that part of the world are relatively primitive. The phone systems in Bangkok are approximately at the level of the United States in the 1950's. In the remote areas of Thailand they are almost nonexistent. My pri-

mary method of communication into the "up country" regions of Thailand consists of buying a bus ticket to a remote area and sending an agent there with an oral message and instructions to try to find a telephone to call back an answer.

Mr. Chairman, I find it appalling that after almost 20 years of inaction, and only when it became apparent that members of the Defense Department would be compelled to testify before this Committee, interest has suddenly been stimulated to aggressively "investigate" a prisoner of war matter, in this instance the Carr case. During my latest trip to Thailand, during which I was "part of the team" according to Mr. Cheney, there was no question that a sense of urgency existed in the minds of those DOD/DIA people who traveled there at the same time.

Judge Turner and I were constantly reminded of the time constraints resulting from these hearings. We were repeatedly asked what could be done to "make it happen". While these travelers from Washington enjoyed their lodging in the Imperial Hotel we did our best in more spartan surroundings to "make it happen" at our own expense. Moneys were paid and bus tickets were bought but in this instance "southeast Asia" was not ready to perform at the belated cue of the DIA within their self-imposed time constraints.

The single most important lesson anyone from the west can learn in dealings in southeast Asia is that patience is a prerequisite to any sort of success to be gained there. This sort of ignorance of the ways of that part of the world is among the roots of our failure in the Vietnam war.

One individual connected to the Carr case was produced for questioning by the DIA. This man who we call "Mario" was one of my original points of contact to Mr. "X" but I did not consider him to be a major factor in the Carr operation itself. This turned out to be an error in judgment on my part.

After the photographs were developed the operation to bring out two American POW's was to proceed irrespective to any attempted identification of the subject in the picture. Mr. "X" left to continue the final stages of the plan and I waited to hear from him. Last week Mario told me what happened to cause the operation to be ended.

While I was waiting for the message from Mr. "X" to proceed with the mission, Mario was contacted by a man from the American Embassy in Bangkok. This man told Mario that I and my primary Thai contact in Bangkok had received a large sum of money for the operation but that we had kept it for our own use. The man from the Embassy told Mario that my Thai contact had bought a large and valuable piece of land north of Bangkok with the money, that we were cheating Mario, Mr. "X" and the others involved in the plan and that we intended to cut them out entirely.

As a result of the false information provided to Mario he contacted Mr. "X" and the other members of the operation, telling them that everything was off and that they were being cheated by me and my Thai contact. As a result of these actions I never received any further communication about the mission from Mr. "X" and concluded that something beyond my control had occurred. While this is true I was astonished by what that something was.

After talking with my Thai contact and myself last week Mario realized that the man from the Embassy had lied to him. Mario then became very apologetic, saying he was sorry and that he had "misunderstood". Mario feels very bad about this occurrence now but not half as bad as I do.

Mario told us that the man from the Embassy knew about the operation from some other source. He gave Mario money in the sum of 150,000 baht (\$6,000) and said he wanted Mario to work for him and not me. Mario said that he gave the man "some information" but refused to work for him further even though he told Mario he would buy him a BMW automobile if he did.

When Mario still refused the man from the American Embassy said that if Mario ever revealed the man's name he "could not be responsible" for the fate of Mario, his daughter or his mother. Mario took this to be a threat against the lives of himself and his family. He believes that the man from the Embassy has "friends" in Thailand who are capable of carrying out this threat. The man from the American Embassy coerced Mario to swear an oath to Buddha that he would not tell the man's name. Mario told us that he has moved his daughter out of his house to another location to preclude her being kidnapped or killed. He is now in fear for his life.

This information was given in the presence of Judge Turner and myself and three members of the DOD/DIA who were questioning him. Mario was asked at that time what the name of the man from the Embassy was. He said he could not tell the name. No further questions were asked about this subject at all by the DIA men.

After the meeting with the DIA people was concluded, Judge Turner, my Thai contact and I took Mario to supper. During the meal we tried to convince him to tell us who the man was and he broke into tears and said that he couldn't because the man's friends would kill him.

Just before I left to return to the United States to attend this hearing we met again with Mario at his house. After extensive discussion Mario in fact *did* reveal the name of the man from the American Embassy to us.

From this meeting and that with the DIA/DOD personnel it appears certain that there was a deliberate sabotage of the Carr operation by the introduction of misinformation in the form of lies about me and about my Thai contact. There is in fact, land owned by my contact north of Bangkok. It was an inheritance years ago from that person's father. There was no money received by me or by anyone else in the Carr case except what I had paid from my own pocket for the taking of the photographs. No money was to be paid until there was a release of a POW. The statements made by the man from the Embassy to Mario were absolute lies from beginning to end.

There are many pitfalls in any sort of operation such as the one planned for the recovery of prisoners in the Carr case. While it cannot be proved that the operation would have ultimately succeeded, it can be stated with certainty that this man from the Embassy of the United States of America cut off any chance of the mission's success by a deceitful and arguably treasonous act to kill it by lies, bribery and threats to a Thai citizen in his own country by a representative of the government of the United States.

The final issue I would raise for consideration of this Committee is whether or not American prisoners of war have died as a direct result of the actions of this agent of the U.S. government in Thailand.

Thank you for taking the time to hear my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, where are you taking off to? Do you have a plane? You just arrived.

Colonel BAILEY I have a serious illness in my family.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have to leave to go to where?

Colonel BAILEY. To Tennessee.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be here for a while so we can follow up?

Colonel BAILEY. I would very much like to answer your questions, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I mean in the next few days will you also be reachable?

Colonel BAILEY. I am heading for Thailand the first of next week. But I would make myself available in any way that I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Turner.

STATEMENT OF NORMAN M. TURNER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF (RETIRED)

Colonel TURNER. Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you for allowing me to address this Committee today. I am a former U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who flew combat missions in two tours of duty in Vietnam. I have been working with Jack Bailey primarily on the Donald Gene Carr case since the middle of June of this year. I have become familiar with the facts of this case, and I am convinced that—

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Turner, can I just ask one quick question? Are you going to summarize your testimony?

Colonel TURNER. Well, I was going to read it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. It is about 15, 20 minutes long. That is the reason I ask. Am I wrong in judging that.

Colonel TURNER. Well, I'm used to reading jury instructions. I think I can get through it quicker than that.

I am convinced that the photograph is that of Capt. Donald Gene Carr. I will condense parts of it.

I will discuss the trip to Bangkok. I went to Bangkok with Colonel Bailey, and I will summarize parts of it in the interest of time.

From the time we arrived in Bangkok until the day we left, Jack Bailey had agents up-country trying to make contact with a man who had taken the Carr photos, whom we referred to as Mr. X, and to bring him to Bangkok. Both Bailey and I paid out of our pockets for the expense of sending people to various places in Southeast Asia. This sum was well over \$2,000. At one point I observed Jack leave one of his rings in a Bangkok hock shop to obtain more money to pay for expenses for one of his sources of information.

I am aware—and if you will read along with me, I will skip paragraphs and move on down to those I consider the most pertinent to this session.

I will make this statement under oath, that to the best of my knowledge, under penalty of perjury that I swore to, that the facts of this statement are true. I am aware that testimony has been presented that while in Thailand Jack Bailey stated that the Carr pictures might have been taken in Thailand or Burma instead of Laos.

I was present at Bailey's side every second that he was in the physical presence of people from the DOD or DIA. He never made any such statement to any of them that I heard. I am as aware of his views about the Carr case as any person on earth. He does not believe any such thing. When comment has been made by others that the pictures looked as though they might have been taken in Bangkok, I have heard him state words in frustration to the effect, well, if they were taken in Thailand, let's find out where in Thailand Butch Carr is and bring him home.

Whichever small-minded DIA minion made such a bogus report to his superiors knew full well that he was quoting Bailey out of context if at all, and he also knew that no such meeting was ever intended by Bailey.

The most significant event in the trip occurred when we made contact with a Thai man called Mario. He had been involved in Jack Bailey's operation to return American prisoners of war which you have just heard about. In the process of trying to get to Mr. X to bring him back to Thailand, we received information—and I am paraphrasing now—that there was bad feelings toward Jack and his primary source of information, an individual in Bangkok.

A meeting was made through a third party between Bailey, his Thai contact, and Mario. I was not at that meeting, but I was informed later that the facts were as you have heard—this false information, which I will address in a moment.

My first contact with Mario was on the evening we brought him to meet with the DIA people. We were concerned because Mario was very apprehensive about talking to anyone from the American Embassy. We asked Colonel Cole to bring only one other person with him to keep the environment from being too intimidating. Three of them showed up. The three men who appeared to meet with Mario were Col. John Cole, Bob Sheetz, and William Gadoury.

Mario was asked why the rescue mission failed, and he told us about the man from the American Embassy who gave him money

and told him how Jack Bailey and his Thai contact were cheating him. He also said that the man who told him had told him that if Mario ever told anybody his name, he couldn't be responsible for the safety of Mario, his daughter, or his mother.

One of the DIA men asked what the embassy man's name was, and Mario said he didn't want to say. Mario said, "He is very powerful. You all know him." The questioner, Bill Gadoury, dropped the whole line of inquiry.

It was apparent to me that there existed the strong possibility that actions by an agent of the U.S. Government had deliberately killed a viable operation to rescue American prisoners of war, and I wanted to find out what I could about it.

Jack and I took Mario to supper after the DIA men left, and I tried the best I could, as gently as I could, to get him to tell me the name. He looked pained, and kept apologizing to Jack, saying, I'm sorry, I misunderstood; I can't say his name because he has many friends who would kill me.

Finally, after I explained that he might now be in greater danger if he did not tell us, he said he was sorry, he broke down and began to cry, pressing his napkin to his face. At that point we ceased to pressure him further.

Several days later, the night before I left to come back, we went over to see Mario at his house with a video camera and tape recorders and still cameras. Basically what we did is pump him for information about the name of the man. That is what I wanted.

The CHAIRMAN. The name of the man from the embassy?

Colonel TURNER. The name of the man from the embassy who had talked—who had split the operation and ended it and threatened his life.

Mario finally admitted that he had told three other people the man's name. One was a connected friend of his upcountry who had associates who Mario said, "could protect him." The other two were Mr. X himself and another person called Dr. No, one of the original old Carr operation people.

Based on his years of experience in Southeast Asia, Jack had guessed who he thought the man would be. He gave me two names quietly. I wrote them in the margins of a Thai newspaper lying on the floor in Mario's house. I said, look at these names, Mario, if you were to cross out one of them, which one would it be. And I handed Mario my pen—this pen right here, as a matter of fact. He looked at the names I had written, and after a few seconds made an X by one of the names. I asked him, cross out this one. And Mario said, "No, that him." That is a quote. We turned the video cam back on and tried to get Mario to say the name out loud but he wouldn't.

Finally, we shut off the camera and I took my tape recorder out and put it up by his mouth and I said, Mario, it's—and I spoke the man's name. It's that man, isn't it. He hesitated for a while and finally he said, in my tape recorder, yes.

I am a judge in a criminal court. I deal with victims and perpetrators of crime. Every day of the week I have heard hundreds, if not thousands, of witnesses testify. I would not bet that every detail of what Mario told us is true and complete, but I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the following.

One, Mario's loyalty is to Jack Bailey and the Carr mission were deliberately estranged by lies told him by a man who works for the Government of the United States.

Two, the mission was aborted because of the intervention of this man from the American embassy.

Three, Mario now regrets his actions in stopping the mission.

And four, Mario is terrified of the prospects of physical harm or death occurring to himself or his family through actions initiated by the man from the embassy, or that man's friends.

Mr. Chairman and Members of this Committee, you have in the span of the last 3 days been eyewitnesses to what I believe is a complete microcosm of the moral and ethical defects in governmental agencies that has plagued the conscience of this Nation since the end of the war in Southeast Asia.

You have heard testimony from at least two members of the DIA/DOD team that accompanied Jack Bailey to Thailand. Those two members were under oath to tell the truth, to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help them God, before testifying before you. It is my understanding that those team members were asked if there was anything else they know about any matter concerning the matter of POW's in Southeast Asia. Apparently none of them present at the time of the questioning of Mario bothered to mention the matter of Mario and the aborted Carr rescue mission to this panel.

I was horrified to learn of the allegations of such criminal acts by an agent of the U.S. Government. Apparently these investigators did not feel such information was even worthy of being reported to their superiors or included in their sworn testimony, even when directly asked.

The acts of the man from the embassy in aborting the Carr rescue mission by intimidation and bribery were recited by the victim of those acts in the immediate presence of Robert Sheetz, the Chief of DIA's Office of POW/MIA affairs at the Pentagon, Col. John M. Cole, Jr; the chief of the POW/MIA team at the embassy in Bangkok, and William R. Gadoury of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at the Embassy in Bangkok. These are the very men who are most responsible for the investigation of reports concerning American prisoners of war being held in Southeast Asia. How could such individuals recognize valid information concerning prisoners, if they can't even see the relevance of the information just stated?

The CHAIRMAN. The relevance of which?

Colonel TURNER. The relevance of the fact, Senator, that an operation was deliberately interfered with, that a team was split and the mission canceled, and that threats were made.

The CHAIRMAN. But all of that was laid out to them. You are saying—

Colonel TURNER. To the best of my recollection, yes. Not in detail. I mean, there was no further questioning after about 5 minutes. But to the best of my recollection it was, it certainly was laid out that that is why the mission failed.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that accurate, Colonel?

Colonel TURNER. Is Colonel Cole here?

Colonel COLE. That is not accurate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will get to you later on that.

Colonel TURNER. When the statement was made that this had happened, Colonel Cole made the statement—and I am not going to mention the man's name—there was another man, who said, was that so-and-so again. And that is when Mario said, I can't say his name, he is very powerful; you all know him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you give the name of this embassy official to the team?

Colonel TURNER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you willing to share the name of this person with us?

Colonel TURNER. Yes, but in some sort of closed session. We will explain why in a closed session. We are concerned about the life of our man.

The CHAIRMAN. Privately, after this meeting?

Colonel TURNER. Yes, sir.

Colonel BAILEY. The man would be willing to come and testify before this Committee, sir. The individual himself, Mario, would. He would be very happy to come and testify.

Colonel TURNER. In the interests of brevity that you request, Mr. Chairman, I am going to skip just to a couple more parts of my statement, which is entered into evidence, and state just a couple of things that struck me recently.

In an incident reported locally on November 6, yesterday, the Vietnam Ambassador to the United Nations, Trinh Xuan Lang, remarked that his government could quickly settle the issue of missing American prisoners of war if Washington would just stop making it a condition for normalizing relations.

I am sorry to appear in levity, but my feelings were, upon reading that quote, reminiscent of the old joke, what's he mean, Mommy.

Senator MCCAIN. He gave us a letter yesterday refuting that, saying that that is not what he said, that there was no condition.

Colonel TURNER. That is how he was quoted in the paper.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was disturbed by, apparently, the misinterpretation, and he submitted for the record a subsequent clarification.

Colonel TURNER. Very well. I would be interested to hear what the reporter recalls.

I am just going to make the last—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, incidentally, that all of that, frankly, is meaningless anyway, because the bottom line is still going to be the performance and follow-through, so this is gloss in any respect.

Colonel TURNER. To conclude, I would just like to read the last portion of my statement. On a larger scale there seems to be a prevalent presumption in the hearts and minds of our governmental leaders that unless some individual can present some solid uncontrovertible proof of the existence of a POW, that POW doesn't exist. That constitutes a presumption of death which is patent nonsense.

In the law there are many presumptions. These presumptions were conceived over the years by a process of long and careful consideration of logic and public interest. In the case of war, a living,

breathing man is sent forth into combat and, barring some positive evidence of his death, there is no conceivable reason in logic to presume such a thing just because he is missing.

There are a number of alternatives to such a conclusion. In the majority of cases. That presumption, however, appears to be the rule in our governmental policy in this area. And I would like to point out that there is nothing—none of this is aimed at this Committee. This is all that has happened up to this time.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand. We are just looking forward to a few months from now when it is. [Laughter.]

Colonel TURNER. Well, I hope that—if I can just say briefly, I—

The CHAIRMAN. We are not going to give anybody any cause to aim at us.

Colonel TURNER. I heard Senator Smith's opening statement, and that was the best I've felt in a long time, after hearing that.

Who made the decision in our Government that out of sight constitutes a presumption of death? What gave our government the right to place the burden of proof to the contrary on the families of the missing men and private seekers of prisoners to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a POW exists before the government will act? Nowhere else in our system of government does such backward thinking exist. Although our governmental spokesmen deny that this is their policy, there is a virtually unanimous opinion among the families of MIA's who have tried to deal with official agencies that such is the case.

In the undeclared war over Laos, in which I flew at least 50 strike missions, our country lost almost 600 men MIA. Not one single prisoner of war was ever returned by that country. For every 600 such losses over Vietnam, we could expect to have about 100 men returned. And my question is, what do you suppose happened to all those folks? Why is it logical to presume that they are dead without conclusive evidence to support such a conclusion?

Nowhere in the law could such logic long survive. Perhaps the difference in this instance is that there is—in the past—no one to speak for the interest of the prisoners except for those lonely voices of family members and private seekers acting alone, and without adequate means to refute the power and majesty of governmental agencies fixed in their internal agendas, who are both the investigators of the evidence and the judges of their own competence.

Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Turner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN M. TURNER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF
(RETIRED)

Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you for allowing me to address this Committee today.

I am a former U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who flew combat missions in two tours of duty in Vietnam. I have been working with Jack Bailey primarily on the Donald Gene Carr case since the middle of June of this year. I have become familiar with the facts of this case and am convinced that the photograph presented to the DOD and the press depicting a man held captive in Laos is in fact Capt. Donald Gene Carr.

I accompanied Jack Bailey on his first briefing of members of the Department of Defense and DIA in August, 1991. I also traveled with him to Thailand 2 weeks ago to help try to provide information requested by Secretary of Defense Cheney con-

cerning the Carr case. I will state my observations and conclusions of the conduct of the latter trip to the Committee.

I was aware that Jack Bailey was frustrated by the inaction of the DIA before the trip started. He had given them his original negatives from which the Carr photos were made. Although he had requested their return, that had not been done. Nor had he been repaid for his airline tickets for his travel to and from the Pentagon briefings as he had been promised.

From the time we arrived in Bangkok until the day we left Jack had agents up country trying to make contact with the man who had taken the Carr photos who we referred to as Mr. "X" and to bring him to Bangkok. Both Bailey and I paid out of our own pockets for the expense of sending people to various places in Southeast Asia. This sum was well over two thousand dollars. At one point I observed Jack leave one of his rings in a Bangkok hock shop to obtain more money to pay for expenses for one of his sources of information.

It was a frustrating time for both of us which was not helped by the numerous daily phone calls from the embassy asking if we had heard anything. On every occasion that we spoke to the DIA people they made mention of how short the time was before they had to return to Washington for the hearings. It was obvious to me that they were far more interested in providing information to their superiors about the Carr case than in actual investigations of POW's. On one occasion Colonel Cole asked, "what am I going to put into my report tonight?"

I am aware that testimony has been presented that while in Thailand Jack Bailey stated that the Carr pictures might have been taken in Thailand or Burma instead of Laos. I was present at Bailey's side every second that he was in the physical presence of people from the DOD/DIA. He never made any such statement to any of them. I am as aware of his views about the Carr case as any person on earth. He does not believe any such thing.

When comment was made by others that the pictures looked as though they might have been taken in Bangkok, I have heard him state words in frustration to the effect, "well if they were taken in Thailand, let's find out where in Thailand Butch Carr is and bring him home".

Whichever small minded DIA minion made such a bogus report to his superiors knew full well that he was quoting Bailey out of context and he also knew that no such meaning was ever intended by him.

The most significant event in the trip occurred when we made contact with a Thai man called Mario. He had been involved in Jack Bailey's operation to return American prisoners of war held in Laos in 1990 which was to include Donald gene Carr. Jack had been talking to people close to Mr. "X" trying to get him back down to Bangkok. When Mario was contacted in this process the word came back to us that he had bad feelings toward Jack and his primary source of information in Bangkok.

Through the help of a third party a meetings was made by Jack and his Thai contact with Mario. I was not present at that first meeting but I was told that Mario had become alienated from the two of them because of information given to him by a man from the American embassy in Bangkok while the plan was in process. As a result of the statements of this man Mario became convinced that he and the other members of the team were being cheated out of money by Jack Bailey and his Thai contact and Mario convinced the others to call off the operation. After the discussion between the three of them Mario realized that he had been told lies by the man from the embassy. He became contrite and apologized to Jack and his Thai contact for believing the worst about them.

My first contact with Mario was on the evening we brought him to meet with the DIA people. We were concerned because Mario was very apprehensive about talking to anyone from the American embassy. We asked Colonel Cole to bring only one other person with him to keep the environment from being too intimidating. Three of them showed up. This was consistent with the mode of operation I have observed in dealing with the DOD and DIA throughout my limited experiences with them. They always went at least one step beyond what they agreed to. The three men who appeared to meet with Mario were Col. John Cole, Bob Sheetz and William Gaudoury.

We asked them to sit down and talk a little while socially with Mario before starting to interrogate him in order to let him relax a little first. As soon as Mario sat down they whipped out their pads and started taking down everything he said. The first words addressed to Mario were that there was no credibility with his name because he didn't look like a "Mario".

The questioning was fairly inept at that meeting but there was one significant area addressed briefly. Mario was asked why the rescue mission failed and he told

us about the man from the American embassy who gave him money and told him how Jack Bailey and his Thai contact were cheating him out of his share of the money for the Carr operation. He also said that the man had told him that if Mario ever told anybody his name he couldn't be responsible for the safety of Mario, his daughter or his mother. One of the DIA men asked what the embassy man's name was. Mario said he didn't want to say it. Mario said, "he is very powerful. You all know him". The questioner, Bill Gaudoury, dropped the whole line of inquiry.

It was apparent to me that there existed the strong possibility that actions by an agent of the U.S. government had deliberately killed a viable operation to rescue American prisoners of war and I wanted to find out what I could about it. Jack and I took Mario to supper after the DIA men left. Mario, ordered the most expensive item on the menu which went on my credit card. After we finished eating I tried as gently as I could to entice the name of the embassy man from Mario. He looked very pained and kept apologizing to Jack saying, "I'm sorry. I misunderstood. He told me you were cheating us. I can't say his name because he has many friends who would kill me."

Finally, after we explained that he might now be in greater danger if he did not tell us the man's name he said he was sorry again and he began to cry, pressing his napkin to his eyes. At that point we ceased to pressure him further.

Several days later, on the evening before I left Bangkok, Jack Bailey, his Thai contact and I went to Mario's house. We brought a video camera, tape recorders and 35 millimeter cameras.

After talking with Mario for a while we set up the video camera and proceeded to do an interview with him. I did the questioning. On several occasions I referred to the actions and statements of the "man from the embassy" and he responded appropriately.

He told us that he had been contacted by this man who paid him a total of 150,000 Thai baht. Mario said that this man told him bad things about Jack and his Thai contact and said they were cheating him and the others out of the money that had been paid for the rescue operation. He was told that the Thai contact had used some of the money to buy a big farm north of Bangkok. In actual fact that Thai contact inherited a larger parcel of land from relatives years before. Mario said that he had no money then so he took what was given to him. Afterwards he said, he refused to work with the man from the embassy but he was still angry with Jack, and his Thai contact at that time. Mario said he spent the money in 2 days in women and partying because it was "black money".

After a time we turned off the camera and the tape recorders and just sat talking. I again discussed the danger of his position noting that the embassy probably knew who the man was and if he would tell us he would be safer. Mario finally admitted that he had told three other people. One was a "connected" friend of his up country who had friends Mario hoped could protect him. The other two were Mr. "X" and "Dr. No", two of the old Carr operation people.

Based on his years of experience in Southeast Asia, Jack Bailey had guessed that the man involved was one of two people he knew. Jack quietly told me the two names and I wrote them on the margin of a Thai newspaper lying on the floor in Mario's house. I said, "look at these names Mario. If you were to cross out one of them which one would it be?" I handed Mario my pen.

He looked at the names I had written and after a few seconds made an "x" by one of the names. I asked him, "cross out this one?"

Mario said, "No. That him".

We turned the video cam back on and I tried to get Mario to say the name out loud but he wouldn't. Finally we shut off the video camera and I turned on my little tape recorder again. I held it up in front of him and said to Mario, "it's isn't it?" He hesitated for several seconds and finally, quietly said, "yes".

I am a judge in a criminal court. I deal with victims and perpetrators of crimes every work day of the week. I have heard hundreds if not thousands of witnesses testify. I would not bet that every detail of what Mario told us is true and complete but I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the following.

1. Mario's loyalties to Jack Bailey and the Carr mission were deliberately estranged by lies told to him by a man who works for the government of the United States.

2. The mission was aborted because of the intervention of this man from the American embassy.

3. Mario now regrets his actions in stopping the mission.

4. Mario is terrified of the prospect of physical harm or death occurring to himself or his family through actions initiated by the man from the embassy or his "friends".

I have always considered myself a loyal American. I have served my country as an officer of the U.S. Air Force and a fighter pilot who flew over 335 combat missions in Southeast Asia. I am a registered republican who has been a member of the establishment all of my adult life. To say my faith in the government has now been shaken now is a significant understatement.

Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, you have in the span of the last 3 days been eyewitnesses to a complete microcosm of the moral and ethical defect in governmental agencies that has plagued the conscience of this Nation since the end of the war in Southeast Asia.

You have heard testimony from at least two members of the DIA/DOD team that accompanied Jack Bailey to Thailand. Those team members swore an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help them God before testifying before you.

It is my understanding that those team members were asked if there was anything else they knew about any matter concerning the matter of POW's in Southeast Asia. Apparently none of them present at the time of the questioning bothered to mention the matter of Mario and the aborted Carr rescue mission.

I was horrified to learn of the allegations of such criminal acts by an agent of the U.S. government. Apparently these "investigators" did not feel such information was even worthy of being reported to their superiors or included in their sworn testimony even when directly asked.

The acts of the man from the embassy in aborting the Carr rescue mission by intimidation and bribery were recited by the victim of those acts in the immediate presence of Robert Sheetz, the chief of DIA's office of POW/MIA affairs at the Pentagon, Col. John M. Cole, Jr., the chief of the POW/MIA team at the embassy of the United States in Bangkok, Thailand and William R. Gadoury of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at the American embassy in Bangkok. These are the very men who are most responsible for the investigation of reports concerning American prisoners of war being held in Southeast Asia by our government. How could such individuals recognize valid information concerning prisoners if they can't even see the relevance of the information just stated.

The only alternative conclusion to a complete breakdown of judgment on the part of three of the most critical members of our government's primary POW investigation team is that they are willing to ignore or hide evidence that they know is relevant or were ordered to do so. When such conduct is done under oath it is called perjury or worse.

You have heard the testimony of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford, Jr., which was apparently based on information provided by members of the team just discussed. The "independent" statements presented to this Committee by these two most senior members of the governmental agency responsible for investigating POW reports are remarkable in their consistency. The words "lock step" seem anarchistic in comparison.

I pray that this Committee will look closely into the methods, procedures and philosophy employed by those governmental agencies and individuals who, in the last 20 years, have been entrusted with that most solemn and sacred trust of seeking the truth about our men left behind.

It appears to me that what you have seen is the presentation of a governmental agency that has a firm and solidly understood "party line" as expressed by its leaders. You have seen and heard from key witnesses from the operational level who saw fit to omit the information that appears to me to be one of the most dramatic allegations I have ever heard in the area of POW investigations.

Finally and most importantly it appears to me the strong possibility that a viable private operation to rescue American prisoners of war was aborted by the deliberate efforts of a member of the embassy of the United States in Bangkok, Thailand. Further it appears that this man did so by the deliberate intimidation of a Thai citizen in his own country. The specter of an employee of our government doing such an act is unspeakable not only for its impact on the lives and possibly the deaths of American prisoners but as an international crime which would certainly result in a justifiable complaint from the government of a friendly nation and an international incident if found to be true.

It would certainly take more than the unverified word of a single witness to prove such an allegation. Without doubt it warrants the singular attention of some official body of our government that doesn't have a stake in the outcome of the investigation. A key issue in such an investigation is whether or not the actions of this man were sanctioned by his supervisors and hence an official act of our government.

Finally I would like to address the statement I understood was made on November 5, 1991 by Secretary Cheney that there is no conclusive evidence of prisoners alive in Southeast Asia.

Before the latest trip to Thailand by the DIA people Cheney indicated to Jack Bailey that he was very interested in the Carr case and was going to do everything in his power to investigate the matter. He even put on a POW/MIA bracelet with Carr's name on it given him by Bailey saying he would continue to wear it.

Now, 2 weeks later he makes a public statement that there is no conclusive evidence of POW's and that none of the leads have panned out. I find it absolutely incredible that the government of the United States for which Cheney speaks can make such an about face concerning the "highest national priority" after a single week of non-investigation in Thailand. This is the equivalent of a local police chief stating that there is no evidence of a crime because his officers are unable to bring in a key witness within 2 or 3 days.

In the face of the evidence that has been presented in the Carr case Cheney's statement appears irresponsible at best. The above noted hypothetical police chief would soon be looking for another job but such thinking doesn't seem to be hazardous to a federal career. This sort of counter logic is beyond belief yet it appears to be the mind set of our government when the issue of POW's is raised.

In an incident reported locally on November 6, 1991, the Vietnam ambassador to the United Nations, Trinh Xuan Lang remarked that his government could quickly settle the issue of missing American prisoners of war if Washington would just stop making it a condition for normalizing relations.

My feelings upon reading that quote were reminiscent of a child asking, "what does he mean mommy?"

On a larger scale there seems to be a prevalent presumption in the hearts and minds of our governmental leaders that unless some individual can present solid, uncontroverted proof of the existence of a POW, the POW doesn't exist. That constitutes a presumption of death which is patent nonsense.

In the law there are many presumptions. These presumptions were conceived over the years by a process of long and careful considerations of logic and public interest.

In the case of war a living, breathing man is sent forth into combat and barring some positive evidence of his death there is no conceivable reason in logic to presume such a thing just because he is missing. There are a number of alternatives to such a conclusion in the majority of cases. That presumption, however, appears to be the rule in our governmental policy in this area.

Who made the decision in our government that out of sight constitutes a presumption of death. What gave our government the right to place the burden of proof to the contrary on the families of the missing men and private seekers of prisoners to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a POW exists before the government will act? Nowhere else in our system of government does such backward thinking exist. Although our governmental spokesmen deny that this is their policy, there is a virtually unanimous opinion among the families of MIA's who have tried to deal with official agencies that such is the case.

In the undeclared war over Laos, in which I flew at least 50 strike missions, our country lost almost 600 men MIA. Not one single prisoner of war was ever returned by that country. For every 600 such losses over Vietnam we could expect to have over 100 men returned. What do you supposed happened to all those folks? Why is it logical to presume they are dead without "conclusive evidence" to support such a conclusion?

Nowhere in the law could such logic long survive. Perhaps the difference in this instance is that there is no one to speak for the interests of the prisoners except those lonely voices of family members and private seekers acting alone and without adequate means to refute the power and majesty of governmental agencies fixed in their internal agendas who are both the investigators of the evidence and the judges of their own competence.

Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, thank you for your attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Let me just say, folks, that we began this panel half an hour ago. It was supposed to have been two 5-minute statements—what was supposed to be two 5-minute statements. It has been about 27 minutes. So I am trying to obviously keep the process moving and be fair to everybody.

The importance here is going to be the capacity to question and get at this a little bit. And so I do beg your cooperation, if we can.

Now, Mr. Bailey, you have to leave for a plane. Is that accurate?

Colonel BAILEY. I would like very much to stay and listen to what Colonel Cole here has to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we want to be able to have a chance to ask some questions.

Colonel BAILEY. I will stay here until midnight to answer any questions you have, regardless.

The CHAIRMAN. Then could we proceed with the next testimony? I am not sure how—

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I do have to catch a plane, and I promised Colonel Bailey that I would ask him a couple of questions, if you do not mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Be my guest.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you for your service to our country, both of you; we are very grateful. I will make my questions brief. Clearly there is a strong disagreement between what both of you have just testified to, and what Secretary Cheney testified to. So either one of you is correct or he is misinformed, one of the two. Would you agree with that, Colonel Bailey?

Colonel BAILEY. Definitely, sir.

Senator McCAIN. It says on page 22 of his statement, he says, "Senate staff mission," he says, "I provided several experts to go along on the trip because of purporting to have hot information. The individual"—is he talking about Mario—"subsequently provided the Senate staffer with a source who failed a polygraph test."

I take it the individual is you?

Colonel BAILEY. No, sir. I took a polygraph test on my own.

Senator McCAIN. I am talking about Mario.

Colonel BAILEY. That is not true, sir; that is absolutely false.

Senator McCAIN. Maybe I am talking about the wrong trip here that the Secretary of Defense is talking about.

Colonel BAILEY. If I could clear this up. They did ask if he would take a polygraph, and after, that evening, they asked if he would, and I said we would talk about it and ask him. And I believe it was the next day or a couple of days, we did ask him, and he said, I do not trust them, period. He said, I will not.

Mr. LUNDY. This is about a different trip.

Senator McCAIN. So Mario never took a polygraph test?

Colonel BAILEY. But I believe he would be happy to now, after all of this. I believe he would be happy to; he will come here and testify.

Senator McCAIN. Did the picture of Captain Borah come to either one of you?

Colonel BAILEY. No, but I was familiar with it, through the source, yes.

Senator McCAIN. Do you accept the alleged proof now that that is not Captain Borah, but that is a Laotian?

Colonel BAILEY. Sir, I would prefer not to comment. I think you should ask Mr. Gayden that question.

Senator McCAIN. OK. So the fact is that the whole mission was aborted, in your view, because of interference from someone in the American embassy in Thailand?

Colonel BAILEY. There is no doubt about it in my mind, sir. Definitely.

Senator McCAIN. The three individuals who Colonel Turner mentions in his statement basically did nothing about it? The three, Colonel Cole, et cetera. Is that right?

Mr. TURNER. I am not sure what they could have done about it as far as anything at that time. But I was surprised that it was not reported either in Mr. Cheney's report to you, testimony, or by themselves, when they testified before you. That is my comment. I could not believe they had mentioned, that they did not feel it was important enough to mention.

Senator McCAIN. In other words, how could such individuals recognize valid information about prisoners if they cannot even see the relevance of the information just stated? So you are accusing them of at least non-carrying out of their duties, failure to carry out their duties?

Mr. TURNER. Well, as kindly as possible I am questioning their judgment in not seeing that this is relevant information. If they did not understand the total picture there, they could have asked more questions. I thought that it was quite clear at the meeting they had there, after just a short time after he would not answer the question of the man's name.

Senator McCAIN. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, we need to get to the bottom of this. I have no further questions at this time. I, like Colonel Bailey, look forward to the responses. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Bailey, just share with me what do you do?

Colonel Bailey. What do I do?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel BAILEY. I spend my time 100 percent working this issue, Mr. Chairman. I spend 8 to 10 months out of the year in Thailand working this issue, and have for the past 10 years solid—I started in 1965 on this, actually—on the POW-MIA's. I would like to discuss many more cases.

I did not want to get away from the Carr case, but there are many others that should be brought up and this Committee should be aware of.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Committee is going to. That is why I asked you how long you are going to be here. We do not want you to have flown so far at expense and everything, and not have the opportunity to talk to you. We want to review all the information that you have in all the other cases.

So that is why it is particularly important if you can make certain you are available in the next days so staff can spend time with you, and actually go through the deposition process and begin to build the record here. We need to do that.

Colonel BAILEY. I will be happy to cooperate with you, sir, and I assure you I am going to bring Mario to this country, and he will be available to testify. We also have more than 1 hour of videotape of this man's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. We look forward to that. Now, who funds that operation?

Colonel BAILEY. Who funds it? I think he sort of funded the last trip with me. I funded the expenses of trying to find Mr. X out of my own pocket. I even hocked my ring at the time that I had to send the last man up.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are living in Thailand, basically in retired status. Is that accurate?

Colonel BAILEY. I am Retired Air Force, yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is how you support yourself?

Colonel BAILEY. That is right. Colonel Wallace Robinson from Kansas, my classmate, who is very close to the Senator here, and Senator Dole, has really funded me, and through other people who believe in what we are doing. While on the other side, the DIA and other people try to discredit what I am trying to do. I appreciate your good friend, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you express any concern to any of the DIA folks or to, either to Mr. Ford's DIA staff or to Pentagon staff that the CIA, you were concerned about going back because of the CIA?

Colonel BAILEY. Definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. You did express that?

Colonel BAILEY. Well, I did mention it, I believe, to Colonel Jordan, and Judge Turner was with me when we were briefed by the contact CIA person that gave us the information. We felt it was pretty reliable, and I think we could give you that in closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have shared that with DIA?

Colonel BAILEY. Some of it I believe I did, with Colonel Jordan.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell Mr. Ford's staff that you were concerned about, that you had been told by some Congressman's staff that CIA would be following you in Bangkok?

Mr. TURNER. May I address that, Mr. Chairman? I received a phone call from the Carr family member from Florida who was upset, saying her daughter had received a call from, I believe it was Representative—or Congressman—Goss' secretary.

I then spoke to the daughter, a very level-headed person, and that daughter told me that she had, that when this woman—whose name I believe is Christie Hahn, a secretary/aide of Congressman Goss—called her, said she had just gotten off the phone from the DIA, the DOD, excuse me, and that they had told her that they thought that the pictures were taken in Bangkok or Thailand.

And that when they went back, which was just before this last trip, the DIA and CIA were going to be following Jack around; they were going to be hanging on to his coattails. I guess at that point, this daughter, loyal to our side, got into an argument with her. And she said, well, Jack will not know it because they will be in civilian clothes.

We talked to the folks here from the DOD, and they assured us no such thing had occurred; nobody was badmouthing Jack. But this is something that just did not come out of the air.

The CHAIRMAN. When you met with DIA in August, did you tell them you knew the locations for up to 14 camps that hold prisoners in Laos?

Colonel BAILEY. At our first meeting we had in August, the judge was with me; so was Col. Wallace Robinson. Yes, I did. We did give them information; I do not know the exact numbers, but we gave them quite a bit of information, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell them you would provide them those locations?

Colonel BAILEY. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you done that?

Colonel BAILEY. I do not think I provided them with 14, but I provided them with—when we met with Secretary Cheney, with two Congressmen, McCloskey from Indiana, I did give them the locations, the new camps, the updates that we had with POW's, the information, the latest that we had, even with the names of the camp commanders.

May I add, if I could at this time, I made it very pointed that these people were being held, including Carr, by the 379th Division, North Vietnamese Division, inside of Laos, and gave them the names of the people, of the camp commanders, even the pictures that I had, and the Carr pictures, the name of that Lieutenant Colonel, the Vietnamese, the major Pathet Lao.

I went further. I am sure that they would be happy to turn that information over to you; if they do not, I will. That was the first day. The second day, I was asked to stay over. No, this was the second trip; I am confused. The first 2 days we spent, Judge Turner was with me, Larry Stark, and Wally Robinson—Colonel Robinson.

We turned over everything to them on the Carr case, with the exception—we were talking negatives now—we gave the pictures, the negatives of everything but the picture showing the man that took the photos, Mr. X, and the Lieutenant Colonel, and the Pathet Lao major.

The CHAIRMAN. This Mr. X is somebody that has access to the camp?

Colonel BAILEY. Within the Laotian Government, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. X is within the Laotian Government?

Colonel BAILEY. Working with the Laotian Government at that time, yes, sir. Now, this information was given to them.

The CHAIRMAN. How many locations did you identify where the Carr photograph was taken at? Did you have different views about that?

Colonel BAILEY. Yes, I did, sir, definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that by mistake?

Colonel BAILEY. The first one I gave them, the Senator here has a report that we gave to her through Colonel Robinson quite some time ago, that indicated where this camp was, to Senator Dole and to Senator Kassebaum. This was this last year.

Now, in the report that we gave to her was the same thing we gave to DIA, and then after I went back to Thailand we did have some updated information on some new camps, and the possibility where these 30 people might have been moved to, including Carr, which we gave at that time, even the names of the commander that was commanding these camps.

I would like to make this one comment, and we are talking about the Vietnamese; there is no one, I do not think, in Vietnam, because they have been moved into Laos, and some into Cambodia. Even the 379th Division people that we have a contact with want to assist and to help on the POW issue; they are being pulled out this month right after the monsoons.

Right now would be the time for the U.S. Government to try to negotiate this thing with them, and this is what we said. I believe the best way to bring them out now is diplomacy. But five Presidents have not done it; we have not done it from the private sector,

and we join forces with the Government here and look what happens. I do not have the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to make sure other Senators have a chance. Do you want to ask questions of Mr. Bailey now, Senator, and get the rest of the testimony? Could we then hear the rest of the testimony? I do not know who is next, and then we will come back. Why do we not go with—

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Would it be all right if Mr. Gayden testified?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, sure.

Mr. GAYDEN. I will not read my statement; I will just orally present the viewpoints that I wanted to present.

The CHAIRMAN. Your full statement will be placed in the record. I would remind everybody that their full statement is placed in the record as if you had spoken it, and it is under oath.

STATEMENT OF HAMILTON GAYDEN, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT JUDGE

Mr. GAYDEN. Thank you, Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, Senator McCain, Senator Reid, and Senator Kassebaum. My name is Judge Hamilton Gayden. I am a Tennessee Circuit Judge. I am graduate of Vanderbilt University and Vanderbilt Law School, and have been a judge for 17 years.

I am also an author of a book that was published in 1987 entitled, *To Circle the Cross*, which is a fictional story of an MIA retained in Laos after the war, predicated upon the sinful fact that we abandoned 600 American MIA's in Laos, and that they were not covered by any treaty.

I also introduce to you and have sent you my court officer who works for me during the day, and together we work at odd hours trying to prove that there are live American POW's in Southeast Asia. His name is Khambang Sibounheavang. Khambang is a 10-year veteran of the secret war in Laos. He is a 13th-ranked member of the Free International Lao.

I bring to you a little bit of a different viewpoint. I am not a Vietnam veteran; I have never been to Asia. I advise Khambang and his friends who are part of the freedom fighters internationally what to do with evidence that they have been able to procure from Southeast Asia. Khambang has many contacts, even in his family; even one family member is a ranking member of the Communist government today.

The bottom line is that I am convinced that there are over 300 American POW's. I am going to talk about Dan Borah in a minute. I do not back up from that, but I hear a message from you, Senators; you are tired, and I appreciate your patience. I want to start out at the top and then get off this and not steal the thunder of the Stevens, Lundy, and Robertson families.

As an American, I was part of this, the American end of an escape attempt 3 weeks ago which failed, on October 16, 3 weeks to this day, the gentleman who was interdicted on the shore of the Mekong River was Colonel Lundy. In the process, we were able to gain certain evidence, letters, for the third time, original thumbprints and handprints. These are copies.

We actually have matching handprints and thumbprints, although I will say parenthetically that our government cannot come

up with one single set of fingerprints or thumbprints of Col. Albro Lundy. I have come to learn through Albro Lundy, III, that Albro Lundy, was a UCLA basketball player, and having played under Coach Wootten as a sideline, has tremendously big hands and big thumbs. As you can see from this, he has abnormal hands; there is not a man in this building that can match this thumbprint.

Senator REID. That is this man right here?

Mr. LUNDY. No, he is talking about Maj. Albro Lundy.

Mr. GAYDEN. I am going to get on Dan Borah in a minute. Today I gave to the American Legion this morning root hair samples that they have taken, and they are going to run a DNA and report back to this Committee.

I have done this because I think the American Legion is a third-party; they have no interest in whether I am telling the truth. I have no interest in conflicting with Secretary Cheney when he calls us fraudulent and those kind of things. I am not going to get into name-calling.

The CHAIRMAN. A root hair sample on—

Mr. GAYDEN. On Albro Lundy. And we hope that that report will be made to you. We are told that—

The CHAIRMAN. But from where? You have got to help me out here.

Mr. GAYDEN. These hair samples came through the Laotian network across Mekong River, delivered to a freedom fighter, then to my court officer and then delivered to the American Legion this morning.

Senator REID. When was it delivered, John?

Mr. GAYDEN. This morning at 8.

The CHAIRMAN. It was delivered to the American Legion this morning?

Mr. GAYDEN. The hair samples were delivered to us approximately a month ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how would a neutral person looking at this have any way of ascertaining the custody of this? I mean, you are a judge; you are both judges. And for evidence to be probative, you have got to be able to show the chain of custody. Now, how does anybody know where this really came from? That is all I am asking.

Mr. GAYDEN. Senator, you are right, and not to be argumentative, I do not know who all takes these hair samples. I do know, however, that hair samples can be aged; in other words, an expert can tell you whose hairs are 2 months old. That to me would answer the custody, the hair sample custody question, because we know that Colonel Lundy is not running around in the U.S. So to answer that, it can be aged.

The CHAIRMAN. I will get at that later, but it does not really answer my question, but that is all right.

Mr. GAYDEN. At any rate, if it is his hair, and it is 2 months old, I think the logical answer is that this hair, 2 months old, of Albro Lundy, Col. Albro Lundy, is somewhere in Southeast Asia. As far as to who handled it, it came through the network of the—through the network, and I cannot answer that. I am not going to steal their thunder, as I said. We have several handprints and fingerprints.

I will say parenthetically that we had, through a Senate investigator through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a free check on fingerprints of four individuals in March of 1991. We were told through an intermediary that the handprints and fingerprints of Colonel Stevens—excuse me, Commander Stevens—and Colonel Robertson were in the files of the Defense Department. And 3 weeks later these gentlemen say they cannot find any fingerprints.

At any rate, I am going to turn now to Mr. Borah. In July of 1990, Khambang, my court officer, received 23 negatives. He also received a message that this gentleman's name was D-e-c-a-e-k-o-s, or B-a-r-a.

We had the negatives developed; we also had other information, his wife's name, his son's name, his daughter's name, and a message that he wanted to come home, but only with his children and his wife, and also with this other man. He would be Bara or Decaekos, as they pronounced it to us phonetically. They handed to me, and I converted the Decaekos to a rather simple conversion. There was a guy, Col. Robert Disenkowski.

We contacted his wife through another intermediary we had in Arizona. His wife lives in Mesa, Arizona. She was interviewed; she could not recognize this as her husband. They gave the picture back to me, and through the process of elimination, and actually looking at this Life magazine that I see here, this one night I was able to identify Colonel Borah. We knew he was from Arizona, but we knew that Disenkowski was probably with this guy. I did see the picture of Daniel Borah, and I immediately thought that was him.

To make a long story short, through various correspondence and, to be as tactful as I could, I got the Borahs to send me pictures. In turn, after I saw the pictures of Dan Borah as a child and as a young adult, I called the Borahs in Illinois and asked them to come down to Nashville. Mr. and Mr. Borah and one of the Borah girls came down to Nashville, and Khambang went out, and we went out and met them. I apologized to them for even intruding in their lives, because they had given up on their son.

And I told them, "I want you to tell us this is not your son, and we will go away; I do not want you to tell us this is your son." That is exactly the way I said it. And they looked at it and said—I noticed tears in the eyes of Mr. Borah, and I noticed a shock in Mrs. Borah.

Senator REID. Is this the picture right here? You are talking about the middle picture?

Mr. GAYDEN. No, we are talking about this. So they went back to Albion, Illinois, and called me up and said, Judge, basically, to paraphrase, this is our son. And they said, well, what do we do. I said, well, the first thing I want you to do is tell me about all the family members.

There were five children, and the mother and father. And I said, each of you must say 100 percent, each of you must be convinced. We actually made a video that I got them down in Nashville in my jury room. I was convinced—

Senator McCAIN. Judge, could you get to the part where we have now got pictures of a Laotian of French blood?

Mr. GAYDEN. The mountain man has been introduced, and of course we all want to believe; the government comes up with a picture of a mountain man and says, this is mountain man, and not Dan Borah. We all want to believe. And they have got that benefit working for them.

I will have to tell you that I gave to the government the picture of Dan Borah, trying to cooperate with them one more time, along with, in that picture, the man they call the business man. I sent a letter, and I will make an exhibit, on July 24, asking for two things to Major Gittins.

[The letter referred to follows:]

STATE OF TENNESSEE, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
502 METROPOLITAN COURTHOUSE, NASHVILLE, TN 37201,
July 24, 1991.

MAJ. CHARLES GITTINS,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Pentagon, Washington, DC.

DEAR SIR: Enclosed please find 1 of 19 photographs of Lt. Daniel Borah. As a comment, the individual alone with him is a Laotian National and his life is obviously presently in jeopardy. We are doing all we are able to protect him under the circumstances; I hope your department will use this photo advisedly even though it has been otherwise decimated.

As you know we have a map depicting where Larry Stevens, Albro Lundy Jr., John Robertson and an unnamed fourth individual were being held as of 6 to 8 weeks ago. Despite pleas from several quarters, Khambang and I have decided that the only useful entity that should be apprised of this fact is the Executive branch of our government in hopes that at least satellite surveillance would be considered.

In relaying this information to you and to Colonel Jordan, I don't pretend to be the beneficiary of forthcoming satellite photographs and interpretations, I am simply making a statement of believed fact that is of import. To reiterate the location of the place where these men are being held: Savoy Island, Vietnam, at the mouth of the Ladda River, completely surrounded by water with no bridge. There is at least one building and believe it is part of the Vietnamese Sea Survival School, and there exists military installations on banks on both sides of the island. Although the map doesn't tell we also believe Savoy Island is in a "Vinh . . ." bay, and is on the coast of Vietnam somewhere near the old DM zone extended. I have confidence others know of this location by map in the Department of Defense.

We are studying the best method to release to the Department of Defense the various affidavits surrounding the Borah photograph as it contains the name of our photographer, and others, and is astonishingly attested to by a certain local Pathet Lao Colonel with an official Pathet Lao Seal. We will contact your Department with a suggestion that we are presently working on through the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee before whom we have agreed to testify.

Khambang and I are willing to cooperate with the Department of Defense circumscribed by other considerations. We are, for example, very concerned over the whereabouts, if not lost or destroyed, of the fingerprints of Lt. Borah; we know the family has been requesting them for sometime.

Regards,

Hamilton Gayden, Khambang Sibounheuang.

(This letter was hand-typed by Judge Hamilton Gayden and no other persons other than the reader is apprised of the location of Americans, by and through either Hamilton Gayden or Khambang Sibounheuang.)

I gave him a letter, I said, you can test it; it is a first-generation negative. I also mentioned, and I am going to come back to that, that Stevens, Lundy, and Robertson were on Savoy Island by way of a hand-drawn map, which is in possession of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which you are welcome to have. I asked them for a satellite photo—I am going to this story, and then I am going to get back to Borah.

My contacts told us they brought heavy equipment out to Savoy Island, tore down the buildings, and moved Lundy, Robertson, and all off the island. Back to Borah. Instead of protecting the picture of Borah, the government made copies of it and sent it to the communists; it was on Laotian television. Our people, our—

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that? Hold on. Why is that? They sent it over there to try to trace him, did they not?

Mr. GAYDEN. We asked in the letter, we told them that this guy in the pictures, his life was in jeopardy. Obviously it is in jeopardy. So they put it on Laotian television.

The CHAIRMAN. But let me just ask you, and I am sorry to keep interrupting, but your 5-minute summary is already a 19 minute discussion, and I want to get to the point here. I mean, the question is the evidence, correct? Here is a photograph which you have appropriately brought forward and suggested is Dan Borah, correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, our people have gone out and I gather that the Borah family is flying over, the Government is taking them over—am I correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand they are flying over at their own expense. But what I am saying is that they are going to be taken to this person. Is that not correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. That is right, which of course we would rather be taken to where the person was so he can point out where the picture was taken, and there are some other anomalies, too, that we know about that they do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Will there not be momentarily a very clear comparison, or am I missing something?

Mr. GAYDEN. You are exactly right. The two Borah sons will be able to look at this man and tell whether it is their brother, of course. And they will be able to take pictures.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, what is the issue in terms of this?

Mr. GAYDEN. I am not sure what the issue is.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, may I ask, here are two pictures, one that you provided, and here is the one that the government took. Apparently this is the same individual, or is it not the same individual?

Mr. GAYDEN. Let me answer you. That is what the Government says.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking for your opinion.

Mr. GAYDEN. In my opinion, absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. These two individuals look strikingly similar.

Mr. GAYDEN. Well, we have showed that in a short period of time to seven experts in the St. Louis area, and every one of them, and I can quote them, that in this photograph, the Government's photograph is probably tampered with.

Senator McCain. The Government photograph is tampered with?

Mr. GAYDEN. That is correct. They have overlaid the photograph, and I have got seven experts, and they are looking, by the way, at a third-generation photograph, not the negatives, which the government has.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you submit to the Committee the names of the seven experts?

Mr. GAYDEN. I have them right here, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

FORENSIC PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS

1. Upon initiating this facet of the investigation, Covert Inquiries received, from said client, Five (5) 5 x 7 photos, depicting subject "AHRAO", (purportedly identified as same by the JCRC—CILHI Investigative Team), in the company of another Lao Theung, Mr. Bounthon, and several various team investigators. These photos were received by this reporting agency on 10-23-91. Said Government Investigative Team members purportedly took said photos in Laos on 12 Sept. 91 and subsequently forwarded said photos to the indicated client.

2. In an effort to verify the authenticity of said received JCRC team photos, Chief Chemist, Harold Messler, Laboratory Division, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, St. Louis, MO, was contacted who advised following listed evidence technician was the Department's resident photo expert: Police Officer James Stegman, 4986 Magnolia, St. Louis, MO 63139; Home: 314-773-1656; Bus: 314-444-5537, (Also FAX) (Experience—18 years Evidence Technician).

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A subsequent interview conducted with Officer Stegman, during which Stegman examined the indicated photos, revealed Stegman's opinion that said photographs had been retouched in order to add the Lao, "AKRAO", in the photos. Stegman added that dark lines in two of photos, along with inconsistent shadowing on each posed subject, to him, would definitely indicate possible alterations to the original photos and would warrant further investigation as to an explanation of the discrepancies.

3. Continuing the investigation, this investigator interviewed one Mr. Larry Block, Owner-Professional Photographer, thirty years plus, of Larry Block Photography, 10286 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132; Bus. phone: 314-427-1800, who advised he had on several previous occasions, completed mechanical photo "drop-ins", (slang for the process of altering photos whereby person(s), objects, are added to the original photograph to give the appearance said person(s) and/or objects were present at the time the photograph was taken). Mr. Block, after examining said (5) five photographs, through the use of a magnifying device, related the following listed discrepancies:

a. White male subjects in all photos do not have consistent shadowing with other persons in the same photos.

b. Foliage, under examination, did not match, in the background sections of several photographs.

c. Although the posing of MSGT. Eddie Smith in Pictures Number 1 and 2 is very similar, Photo #1 shows cut-jagged shoulders on Smith as opposed to Photo #2, Smith's shoulders are rounded.

d. Facial lighting on CILHI Rep. Napoleon in Photo No. 5 not consistent with other two males in the photo.

e. Block related that in his opinion said photos are "drop-ins" and said photos have been altered to give an untrue conclusion.

f. Block stated that in order to obtain proof-positive, said photos would have to be examined by a competent photo laboratory—Eastman Kodak, to check for varying grain patterns that would not be conducive to a true print or photograph. Altered photographs would possibly contain different grain patterns due to the different film batches that are distributed.

October 29, 1991

4. An interview conducted with Eastman Kodak Corporation, Rochester, New York, per Legal Representative Anne Warner, revealed, after being appraised of the circumstances, that said corporation's laboratory could perform the required analysis. Due to the corporation's present policy of not offering said service unless Eastman Kodak was involved in said litigation or Eastman Kodak was ordered to complete said analysis by a Court-ordered subpoena, her company would have to decline any requested assistance.

5. An interview conducted with Professional Photographer David Stout, Owner-Operator, 12 years, Commercial 35 Laboratory, 2732 Sutton, Maplewood, Missouri, Phone 314-781-7030, and subsequent to his viewing the aforementioned photographs, revealed that Stout also noted several inconsistencies in said photos, (as previously listed, shadowing, black lines, facial lighting, etc.). Mr. Stout then conducted a negative slide enhancement of said photos selecting various points of enhance-

ment, (44 slides). At the conclusion of Mr. Stout's enhancement process, Stout related the following information:

a. Slide #117, Photo #5, Subject CILHI Rep. Napoleon's facial grain structure different than the grain structure in the two Lao's faces. Stout stated that since said photo was not of a first generation print, probable 2nd-3rd generation copy, that it would be hard to raise the grain to the necessary specific degree in order to reach a positive conclusion.

b. Stout advised that possible photo alterations could also have been completed by an electronic/computer process referred to as "electronic imaging".

6. An interview conducted with one Mark Hamel Head Technician, Display Photo-Graphics, 803 Lafayette, Maplewood, Missouri. Phone: 314-961-6622. Revealed, after conducting an examination of said photos, that his opinion/conclusion was that said photos could possibly have been altered through the use of computer enhancing and/or electronic imaging. Hamel could add no further.

7. An interview conducted with one, Joseph Toohey, Chief Technician, Spectrum Image Group, 10835 Midwest Industrial Blvd., St. Louis, MO; Phone 314-423-8111, and upon being appraised of the aforementioned photographs, revealed that his firm did in fact, do electronic imaging on photographs. When questioned as to whether he would analyze said photographs to locate any possible discrepancies, Toohey advised his firm would first have to get clearance from their Legal Department prior to completing that type of request.

8. An interview conducted with one, Jerry Taylor, Assistant Chief Photographer, and one, George Maravich, Chief Photographer, ADSTAT Photo Group, #10 South Broadway, St. Louis, MO, revealed, subsequent to their examination of said photographs, that said photos did contain numerous inconsistencies that would generally give the appearance that said photos had possibly been altered. Maravich stated he was aware that "electronic imaging" was in use in altering, to various degrees, photos to represent person(s) and/or objects not originally in the photo.

October 30, 1991

9. An interview conducted with one, Cynthia Cygan, Laboratory Manager, Photo Touch Up Specialist, Silver Image Group, 4248 Forest Park, St. Louis, Missouri, revealed that the only Midwest company providing electronic imaging for photographs is one, Crosfield Design Systems, Minneapolis, Minnesota, (See Attachment C-1, C-2, and C-3, of this report for imaging particulars).

10. Located and conducted subsequent interview with the following Forensic Photographer—Legal Consultant: Mr. Fabian Sickels, Sickels Legal Photography, Inc., #70 West Sherwood Drive, St. Louis, MO 63114, Bus. Phone: 314-426-2400. Qualifications: Qualified Forensic Expert in photography analysis Federal Court and State Court. Professional Laboratory Owner-Operator since 1945. Prior Combat Photographer, U.S. Marines, WWII. Qualified in all levels Court—Civil Cases—Photo Analysis. Photo analysis completed by Sickels for various Law Enforcement Agencies. Photo Analysis completed in Sickel's Laboratory in presence of Custody Officer/Investigator to maintain correct custody chain.

Mr. Fabian Sickels, upon examining said photos related the following expert opinions:

a. Said photos are of 2nd to 3rd generation copies.

b. Sickels related he could not definitely state said photos had been altered, but due to the various inconsistencies apparent in the photos under magnification, said photographs certainly deserved a more thorough examination which could be completed by him and staff members with the original negatives and 1st generation prints of the indicated photos.

c. Quote: Fabian Sickels, "Photos generate enough suspicion to warrant competent examination of the original negatives and this first generation photo prints."

d. Sickel advised that his laboratory, if afforded the opportunity by the investigating officials, (D.I.A.) (JCRC), while in their presence or at a professional photo laboratory of their choice, also in their presence, through the expert examination of said photo's original negatives and 1st generation prints, could conclude whether said photos are true or not true, altered or not altered.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you, please? They are saying that this photograph of Bill Gadoury is a fake, is that what you are saying to us?

Mr. GAYDEN. In varying degrees from "fake" to "it needs to be studied." They would not accept it on its face. So it is in varying degrees.

The CHAIRMAN. The experts will not accept this on its face?

Mr. GAYDEN. Well, I can quote someone for example—

The CHAIRMAN. So now they are going to introduce this person, correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. Do you want to hear some of the quotes?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. GAYDEN. One of them says, this is the chief photographer for the St. Louis Police Department, in his opinion that "the said photographs have been retouched in order to add the area in the photos."

Mr. Block, another one, through the use of a magnifying device, says, "White male subjects in all photos do not have consistent shadowing with the other persons in same photos; the foliage on examination did not match in the background sections of several photographs; (c) all of the pose of Master Sergeant Eddie Smith in the pictures (1) and (2) is very similar; photo number 1 shows a cut jagged shoulders on Smith, as opposed to photo number 2, where Smith's shoulders are rounded; (d) facial lighting on representative in Napoleon photo number 5 is not consistent with the other two males; (e) Block related in his opinion that photos are drop-ins and photos have been altered to give an untrue impression.

I might add that they refused to give the Borahs the original negatives or a first-generation copy for this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Bill Gadoury here?

VOICE. He flew back.

Mr. GAYDEN. There are others in varying degrees.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of you present when these photographs were taken?

VOICE. No, sir.

Mr. GAYDEN. I would also like to make the letter of Major Gittins an exhibit, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. All of this will be placed into the record.

Mr. GAYDEN. In closing, we have a lot of evidence; this is not all we have. For example, the hair samples of Albro Lundy. We can afford—we believe 90 percent of this is wrong; if I am wrong with the Borah picture. I am a judge; I was born with an eraser on my pencil, and I will admit it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gayden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAMILTON GAYDEN

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Select Committee: My name is Hamilton Gayden and I thank you for this opportunity to discuss our present ability to investigate the existence of live Americans in Southeast Asia. By way of background, I am a State of Tennessee Circuit Court Judge and an author of a novel, a story of an American P.O.W. However, I appear before you as an individual American, not as Judge nor as an author.

I also introduce to you in absentia an American-Laotian by the name of Kham-bang Sibounheuang. A year and a half ago, Khambang and I formed a pact; we agreed to merge in an effort to gather evidence of American POW's and, if the situation presented, to help in an escape attempt. Khambang is presently in Southeast Asia.

Our original motives were somewhat different although in time our interests have become more similar. My desire was to help liberate live Americans from bondage; Khambang's main interest was to draw attention to the oppressed Laotian people who are being subjected to endless deprivation of human rights and liberties—the POW issue might draw attention to the conditions in Laos and Vietnam today.

At this point, Khambang and I have accumulated considerable evidence: photographs, finger, thumb and hand prints; human hair including "root hair"; signatures, written messages, live witnesses; some of the evidence has been discarded by us as false, other evidence will require scientific testing, i.e., DNA hair analysis and comparison; thumb and finger print comparison and interviews of live witnesses; and we may even be able to provide a live video of American P.O.W.s. We have already delivered considerable evidence to the Foreign Relations Committee, although we admittedly have no clue as to whether that evidence is secure. We believe our evidence to be 90 percent accurate. We also believe we will be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of a handful of American POW's, and by a preponderance of the evidence of many other American and allied P.O.W.s. We offer an educated guess that there are as many as 300 to 400 American and allied POW's scattered in small or large groups of camps and guarded villages throughout Laos, Vietnam and possibly southern China.

Our evidence comes from many sources including Khambang's Laotian contacts in Laos and Thailand, military and civilian. (Khambang is the 13th ranked member of the International Free Laotian congress, was a company commander in the Royal Lao Army and is a veteran of the secret war in Laos, 1960-1975.) We also are in contact with an Interpol agent, one ex-CIA Special Forces person who obtained evidence for the United States on POW's in Asia, and a DIA informant, among others.

To address the question of what "our capabilities" are we must draw a distinct line between "Our" meaning Khambang, myself, other private individuals and friends who have had no encouragement or help from the U.S. government. In fact, we believe we are justified in adopting the approach that the U.S. Government is our number one enemy.

In order to understand our government's directive to those agencies charged with MIA/POW affairs, we must come to grips with the ominous realization that the ever-present threat that the Vietnamese and Laotian leaders will disclose to the American people the existence of live Americans who still want to be repatriated is the focal point and driving force for the administration's Southeast Asia foreign policy, and it is this silent yet politically explosive blackmail that dictates the purpose and policy of the government agencies charged with MIA/POW affairs.

The directive from the top is simple: "There are no POW's!" And this is a direct quote from the President, the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of Defense.

The sole quest for accountability is condensed down to delivery of "remains only." This statement paraphrases a Laotian Ambassador who stated to an American businessman that the Laotian government has privately continued to attempt to negotiate for the release of Americans. The program for the agencies is to deceive, discredit, deny, debunk and most importantly, interdict—no live POW's: the goal is for the Vietnamese and Laotians to carry out the final act; dead men don't talk.

Looking at the big picture, the realities are that we are on the threshold of being asked to accept a Southeast Asia Foreign policy where we promote democracy with money and men and women in Cambodia and concomitantly refuel Communism just across the borders in Laos and Vietnam. This inconsistent policy will assuredly lead to needless bloodshed for American men and women and our allies stationed in Cambodia.

In our endeavor to obtain evidence we have had to box from many angles as we have many enemies who do not want the facts to emerge—that there are live Americans still being held against their will.

The duplicity of our own government is unchecked. Why? Because the American people want to believe our leaders. A prime example is the simple pronouncement by the Defense Department that the three men in the recent photograph are Russians. The average person on the street believed it. Yet it is an incredible lie.

Even Khambang and I, for a short period of time, opted to cooperate with the Defense Department in giving them raw intelligence. The result was that the Defense Department passed the information, against our requests, to the Communists. We also have been told of the Defense Departments' destruction or loss of official finger print files, "red flagging" of recent confirmed live-sighting reports, and "red flagging of live files" all in the past weeks.

The Defense Departments' excursions into Laos in search of Donald Eugene Carr is a floor show to deceive—to have the American people think the Defense Department is working on the problem. The way to get Donald Carr and the 30 men he is with out is to give the Laotians an ultimatum or negotiate. And we know, don't we, that the Laotians allegedly found Daniel Borah, the "mountain man", immediately from one photograph passed to the Communists by the same defense department. The Communist have the Carr photo. Why don't they just go get him!

We also know that there is a plan in place to "end-run" this Committee to begin immediate talks with Vietnam. At the time of this writing I am told by an informant that the President himself will unilaterally announce the beginning of talks. The two reasons advanced to justify "immediate talks" is that we are wasting an opportunity to develop oil reserves and because the Laotian and Vietnamese Communists are cooperating on the MIA/POW issue. Simultaneously, we are told in November, Americans being held in Southeast Asia will be removed to an area west of Dien Bien Phu where they will be held pending the progress and outcome of talks to normalize relations, and the Final Solution is tentatively set for January to February of next year. We are told our government is fully aware of this plan, and one of the essentials of this plan has already taken place—the delay of any inquiry by this Committee.

In closing, I am going to quote the Vietnamese Ambassador to United Nations, Ambassador Nguyen Can, who said to a group of us who met with him in the fall of 1989 at the Vietnamese Mission in New York, to paraphrase: We will never be able to account for Americans because your government won't let us.

Senator SMITH. Was any recording made on anything other than just a photograph?

VOICE. He was fingerprinted.

Senator SMITH. Do we have Borah fingerprints, Dan Borah's fingerprints?

The CHAIRMAN. Was video taken or was it only stills?

VOICE. Still photography.

Senator SMITH. Do we have Dan Borah's actual fingerprints?

Mr. GAYDEN. Senator Smith, the answer to that is after 6 months, they showed up. But the Borah family does not fully accept those as being true fingerprints of Dan Borah.

Senator McCain. So it is your allegation that the U.S. Government has tampered with the photograph in order to make these two people look alike. Because these photographs look incredibly alike.

Mr. GAYDEN. I am relying on experts, Senator McCain. I am admittedly not a photograph expert.

Senator McCain. Well, an expert identified this first picture, a forensic expert, as being Mr. Borah.

Mr. GAYDEN. Which brings me to this question. We also have the picture of Larry Stevens which came out of the Denver Post.

Senator McCain. Focusing on Mr. Borah right now, OK?

Mr. GAYDEN. It seems to me an independent expert, with a \$1 million budget that this Committee has, an independent expert could be hired by you guys to find out the truth. Because they are going to say one thing, and probably we are going to say another.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. The Borah family is about to meet this person, correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to say that that will not settle it?

Mr. GAYDEN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that will settle it?

Mr. GAYDEN. If the Borah sons come back and say, no—no, I take that back. If they say that it is not Dan Borah, there are several other possibilities. For example, they have got the report of the names; they are totally wrong. The names they use for the wife and the children are absolutely wrong. The place where the picture was taken is not correct either. And so they either do not know—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Let me just suggest, okay, that when DIA goes back there, they take every possible angle photo-

graph, they videotape it, they bring this back to us in the most complete manner possible so that this issue does not gain a life of its own. Is that possible? Can we somehow wire them over there and make sure that happens?

Because certainly to my non-expert eye, but being in politics, we look at a lot of photos. These look like the same human being to me, and I think it is very important, obviously, because that will, I think demonstrate; I do not know what more they can possibly do at that point in time. Would that begin to help satisfy you if the entire event were videotaped?

Mr. GAYDEN. I think it is going to be videotaped. Our people are taking videos over and cameras. They are going loaded, too. And that does not mean that that is the only piece of proof we have, a plethora of proof we will offer through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

On the Stevens picture, one last word. The Stevens picture that came out this week, that Michael Charney says is Stevens, the Government is going to say obviously it is not Stevens. I would say why do you guys not get together and hire an expert? Let him tell you; let a third party tell you. That is the way we do it in our court, instead of us throwing stones at them and them throwing stones at us.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by hire an expert?

Mr. GAYDEN. Let the Committee hire their own expert to take the Stevens photo and say, tell us—

The CHAIRMAN. On the Stevens photo, we are going to do analysis on these other photos, absolutely. But I want to wait and see what transpires on this Borah photo. But absolutely, on the Stevens photo, we will look at that as carefully as we can, and also on the other photos that, the Robertson, Lundy, Stevens photo, the joint photo.

Can I ask, could we hear the testimony from Al Lundy and company? Or Gladys, are you going to go first?

STATEMENT OF GLADYS STEVENS FLECKENSTEIN, MOTHER OF LT. COMDR. LARRY STEVENS

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I do not think I need to even read what I have written because Judge Gayden did come out with a picture of my son. I have had that completely ID'd. We had it blown up. This is the blow-up.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record, so everybody knows who you are talking about.

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. This is my son, Lt. Comdr. Larry James Stevens at a young age. This is the picture that was brought out, that Judge Gayden brought out. He would be 49 years old next month. I believe it is my son. I have had it analyzed by Dr. Charney, who has analyzed it not only one time, but two times. We have also had another private source analyze it, by the name of Tom Wilson from Pittsburgh, and he has definitely ID'd it.

I also was waiting for the Government to analyze it, because when they found out Dr. Charney had done the analysis, it was sent to the DIA, and in return they sent it back to me as of Sep-

tember 16, saying that they would not accept an independent source, but that they would do their own analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I did not mean to interrupt you, Gladys. I did mean to, but not rudely. But, Judge, you brought that out, is that correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. Well, "you" is a euphemism for the Lao contact. I am actually the American depot for the Lao. It was brought out by Laotian freedom fighters.

The CHAIRMAN. It was brought out by a Laotian. When was that brought out?

Mr. GAYDEN. Probably I would say in May, May 1991.

The CHAIRMAN. Of 1991.

Mr. GAYDEN. Yes. On the back of the photograph, I believe, is written September 1990; it was taken on Savoy Island.

The CHAIRMAN. And this Laotian who gave this to you, have you had prior contact with this person?

Mr. GAYDEN. He came to the U.S. in February, and I met him personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Who paid for his trip to the U.S.?

Mr. GAYDEN. He paid for it himself. His son lives here in South Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. GAYDEN. His son lives in South Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. He brought that with him when he came?

Mr. GAYDEN. No, he did not. He sent it in May. He came here in February, and that came later.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a full articulation of precisely what his route of acquisition was?

Mr. GAYDEN. Yes, he came from Vietnamese friendlies, who may be dead, by the way, as of 3 weeks ago; a Mrs. H-o-a, who was in the 5-page code that is also with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a major and a Vietnamese general. These three individuals were responsible for bringing Albrow Lundy to the banks of the Mekong River, where they were interdicted 3 weeks ago.

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I would like to finish my statement. As of September 16, I received the information from the Defense Department that they didn't accept the picture which had been analyzed by Dr. Charney, and that they would analyze it themselves. I waited up until now. I've called and called trying to get that analysis to me, which I did not get, and didn't know about until I arrived here yesterday morning and it was handed to me by Major Gittins.

My son from California had been on the phone to Dr. Carl Ford, and he wouldn't even speak to him about this issue, but did get to his aide. The aide said it would be in the mail, and I needed that information before I got here, so I was pretty upset about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they are going to come back next week to respond to a lot of the other things that have been set forth here. And so I can promise you that that will be on the agenda when they do come back.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, what information did she want?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I wanted the analysis done by the Defense Department on the picture of my son that you're looking at here. In the conclusions in the report that we did get from the DIA, I only read the first two lines. I think that says enough. But it says I

cannot say whether or not the service record and purported images show the same man. The man in the two images do look somewhat alike.

At the end they say, finally, I am concerned about the technical foundation upon which Dr. Charney has made his identification. Again, I say I positively believe Dr. Charney. He has done two different analyses on it. He went public with it on live television in California, I saw it on channel 4, stating that he had the analysis and it was my son, Lt. Larry Stevens.

And that's about all I need.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a question. How do you balance that kind of an analysis against—and I just ask you this personally—how you balance that kind of analysis against the fact that we know that some of these photos—in fact, four of them, it appears, are fraudulent. We have seen the actual photograph from the Soviet magazine. How do you deal with that?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I can deal with it very well. For one thing, this second picture that came out of my son, his father has been dead for quite a few years. My grandson took a look at this picture and he disappeared for a while and came out with a picture of Larry's father. And I was in shock at the complete, total likeness of his father, who would have been approximately the same age as Larry is today in that photo.

And that certainly was another convincer to me.

The CHAIRMAN. But does part of you sort of steel yourself for the potential that there are some hoaxers out there, and somebody might be taking advantage of you?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I am quite sure that there could be people out there working the situation, because we have heard of that. Yes. But in this instance I have—Dr. Gayden has brought this picture out. It was taken in 1990 in September. It has been totally analyzed by three different times.

The Government has not said yes or no in this report from them.

The CHAIRMAN. So, therefore, obviously, you—

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I have to accept it. That is my son. Because it is. That is my son. I have been fighting for 22½ years to find that boy, because I've always felt that he was alive. Now here he is in this picture. And I have to say again, you mentioned the report of the three men in that picture. Well, we got conclusions from that too. I still state again before this Committee that that man in the three man picture on the right-hand side is my son taken at a much earlier date.

He is the image of his younger brother. I am positive that both of those men are the same. When you put the pictures up and really analyze them against that picture and the ones that I do have, you can see the resemblance.

But I do want to say that in conclusion of the three man picture, this comes from Sandia Laboratories, this is the Government's analysis on that three man photograph. And I have to read this to you. It says I—now, they sent me a 19-page letter trying to tell me that this picture was taken after World War II; they're Russians, in Russian uniforms. They have guns. But their conclusion, after all of that: "I cannot prove that this photograph is a hoax, but I believe there is substantial evidence that rifles are being held. It

doesn't make sense that captive POW's would have their picture taken holding weapons. This, however, is conjecture on my part. I have found no evidence that this photograph has been tampered with.

"I also have found no evidence that it is tamper-free. I recommend a continued historical literature search to locate the original image."

Now, again, let me repeat, "I cannot prove that this photograph is a hoax." This is from the DIA, Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but they did find that the signed piece of it had been taken—

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. We've never paid any attention to that sign. The only thing we paid attention to are the three faces in that picture, and you will have their testimony as to their feeling about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is it your—just so I understand these pictures correctly, the picture on the left is the one similar to the one right here in front of you. And that is the recent picture that you say that the Judge brought out?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other picture in the middle is the one that you say, that is the one I recognize from the three person picture?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Yes. That's the one—the one on the right-hand side of the picture. That is my younger son.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. This is my younger son on the right-hand side.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But the picture in the middle.

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying that the picture in the middle is the same person as the picture on the left?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Yes. I definitely think so. But I think it is at the time of aging in there. I think this picture was taken quite some time ago. But the three men have been seen, as Dr. Gayden has just said. And we know those faces are real. They are our men.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Fleckenstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLADYS STEVENS FLECKENSTEIN

Members of the Senate Select Committee. My name is Gladys Stevens Fleckenstein. I am the mother of L/CDR Larry James Stevens. After taking off from the USS Coral Sea, Larry was shot down in a night action over the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos on February 14, 1969.

Eye witness reports from three U.S. fliers who saw the crash of Larry's plane state they picked up a 5 to 10 second beeper signal 2 or 3 minutes after Larry's plane impacted the ground. They are positive the signal came from Larry.

The official report from Larry's commanding officer on the incident stated that he felt the chances of Larry's survival were good. A navy man, John Hamill, Lemoore, California, who was aboard the Coral Sea on this same cruise told me that the ship's crew was told that Larry "punched out" immediately and was known to be alive on the ground. These and other data throughout the years only strengthen my belief, Larry is alive.

I have always felt in my heart that my son survived the crash. Now I have that proof. After 22½ years of searching, traveling to Paris, Geneva and Laos, flag raisings, speeches, and doing whatever I could do to keep the awareness about our LIVE POW's before the public. We have spent everything we have had over the years and now I have reached the end of my quest to find my son. We have found Larry Ste-

vens. I have a picture brought out by a source of the Three POW's in my possession. The man on the right is my son. I have a new LIVE POW picture, of Larry wearing a blue shirt, brought out by Judge Hamilton Gayden's sources. This blue shirt POW photo has been positively identified by Dr. Charney of Colorado Springs, Colorado. Larry Stevens has been positively identified by a second forensic expert, Thomas Wilson, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Documentation of photo I.D. attached.)

My family and friends who have men in a "missing" status have long felt that the U.S. Government, and especially the DIA, are not aggressively pursuing the data and evidence that support our belief that live Americans remain captive in Southeast Asia today.

One single fact shows the most damning proof that DIA is not serious about finding live POW's. Using information that DIA had been sitting on for 6 months, the families contacted a source known to the DIA for those 6 months, talked with him by phone, flew to his home in California, and were given a copy of the Three POW Photo showing the three men, and which had the names of Colonel Robertson and L/CDR Stevens on the back. All of this was accomplished in well under 72 hours from the time news of the sighting report was first received by the families on November 8, 1990. Yet, in a letter dated December 10, 1990, a month later, Deputy Chief Trowbridge states DIA is still trying to interview this same source.

In support of my belief that DIA is remiss and not doing an adequate job on the POW/MIA issue, I offer the following:

1. DIA has over 1,400 first hand live-sighting reports which claim that live Americans are being held against their will. These 1,400 reports are classified and are denied to the families and to the American public (including Members of Congress).

Why should reports of incidents that occurred 20 to 25 years ago remain classified? Is it "national security" matter or is LIVE POW information being classified in order to cover up DIA's ineptitude?

Worse yet, these files denied to the families have been TURNED OVER TO HANOI.

2. The Tighe report specifically charges DIA to have a mind-set to debunk all live-sighting reports and states that evidence proving LIVE POW's exists, remains classified and is hidden from the families and from the several congressional committees which have oversight responsibility.

3. The 5-page letter submitted by then Chief of the POW/MIA section of DIA, Col. Millard A. Peck, makes the same charge.

4. The interim report as well as the final report by the "U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Republican Staff" document in detail similar allegations.

5. DIA and the IAG (inter agency group) have launched a concerted and continuous attack to debunk the identification by family members of at least five military men whose reported photos have been made public lately. The names of L/CDR Larry Stevens, Col. John Robertson, Maj. Albro Lundy II, Lt. Daniel V. Borah Jr., and Maj. Donald G. Carr (all names appearing on official MIA lists) have surfaced along with photos and reports which claim these American military men are still alive. Instead of trying to deny these men are alive, the DIA should send out their teams to follow all available leads.

Our men shot down and captured are advancing in age. We need the WILL to find them NOW and bring them home AT ONCE. Advancing age, disease, confinement and possible torture are not conducive to their health and well-being. DIA's most urgent task is to send investigative teams to the prison sites and caves where indigenous people have stated that live Americans were observed being held against their will. I feel this may be our men's last hope to ever see their homeland again. It is up to you, the newly formed Senate Select Committee, to BRING THEM HOME NOW.

STRANGE HAPPENINGS THAT PUZZLE ME

1. The FBI claim they have no fingerprints for any of the men in the three POW photo. Yet, all three men have held high security clearances. It seems strange that the Los Angeles Hall of Records have a birth certificate of my two younger sons, but not one of my POW son, Larry Stevens. The same situation exists with hospital and DMV records. (See the Fingerprint Saga, attached.)

2. DIA sends us a tape and written material in a foreign language. When we request an English translation, DIA sanitizes all names and places in the returned English version, but leaves this data in the foreign copy.

3. Instead of helping the family members, DIA forces us to prove time and time again that our men are alive, while DIA classifies all the records we need.

DIA claims that the pictures of the 3 men is a hoax and yet they cannot prove it. I received a 19-page report from Sandia Laboratories and their conclusions which I would like to read to you.

"I cannot prove that this photograph is a hoax, but I believe there is substantive evidence that rifles are being held. It doesn't make sense that POW's would have their picture taken holding weapons. This however is conjecture on my part. I have found no evidence that this photograph has been tampered with. I also have found no evidence that it is tamper free. I recommend a continued historical literature search to locate the original image." Let me repeat part of the first line—"I cannot prove that this photo is a hoax."

Regarding the purported picture of L/CDR Steven's alone, Sandia Lab's state: "I cannot say whether or not the service record and purported images show the same man. The men in the two images do look somewhat alive. Sequence 1 on the video tape documents this. However, sequences 2 and 3 on the video tape show that an imposter can also be photographed to look somewhat like the service record and purported images. The increased width in the purported image compared to the service record images of the test subject as a youth and as an adult. Age and weight gain did not increase the width. Finally, I am concerned about the technical foundation upon which Dr. Charney has made his identification."

Dr. Charney has positively identified my son's picture two different times and I believe in his analysis one hundred percent.

I have fought the fight all these years when our government should have brought my son, and all LIVE POW's home and as full as possible accounting of those who perished. Last, they flew me out over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos, and I left my heart and my son in that lonely and foreign land.

At the very best what is going on here is gross incompetence starting with Carl Ford and leading to President Bush.

At worst, there is an active government cover-up.

Gentlemen, if there are any real men left in the leadership of this country, I call on you now to stop this pathetic charade and bring my son, Larry Stevens, home.

Larry has managed to get his picture out. What more can he do?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me hear from the members of the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens—or let me hear from the Roberts and Lundy family here.

STATEMENT OF SHELBY ROBERTSON QUAST, ROBERTSON FAMILY MEMBER

Ms. QUAST. I'm Shelby Robertson Quast. I'm here speaking on behalf of Col. John Robertson. What we've chosen to do is share my testimony with my sister, Deborah Robertson Bardsley, because she just recently returned from Hanoi, and has some interesting things to share with you.

Tomorrow marks a year anniversary since I first got this photograph. And, in marking that anniversary, what I want to do is I want to set the record straight. There seems to be some confusion throughout the world. We continually hear that this photograph is a hoax. That it's a fake. That people believe that we found this photograph in a Soviet magazine.

The Washington Post ran a story yesterday that, once again, it was in a Soviet magazine. It was a Soviet baker. Let me quote Carl Ford. Let me quote Colonel Cole. Let me quote Bob Sheetz, Susan Strednanski, the Defense Department press person. That picture has never been found in a Soviet magazine.

I guess I'm asking for some help. We have said this so many times, yet I continue to hear it's been in a magazine. It's simply people don't want to hear that. And I would like to, for the record, set it straight. It has never been found to be a fake or a hoax, or ever found in a magazine.

The CHAIRMAN. The picture of the threesome together?

Ms. QUAST. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You are absolutely accurate. That is correct. It has never been found in a Soviet magazine, and it has not yet been proven to be a hoax. And that is—

Ms. QUAST. Excuse me. If I could, I want to just ask one thing. Could you—I would prefer that you don't say it hasn't yet been found to be a hoax.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I am saying is that the DIA has found inconsistencies that they have cited.

Ms. QUAST. But what they have found and what they have reported to me—

The CHAIRMAN. I was simply using the words that Gladys used that she read from them. That is all.

Ms. QUAST. OK. Yeah. What's been reported to us is the fact that the sign has indeed possibly been altered or added. That's not something that we want to say has not happened.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. No judgment has been made to the Committee's understanding.

Senator REID. I thought—in fact, I think I met this young man in an elevator. He was carrying around a picture of his father. He is a lot older than he looks, too. But, anyway, after I saw him I read that this came out of a Soviet magazine. Where did this come from?

The CHAIRMAN. There were several photographs that came out in one package, so to speak, from the same source.

Ms. QUAST. I'm going to address that entire thing, actually. I'm going to address it in the testimony. If I could do that, I think I will answer your question, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Ms. QUAST. I would like to just continue to set the record straight, and it addresses that point. This photo came out from several sources. Not just one. The list includes foreign officials. It includes a monk. It includes a shaman, a general, a teacher. A towel merchant happens to be included in that list.

The photograph was first received in November, and that was through a Cambodian refugee. It was not in combination with the other four photographs. The second picture received from site two by an American was also not in connection with those other four photographs.

Admittedly, there might be somebody who got a hold of one of the copies of the photograph and is marketing it, but I want to be clear, this has come through several sources, and one of them was tied with the other four photographs. While I was in Cambodia I did see those four photographs. Only one of them had an altered date on it at that time. Something has been added since they came out to Thailand and back to the United States.

When we got this photograph in November and it was identified as being my father, what we did was we decided to work backward and based on the photograph to see what evidence existed that may show that my father is alive. And I just want to tick off quickly what that evidence is. My father, Colonel Robertson, was a Vessey discrepancy case, defined by Gen. Vessey yesterday as last known alive.

Two, a villager, a Vietnamese villager, stated he captured a bright-haired pilot in September 1966. Another man in the same province but from another village talked of capturing a dark-haired pilot. Only one plane went down in that province during the entire time of the war.

The villager who stated he captured a bright-haired pilot took the pilot to his home and, while waiting for officials, had a conversation in English with this pilot. My father's backseat pilot, Hugh Buchanan, who's dark-haired, said he never had a conversation in English when he was captured before the officials came to pick him up.

Senator REID. Say that again.

Ms. QUAST. There are two pilots in the plane. My father had blond hair. His backseat pilot, Hugh Buchanan, had dark hair. In one province there are two reports of two pilots being possibly captured, one with bright hair, one with dark hair. And what I'm saying is that a villager who allegedly captured the one with bright hair said—had a different story of capture than Hugh Buchanan, who came home a returned POW, experienced.

There is one other discrepancy between the two captures. And that is, Hugh Buchanan was captured by somebody he felt would be in his forties right now, while the man who captured the bright-haired pilot was apparently in his 70's.

Congressman Pete Peterson testified under oath before the House Committee that he was interrogated with my father's I.D. card and dog tags, both of which were in impeccable condition. There was an interrogation report in our file, and it describes the capture of a U.S.—

Senator REID. I am sorry. Congressman Peterson was?

Ms. QUAST. He was a POW.

Senator REID. But you say he was interrogated. And what about the dog tags?

Ms. QUAST. He was interrogated with my father's dog tag and I.D. cards. He was pulled out and he was individually pulled out and asked how he knew Colonel Robertson. And he was shown my father's I.D. tag and dog tags. At that time, he said they were in impeccable condition and he could only assume that the body or person of my father was also in the same impeccable condition. He never did see my father, though.

Hugh Buchanan never stated Robertson went down with his plane. He stated he did not know what happened. My father's commanding officer felt that Colonel Robertson could have survived the crash and been taken prisoner. Successful experience ejecting from a burning aircraft was something that my father had before. In Germany he did the same thing and was commended for that.

He was a category two. His supposed remains that were returned were actually found to be an animal bone and a rock. The remains of Colonel Robertson have never been returned to the United States or identified in Southeast Asia.

In August 1990, DIA received a live-sighting report on my father. In October 1990, they received a photograph with my father's name on the back, as well as Lt. Cdr. Stevens, as well as fingerprints. The photograph was positively identified by the family.

I traveled to Cambodia with that and spoke with the man who said that he had been a guard at my father's prison and had allegedly spoken with my father. DIA received over eight live-sighting reports stating that my father was seen somewhere in—throughout Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

And my sister also traveled to Hanoi and spoke with the person that felt the person he captured could have been my father.

This is all proof that goes to substantiate why he could be alive. The only thing that could possibly substantiate his death is a villager report that said he disintegrated in the aircraft. Yet, my father's file is one of the Vessey 57 discrepancy cases where fate has been determined. There's a lot of evidence to suggest my father could still be alive, but they still closed the case.

I want this case to be returned back to an active discrepancy case, or I'd prefer that the Committee take a look at the file and see if there is indeed evidence to have found fate determined in that case.

The reason that this concerns me as much as it does is the emphasis on the road map—that the road map places on resolving discrepancy cases. It states that the Vietnamese need to cooperate fully to resolve the discrepancy cases, provide witnesses to resolve these cases. However, what I was hearing the last 2 days from various people testifying is if we ever receive a live American from Vietnam we will never normalize.

I'm just asking what the message is we're sending, because I'm confused. It sounds like we're saying, if you ever return a live American we'll never normalize with you. But if you want to normalize, we have to resolve the discrepancy cases. And I'm just hoping the Committee can clarify that for me.

The third part I just want to touch upon is quickly to address the access to information. I have been promised at a very high policy level access to my father's file, but denied access by those people that have testified before this Committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking what is the policy and who actually runs the show for the POW policy.

We've been told that families have access to all information in the files. In our case, that's simply not true. There is another photograph that's not the same. We saw that at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and we simply have not been able to see the report that that photograph came in with. There is an October 18 report that was sent to the Stevens family about Robertson, yet we've not received it.

There's also another—the analyses of the photo we have not received. The reason I'm bringing that up is our casualty officer went into the Defense Intelligence Agency this morning, compared notes, and gave us a report from 1988, but those three are still missing. What I'm saying is I don't believe the family is indeed getting all the information.

The last point I just want to touch upon is I've spoken to people in the DIA POW office. This person is in a position to know. I feel that what they told me was when Mike Peck was in office—I just want to state this for the record—that there was more excitement and more interest toward the live POW issue during Colonel Peck's tour than at any other time, either prior or after his tour.

Mike Peck stepped outside of Pentagon policy when he let me talk to a source and actually get this photograph. And he did something that was extremely decent. When he walked out of the Pentagon with me that day he knew he had just kissed his career goodbye. I just want to say I hope that we can look at the policy that enables people to keep this secrecy and not let that happen again.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Quast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHELBY ROBERTSON QUAST

I am the daughter of Col. John Leighton Robertson, POW. I will testify on behalf of the Robertson family. I want to state for the record that the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo has never been found to be a fake or a hoax. It has never been found in a Soviet magazine.

I will present compelling evidence that Col. John Leighton Robertson could still be alive and in captivity. My father is currently included in the 57 Vessey Discrepancy cases where fate has been determined. There was no basis for this decision. My father's case should be taken out of this category and put back into the active discrepancy cases. I have requested that this be done numerous times and I am hoping that the Select Committee will feel compelled to help me.

I would also like to discuss the emphasis the State Department's places on resolving the discrepancy cases in the road map for normalization with Vietnam. It appears that the Vietnamese may be pressured into resolving these cases even when there is not credible evidence to do so. My father's case is a strong example of this.

There seems to be a great deal of confusion surrounding who actually runs the show regarding the POW issue. It seems that DIA's special office for POW's can override decisions and policies made at a much higher level. DIA's special office for POW's has not provided the Air Force casualty officers or the family with all the reports they have received despite repeated requests, and they continued to deny access to analyses that have of the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo.

Why is policy still in place that enables the POW issue to be surrounded in a shroud of secrecy?

There are a lot of questions surrounding the POW issue and I am asking that you help us get to the truth. It may be difficult to navigate around the policies and economic pressures to normalize but it is our responsibility to get to the truth regarding our POW's, mine as a daughter and yours as Members of the Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs. My father deserves at least that much.

There is compelling evidence that Col. John Leighton Robertson could still be alive and in captivity from the Vietnam war.

Vietnamese villager stated that in September 1966 he captured a pilot with "bright hair" while a man from another village within the district talked of capturing a pilot with dark hair. Colonel Robertson had blond hair while his back seat pilot had dark hair. The villager felt he recognized a photo of John Leighton Robertson as the "bright haired" pilot he captured September 16, 1966. (Documented on October 1991 trip to Hanoi. Film footage available upon request from Deborah Robertson Bardsley.)

Villager stated that after capture of "bright haired" pilot, he walked him to his home; while waiting for officials a college student came and had a conversation in English with the "bright haired" pilot. Hugh Buchanan did not speak to anybody who spoke English while waiting for officials.

Could it be that two pilots were indeed captured September 16, 1966 and that the student that spoke with the bright haired pilot was one of the students from the Super phosphate plant sighted in the attached CIA document. The pilots taken to this plant were reportedly handed over to the Soviets and Chinese. Is it possible that Colonel Robertson went into a separate prison system from the initial point of capture—and that records may have been altered from the beginning.

The villager who captured the dark haired pilot is now in his forties, Hugh Buchanan stated that the villager who captured him in 1966 was in his twenties. The villager who captured the "bright haired" pilot is now in his seventies.

Vietnamese official stated he knew of the villager that captured Colonel Robertson.

Interrogation report No. 503-68 included in Colonel Robertson's file, provides information concerning the observation and description of a U.S. pilot downed over BAC Giang Province, NVN. The description of a blond haired pilot in his forties could match that of Colonel Robertson, but not Hugh Buchanan. Hugh Buchanan was 21 and Colonel Robertson was 36 in 1966.

According to district officials in Vietnam, only one plane crashed in this province during the entire period of the war. Two individual pilots appear to have been captured in this province September 16, 1966, not just one.

Congressman Pete Peterson, former POW, testified July 31, 1991 under oath before the House Subcommittee on POW's that he was interrogated with an ID card and dog tags, both in impeccable condition, belonging to Colonel Robertson.

How did the Vietnamese get the ID card and dog tags of Colonel Robertson? If Colonel Robertson went down with a fiery aircraft, how did his ID card and dog tags survive the crash without damage? How did the Vietnamese know that Colonel Robertson knew Pete Peterson. They were not in the same squadron, but know each other prior to Vietnam. Is it because Colonel Robertson questioned his captors about the fate of Pete Peterson who had been shot down 6 days earlier?

Lt. Hugh Buchanan never saw Colonel Robertson after Lieutenant Buchanan ejected. Hugh Buchanan never stated that Colonel Robertson went down with the plane. Hugh Buchanan is available for comment.

Colonel Robertson's commanding officer felt that Colonel Robertson could have certainly survived the crash and been taken prisoner. He extended his MIA status beyond the 12 month reevaluation period.

Colonel Robertson had experience successfully ejecting as a pilot is less than ideal circumstances. In 1956, while stationed in Sembach Germany, his plane blew up in the landing pattern. He safely ejected from his aircraft at less than 300 feet above the ground, he was awarded caterpillar wings for a successful forced ejection below 300 feet. Colonel Robertson was continuously evaluated as being level headed, even when under extreme pressure.

Colonel Robertson was classified in category 2—a status reserved for men about whom the U.S. government had suspicion that the enemy had further knowledge.

Colonel Robertson was listed as one of the 119 Vessey discrepancy cases. A U.S. team traveled to Vietnam to "resolve" the discrepancy case.

March 1990 JCRC investigation of case 0459 (John Robertson). Team spoke with villagers that had several contradictory stories. The team chief stated that the villagers were nervous and hesitant to provide any information regarding this case. The U.S. Hanoi office recently stated that they suspected the villagers had been coached as to what to say. Not one of the villagers saw a dead body, yet "alleged" remains were turned over to the U.S.

April 1990, the Vietnamese returned the above mentioned "alleged remains of Col. John Leighton Robertson. Upon investigation of Box 2 with the name John L. Robertson attached, received during the April 10, 1990 repatriation, CILHI found the skeletal material consisted of three bone fragments, all of them from a large mammal the size of a horse or cow. In addition there was a piece of non-bone material, possibly a rock. No remains were received in this repatriation that can be identified as Robertson. No remains identified as John Leighton Robertson have ever been returned to the U.S. or identified in Vietnam.

Vessey discrepancy case of Colonel Robertson became one of the 57 Vessey discrepancy cases where fate had been determined, this determination was agreed on by the Interagency Committee. Vietnam states at every opportunity that this case has been resolved. Resolution of the Vessey Discrepancy cases is an integral part of the State Department's roadmap for normalization with Vietnam. Vietnam may be under pressure to resolve discrepancy cases even when they do not have any evidence to accurately or truthfully do so, the Interagency Group, DIA and JCRC did not question this flagrant lack of evidence, but agreed with the inaccurate analysis. Why? Is it possible that the groundless analysis used to "resolve" the case of Colonel Robertson was a calculated effort to further the normalization effort?

August 1990 DIA received live-sighting report of Col. John Robertson and LCR. Larry Stevens.

October 1990. DIA received faxed copy of photo and another live-sighting report of Colonel Robertson and LCR. Stevens. The photo had the names of these two individuals written on the back. This photograph was accompanied by finger and palm prints allegedly of Col. John Robertson. However, the finger prints of John Robertson, Albro Lundy and Larry Stevens are missing from ALL U.S. government files. No comparison can be made to the finger prints received. Where are the finger prints? Why were they removed from the files of each of the men pictured in the photograph?

The Robertson family positively identified the photo as being that of Col. John Leighton Robertson.

Shelby Robertson Quast traveled to Cambodia and spoke with a man who claimed to have been a guard at a Vietnamese prison camp where Colonel Robertson was

held. He claimed to have spoken directly with Colonel Robertson and identified him as the man on left of the photo.

DIA has received over seven live-sighting reports of Colonel Robertson, of which I am aware. DIA had knowledge of the person who allegedly took the photo and where the photo was taken. Copies of these reports are available on request. The location of the place of captivity was independently reported to us by a retired NSA crypto linguist, prior to receipt of the first hand report that DIA has in its possession (DIA denied to Shelby Quast ever having this information). This report available upon request.

October 1991. During trip to Hanoi, Deborah Robertson Bardsley spoke with villager who claimed to have captured "bright haired" pilot that he identified as likely being Robertson.

Independent analysis of the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo and a photo of Colonel Robertson taken prior to September 16, 1966, finds identifying matching points of Colonel Robertson and the person pictured on the left in the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo identified as Colonel Robertson. This analysis includes an identifying mark that has increased substantially in size when compared to photos taken prior to September 16, 1966. This shows that aging has occurred. Presentation of identification analysis and video footage available upon request.

The above evidence as to why Col. John Leighton Robertson could still be alive and in captivity is very compelling; yet Colonel Robertson is still listed as one of the 57 discrepancy cases where fate has been determined. The only evidence to support this finding of fate is the contradictory statements of Vietnamese villagers.

Shelby Robertson Quast has requested numerous times that the analysis used to determine the fate of Colonel Robertson be reviewed. The case of Colonel Robertson should be returned to its original discrepancy status; there is absolutely no evidence to support the analysis that led to the determination of fate; while, to the contrary, there is information to support the fact that he may be alive.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROAD MAP FOR NORMALIZATION

Phase I of the State Department's road map for Normalization with Vietnam.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement for a Cambodian political settlement Vietnam must:

- cooperate fully to resolve quickly the remaining unresolved "last known alive" discrepancy cases through unilateral efforts, to include providing the necessary witnesses and historical records to facilitate joint investigations.

The signing of the Paris Agreement took place October 23, 1991.

It appears that the State Department and the Administration are pressuring Vietnam to resolve the remaining unresolved discrepancy cases; to provide witnesses and historical information that will effectively close the case. No where in the road map is there a demand for live Americans.

Criteria to be a Vessey 1 & 2 discrepancy case: high knowledge ability of Communist governments, included are the last known alive on the ground cases.

This appears to be exactly what took place with the case of Col. Robertson. He last listed as one of the 119 Vessey discrepancy cases, the Vietnamese provided the "necessary" witnesses to resolve the case. The contradictory statements of these witnesses was accepted to quickly resolve the discrepancy case. Thus complying with the State Departments criteria for normalization. While the evidence that compels one to believe that Col. Robertson could be alive was not even followed up.

Why did the Inter Agency Committee, made up of the State Department, the Department of Defense, National Security Council and National League of Families that fate had been determined when no credible information had been presented.

The Vietnamese have officially stated on numerous occasions that they would like the names of the individuals providing information of live American POW's so they can be punished. Why does the U.S. government provide raw data of live sightings and complete with names and locations to the Vietnamese government, when the families can't see this information. Why doesn't DIA attempt to speak with these individuals instead of giving the names to the Vietnamese so they can be punished?

WHO IS RUNNING THE SHOW

Shelby Robertson Quast requested to debrief her trip to Cambodia with the person she traveled with to DIA's special office for POW's. She was refused because policy did not allow family members to debrief with nonfamily members. It was prohibited by policy. DIA refused to review the policy despite numerous requests by the family and the Air Force.

Shelby Robertson Quast requested to see the 22 pages of information regarding the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo referred to in DIA's 7 page analysis. Carl Ford assured access to this information to both Albro Lundy and Shelby Quast. When Shelby Quast attempted to see this information she was denied access by DIA. How is it that DIA's special office for POW Affairs can override a decision made by Carl Ford.

Shelby Quast submitted a list of questions regarding the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo to Carl Ford's office July 21, 1991. She was informed on July 22, 1991 that the questions had been answered by Carl Ford's office; but they had been sent down to the DIA special office for POW Affairs. Shelby Quast has never received a response to these questions despite numerous requests. Why does the DIA special office for POW Affairs approve questions answered by acting Assistance Secretary of Defense? Who is running the show?

Shelby Robertson Quast requested through the FOIA to see all versions of the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photograph. At a meeting with Bob Sheetz and Chuck Trowbridge of the DIA special office for POW's, she was informed that there was only one version of the photograph. Yet when Chuck Trowbridge showed Albro Lundy and Shelby Quast copies of the photo, there were clearly two separate versions of the photo. One, the highly publicized version, and the other showing a great deal more of the bodies of the men in the photo. How many other pictures of these three men exist. When Shelby Quast contacted the Air Force Case officer regarding the other photo, she was informed that the AF had never received that information from DIA's special office for POW's. Is DIA's special office for POW Affairs picking and choosing what information they share with the military and the family?

Shelby Quast requested to see the original of the above mentioned photo. She scheduled an appointment with Chuck Trowbridge to see the original photo along with the source of information and report. She confirmed her appointment with DIA; yet when she arrived at DIA the photo had allegedly been sent to the lab and Mr. Trowbridge did not have the accompanying report handy. Shelby Quast has called DIA several times since to see the original photo; she has been told each time that it is not available.

Shelby Robertson Quast had requested to see her father's file. She was told that policy prohibited access to the file and was referred to Carl Ford. Carl Ford stated that she could have access to Col. Robertson's file; however when she made the appointment, confirmed her intentions with Carl Ford's office and Col. Jordan's office, she was denied access to Col. Robertson's file by Chuck Trowbridge of DIA's special office for POW Affairs. Shelby Quast was simply informed that Carl Ford misspoke. Who actually sets the policy, why can Chuck Trowbridge override a change in policy made by Carl Ford. Who is accountable?

The family of Col. Robertson has been continually told that they have all the information in the file. However, it is a fact that they do not. The fact that another photo exists along with an accompanying source report that neither the family nor the Air Force has is proof that there is information in Col. Robertson's DIA file about which the family has not been informed. Why is POLICY being used to enable DIA to keep information from the Robertson family and the Air Force regarding Col. Robertson?

Why does the DIA give the families and the Air Force sanitized live-sighting reports, when the forward raw data including source names and locations to Vietnam?

At a meeting with Bob Sheetz and Chuck Trowbridge, Shelby Quast and Albro Lundy were informed that DIA did not have any information regarding the person who purportedly took the photograph; yet Shelby Quast has a live-sighting report that states otherwise. Why was this information denied?

Despite numerous requests, Shelby Quast has never received any information regarding alleged follow up of any of the 22 live-sighting reports mentioned in the DIA 7 page analysis. No one in the U.S. Hanoi office has been tasked to follow up on any of the live-sighting reports on Robertson, Lundy or Stevens. They have not even seen these reports. Is anyone at DIA or DOD actively following up on any of the live sightings? If so, why is the family being denied the information?

Despite numerous requests in person, in writing and through FOIA, Shelby Robertson Quast has never received any of the analyses or photo overlays of the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photograph that DIA mentioned in its 7 page analysis. Why is the family denied access to the photo analyses?

Why is the U.S. government allowed to stand behind a policy that enables them to deny access to information regarding POW's; when the war has been over for 18 years.

Why can Chuck Trowbridge override a policy decision made by Carl Ford? Who is accountable? When Shelby Quast questioned how Carl Ford could assure her access

to her father's file on one day and the next day she could be denied access, she was simply informed that Carl Ford misspoke.

Senator SMITH. I just want to interrupt for one quick question, Shelby.

Did you get any official explanation on the Pho To photo? Did you get any official explanation as to what that means?

Ms. QUAST. No, I've never seen anything official.

Senator SMITH. Are you aware that there is?

Ms. QUAST. Well, not from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Senator SMITH. Did you, from the Defense Intelligence Agency?

Ms. QUAST. No, we received one from a retired intelligence—

Senator SMITH. What did you get on that?

Ms. QUAST. He was able to decipher it as being a particular location.

Senator SMITH. Just for the record it is. There is a village in Hanoi on the road from Son Tay to Vinh Yen called Pho To. I have not even—and I just want to say for the record that I have had a number of discussions with Government officials on that point on that photo. I was not told that but I did find it out on my own by simply looking at a map, which I should have done in the first place. But again, it is interesting how you have to elicit information.

I just wanted to ask one other question and we will get right back to you.

Just for the record here, when did you and how did you find out about this photograph?

Ms. QUAST. I first found out that there was a live-sighting report from the Stevens family, because my father was mentioned in a report sent to them. And I called DIA and went in the next morning. This was November 8 I found out; went in the morning of November 9. And while we were there they said, well, we've received a faxed copy of a photograph that is allegedly your father and Lt. Comdr. Larry Stevens. The names were written on the back.

The next morning I went in and asked to please speak with that source. I had found out from an analyst, Warren Gray, that the source, the Cambodian source in California, had been trying to give them the photo. He did not want to send it through the mail, but felt there was an extremely tight time constraint and had asked DIA to please come and get it or bring him out. Whatever they wanted to do, he wanted to pass this information on and get in touch with the families.

At that point Colonel Peck let me talk to the source, and I flew to California myself and picked up the photograph.

Senator SMITH. Were you told that the photo had been in the agency for a while?

Ms. QUAST. I've heard a lot of different things. I've heard that, yes, they've seen it since last July; then I heard no, it was only faxed in. I'm not exactly certain when they first saw the photograph.

Senator SMITH. I apologize for interrupting, please go ahead.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, one thing I do not understand is where Mrs. Quast, where you live?

Ms. QUAST. I live in Vienna, VA.

Senator REID. So you live in Vienna. And Mrs. Fleckenstein, where do you live?

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. I live in Big Bear Lake, CA.

I would like to add, if I may, just one little thing here on what she said about getting this information through Colonel Peck. All of what she was talking about, all of this was accomplished in well under 72 hours from the time news of the sighting report was first received by the families on November 8.

Yet, in a later letter dated November 10, 1990, 1 month later, deputy chief Trowbridge states DIA is still trying to interview the same source, and that source told Shelby that he had been trying to get hold of the family for 6 months and hadn't been able to—or allowed to.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH ROBERTSON BARDSLEY, ROBERTSON FAMILY MEMBER

Ms. BARDSLEY. I'll just take a moment. I am disappointed that some of the Senators are missing. I recently returned from Hanoi, just 14 days ago, and it was actually due to a suggestion on the part of Senator Kerry. He called me when he returned from his trip and said that he thought it would be very enlightening for me to go over there myself. When I received an offer from Scottish Television that they were making a documentary on the POW issue and would like to extend an invitation to me to go to Hanoi and just document what it was that I could find out over there, I was very happy to take them up on that invitation.

I found out several things I never realized. That I was the first family member to actually, in Bangkok, go to site 2, which is a refugee site of about 192,000 refugees, where a lot of the live-sighting reports on POW's come from. I was the first family member, I understand, to visit Stony Beach and JCRC in Bangkok at the American Embassy. I understand that I was the first family member to go to the American Hanoi Office. I was the first family member to go to Son Tay Prison. I was the first family member to meet with Mr. Dich, the head of the Vietnamese MIA office, Mr. La Bong, the deputy director of the Department of Americas, Mr. Le Mai, the vice minister of the Department of Americas, Mr. Nguyen Co Thach and Mr. Kiet, the Prime Minister.

There are a lot of things I would like to talk about, however, Senator Kerry's aide told me that if I would like to talk about my trip I'd have to fit it into the 5 minutes allotted to my family to speak on my father's case, so I will just make myself available for any questions. However—

Senator SMITH. Any information you have you may provide for the record, and you may take a little more time if you wish.

Ms. BARDSLEY. Thank you very much.

A couple of things. As I think everybody has heard discussed here in the past few days, family members do not have access to source names or locations on sighting reports. When I was meeting with some of the Vietnamese officials they said to me, next time you come to Vietnam, why don't you bring us the names of the people who have told you these terrible things about these hoaxes. They provided me with a newspaper article from the Washington

Post in case I didn't know that our picture was a hoax. They said next time you come you bring the sources that have told you these terrible things and we will punish them.

As a matter of fact it was interesting, and reminded me that on July 26 the Vietnamese released a press release that said—it was regarding the Robertson-Lundy-Stevens picture. They felt—really, I guess, in shorthand that the picture was a fake and the guys were dead. That whoever had provided this photo deserves severe punishment.

Now, the day after this was put together, and actually the day that it was released, I understand that an American official was in Vietnam to speak to them about the picture, and Mr. Dich of the MIA office in Vietnam gave me some information that was given to him by this official.

I'll tell you I was really quite shocked and surprised to find that a Vietnamese official was giving me source names that were involved with the picture. I simply couldn't believe my eyes, frankly, especially, considering that he had just told me that they would punish these sources. And to find out that an American official had given classified information—after the past few days I've heard that is simply not policy for us to do that.

Senator SMITH. May I clarify? I want a clarification. The Vietnamese gave to you a list of sources that were provided them by American officials?

Ms. BARDSLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Sources of collecting data?

Ms. BARDSLEY. Yes, names and locations, even, I see, of a government official in the Cambodian ministry who's involved in the Robertson-Lundy-Stevens picture.

Senator SMITH. So one of the sources listed was an official in the Cambodian ministry, and that source was provided to the Vietnamese?

Ms. BARDSLEY. Yes, it was.

Senator REID. How long were you in Vietnam?

Ms. BARDSLEY. I was in Vietnam for 5 days, and I feel like in my 5 days that I was in Vietnam I found out more about my father's case than I've learned from the Government in 25 years.

Senator SMITH. Would you submit for the record that list of sources? Would you be willing to do that, and who provided that list to you, or a copy thereof?

Ms. BARDSLEY. Yes, as I said, in fact I hope that what I'm saying is now being provided for the record. And I don't know, I tell you. I hesitate because if this is classified information I don't know that it is legal for me to turn it over to you now. I'm serious. I do have a copy here, and I can let you look at it, I guess. If an aide would like to take it up—

Senator SMITH. Oh, so it would not be classified.

Mr. LUNDY. This is classified information. This information is not provided to any of the family members—

Ms. BARDSLEY. Or Senators or Congressmen.

Mr. LUNDY. A high-ranking member of our State Department gave this list to the Vietnamese.

Ms. BARDSLEY. Also, along with this list, once again to my surprise, I do realize that some of the sighting reports in regards to

the Robertson-Lundy-Stevens picture are classified, and that we family members cannot see this information. So I was once again very surprised that a Vietnamese official gave me a classified sighting report that lists the location of the camp that these men were allegedly held in, the name of the general who runs the camp, and the name of the man who took this picture, and described that it was taken in front of a specific kind of trees.

My sister, Shelby, right before I left to go to Hanoi, implored the Defense Intelligence Agency to please let her look at the files, asked if there had ever been a report made that had to do with any person that may have been involved with taking this picture, and was told at that time that no such report existed.

Now, this is one of the really quite surprising things that I found out on my 5-day trip to Hanoi. Once again I would be happy to answer any further questions.

Senator SMITH. All right, I think that—

Ms. BARDLEY. Excuse me, if I could add one thing. I was very interested to hear that one of the sources on this list, Colonel Cole testified yesterday, is now missing and unable to be found in connection with the picture. And, I'll tell you, I'm concerned that a list of sources is given to the Vietnamese when they say they want to punish sources, and then I hear from Colonel Cole that one is actually missing. I have some questions and concerns about this.

Senator SMITH. We have some questions about it, too, and we will take those up, I assure you, with the officials involved.

Mr. Lundy, I think you are the last witness in the group, and so why do you not proceed for a few minutes, and then we will try to take some questions.

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Can I just add one thing? Judge Gayden just gave me this note. He said that I should mention the fact that there is a hair root sample of my son also, and all of my family has sent hair over there to be analyzed.

Senator SMITH. Your comment there made me think of something, and now I apologize—we will get right to you in a second. How many people here in the room are either current military or former military—members of the military—just raise your hand?

[Show of hands.]

Senator SMITH. If you were fingerprinted when you went in the military, would you put your hand down?

[Show of no hands.]

Senator SMITH. There is not a hand remaining, let the record show. I am absolutely amazed that whether these fingerprints that are being presented to us in the name of a prisoner or allegedly prisoner—are accurate remains to be seen, but I am absolutely flabbergasted that we cannot find fingerprints on record anywhere in the service record of military personnel. The first thing that happened to me when I went in was I was fingerprinted, and apparently everybody else here was too.

So I am just going to put all officials in control of these on notice that I intend to know why, in the case of all of the live-sighting reports, and all of the individuals involved in those reports, why we do not have fingerprints in the service jackets of those individuals. And if you do not know why you better start looking because I want to know why. [Applause.]

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Senator Smith, that isn't all of it either, because I—when I was looking to get fingerprints I went to the Hall of Records in downtown Los Angeles. They had no birth certificate on my son, but they have on the other two of my sons. I went to Sacramento; they have no birth certificate on my son. DMV, the hospital records, there are no fingerprints to be had anywhere.

Senator SMITH. I do not understand that, but we will find out about it.

Al, go ahead.

Mrs. FLECKENSTEIN. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF ALBRO L. LUNDY III

Mr. LUNDY. Thank you for allowing me to speak on this. I again want to stress for the record, Senator Reid and I had a nice conversation in an elevator about this particular photograph and about my father. I have asked one photo analysis that we've done to be passed around to the Senators. It's a simple photo overlay. It's done on acetate, and if you take a look at it—you just lift the acetate up—one of the photos is my father as a younger man and then the other photo is the copy of the photo drawn out. You see that it matches perfectly. All the features are the same, the head shape is the same, everything with regard to the photo is exact. That's a very simple analysis, something that could have been done very easily, I think by the Government immediately, but has never been done, or at least has never been provided to us.

I'm going to start out telling about the Lundy family a little bit, and about Maj. Albro Lundy because I think he is the reason and those men are the reason that we are here. My father, still serving in Vietnam right now, went over in 1970, a highly decorated individual, I've put in the record. But we were told he was killed Christmas Eve, 1970. The Government told us that, and my family—6 children ages 12 to 9 months old, and my mother accepted that and it was brutal. I almost lost my mother at the same time I lost my father because of the closeness of that relationship.

But my mother worked very hard to get over it. She went to law school. Myself and my older sister worked very hard helping raise the children.

We never thought twice about my father being alive. There were some mysteries with regard to the circumstances of his accident—incident. We didn't have those cleared up for us, but we never thought twice. To us he was dead. It was very difficult to get to, but to us he was dead.

I was approached by an individual named Scott Barnes in 1981, I guess. Scott Barnes said that he had been in the embassy, in the CIA, in Thailand—Bangkok, Thailand—the CIA portion of the embassy. And he had seen an individual file, a secret file, a top-secret file given to him by Colonel Mather—Paul Mather, who I think, interestingly enough, has been rehired by the DIA. And that Colonel Mather said here's someone we've had reports about. He might be alive. Now this is CIA information by the way.

Our family—and I brought this man—I met him by coincidence in church. My name is Albro Lundy and my father's name is Albro Lundy, and he had seen a visitors' roster and approached me. He

said I would like to tell you about the information. He had information about my father's case that I didn't have with regard to the circumstances of the accident, the individual area where he went down, things that the family hadn't been provided. He said your father may be alive.

We said, thank you very much. We think you are very well intentioned, but we know you're wrong. My father is dead. And we sent Scott Barnes on his way. Scott Barnes never again contacted me until this photo came out.

In 1985, I finished law school and I said, you know, I wonder about the mysteries. The mysteries were my father's parachute opened, but they said there was no one in it. I didn't understand how a parachute could deploy without any weight in the parachute. There had to be somebody there and I've spoken to parachute experts about it. They say you've got to have some weight on a parachute for it to deploy.

So I wanted to talk to the witnesses. I figured there were witnesses to my father's incident. There's no way they could call him killed in action, body not recovered, unless they had some witnesses.

So I wrote a FOIA, and I want to direct your attention to this blow-up here. You have it attached in the bound copy of my statement. So if you cannot read it, but the part that is highlighted says specifically, this is all the information in the file, there were no witnesses to this incident. Then down at the bottom, I just want to highlight there, it says, sensitive to the people. That is from the Air Force, that is the DOD, that is my contact. There were no witnesses and Albro Lundy, just graduated from law school, said this is the official Government response to me, and I didn't look any further. I believe there are no witnesses.

I'm a family of military background. We believe our Government. We know our Government. We trust our Government. My father was the ultimate patriot. I didn't look any further. There were no witnesses.

Judge Gayden sent me a letter, Easter of this year. He says, I have information about your father, who might be alive. I say to myself, another one, my father is dead. But I call him up because this time I am interested; I want to follow up the leads, and he has got basically information which I did not think could come from just anybody about my father.

He has got my father's Social Security number, he has got my father's birth date, he has got his correct rank, and he has got his correct name, Albro Lundy, which is as unique as his Social Security number. And besides, he is dead.

I said, where is this information coming from and why would somebody bring information about Albro Lundy out; he is dead. No one would be so stupid as to try and pull a hoax; he is dead. I had better follow this up a little more. Because I could not understand where that information came from. So I start writing.

Actually what happened is, a little while after that, my mother got information from the government, the same, very same information that Judge Gayden had sent to us in a TWX. In that TWX it had a cover letter, and Chuck Trowbridge was the person that

had written the cover letter. He said, disregard this information; it really is nothing but a dogtag report.

My mother did not look any further. She took that and threw it in the trash. My father is dead. She threw it in the trash. I said, Mother, I would really have liked to have seen that. I had to get my own copy. I called up and got a copy, and I read through it again, and I said, well, dogtags do not have birth dates on it. Chuck, how could that be? Why did you call this a dogtag report?

Chuck has not responded to me as far as that is concerned.

Senator REID. Who is Chuck?

Mr. LUNDY. Chuck Trowbridge. I am sorry to be so familiar. He testified here earlier. I said, well, I am going to read the report itself, because it was basically a letter purportedly written for my father with this information. I did not believe much of the information on it. But I did not know where that correct information had come from, and that was very unusual to me.

And I saw something at the bottom of the letter that amazed me. It said thumbprints. Now, I did not get the original; I got a transcription. But it said thumbprints.

Senator REID. Is this from the judge?

Mr. LUNDY. No, this is from the DIA. And nowhere in the cover letter that said disregard this did it mention these thumbprints. Nowhere. And so I called up and I said, there is thumbprints in the original; have you checked? Have you checked my father's thumbprints? I think we can get rid of this right now.

Because to be honest with you, I did not tell my mother anything about the investigation I was doing. I opened the case as a case in my law office, and I was going to disprove it because my father was dead; this was a hoax. I spent literally thousands and maybe tens of thousands of dollars worth of man-hours trying to disprove this case.

I did not want to bring it back into the family. My father was dead, and I knew what this would do to our family if I brought it up again. Three and a half months worth of investigation before I told anybody in our family about this.

You know what I was told when I asked about the fingerprints—have you checked the fingerprints? Now, this has been in the DIA's hands now for 5 months. They said, we do not do that unless the next of kin requests it. That was the response.

I said, well, I am next of kin. And they said, no you are not. I said, well, what do you call me. No, you are not next of kin; your mother is next of kin.

So we had to go through a little formality. But I requested it, and I got an answer back: There are no fingerprints in your father's file. There are no fingerprints to check on him.

I said, my father had top secret security clearance, nuclear, intelligence. He was ROTC, went to regular. How could there not be fingerprints in my father's file? And then I looked through the file very carefully. Here is the—I would like to draw your attention to this next blow-up, and it says right there, there is a letter in his file, it says, attached are forms and fingerprint cards on the above subject.

Senator REID. But look at the date on it.

Mr. LUNDY. Right. But they do not throw anything away. That does not make any difference when the date is; 22 of December, 1954, that means my father was fingerprinted and the card was in his file. Then, more importantly, look down there on the bottom, it says, "National Agency check is completed on this individual." That means the fingerprints were good. That means Henry classification cards had been done. That means my father's fingerprints had been checked out in the Government, and the Government had a set of fingerprints in his file, that very file I was looking at.

Much to my amazement, when I flipped it over to find the attachment, there was no fingerprint card attached, nor were there any Henry classification cards. I cannot understand that. I still cannot understand that. It is absolutely unbelievable.

This is a smoking gun letter, that there is cover-up in our government. It could not possibly happen if there was not, because guess what? Somebody had to pull that card from his file; it just does not magically disappear, or they just forgot to take out the cover letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are going to inquire when the folks come back next week.

Mr. LUNDY. Moving on to the photo itself—

The CHAIRMAN. We need to do that. We need to try to wrap this up. I am not trying to cut you off, but I just need to.

Mr. LUNDY. I understand. I felt that was probably the most important aspect with regard to the Government's response.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever asked them about that?

Mr. LUNDY. I have letters.

The CHAIRMAN. About the fingerprint thing, though.

Mr. LUNDY. Right—

The CHAIRMAN. And their answer to you is what?

Mr. LUNDY. There are no fingerprints—

The CHAIRMAN. No, but as to why, as to what happened?

Mr. LUNDY. "We do not know. We are very sorry." That is one of the most embarrassing things I can tell you. Carl Ford, if can quote Carl Ford—

The CHAIRMAN. Is it beyond the realm of possibility that it might be incompetence and not—

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I am just asking the question.

Mr. LUNDY. One, two, three, all—

Ms. FLECKENSTEIN. All three of them, they were highly cleared for security.

Mr. LUNDY. And it just so happens that there are pictures of all three, legitimate pictures, that is what I want to get to, because I did photo analysis. Before I would even take this to my mother, before I would even bring it up, I made sure in my own mind that my father was alive.

Let me put it this way, that I had enough evidence that somebody would not have to prove to me he is dead. OK? And I think that is what our Government should be doing right now, it should be saying to the Vietnamese, you prove to us he is dead; you prove to us all of these guys who are missing are dead. It is not our responsibility to prove they are alive because they know they are alive.

We knew they are alive, and that is my father. This analysis, I had a 16-point analysis done. There are 16 facial features—and if you saw the overlay, it is obviously recognizable—16 facial features of my father on one to the other. It is him; there is nobody that is disputing that. The only people have been the DIA who said they are inconclusive, they do not have a result. Inconclusive is all they have said as far as it being him.

But I went to my mother July, I say July 5, probably, and I said, Mother, I have got information, you need to know about it. I think now is the time you should hear it. She did not hear any information, she just wanted to see the photograph. I said, let me brace you. She just wanted to see the photograph. Minutes later, after she saw the photograph, she said, that is your father. Absolute identification.

We do not need anything else. All of our families know, we absolutely know those are our parents or sons. We do not need another analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you a quick question there? Apparently some other families claim it is theirs.

Mr. LUNDY. Is it not interesting that the other families, and we are tight, families of POW's and MIA's—and I was not part of this 5 months ago, I could not even think about POW's. My father was dead. We are so tight, they treat these people like sisters. She calls me her son, because we stick together; we have to.

None of those "families" that the DIA has talked about have come forward, have called and said, let me help you here, this is my son or this is my brother. Would it not be a relief to me? I am looking for the truth. If that is not my dad—

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to try to get at that.

Mr. LUNDY. I asked Chuck Gittins, I said, please, Chuck, contact those people. Please write them and tell them to contact me. I need to know, I need to know. I do not know if Chuck has done it or not, but they have not contacted me.

I do not even know, to be honest with you, if there are other families. Because I think they would have gone public, because if that is their man, they would want him home, too. They would be right here in front of you saying, I want my man home. And they did not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one other sort of—

Mr. LUNDY. We could just ask Chuck that question.

Chuck, have you followed that up? That request I asked of you? [Applause.]

Mr. GITTINS. [Inaudible.]

Mr. LUNDY. There you go.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I did not hear what he said.

Mr. LUNDY. I asked Chuck if he had followed up the request I had to forward my name and a request that the families contact me, to those "other two families." And he did not know what I was talking about.

Mr. GITTINS. He has not made that request to me, sir.

Mr. LUNDY. That is an absolute untruth. I have made it two different times, once at the Pentagon and once at the POW Task

Force hearing that I did in front of Chairman Solarz. Twice. I have not done it in writing; that is my mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me gavel this quietly back to order and see if we can try to pull this together.

Mr. LUNDY. I will finish up here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lundy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALBRO L. LUNDY III

In March 1970 at the age of 37, Maj. Albro L. Lundy, Jr. said goodbye to his parents, wife and six children to answer his country's call. In the face of extreme controversy about a conflict half a world away, he unquestioningly went off to fight for freedom against an enemy known as communism. He is first and foremost, a patriot. Major Lundy is a fighter pilot but his military record shows far more. Prior to his assignment to Southeast Asia, he had taught German Luftwaffe pilots how to fly America's best planes. Upon return from his tour in Vietnam, he was to be assigned as the military attache to an Eastern European embassy (he went down just 12 days before his rotation home). Major Lundy had also served at Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) where he had designed weapons systems and operations. This assignment came after he had completed his master's degree in Human Factors.

In addition to his family, his love was flying and he was very skilled at it. During the first 8 months of his tour in Southeast Asia, Major Lundy was awarded the Silver Star, 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Air Force Air Medal and 6 Air Force Commendation Medals, (Fourth through Ninth Oak Leaf Clusters.)

FACTS OF LOSS INCIDENT

On Christmas Eve 1970, Major Lundy was flying a med-evac search and rescue mission in North Central Laos over the Ban Ban Valley. Although two other A1E fighter groups had refused this mission, Major Lundy volunteered. Three Air America helicopters, two Raven forward air controllers, an Air America C-7A and another A1E were flying on that mission. Major Lundy reported having a rough engine and that he needed to leave the airplane. Subsequent intelligence analysis indicated that his engine was hit by groundfire, as the area was heavily defended by both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao ground troops.

Major Lundy announced that he was leaving the airplane and the observers watched an apparently normal chute deployment. One observer reported seeing someone in the chute initially, while other observers reported that no one was in the parachute as it neared the ground. Ground rescue teams were unable to reach the parachute site as the area was very hostile and casualties were taken.

Major Lundy was declared MIA, survivability rated as Category 1 (indicating out of aircraft at time of crash—Attachment 1). Two days later Major Lundy was declared KIA/BNR. There is no clear explanation given as to why he was declared KIA. Although combat forces try to make the best determinations they can in the face of uncertainty, this does not mean their judgments are infallible. For instance, Ernie Brace, who had been declared dead by the U.S. Government, returned alive in 1973 during Operation Homecoming I.

Immediately following Major Lundy's "death", and for 20 years thereafter, the Lundy family was given but a fraction of the above information. For instance, both the telegram and official condolence letter from the Commander of the 56th Special Operations Wing, Col. E.J. Walsh, specifically indicated that Major Lundy did not leave the aircraft and that "he died instantly as a result of the aircraft crash." (Attachment 2) Yet, one witness states that he saw Major Lundy in his parachute and the government to this day lists his survivability category as 1, meaning that he was out of the airplane. Additionally, the family was told that a parachute deployed from the plane, yet no adequate explanation has ever been given as to how his parachute could deploy if he went down and was incinerated in the plane. Finally, from whom, when, and where did any of this information come from? The family was not given any information to answer these questions or verify the facts.

FAMILY RESPONSE

Major Lundy's family accepted the KIA/BNR designation despite the mysteries surrounding the crash. The Lundy family went on with their life. Johanna Lundy went to law school, became an attorney and raised six children on her own. Major Lundy's loss was so traumatic to the family that they completely avoided the POW/

MIA cause even while the war was ongoing. The Lundy family accepted the death of Major Lundy so firmly that when Scott Barnes met some of the family at church in the summer of 1981 and said he had information that Major Lundy was still alive, the family said they were not interested in his information because Major Lundy was dead. Barnes approached the family because he saw Albro Lundy III's name in a visitor's book and recognized the unique name.

Scott Barnes reported on Major Lundy in his book *Bohica* on page 42. The Lundy family formally requests the Senate Select Committee to subpoena the CIA files on Major Lundy that are referred to in *Bohica* and to subpoena Col. Paul Mather, to question him about Major Lundy and all other POW's. (Attachment 3)

Major Lundy's eldest son, Albro III, had always wanted to speak to the wingman who watched his father go down and in 1985 he submitted a FOIA Request for his father's file and the names of the witnesses to his crash. The Air Force responded by sending Major Lundy's personnel and medical files but sent a letter stating that there were "no witnesses to Major Lundy's incident." Albro Lundy III accepted this letter as the truth and did no further follow-up. Despite this letter, when the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo was leaked to the media, the government immediately said that there were four witnesses to the "death" of Major Lundy. (Attachment 4)

Why did the government lie to the family when they knew there were witnesses and at least one witness statement? The government has lost all credibility in the family's eyes—they now want to see all the original documents for themselves. And so they should. There is no legitimate reason to classify these documents.

FIRST LIVE REPORTING OF MAJOR LUNDY

In the Spring of 1991, the government sent Johanna Lundy a transcription of letters purportedly written for Major Lundy. The government classified them as "dog tag reports" of an obviously fraudulent nature although the report contained correct information not found on a dog tag. Johanna's response was to toss them in the trash and mention it to her family in passing. This is another example of how firmly the family believed that Major Lundy was dead.

Albro III ordered his own set of documents and while examining them found a mention of thumbprints buried in the bottom of the transcription. It was difficult for him to understand why this wasn't mentioned in any of the government's analysis. Certainly this could prove or disprove the correct nature of the report and whether or not Major Lundy did survive.

Albro called his Air Force Liaison officer, William Frampton, about the case. His first question was, "Have you run the fingerprints yet?" Frampton replied that they do not check fingerprints unless the next of kin requests it. Lundy III was stunned. At this point it had been 5 months since the original documents were received. This is the "Highest National Priority" and the government does not even try to match fingerprints of a possible POW? The Pentagon leaves "no stone unturned" in their search for POW's and does not try to verify fingerprints? Lundy also noted that they also did not call the Next of Kin and ask if they wanted them checked or mention them in their reporting. In some cases the NOK may not even know that fingerprints exist to try matching.

MISSING FINGERPRINTS

Lundy's amazement at the cavalier attitude toward the fingerprints turned to shock when it was discovered that his father's fingerprints were missing from the file and no match could be attempted. In addition to knowing that his father had been fingerprinted at least 5 times, Lundy III possessed a letter from his father's file saying "Attached is Major Lundy's fingerprint card." (Attachment 5) His father's prints did not just fall out the file if they were attached to this letter. Someone had to take them out on purpose.

ENTER: THE FAMOUS PHOTOGRAPH

In late April, Judge Hamilton Gayden called Albro III and suggested he contact Gladys Fleckenstein, the mother of Lt. Comdr. Larry Stevens, because she might have a photo of Major Lundy. Gladys had had the photograph in her possession for almost 6 months and had never been able to identify the third man in the photo. The names of Stevens and Robertson were on the back of the photo Shelby Robertson Quast had obtained.

Gladys had previously been aware of the Lundy family name from a letter sent to her by Chuck Trowbridge of the DIA in February 1991 stating that Major Lundy was supposedly held with Robertson and Stevens (Attachment 6). Gladys requested the Lundy family address, however, the government would not release this informa-

tion. The fact that private individuals had to bring these families together is not so incredible when compared to the fact that the government possessed a 3-man photograph with an unidentified third man and independent corroborating evidence that these 3 men were being held together and never once contacted the Lundy family to possibly identify the third man. This blatant government malfeasance directly contradicts the stated POW policy of being the "nation's highest priority."

Upon receiving a copy of the photograph from Gladys's source, an American humanitarian worker who received the photo at Site 2, Thailand, Albro immediately submitted it to a preliminary photo analysis that showed the photo had not been tampered with, except for the label applied as the sign. Albro who wanted to protect his family, especially his mother, did not mention the photo or his investigations.

SECOND EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT

On June 27, Lundy was called by the Air Force Liaison with a second-hand live sighting of his father, still reportedly held with Robertson and Stevens, that was received in January 1991 by DIA. As of September, 1991, the DIA still has not investigated this live sighting. This was confirmed by Bob Sheetz, Chuck Trowbridge and Warren Grey in a meeting with Lundy and Shelby Quast September 1991. In fact, when the question was raised at this meeting specifically about these men, none of these individuals, supposedly fully briefed on the case, even recalled the existence of a second live-sighting report. DIA had the report 5 months before giving it to the family and has still not followed up a live sighting now 9 months old on this highly visible case. If the families had been given the names of the sources and supposed locations, instead of having this information classified, the men might be home right now.

PHOTO IDENTIFICATION

Albro finally told his mother about the existence of the photo in early July, just prior to flying to Washington for the National League of Families conference. Johanna demanded to see the photo before hearing any corroborating evidence, and she identified the photo within minutes. "That is a picture of my husband," Johanna Lundy has said to the world. Nothing but an actual photograph of her husband would convince her that he survived. It took the weight of this picture, along with the other evidence, as well as the government's dishonesty and malfeasance to cause her to question the government's initial declaration of his death. "Why would they lie if they don't need to?" she states. This photo is also unanimously identified by all Major Lundy's relatives and friends.

This photograph has also been analyzed and the identity of Major Lundy has been confirmed by photographic and computer photo analysts. These analyses will be submitted separately upon request of the Committee. Particularly with Major Lundy there is an unmistakable correlation of Major Lundy's features in his young photo's to his aged image in the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo.

PENTAGON TREATMENT OF PHOTO

Albro Lundy III has made four trips from California to the Pentagon to see the file on his father and has been denied access each time. The first time occurred during the League of Families conference where the Robertson, Stevens and Lundy families all met together for the first time. When all three families questioned Pentagon officials during the League of Family Conference July 11-14, they all said they had never seen the photo before. Because of the families' definite identifications of the men in the photo, Carl Ford and Ken Quinn made plans to give the photo to the Vietnamese and request repatriation of the men.

On July 5 the photo was given to the Vietnamese and surrounding governments. On July 16, the photo was leaked to the press—not by the families.

On July 17, the Pentagon held a press conference saying the photo could not be proved authentic and "unnamed Pentagon sources" said the photo was a hoax.

Before Ken Quinn could even get to the bargaining table on July 25, the real OFFICIAL government policy was made quite clear to the Vietnamese; THE POW's ARE ALL DEAD.

The Pentagon undermined Ken Quinn's trip to Hanoi to discuss the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo by releasing to CBS News a 7-page analysis discrediting the letters and therefore, by association, the photo, even though the two had never before been connected, on the eve of his meeting. This analysis, containing a plethora of errors and misinformation too numerous to cite here, was handed to nationwide news media before it was released to the three families involved. Carl Ford had promised the families prior to this that nothing would be released to the news

media without it first being given to all three families involved. When questioned by Albro III about this breach of his promise, not to mention policy, Ford responded, "I guess my word is not worth much, is it?" Absolutely not, says the Lundy family.

One of the most tragic results of this breach was the fact that Johanna Lundy was told by reporters over the phone that the analysis indicated that remains of her husband and his identification card had been found. The fact that the government would even have printed this information when it knew that Major Lundy flew sanitized, (meaning that he flew without any identification on his person because he was flying in the secret war in Laos), and that the official government line to Mrs. Lundy until this moment had been that he was incinerated in his plane, is nothing less than brutal and blatant dishonesty. The government has yet to make a retraction nor provide the Lundy family with any of the evidence they purport supports this lie.

The government has had this photo in its possession since June 1990 according to DOD News Briefing on August 6, 1991. A FOIA submitted in September requesting all copies of the photo and photo analyses done on it has still not been responded to by General Soyster. The families were told by Bob Sheetz that the photo was not sent to the FBI for analysis until July 1991. Why did it take the DIA one year to even submit this photo for analysis? Why does DOD continue to focus on any potential aspect of this case except for the identities of the men? Why does the only photographic analysis (from Sandia) released to the families dwell on the erroneous identification of the photo as circa WWII instead of specifically focusing on the specific identities of the three men? In fact, an identity analysis was not even requested of Sandia.

Concerning other Pentagon allegations about this photo, the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo has never been found in any Soviet magazine nor has it been proven to be a "fake" or a "hoax". The Pentagon's official response to the families is that the families' identifications indicate that these men are who we say they are and the Pentagon is seriously investigating it. Yet, in actuality, they are doing nothing to bring these men home and, in fact, are discrediting the evidence that shows they are alive.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS

Why would our government risk their credibility with the Vietnamese by giving them a photo they had done no analysis on?

If the government truly had evidence showing questions about the photo, why did DIA not share this information with the families when they made numerous trips to the Pentagon requesting all information on the photograph? Or did DOD just start slandering the photo for their own purposes after it became public?

If two other families have actually identified the middle man in this photo, why haven't they come forward to shed light on this photo and to help bring their man home?

Why hasn't the DOD forwarded the Lundy family's request to these two families that they come forward or contact the Lundy family privately? Did the DOD just create this story as a way to debunk the most readily identifiable image of the three men?

How could a parachute deploy without a person in it?

Who were all the people who saw Major Lundy's incident? Where are the witness statements of the Durax pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement?

Why was Major Lundy rated survivability Category 1 and still declared KIA without further proof of his death?

CERTAINTY OF PRISONERS IN LAOS

The United States lost 586 servicemen, missing in action, in Laos during the Vietnam War. In February 1973, the communist Pathet Lao, through their spokesman Soth Petrosky, claimed to hold dozens of our men as prisoners of war and demanded that the U.S. negotiate for their release. Within 2 months, President Nixon fell from power because of Watergate and never negotiated with the Pathet Lao. The Vietnamese, as recently as July 1991, through their U.N. Ambassador, told Johanna Lundy that the Vietnamese did not negotiate with the United States regarding POW's held in Laos and that the U.S. must negotiate directly with the Pathet Lao. To this day, not one living American POW has returned from Laos. "You do not understand. . . there is a greater destiny for our foreign policy in Asia and the POW's are expendable in pursuit of that policy. . . ." said Harriet Isom, Charge d' Affairs, United States Embassy, Vientiane, Laos, 1990.

SUMMARY

In the Lundy case, the family has been deliberately lied to, Major Lundy's file tampered with, all evidence including the live sightings and fingerprints have not been pursued and the photo has been erroneously slandered by the government. The Lundy family feels the government has shown a complete lack of good faith in trying earnestly to follow up all possible leads on the possibility of Major Lundy's captivity. They have in fact deliberately obfuscated the truth, prolonging the captivity of Major Lundy as well as all the other live POW's. It's time to stop the ludicrous charade that has been perpetrated by the Department of Defense. We pray that the Senate Select Committee can reveal the truth and finally bring our loved ones home.

FORMAL INFORMATION REQUEST

The Lundy family formally requests the Senate Select Committee to obtain and provide to the Lundy family the following information which we know exists:

- All classified information on Major Lundy.
- CIA Radio Intercepts on prisoners captured in Laos from 1970 until today.
- All photo analysis done since receipt of the photo in June 1990 which should include DIA and FBI's photo analysis.
- All reports of photo and sources.
- Latent prints of Major Lundy known to be held at the FBI.
- Any and all Henry Fingerprint Classification Cards on Maj. Lundy.
- Witness statements of all Air America pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement.
- All CIA files on Major Lundy, particularly the one referred to in *Bohica*.
- Subpoena of Col. Paul Mather to discuss post-1973 reports of Maj. Lundy.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS ON THE LUNDY CASE

Why would our government risk their credibility with the Vietnamese by giving them a photo they had done no analysis on?

If the government truly had evidence showing questions about the photo, why did DIA not share this information with the families when they made numerous trips to the Pentagon requesting all information on the photograph? Or did DOD just start slandering the photo for their own purposes after it became public?

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How could a parachute deploy without a person in it?

Who were all the people who saw Major Lundy's incident? Where are the witness statements of the Durax pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement?

Why was Major Lundy rated survivability Category 1 and still declared KIA without further proof of his death?

Why did the government lie to the family when they knew there were witnesses and at least one witness statement?

Why did it take the DIA one year to even submit this photo for analysis?

Why does DOD continue to focus on any potential aspect to discredit this case except for the identities of the men?

Why does the only photographic analysis (from Sandia) released to the families dwell on the erroneous identification of the photo as circa WWII instead of specifically focusing on the specific identities of the three men?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, let me just say to you, because I think that we have been for today at this a long time. You have been at it a lot longer, and we recognize that. Let me try, unless colleagues have any further—Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am just curious, because, Judge Gayden, you seem to be a conduit largely through your Laotian connection, is that correct?

Mr. GAYDEN. That is correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you have any idea why all of a sudden there seems to be, through this Laotian connection, these photographs coming? Have they asked for financial reward? Or do you have any ideas why this is happening as it is?

Mr. GAYDEN. Well, there are two things, probably, well, three things. The predominant thing is, and this has not been mentioned at all, I think that the sudden full court press by this administration to normalize relations is because the Communists are losing it. They are losing it, I know through the Laotians; they are losing it in Laos and they are losing in Vietnam, just like they did all of Eastern Europe.

We have affidavits from Pathet Lao soldiers that that is Dan Borah, Communist soldiers with a hammer and sickle in their own file with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They do not mention that; the Defense Department does not mention that. We could get them here, possibly. They will tell you it is Dan Borah.

We have people right now that are actually revolting against the Government.

Senator REID. I cannot understand this. What happened with the hammer and sickle?

Mr. GAYDEN. We have affidavits from military Communist officers with the hammer and sickle saying that that is Dan Borah. So what it is, is there is actually a revolution going on, but we do not read about that in our news. But it is going to happen.

So I think there is a full court press on to refuel the Communists, in my opinion, to keep the secrets. This way it is now coming out through the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Judge, I am not going to pick an argument with that, because there is another side that would suggest that it is going to crumble over there no matter what. I think it is, personally, with time. It may be sooner rather than later.

But the question here is whether or not we are going to further the process of getting answers no matter what happens politically. I mean, that is really the question. One day longer is one day too many, and we have all agreed on that.

So the question is not so much the dynamics of the politics and everything, frankly. It is whether or not we are able to get answers now, and whether there is a process in place that allows us to do it. Now, do you believe that is the reason?

Mr. GAYDEN. No, there is another reason, and Senator Smith is familiar with this. We get both kinds. We have, we, and I say "we," my Lao connection has several contacts. Some of them are actually after the \$2.5 million reward; that is a motivation, no doubt about it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Have they collected some money?

Mr. GAYDEN. I am sorry?

Senator KASSEBAUM. They have collected rewards?

Mr. GAYDEN. No, they have not, no. When one of them comes across, it was 24 Congressmen, of which Congressman Smith was one of them. They have really come and generated a lot of interest, and the Vietnamese, as I have been told, that are part of this Lao connection, are strictly for coming out and turning in the Vietnamese and showing that the Vietnamese have been holding POW's. They are not interested in the reward if they are alive.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me intercede here.

Mr. LUNDY. I wanted to say one other thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. LUNDY. Specifically with regard just to the treatment of the families, and my coming in here now. Because as soon as my mother identified it, basically I flew to Washington and gave the photo to the Defense Department, and said, here is my dad, go get him, please bring him home. Bring my dad home.

I was naive. I was absolutely, entirely naive. Because instead of my Government saying, like when Bobby Garwood was identified, they brought him home, instead of my government going over there and finding my dad and bringing him home—

The CHAIRMAN. No, he came home on his own with the help of another nation.

Mr. LUNDY. OK, that is fine, I am sorry I misquoted there. I have put up now with 5 months' worth of the photo being slandered erroneously. Never once have they questioned the identities, never once have they done anything but connect it to things which are fake. I mean, really, absolutely fake.

There are nine different sources. My source is a woman, an American, who brought it out. But that never gets mentioned in the press. Everybody says that photo is a hoax. I look at them and I say, but that is my dad, that is my dad. So my point here is that my little girl, she is 3 years old, and she says, when is Papa coming home; Papa is in Laos. Papa is in Laos. I am reading her a book, and the book is called, *The Emperor's New Clothes*.

Everybody knows, everybody knows there are men alive, and that we left them there. What I am asking this Senate Select Committee to do is be a little boy in the audience that looks over and says, he has got no clothes on, because that is the charade that is being played right now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let me try to bring this to a sensible conclusion for the first 3 days. First of all, it is clear, we could spend another 3 hours with all of you in a panel in open session. But we are going to wind up at the end of that 3 hours where we are right now, which is where the Committee really needs to begin to do some analysis outside of the Committee, by bringing in some experts, sitting with you individually and pulling this together.

It is clear, and the last 3 days I think have indeed been different than I predicted. I said I did not think there would be revelations; I think there have been some, and not the least of which was a statement by a gentleman who spent years at this effort, that he believes that people were alive for a period of time.

I think the fact that this is the first time we have ever had people from on the ground, in Vietnam, come forward is new. I think the level of distrust is in itself its own revelation, and it is a tragedy; there is no other way to describe it. It is extraordinary that so many people are here feeling that there has been a breach of faith with them—convinced that there is, not feeling it, just convinced.

Whatever it is that has happened, whether there is legitimate cause or illegitimate cause, the fact remains that this has documented why this Select Committee had to be created, and it has documented the difficulty of the task ahead of us. There are too

many families who, for whatever reasons, are not getting the answers that they deserve to have, not being treated the way that they deserve to be treated. That has to change.

Now, Secretary Cheney came here personally 2 days ago, and said it has changed, and will change. The proof of that will be Albro Lundy and whether or not you get the information, and whether or not each and every one of you get that, and whether this Committee does.

But I think there has got to be a mutuality in this. I think there has got to be an effort to try to help the DOD and DIA and others to be able to do their job in these next months. This Committee is here with a life now that will watch that very, very carefully. We are going to be sort of the intermediary, if you will, the interlocutor.

We are also going to be doing an awful lot of hard work of our own, a great deal of research, a lot of the facts. Now, nothing that has come before us in the last 3 days at this point is going to be discounted, is going to be cast aside.

We are going to divide up the Committee in a way that allows staff to be able to address each of the sort of compartments that are in front of us, ranging from photographs to live-sighting reports, to the intelligence review to the case-by-case review, to the question of the experts that are needed to try to discern some of this, to the on the ground effort in Vietnam itself.

The Committee obviously has an enormous amount of work in front of it.

Next week we will hear from some of those about whom accusations have been made today and give them an opportunity to respond.

Colonel Cole is here now; Major Gittins is here now. Major Gittins, if you want an opportunity to respond now, but I think it would be better to bring you back with everybody else and have an opportunity to answer these kinds of questions. And we will proceed then to do that and to set that up in as short an order as possible.

The State Department has sent up a deposition in writing with respect to the accusations made by Mr. Burch, and those will be entered into the record at this point in time.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington, DC 20520.

Hon. JOHN KERRY,
Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your letter of September 20 asking the Department to respond to the allegation that the Secretary ordered a mass destruction of POW/MIA records. Upon learning of the accusation, our Vietnam desk officer contacted Mr. Burch in an attempt to clear up what may be a misunderstanding. Mr. Burch declined to provide us with information that would have helped our investigation.

The Secretary of State has not issued a written or oral order this calendar year to destroy POW/MIA files. As best we can determine, no other Department official issued a written or oral order this calendar year to destroy POW/MIA files. In any case, we have been unable to find anyone in any of the bureaus listed in your letter who received such instructions.

As you might expect, offices within the Department of State routinely retire, for either destruction or storage, old documents to make room for new documents. While the Department does not preserve and store every copy of every document on every subject, substantive documents, including those dealing with POW/MIA issues, are preserved and stored.

To my knowledge, the only file retired this year that might pertain to POW/MIA matters was a chronological letter file kept by the previous desk officer for Vietnam, Donald Stader. A copy of the transaction form is attached. Although Mr. Stader's letter file is still intact and will remain so at least until the Committee can further clarify Mr. Burch's allegations, chronological files are eventually destroyed because a copy of each document in those files also routinely appears in a subject file that is preserved for storage.

As you may know, there are retired individual State Department office files dealing with POW/MIA matters located in the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. They have been declared permanent records by the National Archives and Records Administration.

We have done our best to investigate Mr. Burch's allegation and can find nothing to substantiate it. If the Committee can provide more information, we would be happy to investigate further.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

JANET G. MULLINS,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Attachment: As stated.

But we will continue to follow up on those issues also. I want to thank you, each and every one of you. It is no fun for you to sit here, I know, to vent your spleen at your own government in whom you have believed as deeply as you have.

This is obviously about as contentious an issue as there is. And it is going to be hard for this Committee to sort some of it out, although I think we are really on a road to being able to do a lot of it.

And Senator Smith, do you have any comments you want to make?

Senator SMITH. Yes, very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to thank Senator Kerry for his cooperation throughout these hearings and also in the process of setting up the Committee, which was a long and arduous task—too long. Some of that was out of our control, however.

We look upon this as the beginning. We know it has been a long, long road, but we have made some commitments and I have made some that I intend to keep, that we are going to do everything in our power if it is humanly possible to find out the truth.

And Jack, in the case of something as dramatically different as what you have to say and what other people have to say, I would, although I would like to ask you some questions now, I would prefer to wait to get the response and then come back and do that.

But we are driven to do this. I want to assure you that. We are driven to find the answers. We are not miracle men and women, but we are driven to try to find the truth. If we can do it, we will. We are not going to give any false hopes. But this has been a very, very good start, because we got to hear you, all of you, we got to hear every witness tell his side or her side of the story. What we have to do now is dig. This is not meant to be complete. It is just the beginning.

I do want to make—it has nothing to do with the witnesses, and just a quick moment, Senator, of personal privilege. Earlier in the day I made a comment regarding something that I perceived to be

the truth that was different from what Senator McCain perceived to be the truth. It was exactly that. What his perception of it was and what my perception was and it was in no way that I intend or in any way to challenge the veracity of Senator John McCain, whom I have the greatest respect for.

It was a difference based on a set of facts that he had and a set of facts that I have and I will make my side of that available for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Reid?

Senator REID. I know that time is late. I do want to say this. I think, for my peace of mind, it would have been much better had we ended these hearings the first day. Because there was very little controversy, it would have made for a nice clean hearing and we could have gone home and not worried about it.

I have learned a great deal in these 3 days. The fact is, they did not end the first day, and I think we have a lot of facts that are going to take a lot of digging.

I want to publicly commend and applaud you and Senator Smith and the entire staff for the fine hearing that has been developed. I was a trial lawyer before coming back to Washington and personally prepared and had prepared many, many cases. This is starting out like a very well-prepared case and we should come to a good conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that comment very much, Senator. It would be nice if this were clean and easy. The reason there are 3 days of hearings and the reason there is controversy is that there is controversy. If we are going to lay this out, there is no way to avoid that. There is nothing that is going to be easy about it.

On the other hand, I really see a framework that is coming out of these 3 days. I also must tell you that until proven otherwise, I am convinced that Secretary Cheney's put himself on the line here in a way that no other Secretary of Defense has done.

This Committee is going to do its utmost, obviously, to follow-up on that and hold that to account. I have worked closely with these people over the last weeks and I believe they want this issue resolved.

I also believe that there is a new page that has been turned over in terms of the openness. Now, that proof will be in the next weeks—very shortly. We are told that much is to be declassified. We are told that much will be available that has never been available before and some of it already is.

So bear with us. If you do not get something right away, I hope it is mostly because we are understaffed and overworked and not because there is an effort not to get it to you.

But I suspect this process is going to open up. And the test of that will be our work and your cooperation with us over the course of these next weeks.

We will not not ask any questions and we will not avoid seeking the answers, no matter how difficult they are.

On that note, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 7:35 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

POW/MIA POLICY AND PROCESS

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee convened, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry, chairman, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. The select committee will come to order. Good morning, our apologies for starting a little bit late this morning. We were having a Members meeting from 8:30 this morning. We were hearing some testimony in closed session and now are moving into the open session.

As everybody knows, this session is the wind-up, if you will, of the initial 3 days of the select committee's hearings. I have said previously, and I am not going to stop repeating it because I think it is terribly important to keep in mind, that the opening days are exactly that—opening days—and their purpose is to outline the parameters of this issue.

We heard from the administration, we heard from veterans organizations, we heard from a foreign witness, we heard from people who have been on the ground in Vietnam for the first time ever in the course of this kind of inquiry, and we heard from the families. We agreed that since we knew that certain kinds of allegations were going to be made, that it was fair to permit those against whom the allegations were made to come back and to be able to answer some of those in open session in order to help the committee but also in order, in fairness, to be able to address those as a matter of public record, and that is why we are here today.

But again, I emphasize on behalf of the entire committee, and we have just in our own meeting with Senators confirmed our inclination to proceed efficiently and quietly to a certain degree in these first months with a significant number of depositions and a significant number of private meetings in order to gather facts, and to separate fact from fiction, and do the best job that we can of trying to lay out reality here. But I will confirm that every Member feels very strongly that no stone should be left unturned, but every Member also feels very strongly that at the appropriate moment, obviously it all has to be laid out in public, or we become part of the problem, and we do not intend to let that happen.

So this is not a morning for long opening statements. I will say something for the record and ask any of my colleagues if they want to add quickly to that.

Senator McCAIN. I wanted to add one brief comment, Mr. Chairman. We have been contacted by many people who wish to testify before this committee. Obviously, this committee cannot take personal testimony of every person who wants to, but I know that they are all assured that we will take their deposition, their statements and read with interest any statement or any information that they feel needs to be brought before the committee, correct?

The CHAIRMAN. That is absolutely correct. We welcome that information. We know there are people out there who have it. There are also people out there who think they have it and do not, and we want to make it very clear that the committee is not going to tolerate folks who want to use us as some kind of springboard or platform for wild-eyed, cock-eyed theories that have no basis in fact whatsoever.

We are going to be tough with respect to that, and we have a process set up to try to do it, but we do want at the end of this process for everybody who has legitimate information to feel that this committee was receptive to it. We already have met with people that have never been part of any prior inquiry. We are going to meet with other people who have never been part of any prior inquiry, and I suspect that the chips will fall where they may in that process.

Mr. Ford, thank you for coming back. We appreciate it, and without further ado we would welcome any opening statements that you and Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Quinn want to make. I do want to swear you in again, which is important.

[Witnesses sworn.]

STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT SHEETZ, CHIEF OF THE SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We very much appreciate this opportunity to come back this morning. I wish I could tell you that we had been able to, in the past week, do all of the homework that we plan to do and that we have been able to respond to all of the questions and concerns and allegations.

We haven't, but as the Secretary pledged to you, we are committed to carry through 150 percent, is that we will provide you with anything you request, and that we see this as an opportunity to lay out for the committee what we are doing and how we do it, and we believe that that opportunity will be a positive thing for us and the families and the American people.

I have taken some of the comments that we have been able to develop so far and put them into my statement, and I'd like to go through that. I will be submitting as I go along various documents for the record. My staff and I are already at work going beyond that, but it will be given to the committee as we complete it over the next few weeks.

First, I'd like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the phrase, last known alive discrepancy cases. This is something that's been confusing to a lot of people, and we've tried to put some rigor to our definition so that hopefully we can dispel some of the confusion.

The way we define a discrepancy case is a case about which the U.S. Government has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, should have specific knowledge. The term, discrepancy case, includes not only individuals who were last known alive, but also individuals who we are not certain of their fate, or who were known dead but for whom the Indochinese Government should be able to provide information or remains.

As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three sub-category cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what precisely we were talking about when we use the terms, discrepancy case, compelling case, last-known-alive case, Vessey case. All meant different things to different people.

The three sub-categories of discrepancy cases are first, the last-known-alive cases, those cases in which the U.S. has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incidents.

The second category is a POW at Homecoming, a specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and service Secretaries as POW's but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as last known alive, due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 listed POW's have been accounted for through unilateral Vietnamese repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

The third category are those that we think that the Vietnamese, or the Laos, or the Cambodians, should have knowledge of the incidents. Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incidence of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence, however, that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now we'll shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here called variously the Vessey cases and the Vessey discrepancy cases. The first point to make is that from the beginning the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, worked together to develop a list of most compelling last-known-alive cases as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and the remains if the individual is dead.

The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative. The primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incidence of loss but did not return in Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting.

So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam. There are additional cases beyond the 119 individuals which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the Vessey discrepancy cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead, but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the last-known-alive definition as well as 13 individuals who were classified by the respective service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the Vessey cases, who are otherwise not accounted for.

This group of cases will be the focus of the full-time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the CINCPAC joint task force already described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase 1 of the CINCPAC plan.

Next, I would like to address an issue which has been implicit in the testimony you've heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach, and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency.

The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In cases where the family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's management inquiry associated with Colonel Peck related to functions assumed by the POW/MIA office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

Where it is appropriate, if there are questions about the intelligence, what we will do is, when they meet with us, we will ask Mr. Sheetz or members of his staff to join with us when we meet with the family so that they can explain from their perspective the intelligence, but that the meetings are conducted and the contact with the families are done by myself and my staff.

Let me now turn to some allegations that were made by Dr. O'Grady. We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file, and we believe that Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs process.

The O'Grady case is one in which we believe that the family has been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and information relating to the case. Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance, malfeasance, and misfeasance, are without factual basis.

For example, Dr. O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong. From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft. He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground, but he was not in it. All indicates were that he survived his ejection.

Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing-in-action status until 1977, when his status was reviewed at the express request of the primary next of kin, and his status changed to deceased, and a presumptive finding of death was entered in his case.

Senator MCCAIN. Who was the primary next of kin?

Mr. FORD. His wife. A second most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that identifications were made with teeth and teeth fragments, but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted there were no dental records to be compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental identification rendered by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either an antemortem dental x-ray or dental chart was available to provide the factual predicate for the dental identification.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt you for a moment. Where does that come from, her perception that it was not there? Do you know?

Mr. FORD. I don't know, but I have Col. Johnnie Webb, who is the head of our CIL-HI facility in Hawaii here, and if there are questions about this, he can either answer them for the record later, or you can call him to testify.

I have a detailed written response to other allegations made by Dr. O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record, but let me note, I always feel personally very uncomfortable when I have to make statements like this that suggest that a family member has not gotten the story exactly right. It also suggests that somehow I'm portraying the Defense Department as never having made any mistakes with the families, or not having always been sensitive to their concerns.

As I said the other day, there are too many examples—more than I would like to have to explain to you—where we have, in fact, made mistakes and not been as sensitive as we can, and we will not try to hide that fact. All you have to do is talk to some of these family members and realize how distraught they are over so many years, and how difficult it has been for them, and when mistakes are made they clearly remember them.

But again, it's also important for us to make sure that the professional—professionals in our casualty offices and our various offices like CIL-HI, when charges are made, we also have to defend them as well.

Let me move on to Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy. As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the investigation of the photo.

I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs.

We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects in the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any—any suggestion by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photograph is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise.

We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest level of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow up information in an attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our defense attaches worldwide to search for the photo.

We have tasked several technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs, and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals, or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously. However, without some new leads we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

Finally—and this is an important point—the Colonel Robertson case is not closed. It is still under active investigation, and any preliminary judgments made have been set aside pending further investigative activity and information. I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

Next, let me turn to Mr. Donahue's testimony about his brother, and if I might, let me just read very briefly from the transcript of that testimony. He was asked by Senator Reid about getting the live sighting reports, and Mr. Donahue said, yes, and I would like to mention one, if I may, right at the top, if I can read from it. I also have information about live prisoner of war.

And he reads information about a live prisoner of war named Jefferson Donahue—that is a phonetic spelling—date of birth, airplane number, and it gives the aircraft number, and it gives my parents' zip code in Florida instead of the aircraft number, and how this guy in the jungles of Laos ever got my parents' zip code number?

And Senator Reid then said, where did you get that, and he said, this was a live sighting report provided, classified. This is the declassified version provided by the Defense Department.

Let me also submit for the record a fact sheet that was circulated by the family in Southeast Asia, and let me just read briefly from that. It's toward the end, and it shows a photograph of Mr. Donahue's brother and some of the information about him, and then at the end it says:

The family of Capt. Morgan Donahue is willing to underwrite by prior arrangements the cost of obtaining credible and demonstrable physical evidence of his survival—i.e., fingerprints, photographs, et

cetera. They will also offer a substantial reward to anyone arranging for his escape or delivery alive and well to a location to be mutually agreed upon in the city of Bangkok, Thailand, where he would be met by his father and others.

No information on how he reached Bangkok, who brought him there, or how he managed to get back to the United States, will ever be disclosed to anyone, including representatives of the Thai Government or the United States. At such time as arrangements are made with persons capable of this task, the family of Captain Donahue will provide information which can be used to positively identify only him.

Captain Donahue's father can be reached at No. 7 World Green, Cocoa Beach, FL, U.S.A., zip code 32931, and his telephone number is—and then it gives his telephone number.

I think it is quite clear where it is possible that this person in the Lao jungle got the zip code of Mr. Donahue's brother. Unfortunately, it probably came from this flyer with the offer of a reward.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the flyer distributed?

Mr. FORD. I will have to check, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure. The one I have doesn't have a date on it, but I will get that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Over a period spanning two decades, members of Morgan J. Donahue's family and others have circulated flyers in Southeast Asia seeking information on the missing Air Force officer. Attached is a 4-page, undated information sheet which we believe was circulated circa 1979. Note that the last page clearly lists the address of Captain Donahue's father, including his zip code.

In 1987 an ethnic Lao in Thailand told DOD interviewers that Jack Bailey had given him a Lao language flyer on Captain Donahue. The Lao man, who claimed to have been previously involved in gathering POW information and remains, said that based on the flyer on Captain Donahue he planned to give up his other activities and devote himself solely to searching for Captain Donahue.

FACT SHEET—MISSING U.S. AIRMAN

Name: Morgan Jefferson Donahue
Rank: Captain, U.S. Air Force
Serial No: 560-587-7424 FR
Date of Birth: 2 May 1944 (Age—34 years)
Place of Birth: Hollywood, CA, USA
Height: 6 feet 4 inches (1.90 meters)
Weight: 175 Pounds (79.2 kilos)?
Hair Color: Dark Brown
Eye Color: Very Dark Brown
Teeth: A lower broken front tooth has a plastic cap

Captain Donahue, then Lieutenant Donahue, was assigned to the 606th Special Operations Squadron (Candle Light) of the 56th Special Operation's Wing at the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, located adjacent to the Mekong River between Thailand and Laos. He was a Navigator flying a C-123 flare dropping aircraft. The air distance between his base and the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the east where his aircraft went down was approximately 85 miles.

On the night of 13 December 1968, at 0300 hours, local time, Captain Donahue's aircraft, with a total crew complement of seven, the pilot, copilot, flight engineer, two navigators and two "Flare Kickers" (individuals who were responsible for dropping flares via the loading ramp in the rear of the aircraft to illuminate North Vietnamese vehicular traffic on the Trail moving south) were flying a mission at approximately 8,500 feet mean sea level (2,000 to 3,000 feet above the ground) on an assigned length of the Trail searching for surface movement of North Vietnamese vehicles, with the mission of illuminating such traffic by flares. Once such traffic was located and flares dropped, the C-123 aircraft functioned in forward air control.

ling capacity to direct medium size bombardment aircraft to any such target for ordnance dropping purposes. On the night in question, a convoy was spotted by the crew of the C-123, and a B57 aircraft loitering at a higher altitude was given the location of it and directed to it by radio by the C-123. For whatever the reason, in descending on its first bombing run, the B57 struck the C-123 cruising below it. Both aircraft were damaged in the collision and subsequently crashed. The B57 struck the ground near the bank of a river and the C-123 hit the ground in a wooded area in the nearby rocky hills (Karst).

It is not believed that either of the two pilots in the B57 aircraft survived the accident, however, the aircraft commander of the C-123 airbase parachuted safely from the aircraft and landed in the top canopy of one of the many tall trees in the area. He remained concealed therein until shortly after 0800 hours local time when he was rescued by a Jolly Green Giant helicopter. He was subsequently debriefed back at his home base, Nakhon Phanom, at which time he stated that he saw at least one other parachute descending beneath him in the darkness after he had bailed out of his aircraft, but it was too dark for him to identify the user. He was unable to say how many of his crew had successfully escaped from the airplane. The location of the crash scene of the C-123 was approximately 75 nautical miles from the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom on the 105 degree radial of the TACAN radio navigation station at that Base. The impact area was reported as being northwest of the village of Sepone (Tchepone), approximately at Ban Phaphilang (XD055824), which, at that time, was in Pathet Lao controlled territory as it is today.

No word was received on the fate of Captain Donahue after the accident in which his aircraft was involved until the Spring of 1975. At that time the Sepone inhabitants positively identified Captain Donahue from pictures and descriptive literature brought to them from Royal Lao territory. He was described as the American "pilot" who had landed by parachute near their village on the night of 13 December 1968. He apparently broke a leg on landing and was captured by Pathet Lao who took him away the next day in a cart.

In the summer of 1975, a credible source of information was arrested held by the Pathet Lao in their Headquarters Building in the City of Vientiane, Laos. According to that source, now in the United States, the name of Captain Donahue was regularly mentioned by Pathet Lao intelligence personnel as the list of Americans they were holding was periodically read off in briefings in the Headquarters. The source, who also reads and understands Lao, further stated that whenever the opportunity presented itself, a quick scan of Pathet Lao documents that were laying around on desks was made. A number of these documents reflected the names of U.S. personnel still in Pathet Lao prison camps, and among them there always appeared the name of Captain Morgan Donahue. What the source of information saw and heard demonstrated that Captain Donahue was indeed alive and being held in a highly secure and little known prison camp near Sepone as recently as the summer months of 1975.

A third credible source of information, the former Director of National Security of Laos, was located and interviewed in 1977. He stated that prior to fleeing Laos in 1975, before the takeover by the Pathet Lao in 1975, he gave the names of over 200 American "pilots", who had been captured by the Pathet Lao after their aircraft had been brought down to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane. Having some recall of the names on the list which he surrendered to the U.S. Embassy, he claims to have remembered that of Captain Morgan Donahue and affirms that there is an excellent chance that Captain Donahue is still alive in Laos.

Further, another credible, high ranking source of information stated that he had located and talked to Captain Donahue who was being held in a high security prison for American pilots near Phu Bhan. He subsequently planned a night helicopter escape for Captain Donahue, but unfortunately the takeover of the nation of Laos by the Pathet Lao at this same time precluded the effort from being made. The source of information disappeared about this time, and it is not yet known whether he was seized and taken to an indoctrination camp (seminar) to be "re-educated" or whether he was liquidated.

Particularly worthy of note is the fact that during one of a number of visits the father of Captain Donahue made to the villa, in Vientiane, of Soth Pethrasi, who was the Chief Delegate of the Pathet Lao prior to the takeover of the country by the Pathet Lao, he was personally told by Soth that the Pathet Lao forces had captured and were holding over 100 American "pilots". Soth refused to identify or give the locations where these Americans were being held and stated that the matter was one which should be formally addressed when the war was over.

During the 1973 prisoner release by the North Vietnamese after the Paris Peace Accords were signed by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam, nine Americans were freed by Hanoi, but because they had been captured on the Ho Chi Minh Trail by North Vietnamese in Laos, the Pathet Lao claimed that the nine were being released by them and not the North Vietnamese. Intelligence sources allege that the Pathet Lao are still holding captured Americans because Kissinger did not recognize Laos in his Paris Peace Accords, and the Pathet Lao refuse to give their U.S. prisoners to the North Vietnamese to surrender to the Americans.

The family of Captain Morgan Donahue is willing to underwrite, by prior arrangements, the cost of obtaining credible and demonstrable physical evidence of his survival, i.e., fingerprints, photographs, etc. They will also offer a substantial award to anyone arranging for his escape or delivery alive and well to a location to be mutually agreed upon in the city of Bangkok, Thailand, where he would be met by his father and others. No information on how he reached Bangkok, who brought him there, or how he managed to get back into the United States will ever be disclosed to anyone, including representatives of the Thai government or of the United States.

At such time as arrangements are made with persons capable of this task, the family of Captain Donahue will provide information which can be used to positively identify only him. Captain Donahue's father can be reached at #7 Willow Green, Cocoa Beach, FL, USA, 32931. His telephone number is 305-783-2698 (home) and 305-853-2121 (office).

There was also the problem of fingerprints. There have been allegations made that fingerprints and other records have mysteriously disappeared from DOD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining lost or purged fingerprint records be entered into the record.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
WASHINGTON, DC 20535,
August 27, 1991.

Hon. STEPHEN J. SOLARZ,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On July 31 and August 2, you conducted hearings concerning MIA's from the Vietnam War, in particular, the recently surfaced photograph that depicts three individuals that are purported to be MIA's. Carl W. Ford, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (DOD), was the principal witness for the administration at the hearings. At the request of DOD, the FBI had been requested to conduct analyses on the photograph and documents associated with that document. Additionally, the FBI conducted other analyses in relation to the MIA's.

As you are aware, DOD requested the presence of FBI representatives in the event certain topics surfaced in the course of the hearing. We provided experts on fingerprints and photography. We believed that their presence was necessary so that an accurate and complete record would be established if questions arose concerning those issues. These issues were mentioned in the course of the hearing, but more information is available that will make the record complete. I am taking this opportunity to provide that information and comment on another issue that was raised at the hearings.

By letter from you to Mr. Ford dated July 26, 1991, you requested an analysis of "finger and palm prints that the Lundy and Robertson families have received and have associated with their missing relatives." (In conversations with staff, it has been determined that this was a joint request with Congressman Robert J. Lagomarsino.) Since the FBI is the repository for fingerprints for military personnel, DOD requested the prints for these individuals, in addition to the third person linked to the photograph, Lt. Comdr. Larry J. Stevens. A search of FBI fingerprint files did not disclose a record for these three individuals. There are many reasons why we may not

currently have those fingerprints and an explanation for the record may be beneficial.

The most logical reason for the absence of these prints may be the policy for purging files. In the case of military prints, if DOD reports an individual killed-in-action (KIA) or otherwise deceased, the print is placed in a special file for 7 years and then destroyed unless there is additional information furnished by the military. In testimony, Mr. Ford advised that the DOD had listed Maj. Albro L. Lundy, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Stevens as KIA based on eye witnesses' accounts of each incident. Relevant herein is a list of 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DOD in 1984. They were identified by DOD as being "Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." A search of our fingerprint files identified prints for 912 individuals from that list. The prints for the three individuals linked to the photograph were not among those with prints in file. All existing prints from that list are being maintained and are not subject to being purged.

Another explanation is that we never received fingerprints of those in question. But, it would perhaps be more than coincidental that the prints for three individuals linked to a single photograph would not have been submitted. This is particularly true given the policy of fingerprinting all military personnel. Unfortunately, due to the volume of civil prints alone, approximately 35 million individuals and 90 million cards, records of receipts are not maintained. In most instances, the only means to determine if there is a print on file is to check the index. The absence of an individual from the index only indicates the FBI never had a file. It could have been previously purged from the system, but, in most instances, there would be no record of the purge.

Fingerprints are frequently not capable of classification/retention due to their illegibility based on the quality of the inked prints that are submitted. When this occurs, the prints are sent back to the contributor with a request to obtain a legible fingerprint card for resubmission. It is not unusual to not receive a follow-up set of prints. As above, there would be no record if this occurred. As a point of reference, in the first three quarters of fiscal year 1991, the FBI Identification Division rejected over 790,000 fingerprint cards for this reason. Although historical figures are not available for the Vietnam War era, rejection rates for prints submitted by the military in early 1980's were about 15 percent.

In the course of the hearing there was testimony that the photograph had been submitted to a photographic expert to determine if the middle individual was identical to Major Lundy. According to the testimony of Major Lundy's son, 16 positive points of identification were made. It is the opinion of the FBI's photographic experts that due to the poor quality of the photograph such an identification process is not possible. Further, positive identifications from photographs are dependent on scars, marks, and other individually unique features. Additionally, the positive identification points that were recited by the witness are broad-based characteristics common in large segments of the population. This does not reject the possibility that an individual may "recognize" a particular person in a photograph, but it does reject the capability to make a positive identification through analysis, given the quality of the photograph and the absence of identifiably unique features.

One other issue raised at the hearing bears clarification. A Member raised the issue that the FBI had in its possession photographs of a possible MIA approximately 6 months before they were made available to DOD. As stated by the Member, these photographs were furnished to the FBI by a Congressman. However, no specific information was furnished the FBI that these photographs concerned a possible MIA. Even if they had been suspected to be MIA related, the FBI had no reason to believe that the photographs had not already been referred to DOD. Within a matter of a few days, these photographs were returned to the Congressman. I would also note that many communications between Congress and the FBI are considered to be privileged unless otherwise indicated. This is a privilege we do not take lightly, given the sensitivity of constituent and other matters that are referred regularly to the FBI. The FBI does not believe we acted improperly in this instance.

The FBI remains committed to assisting Congress and DOD in the resolution of the status of the MIA's. Submissions by DOD are being handled on a priority basis. Should you be in need of additional information as the FBI's role, please contact Charles E. Mandigo, Special Counsel, Congressional Affairs Office, telephone number 324-6028.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. SESSIONS.
Director.

Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr.,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs,

Department of Defense,
Room 4E813, The Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301-2000.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

There were also questions about the Minority staff report. I am not prepared today to go through the entire report. One, we haven't had enough time to go through it line by line yet, but let me just go through some of our concerns about it.

I would like to point out a couple of glaring examples of poor research and errors. On page 5 through 8 of the report, the staff states "in fact, only 591 U.S. POW's were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation Homecoming, which is 12 percent of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POW's held by the North Vietnamese reported by the New York Times."

The original New York Times article, the primary source material appeared on the front page of the 6 March, 1973 issue. The number 5,000 appeared only once in the entire article quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been often quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend credence to the allegation that 85 percent of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second inaccuracy is found in the prologue to Part 2, page I. The report states, "In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first-hand live sightings, the Department of Defense remarkably still believes it has 'no credible evidence.' How does it dismiss these reports?"

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are unresolved. Second, live sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA analysts have been able to establish that the report is true.

These reports involve POW's who returned at Operation Homecoming or have been correlated to other Americans or westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the communists took control. Almost 300 relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today. A more important issue—

The CHAIRMAN. Can I interrupt you there for just a minute? I think this is something that I talked to you about a few months ago, and it was my understanding that it was going to be prepared, that just such a categorization—I think it is critical to have that.

Mr. FORD. We are in process of preparing it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee would welcome a page-for-page, line-for-line refutation and statement of accuracy. I think it is absolutely critical once and for all to resolve those kinds of things.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Minority Staff Report charges the Government with conspiracy and cover-up in its handling of the POW/MIA issue. The author's arguments, however, are grounded in speculation and cloaked in innuendo. Replete with factual errors, the Report relies on news articles and quotations taken out of context to prove its claims. The shoddy research and poorly supported reasoning reveals the authors' superficial grasp of the issue and make it appear as if they had formed their conclusions before undertaking an examination of the data.

The following examines selected passages of the Report relevant to the Second Indochina War and the Gulf War. Specific excerpts as well as general themes are addressed.

PROLOGUE TO PART I

Report: (Prologue to Part I, i) "On the record, the U.S. Government has professed to give [the issue] 'the highest national priority.' Off the record, this priority vanishes. Instead, other considerations emerge: Grand visions of a foreign policy of peace and reconciliation; desire for a new economic order of trade and investment; ideological imperatives to downplay the hostility of antagonistic systems; and the natural tendency of the bureaucracy to eliminate its workload by filing cases marked 'closed' instead of finding the people."

Response: If, as the above polemic states, the bureaucracy's goal is to mark cases "closed" and "eliminate its workload," then it has clearly failed. More than 18 years have passed since the conclusion of Operation Homecoming, and only 316 of 2,583 missing individuals have been accounted for. Executive branch initiatives to secure information on our missing servicemen from the Vietnam era span more than five administrations. No administration has permitted diplomatic policy considerations or bureaucratic ennui to interfere with its efforts to search for MIA's. DOD challenges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff to describe even one instance where DOD suggested that the normalization of economic relations should be accomplished at the expense of accounting for POW/MIA's. While the results of the search for MIA's have failed to meet expectations, primarily because the communist governments of Indochina have refused to extend their full cooperation, the perception that the U.S. Government might have something to gain by failing to act is spurious. The minority staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are not the first individuals outside the Executive Branch to examine the government's commitment. Over the years, conspiracy and cover-up charges concerning the Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue have been repeatedly investigated by the Congress and DOD and found to be without foundation. A congressional mechanism has been in place since 1975 to exercise oversight. DOD and DIA activities and efforts in this area have been vigorously monitored by the House Select Committee on POW/MIA's, the POW/MIA Task Force of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Veteran's Affairs Committee and by the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.

The Department of Defense remains committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting. Assets devoted to the collection and development of intelligence data to resolve the issue have increased steadily over the years and all available means of intelligence collection are routinely exploited. The U.S. is currently engaged in joint efforts with the Indochinese governments to investigate loss incidents, interview eyewitnesses, and excavate crash and grave sites. Diplomatic initiatives, however, have failed, thus far, to elicit their full cooperation. Access to records as well as to areas identified in live sighting reports has been limited.

Report: (Prologue to Part I, ii, iii) The Minority Report claims that the U.S. Government is unable "to cope with the problems of accounting for the missing," and offers, as an example, the case of SPC Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, taken prisoner by Iraq during the Gulf War. The Report states that her status was "initially listed as 'unknown,' then changed to 'missing,' a status distinct from that of 'MIA,' reserved for personnel unaccounted for in noncombat circumstances. The Report notes that she and SPC David Lockett, the individual with whom she was captured, were never listed as MIA or POW despite the existence of an abundance of information indicating that they had been captured. The authors claim that the failure to categorize

them as such represented 'an important illustration of how DOD uses technical distinctions to avoid a finding of POW/MIA.'"

Response: The Minority Report's discussion of accountability during the Gulf War demonstrates the authors' fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between assigning a missing person a status as defined by the Missing Persons Act, and accounting for the individual in fact. The Missing Persons Act was written specifically to protect the financial interests of the missing servicemember and the next of kin. An individual's accountability is not addressed by the Act and only comes into play once someone is lost and the act is implemented.

Rathbun-Nealy's initial "unknown" status represented a category to which all missing personnel were assigned for an interim 10-14 day period to permit the commander of the individual's unit time to conduct a preliminary investigation. She was moved to "missing" and not "MIA" because hostile action had not yet commenced and, as a truck driver in a convoy, she was in a noncombatant role. Despite indications of her capture, she was not listed as a POW because the available evidence was not sufficiently compelling. The military services maintain strict requirements for confirming someone a POW not "to avoid" such a finding, but to protect the families from exposure to reasons for hope that are not absolutely verifiable. The underlying philosophy is to avoid error at all costs but to err on the side of caution if error is unavoidable. Meanwhile, the search to locate the individual in the enemy's prison system continues.

In Rathbun-Nealy's case, the Army Casualty Officer supplied information to her family which strongly indicated she had been captured. Although, the information was not considered by the Army to be sufficiently compelling to change her official status, the Army's determination did not diminish the commitment of DOD analysts to pursue all information relevant to her case on the assumption that she was alive and a POW.

PART I: THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR

Report: (5-1, 4) Henry Kissinger's statement, in his book *Years of Upheaval*, that the U.S. "knew of at least eighty instances in which an American serviceman had been captured alive and had subsequently disappeared," is interpreted as proof that Kissinger believed at the time that these men were still alive.

Response: In making this statement in his book, Kissinger did not state that he believed the men were still alive. He simply commented on their unaccounted-for status. When their names did not appear on the list of prisoners returned after the Peace Agreement was signed, he asks, in the very next sentence following the one quoted in the Minority Report, "Why? Were they dead? How did they die? Were they missing? How was that possible after capture?" The Minority Report fails to note that these very cases are part of the 119 Vessey discrepancy cases, chosen to be investigated first because they demonstrated the most compelling evidence of men we believed survived their loss incident and for whom the Vietnamese should be able to account.

Report: (5-1) "However, news reports and other documentation stated that the U.S. Government left men—perhaps thousands of men—in the captivity of Communist forces in Southeast Asia."

Response: There is no credible evidence to suggest that the U.S. Government abandoned anyone who was a captive of Communist forces at the end of the Vietnam War. (See discussion of reference made to New York Times article below for source of reference to "thousands of men" above.)

Report: (5-2) "In fact, it was widely known that the Pathet Lao were holding many other U.S. POW's. On March 25 one news report stated: U.S. sources believe that a substantial number of the missing [in Laos]—perhaps as many as 100—still may be alive. The conclusions are based on inspections of crash sites by search teams and on intelligence reports."

Response: When the Paris Accords were signed, we had no evidence of live Americans being held in Laos. There have been numerous reports, from a variety of sources, suggesting that large numbers of Americans were being held by the Pathet Lao. During Operation Homecoming, nine Americans who had been captured in Laos were released by the Vietnamese. The Pathet Lao, however, never released any Americans who were listed as POW or MIA at the time the Accords were signed. One of the principle sources of the reports described above was Soth Petrasy, a Pathet Lao spokesman in Vientiane during the conflict. Souban Srithirath, Laos' Vice Foreign Minister, has stated that Mr. Petrasy's comments were sheer propaganda, made at a time when the Pathet Lao were trying to encourage their troops

and supporters. Petras, in a separate interview, confirmed that his statements were "wartime propaganda" intended to rally Lao support.

Report: (5-8, 10) An Associated Press dispatch, referencing a New York Times article, is quoted by the report in the following manner: "While the North Vietnamese did not list a number of prisoners they wanted freed, The New York Times reported from Saigon today that American sources set the demand at 5,000."

The report goes on to build a case on the number "5,000" quoted from the Times, stating that "only 591 U.S. POW's were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation Homecoming, which is 12 percent of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POW's held by the North Vietnamese reported by the New York Times." The report's very next paragraph goes on to correlate the number "5,000" even further. It states that "the number of prisoners which The New York Times reported that the U.S. Government demanded from the North Vietnamese—5,000—correlates with the statement of a former employee of the U.S. Government [Jerry Mooney]. This former National Security Agency (NSA) employee said in a sworn affidavit that the North Vietnamese repatriated only 15% of the U.S. servicemen they held in captivity. In other words, according to this source, the North Vietnamese kept 85% of the American POW's who were alive after March 28, 1973."

(5-10) The report bases further analysis on the figure "5,000," stating that "the North Vietnamese—apparently—were waiting for the reparations that Kissinger had promised them, before the vast majority of American POW's reported by the New York Times were to be repatriated. Doubtless, they held the prisoners back as human collateral. It should be noted that the 5,000 POW figure cited by the Times is slightly less than twice that of the U.S. official POW and MIA totals. However, it is likely that the 5,000 figure reflected the total number of individuals believed to be held by Communist forces in Southeast Asia at that time. This total would have included the total number of covert or Black Cowboy POW's and MIA's who were not factored into the official U.S. Government MIA and POW casualty figures for the entire Second Indochina War throughout Southeast Asia."

Response: The original New York Times article, from which the number "5,000" was taken, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. In that article the number "5,000" was mentioned only once, as a reference to a quote from an American source who states that at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon. Despite the authors' misinterpretation of the meaning of the New York Times' 5,000 figure, it, nevertheless, is consistently cited and incorporated analytically to support the Minority Report's key argument that thousands of American POW's were abandoned in Indochina.

Report: (5-9) "Some evidence suggests that a number of nonrepatriated Americans may have been turned over to Soviet control and subsequently transported to the Soviet Union. A former U.S. military serviceman, assigned to the NSA, provided the Minority Staff sworn affidavits that during the Vietnam War he 'tracked' a certain number of U.S. servicemen from their point of capture to their release to the Soviets for debriefings by both North Vietnamese and Laotian officials. This has not been corroborated, but information provided to the Minority Staff indicates that POW's may have been sent to the Soviet Union for interrogation and subsequent use of their special skills."

Response: Mr. Jerry Mooney, a former National Security Agency (NSA) analyst, has asserted over the years that the U.S. Government has or has had intelligence information that proves the existence of American prisoners of war left behind in Southeast Asia after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973. Additionally, he has claimed that a portion of these men, those with special technical or intelligence knowledge, were transported to locations outside of Vietnam, specifically to the Soviet Union and China. Mr. Mooney's claims have been investigated and proven to be false (Details of the investigation are available for discussion in executive session.) Recent assertions from Soviet sources that an American POW from the Vietnam War was living in Kazakhstan and that Soviet officials interrogated American prisoners in Vietnam after 1973 are under investigation.

PROLOGUE TO PART II

Report: (Prologue to Part II, i) The position of the Executive Branch is that there is "no evidence" that living Americans exist in Southeast Asia, nor were any left after American prisoners were returned in 1973.

Response: The official position of the Executive Branch is as stated in the DOD POW/MIA Fact Book, dated July 1991:

"Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans are still detained against their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility." (Italic for emphasis)

Report: (Prologue to Part II, i) In discussing the 1,400 or so live sighting reports, the report claims that "the U.S. Government has not judged a single one of these thousands of reports to be credible." It also claims that the 1,400 reports are unresolved.

Response: Both statements are wrong, as 75 percent of the live sighting reports have been judged to be true. They are simply sightings of accounted for Americans (i.e. returned POW's), or of Amerasians, Eurasians, Westerners, Russians and East Europeans who are mistaken for Americans. A large number are of Bobby Garwood. Because live-sighting reports come into DIA on a daily basis, the number of unresolved continues to fluctuate. Currently, approximately 100 remain unresolved.

Report: (Prologue to Part II, i, ii) Garwood's "court martial as a collaborator and deserter solved two problems for DOD. By bringing up the charges DOD sought to redefine his case as a voluntary expatriate and therefore not technically a prisoner—and it enabled DOD evaluators to dismiss fully 200 of the live-sighting reports."

Response: All returnees, who had personal contact with Garwood while they were held captive in the South, agree that he was not a POW but a "collaborator." Private Garwood was tried by a General Court Martial and convicted of aiding the enemy and assaulting a fellow prisoner of war. His conviction was affirmed by the U.S. Navy Marine Corps Court of Military Review and by the Court of Military Appeals. The fact that he was tried by a military court for desertion and collaboration stemmed from the charges initiated by fellow prisoners of war and was not in any way motivated by an attempt on the part of the Defense Department to deny any claims he may have had to being a POW. The close to 300 live-sighting reports judged to be of Bobby Garwood have not been dismissed, only resolved. They have been correlated with Garwood because the information they contain clearly identifies him and no one else. (For further information on Garwood, see Garwood File enclosure.)

Report: (Prologue to Part II, ii) Files are not accessible to the families.

Response: Through the armed services' casualty officers, the DIA provides all relevant information to families in accordance with public law. The families receive all information that has been correlated to their missing member. The files maintained by the DIA, however, are classified documents because they contain information which identifies intelligence sources and methods. Before being released to the casualty officers, who in turn provide them to the next of kin, the documents are sanitized to remove sensitive information which may identify the intelligence source or reveal the manner in which the information was collected. The names of all associated individuals, including those of other MIA's, are also removed to protect their privacy and that of their families.

Report: (Prologue to Part II, iii) "Colonel Peck confirms that a 'cover-up' has been in progress."

Response: Col. Peck's allegations were examined by an internal DOD inquiry and were found to be without foundation. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, he was unable to substantiate his claims. (See responses to inquiries 7, 8, and 10 in Committee letter requesting responses)

PART II: LIVE SIGHTINGS

Report: (6-1, 2) The U.S. Government's policy of dealing with the live-sighting reports is flawed. Weaknesses exist in methodology and procedures for collecting and analyzing information.

Response: DIA's efforts in examining reports of firsthand live sightings are predicated on the assumption that some Americans are still alive in Indochina. The urgency inherent in this assumption dictates that such reports receive the highest priority in intelligence analysis and collection resource allocation. Consistent with this determination, DIA's methodology emphasizes the fullest possible exploitation of live sighting reports. Reported information is rigorously compared with the aggregate of intelligence information available in DIA's data base, then developed and followed-up on as required, regardless of where it may lead.

All information is evaluated according to the plausibility, cohesiveness, and sufficiency of the data and all potential corroborative evidence. Upon receipt, live-sighting reports are examined to determine if the geographic location of the sighting, the time and circumstances of the sighting, and the details provided correlate to a known missing American. Related data is retrieved from DIA's extensive casualty, source, and camp files, and the information is compared with what is available in

the report. All files of losses or known incidents of capture or imprisonment in proximity to the location reported are isolated for possible correlation as are all files of sources who have previously reported sightings in the same area. A similar procedure is then employed to isolate the files of missing individuals whose time and/or location of loss generally relates to that given in the report.

Based on these findings, a preliminary determination is made regarding whether the descriptive details provided by the source correlate to any of the missing Americans believed to be likely candidates. If the information is judged to be possibly pertinent to a POW or MIA, it is actively pursued by all available means. Data gaps identified may require that the source be reinterviewed, or that further collection efforts be taken. The establishment of the POW-MIA office in Hanoi manned by U.S. technical personnel, including a DIA analyst having extensive knowledge of Vietnamese record-keeping systems, and a DIA live-sighting investigator, facilitates the live-sighting issue. The Government of Vietnam has permitted representatives of the U.S. Government to conduct targeted information research through direct access to official archival material, and has begun to grant limited access to reported live-sighting locations.

A live-sighting report is considered resolved when it has been determined that the evidence is clear and convincing that the individual described has been identified or when analysis indicates that the report is clearly a fabrication. Once these analytical judgments are reached, DIA's analysis is then subjected to the scrutiny of an interagency review panel before the report is considered resolved. This panel consists of representatives from CIA, State Department (INR), OASD/ISA, OJCS, and DAMI-PO. Upon concurrence by the review panel, the report remains in DIA's data base where it is available for review by analysts working independently on other live-sighting reports.

Reports in which questions of correlation or validity remain unsettled are considered unresolved and are subjected to additional analysis and collection efforts until a final determination can be made.

Report: (6-3, 4) DOD correlated a sighting report of the capture of an American pilot to returnee Capt. James Hickerson, USN, instead of LTJG Dooley, so as to consider the report resolved. The minority staff claims to possess a written statement, made by CAPT Hickerson, that contradicts many of the details of his shootdown that he provided in his debrief.

Response: On 22 October 1967, LTJG James E. Dooley was flying an A-4E aircraft which was hit by anti-aircraft fire following a strike mission in Haiphong. U.S. witnesses to the incident reported that LTJG Dooley's aircraft was streaming fuel and headed toward the Gulf of Tonkin, where it descended and crashed into the water just east of the Do Son Peninsula. There were no signs that LTJG Dooley ejected from the aircraft, no beepers were heard, and a search revealed no sign of survival.

The Senate Foreign Relations minority staff report claims that: a) DOD correlated a sighting report of the capture of an American pilot to returnee Capt. James Hickerson, USN, instead of LTJG Dooley, so as to consider the report resolved; b) "In 1973, a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi"; c) "Two Thai special forces' soldiers released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate" and; d) A communist photo of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi shows a partial profile of a person who "strongly resembles" LTJG Dooley.

a. The refugee report clearly describes the capture of CAPT Hickerson, whose own detailed POW debriefing account of his capture, given immediately following "Operation Homecoming," closely follows the source's reporting. The minority staff's "analysis" of the fore mentioned live-sighting report is a classic example of how raw reporting, without access to a data base of facts, can be misinterpreted. In this instance a Vietnamese refugee source interviewed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in December 1986, reported firsthand information on the capture of a U.S. pilot in what he believed was October or November 1968. The source described seeing a man in a parachute land on the beach and attempt to evade by swimming out into the water. The source says the Vietnamese shot at the swimmer to limit his movement, and local forces swam out to capture the man. He also says that the pilot began firing at the Vietnamese and attempted to talk on a hand-held radio, but was unable to do so due to waves. He goes on to report that the pilot wore a one-piece uniform with a long zipper in the front and that the POW was blindfolded and his arms bound behind his back before he was loaded into a sidecar. He adds that he was later put in an automobile and driven away.

Based solely upon the loss location, time of day and month, JCRC originally believed the report could relate to LTJG Dooley; however, when the facts of CAPT Hickerson's capture were later brought to their attention (JCRC did not have access

to his debrief at the time the original correlation was made) they reevaluated all reports from that area and rescinded their tentative correlation to LTJG Dooley, concluding that the source's information described CAPT Hickerson's circumstances of capture.

The minority staff says that CAPT Hickerson has provided a written statement of his capture, claiming "he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured," and refuting other points in the source's story. They say that "Hickerson was taken to prison riding on the back of a bicycle, not in a jeep as the fisherman described."

While DIA does not possess the alleged written statement from CAPT Hickerson to which the Senate staff refer, we do have his 1973 debriefing in which he details the events of his December 1967 capture. Upon returning to the U.S., CAPT Hickerson told debriefers "... (he) collapsed his parachute, he found himself face-to-face with about 100 civilian personnel. He immediately separated from the parachute and started running out into the shallow water, after going a short distance he detached his seat pack and commenced swimming seaward. About this time rifle shots started splashing in the water around him ... "At this point Hickerson saw he was about to be captured so he pulled out his survival radio and sent the message ... to his wingman. He then stopped, put up his hands and surrendered to the DRV swimmers." In his debrief CAPT Hickerson goes on to describe how he was stripped of his clothing, blindfolded, his hands tied behind his back and how he was put on the fender of a motorcycle and taken to the fishing village. Later that day he was also moved in the sidecar of a motorcycle, during which time he was seen by crowds of people who threw rocks and sticks at him.

While there are slight differences in the source's account and CAPT Hickerson's as reported in his debrief, the refugee report clearly refers to the former POW. It is noteworthy that the source was only 13 years old when he observed the event, and 19 years passed between the time he saw CAPT Hickerson's capture and the time he reported it to U.S. authorities.

b. No returnee ever claimed to have seen LTJG Dooley's name on a prison wall. DIA is not aware of anyone claiming to have seen Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell. This story appears to stem from a returnee who reported that another POW had mentioned seeing Dooley's name on a wall; however, the POW to which the story was attributed never mentioned Dooley in any manner in his debriefing or later interviews.

c. The Thai POW's did not identify Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate with any certainty. When shown a pre-loss photo of LTJG Dooley, they were uncertain, saying only that they saw a similar face in 1968 at a prison known as the "Zoo." Based upon other information they furnished, it is clear that they saw another individual who subsequently died in captivity, but who bore a physical resemblance to the preloss photograph of LTJG Dooley they were shown. There is no information that points to LTJG Dooley's capture or to his being imprisoned at the "Zoo" or any other prison.

d. LTJG Dooley is not depicted in any post-capture photographs. With one exception, every POW photograph from the war has been identified. The one remaining unidentified photo is clearly not the missing Naval aviator. DIA possesses no post-capture photographs that can be attributed to LTJG Dooley.

PART II: "BLACK OPERATIONS"

Report: (7-1) The names of all individuals unaccounted for have not been made public. Personnel lost in covert or "black" operations are declared KIA and are not included.

Response: No one is missing from the public list, and there is no secret list. The authors of the report are under the illusion that the U.S. Government considers a man accounted for if a presumptive finding of death has been made. In fact all the MIA's were presumed dead by the early 1980's, with the exception of COL Charles Shelton, USAF, who remains listed as a POW for symbolic reasons. A presumption of death, however, in no way changes the Government's obligation to account for those missing. The Senate staff members appear to have confused legal, administrative procedures with DIA investigatory methodology—two approaches having totally unrelated purposes.

PART II: ACCOUNTABILITY

Report: (8-1) The means of arriving at accountability is questionable.

Response: The U.S. Government's goal of fullest possible accounting is achieved by resolving individual cases. A case is resolved when either an individual or his remains are returned or when a convincing explanation of why neither is possible can be formulated.

Within the U.S. Government's goal of fullest possible accounting, General Vessey's specific goal is to illuminate the POW issue by utilizing a number of discrepancy cases.

During the Vessey process, we have collected sufficient intelligence to confirm the fate of 56 individuals: 22 have been accounted for through the return of remains; 34 are known to have died but have not yet been accounted for.

Joint investigation of an incident proceeds on the assumption that the man is alive. The case is investigated until the man is located and returned alive or until evidence confirms that he did not survive. Once death is confirmed, the investigation/negotiation continues until his remains are returned or until it is determined that there is no likelihood of remains recovery.

In the course of the investigations witnesses are interviewed, crashsites are visited, aircraft wreckage is studied, and excavations are mounted.

DIA's primary role in the joint investigation process is to collate and assess information derived from U.S. and Vietnamese files and from the investigations themselves.

Data gaps are identified, some of which Vietnam is requested to fill through research of wartime records, provision of additional witnesses, or site surveys and excavations.

All information is evaluated according to the plausibility, cohesiveness, and sufficiency of the data, amount and type of corroborative evidence, and credibility of the source.

To confirm an individual's fate an analyst assesses whether the evidence available firmly identifies the individual involved and whether it proves that death did or did not occur. If death is indicated, an analyst must assess the prospect for recovery of remains by determining the reliability of evidence revealing the location of death and by taking into account the possibility that the individual's remains may have already been recovered.

Clear and convincing evidence must be obtained before any judgement is rendered regarding the death of an American or a decision made that remains are not likely to be recoverable. The process is a rigorous one. DOD believes every effort to obtain information must be exhausted before a determination can be made.

Report: (8-4) Dr. Michael Charney is cited for his charges that CILHI has misidentified and deliberately lied about the identification of remains.

Response: A Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado, the report cites Dr. Charney as a forensic expert critical of CILHI's methodology. He has never visited CILHI. He is the same Dr. Charney who claimed to have scientifically determined the photo, now known to be of a Lao tribesman, to be that of Navy Lt Daniel Borah. Dr. Charney's photo identification methodology is based on the computerized superimposition of "edge" images where a known image is superimposed on the image in question and the two photos' various "edges" analyzed for overlap. According to a photo analysis expert from Sandia National Laboratories, the integrity of "edge" images remains questionable since the "definition of an 'edge' in a digital image is somewhat subjective." The Sandia expert concludes that a definitive identification cannot be made using this technique alone.

PART II: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE

Report: (9-1,2,3,4) The French experience in Vietnam is a precedent for U.S. experience.

Response: In 1954, 6,900 persons, of whom 2,200 were native French, were carried as missing from French expeditionary forces. These were not prisoners but rather men lost under uncertain conditions. All native French prisoners were returned by the end of October 1954. A tiny number of non-French and non-Vietnamese remained in North Vietnam but not against their will. Of the Vietnamese serving in French forces who were carried as missing, some had changed sides prior to the end of the war. These indigenous Vietnamese decided to settle in the North. According to the French Government, the Geneva Accords, ending the war, were implemented, and no one remained behind against his will.

EPILOGUE

Report: (10-1,2,3,4,5) The report's authors claim their conclusions parallel those of Col. Peck.

Response: (See response to Col. Peck's charges of cover-up, Prologue to Part II, iii and responses to inquiries 7, 8, and 10 in Committee letter requesting responses to the Select Committee's inquiries.)

Mr. FORD. A more important issue that this committee should address of Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of Defense information relevant to the investigations of the Stevens case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the Department of Defense investigating these cases.

Mr. Chairman, for example, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense finally received the information, we resolved the case in less than 2 months.

The CHAIRMAN. In point of fact, the family doesn't think you resolved it, is that accurate?

Mr. FORD. I'm not sure that that's the case. Let me go through this next part of my testimony, because I think that there were also allegations made by Judge Gayden and also by Jack Bailey that I would like to address myself to.

I unfortunately was unable to either be here or watch on C-SPAN the testimony of Judge Gayden and Jack Bailey, and I also unfortunately, or fortunately, did not read the transcripts until yesterday when I was preparing for this testimony. I am glad that I didn't. I was so outraged—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt you for one second if I can. We want to try to keep this hearing going so we don't have an interruption. Senator McCain will chair while I go and vote, and let me just say for the record, Senator Smith was not here at the outset simply because it is his amendment on the floor right now and we are voting on it, and I think he'll be back shortly. So if you could keep going, we will try to keep running through.

Mr. FORD. I was mentioning that I was glad that I didn't finally get around to reading those until yesterday, because I was so outraged that I'm sure it would have affected my whole week.

The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the allegations made by a number of individuals before this committee. Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr. Sheetz will later discuss the Carr case in detail. However, I would like to spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by Judge Gayden before this committee.

Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would knowingly provide to the family, the Congress, and the American people altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill Gadoury, and the individual is outrageous.

Even more disturbing is the fact that Judge Gayden, an officer of the court, would allege that he obtained a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that DOD photos are frauds. This committee cannot stand by and let these gross distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe the DOD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports or their testimony or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.

Our investigators, with the help of the Lao, found the individual photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. The individual is not Lieutenant Borah. The Borah family has been convinced by Judge Gayden's bailiff, Khambang, that the individual is Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Thailand passed the roll of film containing the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States.

Khambang has a long history of providing POW-related materials from as early as 1985, and none—not one of these leads has ever proven valid. I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into the record. The Judge Gayden-Khambang connection needs to be thoroughly investigated. I hope that this committee will undertake that task.

If I might, I would also like to add some of my own personal involvement in this particular case. Judge Gayden made much of the fact that we have put Lieutenant Borah in jeopardy by having his photograph appear on Laotian TV. I would simply note that the first time I saw the photograph was on NBC, and that after having seen the photograph and noticing the remarkable resemblance between the photographs of Lieutenant Borah and this photograph that was on NBC, we tried to get hold of the photograph.

There was a period of weeks when it was in almost every newspaper in the United States, almost every television station, probably throughout the world. We couldn't get a hold of it. Until Senator Smith interceded we were unable to get the information. Once we had the information, we were able, using the photograph and working with the Laotians, to find this individual that was in the photograph.

The only question about putting people in jeopardy was a long period of time in which this information was withheld from the people that our Government has tasked the job with checking out all of these leads. The notion that Bill Gadoury, who appeared before you, would allow himself to be inserted in a photograph that had been doctored, or that he had doctored a photograph, I just find totally outrageous that anybody would make such a claim.

He was here before you. You had an opportunity to meet him. The fact is that he was under oath, and that all we have done is tried to do our job, and when we do our job, then some other story comes up, and guess who seems to be behind much of all of these allegations, Mr. Khambang.

Mr. Khambang is someone who was involved also in Mr. Usry's secret trip in August. He had reported that he had information about the Stevens case, and Robertson, Lundy—particularly Stevens—and that there was information that if they went to Southeast Asia, that he would be able to provide our researchers with information.

This was communicated to the Secretary of Defense. He agreed to allow a plane to be diverted to take this mission. I know this for a fact, because it happened to be diverted away from me. I didn't know it at the time, but I was in Hawaii with the Under Secretary of Defense at a meeting and we happened to have the only aircraft that was unmarked to be sent into Southeast Asia, only to find out that it had been redirected. We also supplied by request individuals who were polygraph investigators.

Mr. Khambang hit Bangkok and was told go find your sources and bring them in. After much delay, and explaining why he was having difficulties, he finally brought in one individual. Mr. Usry and the team of investigators questioned him. They polygraphed him, and they concluded that he was lying.

When during the interviews, as I understand it has been told to me, the source that Khambang brought in indicated that he had provided this famous map of various people located in Vietnam that were being held prisoner on an island, he was asked a very simple question. Well, could you draw us again that map? When he could not draw the map or barely draw at all, they asked the obvious question, well, who did draw it?

Well, guess who drew it? The same people that are providing Khambang with the Borah photograph information, and at the time in August we had not located the Lao hill tribesman. We did not directly make the connection that here were two cases in which Khambang had clearly been involved, one in which his source failed to polygraph, and the second in which the photograph had obviously been taken of the wrong man and had been given to the families as possibly being Lieutenant Borah.

Now, it takes a lot of our time and a lot of our energy, and it certainly is frustrating to me, but all of that pales in comparison to what this puts the Borah family through. The fact is that they have been led to believe not only that their son was still alive, and all that that trauma involved, but when it was proved to be false, fabricated, they now are being told, no, no, no, that's not true, your Government has altered the photograph, all of this coming from a guy who was clearly involved in scams.

Now, I don't think that—that anyone here, or certainly anyone in the Pentagon, can feel very comfortable with the notion, beat up on us, call us names, but the fact is that the people that really get hurt by this are the families who have these people coming around preying on their uncertainties and their concerns about their loved ones, and it ought to stop, and that's one reason we think that this committee is one of the best ideas going, because hopefully we will get to the bottom of this.

I would ask Mr. Usry as a challenge, if he is so interested in investigating cover-ups, if he is so interested in investigating us, fine. Do it. Do your best. But why doesn't he spend some of his talent and some of his time investigating what are clearly egregious incidents of preying on these poor families, and as far as I'm concerned, we've got to do something. I don't have all the answers, but I know we have got to do something.

Now, let me talk about Mr. Bailey. Mr. Bailey, along with two Congressmen, requested to see high officials in the U.S. Government and Secretary Cheney agreed to see Jack, accompanied by

two Congressmen. I was present, Secretary Wolfowitz was present, others were there, and during this meeting Jack presented some of the information that he had been unwilling to provide over several months of intensive efforts to try to get him to share with us, and we thanked him for it.

He also provided the name of this notorious Mr. X. In fact, it was done—he was so nervous about providing the name that he only told it to me, not to the Secretary, not to the Congressmen. There was this writing on a piece of paper and he was showing it only to me. I did not speak Laotian, and so I just simply took it at face value. After all of this rigmarole and mystery to get the name, it was sort of like giving us Smith, and it's someone in the New York phone book. It was not even spelled correctly and was absolutely of no help to us.

But beyond that, the most important aspect of the meeting was that we thought that there was a reconciliation between Jack and the Defense Department and that we got up from that meeting believing that Jack had volunteered to make all—not one, all of his sources available to us, not only on the Carr case but on other cases. He mentioned a Lao general and various other people in Thailand and Laos that he would make available to us and agreed that they could also be polygraphed.

We indicated that just having the information without being able to sit down and talk to the sources directly for some extended period of time and getting the details we would not be able to really do much with the general information that we had been getting from him up to that time.

He agreed to all of this, and I thought that here is the man that has the only real leads that we know of to the Carr photograph, the most compelling of the photographs that I have seen, where our experts that have looked at this photograph suggest that it could very well be Carr, and here is our primary access, and he has agreed to work with us and bring the sources in and give us their telephone numbers and let us talk to them, polygraph them.

He indicated in a general way that he was going back to Thailand soon. He then mentioned to the Secretary that he had one major concern. He felt that the whole operation and his sources were going to be undermined by our efforts to investigate using the Thai police and Thai intelligence services.

Let me just mention that the reason that we had to go to the Thai police and Thai intelligence service is because Jack Bailey would not give us any more information.

We had a compelling photograph, the requirement to move with urgency, and nowhere to go. So we were putting together all the bits and pieces we had, and sharing it with Thai intelligence, and saying, "Have you seen this person? Do you know where we can find him, where we can talk to him?"

But, because of Jack's great concern, and because he was the real source of where these people were, I walked out of that meeting. I went back and ordered that all investigations by the Thai police and Thai intelligence cease; if they were going on, stop them.

We also wanted to make sure that the opportunity that Jack was providing us wouldn't be somehow undermined or interfered with,

by his being fearful that we were somehow involved with the wrong people.

I will have to tell you that I got a lot of advice that I was making a mistake. Our only credible leads, at that point, were trying to take the bits and pieces we had and let the Thai police and others help us try to find people.

I have to admit that I thought about it, and, in the end, my judgment was that Jack has the best information so far, and he actually talked to the people that took the photograph, or know who took the photograph, and so I called it off.

We then, and Bob Sheetz can go into this in greater detail after the meeting, turned over Jack to my staff and DIA to talk to him in more detail about the information he was providing.

Because of the urgency of the case, and the compelling nature of the case, and because I had turned off our only other investigative efforts, I was obviously concerned about when Jack would be going back to Thailand. He had promised the Secretary very soon, and he suggested it would be the next week.

When he did not appear to be interested in going back quickly, we began to call and suggest, "Why can't you go? I thought you said you were going back to Thailand. We are holding things up for you, Jack."

Finally, it turned out that part of the problem was money, and so we bought him a ticket. When he finally got ready to go, we were prepared to help him as much as we could. We saw this as a cooperative effort.

We sent one person from our staff, a very senior person. Bob Sheetz went, and Col. John Cole, who was already in Thailand, who was there to help with working Jack's information, and helping move forward on the Carr case.

I do not know, other than second- and third-hand, what happened after that, and I will let Bob Sheetz finish the story from there.

Let me just simply go over, in very general terms, that instead of producing all these sources he had talked about, these telephone numbers, this Lao general, we had one person who refuses to be polygraphed who spins a yarn that appears to be untrue.

Then, when they cannot come up with the assurances they have given to me, to the Congressmen, and certainly to the Secretary of Defense, all of a sudden there is this mysterious American that is threatening lives and paying \$50,000 for this, that and another thing.

If I have ever seen a cover-up, this is it. The fact is that what is being covered up, for whatever reason, is that Jack Bailey went to Southeast Asia with our assistance, with our hopes, with our prayers, and came up empty.

I am not going to be blamed for that, and I am not going to let my people be blamed for that. If there is an American, mysterious or no, that is threatening lives, we will get to the bottom of it.

If we get a name, we will check it out, but the fact is, that my judgment is, that every time we go and try to pin people down for detailed information, when they do not produce, we get blamed.

They are the ones to blame. They either put up or they shut up, continually coming back and saying, well, it was not my fault, or

we were duped, or we had people following us down the streets of Bangkok, I am sorry.

We went the extra 1,000 miles. We went the extra 6,000 miles, and I do not think that Defense, the Secretary, or anybody at this table, or anybody on this committee should be blamed for the failures of Jack Bailey to provide what he promised he was going to provide.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not informed, Mr. Secretary, who that individual was that is alleged to have interfered?

Mr. FORD. I have been given the name that, I think, was passed on from your staff, and I was shocked. I was shocked that is who they said this American was. We have contacted him, he denies it categorically.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just curious whether there had been a contact there. Was Mr. Bailey at any time polygraphed?

Mr. FORD. No. Not to my knowledge. Certainly not on this particular operation. Sir, that is the end of my formal and informal statement. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL W. FORD, JR.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have arisen during the 3 days of historic hearings that you convened last week on the POW/MIA issue.

First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were "last known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the Indo-Chinese Governments should be able to provide information or remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what precisely we were talking about—the terms "discrepancy case," "compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant different things to different people.

The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are:

Last known alive: Those cases in which the US has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incident.

POW at homecoming: A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POW's but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POW's" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

Knowledge of the incident: Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here, called variously "Vessey cases" and the "Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the beginning, the list was not

meant to be all-encompassing. In 1987, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and remains if the individual is dead. *The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative.* The primary purposes were to give the Vietnamese cases on which responses could be readily provided and to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.

There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well as 13 other individuals who were classified by their respective Service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this committee by General Christmas.

DIA AS FAMILY OUTREACH ORGANIZATION

Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions assumed by the POW-MIA Office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

ALLEGATIONS BY DR. O'GRADY

We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file and we believe that Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs process. The O'Grady case is one in which we believe that the family has been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and information relating to the case.

Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance are without factual basis. For example, Dr. O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong. From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft. He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground, but he was not in it. All indications were that he survived his ejection. Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 when his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in his case.

A second, most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications were made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental identification rendered by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante-mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factual predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Central Identification Labo-

ratory. Should you have any further questions on this point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory available to respond.

I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by Dr. O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.

ROBERTSON, STEVENS AND LUNDY RESPONSE

As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any intimidation by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our Defense Attaches, worldwide to search for the photo in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however, without some new leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

Finally, and this is an important point, Colonel Robertson's case is not closed. It is still under active investigation and any preliminary judgements made have been set aside pending further investigative activity and information.

I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

DONAHUE ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Donahue stated in previous testimony that he has information about his brother, Captain Morgan Donahue, lost in Laos on 13 December 1968, and relates the fact that the presence in intelligence-reporting of his father's zip code is proof that his brother is still alive in Laos, because only his brother could know the postal zip code of his father. In fact, the postal zip code of Major Donahue's father was contained within a widely circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout Southeast Asia. It is not unusual that information contained in such flyers later shows up in intelligence reports about American POW's.

LOST RECORDS

There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records have "mysteriously" disappeared from DOD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MINORITY STAFF REPORT

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tracy Ustry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to defend the minority staff report, *An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA's*, authored in large measure by himself. That report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor research and error.

On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:

In fact, only 591 U.S. POW's were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POW's held by the North Vietnamese reported by the New York Times.

The original New York Times article, the primary source material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The number "5,000" appeared only once in

the entire article—quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, *North Vietnam* had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oft-quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend credence to the allegation that 85% of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part II, page i. The report states:

"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand live-sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are *unresolved*. Second, live-sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA analysts have been able to establish that the report is true. These reports involve POW's who returned at Operation Homecoming, or have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the Communists took control. Almost 300 relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today.

A more important issue that this Committee should address of Mr. Ustry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of Defense information relevant to the investigation of the Stevens case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Ustry withheld information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the Department of Defense investigating these cases.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Ustry about how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense finally received the information, we resolved the case in less than 2 months.

RESPONSE TO JUDGE GAYDEN'S ALLEGATIONS

The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the allegations made by a number of individuals before this Committee. Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr. Sheetz will later discuss the Carr case in detail, however, I would like to spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by Judge Gayden before this Committee.

Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would knowingly provide to the family, the Congress and the American people altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill Gadoury, and the individual is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact that Judge Gayden, an officer of a court, would allege that he had obtained a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that the DOD photos are frauds. This Committee can not stand by and let these gross distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe the DOD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their testimony, or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.

With the help of the Lao, our investigators made direct contact with the individual photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. *The individual is not Lieutenant Borah.* The Borah family has been convinced by Judge Gayden's bailiff, Khambang Sibounheuang, that the individual is Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Laos passed the roll of film containing the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States. Khambang has a long history of providing POW related materials, from as early as 1985; and none—not one—of his leads has ever proven valid.

I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into the record. The Judge Gayden/Khambang connection needs to be thoroughly investigated. I hope that this Committee will undertake that task.

BAILEY COOPERATION

Finally, I would like to clarify a point raised by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey in his testimony. *I would like to make clear for the record that the Secretary of Defense did*

not misspeak nor was he mistaken in any of the testimony he provided to this committee relative to Lieutenant Colonel Bailey.

Bailey's promises of cooperation were made to the Secretary of Defense in the presence of myself, and Congressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the Secretary's office. The Secretary's testimony correctly reflected who and what Bailey stated he would make available to our investigators. It also correctly reflected what Bailey told our investigators in Bangkok about where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our conversations with Bailey which I would like to make a part of the record. I have with me the individuals who were involved in the Carr investigation with Colonel Bailey and who will provide you the facts about their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the conduct of the Carr investigation of which Bailey was a part.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared now to respond to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an important statement. Thank you very much. Mr. Quinn, do you want to go next?

STATEMENT OF KEN QUINN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, CHAIRMAN OF THE POW/MIA INTERAGENCY GROUP

Mr. QUINN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Daschle, I, too, would like to say that I welcome the opportunity to come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not just identify yourself for the record?

Mr. QUINN. Certainly. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary of State covering Southeast Asia and Indochina, Kenneth M. Quinn.

Senator I think I have watched an awful lot of it on C-SPAN and some of it at about 4 or 5 in the morning, but I think having this available in such detail for all the American people to see, and have everything laid out, is very, very beneficial.

As a citizen, I sort of grieve over the fact that we have this problem so long after the war. It still is a sore that has not healed and has not been dealt with. I think that what you and the committee are doing is going a long direction in letting our citizens know exactly what is involved.

I would like to respond to some of the statements and allegations that were made during the week. First of all, there was one witness, the author of the book, Kiss The Boys Goodbye, who indicated that the Vietnamese official had made an offer to return 160 U.S. prisoners to the Woodcock Commission in March 1977, while the Woodcock Commission was in Hanoi.

I was a junior officer then. I was on the Woodcock delegation as an interpreter, somebody who is familiar with Vietnam.

I can tell you that no such offer was made at any meeting in which I participated, and I participated in all of the formal meetings. Nor was any such offer ever mentioned or discussed in any delegation staff meeting, or among the delegation staff when I was present. Nor was it included in any of the reports that were sent to the President of the U.S., which I helped draft, encrypt, and translate.

So I just wanted to be extremely clear that there was never any discussion mentioned of anything like that at any time during the period when we were in Hanoi. I assume that you would also be able to talk to members of the Woodcock Commission.

If there was some additional evidence, or suggestion of where this happened or when it happened, I would be happy to try to comment on that.

But just to assure you that this never came up in anything where I was present, and I was present for most all of the talks—

The CHAIRMAN. We intend to reach out, obviously, to all members of the Commission, and to others who were involved in that.

Mr. QUINN. Second, I would like to talk about the charge that Mr. Burch made about the destruction of records. I know you already have a letter from Assistant Secretary Mullins about this, the charge being that the Secretary Baker ordered, and the Department participated in, the massive destruction of POW/MIA records.

We got that charge. The first thing we did was to call Mr. Burch several times to try to find out more detail about this, because we were astounded by it. We thought we would answer this for him.

We have not been able to get any further information from him, so we ordered that a search be made, and that this be investigated.

We went through this once; I got the results, and said, I am not satisfied with this. I want to go back again and be signed off again by a senior official in every bureau that was named, including several others that were not named by Mr. Burch as having participated in this.

We have found no information that would corroborate this charge. The Secretary issued no such order, and no one we checked with participated in or knew of a massive destruction of POW/MIA records this year, or any other kind of destruction.

I can assure that, if such an order would be given, it would come to me—at least in our Bureau. I absolutely received no such order, nor did our people, or I, participate in any type of destruction of POW/MIA records.

Again, if Mr. Burch has some other information he wants to make available to us, we will, of course, pursue that.

There was also a charge, a criticism, of our overall policy, particularly the State Department's role in the POW/MIA effort, that we are at the behest of commercial interests, that we are rushing to normalize relations with Vietnam.

I doubt that those who would charge this have heard from the American businessmen and businesswomen who see me almost every day, and who leave, for the most part, disappointed.

I tell them that we will not have the domestic support system necessary for Government or a business to move ahead with Vietnam until we resolve the POW/MIA issue.

I add that there is hope for the future, because our policy appears to be working; but the embargo will remain in place until the proof is in.

American economic interests have high standing in our foreign policy, but in the case of Vietnam, these interests are weighed against even higher priorities.

It is true we are in a rush, a rush to obtain the fullest possible accounting for the 2,271 American POW/MIA's from the Vietnam War.

The uncertainty has gone on far too long. We are doing our best to energize the process and elicit the cooperation we need from the governments in the region.

We have had some notable success in the past year, but more must be done. As we get results, we will take the commensurate steps that will help put the past behind us.

The response from Vietnam is slow and begrudging. So, too, will be the pace and scope of normalization. At every opportunity, we remind Vietnam of this fundamental reality.

The steps Secretary Baker announced in Paris last month are not, as some have implied, the first moves in an effort to sweep the POW/MIA issue under a rug. Our motive is exactly the opposite.

These steps are being taken to elicit further cooperation on issues of great import to the United States, most particularly, that of POW/MIA's.

In April, when we presented the roadmap, we told Vietnam that if it took certain actions toward meeting our concerns, we would not, in turn, give evidence of our willingness to meet Vietnam's concerns.

In view of the signing of the Cambodian peace agreement, progress on POW/MIA's and other humanitarian issues, we took steps to assure the Vietnamese that we would be true to our word.

We acted, in short, to build the credibility necessary for further cooperation in resolving this issue. We judge the Vietnamese on actions they take, including their response to our requests.

For example, when I visited Hanoi this summer with the photos in which families identified their relatives, Vietnam provided new information and witnesses, publicized the photos, agreed to another excavation of the crash site, and gave us access to prisons for the first time.

Since then, they have agreed to streamline access for our live sighting investigators, approved visits we have requested in the Hanoi area and to offshore islands to investigate live sighting reports.

I read this morning the first report back from our office there about an investigation in the Hanoi area that had just taken place. They provided us additional information from a very useful, but apparently classified military record of aircraft shootdowns, and agreed to a new joint investigation beginning tomorrow.

We also asked Vietnam to agree to try lateral cooperation with Cambodia and Laos. All three countries have now agreed to this. We are working to arrange such meetings for the very near future.

There is a lot more they could do. For example, we expect the Vietnamese to insure that our live sighting investigator can follow up expeditiously on all credible reports, work out with us an agreement on increased helicopter support, once we have proposed a plan; agree to an extended plan for greatly expanded joint activities, including a live sighting plan; and recover and turn over for our review all available remains.

These actions could be done very quickly, and they would do a lot to solidify the base for expanded cooperation and accelerated normalization.

But what the leadership in Hanoi has so far failed to grasp, or at least, failed to act on, is that it could enormously improve the cli-

mate for normalization through an all-out effort to help us acquire the information we need to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

It is our task, our challenge to sustain and increase the momentum. We encourage, we prod, we stick to our principles, we point out shortcomings, and we will continue to do so.

In Laos, as you know, President Bush announced this week that we will be upgrading our relations to the ambassadorial level. This decision is made in recognition of increased cooperation, on POW and counternarcotics issues, and in the belief that upgrading will lead to further progress.

This same week, we have seen some positive developments in our POW/MIA effort in Laos. The Lao Senate sent a team up to Xiang Khoang province to pursue a report on the Carr photo, and a joint U.S./Lao team should join them shortly.

The Laos have also agreed to arrange a meeting between—
Senator McCain. What was the result of that?

Mr. QUINN. I do not have the results yet. They have also agreed to arrange a meeting between the Borah family and the subject of the photo previously identified as Lieutenant Borah.

We were able to interview Soth Petras, the former Pathet Lao representative, who made a number of statements about American prisoners during the war. And here, Senator McCain, I do have the results.

Petras said he never had any first-hand information on POW's, but relied instead on news reports and messages from Pathet Lao headquarters. Citing the communications problems they face, he expressed doubt that even the Pathet Lao leaders knew how many Americans had been captured.

Petras said his wartime statements that the Lao were holding numerous American prisoners were nothing more than propaganda designed to boost morale. He insisted that the Lao had released all prisoners at the end of the war, and that none were alive in Laos today.

Of course, his recent statements in no way diminish the very highest priority we continue to give to the live prisoner question. I am not saying we take his statement at face value, but we have had access, and I will report to you what he has told us.

On the Soviet connection, I want to say something else about our efforts to take advantage of the changing circumstances there.

The most recent example of our vigorous pursuit of the Soviet connection is that we immediately instructed our embassy in Moscow to dispatch an officer to try and confirm a Soviet press report that an American pilot shot down over Vietnam in May 1967, was brought to Alma Ata in September of that year, and then moved to Saryshagansk, Kazakhstan, where he allegedly still lives.

Our embassy was also asked to attempt to contact the Soviet citizen who was quoted in the article as having been involved in the transportation of American POW's out of South Vietnam in 1962.

Over the past few months, we have raised the issue of American POW's at the highest levels, Soviet and Russian Government officials, requesting any information about American POW's, and access to appropriate files.

President Bush raised the issue during the August summit meeting with President Gorbachev, and Secretary Baker reiterated our

information request during his September visit to Moscow, and his October 23 meeting with Foreign Minister Pankin in Paris.

Given the new political realities in the Soviet Union, we have urged officials of the Russian Federation to provide any information that may be available to them, and in meetings I have held with senior Soviet diplomats who were stationed in Vietnam during the past decade.

They have separately, categorically stated that no information ever reached them during that period, indicating that there were live American military men in Vietnam.

This morning, we have gotten a cable back from Moscow, which indicates that our staff has spoken with the journalist who wrote the story. The journalist suggested that the English language version and the Russian version were slightly different in that the ordering of paragraphs was different, and that the English language version gave more certainty to the statements that the American was living in Saryshagansk.

The journalist indicated that this was a second-hand source, and he was not certain that the source that he was getting the information from was indicating that this person was still there.

We will endeavor to pursue it, and have somebody go there. There is not an airfield at that town, we will have to fly into someplace nearby. My understanding is that this town is in an area which has been considered militarily sensitive, and so we will have to ask permission.

I will assure you that we will pursue this; we have been in communication with our embassy in Moscow, and we will keep the committee informed through the staff of all of this as it proceeds.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss another charge laid before the committee, that when I went to Hanoi this summer, I provided the Vietnamese Government classified documents pertaining to the Robertson case, documents that were not available to the family and which contain sources of U.S. information.

Let me state categorically that all information I provided the Vietnamese was sanitized; that is, all source information was removed, and this was cleared with the Defense Intelligence Agency, representatives with whom I worked in doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not mean that it was not a classified document. In other words, the fact that you sanitized it means you took a source out, or you took the means out; but the information you gave them still would have been in a document under the title classified, which is not available to people here, correct?

Mr. QUINN. At that time, the whole document was classified. What we did was extract the information, and we made a judgment at that point that the information would be declassified.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, Ken, and I understand what you are saying. I would concur that it would no longer be classified; but the point is, to the person who made the allegation, the document still was a, quote, classified document not available to that person.

Mr. QUINN. The documents which I—

The CHAIRMAN. You did not sanitize it and give it to the family, correct?

Mr. QUINN. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did give it to the Vietnamese sanitized. Mr. QUINN. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So what the Vietnamese got was sanitized according to you, they got something that was not available to the family. That is the only point the family is making.

Mr. QUINN. The Defense Department is the agency that provides information.

The CHAIRMAN. The allegation that was made is that the Vietnamese were given classified information. And on the face of the paper that they were given might it have been they were classified because of the sources?

Mr. QUINN. I'm not—I don't know what documents were given to the three families or not. But let me make a point. It is my understanding that the Defense Department provides the information that can be attributed to a particular case. The most specific information which I gave to the Vietnamese about the prisons in Vietnam had absolutely no reference to Robertson, Lundy, or Stevens by name in that report. Now, I don't know if that is the reason that perhaps the family didn't see it.

We, in fact—I spent, as I told you the last time, hours and hours with Warren Gray and John Cole, who are both here, and their staffs in Bangkok, poring over all the reports, and we—through this work—identified the report about the prisons, because it originally was not included in the analyses that were done, in the briefing that I had here, as relevant to the case. And, yet, when we read that, we found that it was very specific information. It was about prisons, and it described the photo. Now, perhaps, you can argue it should have been, but it wasn't, and we then acted on that and, of course, got access for the first time ever to prisons in Vietnam as a result of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that and I appreciate that, and I am just trying to draw the distinction between—and I just want to intercede very quickly. I think it becomes the family's perception problem and the question of the communication process. It is not inappropriate to you, I think, to be giving that information. I think it is essential to the resolution of this process and nobody would say you should not have done that. It is a question of their perception that they also somehow could not get it.

Mr. FORD. Even their perception in this case is correct. We had not provided them with that document, and when they received it—

The CHAIRMAN. And I think that goes to what the committee has been trying to say.

Mr. FORD. There are explanations for that, but the fact is that their view is correct. They had not received that document from us. As soon as we realized that it should be, we did. But that doesn't make up for it. The fact is that—

Senator McCain. But you did give it to them?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ford, I think that what this underscores, and this is not the first time it has been said, but we talked about this. We had a staff meeting of the committee a day or so ago, and I think one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relation-

ship process with the families. I think you have agreed to that and, therefore, I think the sooner—within the next week or so—that we can get that relationship renewed, so that there is no longer this sense that they cannot get things or whatever, and my advice and counsel would be, since those families that want it—they sit with you and they deal with the realities of the information, whatever it is, and you walk them through it and you make it all available. Is there a problem with that?

Mr. FORD. No, sir. And, in fact, we clearly realize this needs to be done and we are going to do it. Whether we can do it in the next week, I hope, but I think that we will begin, and begin to talk to you on this committee. And talking with family members and talking among ourselves, to come up with not just a solution to this problem, but the solution or a better solution to how we interface with the families on everything. And my instructions, my marching orders from the Secretary, basically what needs to be done, we'll do it. And so if that means rather dramatic changes about the way we do business, those will be considered and, if necessary, we will do them.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. I am sorry to interrupt you.

Mr. QUINN. No, no. I think it is again important to emphasize that on that particular report, that these names were not mentioned in the report at all, and it's quite a long extensive report, and it took a lot of reading to get to the end to where the photo was a very small part of it. And it was only in reading all of this that sitting in Bangkok, at that time, that we made the connection and put the pieces together.

So up until the time I went to Hanoi, there wouldn't have been any reason to connect it to any of the three men involved. In fact, it was at a—it had another name, a different name in the report. It was not a report associated with those three men and was only, in our analysis, and here—credit to Warren Gray and John Cole for their work and bringing it to my attention, and the three of us working together—only because of that analysis, that we put it together and were able to go there and pursue that lead.

I also think it's important that you know that I stayed in touch with Shelby Quast throughout my mission. I phoned her regularly. I phoned her from Beijing, from Bangkok. I briefed her over the phone. When we came back, she came to my office. We spent an hour and 15 minutes together. Members of my staff were there with me. I went through—I told her what the Vietnamese told me. I told her of our approach.

I did not give her the documents, because I didn't think it was appropriate for the State Department to be a source of the documents. That should be done through the Defense Department. So there was an extensive effort, obviously not satisfactory, but on our part to keep them informed and I asked Shelby would she please be the conduit to present the information to the other families, since she was readily available in Washington, DC, and she said that she would on that.

So I—we felt that we were making every effort to do that. But I want to be clear, and I—I have the documents we handed over. I'm happy to give them to you, Senator, and to the committee. Even though they are unclassified, we think handling them sensitively

was the right way to do it. There was a cooperative effort, again, building credibility with the Vietnamese on this.

They took us out to the prison. We provided them information about why we wanted to go. When they saw what we had on this, they made the decision—all right, we'll take you—on that, so we saw it as a way of getting access, of following up, of making every effort that we could to try to investigate this.

Now, I guess, just in summary I would say we handed over these unclassified documents with one purpose in mind. To obtain the cooperation necessary to resolve the fate of a missing American and put his family's mind at ease, and that, multiplied by 2,271, is our mission. The Department of State, in full cooperation with the Department of Defense, intends to continue doing all it can to achieve the fullest possible accounting for our POW's and MIA's from Southeast Asia. And, in this way, achieve the reconciliation with the countries of Indochina that's long overdue. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Sheetz, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do not. But I came prepared to discuss the Carr investigation. If I could have an opportunity, I'd like to amplify a bit on the topic that was just discussed with Deputy Assistant Secretary Quinn.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be fine, and if you want to share with us any observations on the Carr allegations that were made, we would certainly appreciate it.

Mr. SHEETZ. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. And then we will proceed. I know members have a lot of questions and we do want to get into those.

Mr. SHEETZ. I would just want the committee to know that I was surprised myself to find out just this last week that the report that Mr. Quinn has been talking about did not get transmitted to the families, up to that point.

That report came in in August 1990. It did not mention Robertson, Stevens, or Lundy anywhere in the report. At the time it came in, it was the first time the photo of the three men had come to the Defense Department. There were no names associated with the photo. Ultimately, as Mr. Quinn has mentioned, we did receive that name correlation thanks to the families' identification of the men in the photo.

Somehow, in the rush of business, and there's been a lot of very frenetic activity on this case, that particular report did not get transmitted to the families. I had Debra Bardsley and Shelby Quast in my office last week. Mr. Kolesnik, an aide to Senator Grassley, accompanied them. I used that opportunity to share that report with her. The reason that we did that was, I have an FOIA request that has been passed to me by Shelby Quast.

The request is rather narrowly drawn, but I asked my staff to consider that request to be for any and everything, without regard to the definition that's in her request. In the context of doing that FOIA review, the report came to my attention. I should have known it before. I will take responsibility for the fact that the report—it was the first time I had seen that particular report, did not have name correlation to the case. As soon as I saw it, I said,

my gosh, we've got to get this to the families. So I had it sanitized on the spot and I presented the appropriate part of that report to Shelby when she was in my office last week.

So there clearly was a slipup there. I will take responsibility for it. I'm the manager of the office. Although the report was in, as I said, in August 1990, once we did have a name correlation to the case, which we ultimately did, that report should have been provided to the family and it was an oversight.

For the committee's information, I'll summarize what the report says. Basically, a source provided the photo of the three men that we've come to know as Colonel Robertson, Albro Lundy, and Larry Stevens, and a second photo, that is the Federico Gonzales photo. The source says that his subsource, who passed him the photographs, said that he was given access to the prison camp west of Danang. He said he personally took both photographs, that four men were brought out of a confined location.

Three of them ultimately were grouped together with a banyan tree in the background, and he took their picture and that was the picture that ultimately became known as the Robertson/Stevens/Lundy picture. And the other picture that the subsource said he took was Federico Gonzales, and both those pictures came in to us. Federico Gonzales, as the committee well knows, is one of the fake pictures that came out of Soviet Military Review. It's actually a picture of a lieutenant general in the Soviet airborne forces. They drew a fake mustache on this man, and put a phony collar tab on his collar that says Federico Gonzales.

I have no idea if the source did take the Robertson/Stevens/Lundy photo, but I know for sure that he didn't take the Federico Gonzales photo, because that photo is a fake, unquestioned.

I assume the committee wants to know about where we are with the Carr investigation and I'd like to start out by saying I think there are a couple of Jack Baileys. There's a Jack Bailey who talks to the press and talks about how open and cooperative he's being. There's a Jack Bailey who talks with the Secretary of Defense and makes promises and doesn't fulfill them. And there's a Jack Bailey that I deal with, who bears no resemblance to the first two.

Since August, when I first met Jack Bailey, I have heard him say time after time, after time, in response to very detailed probing questions, "you'll have that information. I'll get it to you. I promise to give that to you. As soon as I get back to Bangkok—that information is over in Bangkok." When our people in Bangkok ask him for the information, he says, "well, that information is in California." And let me give you some specifics so that you can get your arms around this.

When I met with Jack for the first time, it was for 2 days of debriefing in the Pentagon in August of this year. Jack turned over copies of the Carr photos, and some of the negatives. He said that he had information on 16 prisoner-of-war camps in Laos. As soon as I heard that, I sent my staff downstairs to break out a 1:50,000 map. We laid that map down. I said, Jack, help us. Where are these camps? "I don't have those locations with me today. I'm coming in tomorrow, I'll bring them in tomorrow."

Jack came in the next day. We got the map out. Jack, come on, we've got to plot these locations so that we can get investigations

rolling. "I wasn't able to bring that information in today. I found out I left it back in Bangkok. As soon as I get back to Bangkok, I'll get it for you." I got with Colonel Cole, who is the chief of Stony Beach. After those 2 days of debriefings we spoke with him, to alert him that as soon as Jack gets back to Bangkok, we've got to get the locations of these camps that he says he has so we can start the investigation. Jack never provided those camps.

On this last trip to Bangkok, in pursuing Jack's promises made to the Secretary in October, after Jack was unable to follow through or failed to make any sources available, and didn't reach any of the agreements that he said to the Secretary, I went back to that prior promise about the camps. "I'll get that for you," and Jack said, "I'll show you a videotape." Well, we saw the videotape. There was no specific information in the videotape, and when pressed to bring forward information that he—says he has about—16 locations where Americans are being held in Laos, we are still waiting.

I'd like the committee to realize how far the Government went in trying to work with Jack. After the October meeting, the day after he met with the Secretary, Jack promised to return to Bangkok promptly. I told Jack that I would personally come to Bangkok, along with Warren Gray and Colonel Jordan, from Deputy Assistant Secretary Ford's office, and that we would form a team and investigate the leads. Jack promised to get over there quickly and get things ready for us.

Well, Jack's departure was delayed. Ultimately, we got on the phone with him out in California, and convinced him he needed to get over there. We went out to California to meet him. The day prior to the flight out Jack informed us that he wasn't going. And why? "Well, I don't have any money to get over there." I said Jack, that's not a problem. I took my personal credit card out of my wallet. I called a travel agency, ordered a ticket and had it hand-delivered to Jack's address so that Jack would not have an excuse not to go over to Bangkok.

Later that day, Jack called and said, well, I have an illness in the family and I can't go. We reminded Jack of the commitments that he had made to the Secretary, of the importance of investigating this case. The most promising of all the photo cases that I have seen in my time in that office, since August. Jack said, "I don't think I can go."

The next morning we called him and said, Jack, please, you have the key to this investigation. You have all the leads. You have all the sources. Our investigative effort has been ordered to be stood down while we wait for you to provide your information, and until you connect with us on the ground, we're basically stymied. Well, Jack told us that his sister had died over the night and we expressed our sorrows to him. He said because of that he had some family arrangements to make and he would make those and join us in Bangkok in a day or so.

So we proceeded on to Bangkok. Jack did show up a couple of days later and, it's a very disappointing tale from that point on.

Over a period of 6 or 7 days he did not provide any leads, he did not provide any sources. The day before I was due to go back to Washington, other members of the team were staying on to contin-

ue to work with Jack, but I had to get back to help get ready for last week's hearings, and I told Jack that I was going to have to go back and other people would stay here and work with him.

I was saddened to have to carry back to the Secretary essentially a very disappointing message that we had not been able to make any progress, and I felt bad about that. Jack said well, he felt bad about it too and that he had pulled out all his stops and done everything he could and he felt poorly that he had not been able to come forward with any of his promises.

About an hour or two later at the embassy we got a phone call from Jack. Suddenly, Jack said, "I have got something for you. An individual who works with me," who he called Mario, had now been found. Mario was a critical link because he was the guy who says he introduced Jack to Mr. X, the fellow, if you remember the story, who Jack says actually took the pictures and was given access to the prison camp where Donald Carr is held. That really excited us.

So Jack said we will try to make some arrangements for you to meet Mario before you have to go back to Washington. I had a plane that was leaving at 5:30 in the morning, but nonetheless we ended up meeting Jack in one hotel and then it was like some sort of a cheap spy movie. He said, no this is not really where we are going to meet him. We are going to go somewhere else now, I just wanted to make sure that you did not have CIA guys tailing me.

I assured Jack that we did not, which we did not. But we went to another hotel location. The place where Jack wanted to have this interview take place was in the cocktail lounge of this very nice, modern hotel on the outskirts of Bangkok. It had a typical cocktail lounge, and band that you would never buy the record, but sitting there you will listen to them. The band played very loud. They got us a table, kind of close to the band. It was not sort of the arrangements that—I mean I spent 10 years as a Federal criminal investigator and I know how to do interviewing and I know there are certain environments that are good for it and certain ones are not, and I knew I was in one that was not all that good, but this was their show.

And so I said, well, can we move to a table that is at least a little quieter, and we moved. Mario was introduced to me. I went through a line of questioning to try to bring out Mario's name. And that was made light of the other day during Judge Turner's testimony, but in any case they did not provide Mario's name.

We started into the discussion and I said, well, Mario, I understand from Jack that he dispatched you, up country and into Laos to try to find Mr. X. "Yes, that is right. I looked for Mr. X." I said, "well, how did you do that, Mario?" Mario said, "well, I went to Laos and I went to places where I know Mr. X hangs out and I went to talk to people who know him and I went other places and asked people if they had seen him." And I said, "well, did you have a photograph or something that you could show people and say have you seen this man?" And he said, "no, I did not have a photograph. I described him to people."

And I said, "well, describe him to me, Mario." And Mario, gets this extremely worried look on his face and he looks over at Jack and he kind of goes like this, and Jack starts to talk and I said,

Jack, please we are here to talk to Mario. Let us let Mario tell his story. I said, Mario, please, would you describe Mr. X to me? And Mario started rocking in his chair and you could see he was deep in thought and he said, "well, he is a Lao." And I said, Good, Mario, some specifics. And he said, "he is older than I am." Good. "He weighs more than I do." Good. I said, but Mario, if you are going to describe someone to someone who does not know a person, you are going to describe their face. Did he have long hair, or short hair, a long thin face, a round face, did he have a big nose, a thin nose, a fat nose, big ears, little ears, thin lips, fat lips? I said, did the guy wear glasses, and he said, "oh, no, no glasses." Every picture that Jack Bailey has given us of Mr. X he is wearing prescription glasses.

And I said, well, Mario, was Mr. X, did he have a beard or a moustache or was he clean shaven? "Oh no, he is clean shaven." Well, every picture we have of Mr. X, he has got a small moustache. It is not a very full one, but it is definitely a moustache. And we went on then to discuss with Mario how he conducted his search. I have to tell you, as someone who conducted investigations for some period of time in the employ of our Treasury Department, I know an evasive witness when I see one.

Mario was totally unable to provide any kind of embroidery or substantive detail to give me a comfort that this guy had really gone on a search mission. After 15 or 20 minutes I turned the questioning over to Bill Gadoury from JCRC, who was along with Colonel Cole. Bill Gadoury talked to him for about 15 minutes, well maybe half an hour, and basically, we got nothing from Mario; Mario knew nothing.

Mario did relay the story that was testified to last week by the other witnesses, Judge Turner and Jack Bailey, about this mysterious threat against Mario's life and against the life of his family and that large sums of money were offered by people in the U.S. Embassy to convince Mario not to work with Jack Bailey. They would not tell us. We did ask questions, well, what is this all about. And Mario said, I cannot tell you, they will kill me.

He would not give us the identity of this person. Basically we were told to drop that line of questioning. I have to tell you I came away from that period in Bangkok a very frustrated investigator. We went over there with high promise. Promises were made to the Secretary. Jack did give us a phone number that we could perhaps reach Mr. X at in upcountry Thailand. We called that phone number and there was no such working number.

Now, I do not know how other to describe it to you than as a very frustrating experience, without substantive detail. Jack Bailey showed us, he made a very, very excited lead-in to a videotape that he said would provide us substantive detail on U.S. prisoners. We invited him to the embassy to show us that videotape. And the videotape starts with something like this—we asked for a copy and he said we would get it, but like everything else, after numerous follow-ups we still do not have it, but the videotape starts like this:

It is shot from behind the individual who is alleged to be Mr. X. You never see his face. The camera never moves. It is on a tripod and Jack says, "well, I understand you have some information about prisoners in Laos. Will you share that with us?" And they

fold out a map. It took them about 15 minutes to get oriented on the map. Where is Bangkok, where is Vientiane. Finally they got oriented on the map.

And Mr. X puts his finger on the map. They do not show you where it is because the camera is back here. And Mr. X says there are 168 prisoners here, and there are 33 prisoners here. And Jack goes, "168 prisoners, boy, that sounds a little preposterous." I am not sure the word was preposterous. I do not want to put that word out but he said, "that sounds a little high to me. Let's not talk about that one. Let's talk about the 33 that are over here."

And then they went through this incredibly long-winded dialogue totally devoid of any substantive detail. Jack says that videotape was shot in 1988 and that information ultimately developed into what we have come to now to know as the Carr case.

We have a memo for the record in the files of Stony Beach in Bangkok, dated March 1989: a phone call from Jack Bailey to Colonel Miki, then chief of the office. "I have some photographs," he called them the Carr photographs. "I am going to bring them in to you"—and he never came in.

The follow-up calls from the people in Stony Beach to Jack were basically like this; "well, I am trying to put together some more information. I want to give you a complete package. I will be in next week." And Jack never came in. The first time we saw those photographs was in July this year when they showed up on national television.

When we interviewed Jack in August I said, Jack, what have you been doing with these photographs? Why are we now just hearing about them, now, on television? "Well, I gave them to the Government over a year ago." Who did you give them to Jack? "To the Senate staff on Foreign Relations." I said, good, this is the first time we have seen them, so let's talk about them. In the interview in October, after the Secretary's visit, I said to Jack, we are kind of frustrated here, you are holding all the cards. You have got all the leads. If we are going to get to the bottom of this you have got to help us and Jack holds up the photographs and says, look, I am frustrated too. I have had these damn photographs over 3 years now and I have not been able to get anywhere with them.

Well, I will tell you why I am frustrated. How am I supposed to be in charge of the office that is conducting investigations, trying to find people, if private individuals are hoarding information and if it is turned into the Government and it is not given to me? I find that very frustrating. I find this whole case frustrating.

But at its core, we are left with the most compelling photographic evidence that the U.S. Government has seen. And there is one more thing that I have to tell you and I know I am being long-winded. But I think the committee needs to know this, and I think the American public needs to know exactly what is going on here.

When we met with Jack in October, he identified the location of this camp where Carr, and he told us 4 to 16 other Americans are held. He said, it is right here, in the northeast corner of the Plain of Jars between Ban Ban and Kon Kai, along where Route 7 runs. We had given Jack a map. At about 25 kilometers, apart, those two towns. The Senator knows this very well because I have been up here on the Hill briefing this information all summer long, telling

people what we are doing and trying to get to the bottom of this case. Telling people all the intelligence assets that we have targeted against that location.

In October Jack tells us, "Well, that really was not the location," he said. "I felt like I could not trust you. The relocation is over here on the Burma border, 22 kilometers." So I have spent all summer, according to Jack, in wasted effort because he gave us the wrong location. He told the Secretary a location 22 miles from the Burmese border.

The next day, when we were sitting down talking, Jack says, "well, you know, I really not sure that he has been moved. I think he has been moved. When we get to Bangkok, it is not even the location 22 kilometers from the Burmese border. It is in the next province down, which is another 60 or 80 miles from the border, on a farm that is supposedly owned by one of the former royal princes of the Lao Government."

Through means available to us, intelligence means, we have been able to determine that neither one of the royal princes ever either lived or had a farm or any kind of a vacation or getaway location in that part of Laos. That part of Laos is an extremely hilly, mountainous area, very inaccessible, very poor, it is basically a place that time has forgotten.

One of the royal princes lived in Dien Tiem and one of the other royal princes lived in the eastern part of Laos. Neither of them lived in the western part, near the Burmese border. I do not know where to tell you, if Donald Carr is alive, where he is held. I have now got three locations that I have got to task all the available intelligence assets of the U.S. Government against.

We have made requests of the Lao Government to go in to allow U.S. investigators to come in and personally, physically observe these locations. Well, the only location we knew at the time which was the Plain of Jars, which Jack tells us now is not a real location. Maybe other people would have been more fortunate in getting information from Jack Bailey. Maybe the Senate has had better luck with him than we have, but it has been a very frustrating experience and I do not know how else to characterize it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think, Mr. Sheetz, your testimony is very valuable and important and I do not think it long-winded. It was long, but not long-winded. It was and is important for the committee to get the full texture of this.

I do not think a lot of people have a sense of the full texture of it. I have no doubt that Mr. Bailey and others would have a different view. We are going to sweat all of that out in public. We are going to sweat all of it out. And it is going to require some time and energy of sitting down with both of you present and working at it but in a sense also your testimony underscores the extraordinary nature of this issue today.

When you think about the Secretary of Defense assigning an aircraft, personnel, and people flying over personally, a Government official pulling out his own credit card and getting a ticket and traveling that distance and putting all of his intelligence assets on the line and going the route, if you will, and then at the end of it being told, well, I did not trust you. Those months of effort were sort of a test. It really is an incredible statement about where we

are in this process 20 years later. Now it is vital that we continue to air this in this way and I think it is very positive, frankly, for people to begin to make some judgments about who is doing what here and how.

Before we begin the questioning let me just say to you that I do not want to diminish how I am sure you feel sitting here and some of the folks behind you. It is no fun, as a Federal official, having your bona fides questioned and the committee is not questioning them in a way that I think some are. The committee is trying to sort out who knows what.

But I want to say to you and others behind you that we are sensitive to that. It is no fun. We get it every weekend or when we go home or wherever we are, but we ask for it. Except you are public officials and the system has come to a grinding gridlock of lack of credibility and we have got a requirement here to sweat it out. You understand that, but I just want you to know that I think there are a lot of extraordinarily dedicated people who are committed to this issue who are working day and night to try to find if somebody is alive and to bring them home and regrettably we are, where we are, because there is a then and there is a now to this issue.

To a certain degree Secretary Cheney, in his testimony here acknowledged this by saying, look, I think some mistakes were made, but it was not on my watch. And I certainly took it as a very significant demarcation point here, which is saying, we are doing our best. We are confident of what we are doing. But we understand that some things have happened in the past.

To the degree we can sort out what happened in the past and understand it, we are going to help to understand this issue today. And that is what I want to begin to get at a little bit here in the beginning of my first round of questioning.

You said we are seeking a full accounting and we begin with this number 2,273. But frankly, I do not know as I listen to testimony and I look at different numbers that are in front of us, what the real numbers are and we have got to ascertain that as to Vietnam, particularly as to Laos and cross check where we are. Now you say that we are still dealing publicly with this magic 2,273 POW/MIA's, but in point of fact, there are not 2,273 today, are there?

Are there not at least 1,000 of those that we could say, with certainty to families, that they are now known to be deceased. Is that not accurate?

Mr. FORD. In fact in just the last day or so we've changed the number to 2,271. Two families have been notified. But you're right, the list is made up of an assortment of different classifications of individuals. And there are a large number of people on the list that were reported by their commander, or someone in the field, that they were killed in action. But their body was not recovered.

And that these people, earlier on, were separated out into a different category. And at some point it was decided that we wanted to account for all of these people. If we couldn't determine and get the family an answer about what happened to the body or what happened the day they died, that they ought to be also included in this list. So they were merged with those that were missing in action. Also with those that were killed in action, body not recovered.

ered. And so that about half of the 1,000 figure is fairly accurate, or listed in our files as killed in action.

The CHAIRMAN. And are there not—I mean some of these reports that I have seen, at least to me as a former combatant—seem pretty valid. I mean they have a texture of two to three people in the unit saw somebody get hit, or there was a significant explosion and somebody was underneath it, and nobody could be recovered by virtue of that. And there were enough witnesses, whatever, that you could really—can you not say with a certainty what happened, as reasonable people look at it?

Mr. FORD. Senator, I'm not sure of all of the background. It was before my time, but my understanding, and I understand it now, is that it was a matter of credibility. This issue has not become a cause celebre or an issue that people were concerned about last year, or the year before. It is through this entire period there has been concern by the families and others about POW/MIA's. And so that at some point people began to question, well, did you really know they were dead? Was the report accurate?

In fact we know—well on the other hand, there were some commanders thinking they were doing the family some good—would know someone was killed in action and had very good evidence of that, and would leave them MIA or POW. And so that these lists were not all that black and white. There was some confusion at the time during the battle, and whatever.

So that as an act of mercy for people with all this uncertainty I think, quite rightfully—the people that still would like to find out what happened to their son, or their husband, or their father on the day he was killed. We also owe them an accounting.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and I am not suggesting they should not get the accounting. What I am suggesting is that in many of those cases, at least to this Senator's reading, there is an accounting available. And I am uncertain as to why it has not been laid out in that way. I am going to come back to that.

I also, to take the other side of it, believe that for a significant portion of those numbers on the other side of that ledger, there are some huge questions. Now I am not going to abuse my time here. I want to come back to that in my second round. But there are some very significant questions about Laos and the correlation of people in Laos to those who returned. And we need to get to that.

I want this committee at this hearing, hopefully today, to get some base numbers from you. Some realities about the numbers of deserters alleged, and some realities about where we are in terms of Laos and Vietnam. My time is up, let me turn to Senator Smith.

Mr. FORD. Could I just respond briefly? We would be happy to provide you with the numbers as you request. But I also point out—and just don't want to overdo the issue but the fact is that there are a number of cases in which we have very convincing evidence from a forensic examination, dental and various other things, in which the families are unwilling to accept our judgment. And that we have remains back, we have a story, we have an explanation.

It seems to me understandable that there would be many families out there who at some point or another in the last 18 years or 20 years said, I'm not sure that my son died. Even though—and

maybe in their head they know what they remember hearing and reading—but in their heart they don't accept it anymore. Now those numbers, as far as we're concerned, we have to deal with. An accounting for those people is just something that we feel obligated.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is part of the tragedy of what has happened here, and obviously the review of all 2,273 and the recommunication process is going to be critical to dealing with that. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one question that I would like each of you to answer, if you could, and you can do it with a yes or no if you like. Have you seen, or do you know of, any information, good information, that would indicate that any American was alive? Any American who may have been a POW was alive after 1973. Mr. Quinn.

Mr. QUINN. I have seen information that there was a man named McKinley Nolan who was alive in North Vietnam.

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about hearsay. I understand that. I mean good solid stuff.

Mr. QUINN. I think this was good solid stuff that he was alive. All the reports indicated that he had in some way—was not a prisoner—that he had somehow had—and I don't want to use the words that might characterize him—but that he was somehow in a different status and was moving about more freely, and had some type of different relationship with the authorities in North Vietnam.

Senator SMITH. And so it is yes in the case of Nolan.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, and there was one other report that was attributed to the mortician, who said that he saw some people with Mr. Garwood. And I think DIA and DOD is better to do that, but that report struck me as indicating—I mean it had a lot of detail and he apparently—the mortician was able to identify Garwood. And so I've seen those two that are reports that really ought to be followed up, and that there were some Americans that there is—that are possibly alive after that time.

Senator SMITH. Nothing else.

Mr. QUINN. I can't think of anything else right now.

Senator SMITH. Carl.

Mr. FORD. I have not seen anything that would convince me that there are not some Americans still alive.

Senator SMITH. Anybody alive after 1973.

Mr. FORD. The reports that I have seen suggest that there were. How many I'm not sure, but I think that the reports suggest that there was one for sure, that the Vietnamese didn't tell us about until much later. That was one, but there are also some reports suggesting that people might have been alive we didn't know about. We didn't know where they were—and probably died afterward.

I think that the evidence is not real compelling, but it certainly causes me to pause. The more important question for me—and I accept the importance of the question in 1973 as an important point of saying well, why did it happen? We have focused most of our efforts on are there any alive today and can we find them? And that as we accumulate evidence and as we go through that process,

we are able to begin to piece together a little bit better, what happened back in 1972, or 1973, or 1975. And the evidence, as we accumulate it, more and more suggests that there are probably some left alive in 1973.

Senator SMITH. I am trying to get a quicker answer because I want to ask you a couple other questions.

Mr. FORD. I understand. We're here as long as you want us.

Mr. SHEETZ. As Senator Grassley well knows, DIA did a compilation of reports that were received in the period after Operation Homecoming. It is our assessment at DIA that those reports are not definitive—they are not firm, credible evidence. They were reports—they were evaluated at the time.

And one thing the committee might do is, in its future deliberations or investigative efforts, call in the commander or the then commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, which had the responsibility for checking those kinds of reports on the ground. Warren Gray who was on my staff was part of that JCRC in 1973, 1974 time frame.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me. We cannot go into a lot of detail here, but let me just phrase it this way and just ask for a yes or no. You have seen the information that Mr. Bell provided us. Based on having seen that information, do you agree with him or disagree with him—that based upon the information that he provided, that he discussed—that that would indicate that there was some indication of somebody alive other than Garwood. Somebody alive after 1973, not necessarily alive today. Do you agree that that was evidence, at least, that was presented?

Mr. SHEETZ. DIA has held all along that the report of the mortician that he saw three Caucasians who were identified to him by another person as probably being Americans—that that report stands. That there is validity to that report.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask a couple of quick—and I know my time is almost up. Mr. Sheetz—back on the committee, staff and myself, and I am not sure who else was there—did talk to Mr. Bell as well. And we are also trying to sort that out and I think you gave a pretty good analysis of what happened on your end. Just trying to follow up on a couple of points that he made with us. Did he show you photographs that he alleged, or was led to believe—one or the other—of the alleged facility where Carr may have been held. Did he show you photographs?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, he did.

Senator SMITH. And in one of those, without being too particular—in one of those photographs was a building—pretty obviously distinguishable building. Do you know where that building is?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do not.

Senator SMITH. So we do not know where that building is.

Mr. SHEETZ. That's true.

Senator SMITH. Are we making an effort to try to find out where it is?

Mr. SHEETZ. Every effort that I know how to make. And generally, we are employing all of the many and varied assets of the U.S. intelligence community, and when we get into closed session I will be happy to brief you at length on that, sir.

Senator SMITH. Finally, a couple of quick points on Bailey. Was there any prior contact by the U.S. Government with Mario, the source that you interviewed in Bangkok with Bailey? Was there any prior to that meeting—was there any prior contact by the Government with Mario?

Mr. SHEETZ. I have no personal knowledge of that. As I understand his allegation—and he was not specific with me—that this contact involved—possibly involved, U.S. Embassy personnel who are working the POW/MIA issue. I have not spoken to them and, to be honest, I've heard two possible names mentioned. I have no personal knowledge of that.

Senator SMITH. Because he did allege that an individual from the U.S. Embassy, as you stated, paid Mario money.

Mr. SHEETZ. I think Jack told us the sum was \$6,000.

Senator SMITH. That is what he told us, but you do not have any knowledge of that?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do not.

Senator SMITH. And you tried to check that out.

Mr. SHEETZ. I have not had the opportunity to speak with the two individuals whose names, I think, may be candidates. I would like an opportunity to get to the bottom of that too. I would be happy to work with you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

The allegations were investigated and found to be fabrications.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Quinn, I hope that if some other allegations arise, or information about the whereabouts of an American POW you will notify the committee. We were not happy to read about the information concerning an American in the Soviet Union in the newspaper.

Mr. QUINN. Well we will certainly keep the committee informed, Senator. But I will point out the day after I testified here, I testified on the House side and was asked a lot of questions about the Soviet Union. And I gave a full briefing of everything that we knew at that time. So there is certainly no hesitancy on our part to withhold any information.

Senator MCCAIN. I was not implying that. Ms. Monika Jensen-Stevenson alleged that the Vietnamese offered 260 prisoners to the Woodcock Commission for a sum of money. I believe you were a translator for the Woodcock Commission. Is that true?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir, and I addressed that in my opening remarks, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. And you have no knowledge of any offer.

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely not.

Senator MCCAIN. You would have had knowledge of such an offer.

Mr. QUINN. Unless this was something that was whispered to one person, and that person didn't share it with anyone else. I would have had knowledge of that. I was in all of the meetings. I heard everything that was said, and I was in all the discussions afterward. I was part of writing, encrypting and transmitting Mr. Wood-

cock's personal messages to the President of the U.S. And there was absolutely no discussion, at any time, of anything like that.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Quinn, do you know—or do any of the witnesses know of any of the liaisons between administration officials and identified members of organized crime?

Mr. QUINN. No, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Senator, I've heard the allegations but I've not seen any evidence yet.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Sheetz.

Mr. SHEETZ. No knowledge.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Quinn, do you know of any sanctioned rescue missions, or missions by the Department of Defense, after 1973?

Mr. QUINN. No Senator, I don't.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. I have been told that there was one mission.

Senator MCCAIN. That there was one mission. Mr. Sheetz.

Mr. SHEETZ. The same information that Mr. Ford has.

Mr. QUINN. Senator, if I could—there was a mission that was described to me after the previous hearing which I had never heard of before—which was described as reconnaissance mission but not a rescue mission. I make that differentiation, but I have no information about any rescue attempts.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. The trip that Mr. Usry made in August—that was as a result of information provided by Mr. Khambang—is that correct?

Mr. FORD. That is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. And at the time—

Mr. FORD. There may have been others, but that was the major source of information.

Senator MCCAIN. And Mr. Khambang was along on the trip, and he was going to provide additional information to corroborate the fact that Americans were somewhere alive.

Mr. FORD. He was going to bring in the people that had provided him the information.

Senator MCCAIN. And at the time, did you know that Mr. Khambang—according to the assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs—Mr. Khambang passed bogus dogtag information to his superiors in the Arlington Police Department where he worked as a clerk? And that turned out to be fabricated. In the fall of 1990 passed a roll of film and other information—the purported Borah photograph—you knew all of that when you decided to have that trip proceed.

Mr. FORD. The details had been accumulated and put into that particular document for the record. At the time, I was aware that Khambang had been very much involved, for a number of years, in this, and that we had considered his information to be unhelpful—incorrect.

Senator MCCAIN. Have you or anyone else in your department—the Department of Defense—falsified any photographs?

Mr. FORD. Absolutely not.

Mr. SHEETZ. No sir.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Sheetz, what was the result of Mr. Gaudoury's trip back with the individual to meet the individual in Laos?

Mr. SHEETZ. The Laos Government did make Mr. Ahroa available. He was interviewed by Mr. Gaudoury from JCRC, and Mr. Eddie Smith from Stony Beach. Once Mr. Ahroa's story was gotten—a written statement was taken.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Sheetz, I am talking about the follow-up trip with family members.

Mr. SHEETZ. It's happening right now.

Mr. FORD. The details that I have are incomplete, but Mr. Gaudoury met up with two of Mr. Borah's sons in Tokyo and they flew to Bangkok. There was some delay in getting the arrangements made for the individual in Laos to be made available. My understanding is that that, in fact, is now in process, and I have not heard what the results of that meeting are.

Senator McCAIN. You will let us know.

Mr. QUINN. They're going into Laos tonight.

Senator McCAIN. You will let us know the results. Have you been able to receive any of those affidavits that the judge said proved that the pictures were tampered with?

Mr. FORD. We have not received any, to my knowledge. I am hoping that the committee has and will share it with us.

[The information referred to follows:]

We have determined that the individual in the 1990 photograph is not LT Borah, but a Lao highland tribesman named Ahrao. To assist the family in overcoming their doubts, the Department of Defense facilitated the meeting of the Borah brothers with Mr. Ahrao in Savannakhet, Laos. Mr. Ahrao identified himself in the original widely publicized 1990 photos. He explained the circumstances under which the photos were taken, and he displayed for the two brothers the jacket that he was wearing the day the original 1990 photos were taken. Also present for the meeting was the second individual in the 1990 photo, the individual first identified as "LT Borah's guard." These individuals are obviously the two individuals pictured in the original 1990 photographs purported to depict "Borah and his guard."

We consider the "Borah" photo issue, and the 1990 photos purported to depict Lt Borah, resolved. The case of Lieutenant Borah is, however, an unresolved discrepancy case, and is still under investigation by the Department of Defense.

Senator McCAIN. I do not think we have. Mr. Quinn, I hope that we will continue to exhaust every effort as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. And perhaps from our embassy level—with particularly KGB and Russian defense personnel, we could ascertain—

Mr. QUINN. We have—the embassy has begun that effort and has had several conversations. But obviously there is more to be done and we would like to have access to those records.

Senator McCAIN. If I could slightly refine Senator Smith's question, do you believe there were any American prisoners of war alive in Southeast Asia—or do you have any evidence of that, or do have a belief in that—after 1973?

Mr. QUINN. The reports that I saw—McKinley Nolan wasn't being treated as a prisoner of war. The other report, which is the one that Mr. Sheetz also referred to, is that there were two Caucasians who were with Garwood in 1979, who seemed to also be moving about freely. And these people were identified to the mortician by Vietnamese present as being other American pilots. But the mortician himself didn't know whether they were. But I've not seen any reports of people actually being held in captivity.

Mr. FORD. Senator, when you refine it that way, it certainly makes me answer much more guarded and cautious. I would still have to say that the evidence that I have seen suggests that there could be. But I do not have any evidence that there were.

Mr. SHEETZ. I am unaware of any firm credible evidence that Americans were held against their will after Operation Homecoming.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to come back to that, but I will wait until my time. Senator Brown?

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Quinn, can you give us a brief summary of what the State Department has done in follow-up on the wire stories, reports of a POW being in the Soviet Union?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, certainly, Senator. As soon as we saw that, we sent an instruction to our embassy in Moscow to immediately follow up on that. Our embassy has sought the journalist who wrote the story as being the first source of information and has had an interview with that individual.

I don't know if you were here before when I made reference to that. Let me repeat that for you. We have just literally gotten this morning the report of that interview, the journalist was a little difficult to find, in which the journalist said that the story carried by this journal, Kommersant, ran in the Russian-language version and an English-language version and that there were some changes to the story in the two languages.

And that, in the Russian version, which the journalist said is the authoritative one, the paragraphs were ordered differently and the meaning conveyed in the Russian-language version was much less certain than any American continued to reside in that city.

In the Soviet Union, a small town in the Soviet Union, where it was identified that an American was living in the English-language version, it is more certain. The journalist told our embassy representative that the Russian version is what he was conveying, that he was not certain. Nonetheless, we are going to send an officer to this town, if we can.

The reason I say if we can is that one, there is not an airfield there. We will have to fly into an area nearby and find a way to get there. We can do that. But it also is in an area which is a Soviet testing range or testing area and therefore is considered militarily sensitive and so we are not certain that we will be allowed to go.

But of course we are going to do everything and push in every way to get there. Now, we are also following up several other approaches with the Soviet Union. We have had conversations with Soviet officials about access to records, and some of this has to do with POW/MIA's from Korea and World War II, which is not an area of my responsibility.

But you mentioned President Bush raised it with General Secretary Gorbachev. Secretary Baker has raised it twice with the Soviet foreign minister. I have had several conversations with senior Soviet diplomats who lived and worked in Vietnam in the period after the war was over.

In one case, one man was there before the war and after the war. And they said to me in two separate conversations that they had never seen any information coming to the Soviet Embassy, and they were in senior positions, indicating that any American remained alive in Vietnam. And they pointed out that the Soviet Union had a very close relationship with Vietnam and there were Soviets all over Vietnam, workers, technicians, assistants, officials. And they felt with a very high degree of confidence that if there was such an American or Americans being held in captivity, that they would have heard about it, that they would have found out about it.

Now they qualify this always to say, well, there always could be something that we did not see or did not hear about, but they were very certain in their judgments and they passed this to us. They said in the spirit of the new relationship which exists between our two countries.

And they also came in conversations where we discussed other issues that relate to Cambodia and the Cambodian settlement, in which we felt that they were being very forthcoming and providing us assessments and information about the current situation there, which we strong reason to believe were accurate. So I judged, in these conversations, that they were giving me a straight answer. That was my impression.

Senator BROWN. Can you give me an idea of what we have done in the way of requests to the Government of Laos and Cambodia for access and where that stands?

Mr. QUINN. Access to?

Senator BROWN. Access to follow-up on live sighting reports to send personnel in?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir. Of course in July, I raised the photo cases and well as the Borah and Carr cases at that time and they have been willing to follow-up on these immediately and unilaterally and then to work with our investigative teams and to take them to meet with individuals who are associated with these live sighting cases in Cambodian.

An investigative team from Stony Beach and Bangkok went into Phnom Penh in July and was taken around and actually met and interviewed people who were associated with the handling of the Robertson/Stevens/Lundy photo.

And you know from Mr. Ford's testimony that we also received access to the individual who was the person who was identified in the photo as Lieutenant Borah. And right now we have a mission that is underway in Laos to go to Xiang Khoang Province to follow-up on the Carr case.

Senator BROWN. What about all the other sightings we have had that are located in Laos? Is that something we have made a request on or where does that stand?

Mr. QUINN. We have a number of the other discrepancy cases in Laos and we have had, in the past year, continued increased access to these. And for the first time, we are in Pua Pang Province which contains the site of where the old Pathet Lao headquarters was. We have never been able to get there before.

We have also had cooperation in expanding the number of investigations that we can do each year. I do not want to leave the im-

pression that I think it is perfect. We would like to be able to go out ourselves and not have to ask anybody and just get in our own helicopter and fly out there and investigate without asking anybody's permission or agreement. That is the ideal. That is what we strive for in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But in the context of continuing—

Senator BROWN. They have turned it down but they have been willing to go with advance notice of where you were going?

Mr. QUINN. What has happened in Laos and Cambodia is when we have particular requests and Vietnam, in the case of the photo case, when we have particular request with information, we are able to get out there, but with them to go and follow it up.

Senator BROWN. I am sorry, I do not mean to be rude, but let me take you back so that I understand. We have asked for, from them, the ability to go through the countryside without a guide and without advance notice and they have turned us down on that request.

Mr. QUINN. I am not sure that we have put the question to the Lao that way, Senator, in those terms, and they have said no, you can not do that, but you can do it this way.

We have, in Vietnam, made the point that we want to have it for our investigators to be able to go out and we have told them that is the ideal. I am not sure that they have said, no, you cannot do that, either.

We have conveyed this. We certainly—I do not think there is any misunderstanding on their part that that is what we would like to do but I do not think it has been done in that we want this and no, you cannot do it. Usually the answer, the Asian style, is never to say no, no, you cannot do that. It is not the way business is done. The way you get the answer back is that you get some other type of increased cooperation.

Let me check, if I could.

Senator BROWN. Would you? I have found over the years that it is difficult to get the answer you want if you do not ask the question.

Mr. FORD. If I might, I think we may not have phrased it exactly as you did, but in Vietnam we have asked to do this and we have been told that we have to submit a request in advance. When we have done that, we have had trouble even getting permission after having requested it. In the case of, obviously what we are concerned about is that if the report we have is of an American in captivity, either by the Government or private sources, that if we tell the Government we want to go and look for somebody in a particular area that it will tip off the people there so that they will move them.

There are other cases in which there are reports of Americans living free and we have been trying to test the system with those cases. But because one, we wanted to test it, and two, we thought it was safer to do it that way, rather than trying to do the cases. Where we have reports of captivity, we have not had much luck.

Now I am concerned and upset about that. I am not particularly surprised. Vietnam is still a Communist country. They do not even let their own people travel freely. And so that what we are asking them is extraordinary. It is an extraordinary situation. And I think that they have indicated to members of this committee and certain-

ly to other people that they are going to, and we just simply think that they ought to let us have the access we need.

Mr. QUINN. I have checked with people who have a better understanding of the full record of our dealings with Laos. And the situation is basically as I said to you, Senator, that we have made the statement that this is what we want. We want unfettered access. They do not say yes, they do not say no. They take note of it and we then get back some other answer and some other, we make some movement.

We have discussed with them the possibility of our own kind of transportation or having U.S. transportation in there, which would be something that if you then had it and you controlled it, you could get out and move. And in both the case of Vietnam and Laos, the indication is that they would be favorable to such an arrangement, but with their pilots, indicating that they want to maintain a degree of control.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Senator Grassley?

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. Secretary Quinn, before I ask a line of questioning, I want to ask, I would like to ask about Bill Bell. I had a conversation through staff with Bangkok, the Bangkok embassy, and I understand that he was given a visa in Bangkok but it was not approved by Hanoi. And I guess I would like to have you tell me, if you can, the status of Bill Bell's return to Hanoi.

Now this is 24 hours ago that I had this information.

Mr. QUINN. Well, I had a call last night at 10 from our DCM in Bangkok, who told me that Bill was scheduled to go back, I guess tomorrow morning, that he had his visa. He has his ticket and that the embassy, which has had conversation with the Vietnamese Embassy about this was told that there was no problem of his going back.

Mr. FORD. The information I have is essentially the same but Senator Grassley, what we had heard earlier and I am sure that what you and your staff have heard earlier, is that a middle-level official whom Bill deals with on a regular basis in their unit, that those POW/MIA's indicated to us that they were not going to let Bill back in or give him a visa until he provided certain information, the transcript of testimony, and then not until Christmas. When our official on the ground heard that he said, what are you talking about, you have got to be crazy. Our representative said, well, we would like this in writing and he said, well, this is unofficial but you should understand this is the case. I know Secretary Quinn and I just about exploded when we heard this. And the fact is that the committee was very much involved and we were waiting to see what would happen.

But it looks like it was not official and that it was some mid-level official who was out of sorts with the testimony or whatever and was trying to take it out on the people there in the office.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, your response, as you have stated, you were outraged about it, would be very appropriate from my point of view. If you were not outraged, I would expect you to be outraged.

Because this is some bit of evidence of whether or not the Vietnamese evidence is going to fully cooperate with us. And so we want to make sure that there is obviously no retaliation.

Secretary Quinn, when you were questioned by Senator Kerry about divulging classified information on Vietnamese, I am not sure we are all talking about the same document, so I would like to have a clerk give you a couple pages that I have here and have you take a look at that. And I would like to go back to the Secretary's line of questioning, but I would like to start from a different point.

Now this is no effort on my part to just get some basic information. And if you cannot give the information now, if it is just a case of your willingness to provide the information.

On our first day of hearings last week, I asked you the following question and received the following response. And I would read from the transcript of our hearing.

I asked you, we heard this morning that the U.S. and Vietnam have agreed to certain procedures to investigating live sighting reports.

My question to you, does this include our government turning over classified file information on POW's like sources and methods.

Your response, a partial response, certainly not turning over anything about sources and methods. I couldn't imagine a situation in which we would do that.

And then, skipping a sentence, in the case of the Robertson/Stevens/Lundy photo, we did provide information to the Vietnamese Government, the Cambodian Government and the Laotian Government, which we expect them to investigate wherewith and we asked them to provide us answers. But we certainly didn't turn over anything.

In fact, one of the things Colonel Cole and I did and Warren Gray, until about 2 in the morning, was going through this information to make absolutely sure that in no way was there any compromise of where we were getting our information.

Well, 2 days later then we had Debra Robertson Bardsley testify that she had recently returned from Hanoi and was told that she was the first family member to have met with Vietnamese officials. She stated the following. Either during or after her testimony, number one, a Vietnamese official whom she described as a Mr. Dich, and I spelled that D-i-c-h, and whom she said is the head of Vietnam MRA office, gave her a list of sources and a memo describing locations of live sightings pertaining to Colonel Robertson.

Ms. Bardsley says that Mr. Dich expressed a desire to punish the sources on the list. These lists were provided to the Vietnamese by an American official, according to Mr. Dich. There was a corroborating witness with Ms. Bardsley who heard this. Mr. Dich said that the American official who provided this information was Mr. Ken Quinn.

The name of K. Quinn, as you can see, is written at the top of each page and it is in Vietnamese style script, along with a date of July 26, which I believe is when you traveled to Vietnam.

If this is bona fide live sighting intelligence and if Mr. Dich's statement is true regarding how he received this information, then your statement on November 5 would appear to be erroneous. On

the other hand, no one has yet made such an allegation and this committee expects to determine the truth in this matter.

But I wanted your response to that, please.

Mr. QUINN. The two documents that you sent down to me are indeed the two pieces of paper which I gave to Vietnamese officials in Hanoi on the 26th of July of this year. These two pieces of paper were prepared by me, Warren Gray and Colonel Cole in Bangkok. They are not documents that exist any place else in the U.S. Government. They are extracts and I went through information with Cambodian officials and with Vietnamese officials about what we knew and where we wanted to go and why and I spoke that information.

Actually, I spoke it in Vietnamese, in Vietnam and then, gave them this as an aid for them to remember because there was a lot of information going no place on either of these documents. And there is a third document which I gave to the Cambodians which is different than this and which I am happy to provide to you.

On no place on here is there any name or person, or method from which we gained information. This is information about people who were in some way involved with the photos that we wanted to investigate. This was all worked on and cleared by the representatives of the Defence Intelligence Agency who were with me and it also was shown to Mr. Bell before we presented it to make sure, triple check, that there was no problem in doing this.

The reason we did this was that we had the photo. The family members said, these are our loved ones. They had a date on it, 1990, and we had other reports suggesting that the reports in this photo could be alive. We wanted to go and see. We wanted to go and try to find them any way that we could. We could not do that alone. We are not able to go into any of these countries and move around alone by ourselves. Therefore, we can only do it with the Government's assistance. Particularly in the case of Vietnam, they did not take these photos seriously at first. They considered it to be some type of propaganda, operation, misinformation, what you will. And so we wanted, and I wanted to convince them that this was serious and so Mr. Gray and Mr. Bell and I sat down with them for 2 hours and walked through what we knew. This is not all that we know about this. When you see the full report you will see that there is a great deal more information, but this is where we told them we want to go.

Here is why we want to go and we want to go there as fast as we possibly can and it is of crucial importance to the United States of America that we get there. I made the judgment that in doing this that we could accomplish that, and in fact we got into the prisons that are in that area and were able to look and see for ourselves. And we also got access to other information about the Robertson case, as a result of that.

In Cambodia we got to go and talk to many but not all of the people on this list. We got to go, Colonel Cole is here, he can tell you that we actually went to the places where Robertson and Stevens and Lundy were supposedly held. This had never happened before. We had never been in the prison before. We had never been in Cambodia before. We never got to go around and actually go to the places where they were being held and so that is why I did

that. In retrospect, if it is considered to be a misjudgment, I take the blame for that, not Mr. Gray, or Mr. Cole. I do not consider it was, I consider it a real advance and frankly, the Vietnamese and Cambodians considered us to be acting in a serious way with them, in a cooperative way and that is important because tomorrow we get another report, another photo, that says here is an American who is alive and well so Cambodia or Vietnam are going to face the same question.

How do we get out there and find out for ourselves. We are not at a point where we can go alone. We can only go if they let us go and we want to do that as rapidly as we can. That is not the best situation. That is not the way I would like it to be. That is not the way that we are working to have it be but to get there. It is, unfortunately, a step by step process.

I consider what we have done a big step, but, I am sorry to go on for long, Senator, but I wanted you to understand.

Mr. FORD. Can I add one brief comment to this. I had a brief conversation with, as I recall, at least the representatives, of the Robertson family and the Lundy family during this period when the photographs and identification of that photograph had just been made.

And one of the subjects that we talked about, because they were urging, not only Ken, but me and others, Go out there. Talk to the Chinese. Talk to the Vietnamese. Talk to the Soviets and I had a discussion about the risks involved and did they understand what they were asking us to do. That if, in fact, these governments were holding back, were holding their loved ones, that this was a certain risk that we were going to have to take and that we were trying to do it more indirectly than they were suggesting.

And they said, you understand the quandary we are in and the pressure we are feeling. And they both—or the people there understood, that we would have to be taking some extraordinary steps. And so, that while in the best of all worlds we would have tried to have done it differently, everyone was aware that this was pushing the envelope way far out and we thought there was good cause.

Mr. QUINN. And I did not take the step of going to work with the Vietnamese on this without consulting the families. I spent 2 hours on July 12, with all families assembled and told them that there were these two choices. And they concurred in our going and working with the governments involved. I wanted to be, sure, I did not want them to come back later and say, you have gone out and messed it up. You should not have done it that way.

I wanted it to be a consultative process, and as I mentioned earlier, Senator, all along and afterward I kept Shelby Quast informed of this. I had an hour and 15 minute debrief in my office about the results. I told her—I did not give her the documents, but I told her what had happened and I told her what the Vietnamese had said.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could you comment for me on the point that has been made to us several times about what I would call the mentality that is presented by the Vietnamese that give us a name so we can punish the sources, punish the people. Now you are looking like that has never been expressed to you.

Mr. QUINN. No that was expressed to me.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, just comment whether or not that is something that is a real fear out there that we have to be overly cautious about, protecting sources.

Mr. QUINN. Obviously, if we have a source who is giving us information the last thing we want to have is the Vietnamese or Cambodians or Laotians or anybody else to know who that is. That has to be protected. I would make the point that these people involved are not sources from whom we got information. They are people who we have information that they would know something about, the photos, or were actually involved in holding the Americans.

Senator GRASSLEY. In this specific case—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I need to try to get to Senator Kohl.

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, this is in regard to the same point. The people on this list, you see, Mr. Dich stating to Debra that we want to punish these people. You see the people on the list. That was what was expressed to Debra.

Mr. QUINN. I understand, I mean, the Vietnamese do not accept the photo as legitimate and they have said publicly and privately that they believe that people are doing this to impune them and their reputation on this and to thwart better relationship between our countries or they are doing it as a way of just a scam to make money. And so they are concerned about that. So you have to make some judgments if you want it investigated. You have to give them something so you can go out and investigate it. If we want to talk to the only people would know about this, we have to go through them to get to them.

So, in there, we try to separate out anybody who is a source so that they would not come in for any type of punishment but to name the places or the individuals so that we can go and try to find them—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to the Senator that one of the things the committee is going to gain from our trip in February will be an opportunity to really confront some of those things firsthand and to have a sense of some of the difficulties that are being worked with. I mean we tend to forget that this really is a closed society, a Communist country, and I know you do not forget but the reality is that I think a lot of progress has been made in the last months in overcoming some of those problems.

Mr. QUINN. Could I make one last comment on this and I apologize. I had information in a case we thought the Americans would really be alive. My judgment call along the way was, What is it that is going to get us the maximum ability for our country to find out about these people. That was the bottom line decision making and that was always in my mind. What is it that we should do here on the ground and in an evolving situation that will get us the best chance to find out about this photo and these men in it.

Maybe somebody else would come to a different judgment. This is the judgment that I came to. And we got certain results, which I think were clearly things which we had never had before and access we had never had before and was to me, that is a good result.

The one other factor in this case, the Federal case, to keep in mind is that the photo was publicized. I do not know by whom, here in the U.S., the day after the families gave it to us. Certainly

not by us and that which put the case into a very different kind of public perspective. We had already made our decisions. We had already approached the Vietnamese Government on this investigation, but in publicizing it like that, we had not provided any of this information where we thought anybody was or who might be involved, called great attention to it in Vietnam before we ever got there and I think probably, in the end, it was not helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kohl, thank you for your patience.

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would like to talk just a little about POW's in the Soviet Union, and specifically I would like to talk about a Lt. Robert Reynolds who was shot down while piloting a Navy surveillance plane in the Baltic Sea in 1950. Apparently we were aware that this crew was shot down and that there were some survivors. That and other stories were written up in the Los Angeles Times earlier this year. I wrote a letter to you, Mr. Ford, about this case and you responded very courteously and very promptly and I appreciate that very much.

What you said is that we inquired back in 1950 when it happened and were told that there apparently were not any survivors, but made no further inquiries until 1991. I ask the question: How is it that between 1950 and 1991 we did not go back? The evidence was that there was some indication that some of these people were there and that they were alive. What happens in 41 years that we do not go back and reinquire and ask whether or not there is some information that would be useful.

Mr. FORD. I do not know, Senator. I was not even aware until this particular issue came up that we had made the original inquiry or that there was this person, or there was this information about a person in the Soviet Union. As soon as we knew something about it, we tried to respond to it in various ways in terms of asking and pressing the Soviets for more information and we continue to do that in this case. But why, for 41 years we did not. I think it was simply the people that originally checked it out and were concerned about it did not pass that concern on to others and somehow over the years, we forgot that it even existed.

Senator KOHL. Again I would just make a comment. During this time we inquired about many, many people in the Soviet Union about whom we were concerned: Soviet Jewry, rightfully so, Raoul Wallenberg and many others. Why were we not at the same time asking consistently asking about POW's and missing POW's in the Soviet Union that we did not have any information on or inadequate information on? If your answer is, We did not, and I understand that. But is there some reason? Is there something I am missing here?

Mr. FORD. No, Senator, I think that the organization which has been looking at this issue in the Defense Department, DIA, and in my office and also in Hawaii, we have been focusing on Indochina POW's and it is only in the past year as concerns were expressed, as people's interest on this issue widened.

For example, Senator Smith has been very interested in Korea. We have not really done much on Korea and so that we are widening our scope from my office to these other areas for the first time and in our new organizational structure we are going to have

people here for the first time focus on Soviet Cold War POW issues. We are going to have somebody who focuses on Korea and World War II issues, but why was it, why it was not done before I do not know, but we are going to do it now and we have got my office, my office has put out or is in the process of putting contracts to people like Rand to tell us how to do that. How do we go back 41 years and begin the search over again and most of the records either have not been kept or destroyed and a researcher is in fact on his way shortly to the Soviet Union and begin the process of what we might be able to find. So that, it is a small step, but it is at least we have listened and we understand people's concern and we will try as best we can to do something about it.

Senator KOHL. I am very happy to hear that. I was going to ask you if we are now prepared to handle in a systematic, professionalized manner and you are suggesting we are doing that.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. I would like to ask again about Lieutenant Reynolds. Could your office help me to get information to his family and to get the release of whatever was formerly classified as top secret or anything like that 41 years ago? Can you see to it that we get all possible information that we have to the family of Lieutenant Reynolds?

Mr. FORD. We will do whatever we can to help them Senator.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. I had to go preside over the Senate the last hour, and I do not want to repeat any of the testimony that these witnesses may have given to the committee. I will review it later on, but I wonder maybe—and I assume you are about to wind up with this panel and go into the next panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, not yet. We are going to have another round.

Senator ROBB. Well, let me just ask a general question. But in light of the information that was being elicited toward the period just before I left, I got the feeling that anyone who has any official responsibility for the handling of any reports or dealings with POW/MIA families is now prepared to give virtually all information—with the exception of those sanitized pieces that might relate to something that could still be regarded as legitimately needing classification—to the families if they request it.

Is that too much of a generalization? Would families of those who have unresolved cases be able to count on virtually all of the information, with the possible exception of very precise information, that might not be available to them at this point?

Mr. FORD. Senator, the current practice—or the practice certainly in the past—has been to provide the families with information that has been correlated specifically with their loved ones—as opposed to all the information that happened in that year, or that area in which their loved one was lost. And so part of that was privacy concerns—of giving information out about other families cases—and partly it was sources and methods.

And I think that over the years, the families have grown dissatisfied with that, and they understand that there is more information

there that certainly is not associated directly with their loved one. But they would like to be able to look and see if we missed something. They would like to look back over our shoulder and see if—because they're more personally involved—they would do something a little bit differently than we did.

And, quite frankly, we've got to find a way to satisfy that requirement. And we have got to find a way to give the families more confidence that they're seeing everything that we've got. And if there are some things that are so highly classified and sensitive that we can't show it to them directly—that they can have the committee, or someone with a security clearance—check for them.

And we would like to try to eliminate that as much as possible. We haven't gotten that answer yet, but DIA and DOD and ISA—and we will be working with others. We're going to find in the very short term some sort of an answer for information for the families. We need to do better, and we just simply have to find the answer and do it as quickly as we can.

Senator ROBB. Are you in a position at this time to reassure them in response to any particular question that they might have that either you are giving them all the information you have, or you are giving them all the information sanitized to protect methods and sources, whatever the case may be?

Or there is another body of information that does not relate directly to their particular loved one's case that, for whatever reason, is not available—but so that they have some sense that they are getting as complete an answer and an explanation for why any missing pieces are not provided for them at this time.

Mr. FORD. I can't give you that assurance. That is our goal and objective—that we try to provide them with every piece of information that we can that comes to our attention and that we correlate to their family member. It is then sanitized and provided to the families through their service contacts, the casualty officers. In some cases we have been able to demonstrate that we have done that quite well. In other cases, things have gotten misplaced or weren't done quickly enough.

And some family members are missing bits and pieces. We wanted to go back and make sure that every family has everything they were supposed to have some time in the past—and if they don't have it, get it to them. And second, we want to expand the definition of what family members are allowed to see, so that they have more confidence that they are seeing all of the relevant information. They know we've put this restriction that has to be correlated directly to your family.

That limits, quite frankly, a lot of the information that is available to us—that is not available to families. We've made a judgment that it is not relevant to their case. They would like to test that for themselves and over the years—because of suspicions and reports coming out of Southeast Asia—they don't really believe that we're giving them everything. So we've got to find a way to give them that confidence that we are.

Senator ROBB. But is there not—I mean if there is no rationale for protecting methods or sources—or some other sensitivity or classified reason for prohibiting the release of certain portions of the information. Is there any general reason, other than—I under-

stand the desire not to give everyone increased expectation from the way they would interpret other facts as it might apply to their loved one. But I mean, just simply to make relevant information—tell them we do not think it is relevant for this reason to their loved one, but simply to make it available to them.

If you would make it available to someone who presented an argument that it was relevant to their particular loved one, why will you not give it to some other person who would make a more generic argument about a time, or period, or whatever the case may be?

Mr. FORD. You are right, and what we're trying to look for is a way that gives them some more say in determining what is relevant for their case. And we simply are committed to try to find that. I don't have the exact answer today, but we have already begun to think about it and how we might do it. And I have been trying out ideas on my people, and various others. And hopefully we will have a better way of doing this in the not too distant future.

Senator ROBB. It would seem to me—and this is just straight off the top of my head—it is always dangerous. But a relevant chronology of all of the types of information that are available, that would have some historical purpose, that they could simply go through at length.

Because this is obviously an emotional matter with families and they want to have access to all the information that they think just might be relevant. And I do not see any real harm—other than perhaps their own increased expectations based upon the availability of it—to come from it.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Robb.

With respect to the Soviet issue, the translation of the text says—what happened to the Americans brought to the USSR is unknown—and it says their total number. Which seems to speak with a kind of definitive notion that people were brought there. Do you agree that seems to assert that, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. That would be the way that, I think, a reasonable person would read it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you satisfied—I do not want to go into the detail, but that is the text and so that is a matter of public record. I do not want to go into any of the confidential aspects of the State Department communications, but are you satisfied that all aspects of that particular case—and the other information—are now being followed up with the Soviets?

Mr. QUINN. I am satisfied that is in process. Certainly, that is not complete and I would think as part of this—just beyond this story is the question of access to files, archives, and records, which could affect a great many other individuals. So this is part of a much larger process which has started, but which still has a considerable ways to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any of the information that Colonel Bui Tin gave this committee with respect to this Soviet interrogation a revelation to you?

Mr. QUINN. I have to admit I didn't see all of that part and I'm not familiar.

The CHAIRMAN. He acknowledged there were Soviets—particularly along the Laotian borders and in Laos—where that kind of interrogation might have taken place. And there are indications, obviously from the Soviets, that it did.

Mr. QUINN. I guess I'm not familiar with having seen reports earlier that would confirm for me that it did take place. But I always suspected that Soviets somehow would be getting information.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not stand to reason? I mean, if the Soviet Union is supporting Vietnam to a significant degree, as it was, and they have personnel in the region. And their number 1 enemy is the U.S. and an American electronic plane goes down and they capture people alive. I would assume we are going to think that they are going to interrogate them.

Mr. QUINN. They are pros. They would be out after that as fast as we would be out after it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back to the numbers again for a minute. The 2,273—did that include Bob Garwood?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I don't know for sure. I will have to check and see.

Mr. SHEETZ. He was—at the time he was unaccounted for when he came out. He came off the list.

The CHAIRMAN. So as of—let us go back—as of 1973 the accords are signed, our formal involvement terminates, correct? What was the number of unaccounted for POW/MIA at that time?

Mr. SHEETZ. I will have to provide that for the record. I don't have that figure in front of me today.

[See p. 932 of the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you Mr. Ford?

Mr. FORD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the number of people shot down in Laos?

Mr. SHEETZ. I think it is roughly 1,300. I don't have the exact number. That can be provided for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was about 500.

Mr. FORD. 526, but when you say shot down, those are all of the ones—the total number of POW/MIA category people. The KIA—we have a body recovered.

Mr. SHEETZ. If I could clarify my number. As I understand it, 1,300 aviators were shot down and roughly 800 were recovered through search and rescue mission efforts, leaving the unresolved number that are on the list of unaccounted for.

The CHAIRMAN. Added to people on the ground.

Mr. SHEETZ. This number includes people on the ground and aviators.

The CHAIRMAN. And does not people on the ground include all clandestine personnel lost?

Mr. SHEETZ. To the best of my knowledge, the numbers we're working with—2,271—would include all personnel lost by all means.

The CHAIRMAN. So all personnel lost during the so-called secret war are included in that number.

Mr. FORD. They are now. That was not the case early on, and the reason was because of the security and the fear that those people might be killed because of the type operations at some point. They were added to the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when they were added, because it is very important?

Mr. FORD. I would have to get the exact date for you. It was in the late 1970's.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense is in the process of conducting research on the question. There were employees of the Department of Defense that were operating in another capacity that were added to the list. (This would involve somewhere between 5 and 10 people.)

The CHAIRMAN. So that really sheds an extraordinary—I mean that is in and of itself a very significant kind of disparity that exists here. That is one of reasons people are saying—wait a minute guys, we are not getting the right numbers. Am I accurate?

Mr. FORD. That is correct. That is why people still believe that there's a secret list and—like many stories—there is some truth to it. There was at one point—as all covert action operators and special forces—they were not initially put on the list. But in fact, they have been now and so all of those people are accounted for, and a number of people have been accounted for in terms of remains.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very significant because, in fact, an EC-47 was shot down after the Paris accord, after Operation Homecoming, is that not correct?

Mr. FORD. I do not know that specifically. I take your word for it.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Cressman case, Peter Cressman? Are you familiar with the details of the Cressman case?

Mr. FORD. I'm not.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, did we not have information that personnel were taken alive from the EC-47 that was brought down? And Mr. Trowbridge, you are shaking your head.

Mr. SHEETZ. I have an analyst here—our senior analyst for the whole office.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to bring him up to the table?

Mr. SHEETZ. This is Robert De Statte. He was the first person in the Hanoi office.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. De Statte, would you raise your right hand, please.

[Witness sworn.]

STATEMENT OF ROBERT De STATTE, SENIOR ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. DE STATTE. My name is Robert De Statte. I'm with DIA, a senior analyst.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been with them?

Mr. DE STATTE. I've been with the office since September 1979.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you just help me understand this, because this is one of those cases where a lot of people have questions and it keeps arising as an issue. It is my understanding that an EC-47 was shot down. Evidence was found that five people survived that crash. Is that correct?

Mr. DE STATTE. The aircraft was shot down, sir, on the 5th of February, 1973. Over the years there has grown the impression that we had evidence that some members of that crew survived. In fact, a careful analysis of the information that led to that impression reveals that the information did not pertain to that crew.

There never has been any evidence that any members of that crew survived. And I have unclassified summaries of the incident that we prepared back in 1987, and which have been released to the House task force. And we also provided that to Senator Smith back in 1989.

The CHAIRMAN. We will make those part of the record, and you can just give me the summary quickly, because my time is up. But I actually want to pursue these numbers issues because they really leap out as a major component of people's misunderstanding—or real misunderstandings here.

Carl Ford has stepped out, but I would like to ask that this committee have, by next week if we can, a full listing, chronologically, of all those people, as of Operation Homecoming, that we listed POW, MIA, body unrecovered, and so forth—in the appropriate categories.

A cross accounting of all of those returned during Operation Homecoming measured against that list, and a subsequent addition of any personnel now listed known to be lost and not accounted for in the course of that process. And a separate listing of those people known to have been captured in Laos and whether or not they were accounted for in the repatriation process with Operation Homecoming, and if not, what accounting there is for them.

Mr. SHEETZ. We will be pleased to provide that.

[The information referred to follows:]

A total of 16 Americans are known to have been captured in Laos.

Fullname	Loss RR	Service	IDATE	City	Remarks
DeBruin, Eugene H		V	630905	LA	Reported died in captivity
Klusmann, Charles F	03	N	640606	LA	Escaped
Shelton, Charles Ervin	03	F	650429	LA	Reported died in captivity
Hrdlicka, David Louis	03	F	650518	LA	Reported died in captivity
Brace, Ernest C		V	650521	LA	Returned at homecoming
Dengler, Dieter	02	N	660201	LA	Escaped
Sitscher, Walter Morris	04	F	680413	LA	Returned at homecoming
Leonard, Edward W	03	F	680531	LA	Returned at homecoming
Long, Stephen G	02	F	690228	LA	Returned at homecoming
Bedinger, Henry James	02	N	691122	LA	Returned at homecoming
Golner, Robert A	04	F	710203	LA	Returned at homecoming
Butcher, Jack M	02	F	710324	LA	Returned at homecoming
Mattix, Sam		V	721027	LA	Returned at homecoming
Riess, Charles F	03	F	721224	LA	Returned at homecoming
Kay, Emmel James		V	730507	LA	Released
Dean, Charles		V	740910	LA	Reported died in captivity

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very helpful in giving us the baseline to begin to determine what numbers we are dealing with and who is really accounted for or not in that process. Now were codes broken—radio codes—in Laos, between the period of 1969 to 1973, which allowed us to track prisoners in Laos?

Mr. DE STATTE. Sir, if I could answer that question. I think that topic should not be discussed in open session. And I think it should be more correctly addressed to a different agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a security reason why—I mean, we now know we broke the Japanese code in World War II. Is there a problem in saying we know we broke the Laotian code of the Pathet Lao, if we did?

Mr. SHEETZ. Sir, that work is all done by another intelligence agency.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just asking whether you know—do you know whether it was broken?

Mr. SHEETZ. I have no personal knowledge of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, Mr. De Statte?

Mr. DE STATTE. Sir, I have only generalized knowledge, and I wouldn't feel comfortable answering.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not putting you on the hot seat. Is it your generalized knowledge we did break some codes, do you know that? Yes or no. And what is the problem here, guys, this was 20-some years ago? Can you articulate it to me?

Mr. SHEETZ. You really need to have a spokesman here from the other agency that does that work.

The CHAIRMAN. But you guys are the Defense Intelligence Agency—you are analyzing this with respect to this issue.

Mr. SHEETZ. And we are given their reports and entrusted to work with their reports under what is called the third agency rule. One agency is not allowed to declassify information from another agency. I mean, it's a law. I'm not allowed to disclose another agency's intelligence. That agency, as you well know sir, very jealously guards their capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. We have met with that other agency and they have told us they are going to provide everything. But I am having—well, okay, look—if that is the rule, and you cannot break the rule, then we are going to have to get somebody who is going to.

I am going to put this committee in the position of asking you to break the rule. So we will deal with the appropriate people to see that you, in the appropriate circumstances, can answer the question. As I know the Secretary said, and I am not going to put you on the spot for that, you have to follow the rules and I understand that.

Mr. DE STATTE. Sir, if I could just add, speaking on a personal basis on this, I used to do that kind of work, and I had the experience—very early in my career of seeing first hand the expense and the amount of recovering from the compromising of that type of information.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mr. DE STATTE. I fear I appeared evasive, and I didn't want to appear so.

The CHAIRMAN. I support covert activity. Some people do not like me because I do, and I think we need them. And it is a fact and reality of modern political and modern life. But there is a difference between telling us how we broke the code and whether we did, and there is a difference in just the level of knowledge here. Now you feel that that's a compromise—I am not going to put you

on the spot. But I am going to put you on the spot privately and otherwise, and we are going to find out where the reality is of what we did then, and what we knew then. Fair enough.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Let me just follow up on that just briefly by asking the question this way. Do any of you have any information or knowledge of any American service personnel, whether they be intelligence personnel, military personnel or any other type private citizen personnel, any type of American personnel, lost in Laos after the final shipment of POW's came home in 1973, yes or no?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So the conclusion—I do not want to put words into your mouth, but we will get into some of this in executive session, but the conclusion therefore is that American military, and if I am wrong, say so, American military personnel were lost in Laos after 1973, after the Paris peace accords were signed and after all of the POW's had come home, correct.

Mr. SHEETZ. My staff reminded me of something I should have remembered myself, that those individuals who were lost after the period that you referenced were civilian employees of the U.S. Government and not uniformed military personnel.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask another question. Did the United States of America or anybody directed by the United States of America, conduct any type of operations in Laos after the last shipment of American prisoners in 1973 came home, any type of operation at all, either directly put on by the United States sponsored by the U.S. or indirectly or any other way? Is there any activity that this country was involved in in any way after 1973 in Laos?

Mr. FORD. I don't know, but we will get that for the record.

[The information referred to follows.]

During a closed session on Monday, 25 November 1991, the subject of operations was discussed at length between members of the Committee and DIA, CIA, and NSA representatives. Since the closed session provided the answer to this question and due to the sensitive nature of this subject, further response is not necessary.

Senator SMITH. I cannot believe that you do not know. Please do not embarrass yourself. You guys are in charge of investigating whether or not there are live Americans in Southeast Asia. Please, yes or no?

Mr. FORD. Senator, the answer, the honest answer is I don't know. I will get you the answer.

Senator SMITH. Do you know, Mr. Quinn?

Mr. QUINN. When I was asked this the other day, I did not—had never heard of any such operation. Mr. Bell then gave his testimony which caused me to ask questions of people who were operating and involved back then who told me that yes, there was.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. SHEETZ. I don't have personal knowledge. I wouldn't be surprised if such things occurred. I have not been briefed and don't have personal knowledge.

Senator SMITH. So the conclusion, and I am just trying to get stuff for the record, I am not trying to beat on you, but the conclusion here is that the individuals directly responsible for seeking and finding American military personnel in Laos do not know

whether or not, except in one case, do not know whether or not there were any military operations or any type of U.S. Government-sponsored operations in Laos after the accords were signed and after the last POW's came home.

And the point is, if we conducted operations in Laos, we can assume you have already stated the personnel were lost, so that first point, we conducted operations, the second point is, personnel were lost. That does not mean anybody is alive but it does mean that you ought to know something about those operations and at least, in two cases, you do not even know whether there were operations.

I want to get into that later. A couple of other questions. Mr. Quinn, I just want to follow up briefly on Senator Grassley's line of questioning and again, this is for clarification only in my mind.

I understand sources and methods. We all do. And I have the list of individuals and I understand your explanation, but it has always bothered me that whether they are called sources or whether they are called information or individuals or secondary sources or whatever they are, that the families who are going over there and looking on their own cannot have the same information.

And I am not going to mention names on the list in public session, but in a couple of occasions, people on the list, one is listed as a General who commands an unidentified prison; another is a General's son who commands an unidentified prison and they name the site of the prison; and another is identified as somebody in the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have seen reports that have been gleaned where names of the refugee has been stricken from the report with a conclusion being drawn at the bottom was this guy was a fabricator, but we still keep that individual classified as a source. I do not understand. Please give me an explanation as to why an individual who might be in the Cambodian Ministry, who says he knows something about a photograph, whether that photograph is bogus or not, why is that person less important in terms of protection than a refugee who comes and you have concluded is a fabricator. I do not understand that. Explain that to me, please.

Mr. QUINN. Because the reason the person's name was on here is one, this individual in the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor anybody else on the list, has told us anything. Whereas the refugee who goes into the camp and tells us is the source of our information and therefore we want to protect that person.

The reason we gave these names to the Cambodians is these are the people we wanted to talk to. So to find them, since we couldn't go ourselves, we gave them the names and said, we want to talk to these people.

Senator SMITH. But if, in fact, any of these individuals on this sheet of paper that we have here that was provided by one of the family members, if in fact, any of those individuals deliberately provided bogus information, I could care less what the Vietnamese do to them and the sooner the better. No question about that.

But if they did not and it was accurate and you do not know that, when you provide these names to the Vietnamese, if these people, by any stretch of imagination, any of these individuals here are in fact valid in terms of the information provided and in fact,

they did take a photograph, see a photograph, see the individual in the photograph as is alleged, they are dead.

And I do not understand the logic with the way you folks protect stuff and I know how much you protected over the years from me and from others. I do not understand why you feel, I mean, we had testimony this morning from people from CIL-HI, that they contradict a lot of you folks have been saying. They say that we are not, the Vietnamese are absolutely not forthcoming in the information. No way are they forthcoming, as a matter of fact, maybe deliberately providing misleading information in the help of identifying remains.

Yet, when you provide this kind of information to them, I understand your motive for it, I am not questioning that. I understand you are trying to do your job there. But when you provide that information to them, you are kind of assuming, really, in your mind, in your own heart, that it is bogus and we are going to get these guys for doing that.

And you are saying these guys are leveling with me because otherwise you would not provide the source or investigate the source. And these are sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I just say one thing. I think in this morning's briefing the assertion was, with respect to the past.

Senator SMITH. That is true. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Although, with respect to, but there is an inquiry outstanding in fairness. There is an inquiry outstanding that they still do not get an answer to and we can talk about that privately.

Mr. QUINN. I would like to answer the question. I don't consider these bogus names on the Cambodians at all. They are real and they have the photos and they know something about the photos. And they know where the photos, where they got the photos from and maybe they had a hand in them.

And they, more than anybody else that we know of, could give us the lead.

Senator SMITH. Let me just ask one last question.

Mr. QUINN. If I could finish my point, with all respect. The choice is talk to them or not talk to them. Pursue the only leads that we have to American military men who might be alive in some form of captivity or some state or not to do it.

That's the choice.

Senator SMITH. And if you are dealing with a totally trustworthy, honest government who is sincerely providing information which we have got statements to the contrary, then I can certainly agree with you very much.

And I am not trying to give you a hard time. I am trying to clarify. You mentioned a General and you said, in the information you gave to the Vietnamese, that he commands a prison and you give the site of the prison and you also say that this prison holds, according to the reports, 20 American prisoners and that this photo was taken there.

Now if the Vietnamese are not telling the truth and if the Vietnamese are holding prisoners they are certainly going to have something to say to this General whose name you provided them. Now, I mean, for God's sake, and if he's bogus and he is not provid-

ing information, then who cares what happens to him? But you are making that assumption when you provide the information. I think I have made my point.

Mr. QUINN. I would just make the point in return and I take your question in the spirit, Senator, that you have said. Is, that we have to, if we're going to try to get out this, get in touch with, talk to the individuals who are involved. We don't know in the case of the General whether he's a real General or not. The Vietnamese have given us information about how their prison system runs and the rank of people who would be involved in it and the nature of the report would raise questions, I think, in your mind or my mind as to whether this was really a person involved.

But what was important, what was really important, was to get into the prison. If these men are being held in that prison, if the Vietnamese knew in advance, they have the photo, they're not going to leave them there.

Senator SMITH. But you did not get in there.

Mr. QUINN. Yes, we did.

Senator SMITH. They did not allow you to look everywhere in the prison. I know that for a fact.

Mr. QUINN. What is important is to be able to go in and to look and see the descriptions of what's involved, to see if this facility matches up in what it's location was.

Senator SMITH. Did they let you look everywhere in that prison?

Mr. QUINN. I did not go in the prison cells. Bill Bell was the man who went in there himself. But it is important information that we obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, that just underscores the dilemma here. I am sure that nobody is going to be fooled into believing they are going to let you look in a prison where they are holding people and find them.

Mr. QUINN. I think it would be very helpful, Senator, if the committee or members of the committee would give us your best advice as representatives of the American people. What should we do? In that kind of situation, how should we proceed?

We have a name, somebody who has information about, possibly about live Americans. We want to talk to that person. We can't get to him by ourselves by any means that we have. Obviously, if we did have means to get to them by ourself, directly or indirectly, we would do that and we would never provide the name. But when you can't, what should we do?

Should we go to the Vietnamese, the Cambodians and the Laos and say, we want to talk to this person because of that or should we not and do nothing? I think it would be very helpful for us to have your advice.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you are on the lawn, it is fair for us to go out on the lawn. And I will answer that. I think you did the right thing in that situation. And I said that, I said it previously and I do not fault it.

But I think the thing I faulted was the family relationship seemed to be breached and there was a distinction. But I do not, in God's name, know how you can begin to do this process, unless we will trust some people on the ground in Vietnam to build some relationships and make some judgments about those relationships.

And somewhere along the line here, somebody has got to begin to believe that not every American working for the U.S. Government is going to become part of some process to hide Americans in Vietnam. And I am willing to trust that some people are not going to do that, obviously.

I just think somewhere we have got to have a basis of rationality that enters into this and what the committee I hope will do is have the guts to make some choices that are based upon reasonableness and rationality. But again, to do that, we have to have base figures and some basic understanding.

I am a little disappointed that you folks do not have at your fingertips those numbers and the ability to tell me, Senator, here is how many went down. Here is exactly how many were unaccounted for. Here is how many, I mean, this is basic, to be able to put the full story out on this thing. And I just think, look, we are dealing with a different phenomenon than any of us ever wished or thought we might be dealing with.

I think it is 67 percent of all Americans believe that people might be there alive. I mean, you are in a sense, under siege here. And you are going to have to come back with the Desert Storm mentality on this one in order to deal with that. And I think you are beginning to see that and recognize that, that this is not, as I said at the outset of the hearing, something that anyone of us wished upon anyone of us, or this committee or the U.S. Senate.

But it exists because it has this tenacious life of its own. And the only way this committee can avoid becoming tarred by this process is to guarantee that we are opening it up and I think you sense that is what we are trying to do. But my advice to you is that you have got to go at it to a degree but do a better job of bringing people into the process and letting them know they are part of it. I do not know what else you could have done, Ken, and I think you have to do that.

I may have spoken out of turn and alone on that.

Where are we here? Senator McCain?

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Quinn. Will you make the details of the road map public, so the families can know it?

Mr. QUINN. We have treated the road map as a confidential document because it is a negotiating document with the Vietnamese and we wanted them to know it was a serious document.

And so, as a result, we have brief extensively on it to the public and to the Congress. We have not made any decision to declassify it.

Senator McCAIN. I would appreciate it if you would, particularly since the Vietnamese have given it to everybody. It is not exactly a secret anymore. We would appreciate that, if you would give that serious consideration.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC 20520,
December 10, 1991.

DEAR SENATOR KERRY: During Deputy Assistant Secretary Kenneth Quinn's November 15 appearance before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, he took questions and promised responses on whether the Department would declassify

the "roadmap" with Vietnam and on whether French POW's were held in Vietnam after 1954. I am pleased to provide you with the Department's responses.

We recognize the Committee's need to understand clearly the role the POW/MIA issue plays in the process of normalization with Vietnam. As a result, we have decided to provide the Committee with a copy of the roadmap. That copy is enclosed with this letter. Because it is an essential element of our diplomatic exchange with Vietnam, we have decided that it should remain classified. We believe keeping the roadmap classified will increase the likelihood that the Vietnamese will treat it as a serious expression of the U.S. Government's views, particularly with regard to the need for progress on the POW/MIA issue.

We would appreciate it if the Committee would treat the roadmap as a classified document. I hope access to the roadmap will assist the Committee in its study of the POW/MIA issue and its role in our relations with Vietnam.

As for the French experience in Vietnam, the French Government informs us that the Vietnamese repatriated all French POW's prior to the end of 1954. No French POW's remained in Vietnam against their will, though some stayed behind voluntarily and returned to France sometime later. Some 6,900 soldiers from the French Expeditionary Corps, including 2,200 ethnic French, were unaccounted for in 1954, but the French say these men were lost under uncertain conditions and, in most cases, were thought to be dead. They were not prisoners. The French have told us that the Vietnamese have cooperated in the repatriation of remains of French soldiers.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

JANET G. MULLINS,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.

[See p. 1 of the appendix.]

Mr. Ford, are you familiar with a procedure called computer superimposition?

Mr. FORD. I have to admit, again, I'm not.

Senator McCAIN. Employed by Mr. Michael Charney, a forensic anthropologist at Colorado State University, are you familiar with that?

Mr. FORD. One, I'm not a forensic expert. That term is never, if I heard it at one point, I've forgotten it. I do know a little bit about Dr. Charney's work and what the FBI and what Sandia and Los Alamos think about it.

Senator McCAIN. What is that?

Mr. FORD. They don't think it is scientific and they have disagreed with every—every time we send them one of Dr. Charney's reports, they say they don't think it is very professional or scientifically done.

It certainly would not be used, for example, the FBI report. as evidence in a trial. It would just be thrown out as insufficient evidence.

Senator McCAIN. Would you provide in writing for the record some of those responses and views about Dr. Charney's work. Because we are presented with that as evidence that is rather compelling and I think it is important to clear that up.

[See pps. 475-498 of the appendix.]

Mr. Sheetz, did you want to comment?

Mr. SHEETZ. Senator, I might add, some of the American public might not know that Dr. Charney had a photograph of the photo that was alleged to be Daniel Borah before such time as the U.S. Government was able to identify the individual as the 77-year-old Lao ethnic hill tribesmen. And Dr. Charney performed his analysis and in the report it says, absolutely, positively, this is Daniel Borah.

And within a matter of weeks, we found the individual.

Senator McCAIN. Dr. Charney did state that according to using his procedure that that was, indeed, Captain Borah?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes. And we can provide that to the record for you.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ford, did the Department of Defense destroy any of the fingerprint files of the 271 missing Americans?

Mr. FORD. Not to my knowledge, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. Would you please research that and give us a more complete answer? There are allegations, as you know, that fingerprints have been destroyed by the Department of Defense. The response we have gotten from the Department of Defense is that that was done by the FBI. I would like an unequivocal statement about that, if you would, please.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. Senator, you're referring to the letter from the FBI suggesting that they were the ones responsible for the fingerprints.

Senator McCAIN. Yes.

Mr. FORD. If you're talking about malicious destruction, the answer is no. Since we're not responsible for fingerprints, what people did with them—officially, I think the answer is still no. But we'll double-check.

Senator McCAIN. I would like you to double-check, and even if it was not malicious, we should know because there is suspicion out there that needs to be resolved. Finally—because we have run way over time, Mr. Chairman, I not want to take up too much more time—is it true, Mr. Quinn, that the French Government has maintained that the Vietnamese repatriated French prisoners from the first Indochina war, as they agreed to? Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. QUINN. I don't know the answer to that.

Senator McCAIN. Would you have the State Department provide that for the record? As you know, there are significant allegations—in fact, most of us believe it is true—that the Vietnamese held back French prisoners of war after the Indochina war, and the counter idea, or statement by the French Government is that those that were left behind, such as those observed by Ms. Monika Stevens' husband, were those who voluntarily stayed behind and did not wish to return. I think it is a kind of an important point in the historical context, if you would provide us a response.

Mr. QUINN. Certainly.

[See letter on p. 669.]

Senator McCAIN. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very good request, Senator.

Senator Reid.

Senator REID. I apologize for not being here for most of the morning, Mr. Chairman, but I have been involved in a supplemental appropriation markup and also the Holloway conference which has been time consuming. I do have just a few questions, though.

One of the questions I have developed, in reviewing this material is, why have we not had, for lack of a better word, assets on the ground—people on the ground, spies, whatever we want to call them, wandering around trying to get information. It seems like

everything we are doing is, here we come, if you have anybody in prison, show us the prison. Do you understand what I am saying?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir. But that, quite obviously, any discussion of spies and espionage ought to be done in closed session.

Senator REID. OK. That will be fine. Mr. Chairman, I would like either the staff, when he has gone—I will just tell you myself. I would like next week, someone to come by that knows what has or has not gone on, and I assume that it could be either, and give that to me sometime at my office.

Mr. FORD. I would be happy to do that.

Senator REID. I look forward to that. What would it take, Mr. Quinn, to declassify the so-called road map? Would it take an act of Congress, would it take a Presidential order? What does it take?

Mr. QUINN. I will put this to people who are my superiors at the State Department and it would be their decision.

Senator REID. Their other classified things, how do we unclassify them or declassify them?

Mr. QUINN. The person who classified them in the beginning would make a judgment that the material is—no longer needs to be classified.

Senator REID. Who classified the road map?

Mr. QUINN. The senior most person who worked on it in the State Department at that time was Under Secretary Kimmitt. So he would probably be—

Senator REID. Kimmitt and/or his—is he still there?

Mr. QUINN. He's not. No.

Senator REID. So Kimmitt's replacement could declassify it?

Mr. QUINN. I presume so. I assume there will be a discussion with the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary about that.

Senator REID. That is why it is tough to declassify things. You never know where to go to declassify them. Right?

Mr. QUINN. Well, normally, the documents have an originator, who will be the person responsible for that.

Senator REID. I guess, Mr. Quinn, my question is as Senator McCain—and I think he speaks for the committee—we would like to have that road map be declassified, because everybody knows about it anyway, and there are people who think we are holding it back because there is some secret, conniving, deceitful stuff in the road map, there is not. At least that is my understanding.

So the question that I have and Senator McCain has—we want to get it declassified—how long is it going to take, what does it take?

Mr. QUINN. As soon as I go back, I will raise this issue to my superiors.

Senator REID. When can we expect to hear back from you on that issue alone?

Mr. QUINN. I would hope in a couple of days.

Senator REID. And that is whether or not it is going to be declassified, and if it is not, what would it take to declassify it?

Mr. QUINN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, just in answer to your other request on the DIA briefing, we have a briefing set up for next Wednesday, at 2:30, which will be a closed session, secret briefing from CIA. Mr. Gates will be there and other relevant people.

Senator REID. We will cover this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. We will also have NSA and DIA, and we will cover the—at least begin to cover the surface.

Senator REID. I have no further questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Before we move to the next panel—and gentlemen, I would like to ask you—this stuff kind of percolates out there and so, rather than let it percolate too much longer, what I want to do is have you remain here while Mr. Ustry reports back to the committee, and if there are glaring inconsistencies or problems that you see right away, as they come up we are going to deal with them right away, so we can kind of sift through everything.

A couple of quick housekeeping issues here. On the declassification of records in the POW/MIA cases, in the past you have said you do not want to declassify a lot of those, based on the need to protect the families. Clearly, a lot of the families do not feel they are being protected by it and they want it. Is that changed now or changing? What will happen in the next few days with respect to their requests and to declassification of those records?

Mr. FORD. Senator, to the best of our knowledge, and where we find it's not the case, we change it, we believe that the families have been provided every bit of information that we have in our files that has been sanitized, that pertain to their particular family member.

There is considerably more information available that is not correlated with their particular cases. It may have been 5 years before, 6 months afterward, whatever, but because it doesn't mention their loved one, it's not been provided to them in the past. We are trying to work out a system that gives the families more confidence they are seeing all the information that's relevant to them.

We do not have the details worked out. We are going to try to do that as soon as possible. I would suggest to you that we are thinking more in terms, at least at this point, in terms of keeping things classified, but with greater access than declassifying and providing it in unclassified form. We think that it probably answers their questions about confidence if they see the real material. We've just got to work out the details. Mr. Gates will be here.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you anticipate as a schedule for that?

Mr. FORD. The only schedule that I can give you—and it's not very good—is as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you keep the committee apprised of that effort, No. 1, and No. 2—

Mr. FORD. And before we make a decision, also I will be consulting with you, members of this committee to get your thoughts about it. If we're going to do something, let's do it that everybody, the families, the committee, the intelligence community, everybody feels comfortable with what we're going to do, and so we will not do anything precipitously that you don't know about.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if, as we proceed along here—as I think you have heard, a number of the committee members say in private meetings with you and publicly, that there is a feeling by the committee that a large amount of this information needs to be made public in order to deal with the questions people have and the doubts they have.

What would be the process, specifically, should the committee feel that there is information that must be made public, because we think it answers certain questions and the committee, as a whole, makes a judgment that we do not view something in there as compromising an interest? Who would we put that to and who will make the decision?

Mr. FORD. I'll have to find out for sure. I mean, the place to start would be to notify me, and then I would find whether it's Duane Andrews, who is the Assistant Secretary over at C3I or whether it's Mr. Gates, or whether it's NSA's director. Ultimately, the DCI is the one responsible for this material, and responsible to the President for its protection, and so that in many cases, we at Defense can't just simply, on our own accord, do that. And so, that—this is going to require discussions among the intelligence community and with us involved in POW/MIA.

I am confident that there is an awareness on the part of all officials that this is an issue that you're very concerned about and that we need to find some answers that resolve the families' concerns and your questions. We hope still that we can do that and, at the same time of course, protect sources and methods.

Our ability to continue to collect information for the families and for other intelligence projects require us to try to keep our sources and methods protected. We've used that more time than I would like to admit as an excuse, rather than as the real answer and I'm just simply telling you that we're going to—that's over. We're going to find a way to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. I appreciate that and I take that at face value. Let me make a formal request though, on behalf of the committee, that you could let us know, perhaps next week, if there is going to be the interagency review. Whatever is going to happen here, can we have a very specific statement to the committee of who will be part of that, and what we can anticipate as a protocol between us for that to happen, because we do not want to get trapped into where you have got to talk to them. Oh, well, it is fine by us. You have got to go back to them.

I think everyone on this committee has been through that before and the committee does not have time to do it and the process will not sustain that kind of process. So if you could tell us, Senator, if you have a request for declassification, it must come to me and I will process it through four or five people, and it will be returned to you and we know what is happening.

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that will be helpful.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just mention again in passing, if the DOD authorization bill is signed by the President, most of those impediments will be removed, because of the amendment concerning the requirement to declassify all possible information.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure he will sign it. The new position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs was first announced in July or August. It is now November, and we do not have one. This issue is a high priority. When will we have one?

Mr. FORD. The names of people that are being considered, are being checked and people are commenting on them. A decision is

expected soon. We have not waited for him or her. We have, in fact, begun the job of staffing that organization with the people that are also supporting me in our efforts in Southeast Asia and with this committee, in terms of requesting the personnel, getting people office space, office equipment. So it's not a matter of—four people are already assigned to the office. It's just a matter of getting all of that finalized. I wish—by the way, Senator, I wish it had been last week, or the week before. And I say that from the bottom of my heart.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made the determination with respect to the person alleged to be Mr. Stevens, in the two different photos of him at different times?

Mr. FORD. Do we have a definitive answer?

The CHAIRMAN. As to whether or not those two photos are alleged to be Mr. Stevens. Correct?

Mr. FORD. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those photos the same person?

Mr. FORD. I'll let Bob speak for himself. But my indication—the information I've received suggests that they are not the same person, other than the family's identification of them.

Mr. SHEETZ. And Mrs. Fleckenstein, Larry Stevens' mother, says that both are pictures of her son. Our experts that we've had look at it are unable to say conclusively whether it is or whether it isn't. The investigation continues nonetheless, as it has ever since the original photo was identified by the family members and the new photo came forward this summer. The investigation is continuing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to Mr. De Statte also, we did not take in the full evidence with respect to EC-47 and we want to do that, and the record will reflect the summary that you have. But in addition to that, I would like to be able to just follow up on that so that is part of the record. We do not need to deal in that now completely. But we do need to go back to that particular area.

With respect to the Soviet issue, does DIA routinely debrief Soviet defectors, to ask them about the possible presence of American POW's?

Mr. SHEETZ. I can't honestly answer that question. I've not been personally involved in debriefs of Soviet emigres.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not a matter of the protocol of the office, I mean, you do not do this automatically?

Mr. SHEETZ. We have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason you have not? Do you take the Soviet issues seriously?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do.

Mr. FORD. To be fair, Senator, Mr. Sheetz's office is focused on Indochina and not the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what about the allegations that people went from Indochina to the Soviet Union? Is that not being treated under the POW/MIA category?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. SHEETZ. And, indeed, we have done quite a bit of work with other intelligence agencies that have information on that topic. That might be another topic that we can get into at next Wednesday's session at 2:30.

The CHAIRMAN. We would appreciate it. I hope you will be prepared to bring us up to speed on that. That would be very helpful.

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be my last question. The then and now issue. We have a huge apparatus operating now on the POW/MIA issue. We have a lot of intelligence assets devoted to it. We have personnel devoted to it. The Secretary of Defense has personally interceded to fly people over to try to bring somebody back and so on. Bob Garwood did show up, after the fact and so, I guess, the question really is—and it is on a lot of people's minds—to what degree do you now state that the Defense Department's policy of 1973 was either in error, or a misstatement of one kind or another, that everybody was dead and they are all home?

I mean, if that policy were accurate, then why are we doing what we are doing today? It seems to me you cannot have it both ways. Either we say the likelihood is not only good, but it is real that we left some people behind and that is why we are doing it today, or this is a charade. It is one or the other.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I think that the history of this issue suggests that in the late 1970's, early 1980's, there was a clear—even then, there had begun to—evidence appear, that we had not, in hindsight, done all the things that we probably should have done at the time. And there was a new focus put on POW/MIA in the early 1980's. That the basic assumption of it was that there were, in fact, people alive in 1973, after Homecoming. And that—

The CHAIRMAN. What do you base that less than doing all we should have on? Was that exclusively America's desire to put it behind us, or was there more to it than that?

Mr. FORD. Now, that part of it I, personally, have not looked at. And the fact is that that is very important and relevant for this committee to look into. It is obviously a very historical interest.

The fact is that our efforts today are focused on are there still any alive Americans? And as I said earlier, as we go through the countryside—remember, we did not have much access to Indochina, directly, really prior to 1987. There were bits and—there were times when we had a little bit. But sustained since 1987 we have had considerably more access than we had before, both in Vietnam, and also to Laos, and now, more recently, Cambodia. As we have been able to get more information, talk to more people, begin to put the pieces of the puzzle together with 20/20 hindsight, each time, each year, more information becomes available it looks like there was, in fact—the evidence suggests that there were people, probably alive in 1973.

And it is certainly whether or not there were or not, we have, since the early 1980's, operated under the assumption that there were. And that since we cannot know for sure—although the evidence may lean one way or another—we operate that there could be Americans there. And if that is the case, they were left after 1973. And we are going to continue to do everything we can to find if that is the case.

In fact, for most of us, of course we hope it is—despite all the hardships that they may have—lived through.

The CHAIRMAN. Now if that is true—and I accept—I mean we are all operating under that presumption—should not the Secre-

tary of State or somebody be sitting down with the Laotian Government and saying hey, folks, you know, give us an opportunity to fly over—to have a—I mean join us in this—they want something for it. Is there not a capacity here to put some kind of a negotiation on a higher level, and a more urgent basis that resolves this for America?

Mr. QUINN. The Secretary of State has done just that, Senator. In my testimony on the first day of hearings, I tried to go through and list all of the meetings that he has had with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, with the Laotian Foreign Minister.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, particularly with Laos is what I am saying. Because Laos seems to be the bigger question in many people's minds.

Mr. QUINN. The other side of that is that we are still viewed with very considerable suspicion by the governments in Laos and Vietnam. And particularly what has happened to Communist states in Eastern Europe, and, indeed, in the Soviet Union itself, is attributed by some of the leadership of those countries to actions by the United States of America—I mean that we somehow caused that to happen.

And so we find when we push for more access and to do those kinds of things—to fly around and fly over—a hesitation which I believe comes from many of the security agencies—this is my personal assessment—from the security agencies in those two countries, who would see, taking steps like that as being very dangerous for the survival of their party and control of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. I just wanted to lay it out for you, to give you a chance to answer what everybody asks as a question here. And we are obviously going to try to sort out that earlier part, and emphasize again there is a then and there is a now. And we are going to try to make judgments about both pieces of it, to the degree that we can.

Senator Smith, do you have anything else?

Senator SMITH. I think the conclusion that we all have to draw here, excepting your willingness, and I believe you to work with the committee to try to provide answers. As we move along, we also have to, I think, to do that. And picking up on what Senator Kerry said, if, in fact, statements were made by then-Government officials in 1973 that in some cases some people who were around then are still here. So there is some continuity still working the issue.

But if Government officials said that in 1973 that everybody is dead, and then we are now taking the position that we are not making that assumption. We are assuming some may be alive. Or, we are operating under that impression. Then I think all of you have to recognize in your position that there may be some who have a great deal at stake.

And I am not saying that people are alive today or not. But I am saying that they would have a great deal at stake, or a great amount of embarrassment to suffer if, in fact, they were wrong in 1973.

We already know they were wrong, because Garwood came out. But if we have to prove it again and again by having more people,

at least, whether they are discovered dead or alive after 1973, there would be some type of embarrassment obviously, to say the least.

And I think you should all keep that in mind as we proceed through this. And let me just, again, to tell you how I experienced it first-hand when I went to North Korea last summer. The first American of Senator or higher rank to set forth in North Korea, to the best of my knowledge. Government official, Mr. Kong, said to me, where have you been for the past 41 years? We have information on your missing.

He then turned over 11 sets of remains, and gave us—as I have already briefed both State and the Defense Department—he gave us substantial other information which you are moving on, and you are. And I give you credit for that.

But I think it is very important that we understand. And I think the question that Senator Kohl asked regarding the pilot, I think it is important to look back. I think we are going to have to do that. And the committee is going to have to do it. And I think you are going to have to do it. And I realize it is a big task. But I think that is going to have to be done.

Just a quick question, and it is meant only in terms of trying to show some spirit of cooperation—one of the things that Colonel Peck said, and again, it kind of refers to what you said, Mr. Quinn—he said one of his points was that we were divulging sources to the Vietnamese.

Is it not reasonable to assume that based upon the kind of answers and information that Mr. Grassley gave, and that I also asked you about, is it not reasonable to assume that reasonable people could conclude that that was, perhaps—that they were perhaps sources, even though under the definition as you have explained it, and I understand what you said, that they would not be sources under your definition?

But is it not reasonable to assume that that conclusion could be drawn by reasonable people; that that difference could be seen?

Mr. QUINN. I do not know what other information Mike Peck, or Colonel Peck could have been referring to. He, of course, had left the job by the time—

Senator SMITH. He simply said sources were provided to the Vietnamese.

Mr. FORD. If he did that, it was his responsibility. If source information was released to the Vietnamese today, this man right here, at least in a management sense, would be responsible for it. And he holds Colonel Peck's job. So that if Colonel Peck says sources and information were passed, he was our expert on deciding to make sure that did not happen.

Senator SMITH. Well, Mr. Quinn testified he did that on his own and accepted responsibility for it. So I do not think you can blame Colonel Peck for that.

Mr. FORD. That was after Colonel Peck left.

Mr. QUINN. Just real quickly, if I could say, I did not give one word of information to the Vietnamese that the Defense Intelligence Agency people said I should not. Every word that was given to them was cleared with the DIA.

Senator SMITH. I understand that. You made that clear, and I agree with you.

I have two, quick points. I want to touch on the fingerprints, but I just want to ask Carl Ford one question.

You said on September 3, that no information from U.S. intelligence sources indicates that a movement of POW's from Vietnam to the U.S.S.R. occurred. Subsequent to that date, there have been a number of dramatic revelations, I guess, if you will. Whether it is true or not, we still have to determine.

But Terry Minarcin said a former national security analyst is being—is saying that he—that they tracked 22 Americans taken from Hanoi to the Soviet Union between December 1977 and January 1978; Jerry Mooney has made similar statements; the Soviet POW story in the Washington Post this week; the L.A. Times story about the KGB connection; comments from former KGB; and the fact from Bui Tin that Russians did interrogate.

So are you moving toward taking another look there?

Mr. FORD. We already are, Senator. We are taking a look, in fact. I tell my colleagues, this is one that is very personally important to me. My wife has recently read the Charm School and she does not even believe me anymore when she asks me about this. And so this is one that we definitely are following up—every particular lead that we get.

At the time I made that statement, that was my belief—that there was no information that demonstrated that to be the case.

Senator SMITH. A final point on that, and my final question of the afternoon to this panel is the issue of fingerprints.

You entered into the record a letter that came to Congressman Solarz from Bill Sessions of the FBI. And I have read that. And you offered it as a kind of an explanation of what happens in fingerprints. And I asked some questions at the last hearing about fingerprints.

It would seem to me that if we have 2,200 roughly, missing people, some are listed as KIA/Body not returned; some are POW's—there is only one, actual POW, but they are missing. And we are operating under the assumption that they may be alive, some of them may be alive.

Why would it be a policy—and I know this happened before your watch, but I am asking—and you did not do it, and I want to make that very clear, you did not do this—why would it be the policy of any of your predecessors to turn over fingerprints to the FBI for the purpose of keeping them 7 years and then destroying them on people that are missing? I mean what is the rationale for that?

Mr. FORD. There is no credible explanation, other than human error.

It was done—some of this was that we probably never did have all of the fingerprints simply because, as has been explained to me, some of them were not good enough. And when they were not good enough, they were not entered into the computer.

There are other cases that they may have made mistakes because they were KIA/Body not recovered. They may have said well, we do not need them anymore. I cannot, as far as I am concerned, every way I have looked in this I cannot find an explanation of why anybody would ever even think about destroying these fingerprints.

Senator SMITH. And again, I know you did not do it. And I want to make it very clear, and I want to talk—and I plan to talk to the FBI about this as well. And I will be very brief here, Mr. Chairman.

In the letter from Bill Sessions, he indicated that the 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DOD in 1984—and they were identified to DOD as being—by DOD as Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.

Those records were provided in 1984. Assuming they did not break the law and stuck with—the FBI, that is—and stuck with the law of destroying those fingerprints in 7 years, that means that those fingerprints were destroyed in 1991—which is as the height of all of the controversy on photographs and people. And I guess I would ask if you know whether or not the FBI did, in fact, destroy those 1984 files. If you do not, fine. We will take it up with the FBI. That is—

Mr. FORD. I do not know exactly, Senator. We will ask the FBI. But my staff points out that last year over 700,000 fingerprints last year were rejected by the FBI, that they were not legible.

Senator SMITH. That point is so interesting, and again, it has to be taken up by the FBI. But they are sending the fingerprints back to you because they are illegible fingerprints that they plan to destroy in 7 years. So they are not legible enough to destroy.

Mr. FORD. My understanding is that these should not have been destroyed after 100 years. I mean the fact is that these were people that were clearly unaccounted for, and would be in a crucial part of the identification process. If they were destroyed, it seems, my guess—not knowing all the details—that there were a number of these, unfortunately, fingerprint cards that were not legible. And they did not get entered into the computer.

Senator SMITH. A final point, I guess I just do not understand whoever made that decision in 1984.

Mr. FORD. We would like to find it, whether it is in Defense or wherever, we would like to find that, too.

Senator SMITH. As I understand it, what happened—I mean what would have happened—what would have had to have happened is that somebody would go through, assuming these files were all sent over there, 2,100-and-some files, personnel files, and literally, leaving everything else out, just pick up the files and saying look. Where are the fingerprints? Let us see. And then taking them out, taking the fingerprints out and destroying them, or at least identifying them to be destroyed 7 years hence.

It just seems to me a bizarre thing. I mean to me, a fingerprint is just as important as some other data that may be in the file.

Mr. FORD. Even more important.

Senator SMITH. Exactly. So I will take this up with the FBI. And I appreciate your candor on it. I just do not understand the rationale. But I assume it is not being done now, correct? We are not sending them any fingerprints to the FBI? Well, we have already done it, so you do not have any more.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

As sometimes trivial as some of the areas may seem to some, they are the stuff that has given credence to people's sense of

either wrongdoing, or conspiracy, or confidence, or whatever it is people may feel about this.

And again, I think if the committee is going to be true to its charter to try to leave no stone unturned, we are going to spend the time to go through that, and ultimately, hopefully, be able to just show what is appropriately debunkable, and what is human error, and what is not. And those are the judgments we are going to have to try to make.

My final comment as we break with this panel is a reiteration of what I said previously. I know it is unpleasant. I know that all of you and the people that work with you sit here and say this is, you know, kind of crazy to be going through this 20 years later, and to have to make your credibility a certainty to people.

But I want you to know that I think it is important. We all understand why we are here. And I think the process will be strengthened by virtue of it.

So as uncomfortable as it may be, I think it will ultimately contribute to people's faith, hopefully, depending on the job we do, and the judgments that we make, that we have put this thing back on the level that it ought to be.

So I appreciate it. And I want to thank you for that. I do ask you to stay, because we have allegations and perceptions that are going to be forthcoming. And we want you to be able to respond to those. And I think it is very important to the committee to try to sort that out also. So if you would—could we call Mr. Usry back? Tracy Usry, and if you gentlemen could just stay, because if we come to the point here we would like to ask some questions, we would like to be able to.

The reporter has been going for hours. I have almost—and we have gotten so carried away with this we have not even broken for lunch, and we have barely even had a moment for people to have a personal moment. So why do we not take a 5-minute recess here while the reporter changes tapes and people have a chance to take a breather.

We will stand in recess for 5 minutes.

[Whereupon the committee recessed for 5 minutes.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Will you raise your right hand?

[Witness sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Usry, welcome back. We are glad to have you back and appreciate your responding to the committee's request and Senator McCain's request for additional detail.

I must say I do wish on the committee's behalf that we had had your statement before 10 this morning so that we could have perused it a little more. Obviously, each of us has been here at the podium the whole time, so none of us will have read it and had a chance to really go through it.

Notwithstanding that, we will try to do the best we can, and I have asked—I do not see them here at this moment, but I take it they are out there and they will be here for your testimony so that we can have some response, and so do you have an opening statement that you want to make today?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Go right ahead.

[The prepared statement and exhibits of Mr. Usry may be found on pps. 53-105 of the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF TRACY USRY, STAFF MEMBER, SENATOR HELMS

Mr. USRY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, let me again thank you for this opportunity to address you today. I will address your questions from last week in the order they were asked, citing the page and line number of the transcript of last weeks' hearings which correspond to each request to us, and then I will prepare or provide the appropriate answer.

Question 1, Senator Kerry: "But in fact, it is true, is it not, that nine Americans were turned over to the U.S. in 1973 from Laos who were nominally Pathet Lao prisoners? Those were as repatriated from Laos."

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record a copy of a document from the Defense Intelligence Agency dated 7 December, 1977, addressed to Capt. Raymond A. Vohden, U.S. Navy, Principal Advisor Office of POW/MIA Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the subject is Pathet Lao knowledge on U.S. prisoners, and basically the correspondence provides a summation of information held by DIA regarding the degree of knowledgeability possessed by the Pathet Lao on U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the document?

Mr. USRY. It is enclosure A to your copy of the report.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would that be? Can you help me out?

Mr. USRY. In the back, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the first document, enclosure A?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir. Should I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Go ahead.

Mr. USRY. The nine U.S. personnel who had been captured in Laos and who were released in Hanoi during Operation Homecoming were all captured by North Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and moved to North Vietnam for detention.

The CHAIRMAN. That is sort of the same thing I was saying, is it not?

Mr. USRY. I'm not disagreeing with you, sir. I'm just providing the documentation we used to state what we did in the report.

The CHAIRMAN. But what you had said was that none were turned over.

Mr. USRY. Excuse me?

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I had asked the question is I thought you had said in your report that none were turned over.

Mr. USRY. No, sir. What we said was that the nine people that were released during Operation Homecoming were not in the hands of the Pathet Lao but in fact had been taken by the North Vietnamese and released to—captured by the North Vietnamese and transported to Hanoi and released by the North Vietnamese during Operation Homecoming.

There was nothing in our report that would indicate that the Pathet Lao themselves had ever released any American POW's that they had captured. So those nine people that are referenced routinely were in fact, according to the document that we read, captured by the North Vietnamese, transported to Hanoi at some

point in time, and then eventually released during Operation Homecoming by the North Vietnamese.

Senator McCain. The only point is, they were officially released by the Pathet Lao at the Homecoming. They were given to the Pathet Lao, even though the witness is correct when he states they were captured by the Vietnamese. They were carefully and categorically placed as releasees by the Pathet Lao.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. USRY. Question 2, Senator McCain: "So your allegation that the two Thai special forces identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate is false?"

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record a declassified sanitized U.S. Air Force message date and time group 052635 Zulu March 1973 from 13th Air Force Clark Air Base, Philippines to AIG7819. This is a Homecoming Air Force message, special report 007, subject, debriefing.

The message relates to the debriefing of two Thai military returnees by U.S. personnel. The returnees identified North Vietnamese personnel who dealt with POW's. The identifications were made by picking out photographs from the DIA publication, North Vietnamese Personnel Associated With U.S. POW's. The Thai identified 13 North Vietnamese who dealt with American prisoners of war as guards, interrogators, or those who were involved with the torture of U.S. prisoners.

The second portion of the document references the two Thai personnel selecting photographs of approximately 300 U.S. personnel with whom they were imprisoned. The photographs were selected from Volume 1 of the DIA pre-capture photographs of missing in action in Southeast Asia. The photographs identified, according to the message, were of personnel all listed as returnees during Operation Homecoming.

In Section 3 of the report it states that the Thais also identified personnel from the photograph volume provided by DIA who were not listed on the list of returnees. They are as follows: Charles E. Shelton, Edwin B. Templin—

The CHAIRMAN. We can read those.

Mr. USRY. And, of course, James Dooley.

Question 3—

Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry. Explain to me, I guess—and I don't mean this to be facetious, but so what? I mean, tell me what you are saying here.

Mr. USRY. Well, what I'm doing, sir, is replying to the questions that were asked.

Senator Reid. I understand that, but what is your reply. Just tell me.

Mr. USRY. Well, in essence the question was whether or not the information we had concerning Dooley that we referenced in our report was available, or was it just a false accusation on my part, and all I was doing now is presenting that documentation in which we used to formulate the position that we took.

Senator McCain. Do you think it would have been fair to mention the fact that it was in a list of many other names, none of whom have ever been reported, or who have been found or returned? Do you think that would have been a more complete pic-

ture of the situation? Because obviously the Thais went through hundreds of pictures and picked out, what, a dozen there, none of whom have ever been accounted for. Do you think that would have been more appropriate and a fair presentation of the facts?

Mr. USRY. I think what was appropriate was the position that we put out initially, Senator, which was there was some concern for the accuracy of the intelligence analysis concerning the whole Dooley and Hickerson issue, and the specific question or statement made to me last week is that the information I was providing was false, and all I'm simply trying to do is present that information that is available, or that was available at the time we drafted the report that we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, you're saying they picked out a group of people among whom was Dooley, is that accurate?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, that is my understanding from reading the document.

The CHAIRMAN. The document, again, is where?

Mr. USRY. That would be enclosure B in the back of my statement that you have.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand. Do I have all of document B?

Mr. USRY. I'm going to look and see exactly what was provided to you right now.

Senator REID. Document B has three pages—enclosure B.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, I have a document B.

Senator REID. It has three pages.

Mr. USRY. On the second page of enclosure B is a list of names.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, I am with you. I have got a list of names, all right. Where does it say that the Thais identified anybody on that list?

Mr. USRY. If you go back to the previous section, and I will read it verbatim to you—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can read it. At least, I think I can read. I am just trying to find—

Mr. USRY. On the second page, on section 2, it starts with SNF. During this debriefing the two returnees were also shown Volume 1, and in there it indicates that they picked out the listed personnel as also individuals they had seen, and these personnel were not reflected on the returnee list on Operation Homecoming.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Paragraph 2, during the debriefing of two returnees, and those returnees are?

Mr. USRY. Those were Thai special forces personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I just want to understand it.

So it says they were cooperative and enthusiastic in establishing a ready—or a reliability by identifying nearly 300 personnel who were on a list of returnees from the DIA photo album.

Senator REID. Maybe that word isn't, reliability. What is that word?

The CHAIRMAN. A ready ability by identifying nearly 300—the following personnel were identified by photos and do not appear on the list, and that was Dooley. So in other words—OK, fair enough.

Senator REID. Apparently, somebody saw a bunch of prisoners or pictures, and some of these people in the pictures supposedly didn't come home, is that the story?

The CHAIRMAN. That's interesting. So these folks were picked out as having—they recognized them, who they were, but that they hadn't come back on the list of returnees in Operation Homecoming.

Mr. USRY. I would basically state both you and I are making the same assumption. This is the assumption we drew from the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. USRY. Question 3, Senator McCain: A U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi. Who was that POW? Let me go on. So his allegations, basically, Mr. Chairman, has been relayed to him with no basis of fact.

Again, what facts do you have to back up your allegation that a U.S. POW had been repatriated who said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi, and under enclosure 3 there is an electrical message or a copy of that which puts forth the information that we related. Enclosure C.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you not think, Mr. Usry, again, as with the previous statement, it would have been more appropriate for you to report that he said he either read it on the wall or heard the name? Wouldn't that have been more appropriate in your report?

Mr. USRY. No, Senator, I don't necessarily agree with that statement.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does it say that?

Mr. USRY. I'm going to read that to you.

The CHAIRMAN. He either saw the name on the wall or was told about the name.

Mr. USRY. Now, what I would like to make interesting—

The CHAIRMAN. Can I ask you something? Let me just follow up, because I don't want Senator McCain to be alone in sort of questioning that. I mean, my reaction is, that's pretty significant, if you're going to say something was seen on a wall, but his memory was that somebody might have mentioned it to him. I'm not saying it puts everything in doubt here. It's just a question of how you come at this.

Mr. USRY. Well, I would like to reference our basic report again to see exactly what the wording was, and I will pull a copy if you will just wait a moment. I believe that was Section 5.

[Pause.]

Mr. USRY. That is Section 6.

Senator MCCAIN. It says he saw Dooley's name on the prison wall in Hanoi, period, 6-3, the second paragraph.

Mr. USRY. I'm sorry, paragraph what?

Senator MCCAIN. The second paragraph from the bottom on page 6-3.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that has an impact whether he heard the name from another person or saw it on a wall? I mean, isn't there a fundamental distinction in fact there?

Mr. USRY. No, I don't believe necessarily there is. I honestly believe that what we're doing here right now is basically splitting atoms. May I continue for a moment?

Senator McCAIN. While we are here, could I go down one paragraph while we're on the same subject. In the next paragraph, it says in April 1989 former POW Hickerson: and therefore he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured.

I talked to Captain Hickerson last night and he was swimming out to sea, Mr. Usry, and I understand that is also in his debriefing. So there's not nitpicking here. Your statement is he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured. He landed on land, he ran into the water and was swimming, and then turned around and came back. That is his words, and I understand that that's part of his debriefing when he came out. I hope you will correct that in future reports.

Mr. USRY. Well, Senator McCain, if you look at what was provided to us by the family members, and there are enclosures in my statement that concern that where Commander Hickerson—or, I'm sorry, Captain Hickerson landed and was basically on the end of more or less a peninsula, and when he went swimming, he went swimming back toward the land area, not actually out to sea. Anyway, this is the information we worked on.

Senator McCAIN. You say he could not have been swimming. He did go swimming.

Mr. USRY. I will grant you that, and I will ask you this question. Is—if—the issue whether he went swimming the important issue, or is the issue that the accuracy of the analysis does not match what happened to him by his own words in a letter that he provided to a family member?

Senator McCAIN. I think it's very important that the JCRC later after review indeed said that it was not the case that the refugee was confused in the shoot-down between Hickerson and Dooley. Did you know that?

Mr. USRY. I don't understand what you're saying, actually.

Senator McCAIN. After further evaluation, the analysis of the refugee's report by JCRC, after their initial finding that the refugee had been confused with Captain Hickerson's shoot-down, the JCRC later issued a reevaluation saying that they did not believe that he was confusing it with Captain Hickerson's shoot-down and capture. Did you know that?

Mr. USRY. I think we're talking about the same documents that we have, but what I don't understand is are you saying—and I'm not playing—

Senator McCAIN. What I'm saying is the initial analysis, we're saying this refugee had confused Mr. Hickerson, that it might be Dooley. Later they thought it was Hickerson.

Mr. USRY. So the refugee—

Senator McCAIN. The refugee was even a year off, Mr. Usry. You don't highlight that. He has it in 1968. I mean, he thought it happened a year later.

Mr. USRY. So what are you telling me? Are you telling me the final decision by JCRC is that shoot-down does not apply to Commander Hickerson?

Senator McCAIN. No. I'm saying that they originally said that it was Dooley, and then they reevaluated it and said that it was probably not. It's my understanding that there was a broad spectrum of information that they have to go by.

Mr. USRY. I agree with you, but what I'm trying to point out is when they made the final evaluation and said what they had said initially was that it was Dooley, or could have possibly been Dooley.

However, their final decision or determination was that it was Hickerson is what we take exception to, and we base that exception on what was provided to the family members and as well as what Commander Hickerson—or, I'm sorry, Captain Hickerson provided in a letter to the family members, and that's why we're saying that there is a difference.

The CHAIRMAN. But you see, the reason it's important, Mr. Usry—and I want to absolutely assure you you are not being singled out here, but you've got very specific stuff you're putting in front of the committee, and if somebody is asserting that it is not in fact, fact, and that it is specific, we have got to sort out, because it bears on the particular case interpretation, and I accept, I'm impressed by the Thai observation and that the Thai makes a statement, and that's good documentation.

The problem is here in the report, which is what a lot of people have been going on lately, you really do have a couple of statements there that vary from what somebody who is looking at this neutrally or something might say.

I mean, if I read that they either saw his name written on a wall of the cell or heard it from someone else, I'm going to have less weight attached to that particular case analysis, because, or hearing it from somebody else means it's 50-50 or less that he saw it on a wall.

You have asserted that he saw it on the wall, and I read it to the family, he saw it on the wall. I mean, that was part of my judgment that it was a strong point. But in fact, that's not so.

Likewise, swimming out to sea. When I read this and it said, he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured, I have no notion that he might have been swimming elsewhere. I just have a sense that he wasn't swimming out to sea, he was elsewhere, and in fact your report sort of infers that when he was shot down he was in a different locale sort of altogether.

In his statement, Hickerson pointed out he landed on the inside of the peninsula and therefore couldn't have been swimming out to sea. I mean, do you see what we're saying? It leaves you questioning whether you really have facts here or you have tidbits of evidence that might, with further investigation, lead you to be able to draw the conclusion you've drawn but don't yet allow us to. That's the issue.

Senator McCAIN. And Mr. Chairman, could I just add one other thing. Again, would it be more appropriate in a statement of a report to say that the Thais identified this man as having been seen along with 10 or 11—I have not counted the other names—none of whom we have ever been able to account for?

I think that that puts it in a kind of a context the Thais were looking at volumes and volumes of pictures, and so I just think that it might be a clearer picture if it was mentioned that they identified him along with about 10 or 11 others, none of whom, unfortunately, tragically, we have ever heard from again. But please respond, Mr. Usry.

Mr. USRY. I don't really know if I have a response. I think what we're discussing here, especially in this last instance that you brought up, is a style of writing. If you take exception to the style of writing that is in this report, there's really very little that I can do to answer that. This was a final report that was approved, and that is what was published.

Senator McCAIN. I'm sorry, I wasn't talking about a style of writing, Mr. Usry, but if that's the conclusion you draw, I think you've answered the question.

Senator REID. The question I have, though, are you talking about style of writing, your writing? Is that what you're talking about?

Mr. USRY. This is a cumulative report worked on by several persons.

Senator REID. Let's talk about style of writing here on page 18.

Mr. USRY. Of what?

Senator REID. Of your statement.

Mr. USRY. Just a minute.

Senator REID. And that is on this organized crime business. Is there any—how are we going to find out about this organized crime figure? I mean, one of my prior lives I spent a lot of time dealing with organized crime, and I know a little bit about it. Now, who is this organized crime person?

Mr. USRY. I would be more than willing to discuss that in a closed session, if you like. I've no objection to that. I think that would be best addressed at that time.

Senator McCAIN. Why is that necessary?

Mr. USRY. Because as we indicated these were problem areas that we were not able to finish investigating. It, however, came up during the time frame we were conducting our inquiry, and because of that mentioning these people—and I really have no problem with the known organized crime figure, because this person has been linked with organized crime, but in discussing that, then we're going to get into the member of the White House National Security Council and a high-ranking member of the POW family—POW family organization, and I think it really would be best for all considered to discuss that in a closed session.

Senator McCAIN. If we do not—though if we do not talk about it in open session, then anyone who is a member of the White House National Security Council staff is now under suspicion, and any prominent and high-ranking member of the POW family organization is now under a cloud of suspicion.

Would it not be more fair to identify the document and identify these people rather than make—I mean, if I were a member, a high-ranking member of a POW family organization or a member of the National Security Council, I think I would want to get this resolved publicly.

Mr. USRY. Well, I will defer to the chairman at the time, and I believe that would be Senator Smith. I'm more than willing to provide that information in closed session and let you make the decision as to whether or not you want to discuss it openly, unless you tell me I have to discuss it openly, and then I will.

Senator McCAIN. I do not say you have to do anything. I just think it is fair.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, this was a question I wanted to pursue. I came in late, so I did not know whether we were going through this front to back, but by this inference and these conversations I guess I am trying to understand why organized crime would be involved. Is there a drug connection here somewhere, do you think, or what is the implication of all of this?

Mr. USRY. Senator, we have no idea why they're involved. We only know the individual that maintained the diaries and what he had done in another issue, as far as what may be the reason that they're involved, but again, we were not able to look into this totally simply because the assets were not available. That is why we listed it as a problem area that we had not finished looking at, and I don't really know whether it's drugs or anything else, honestly, but there is information that exists that shows exactly what I had indicated in my statement.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I am sure that at some point we will take a look at it simply because I think once this kind of statement is made publicly, then everybody does try and second-guess either who is involved or why, and I find it really very hard to have these sort of things on television with, sort of, an unclear focus on how we are going to handle it, or what is out there.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlelady would yield, I can say that if we do this in closed session, I am going to make this public anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask a question.

Senator REID. Senator McCain, because this is in relation to a question that you posed, if we do have this in closed session I am going to make this public anyway, because we cannot have the State Department, the White House National Security Council, and one of these POW family organizations being part of organized crime. I think it would be to everyone's best interests if it were made public now.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask a question, if I can, before I try to make a judgment on that. A "known organized crime figure," by whose judgment is that determination made?

Mr. USRY. That was information provided to us by personnel from the Department of Justice as well as the individual who provided the information to us initially, and I might add that all of that information is presently available in the archives of your subcommittee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I am familiar with that, but I want to know—you see, we did not make it public.

Mr. USRY. No, sir, I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. So that is one reason that my mind has gone clickety here is that there is a reason why we did not, and therefore I am a little reluctant here now to do this. I want to ask, is that as a result of investigative work that was done by Jack Blum?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is a memo to the file that Mr. Blum made, is that what you have taken this from?

Mr. USRY. I guess you would call it a memo to file, yes, sir. I mean, we saw excerpts.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but it was not part of any final report that my subcommittee issued?

Mr. USRY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So for whatever reasons we chose, that we did not have enough information, or it wasn't relevant, or for some reason, it wasn't included in the report.

Mr. USRY. I would imagine so.

The CHAIRMAN. The known organized crime figure is so designated by the Justice Department?

Mr. USRY. That's the information that I was provided when I asked about the name.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, look—

Mr. USRY. And I'm just going again by what we were told, and that is why we put it in as a problem area that we were not able to pursue.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me, so that the committee is not put in the position of doing injury to some member of the administration who met with somebody who might not be, in fact, an organized crime figure, and then their name is dragged into this and the person's name is, or that it isn't relevant somehow to this particular inquiry, I would really like to see the committee look at that particular file, without doubting what Mr. Usry is saying, but make a sensible judgment about it.

This inquiry doesn't end here today. There's no reason that we have to rush to put people's names in the spotlight if they don't belong there, and I'd like to see the committee be cautious about that, and so I'd rather wait, if you don't mind, but I agree in principle with what the Senator from Nevada is saying, which is that if it is relevant, and if there is some reason that the meetings took place and they had something to do with what Mr. Usry is saying, obviously it ought to be public at that point.

But why don't we make a judgment on that, if the Senator is willing to. I don't want to cut the Senator off at all, but I think it would be wise to do that.

Senator SMITH. I would concur with that. I think it is better to err on the side of caution.

The CHAIRMAN. And then we can proceed. I think this is your inquiry at this point in time. I do not have any questions now.

Senator REID. We interrupted Mr. Usry.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Usry, you were going through, I believe, your presentation point by point. Is that accurate?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Senators are going to take liberties as we go on, just so that it is all clear, so if you would pick up where you left off, that would be fine. I am going to let Senator Smith Chair here.

Mr. USRY. I'm on Question 4, Senator McCain: "I see, and finally a communist propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi, dated after Dooley was shot down, shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley. Do you have knowledge of that further, and yet the DIA and no Government agency has that photograph, according to them?"

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record the following, and again, that is an attachment or an enclosure to my statement. It is the next enclosure.

Senator SMITH [presiding]. Is that D?

Mr. USRY. Yes, that would be enclosure D. What I offer is a DOD Vietnam information form dated September 17, 1970, showing that Mr. Henry E. Dooley and wife identified photograph number 46, shown to them by DOD personnel as possibly being their son, Lt. James Dooley; a second document entitled, photo comparison analysis results of a Christmas 1969 photo dated 1 February, 1971, reflecting a comparison of two pre-capture photographs of Lieutenant Dooley with the same photo identified as Christmas 1969 film number USN number 46, the results of which were inconclusive, unable to judge.

Senator MCCAIN. So would it not, again, have been helpful that if you had put down in your report that the results of the analysis of the photo were inconclusive?

Mr. USRY. I don't believe I said that the results of the photo were conclusive, just that there was a questioned photograph.

The question that was put to me was that—or the statement that was put to me was that the Government, the DIA, nor any other Government agency, had that photograph, and what I'm submitting is that photograph originated with the Government.

Senator MCCAIN. And that photograph was inconclusive, and so therefore they don't know whether that photograph was of Mr. Dooley or not, so how could they carry it as being of Mr. Dooley?

Mr. USRY. Senator, I was addressing the question you asked me.

Senator MCCAIN. About the picture, which is supposedly—which some people believe might have been Mr. Dooley. After analysis by DIA it was ruled as inconclusive, isn't that correct?

Mr. USRY. Which to me would mean that there it either is or isn't. There's really no way to tell.

Senator MCCAIN. So if it wasn't, or it either is or isn't, then they can't attribute it as being of Mr. Dooley, since it was inconclusive. Please proceed.

Mr. USRY. I am told that the DIA also maintains a complete casualty file of each individual missing. If that is, in fact, true, then the position that that photograph did not come from either DIA or any other Government agency is not an accurate position, and that, again, more than demonstrates part of the problem that exists concerning the POW issue—that there are inaccuracies from the Government.

Now, even more so. The Dooley family was shown the photograph in the latter part of 1970. There was no analysis requested by the Department of the Navy until February 1971, which is over 4 months after the initial viewing. It is our position that certainly is not what we would call an expedited concern, and also as far as we're concerned shows a lack of compassion for the families, or it certainly did at that time.

Question 6, Senator McCain: "Like your trip to Thailand that you just took. Tell me about your trip, would you, Mr. Usry?"

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, during the latter part of July of this year Congressman Clement arranged for one of his constituents to provide to myself and staff of Senator Grassley what Congressman Clement's constituent felt was compelling information concerning live Americans being held in Southeast Asia.

Judge Hamilton Gayden provided documentary and physical as well as photographic evidence depicting what he thought were live

American POW's being held in Southeast Asia. The most compelling evidence was that of a photograph of a caucasian male and oriental female which according to Judge Gayden was Lt. Comdr. Larry J. Stevens. Stevens was declared MIA during the war in Southeast Asia.

Since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Grassley's staff had already initiated some photographic comparison in the case of Capt. Donald Carr based on photographs submitted by Mr. Jack Bailey, we felt that this evidence could also be analyzed in a similar way.

This information was discussed with the Minority staff and between July 30 and August 2, 1991 I traveled to Fort Collins, CO, to provide Dr. Michael Charney, a forensic anthropologist at Colorado State University with the questioned photograph as well as pre-loss photographs of Lieutenant Commander Stevens.

Dr. Charney, utilizing a procedure called computer superimposition, determined that the pre-loss photographs of Stevens matched the forensic profile of the questioned photograph provided by Judge Gayden. The computer superimposition process creates a computer-enhanced image of the face in question and the image of the pre-loss photographs. The images were then overlaid, or superimposed upon each other.

According to Dr. Charney, they aligned. Therefore, he determined the two individuals in the two photographs were the same person. According to Dr. Patrick Fitzhorn, a professor of mechanical engineering at Colorado State University who created the computer images of Carr and Stevens, these images were exact to 1/100th of an inch. Based upon this identification, on the 2nd of August I provided a briefing to Senators Helms and Grassley as well as to another Member of Congress.

Through the efforts of this other Member, a briefing for the Secretary of Defense was set for 5:30 p.m. on August 5 at the Pentagon. At 5:30 on August 5, myself and another Senate staff member and a House staff member were present at the briefing I provided to Secretary Cheney and two of his staff.

At this time, I would like to provide the same briefing that I did for Secretary Cheney.

Senator McCAIN. I think the first two charts are self-explanatory. Could I ask that chart 3—the defense witnesses say that Mr. Charney analyzed the photograph of Lieutenant Borah the same as he did the others, is that correct?

Mr. USRY. At the time we provided the briefing to Secretary Cheney, the analysis of Lieutenant Borah and the questioned photograph had not been completed.

Senator McCAIN. Has it been completed?

Mr. USRY. Yes, it has.

Senator McCAIN. He said that it is the same.

Mr. USRY. He later rescinded that and said he was incorrect.

Senator McCAIN. Well then, he rescinded it.

Mr. USRY. Yes, he did.

Senator McCAIN. After it became known that the photographs were probably fake?

Mr. USRY. No, not at all.

Senator McCAIN. And you did, of course, take into consideration when you presented this evidence the view of the—according to the Department of Defense people, the view of Sandia, the view of the FBI and the view of others, that Mr. Charney's work was not acceptable as evidence in their view.

Mr. USRY. At the particular point in time, Senator, that we provided this briefing, that other information was either not done, or if it was done, it certainly had not been made available to us.

Senator McCAIN. Well, do you have any opinion of the view of the FBI and Sandia and others about—since now you know that they believe that his methodology is not credible, at least that is the words of the Department of Defense, does that affect your opinions at all?

Mr. USRY. I agree totally with the Defense Department position that the photograph of Lieutenant Borah, or the alleged photograph of Lieutenant Borah, is not Lieutenant Borah, which was my position from the beginning, when I first dealt with the families.

Senator McCAIN. Now I would like you to answer my question. Does it change your view of the validity of Dr. Charney's conclusions due to the opinion that has been voiced by the DIA as reflecting the views of the FBI, Sandia, and others?

Mr. USRY. Not totally, no, sir. May I continue with my briefing?

Senator McCAIN. Please do so.

Mr. USRY. Chart 1, pre-loss photograph of Capt. Donald Carr, as well as a photograph provided by Mr. Jack Bailey which he indicates was taken in Laos and believes to be Donald Carr. Also on that particular page is another photograph showing what is purported to be the cage or area that Donald Carr is held in.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. USRY, I believe we are now going into our sixth hour. I am not sure that we really need for this intensive a review of what you presented to Secretary Cheney. I asked you to tell us about your trip. I think maybe that's a better response, if you just told us about your trip and got through the rest of this.

Mr. USRY. That would be fine, Senator. We traveled to Thailand. The team that we had requested be put together was in fact put together. The source was located after 3 days, I believe, and was ultimately polygraphed by a Department of Defense polygraphers. There were two there, so that everything would be finished at the particular point in time as the polygraph examination was completed.

Once the polygraph examination was completed, it was determined that basically the individual had no valid information and was lying about everything with the exception of him being Laotian and having two children. At that particular point in time, we departed the following day, came back, and that was the end of the trip.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. USRY. I would also like to add that the information that was provided to us, as well as the briefing that was provided to Secretary Cheney, was such that everybody was in agreement that the evidence as it was presented at that time was compelling enough to act upon and therefore it was, in fact, acted upon.

Do we want to continue with the discussion of Commander Hickerson, or have we pretty well resolved that?

Senator McCAIN. I am certainly satisfied.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask whether DOD or DIA folks had any questions or comments raised by the answer. Have they had a chance to read it?

Mr. SHEETZ. I have a fact sheet on the Dooley-Hickerson case that I would be pleased to make available at the appropriate time. [The information referred to follows:]

Attached is a Fact Sheet on the Dooley-Hickerson case based upon the Senate Foreign Relations minority staff report.

THE CASE OF LTJG JAMES E. DOOLEY, USN

BACKGROUND

On 22 October 1967, LTJG James E. Dooley was flying an A-4E aircraft which was hit by antiaircraft fire following a strike mission in Haiphong. Witnesses reported that LTJG Dooley's aircraft was streaming fuel and headed toward the Gulf of Tonkin, where it descended and crashed into the water just east of the Do Son Peninsula. There were no signs that LTJG Dooley ejected from the aircraft, no beepers were heard, and a thorough search revealed no sign of survival.

CLAIMS MADE IN THE MINORITY STAFF REPORT

The Senate Foreign Relations minority staff report claims that: a) DOD correlated a sighting report of the capture of an American pilot to returnee Capt. James Hickerson, USN, instead of LTJG Dooley, so as to consider the report resolved; b) "In 1973, a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi"; c) "Two Thai special forces' soldiers released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate" and; d) A communist photo of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi shows a partial profile of a person who "strongly resembles" LTJG Dooley.

FACTS

- The refugee report clearly describes the capture of CAPT Hickerson, whose own debriefing account of his capture closely follows the source's reporting.
- No returnee ever claimed to have seen LTJG Dooley's name on a prison wall.
- The Thai POW's did not identify Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate.
- LTJG Dooley is not depicted in any post-capture photographs.

ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS

The minority staff's "analysis" of the fore mentioned live-sighting report is a classic example of how raw reporting, without access to a data base of facts, can be misinterpreted. In this instance a Vietnamese refugee source interviewed by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in December 1986, reported firsthand information on the capture of a U.S. pilot in what he believed was October or November 1968. The source described seeing a man in a parachute land on the beach and attempt to evade by swimming out into the water. The source says the Vietnamese shot at the swimmer to limit his movement, and local forces swam out to capture the man. He also says that the pilot began firing at the Vietnamese and attempted to talk on a hand-held radio, but was unable to do so due to waves. He goes on to report that the pilot wore a one-piece uniform with a long zipper in the front and that the POW was blindfolded and his arms bound behind his back before he was loaded into a sidecar. He adds that he was later put in an automobile and driven away.

Based solely upon the loss location, time of day and month, JCRC originally believed the report could relate to LTJG Dooley; however, when the facts of CAPT Hickerson's capture were later brought to their attention (JCRC did not have access to his debrief) they reevaluated all reports from that area and rescinded their tentative correlation to LTJG Dooley, concluding that the source's information described CAPT Hickerson's circumstances of capture.

The minority staff says that CAPT Hickerson has provided a written statement of his capture, claiming "he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured," and refuting other points in the source's story. They say that "Hickerson was taken to prison riding on the back of a bicycle, not in a jeep as the fisherman described."

While DIA does not possess the alleged written statement from CAPT Hickerson to which the Senate staff refer, we do have the returnee's 1973 debriefing in which he details the events of his December 1967 capture. Upon returning to the U.S., CAPT Hickerson told debriefers . . . "he collapsed his parachute, he found himself face-to-face with about 100 civilian personnel. He immediately separated from the parachute and started running out into the shallow water, after going a short distance he detached his seat pack and commenced swimming seaward. About this time rifle shots started splashing in the water around him . . . "At this point Hickerson saw he was about to be captured so he pulled out his survival radio and sent the message . . . to his wingman. He then stopped, put up his hands and surrendered to the DRV swimmers." In his debrief CAPT Hickerson goes on to describe how he was stripped of his clothing, blindfolded, his hands tied behind his back and how he was put on the fender of a motorcycle and taken to the fishing village. Later that day he was also moved in the sidecar of a motorcycle, during which time he was seen by crowds of people who threw rocks and sticks at him.

While there are slight differences in the source's account and CAPT Hickerson's as reported in his debrief, the refugee report clearly refers to the former POW. It is noteworthy that the source was only 13 years old when he observed the event, and 19 years passed between the time he saw CAPT Hickerson's capture and the time he reported it to U.S. authorities.

As to the other points raised by the minority staff, DIA is not aware of anyone claiming to have seen Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell. This story appears to stem from a returnee who reported that another POW had mentioned seeing Dooley's name on a wall; however, the POW to which the story was attributed never mentioned Dooley in any manner in his debriefing or later interviews.

When shown a photo of LTJG Dooley, the two Thai soldiers released from Hanoi in 1973 were uncertain, saying they saw a similar face in 1968 at a prison known as the "Zoo." Based upon other information they furnished, it is clear that they saw another individual who subsequently died in captivity, but who bore a physical resemblance to the preloss photograph of LTJG Dooley they were shown. There is no information that points to LTJG Dooley's capture or to his being imprisoned at the "Zoo" or any other prison.

The minority staff also allude to a communist photograph of a profiled POW who resembles LTJG Dooley. We have no clue as to which photo they are referring. With one exception, every POW photograph from the war has been identified, and the one remaining unidentified photo is clearly not the missing Naval aviator. The plain facts are that DIA possesses no post-capture photographs that even remotely can be attributed to LTJG Dooley.

Senator SMITH. You in your travels, Mr. Usry, you were looking at both photographs, correct, both cases—both Carr, and who was the other one, Stevens?

Mr. USRY. No, sir, that is not correct.

Senator SMITH. I mean, Borah.

Mr. USRY. No. The only reason we went to Thailand was to deal with the Stevens photograph. The information that came to us concerning Stevens came to us from Judge Hamilton Gayden. The information that came to us concerning Borah also came from Hamilton Gayden, but since we had no firm identification at that time, it was felt to deal with that which looked most promising.

The photographs of Carr were provided by Colonel Bailey. However, Colonel Bailey was not forthcoming with any information concerning where Carr might be, and so we did not go to Thailand with any intention of determining anything about Carr. We provided the briefing to Secretary Cheney with the Carr photographs to show him the process. Our whole intent was to deal strictly with Stevens.

Senator SMITH. What is Charney's opinion of the Carr photographs?

Mr. USRY. According to Dr. Charney the photographs are of the same person.

Senator SMITH. And Mr. Ford indicated, I forget the exact language that was used, but compelling resemblance, but you had not ruled that out in this particular photograph and that that is a match, is that correct?

Mr. SHEETZ. That is right.

Mr. USRY. Would we like to continue. I would like to continue with those areas that I pointed out in my initial statement, that were areas that we were not able to proceed to because of asset problems. The first one which were attempts by the administration to infiltrate private activists groups, I believe the testimony of Mr. Sampley to this committee last week supports our position. However, I am offering additional documentation to support that position. This documentation will also support our next problem area list.

Two, illegal surveillance and investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. What page are you on?

Mr. USRY. 14.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say, and I am just reading your testimony on page 14, it says this live sighting report is definitely not that of Hickerson, as the Defense Department indicates. Correct. That is page 14 of your statement?

Mr. USRY. Yes sir. That is also what Captain Hickerson says in his letter and in his statement to me.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Can I ask who is responsible for the evaluation of that? Is that you Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. SHEETZ. That is my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you come up, do you mind. I am just trying to understand this. It inevitably puts both of you on the spot a little bit and I apologize for that, but I am truly trying to understand this, so the committee can really grapple with this, I mean what we have got here. And I just read it and I have a statement from JCRC to Commander naval military personnel, SOCOM, Special Operations Command. And that is an evaluation which was for NSC from Mr. Childress in January 1987 of the Dooley incident.

The next page, here on page 13, let me go back one page before that, excuse me. Go back before that report that has the evaluation. You had the Hickerson letter, To Whom It May Concern, my name is Capt. James Hickerson, USN, so forth and then he says, I do not believe the captured American pilot subject to the report was me. There are too many discrepancies between the JCR report and my capture.

(1) I was not shot down on 22 December—I was shot down on December—I think he means I was shot down—he says I was not, but I think he means, I was shot down on 22 December, not October or November. (2) My parachute was all white, not red, white and blue. (3) If I had landed 50 meters from an air field I would have been aware of it. (4) I swam no more than 50 yards, not 200 meters. (5) I did not attempt to use my pistol. (6) There were no waves. (7) I was transported away on the back of the bicycle, not in a side car and I was never in an automobile. (8) I was wearing marine fatigues, two piece, not a one-piece flight suit. (9) There was a solid, approximately 800-foot, overcast in the area, making it unlikely that five or six jets plus a helicopter would have been flying under an overcast that close to Do Son.

Despite the fact that the location and date of the described capture was approximately mine, considering the above, I do not believe that the captured pilot reported in JCRC report was me. Very respectfully, J.R. Hickerson, Captain, USN.

Now, has he ever changed that testimony? Are you aware of that?

Mr. SHEETZ. I have not seen this letter before. We've been working with his official debrief and that was done right after he came home when his memory was fresh. And that is the source material that has been available to us.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just add a little bit to this. I did talk to him last night. He is a friend of mine, and he said he was asked various questions. Was your parachute red, white, and blue. He said, no, et cetera. The fact is that the refugee cites this incident as being in 1968 and both Dooley and Hickerson were shot down in 1967. So I think it is a little bit hard and I believe that the refugee's reporting was some 19 years after the alleged incident.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. SHEETZ. The refugee was 13 years old at the time of the incident.

Senator McCAIN. 13 years old at the time of the incident?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the refugee, I am less concerned about. I am just trying to get to the letter.

Senator McCAIN. This is based on a refugee report. He was 13 years old at the time he made the report, 19 years later. So I think it is very understandable that there might be some problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this letter drafted by Captain Hickerson?

Senator McCAIN. It was solicited.

Mr. USRY. I believe it was solicited by the individual it was addressed to.

Senator McCAIN. By a family member.

Mr. USRY. I would like to comment, if I may, on Senator McCain's point. I think it is well taken. This is some 19 years later and this was our concern, that the individual was confused to a great degree. Yet it was finally determined to be Captain Hickerson, when it could just as easily have been someone else.

And that is our point. We are not necessarily saying, that this is, or that what the refugee saw was, in fact, a shoot down of Dooley. What we are saying is that what the refugee saw may not have been a shoot down of Hickerson.

The CHAIRMAN. Hang on one second, Mr. Usry. These folks know how many shoot downs there were at Do Son within that period of time. I mean, we know how many aircraft we lost. We know when a pilot went down. So it is either Dooley or Hickerson, I presume. Do you have another pilot that it might be?

Mr. USRY. I believe at that point in time there were four lost in that area from the documentation I reviewed. And they were able to determine in two of those instances, those referred to, there were two crashes in which there, and again, I am recalling from memory there were no bodies recovered or it was assumed that the pilot had, in fact, crashed because there were no parachutes seen.

Senator McCAIN. Was this 1968 or 1967, because the refugee said it took place in 1968?

Mr. USRY. Again, I would have to refer specifically to the document which I would be more than willing to do. I just don't have that particular document in my hand. But the point I am trying to make is, that I understand, there are some inconsistencies, as Senator McCain has pointed out.

The position we are trying to make is that, with those inconsistencies, it was still attributed the shoot down finally, final analysis by JCRC or the DIA, was that it was Hickerson. Our position is that that analysis was not correct and it could have been Lieutenant Dooley because that is still an unresolved issue.

Senator MCCAIN. In fact in your report you state that the description of events more closely resembles the capture of Hickerson.

Mr. USRY. That is based upon the preliminary findings of the JCRC in which they state other than the timeframe in which the shoot down was described by the source it closely resembles that of Dooley.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what do you say to that, Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. SHEETZ. Well, I would like to read a very short piece of text here, that is an extract from his debriefing report. I will give it to you in basically what are Hickerson's words. Upon returning to the United States, Captain Hickerson told de-briefers, "He collapsed his parachute. He found himself face to face with about 100 civilian personnel.

He immediately separated from the parachute and started running out into the shallow water. After going a short distance he detached his seat pack and commenced swimming seaward. About this time rifle shots started splashing in the water around him. At this point Hickerson saw he was about to be captured so he pulled out his survival radio and sent a message to his wingman.

He then stopped, put up his hands and surrendered to the Vietnamese swimmers. In his debrief Captain Hickerson goes on to describe how he was stripped of his clothing, blindfolded, his hands tied behind his back. How he was put on the fender of a motorcycle and taken to a fishing village. Later that day he was also moved in the sidecar of a motorcycle during which time he was seen by crowds of people who threw rocks and sticks at him."

The CHAIRMAN. That is his own words. His own recollection right after he came back?

Mr. SHEETZ. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what is there about the Dooley record that makes it similar from DIA's perspective. Originally DIA thought it was Dooley's shoot down?

Mr. SHEETZ. JCRC.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it that made them come to that conclusion?

Mr. SHEETZ. Based solely on the loss, location, time of day and month. JCRC believed the report could relate to Lieutenant Dooley. However, when the facts of Captain Hickerson's capture were later brought to their attention, they re-evaluated all the reports from that area, rescinded their tentative correlation to Dooley, concluding the source of the information described Captain Hickerson's circumstances of capture.

The CHAIRMAN. Now Mr. Usry, let me ask you, do you not think there are sufficient parallels between Mr. Hickerson's own account and a refugee of 13 years' ago account, that it would be improbable that another pilot had almost the exact same experience from shoot down into the water, capture, bicycle, so forth, bicycle slash sidecar; I mean is there not a probability of fact here that has to enter into this?

Mr. USRY. I believe with the probability factor that it could have been Hickerson, it could equally make it Dooley, I do believe.

The CHAIRMAN. What makes you say that?

Mr. USRY. Because when Captain Hickerson indicates to us, or to the family members, at the time he was asked, that he was not placed in a sidecar, he was not transported across an airport or an airfield, he was not put in a car, but in fact was taken a prisoner on a bicycle. That is an extreme difference. And because of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well Captain Hickerson's own words were just read to you. That is his own debrief. This was Captain Hickerson's own de-brief.

Mr. USRY. So then do we make the assumption that in 1989 he made a mistake and again on the 6th of March, 1990, when I spoke to him that he again made a mistake. I think the easiest way to resolve this particular issue concerning Captain Hickerson would be to ask him, exactly what he remembers now. If, in fact, we are incorrect, then we are incorrect, but if in fact we are not incorrect, then the question is still there.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Did—I do not see Captain Hickerson's signature on this letter.

Mr. USRY. I have it on the bottom in mine. It says, Very Respectfully, J.M. Hickerson, Captain USN, Retired, then it has J.M. Hickerson signed on it. You are looking at the text of my statement. If you look under enclosure F you will find an actual copy of the letter, with his signature.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me just point out Mr. Usry, that I think, frankly, Mr. Chairman, we are spending way too much time on this. We have got a lot of other areas to cover but the reason why we debrief immediately upon release, immediately before we go home, before we see families, you should know, this, Mr. Usry, is so that they can get the freshest facts that they possibly can about our experience in prison.

Now I am not saying that Mr. Hickerson is not telling the truth. In fact, I am convinced, I know absolutely that he is saying whatever is to the best of his recollection, but I would have a strong tendency as he would to rely upon his initial debrief back in 1973, rather than a recollection nearly 20 years later. I think that is the only point.

The CHAIRMAN. Well it is something we ought to try to nail down. Let us move on. We will try to reconcile it as we go along here. Does DIA have any questions about whether or not it might be Dooley today?

Mr. SHEETZ. No. We are confident that it is Hickerson.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator MCCAIN. From what I see, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure.

Mr. USRY. No. 2. Illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists of this issue by the Department of Defense. Mr. Chair-

man, I offer for the record several pieces of correspondence either originating from Mr. John R. Mead or addressed to him. The correspondence from Mr. Mead, in all instances, is addressed to various individuals within the U.S. Government to include the Attorney General of the United States, the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice, the Counsel to the President, as well as the Internal Revenue Service.

The correspondence to Mr. Mead is from various Government agencies indicating that they have received this correspondence and are acting upon it. Mr. Mead's correspondence addresses his concern with the administration (1) utilizing private organizations to spy on him, (2) conducting character assassination on him, and (3) the Defense Department conducting surveillance of him. He specifically identifies, at that time, Mr. Richard Childress of the National Security Council, as well as individuals affiliated with the Center for POW MIA Accountability Incorporated.

I would also like to introduce for the record a memorandum prepared by Dr. Harvey Andrews, a former member of Senator Grassley's staff, dated September 11, 1989. The memorandum addresses, Dr. Andrews has reviewed the file concerning Mr. Mead's allegations. I wish to also point out that Dr. Andrews is a retired defense criminal investigative service special agent with over 30 years of criminal investigative experience.

[See p. 48 of the appendix.]

Senator McCAIN. Excuse me, Mr. Usry, when were these letters written to Attorney General, Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice, et cetera and Counsel to the President and IRS?

Mr. USRY. They started in May 1984, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that in your report?

Mr. USRY. That is enclosure I.

The CHAIRMAN. No, your report originally.

Mr. USRY. No, sir, what we are addressing at this particular point in time, are those issues in my statement of last week, that we were not able to look into due to the non-availability of assets.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Usry, have there been any investigations conducted concerning these instances that Mr. Mead refers to?

Mr. USRY. Yes, that is what I was going to address now Senator.

Senator McCAIN. What has been result?

Mr. USRY. The resolution was, as far as we are concerned, incomplete simply because it was not referred to the proper agency. The Department of Defense did not deny that they had, in fact, conducted their surveillance. However, they said nothing illegal had occurred. The Civil Rights Violations were never referred to the appropriate agency for determination to begin with and that is what I would like to read to you.

Senator McCAIN. Since 1984 they have not been—

Mr. USRY. That is my, our understanding. May I read the document. On August 28, 1989, the Office of Public Integrity, Department of Justice was asked to produce its file on the investigation of a complaint filed by John R. Mead. Reference a local surveillance by DIA, et cetera, Mr. Jack Keeny produced a three-page declaration of prosecution based upon Mead's complaints stating that this paper summarized our enquiry.

Mr. Keeny would not allow the paper to leave this office. Upon review the declination paper was found to be a superficial enquiry of the complaint by Mead which was conducted by Defense Department's Oversight Office. DIA, through the Oversight enquiry never denied a surveillance of Mead but stated it had done nothing illegal. The portion of the complaint dealing with the Civil Rights Violation was not referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or was their any evidence that any other potential criminal violations in Mead's complaint were ever investigated by the FBI.

The paper was a self-serving document that cleared DIA of any wrongdoing. Mr. Keeny was asked to provide the full file on this matter and he said he would have to take it up with some unidentified office. Subsequently Mr. Keeny called and said the complete file would have to be withheld because of the Third Agency Rule and so after that time, to my knowledge, there has been no further pursual of Mr. Mead's allegations.

Senator McCAIN. And one of his allegations is that Mr. Childress was associated with an organization called the Center for POW/MIA Accountability, Inc., a supposed tax-exempt organization and they and individuals associated with the Center have engaged in attempted blackmail and extortion. After receiving approval from Mr. Childress for their travel, that is the allegation, here, that I read.

Mr. USRY. Those originated from Mr. Mead, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. The obviously very serious part of his allegation is that Mr. Childress, who was then a member of the National Security Council directed the Center for POW/MIA Accountability, Inc., and individuals to engage in blackmail and extortion of Mr. Mead, is that correct?

Mr. USRY. As Mr. Mead put it, yes. That is one of several documents that he offers indicating what he felt were improprieties or illegalities.

Senator McCAIN. Do you know anything about this Center for POW/MIA Accountability, Inc.?

Mr. USRY. I know very little about them, Senator. I do believe that, that is the same organization or corporation that Mr. Sampley also referenced that had hired him, but I am not sure on that. I believe it is the same one.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the gravamen of your allegation regarding this?

Mr. USRY. Simply that it was not proceeded to its logical conclusion. It is my understanding that Civil Rights Violations are the principle responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not vouching for the authenticity or validity thereof?

Mr. USRY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just saying it was not investigated?

Mr. USRY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That should be easy enough to ascertain.

Senator McCAIN. Do any of the DOD witnesses here know anything about the Center for POW/MIA Accountability, Inc.?

Mr. SHEETZ. I do not, but there is something else I would like to say. I do not have any knowledge of that organization, but if I could I would like to point out that DIA is a foreign intelligence

organization and we do not do domestic surveillance. If indeed there were any surveillance of Mr. Mead, I can tell you categorically it would not have been done by DIA.

I do not know where this notion of unlawful surveillance by DIA came from, but we are not authorized by our charter to do enforcement surveillance or any of that kind of work in the United States, except under extremely limited context and I have seen nothing here that would lead me to believe that this would be one of those type cases.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Usry, were you aware that DIA does not surveil Americans, anyone domestically?

Mr. USRY. I am aware that the DIA has no charter to do so, yes, Senator.

Senator McCAIN. But you believe they did?

Mr. USRY. I have no belief one way or the other.

Senator McCAIN. You say in your statement there was illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists of this issue by the Department of Defense?

Mr. USRY. I believe I also state those are problem areas we were not able to look into due to restriction of assets and that those were areas that were left unresolved.

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that on?

Senator McCAIN. Page 14 is the illegal surveillance, the Center for POW/MIA Accountability Inc., and also there is allegations about Mr. Armitage.

The CHAIRMAN. Within your original report to the committee, the subcommittee report, the Minority report, what page is that on?

Mr. USRY. Senator, again, I believe that what we are discussing right now are those seven issues that are referenced.

The CHAIRMAN. Just deriving out of your statement?

Mr. USRY. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not out of the report?

Mr. USRY. No sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where you alleged in your opening you were unable to complete?

Mr. USRY. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of—I think I recall that. I do not have a copy. I seem to recall that I read it in the context that you said they were, I suppose it depends on how you read it. All right.

Why do you not proceed? I think what we want to try to do here—and I have read through the others—I think they are pretty self explanatory, with perhaps one or two questions that might arise. Well, that was the illegal surveillance. That was the last one; is that accurate?

Mr. USRY. That was the last one we addressed, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any of the other areas that Senators want to survey and then ask questions about, rather than go through each and every one? If you have questions on them, otherwise they can stand as their own explanation.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Chairman. I do not believe you have covered this in depth, but I was looking on page 20, item No. 3. Certain U.S. Government officials who testified before the House Congressional Hearings lied. Documentation which I will provide for

the record in the form of personal correspondence from various personnel employed clearly showed this duplicity. Who were the Government officials?

Mr. USRY. What we have is personal correspondence between former and present employees of CIL-HI, in which they indicate that some of the statements they made, during, I believe it was a House Hearings a few years ago, were not, in fact, correct, and that they were purposefully misrepresented or misstated.

Senator BROWN. I am sorry, the question I asked was, who were the people?

Mr. USRY. If you will allow me to look in my files here, I will be more than happy to provide it, or if you would submit it for the record I will be more than happy to give you the names. Why do we not just go through the files here.

Senator BROWN. My understanding of the purpose of this was for you to present the documentation for the statements that have been made.

Mr. USRY. That is correct. And so would you like to take a 5-minute break while I go through those.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the personal correspondence here.

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not pull that out. That would be helpful. And let me just ask you, while you are doing that. Did you read the foreign relations committee file, the file with respect to the so-called organized crime figure?

Mr. USRY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not read the file itself?

Mr. USRY. No, sir. You mean what was provided to us or what may be in there in total?

The CHAIRMAN. Well what was provided to you.

Mr. USRY. An abstract of—what we were looked at was an abstract of the notations on various date diaries by one of the individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. In writing? You saw that?

Mr. USRY. I saw it. It was basically a computer print out.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not see the file itself.

Mr. USRY. No sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the abstract was provided you specifically by whom?

Mr. USRY. You had mentioned his name earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. By Jack Blum.

Mr. USRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He gave you the abstract?

Mr. USRY. He let us view it.

[Pause.]

Mr. USRY. Let me refer to your question, Senator Brown. I have some of it here right now. I am still going to have to search for all of it, but what this is, it is a synopsis of correspondence between various personnel that in fact were involved in the operation of CIL-HI and there is a 17 March 1987 letter by Mark Frankel, to Mark Frankel, from Dr. Sam Dunlap, who at the time was employed at CIL-HI. Actually, he was employed at CIL-HI from 2 January, 1986 to 8 August, 1986.

By March 1986 I learned from Dr. Norman J. Sauer of Michigan State University and Dr. William R. Maples, the State Museum, that most of the Pot Set Laos cases, identified in June 1985 were fraudulent and that his assistant, Ms. Marla Mahoney had told Drs. Gail, Maples, and Charney, in February 1986, New Orleans American Academy of Forensic Sciences meeting that skeletal identifications appeared more believable than they really were.

15 May 1986 she told Dr. John K. Lundy, at CIL-HI, same information. Maples informed Dr. Sauer that a former CIL-HI employee had told him that the Commander of CIL-HI changed identification reports on a regular basis. Alice Curley, personal friend of Mr. Furooey, since 1950's and has consulted for the Army off and on for years. And then it goes on and on, so one of the people that did, in fact, lie during the hearings was Ms. Mahoney, when she was asked certain questions during the hearing and I also have transcripts of that hearing that I am more than willing to provide to the committee.

Senator BROWN. You quoted a letter from Dr. Dunlap. The question I asked was, who was it?

Mr. USRY. Marla Mahoney, she was an employee at CIL-HI at the time. She testified at the hearings.

Senator BROWN. If you are willing to, Mr. Chairman, what would be helpful to me to have are the names of all the U.S. Government officials that lied.

Mr. USRY. Could I give that to you on the record or do you want me to do that right this moment?

Senator BROWN. Well I think the Chairman has some other things he would like to go through but what I would like you to do if you would submit for the record, one, the names of everyone who lied and two, the dates on which they testified, and the page reference within the transcript and four, the quote which they gave that is not accurate and five, the documentation that shows that what they said was incorrect. I think that would give us the specifics we need to evaluate that. Is that satisfactory, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely Senator. I think that is a good suggestion and a good way to proceed. Do other Senators have other specific areas of enquiry?

Senator GRASSLEY. Are we at the end of this testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to do, Senator, is speed the process up a little bit because some of this is self-explanatory it stands on its face. But Senators have a specific question about one of these areas, I want every Senator to have an opportunity to ask and then if the administration wants to respond to any particular assertions in any of these areas, they will have an opportunity to do so.

Senator GRASSLEY. I think I had better ask, at this point, a couple of questions, not quite as specific as what you wanted, but I would like to have, Mr. Usry explain as he sees it what was the purpose behind the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report?

Mr. USRY. The purpose of the report was to put forth that information that we had developed that showed there is a problem. And that there is a concern on the part of the public, specifically those families, that their best interests have not been served. Also, to

create that which was necessary in a public forum to cause this committee to actually be chartered and that was basically the reason behind this. There were formulation meetings, if you will, some time ago attended by various staff personnel of some of the people here on this committee and at that particular point in time we provided them with information we had concerning our enquiry.

It was after the publication, I believe, of our first report and that would ultimately might be the end result, part of which would certainly be that there was no way, certainly with the assets that we had, that we could cover this problem in total. It just was not possible. So what we tried to do was bring out that which we found to be questionable so that this committee would eventually formed, and in fact, that is what has occurred.

That was the purpose behind the report, knowing that there was no way that people that were involved in the formulation and writing of this report were the right people or enough people or the right kind of people in every instance to look at this problem from beginning to end. So what hoped would occur, or in fact did, and that was the reason for this report.

Senator GRASSLEY. On a more specific point, in regard to something that Mr. De Statte said in response to an earlier question about Peter Cressman. I would like to have you tell me any commentary on that, or any information you have on it.

Mr. USRY. Prior to my opening my statement I provided to the Chairman of the committee a document concerning Peter Cressman and his shoot down. What is interesting is that Peter Cressman was, in fact, shot down over Laos, after the U.S., I believe, signed the Peace Treaty with North Vietnam and in the documentation that I have presented, and I am by no means an expert on the Peter Cressman shoot down, I only go with what was provided to me, there are partial Intelligence Reports that indicate that shortly after the shoot down there were Americans seen as prisoners within 65 kilometers, I believe it was, of where that plane crashed.

It would also indicate to me, based upon what was provided to the family members, and again, that is who we are working with, that the question you asked earlier, whether or not we were aware, or had broken the code of either the Vietnamese or the Laotians, either the Vietnamese or the Laotians were transmitting in open text and normal language, or the code was broken because there are copies of the text of radio messages in which they discuss four pilots, four criminals which Americans were routinely referred to in Laos and would lead one to believe that the possibility from what was presented to us by the family members, that some people may have actually survived the Cressman, that Baron 52 was the call sign of the particular plane, may have survived that plane crash.

Again, I am no expert on that, but I offer and provided the committee everything we had concerning that particular shoot down.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask, Mr. Sheetz, maybe you could come back up for a second, or the appropriate person, maybe Mr. De Statte. And you have already been sworn Mr. De Statte. Let me just ask you now. Picking up a bit on where we were earlier today,

do you have definitive evidence that what he is saying is not accurate, that everybody in that aircraft was killed?

Mr. DE STATTE. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Definitive, conclusive?

Mr. DE STATTE. That is the way I would characterize it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it necessary to share it with the committee now or just submit it?

Mr. DE STATTE. Sir, it is relatively brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you share it with us.

Mr. DE STATTE. The aircraft was an EC-47Q. It is usually referred to by the call sign for the aircraft, which is Baron 52. It had eight crew members. It was lost over Laos in February of 1973. And I might add, the mother of one of the co-pilots is a personal friend of mine, and I used to work with his father. And so I know something about this. Four days later a search team inspected the records and located the remains of four of the eight?

The CHAIRMAN. Whose search team?

Mr. DE STATTE. U.S. One of the members of that search team was, in fact, a personal friend and had worked with some of the people, the crew in the back of the aircraft. Two of the remains were in the pilot and co-pilot position, the third was in the engineer's compartment. The team was able to recover a portion of this body which was identified as the other co-pilot. The fourth body they found was near the engineer's compartment.

Normally, in this type of aircraft there are two positions immediately behind the engineer's compartment. One of these two positions would have been occupied by S. Sgt. Todd Melton. The other by either Sergeant Matejov or Sergeant Cressman. Due to the physical and time constraints and hostile forces in the area, the team was not able to lift the fuselage to search for additional remains.

The search team also found what appeared to be anti-aircraft artillery shrapnel holes in part of the wreckage. They found no evidence that the crew were preparing to bail out when the plane crashed, and it did not appear that the aircraft attempted a controlled landing or a controlled crash-landing. Disposition of the wreckage and other features of the crash site, for example, the absence of skid marks, indicated the aircraft had plunged in nearly vertically to earth, bounced once and landed upside down and burned.

Although operating outside the range of ground radar stations during most of its mission, Baron 52 had frequent contact with other aircraft in the area. For example, the commander made routine half-hourly contacts with, and reported all unusual occurrences to Moonbeam, an airborne command control center which is another aircraft in the area. They also had radio contact with specter 20 and a HC-130 gunship working in the same area.

Electronics warfare crew members, these are the people in the back of that aircraft, also used separate communications equipment to maintain contact with another EC-47, Baron 62, flying in the same general area. The last reported position of Baron 52 was 8 to 10 minutes flying time from the crash site.

Following a review of facts associated with the crash the commander, Eighth Tactical Fighter Wing, in coordination with the commander, 56 Special Operations Wing, they were the command-

ers of the flying crew and the electronics crew respectively, recommended that the status of the crew members be changed to "killed in action."

The next of kin were informed of this status change, and the facts supporting the decisions, in a series of letters dated between 4 February and 17 February, 1973, which summarized the events of Baron 52's last mission and the evidence obtained by the search team. The commander added that in view of the capabilities of the radio communications equipment, Baron 52's frequent contact with other aircraft and the extensive training of the crew, in case of emergency at least one of the crew would have instinctively used the radios unless the aircraft crashed as a result of some catastrophic incident, that immediately and completely incapacitated the crew members.

Having reviewed the available facts, the field commanders reported that they believed, quote, there was no reasonable doubt that all the members of crew of Baron 52 were killed in the crash, close quote.

Now as for the Intelligence information that Mr. Usry referred to. Although the observations of the search team and other facts constituted what the field commander believed to be compelling evidence that none of the crew members survived, four sets of Intelligence Reports, portions of which were declassified for release to the next of kin, led others to speculate that four electronics specialists could have survived. Two of the documents were dated 5 February, 1973 and another 17 February 1973, 12 days later, and the fourth, 2 May 1973. I might add that I believe Mr. Mooney, who has testified before your committee, claims to have written that particular document.

Through longstanding misinterpretations of these sanitized documents, an erroneous impression of survivors, was preserved. Yet in fact, the four reports do not relate to the loss of the EC-47.

(1) The initial 5 February report originated in the area of Vinh, North Vietnam, about 240 miles by road, north of the EC-47Q crash site. In that report, which was issued as an unevaluated spot report as soon as the information was acquired, a North Vietnamese unit near Vinh said it was holding four prisoners who were not further identified.

(2) The later 5 February report based on and issued after a review of the information in the earlier 5 February report provides no additional insights into the origin or the identity of the prisoners. Now I might add for clarity, both of those documents refer to the same initial report, so these are not two separate reports. They are simply two pieces of intelligence information. The two reports based on the same item of intelligence.

(3) The 17 February document is a report by an enemy unit of the alleged downing of an aircraft in the area immediately south of demilitarized zone which separated North and South Vietnam, and as such does not relate to the EC-47 or its crew.

(4) The 2 May report is yet another analyst interpretation of the 5 February reporting and is neither new information nor a new report. DIA's review of the evidence shows that the analyst who prepared the 2 May report made a number of arbitrary and erroneous assumptions, and speculative assertions all in an attempt to

infer that the 5 February information originated from a location much closer to the EC-47 crash site and that some of the crew survived.

The 2 May report therefore actually provided no more conclusive information than did the original 5 February report. However, the unwarranted personal speculation tends to draw attention away from this fact. In conclusion it should be emphasized that the four documents cited above were never conclusively correlated to crew members of the Baron 52.

The documents initially were entered into the files of the crew members only because the information was acquired shortly after Baron 52 became missing and it was anticipated that future reporting might permit the DIA analyst to make a definitive correlation to the Baron 52 incident.

No such reporting was ever received. It is further emphasized that following the loss of Baron 52 none of its crew members were ever seen alive and there is no intelligence whatsoever which would indicate any of the crew survived the incident of loss.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that, that is helpful. Mr. Usry, what do you say to that?

Mr. USRY. Mr. Chairman, as I stated previously, one, I do not profess to be an expert on the Cressman shoot down. I simply offered to you what we had on Cressman and asked that you review it and compare it with what DIA has just provided you or what they will provide to you at a later time. There is a very good argument made here, in the report, from what I can see, but again, this is not something we spent a lot of time on. It was in the documents I brought with me today. And when I heard it being discussed by you, I provided it for you.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. Let me ask you, Mr. De Statte, very quickly, this plane had destructive mechanisms in it, did it not self destruct so it would not fall into enemy hands?

Mr. DE STATTE. Sir, I am not aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not our electronic capable aircraft have that kind of destructive capacity?

Mr. DE STATTE. I do not know the answer to that question. I can find out.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be confident it did.

Mr. DE STATTE. I just do not know that for certain.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, assuming it did, what was left, I mean why was there so much left of it? Was the electronic equipment in fact intact when the crew visited it. Did they make a determination.

Mr. DE STATTE. They did not go inside the fuselage, as I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how did they find the remains they found?

Mr. DE STATTE. Looking in from the outside.

The CHAIRMAN. Only looking in from outside? Now is it possible somebody could have bailed out before the crash?

Mr. DE STATTE. I am working from a summary here, not the total record, but no, it is not possible. This aircraft . . . I know the aircraft, it is particularly tight and configured in a way, it is very difficult to move and when you are in your position you were kind of there.

The CHAIRMAN. But I gathered there were a couple of slots from which you could bail relatively easily, is that incorrect? Do any of

the military folks here have data on that? Well, we will look into that. Let us not get bogged down with the details now. We have got a presentation on both sides, it is interesting and we will evaluate it. Do any Senators have further questions?

Senator SMITH. Mr. Usry, can you tell me the rationale or the reason for doing the report? Why did you do this report. This is obviously very comprehensive and as you have seen, controversial, but why did you take this task on. For what purpose? Did someone direct you to do it? Whatever information you could provide the committee in that regard?

Mr. USRY. In November 1984, while I was still in the service. As a criminal investigator I was assigned to Korea and shortly before the end of the year I was given an investigation which I foolishly thought would only take 6 weeks.

Basically what it was, it was a series of allegations levied by a major then in the service by the name of Mark Smith and his name has come up repeatedly in here. And the allegations ranged from things such as utilizing these special forces detachment in Korea as a transshipment point for high-dollar value items that they could escape Customs and then give to high-ranking Korean officials; two, the failure on the part of the U.S. Government to act on information concerning live POW's.

Well, I investigated that from 1984 basically to March 1986 and what I found during that time frame was that in every instance where Major Smith, at the time had indicated that he knew something, as a fact, it was in fact a fact and there was credibility to his allegation. When he said he had heard something, and he did not really know whether it was factual or not, that is what he reported. Also, during that time frame of course I felt like I was the messenger or bearer of bad tidings and as I have felt here on occasion, it was more-or-less, let us shoot the messenger.

What I would do is I would come back to the United States and provide briefings to the Pentagon concerning the allegations that Major Smith had made, and in many instances, substantiated, that there were problems with high-ranking Korean officials at that point in time.

There seemed to be little or no interest to substantiate that or to report that; the interests seemed to be at the time to discredit Major Smith and I was asked repeatedly did I find anything that might indicate that Major Smith had done anything wrong and the allegations ranged from cross-border operations into Laos, dealing with guns or smuggling guns and gold throughout Southeast Asia, to bouncing a check.

And again, no real concern as to the allegations and substantiated criminal conduct that Major Smith had reported so when it all boiled down the big issue left was whether or not Major Smith had reported to a general officer information that Major Smith felt was valid information concerning live Americans as POW's.

My charter was never to determine the validity of that information, just whether it had been acted on. And I reached an impasse, where basically it was one person's word against the other and when I briefed my senior officials concerning what had been a routine way to determine who was telling the truth, or at least offered the opportunity, for either one to undergo a polygraph examina-

tion, there was no problem at all offering Mark Smith a polygraph examination, but I was not to offer the general a polygraph examination. Keeping in mind that that is a routine procedure that one would do in this type of investigation.

At the end there was some deliberation as to how this report would finally be written as well as what offenses would be reflected on the part of each individual who I identified as conducting or committing a criminal offense. The final decision was to list Major Smith as an individual who had uttered a worthless check, when the circumstances of which were very honest and there was every reason as to why he did what he did.

There was no interest at all to determining the validity of the POW information or anything else and then, of course, the particular investigation was classified.

At that particular point in time I saw that there was a real feeling amongst the people that I dealt, within the Pentagon, as well as the other commands that I transcended through my investigation, that nobody wanted to touch the POW issue and they were more intent on shooting the messenger.

Now, I will be the first to admit that Maj. Mark Smith is an extremely controversial individual and I know for a fact that he has invited a Senator out to the parking lot when the Senator referred to him or alluded to the fact that he might be lying. But what I saw at that particular point in time was a man who had provided a list of allegations to which I had substantiated and there was no argument about that; and there was more importance in discrediting him than there was in reporting and acting upon the particular allegations that he substantiated.

Based on that, it, I guess, more or less, picked up my curiosity as to whether or not there is something valid to the POW issue so in 1989, when I was contacted by the Staff Personnel of Senator Grassley and asked if I would come over and brief Senator Grassley, on the result of the Mark Smith investigation, because some people referred to that as a bench mark in this issue, I said I was more than willing and explained to them the process they needed to go through in order for me, at the time, being in the military, to come over and brief a congressional Member.

Well, some 30 days later I was still over at my headquarters and I had not provided the briefing. I had been over to the Department of Defense, I am sorry, the Pentagon IG office to discuss the issue and the questions as to what I thought the Senator might be interested in and I laid out that information for both the Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel that I spoke to at the time and they told me that I would be made available to the Senator at such time as we had an opportunity to look at the report and then determine what the Senator wanted to ask me about and I said, fine.

The next thing was when Senator Grassley came and got me and I provided to him within a 3- or 4-day period of time, a briefing as to what had occurred in the Mark Smith investigation and at that time he asked me if I would like to continue looking at the POW issue.

Naturally, as an investigator, this is quite an interesting issue, based upon my previous dealings with the system concerning the

POW issue, I felt it was something that at least needed to be looked at and that is how I got initially involved in this issue.

What I saw was a definite act to shoot the messenger concerning the issue of POW's and other embarrassing issues for the Defense Department and as Senator Kassebaum asked me last week, have I ever seen the government lie, I saw more lying on the part of the government in cover-up, at least in the Defense Government area that I dealt with, concerning the Mark Smith investigation than I had seen in some time.

I still feel to this date. I feel that that man, as controversial as he is, certainly was not given the benefit of an opportunity, in one instance, to be promoted like anyone else, because of this investigation; certainly was not given the benefit or the opportunity to provide the training to younger soldiers that he was capable of providing, as was pointed out by his superiors. And, on the part of the Defense Department, again, that I dealt with, too scurry and bury this rather than to deal with it as they should. I would be more than willing to discuss that particular issue at any time.

Senator SMITH. I have just a quick follow-up point. Is there, in your opinion, is there a line of demarkation in terms of where you feel people have not followed through or malfeasance, or whatever terms you want to apply. Is there a demarkation point where this does not go on any more? Or do you feel it has gone all the way through, from the days of the Vietnam War to today?

As a final follow-up point, there is that we have had a lot of testimony from individuals, lately, in the hearings, who appear to be very cooperative and who have indicated a willingness to be cooperative, so are you seeing the same thing, say post-1988 and 1989 that you saw, not in terms of contemporary time but in terms of your investigation say in 1973, 1974, 1975?

Mr. USRY. I am confident that the administration that has been represented here, which is the Defense Department and I think the State Department, really wants to do the right thing. I do not necessarily believe they want to do the right thing because that is where their heart is.

I believe that they want to do the right thing now because it is a public issue and there is a committee here that is going to look at them and perform oversight to ensure that they are going to do the right thing.

As an investigator, I would also have to say that the point of departure probably is, the date of these hearings. That would be the safe bet, from an investigative approach, and anything that is before these hearings needs to be looked at to determine whether, in fact, the right thing in every instance has been done, as I said last week, and I hope I have made clear, and, if not, I will try it this time.

I do not believe that everything the Defense Department did was wrong. I believe, in many instances they did good work, but in those instances when they were wrong, we are dealing with human life, or the possibility of a human life, and for whatever reason, those need to be looked at. Whether it was just through an evolution of learning, on how to deal with POW issues, or how to deal with the analysis of information, or because it was an embarrassment, and I do not really have an answer one way or the other,

regardless of the reason, the point of departure if I were looking at this would be the day these hearings started and everything before that should be reviewed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator BROWN. Just one quick question. On pages 5 to 8 of your reports you reference the fact that a report in the New York Times, that there were 5,000 POW's held by the North Vietnamese. In testimony earlier today, by Mr. Ford—

Mr. USRY. Senator, I think I can save you time. We were incorrect. There is no two ways about that. There was a misquote. It has been corrected and that is in the new edition of the report. However, I would like to offer that. We still do not feel that it changes the content of the point we are trying to make, but it is an error. I will not argue that.

Senator BROWN. I appreciate you setting that straight. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to offer a comment. It is not particularly pertinent except to speak for the fact that you were an investigator for the Republican side, or the Minority side of the Foreign Relations Committee. This was not something undertaken by—and I am a Republican Member of the Foreign Relations Committee—all of the minority side of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. USRY. Agreed.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just wanted that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Minority of the Minority, Report. Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. It has been pointed out to Mr. Usry that your statements in your first report, in spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first-hand live sightings, the Department of Defense remarkably still believes it has, quote no credible evidence, unquote. How does it dismiss these reports? Was it not important for you again?

Mr. USRY. It was a typo. I agree.

Senator MCCAIN. Was it not important to mention that 75 percent of those were live sightings of people who were alive at the time, then later came home, so there were not 1,400 unresolved reports of first-hand live sightings. There was only 25 percent. of 1,400 reports of first-hand live sightings that were unresolved, is that not correct?

Mr. USRY. Senator, I take no exception to what you are saying, again. This is the way we wrote the report. It was reviewed and this was the determination as to the way it would be published. I think it is very easy to look at something in retrospect and Monday morning quarterback it and say, it should have gone this way. I am certainly not going to argue with that point. I am simply stating that this is what was the final product at the time and it stands as it is.

I would also say that it was not 1,400 unresolved. It was 1,400 resolved, and that is a typo. That has also been corrected. However, the point of fact we are trying to make is that there are 1,400 reports and all I am asking anybody to do and all I have ever asked anybody to do since the day I started on this is go, look at the intelligence yourself, look at the conclusions, reached by an analyst,

and then read the raw intelligence that they used to derive their conclusions.

See for yourself whether I am totally incorrect and if I am, I will freely admit so. Or, what I am saying is, in fact, correct, which is, there are bad analysis.

Senator MCCAIN. Please do not suffer under the impression that I am alleging that you are incorrect in any way. I am just pointing out that a statement that says there are 1,400 unresolved reports of first-hand live sightings is far, far different and frankly, I think, a typo is not the description of it, where 75 percent of these live sighting reports were true and verified, but they happened to be individuals who were there at the time and have since come home.

Let me move on to the Borah pictures. When did you first obtain the pictures that were alleged to be Lieutenant Borah?

Mr. USRY. July 13 or 14 I believe. It would have been the weekend of the National Alliance and National League of Families Convention here in Washington, DC.

Senator MCCAIN. What year?

Mr. USRY. This year.

Senator MCCAIN. That is the first time you have ever had copies of the Borah pictures?

Mr. USRY. Yes, sir, to my knowledge.

Senator MCCAIN. The Department of Defense seems to think you had them since 1989. Do you know why they would think that?

Mr. USRY. No I do not. And if they would like to tell me I would be more than interested in hearing. I received the photographs, to the best of my recollection, from the family members themselves, when they were attending the National League of Families Convention on the weekend of July 12, I believe, was what it was.

Senator MCCAIN. Did anybody else on the staff have these pictures that you know of prior to July 1991?

Mr. USRY. As far as I am aware, there was no-one else on our staff that had those. In fact, when I saw the photographs that were provided to me by the family members, I indicated to them at this time, or at that time, it was my belief that that was not their son or brother, but in fact a Laotian. However, I also indicated I was by no means an expert and we would try to get it analyzed.

Senator MCCAIN. Maybe somebody here from the Defense Department can clarify, why they believe. Can you, Mr. Sheetz—why you believed the information was—can you clarify from the microphone, so that we can have it on the record.

Mr. SHEETZ. I think from the interview of Mr. Ahroa, we know the pictures were taken some time in 1990, early in 1990. All the Defense Department knows is the first time they came to our knowledge was when they were shown on nationwide TV. Jack Bailey indicated to us, in an aside, in our debriefing with him in August of this year, that he had turned over copies of the Carr pictures to the Senate, approximately a year previously.

Senator MCCAIN. That was an incorrect statement on the part of Mr. Bailey. Was that an incorrect statement on the part of Mr. Bailey, to your knowledge, Mr. Usry?

Mr. USRY. I do not know. I know I did not come into possession of any of the Carr photos at that particular point in time. In fact the

first time I was even aware of Carr photos is when I saw a telecopied copy of the Carr photos in Senator Grassley's office.

Senator McCAIN. I am speaking of Borah photos.

Mr. USRY. I believed you asked me about Carr photos.

Senator McCAIN. I am sorry, but you know of no-one else who had, besides those family members who gave you that picture, you know of no-one that works on the Hill that had copies of those pictures, before you did in July 1991.

Mr. USRY. It is my understanding that those photographs were sent to the FBI some months before for analysis by another member on the Hill. But again, that is secondary information. I am not aware, personally, of that occurring. That is just information I have heard.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. I hope we can clear that up because obviously you share my view that we want any information to be brought to the proper authorities; any and all authorities that can act on any information that we have both government and nongovernment, as rapidly as possible and clearly we would want to bring any information we had to the Department of Defense and the DIA, I am sure you agree with that. Before your trip, and I guess the basis of your trip, please correct me if I am wrong, was primarily based on information that was brought forward by Khambang, correct?

Mr. USRY. It is our understanding, the information was funneled or channeled through Khambang to the Judge. I would also like to add that, and this was in fact discussed with Secretary of Defense that we were not comfortable, totally, with the information, but due to the limited amount of time in which the sources or alleged sources could stay in Thailand, since they were Laotian we were more or less forced to act in the time frame, that we did. I mean under ideal circumstances certainly there would have been a different situation, but because this was more or less put upon us at the last minute we felt that it was compelling enough that we had to act.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think I can help clarify that for Senator McCain. And I do not know whether other contacts were made to other Senators or Congressmen by Mr. Gayden, but I did receive, he came, and Mr. Gayden came to my office and I am trying to remember whether I was in the Senate or the House at the time, but I believe it was the Senate. And I would stand corrected if that is not accurate, but I believe it was around the time that I took office, which would have been in December 1990 or January 1991, and he indicated that he had a photograph of somebody that alleged to be Borah and refused to provide that photograph to me, but indicated that, he showed it to me. Subsequently, a number of weeks or months later, he did bring Mr. Gayden did bring those photos in, at which time I provided them to General Vessey, in my office, so that would just clarify what happened as far as my involvement with those photographs.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Usry, if no other members have questions, let me summarize before I ask the administration if they have any further word and before the close today. Let me ask them first of

all if they do, Mr. Ford, do you have anything that you want to respond to? You do not and Mr. Sheetz? No.

Mr. Usry, let me say this to you. You have sat here and appropriately sort of taken some heat, I think, and questions and people saying, is this a fact, is that a fact, and in effect have had to say, well that was a mistake or this was not, on some items, which makes you like DOD, DIA, and a lot of other folks who are here, it makes all of us in the same boat, in a sense. We are all capable of that. I think it has been helpful. My personal opinion is, it has been very helpful because it sets a standard, if you will, for how this committee is going to have to proceed for whatever we put out in a report. But I want the record to show that I believe your intentions here are of the highest order. I think you want this issue resolved and I think you are absolutely concerned, legitimately, about having this resolved and I think your motivations are appropriate to want to get answers where you ought to get them and while, I and others, might have some differences with you as to how some material was presented, I do not think any of us would doubt your sincerity and your commitment and the extraordinary time you have put in to try and help us resolve it.

It does underscore the committee's responsibility to do this responsibly and carefully, without injury to people who are working hard in the field, who do not bear culpability for things that took place 15 years ago, or 20 years ago, which they did not decide, and which they did not do and it is important to try and separate that as we go along here.

Part of the effort that I view this committee charged with is to try to show that Congress can do something well, rationally and reasonably and that we can have a good work product and government does not have to mess things up but rather it can shed light and restore credibility. And so, we have helped scratch the surface of that today.

We are going to have to go through your report and you are going to have to help us go through the report to separate not all of it in public like we did today but to separate what stands up and what does not and what stands up we are going to go after and we are going to look at. So when ultimately we do it we are going to have to deal with your report and the prior reports. Now, I take it that you are prepared as you said you were last week, to turn all the material over to the Committee and work with the staff and you will be working with the staff in an effort to help us sort that out, am I correct?

Mr. USRY. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And I also take it Mr. Ford, the administration is prepared to get back to us on the request I made with respect to the declassification process at issue?

Mr. FORD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And third, you are prepared to set in motion this new relationship with the families. So that we can all work to guarantee their getting the information that they desire.

Mr. FORD. That is correct. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that. I think that is a very important first outgrowth of the committee's effort if you will, I think it is going to be very important to helping resolve this.

We will be meeting as a closed committee on Wednesday of next week to hear from CIA, NSC and DIA and meanwhile the committee will be fanning out in a number of directions, talking with people and seeking information. I think we crossed an important divide, if you will, in the course of the last 4 days' hearings, not consecutive days, but in these hearings. And I just want to summarize this before we proceed to the last witness, but I think that Secretary Ford and Secretary Cheney and others have basically acknowledged, not basically but have acknowledged, that it appears as though some folks were left behind and that is what this is all about.

There are various degrees of evidence about that, not the least of which is somebody like Bill Bell asserting it, as well as others who have asserted it, some not before this committee. I want to again emphasize that this committee is not seeking to become a forum for finger pointing. If the Soviet Union can make an announcement about huge numbers of people being killed by their troops during the war then others can acknowledge things that happened, surely 20 years later, we can make some admissions of error and move on.

I would be much happier if this process enables people to do that. So that we can understand the truth and clear the air and move on, rather than get caught in some exercise of flagellation about that past. I think we have heard a considerable amount in these first 3 days, and I appreciate Senator Grassley's comments on the floor last night. I am glad he has found these first few days valuable. I think we have had a good beginning. Let me thank you, Mr. Usry, now if you could make those materials available and begin to help us catalogue them and so forth, we need to get to work through that and I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. USRY. Senator, can I give you one more document?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. USRY. You had asked the Department of Defense, and I am certainly not trying to usurp them again. That is certainly one of the things that I had. It is just basically a number-crunching of casualties from between January 1961 and December 2, 1973, and its origin is the Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller Direct for Information Operations and is dated December 5, 1973.

[See p. 932 of the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very helpful to us and that is part of the record and that will be very helpful because part of what will be submitted next week or so will be our own numbers-crunching of DIA and others in an effort to really ascertain once and for all what the chart is on this and we will factor that in.

Mr. USRY. What I wanted to point out in this and again, I am sure that the numbers have changed because of information that has been provided since 1973, but as of the December 2, 1973, still carried in a technical status of captured or interned were 59 people, and I believe that that is something that does need to be explained as I am sure that it can be again. This was faxed to me, and I said that I would get it in and I would assume that the document is a valid document which is easily checked but it is certainly is a starting point.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a number of other documents that bear on this and we will be working on those.

Senator MCCAIN. As you know, Mr. Usry, those were people that we had photographs, communication with, and clear evidence that they were alive, at least at the time of their capture, and in some cases they were resolved because we knew what had happened to them and others have never been resolved, so I think we are aware of that and that is why we have started through this process, as flawed as it may have been from time to time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We have one final panelist, this will be a very very brief presentation, but one that is important also and I would ask Mary Backley, the director of operations for the National League of POW/MIA families if she would come forward, please. Thank you, Mr. Usry.

Mr. USRY. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MARY BACKLEY, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. BACKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I realize it has been a very long day and I will be as brief as I possibly can. Prior to beginning I must say, and thank the committee for their desire and their persistence in terms of declassification of the road map which I heard earlier today, that is something that our League Board has unanimously approved and would like to see, declassification of the road map.

We believe that a great deal of confusion will be cleared up if that document were to be made public and so I thank the committee for that.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the select committee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an official response to Patricia O'Grady's accusations against the National League of Families during her testimony before this committee on November 7. The League fully supports the committee's insistence on substantiation of all assertions and requests the committee's consent to examine Ms. O'Grady's purported documentation, if received.

Since Ms. O'Grady neglected to provide any specific examples to support her allegations, it is difficult to decipher the basis for her claims. However, I will address each accusation individually, clarifying League positions and policies as adopted by the annually elected board and/or membership.

According to Ms. O'Grady the National League of Families does not represent the interests of the men.

Founded in 1970, the National League of Families is the only national organization comprised solely of close relatives of Americans still prisoner, missing and unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, as well as Vietnam POW's, returned POW's.

As stipulated in the Articles of Incorporation, previously submitted to the committee, the League's threefold objective has been and is first, the return of all prisoners; second, the fullest possible accounting for the missing; and third, repatriation of remains of those who died while serving our nation in Southeast Asia. This threefold objective recognizes as it has since our founding, the relationship between the live prisoner issue and ending uncertainty. In keeping with these objectives, the League has strongly advocated

and supported increased U.S. Government efforts which have thus far resulted in the return of over 300 Americans to their families and to their homeland.

It is our position that Americans are still held in Indochina. Therefore, the League continues to press for their return. At the same time, the fullest possible accounting is crucial to achieving answers for the families and directly impacts on the live prisoner issue. The two tracks must be pursued simultaneously.

The return of any and all live Americans is our highest objective, and the League cannot and will not discriminate when it comes to obtaining answers. We accept and appreciate all information provided by the Indochinese Governments. Though critics have expressed their differences with the League, even Ms. O'Grady does not disagree with the League on this point.

According to Ms. O'Grady, there is a deliberate plan within the League to undermine the issue and thwart efforts to return live prisoners. Mrs. Griffiths has extensive investment and personal interest with the U.S. Government.

I believe that these three accusations in particular represent the core of misinformation which has circulated from time to time over the past 5 years about the League and its leadership, including the board of directors and executive director. The League's objectives have been and remain crystal clear. Strategies to achieve our goals have changed dramatically through the League's history depending upon the level of U.S. Government attention and commitment, or lack thereof, with which the families have had to deal.

For the first time, we have recently looked at our accomplishments since 1982. As you can see and confirm, the League is responsible for many of the changes in U.S. Government policy on the POW/MIA issue, particularly concerning live prisoners of war. As the only nongovernment, active participant in the official POW/MIA Interagency Group, Mrs. Griffiths, as the families designated representative, is not only in a position to help develop POW/MIA policy and constantly monitor implementation, but tracks family member concerns to the policy-formulating body.

The League will only maintain its position on the IAG as long as we feel it is productive; this is a view shared by the vast majority of the families in the League. Should the families blindly trust that the abandonment policy of the 1970's will not again become the policy of the 1990's? If U.S. policy potentially endangers resolution of the issue, Mrs. Griffiths is in a position to criticize and work internally to rectify problems to ensure that the best interests of those still missing, the families and the issue are protected.

While League criticisms do not appear on the front pages of The Washington Times, Spot Light, Stars and Stripes, National Tribune, or in some veterans' publications, it is inaccurate to assume that there is always agreement between the League and the U.S. Government. There is disagreement, often at times; however, there is also the ability to work together to resolve differences. Publicity of disagreements, as we have seen, is in Hanoi's interest, not ours, unless U.S. policy and priorities were dropped.

As for the allegation concerning Mrs. Griffiths' personal interest and extensive investment with the U.S. Government, I am compelled to agree with Ms. O'Grady that as a family member, with

her own brother still missing in Vietnam, Mrs. Griffiths does have a personal interest, as do the other 2,270 families.

Ms. O'Grady's inference is false by the fact that Mrs. Griffiths requested that her name not be considered to serve in a senior DOD post in the 1985, 1986 time frame. In fact, Mrs. Griffiths has served for 13 years as executive director of the League, acting on behalf of all the families, per the policies and positions adopted by the membership and board of directors, not her own.

According to Ms. O'Grady, Mrs. Griffiths chooses members of the board of directors to her liking and rigs elections of the board of directors. Mrs. Griffiths goes beyond approach; she deliberately blocks the democratic process and refused board member access to the League's family member list.

The League's balloting process for board election and resolution consideration by the membership is approved by the board of directors and implemented by the staff, under my personal supervision and control. Mrs. Griffiths has never assisted or participated in the ballot distribution, collection and tabulation process, which I will outline as follows:

In order to be a member of the League, thus eligible to vote or serve on the board, criteria as set forth in the bylaws must be met and a signed application must be on file.

Ballots are individually numbered and distributed to all eligible League members. The ballots are then inserted in the envelope and mailed to all eligible family members.

A self-addressed, pre-posted return envelope is enclosed with the ballots to ensure that ballots are returned to a contracted certified public accounting firm, not sent to the League office. Any ballots received in the League office are immediately forwarded to the accounting firm which inputs each ballot number into their computer to ensure ballots are not duplicated.

Upon completion of tabulation, a letter certifying the results is forwarded to the League office.

Prior to the spring of 1986, the League enjoyed the voluntary services of a division in The American Legion, to receive, tabulate and certify all League balloting. The time and effort devoted to tabulating incoming ballots were provided to the League on a voluntary basis.

In the spring 1986, three board members who were seeking re-election questioned the integrity of the process performed by The American Legion. As a result, a CPA firm was and has since been contracted to receive, tabulate and certify all balloting by the League membership, including on policy questions.

It should be noted that a process which was performed with accuracy and at no charge for many years now costs the League a substantial amount of money per contracted tabulation. In addition, questions on the validity of the balloting process performed by The American Legion were initiated by those who were subsequently defeated by the membership to serve on the board.

As for access to the League membership list, a poll of the entire membership was conducted in 1986 regarding continuation of League policy to hold in confidence the names and addresses of League members. By over two-thirds majority, the voting members

elected to retain this policy which was reaffirmed in September of this year by the elected board of directors.

According to Ms. O'Grady, Mrs. Griffiths controls the flow of information to the families and participates with the U.S. Government in the concealment of information from the families.

As stipulated in documents previously submitted the League, to include Mrs. Griffiths, has consistently pressed for complete disclosure of information to the primary next-of-kin. In 1982, per the League's recommendation, the Reagan Administration adopted a policy of full disclosure to the primary next-of-kin of all information which pertains, or may pertain, to their missing relative. In 1988, Senator Smith, as a Member of the House of Representatives, submitted an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act which codified this policy into law. Obviously, the League was and is in full support of this policy and appreciated Senator Smith's actions on the families behalf. It is up to appropriate U.S. Government agencies to fully implement this policy in a timely manner. That is their job, as dictated by law, not the League's and certainly not Mrs. Griffiths' responsibility.

Five, Mrs. Griffiths' definition of resolution is different than that of the families.

According to Ms. O'Grady, on a number of occasions, to include in all national media, print, radio and television, Mrs. Griffiths has publicly stated her personal belief that Americans are still alive in Indochina, most recently last Wednesday she stated the same before this committee. In addition, Mrs. Griffiths has repeatedly stated that she is in complete agreement with the threefold objective of the League. This threefold objective was formulated by the families when the League was incorporated and remains the same today.

Ms. O'Grady has insinuated that Mrs. Griffiths' self-interest supersedes the recovery of live Americans.

To be quite honest, Mr. Chairman, I was very taken aback by this slanderous allegation. I believe the issue of self-interest was appropriately addressed earlier, as well as Mrs. Griffiths' position regarding live Americans.

However, I would like to conclude my testimony with personal thoughts based upon over 8 years' experience of working with her. While my tenure with the League has been one of amazement and frustration for various reasons, it has also been one of admiration for the incredible dedication, persistence and perseverance exhibited by Mrs. Griffiths despite some very unpleasant circumstances based on orchestrated attempts to discredit the National League of Families.

I have worked closely with Mrs. Griffiths for 6 of my 8 years. All allegations I have thus far either heard or read concerning her or her performance as executive director are false. In her position as executive director, she is not looking for accolades and she is not looking to be liked. She is trying to do her job and press all responsible avenues to obtain answers for the families.

There has never been such a more critical time on the issue than now. In a sad irony, it is somewhat reminiscent of the war. Domestic divisiveness clearly influenced our Nation's view of the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, that divisiveness has returned. Serious coop-

eration from the governments of Indochina could resolve this issue and opportunities to obtain that cooperation are available, with unified support behind them.

Deliberate attacks against any individual, circulation of rumor rather than fact, and calculated condemnation of the League's leadership and executive director based on lies have once again created mistrust, which in my view could shortly destroy the issue. Though much remains to be done, the League and its membership should be extremely proud of the accomplishments thus far achieved due to its persistence.

I believe that when this issue is resolved, it will be due to the steadfast determination of this organization to press forward, rather than backward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the committee, I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Backley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY BACKLEY

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6) Mrs. Griffiths' self-interest supersedes the recovery of live Americans.

To be quite honest, I was very taken back by this slanderous allegation. I believe the issue of self-interest was appropriately addressed earlier, as well as Mrs. Griffiths' position regarding live Americans. However, I would like to conclude my testimony with personal thoughts based upon over 8 years experience of working with her. While my tenure with the League has been one of amazement and frustration for various reasons, it has also been one of admiration for the incredible dedication, persistence and perseverance exhibited by Mrs. Griffiths despite some very unpleasant circumstances based on orchestrated attempts to discredit the National League of Families. I have worked closely with Mrs. Griffiths for 6 of my 8 years. All allegations I have thus far either heard or read concerning her or her performance as executive director are false. In her position as executive director, she is not looking for accolades and she is not looking to be liked. She is trying to do her job and press all responsible avenues to obtain answers for the families.

There has never been such a more critical time on the issue than now. In a sad irony, it is somewhat reminiscent of the war. Domestic divisiveness clearly influenced our nation's view of the Vietnam war. Unfortunately, that divisiveness has returned. Serious cooperation from the Governments of Indochina could resolve this issue, and opportunities to obtain that cooperation are available, with unified support behind them. Deliberate attacks against any individual, circulation of rumor rather than fact, and calculated condemnation of the League's leadership and executive director based on lies have once again created mistrust, which in my view, could shortly destroy the issue. Though much remains to be done, the League and its membership should be extremely proud of the accomplishments thus far achieved due to its persistence. I believe that when this issue is resolved, it will be due to the steadfast determination of this organization to press forward, rather than backward.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Backley.

I do not have any questions. I am going to make one statement and then I will turn to Senator Smith.

I am sorry for any hard feelings or sense of abuse that any member of the League or anyone has felt in this process. But as you know, and as everybody knows and is coming to know, there are tensions around this issue and there are deeply-felt opinions.

This committee's job is not, one of the jobs we are not going to assume and I think we have assumed most of the jobs that have come to us in the course of the last days, but one of the jobs we are not going to assume is a resolution of the internal politics of the League.

I wanted to obviously afford you and Mrs. Griffiths particularly, whom I respect and who I have worked with, any opportunity to respond as we thought it was appropriate to afford people who have criticisms the opportunity to voice those criticisms. They are part of the dynamics of this issue. And they are very much a part of the attitudes and the conditions and people's feelings and suspicions.

What you have really articulated here, what the whole League dispute articulates and the reason I think it is very important in understanding this issue, is the degree to which there is a division which has even entered among the families and that is, in its own way, a very sad commentary on the whole process. It underscores why it is so important for us to get the League so that it feels like one again, so that we get the Senate and the various administrative departments working together as one on this and so that we are resolving it and not carping at each other.

Ms. BACKLEY. I understand, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your points are well taken and I think it was appropriate for you to come here and set the record straight on that.

Ms. BACKLEY. I agree, Senator, and it is not so much a matter of feeling as though the League took abuse or Mrs. Griffiths took abuse, there were statements that were simply inaccurate and false and wrong. And it is with regards to divisions, they do occur, they occur almost in any organization. Not everybody is going to agree. The organization, I think has, as I stated, has brought about a tremendous amount of change with regards to how this issue is addressed.

The organization also now consists of the highest membership it has ever consisted in its history and there are disagreements, yes. However, we also agree on everything, in terms of the important aspects of the issue. We believe there are Americans alive in Southeast Asia and we, as family and organization, want to expedite all efforts to get them back, whether it be alive and dead, or dead.

And that is what I wanted to obviously clear up today and I think the organization has taken some very unjustifiable criticisms based upon personal views.

However, I think, yes, you could use the organization as an example, unsubstantiated allegations have been made not only on us but on the issue as a whole, in Government efforts as well as private efforts and it is something that we are firmly behind, is documentation, and I am extremely encouraged by your continued reference to that. I think that it is very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you have done what you set out to do today and I think you are been a good spokesperson for it. I also think the League deserves enormous credit and respect for the remarkable way in which it has moved the issue, moved the Depart-

ments that are dealing with it and really stood up for what it believes and for what has to happen here.

My request to you is that, as we go along here, this committee will need the League's help and the committee will need you to help apply to this whole thing, a standard of reasonableness as we look at documentation and as we do open up the process, that it not be the parent to further dissension and conspiracy, but rather it becomes the parent to, you know, a resolution of the process.

Ms. BACKLEY. Absolutely. We want to help in whatever way we can.

The CHAIRMAN. And we look forward to working with you on that.

Senator Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mrs. Backley.

I said in my opening statement when we began hearings that I thought it would be in the best interest of all that we try to work together—whatever the past has been, that we try to work together and hold the same harness, and try to get the answers that we are all seeking.

I think we all admit that we have all made mistakes in that regard in the past, for whatever reasons, and I think we have heard witnesses say, and the senators say from the top, from the Secretary of Defense on down, that the goal here is to try to work together to resolve this.

And in that spirit, I just want to point out a couple of things that I think might be helpful. And I would offer them just as that.

Jeff Donahue has stated, and has written—and these are his words—that dissenting opinion has no forum within the League. Members are forbidden access to the membership roster of the League mailing list. Questions at the annual meeting are severely limited, and no press is allowed during the general session of the annual meeting.

And I agree with Senator Kerry. I am not here to debate the internal workings of the League. They are none of my business, and I do not want to do that. And I am not trying to embarrass you by bringing that up.

What I am trying to say is that I think if those accusations are true, or they are even perceived to be true, it is not a good image for the League. As Senator Kerry has already stated there are many, many differences of opinion in the Senate, as well.

And I found that out this morning when I got beat 80 to 20 on an amendment. But I think there is room for that. The question is, is that accurate—that in your opinion, I mean are those points that I made accurate?

Ms. BACKLEY. Well, I do not believe they are accurate, Senator. I clarified the position with regard to the membership list. Confidentiality of the membership list was originally voted on in 1986, I believe. Ms. O'Grady's husband, Mr. Parsons, was even a member of the board of directors who made that motion to have that confidential. It has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the board throughout the history of the organization.

And as I pointed out in 1986, the families were polled on the League's position with regards to withholding or maintaining confidentially on the list. And 2/3rds majority of the voting members voted to maintain that. So it is the membership, the family's position that they want that maintained, in our confidence.

With regards to no press at the annual meeting, I understand, and I appreciate the opportunity that you are giving me to clarify that. Because my big problem, to be quite honest with you, Senator, is why do these begin? I do not understand, if that is the way families feel, they have an elected board of directors that they can write to.

Now I am extremely encouraged by the fact that over the past few months we have been getting letters in—not a great number—but the families have a right to write to their elected officials. As your constituents write to you, family members can write to their elected officials.

And the League board does sit down and they do discuss. That is their job. They have to. If they did not, I would be outraged as a family member. But they do. And there is a process in place.

Senator SMITH. There is, well, obviously as there is in any organization, there is a—there is deviciveness. That is not a criticism. We are going to have that.

Ms. BACKLEY. Absolutely.

Senator SMITH. I think though some of it relates to—if you go back, and I think there is enough documentation on this to say what I am saying is not controversial—if you go back to some of the memorandums, the Haldeman memorandum, for example. When you go all the way back into the Nixon years, during the war the League—when the League was beginning to organize—POW families were becoming a bit of a nuisance to the conduct of the war to use the, not my words, but the words of those who are running the Government as you saw.

So they had to deal with that. And I think evolving from that, and I think some of the criticisms—this is just my personal opinion, having talked to people on both sides—when the League director moves into the inter-agency group and you begin to get the perception that they are part of the, quote unquote "Government" not that the Government is working toward a different end—that is not the point.

But because of that past, where there was an attempt to use the family members to the benefit of the conduct of the war, which is obviously the case as we saw in the documents, there comes that criticism that why is your League director a part of the inter-agency group? Is she, in fact, part of the Government or does she represent the League?

And I think even when she testified, when Mrs. Griffiths testified here, I felt—as I believe Senator Kerry said—that her remarks were more Government-oriented than they were family oriented.

So I think that is the reason why some of these comments, these criticisms come about. And let me—and I will give you a chance to respond. I just want to say, from my own, personal experience over the past 6 or 8 years that I have been in the Congress, 7 years, there have been three things that I have been involved with, three times that I have been involved with. One was what you mentioned, the

1988 codification of information to the families; another one was the forerunner to that was H.R. 2260, which was a little bit more controversial, because I think it was misinterpreted, which involved publicizing information.

And the last one, of course, was this select committee. In all three cases, I personally, through either personal through a conversation or through a staff person, asked to address the League, or to have somebody from my staff address the League to discuss those issues.

And the one that—the 1988 codification was kind of a last—it was a result of 2260. It was a last-minute decision, almost made on the Floor, so we did not have much chance to address that. But 2260 and the select committee, which was my bill, I was denied the opportunity to—or any of my staff—to address the League on those issues in asking for their support.

From a personal perspective, personal perspective, the League can do what it wants. I am not a member of the League. I felt that that was wrong. I think that you ought to be open-minded enough to be able to accept the comments on legislation which I feel was an attempt to try to help resolve the issue.

So, you know, I bring it up only to say that I think all of us could make some changes. And if you would like to respond to it, please do.

Ms. BACKLEY. Well, the decision with regards to addressing the board, so to speak, I know during July, this past July, I believe your staff assistant, Dino Carluccio was outside of one of our board meeting doors in which it was brought up that you did want to address the board. The board was going to—the chairman of the board was going to draft and send you a letter inviting you to address the next session of the board about this Senate select committee.

What happened before the board convened or met in September is that this was established, it passed. So it was really a moot point to send a letter inviting you to address the board on the merits of the Senate select committee when it was already formed.

Senator SMITH. But you were opposed to the select committee, your board, correct?

Ms. BACKLEY. Absolutely, the last year's board was—

Senator SMITH. Can you give me a reason why you are opposed?

Ms. BACKLEY. Well, I can give you several. One, in particular, is diversion of assets, resources which the League had fought—and the families—for an incredible amount of time to get the number of assets and resources focused on the issue. We were not sure the charter and direction that the committee was going to take. It was very unclear. And we were afraid that it was going to turn into another conspiracy and cover-up, just focused on that.

We also, obviously, Senator Smith, have experienced select committees in the past. And frankly, it devastated the issue and almost destroyed the issue. And we have referred to them or they have been referred to earlier by the committee, and that was the House committee, as well as the Woodcock Commission. Both committees were forced to make a conclusion. They were temporary, and they concluded that no Americans were alive in Southeast Asia.

Senator SMITH. And they were both wrong.

Ms. BACKLEY. Absolutely, and thank you—but the ironic part about it is that the House select committee also concluded that there was little to no chance of further accountability of Americans.

Well, the organization obviously did not sit down for that. We kept on pressing. And ironically, over 230 Americans have been accounted for since the committee issued that statement.

So there is—obviously there is experience from past that led us and obviously caused us great concern. We did not want to see that committee, or this committee to take that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. And now you are filled with admiration and confidence about this committee's ability to come to resolution. [Laughter.]

Senator SMITH. I just want to say in conclusion, I appreciate your candor. And hopefully we can work together and put the past behind us.

And just from a personal standpoint, I think a lot can be done to involve some of those who, quote "have been dissentors" unquote in the process. And I think it would be profitable for all.

Ms. BACKLEY. I know the board looks forward to working with the committee in whatever capacity they can—as does Mrs. Griffiths. Again, she fully concurs with your statement in your opening remarks, Senator, as I think everybody does.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been here a long time, folks. We got here at 8:30 this morning for the committee session. And with the exception of a vote we have not left here. And so this has been a long day.

I appreciate very much your testimony. The committee now has a significant amount of work cut out for it. We will proceed, in the next weeks to have a hearing if the committee feels it has sufficient reason to have a public hearing. But a great deal of our work in the next weeks will be depositions and interrogatories and private work, and data work and so forth.

And so we will make an announcement when we will next have a public session. I want to assure all those who follow the work of this committee on a day-to-day basis—and there are many—and I want to ensure all people who are sort of interested in the public aspect of this inquiry that the fact that we are not having a public hearing does not mean we are hiding anything, nor does it mean that we are not doing anything. It means we are going to proceed to do our homework.

And there clearly will be public sessions as we proceed down here. And all data that we can conceivably make available to the public—with the exception of compromising national security as a judgment made by 12 U.S. Senators—will be made public as we proceed.

So on that note, I thank my colleague, the Vice Chairman, for his help in these early days, and cooperation. And we have a good, solid working relationship with a lot of entities going here.

And we will stand adjourned until further notice.

Mrs. BACKLEY. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m. the committee adjourned.]

THE NATION

Thailand's independent newspaper

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1991

A US-VN normalization road map

Vietnam's cooperation in resolving POW/MIA cases and progress in the implementation of the Paris agreement on Cambodia have been prominently in one version of the US State Department's four-phase "road map" toward normalization of relations with Vietnam, which was obtained by The Nation from a reliable source.

PHASE I

Phase I would begin with the signing of the Paris Conference/UN agreement on a Cambodian political settlement (which took place in Paris on Wednesday night).

Conditional on the agreement to implement the following steps:

Vietnam would:

- sign the Paris Agreement and support its full implementation;

- encourage Phnom Penh to sign and fully implement the Paris Agreement, including cooperating fully in facilitating the UN's arrival and its operations throughout the transition period;

Begin, no later than the date of the signing of the Paris Agreement:

- the release of those remaining Vietnamese detainees eligible for the Orderly Departure Programme, re-education reformation programme, and permit their departure if they so desire;

- encourage fully to resolve quickly the remaining unresolved but known alive discrepancy cases through bilateral efforts, to include providing the necessary witnesses and historical records to facilitate joint investigations;

- implement an agreed plan to resolve expeditiously live sighting reports on which the US requests assistance;

- rapidly repatriate all recovered and readily recoverable American remains;

- by the time of the signing of the Paris Agreement, formally agree to expand and accelerate unilateral, bilateral and bilateral (with Cambodia and Laos) cooperation to resolve as fully as possible all remaining POW/MIA cases with a target of completing the work in the next 24 months and longer if the US determines it would be helpful to achieving the fullest possible accounting.

- encourage the Phnom Penh authorities to agree formally to cooperate on POW/MIA matters in areas where they carry out administration during the period of submission to UN supervised elections.

At the time of signing of the Paris Agreement and with concrete evidence the above steps are being implemented, the US government will immediately:

- lift the 25-mile travel ban on Vietnamese diplomats accredited to the United Nations in New York;

- begin talks in New York concerning the status and modalities associated with normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, including the issue of claims resolution;

- change the US rules on the trade embargo to permit US-registered travel to Vietnam by US individuals, business groups such as American chamber of commerce, trade groups and other organizations including Vietnam groups;

- begin preparations to establish a liaison office in Phnom Penh to be opened at the time UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) arrives;

- encourage that it will take steps to normalize US economic relations with Cambodia, including lifting the US trade embargo toward Cambodia and supporting IFI (International Financial Institutions, such as IMF, World Bank, and ADB) projects that ease trade in place, a scenario has been implemented, and commitment of forces has been made;

- press publicly our concerns about genocide in Cambodia, and our determination to actively support those elements of the Paris agreement designed to prevent its recurrence;

- the first steps would thus represent the beginning of normalization talks and would be marked by actions by both sides to begin a step-by-step process of putting differences behind the two countries on the basis outlined above.

PHASE II

Phase II would include the United States' representatives arrived in Cambodia to establish talks and are to monitor the formal, UN supervised transition to democracy in Cambodia. A scenario would come into effect, the commitment of forces would begin and the verification of the withdrawal of foreign forces and advisers would begin.

The US will initiate steps to normalize US economic relations with Cambodia, including a lifting of the US trade embargo toward Cambodia and support of IFI projects there. During this phase, we would expect the Phnom Penh authorities to afford their fullest cooperation to cooperate on POW/MIA matters.

Regarding US-Vietnamese relations, Phase II would begin after Phase I is fully implemented.

Vietnam would have to do the following:

- fully support the implementation of all parts of the Paris Conference UN agreement, and influence Phnom Penh

to do the same;

- continue resolving with highest priority discrepancy cases of Americans last known alive with a target of completion by the end of Phase II;

- continue the rapid repatriation of Americans remains readily available to Vietnam;

- begin implementing the 24-month programme in a fully cooperative manner through regular bilateral negotiations of remains, productive joint investigations and cooperative research activities.

The United States would be prepared to take the following actions, one step at a time, as this substantial progress on POW/MIA cases occurs:

- send a high level delegation to Hanoi to continue normalization talks;

- grant an exemption to the embargo to allow US telecommunications links with Vietnam (with funds to go into bilateral account pending full lifting of the trade embargo);

- permit US firms to sign contracts to be executed when the embargo is lifted;

- lift all restrictions on non-governmental organizations and non-profit organizations programs in Vietnam;

- grant an exemption to the embargo for US commercial transactions to meet basic human needs (medical, agricultural, etc.);

- work cooperatively with other countries as a programme to help Vietnam citizens to return in the B-71;

- grant a further exemption to the embargo by establishing a World Banking policy to permit US firms to carry out the following commercial transactions related to commerce: opening offices in Vietnam, hiring staff, writing and designing plans, and carrying out preliminary feasibility studies and engineering and technical surveys.

Phase II could move very rapidly depending on progress on POW/MIA.

PHASE III

We will enter this third stage once the Cambodian settlement process is well in place. This stage will begin once the following steps have occurred:

- Vietnam and Phnom Penh have supported the implementation of the Paris Agreement for six months.

- All Vietnamese military forces and advisers have been withdrawn from Cambodia.

Commitment of forces is completed successfully.

- Cambodia — as agreed to by all four Cambodian factions — has begun and is proceeding on schedule.

Vietnam has implemented the agreed plan to resolve live sighting reports, has resolved the last known alive discrepancy case, and has repatriated the remains readily available to Vietnam.

In this regard, we call attention to General Vang's remark to Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach last October that the US believes "hundreds of men" could be recovered within a few months' time.

Substantial progress has been demonstrated in the 24-month programme on POW/MIA through productive joint investigations and repatriation and cooperative research activities.

Phnom Penh authorities have been prepared to begin to cooperate in efforts to support for missing American personnel.

The US will then do the following:

- open a diplomatic liaison office in Hanoi and permit Vietnam to establish one in Washington;

- fully lift the trade embargo;

- favorably consider voting for loans by international financial institutions (World Bank, ADB, etc.) for basic human needs projects;

Phase III is that the period in which tangible results are achieved, particularly in regard to Vietnam's economic and financial needs, on the assumption that the specified steps on Cambodia and POW/MIA have occurred.

PHASE IV

This final stage would occur when:

- A free, democratic election, as certified by the UN, has taken place in Cambodia.

The new Cambodian national assembly has been formed and is meeting in a new session.

Demobilization of all former Cambodian military forces — as agreed in the Paris agreement by the four Cambodian parties — has been fully accomplished.

The US and Vietnam agree that previous POW/MIA pledges have been met and the 24-month POW/MIA programme has achieved significant results and is coming to a close.

At this point, the US would be prepared to do the following:

- establish full diplomatic relations with Vietnam and exchange ambassadors;

- consider granting MFN (most favored nation) status to Vietnam, consistent with Jackson-Vanik requirements;

- favorably consider non-humanitarian needs loans in the various stabilization and development banks and international financial institutions — assuming, as required by US law, that Vietnam's human rights record permits.

This is an unofficial version of the road map, published in "The Nation," an independent newspaper in Thailand. The State Department road map is classified.

12/08/91 13:00

--- POW/MIA Affairs 0002

To: Senator John Kerry, Mass. 202-224-
From: Monika Jensen-Stevenson 2155

October 6th, 1991

Dear Senator Kerry,

Thank you for your letter of Nov. 25th requesting responses from me by Dec. 6th. Thank you, too, for the courtesy and kindness you extended toward me on the day I gave testimony. It is unfortunate that, probably because of the Christmas mail rush your letter reached us just this morning. We are about to depart on our journey back to the far east with a few stops on the way. I will, however, do my best to answer your questions.

1. I have already turned over the information about Casino Man (with his permission) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff KIA/POW investigation. Since you first made your request I have also tried to contact him to get his permission to reveal his name to you. I have received no response and am not certain that he has gotten the message. I am certain, however, that you can get what you need on this from Senator Grassley, since his staffers investigated charges related to Casino Man's findings that were brought to the Justice Department. If you remember, both Senator Grassley and Helms agreed to cooperate with you on this matter. Another knowledgeable person is Colonel Earl Kopper who has a taped record of his conversations with the same person.

2. I have never personally received a letter from Congressman Gilman about our book or anything else. I found out during the hearings that the League of Families was distributing a letter allegedly from Congressman Gilman complaining about the fact that we had not interviewed relevant people like the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This letter was full of errors—the most blatant being the charge that I did not speak to DIA. I did have a lengthy meeting with DIA Director Lenny Perrotto when he still held that office. That meeting was set up with the help of Captain Eugene (Red) McDaniel through the auspices of Congressman Ike Skelton, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee. As I pointed out in a letter to the same person Congressman Gilman addressed his letter to, the Congressman could easily have checked with his colleague Ike Skelton to find out if I was telling the truth. In order to do that, however, he would have had to read the book Kiss the Boys Goodbye which by his own admission he did not. I find it difficult, frankly, to answer such legally liable, obviously made-up charges brought by someone who has not read the book.

3. I appreciate Senator McCain's sudden return of memory on the Norman Gaddis case. The fact, however, is that just about a year ago, on a national television program, Senator McCain stated that he had no quarrel with our book and disputed nothing except the fact that we did not lay proper blame at the feet of the Vietnamese. Captain McDaniel also participated in that program and has a copy of the tape which he will be happy to make available to you. Any investigation I found that it was a common belief among a good number of former POWs that there was more than one case like that of Gaddis. This particular case was as well known that Larry O'Daniel also mentioned it in his 1979 book Missing in Action: Trail of Deceit. N.Y.: Arlington House 1979.

12/08/91 13:10

--- POW/MIA Affairs 0003

2 Senator John Kerry cont.

3. Our book was vetted by former POW Captain Eugene (Red) McDaniel. As you know, he has done extensive research on this issue and had an outstanding record as a prisoner. I encourage Senator McCain and the Committee as a whole to invite him to testify.

4. I explained during my testimony that I am unable to break the promise of confidentiality given to this particular witness. I know, however, that Colonel Al Shinkle is trusted by people who can testify to this fact to such a degree that they will come forward if he guarantees their safety. I urge you to work this out with him. I will also do my best to persuade everyone who spoke to me confidentially to come forward and speak to the committee. If you would like to find out how the Vietnamese, in the past, have made offers and requests, not necessarily in the presence of Deputy Secretary Quinn, perhaps it would be useful for you to speak to my husband, the co-author of KISS and to Mr. Ross Perot as well as to former National Security Advisor Richard Allen.

5. The names of individuals knowledgeable about this are in the files of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority investigation. They include a well known and high ranking Laotian officer. (former). I am sure you understand why I cannot transmit them to you in this fashion. I urge you, however, to speak to Mr. McCoy. Not only is he the most knowledgeable person about this, the information in this book has been confirmed by many high ranking Thai officers. Another excellent source of information about this is Michael Levine the former DEA group supervisor for its New York office and the winner of the prestigious International Narcotics Enforcement Officer Association Octavio Gonzales Award.

6. Former Deputy Director of DIA, Admiral Cutler, ²⁴ have already turned over to Committee staffers the confidential name of the person who worked closely with Colonel Nick Rowe. A primary source of this information spoke to us only through the assistance of Mr. Chris Kolesnik who works for Senator Grassley. I am therefore obligated to ask you to reach the same source through Mr. Kolesnik. The CIA papers from the Ron Oswald case in Hawaii (whose chief prosecutor was publicly identified as a CIA official) are also very informative about this issue. Again, I have given Committee staffers the name of the person who has access to them. In addition I have made available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation the DIA file on one recent rescue effort. I have also given your staffers the name of lawyers involved in deposing some of the government officials involved.

I hope that you find this helpful. As you know I am more than happy to cooperate with you further. I must tell you though that I was gravely concerned about the fact that Senator McCain in his questions to me referred not to the published version of our book but to the copy of a manuscript that we can only assume was stolen from our first publisher who opted not to publish it. This copy was deliberately distorted by an inexperienced editor who joined the staff of the publishing house after our book was already completed. He went to "radicalize" the book, but instead changed facts to rumors and just generally changed the tenor of it to make it unacceptable to us. When our lawyers made it clear that, in no way would we allow that version to go forward, the publisher opted not to go forward with publication. It is common knowledge that we then

12/08/81 13:30

--- POW/MIA Affairs

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Senator Kerry Cont.

sued. The case was later settled and as you know other publishers published the book in three countries, including the U.S. Senator McCain referred to a chapter of our book that is not in the published version, but was in the distorted version that should have been returned to us or destroyed. We would like very much to know how Senator McCain got access to it.

Thank you again for your courtesy.

Sincerely,

Monika Jensen-Stevenson
Monika Jensen-Stevenson

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN LANE EVANS (D-IL)
TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Select Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony for the record. At the onset, I would like to commend the entire committee for its efforts to finally resolve this issue. As Members of Congress and citizens of the United States, it is our responsibility to do everything possible to account for our missing service and civilian personnel.

As a Marine, I was taught that we were never to leave anyone behind, dead or alive. This simple rule is drilled into all our military personnel from boot camp until discharge. Nevertheless, there remain 2,273 U.S. service and civilian personnel unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. The fate of these brave men and women continues to be one of the most divisive and painful legacies of the Vietnam War. The U.S. government owes it to these individuals, their families, and the country as a whole to account for our POWs and MIAs.

Despite the fact that Presidents Reagan and Bush have called the POW/MIA issue our "highest national priority," there is no question that the American government has handled the issue poorly. Even today, virtually all reliable information remains classified so that the American public still remains in the dark about what progress has been made since Operation Homecoming. We also owe all of those affected an explanation of what the U.S. government has done and what it desperately needs to do to conclude this painful chapter in our nation's history.

The American public's trust in the government's handling of this issue has never been lower. The recent storm of controversy over the allegations of Col. Millard Peck, former head of the Pentagon's POW/MIA office, and the surfacing of alleged photographs of POW/MIA's has only added fuel to the fire. I hope that in addition to stirring the government to do a more complete and thorough job on answering the POW/MIA question, we can also convince the American people that its own government will pursue this issue as truly one of its "highest national priorities". I think that the creation of this Committee, along with the hearings you are now holding, will help accomplish this goal.

While we cannot forget or excuse the failure of the Vietnamese and American governments to resolve this issue, we have to recognize that we are now faced with a tremendous opportunity. When I traveled to Vietnam last July, I noted that with its recent change in leadership the Vietnamese government is far more willing than ever before to help us account for our missing personnel.

-2-

They promised that our government, veterans organizations, and families will be able to go anywhere at anytime without prior notification to investigate both crash sites and live sighting reports. They have also promised access to previously classified military records in their military libraries, archives, and museums. We need to take these promises seriously and we ought to push other governments of Southeast Asia for the same kind of access.

Congress has and can continue to play a vital role in our attempt to resolve the issue. I am sure that your committee will prove to be an important step in this process. The committee will allow Congress to fully examine to problems that have plagued our efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue. It will also provide us with a forum to explore the best strategy to pursue from here on out. Similarly, legislation such as the "Truth" bill, of which I am a cosponsor, would establish formal procedures in the investigative process and also serve as a check on the process.

As you know, the "Truth" bill, H.R. 1730, would establish a thorough procedure of investigations to analyze the evidence pertaining to the missing person before the finding of death can be made. This legislation would also give the families of POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam conflict the right to review the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of their loved one. H.R. 2208 would provide procedural due process in determining the status of missing persons. It would also require the Secretary of Defense to review the procedures regarding the determination and resolution of the missing status. The bill also directs the heads of Federal departments or agencies which hold or receive records and information which could possibly have been correlated to U.S. personnel listed as POWs and MIAs after 1940, including from World War II and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, to publicly disclose such records and information.

I am happy to say that the President and his staff are now following Congress' lead by paying more attention to this important issue. The Department of Defense has recently opened a new office in Hanoi to deal with POW/MIA issues. DOD also has authorized a new deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW/MIA affairs and plans to expand the staff assigned to this issue from 138 to 240.

Finally, as a former Marine and a member of both the House Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, I assure you that I have and will continue to do all that I can to seek ensure a full accounting of our military personnel that have died or been detained in other countries. It is in the interest of all Americans, and it is certainly the obligation of this nation, to locate these individuals who have sacrificed so dearly for their country.

THOMAS R. CARPER
BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 25, 1991

The Honorable John Kerry
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
SH - 705
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear John:

I am pleased to transmit to you and the members of the committee the attached report that several of my colleagues and I who served in the Vietnam War - Representatives Skaggs, Peterson, Kolbe, Rhodes, and Glichrest - compiled as a result of our recent mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in August, 1991, for the November 5, 6, and 7 hearing records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

In returning to Southeast Asia for the first time since the Vietnam war, we reviewed the POW/MIA issue; the need for a comprehensive, international accord on Cambodia; the prospect of normalization of relations with Vietnam and Cambodia and upgrading relations with Laos; and the lifting of the economic embargo against Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Administration has stated that it would begin the process of normalization of relations with Vietnam once a comprehensive settlement for Cambodia is signed. Now that an agreement has been signed, discussions can begin pertaining to normalizing relations between the United States and these Southeast Asian countries and lifting the U.S. economic embargo against Vietnam and Cambodia.

I hope this report will be of value to you in reviewing these issues.

Sincerely,

*John, many thanks
for your willing to meet
with us in August prior to our COBOL'S
departure for S.E. Asia. Collectively,
we've done some good, I think.
Obviously, more remains to be done, and
we look forward to working with you*

Tom Carper
Member of Congress

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OCT 24 1991

REPORT
OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

TRIP TO

SOUTHEAST ASIA

August 3 - 11, 1991

FOREWORD

In March 1991, Congressman Pete Peterson and I began discussions which grew into a month-long fact-finding probe into the long-unresolved controversy over the fate of America's missing-in-action servicemen who are still unaccounted for more than 15 years after the Vietnam War. Our review and analysis led us to organize a Congressional delegation, unique in composition and mission.

We enlisted a bipartisan delegation marked not only by its members' common bond of military service in Vietnam, but by their open spirit of inquiry. As we began planning what was to be our first trip back to Vietnam since the war, each brought longstanding questions about the fate of fellow servicemen. Only weeks before our trip, the publication of a photograph of three individuals identified by family members as their long-missing loved ones provoked sharp reactions across the country.

Over the years, our country's views of the POW/MIA issue have been influenced by conflicting forces. The hopes of loved ones have been manipulated -- by governments of the region, by profiteers, by sensationalists. Many have questioned our own government's role in resolving the POW/MIA dilemma. Was there a coverup, as some alleged? Has resolution of the issue been a real governmental priority? Was the failure to make more progress a symptom of mismanagement or incompetence? Was the secrecy which shrouded our government's efforts to gather information frustrating its aim of winning public understanding?

The announcement, in April, 1991, that our Government would address the POW/MIA issue as part of a "roadmap" which would govern the pace and scope of any normalization of our relations with the government of Vietnam gave added focus to our agenda. Despite the State Department's apparent unwillingness to share the text of its roadmap with the CODEL, the Department and many government and nongovernment officials urged us to reinforce its message to those leaders we might meet in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Perhaps ironically, the roadmap fused two of the most haunting remnants of conflict in post World War II Southeast Asia -- the genocidal devastation and civil war in Cambodia and the unresolved fate of America's missing in action.

We set out for Southeast Asia in August, therefore, to study all facets of the POW/MIA issue as well as the process of settlement of the civil war in Cambodia, both key elements of the roadmap. We did so on the premise that an "on-the-ground" analysis might be not only more telling, but that it might differ substantially from "findings" reached in Washington, D.C.

We framed our inquiry to focus on four subjects: (1) the intensity and effectiveness of our own government's efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue; (2) the level of cooperation we are receiving from governments in Southeast Asia; (3) progress toward a comprehensive, lasting peace in Cambodia; and (4) the process for normalizing relations between our country and both Vietnam and Cambodia, and for moving toward full diplomatic relations with Laos.

This publication reflects our findings. It reflects the rich, diverse backgrounds of the members -- experience in military service, foreign affairs, intelligence, international trade and economics, organization and management, and veterans' issues. Most importantly, it reflects the objectivity with which the CODEL members confronted the vexing questions they studied. Despite differences in their backgrounds, the members had a common commitment to conduct a studied, independent analysis of the issues. That open spirit of inquiry and the debt we owe to those who did not return from this war, as well as to the anguished families of the missing in action, have, in my view, forged a commitment far more compelling than party or philosophy of government. It is my hope, and that of the members of this delegation, that this report will help move us closer to the answers we all seek.

TOM CARPER

INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 1991, a bipartisan group of members of the House of Representatives began an eight day trip to Southeast Asia to complete an examination into the fate of servicemen unaccounted for in Southeast Asia; progress on the search for a satisfactory settlement of the civil war in Cambodia; and the process of improving and normalizing relations between the United States and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, respectively. The delegation consisted of Representatives Carper, Peterson, Kolbe, Rhodes, Skaggs, and Gilchrest. The delegation met with officials of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the State of Cambodia, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The trip also included a series of en-route briefing and fact-finding sessions with Department of

Defense officials at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, and with State Department and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand. (See attached schedule.)

This report incorporates current information furnished by officials of the countries we visited, as well as our own analysis and recommendations, based on extensive study, briefings, and observations. We hope this report will be helpful to the Congress as it is called upon to consider legislation or to review policies on the issues discussed. We take the liberty of directing this report as well to the Executive Branch in view of the paramount importance we, and, we believe, the American people, attach to these issues.

This delegation was privileged to travel to this region and study these issues at a critical point in time. We respectfully offer our views to those entrusted with responsibility to shape and execute national policy.

DISCUSSION

In one sense, our journey to Southeast Asia began long before we boarded our C-135 at Andrews Air Force Base. In some measure it began with our service in the Vietnam War more than twenty years ago, representing, as we do, the experience of Army and Marines on the ground, Navy in the air and inland waterways, and Air Force in the skies. This journey was a genuine quest for answers, and each of us had been seeking those answers long before this CODEL was conceived.

Our search had its roots in the Vietnam war, a conflict which shaped each of us as individuals, and from which each of us returned a stronger person.

Just as the war affected us as individuals, the conflict and its aftermath altered us as a nation. As a society, we have grown from that experience, and largely put the war behind us. We in the Congress have helped bring about that closure -- through the establishment and funding of veterans' programs, the development of a framework for resolving claims based on "Agent Orange" exposure, and many other ways.

Vestiges of the war have continued to haunt us, however. None has had more troubling effect than the wrenching questions evoked by the letters "POW/MIA."

As veterans of the Vietnam War, we feel a special poignancy in the question -- what happened to our missing in action? Grappling with that question as a group, though, has taken us in many directions. In this effort, we have re-walked paths a number of our colleagues in Congress had charted, reviewing their hearing

records, reports, and studies. Over several weeks, we met with virtually every available expert -- inside the U.S. government and out, from spokesmen for, to the most vigorous opponents of, Administration policy.

Pursuing questions methodically and analytically, we continued to confront voices of skepticism and distrust. Allegations of "government coverup" continue to find their way into a national debate which has come to be referred to as "the POW/MIA issue". Is there substance to the "conspiracy" theory? If not, how would one overcome such perceptions? Travel to Southeast Asia, see things on the ground! You'll see all we're doing to get this issue behind us," we were told. However, we found the view on the ground in Southeast Asia almost as obscured as the view from Washington.

It is clear that resolving the POW/MIA issue is a matter of national policy. It is equally clear, however, that the policy has never had the "top" priority our chief executives have rhetorically assigned it.

We salute the many dedicated, talented professionals -- linguists, anthropologists, forensic analysts, technicians, and others -- who have devoted years, and often much of their professional working lives, to searching for hidden answers. We want to provide that acknowledgment because they seldom if ever win medals or public accolades for their painstaking work. Like so much of the work associated with this "highest national priority" it is a story that has never been fully told and thus not understood. Their work has helped to unravel the mystery for many families of missing servicemen, and ended years of doubt and uncertainty. They deserve the praise and admiration of all Americans for their selfless work under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

Policymaking

We have certainly seen considerable energy and a high level of U.S. government concern devoted to POW/MIA matters in recent months. Over the years and up to the present, however, dedicated and focused central management, direction, and consistent coordination of POW/MIA activities has seemed as much fortuitous as planned. This sweeping charge is not made lightly or without due regard to the complexity of the job.

Reluctantly, we have to question the leadership directing those efforts. We question whether, at the highest level, there has been the kind of ongoing, hands-on direction needed to carry out a compelling national priority.

It appears that policy on the POW/MIA issue is not set by any one single responsible official. Instead, policymaking regarding the POW/MIA issue is "coordinated" through an interagency body -- the POW/MIA Interagency Group (IAG). That group's membership

includes representatives of the Defense Department, the National Security Council staff, the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National League of POW/MIA Families. The IAG reportedly meets relatively infrequently.

We have not attempted to make any judgment regarding past decisions to use an interagency mechanism to carry out policymaking on this issue. But after evaluating existing arrangements, we believe a new direction is needed. In our view, more aggressive efforts must be taken to find any American servicemen who may still be alive in Southeast Asia, and to locate and identify remains of others. We do not believe an interagency coordinating group provides the best framework for carrying out this mission.

Such an effort requires more than simply "coordination." Indeed it may be that our government has been "coordinating" too long and not managing enough. In any event, we find no basis to believe that the IAG is -- or could be -- singlemindedly devoted to achieving the mission we believe must be established. By virtue of the composition, and the coordinating role it plays, the IAG's members necessarily owe their first loyalty to their parent organizations. As a result, it would appear that the MIA issue itself has become, or perhaps has always been, driven by competing interests, subordinate to and overshadowed by national security, diplomacy, protection of intelligence assets, and other government and private interests.

In examining the operation of the IAG as currently structured, we find no precedent for a representative of a nongovernmental organization, the National League of Families, participating as a member of a high-level governmental working group. It is of utmost importance that our government act with sensitivity to the families of those missing in action. That sensitivity should be balanced, however, with a sensitivity to distinctions between the grant of advisory authority and that of decisionmaking authority. It is not clear that such lines have been appropriately drawn here.

Priority

Our government has identified resolution of the POW/MIA issue as a high national priority. But it has not organized and managed that effort commensurate with its rhetoric. No administration has devoted to this issue the level of resources that would presumably attach to our "highest national priority." Even setting aside the rhetoric, our government has simply not done a good job of basic management.

We have not, it seems to us, identified with sufficient clarity and focus just what the POW/MIA mission is. Indeed there are different missions, and we question the assignment of priorities among them.

It remains our Government's view that it can not rule out the possibility that Americans missing in action remain alive in

Southeast Asia. Our own visit, while providing no indication that any government is holding American prisoners of war, gave ample evidence of why the American public has come to doubt its own government's effort to resolve these questions. One must question the priority that has been given to finding these men.

Our Government's policy holds, in pertinent part, that "actions to investigate live-sighting reports receive and will continue to receive necessary priority and resources based on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive." (Emphasis added.) It is noteworthy that the "cannot rule out the possibility" position was only adopted in 1987. From 1973 to 1987, the government position was that "no living MIA/POWs remained in Southeast Asia."

As to current policy, the precise meaning of the phrase "necessary priority" is not clear. Our own observations lead us to conclude, however, that our government's primary energies and resources -- such as they are -- are being devoted not to any aggressive effort to find the living, but instead to locating remains and accounting for the deceased. Since 1987, the method of search for live Americans has been essentially "reaction" rather than "action" oriented. More specifically, the search has been largely an exercise in rejecting evidence: disproving the validity of photographs and debunking reports of "live sightings", rather than aggressively trying to determine if they are true. The presumption seems to lie on the side of hoax and falsehood.

It is simplistic, and bordering on the evasive, for our Government to declare that "[o]nly the communist governments of Indochina know the answer." (See DoD's POW-MIA Factbook, July 1991.) One could infer from that statement that our own government is under no real obligation to act, let alone take heroic measures. In any case, the facts belie the "only they know" proposition. This DoD rhetoric ignores the fact that Laos, for example, is a desperately poor country whose infrastructure is so fragile that its major cities are not linked by a highway network. Travel from point to point may take two weeks. If one of the more than 500 pilots downed over Laos (only nine of whom were among those released in 1973 in Operation Homecoming) survived and fell into the hands of forces other than the Pathet Lao, for example, might he be alive today in one of the many remote parts of Laos not subject to the control of the central government? In terms of what is known and knowable, we have to consider that possibility seriously. Indeed knowledgeable U.S. Government officials found reason to believe that recently released photos, one set initially thought by some to be of Navy Lt. Daniel Borah and another strongly resembling Army Captain Donald Carr, were taken in Laos. (Our delegation urged the Lao to give all possible assistance and access to U.S. efforts to investigate those cases. The Lao did follow through aggressively. That effort, however, led to the finding in the first case that the photos thought to be of Lt. Borah, compelling as they appeared to be, were not of an American.)

Organizational Structure

Just as the POW/MIA mission on which our Government is embarked appears to suffer from a lack of focus and misdirection of purpose, its execution is hampered by what could be characterized as a byzantine organizational arrangement.

After reviewing our Government's POW/MIA operations, we found ourselves asking the question, "who's in charge here?" One finds no satisfactory answer to that question. Indeed the answer seems to be "everyone", and, thus, "no one". Why that is so becomes readily apparent: the organizational landscape is crowded with different offices. These include a POW/MIA office in the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), the Special Presidential Emissary for POW/MIA; and the POW/MIA Interagency Group.

Certain responsibilities among these offices overlap. Each reports to a different authority. Information-sharing among them is uneven. Coordination among them appears to be a matter of practice, but is not organizationally assured. Some are dedicated exclusively to POW/MIA issues; others are subject to being diverted from that effort to address entirely unrelated responsibilities. Finally, the authority of the entity dedicated to coordinating policy on POW/MIA matters, the Interagency Group, is simply undefined.

The missions of the various offices and agencies with responsibilities for POW/MIA matters vary widely in scope. For example, the able Special Presidential Emissary, General Vessey, has a very narrow formal mission: resolution of 119 "discrepancy cases." Nevertheless, the perception in America and abroad is that this official heads the entire POW/MIA investigative effort. We can only speculate as to whether this is due to his identification as a Presidential representative, the high esteem in which General Vessey is held, or some other reason.

An effort to pinpoint the various offices involved in the POW/MIA issue, their respective missions, and their reporting arrangements is, frankly, confusing. What then, do the families of those missing in action, or the foreign governments whom we are pressing, make of it?

While we have concluded that no one is really "in charge" of the government's POW/MIA effort, the command structure of the organizational components of that effort suggests too that it is not a high profile, high priority effort. For example, what the Defense Department reports to be "the only government organization which has as its sole mission resolving the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel who remain unaccounted for as a result of the Southeast Asian conflict" (i.e. JCRC) is headed by a lieutenant colonel.

The services have signalled the priority they assign to the issue both in the ranks at which these command positions are maintained and in the manner they have been filled. Instead of a regular rotation of command and the new vision and incentives for mission success that go with it, the services have permitted officers to remain in command slots for as much as a decade. These positions have become truly "dead end" slots, due, apparently, to the priority placed on the mission. As such, they have not attracted the best managers and commanders.

The services should not be singled out for blame. If we are correct in believing that the services have not assigned POW/MIA operations a high priority, we are saying no more than that they reflect an attitude which has been prevalent in other parts of our government. And yet the relatively low ebb at which these operations are carried out is at shocking variance from the expectations of the American public, let alone the families of the missing. At its most basic level, the relative lack of priority means the work of our people in the field is seriously hampered by poor support. JCRC personnel working in the field, for example, asked our assistance to acquire ordinary field equipment.

We were all impressed with, and touched by, the dedication and sacrifice of the men and women working in the field in such demanding work as investigation and excavation. We certainly don't want this report to impugn those who have given so much of themselves to the POW/MIA effort or to denigrate the fine work they're doing. Our call is for more focused leadership, and better organization and management. To call for a more aggressive effort is not to characterize ongoing activities as unimportant. To the contrary, we are sensitive to the commitment and efforts of those who labor to excavate remains, to interview refugees, to track down live-sighting reports, to find archival records, to catalogue endless fragments of information, and to piece together bone and dental remains.

What is clearly missing is a single high-level office with responsibility to manage resolution of POW/MIA affairs, armed with the recognized priority, resources, and sense of urgency to accelerate and amplify ongoing efforts.

Allegations of "Coverup"

In view of the many-faceted effort involved in compiling a full accounting of the fate of the missing-in-action, it is profoundly disturbing that a number of Americans still cling to notions of government "cover-up". While it should go without saying, it is clear to us that our Government is not engaged in any conspiracy or "cover-up" on the POW/MIA issue. Unfortunately, the government's mishandling of the issue -- the lack of priority assigned to it and the organizational problems in the command structure -- has provided grist for the mills of the conspiracy theorists.

Significantly, an aura of clandestine secretiveness surrounds the entire POW/MIA operation. It is difficult to disassociate that secretiveness from the perception that a government operating in darkness must have something more to hide than its sources of information. The need to weigh carefully the value of maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information against the public's right to know takes on extraordinary significance in the context of POW/MIA affairs especially with all the misinformation and perception of government wrongdoing.

When Americans question whether they can trust their own government, as many do regarding the POW/MIA issue, we should take notice. But the secrecy surrounding its POW/MIA operation compounds the credibility problem our government has in claiming "this is an issue of the highest national priority."

We believe it's time to bring the POW/MIA issue as fully as possible out into the open. To demystify it, it is imperative that we declassify much of it. Communicating completely, objectively, and accurately is never an easy task for government. But such communication is an important part of what is needed to win public confidence that everything possible is being done to render a full accounting of the missing in action.

In urging that our Government take steps to restore public confidence, we also emphasize the importance of continued sensitivity to the depth and volatility of feeling on the POW/MIA issue. Some groups and individuals continue to charge that governments in Indochina are holding large numbers of Americans against their will. We have found no evidence to corroborate such charges. However, it is important that U.S. public officials avoid actions that would fuel such speculation.

Ultimately, we call on the government to assure not only that its efforts are as open as possible, but that its focus be clear and unequivocal. That focus must, as a first priority, be on finding any Americans who may still be alive in Southeast Asia. A prescription for aggressive action is needed. It is clear that time is running out -- and future efforts will be measured against that reality.

Foreign Cooperation on POW/MIA Issues

In reviewing with U.S. officials the cooperation we are receiving from the governments in the region, it became apparent -- just as is the case with other aspects of the issue -- that only part of the story is "getting out". Rather than "stonewalling", as many have believed to be the case, we found that cooperation by these governments, particularly Vietnam, is improving. Of course, only a few years ago we confronted a very different attitude in the region. Those working in the Departments of Defense, State, and other tasked agencies deserve credit for their collective efforts which have helped to bring the Vietnamese, particularly, to the

current level of cooperation.

This is not to say that we should be satisfied with the levels of current cooperation. In fact, we pressed that point consistently in high-level meetings throughout this trip. This is an important message, and one that should be raised repeatedly in all our contacts with those governments. In fact, Vietnamese officials gave promises of even more cooperation and allocation of resources; these assurances should be tested quickly.

At the same time, recognition should be given to the cooperation and assistance we are receiving. It is ironic that our government should have diplomatic relations with Laos, a country which, until recently, has provided relatively limited assistance in POW/MIA matters despite the widespread view that most of the unanswered questions concerning the missing-in-action lie in Laos, while maintaining a trade embargo against, and diplomatically isolating, Vietnam, a country which has substantially increased its cooperation on a range of POW/MIA issues. The question must be raised whether beginning the process of normalization of relations with Vietnam and lifting the economic embargo is likely to enhance or diminish Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA issues.

By contrast, Laos, while saying the right things, has done less than Vietnam. Laos has agreed to a "one-year plan" for investigating crash sites. The U.S. has made proposals to the Laotians aimed at increasing the resources -- materiel and personnel -- devoted to these efforts. Our delegation urged Lao officials to do so. We do find noteworthy the support the Lao furnished U.S. investigators this summer, which ultimately produced disappointing findings in the case of photographs family members had identified as being of Navy Lt. Daniel Borah.

Laos, which has diplomatic relations with us, seeks to elevate relations to the ambassadorial level, and to win most-favored nation trading status. But the Laotian government clearly understands that future relations with the U.S. depend on improved cooperation on MIA issues.

It is important, however, that we not focus too narrowly in our efforts to secure the fullest possible cooperation overseas on POW/MIA matters. The Vietnam War, we know, saw many East bloc countries, from nearby China to far-off Cuba, lend support to the North Vietnamese. That support ranged from materiel assistance to stationing military advisers in-country. The effort to resolve the POW/MIA issue is ultimately a search for information, and we must seek that out wherever it may be. Indeed the radically changed or changing geopolitical climate in many of North Vietnam's former wartime allies suggests that the opportunity to secure cooperation and information from such governments may be greater now than perhaps ever before. We appreciate that the Department of State has pursued such inquiry with the Soviet Union, China, and other governments. We do not question the aggressiveness of that pursuit. We simply urge the Department to continue to explore

these channels, consistent with the priority this search demands.

Vietnam

It is clear that all the countries in the region want improved relations with the United States. They realize that the Soviet Union, their former patron, has more pressing domestic concerns, and they are anxious to avoid domination by Japan or China. Voices in this country have urged our Government to forge a lasting trading relationship with Vietnam, a country which seems to be seeking to put enmity behind it. In our view, both nations could potentially benefit in the long term from a closer political and economic relationship.

Vietnam is a country of roughly 70 million people. It is noteworthy that that population has climbed substantially since the war's end and the country's unification in 1975 when, according to United Nations census data, the combined population of North and South Vietnam totalled 48 million. Also, that population is relatively young, with a median age of 20.9 years, and its labor force is estimated to number 35 million. Domestically, Vietnam has instituted major economic reforms which have begun to improve the quality of its people's lives. Still Vietnam remains a desperately poor country with dramatic needs for infrastructure improvement and for economic development. The U.S. can play a major role in that nation's economic "blossoming" or we can cede those opportunities to international competitors.

Our State Department's formula for the process of normalization with Vietnam is set out in a "roadmap" which ties normalization of diplomatic and economic relations to continued progress on POW/MIA efforts and to Vietnam's carrying out our policy goals for achievement of a Cambodian peace settlement. The "roadmap" concept can be helpful, in our view. And our Government must be prepared to honor its stated commitment to "immediately" proceed on the path toward normalization as soon as the conditions stipulated in the first phase of that understanding are met.

A roadmap can provide more than a single route to the destination, however. In other words, the "roadmap" should not become a "roadblock." While we see merit in conditioning full normalization of diplomatic and economic ties to certain actions by the Government of Vietnam, we believe that that government has taken steps which warrant our giving consideration to review and possible relaxation of certain aspects of our trade embargo. The relatively rapid progress toward a peace settlement in Cambodia also suggests the need to reassess the precise formula reflected in the "roadmap."

Vietnam's recent 7th Party Congress suggests both a continuing emphasis on market-based economic reform and a "tilt" toward China. These developments also suggest the value of a positive signal from the United States. Vietnam faces deep financial problems with the elimination of Soviet aid, and with

Japanese and European companies poised to reap opportunities there for trade, our Government's posture ultimately may place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage.

In our view, a first step at least is warranted -- to grant an exception to our country's trade embargo to permit telecommunications links between our countries. If we can re-establish telecommunications links with Iraq as we have recently done, we should do no less in Vietnam. It would appear that the bar to such links takes its heaviest toll not on the Government of Vietnam, but on our own Vietnamese-Americans, who are denied the means to speak with loved ones who remained behind as well as on U.S. personnel operating in Vietnam. A second element could be to eliminate the 25-mile travel restriction on Vietnamese officials working at the United Nations. We have called repeatedly on the Vietnamese to ease travel restrictions on U.S. officials and citizens traveling in that country. Our calls would be more credible if we eliminated what appears to be simply a punitive restriction. In that connection, it would be helpful for our Government to allow American businessmen to travel to Vietnam to explore commercial possibilities. Such a step, well short of actually conducting business, would also enhance search efforts by placing more American feet in-country and fostering more spontaneous travel to isolated regions. In taking such initial steps vis-a-vis Vietnam, however, it is important to avoid creating the perception that they represent elements of a quid pro quo. To that end, these steps could well be taken without fanfare or pronouncements; the message would be easily understood by the Vietnamese.

This delegation witnessed the promising working relationship which has developed between members of our POW/MIA office in Hanoi and their Vietnamese counterparts. The opening of that office, the access our people are getting to pertinent military archive materials, the Government's willingness to permit American officials to begin visiting prison facilities, and other actions taken in response to recent requests in connection with the publication of the "Robertson/Lundy/Stevens" photo, for example, are not insignificant acts. This is particularly so in light of the more hesitant and limited cooperation we have enjoyed in some of our dealings with the Lao.

Vietnamese officials characterize their cooperation in accounting for the fate of our missing-in-action as "humanitarian." Surely, it is in our interest to respond in a similarly humanitarian manner by opening telecommunications links. Although this step is currently contemplated only in the second phase of the "roadmap", favorable action at this time, reflecting some flexibility, seems appropriate.

Still, there is very credible evidence that, although Vietnam has turned over remains in the past, it continues to hold the remains of additional Americans. In discussions with Government officials, the delegation emphasized the importance of

"unilaterally" returning recovered remains, and suggested that such action would benefit both of our countries. As the roadmap itself makes clear, the repatriation of remains in Vietnam's possession is an issue which must be resolved before we consider full normalization. In that regard, the Vietnamese can take still further action to repatriate remains. In our discussions, we requested the Vietnamese to institute appropriate steps to waive or alter laws which bar or inhibit Vietnamese citizens from bringing forward or identifying the whereabouts of remains of U.S. servicemen. While we obtained no commitment on this point, it is an issue we would urge our Government to pursue further.

Cambodia

We cannot overstate the importance to the region of achieving real peace in Cambodia. The "roadmap" is right, in our view, in calling on Vietnam to use its influence to press for a comprehensive peace settlement. The Cambodians themselves have taken important steps in that direction. Here, too, our Government can reach its objectives along more than one road.

In our discussions, we urged Cambodian officials as well as the Vietnamese -- who can play an important role -- to work toward a comprehensive, lasting settlement. We pressed them to follow the general framework, if not the blueprint, of the Cambodian peace plan endorsed by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. There are certainly limits to the leverage which the Vietnamese can exert, particularly given the well-founded Cambodian concern that the formula for a settlement not provide any opening for the Khmer Rouge to seize power. Nevertheless, there appear to be common interests within Cambodia -- and in the region in achieving a comprehensive, lasting settlement which ensures the right of the Cambodian people to elect their own government and which protects against the return of a genocidal regime in Phnom Penh. Resumption of relations between China and Vietnam points in this direction.

Differences remain on the nature and extent of a U.N. role in disarming and demobilizing the armed forces of the warring factions. These differences stem from an enormous and justified mistrust of the motives and plans of the Khmer Rouge. While we have encouraged adherence to the U.N. plan, one should not be surprised to see the nations most affected -- Cambodia, Vietnam, China, and Thailand -- reach their own understanding. As long as such an understanding is comprehensive in scope, and guarantees the Cambodian people self-determination, while checking foreign interference in Cambodian internal affairs, we do not believe such an accommodation should adversely affect the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam.

Stability in this region is clearly linked to stability in Cambodia. With that perspective, we note that Cambodian peace talks continue to progress at a pace which gives a real basis for optimism.

Laos

Like Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos is clearly a state in transition. It is progressing methodically, with substantial economic reforms, to develop something closer to a free-market economy. The country has only recently adopted a new constitution. It is a country with great needs. Understandably, Laos' concerns vis-a-vis the United States occupy a relatively lower priority than those of many other nations. In regional terms, however, it should not be overlooked. Its peasant farmers' production of opium-producing poppies, alone, demands that it not escape our attention. And certainly our Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Agency has real concerns. Laos may also hold answers to the MIA riddle, given its rugged terrain over which more than 500 pilots were lost, only a handful of whom were among those released by Hanoi in 1973. One must also acknowledge the vast humanitarian needs facing this country. U.S. Government-provided humanitarian assistance, frankly, is meager in scope.

Until recently, the Lao have appeared to move warily to meet our urgings. Some ascribe this to culture, others to limited resources -- materiel and human, others to the question "why should they?"

One need not have confidently answered that question, however, to conclude that our Government can and should do more in Laos.

Regional Issues and the United States

We welcome the State Department's efforts to link improvements in cooperation on POW/MIA developments to easing in our relationships with these countries. Our extensive travel throughout Indochina provided graphic evidence, however, of the poverty of this region, of the toll of decades of war, and of the need for humanitarian and technical assistance. Each of these countries remain fascinated with America and looks to us with hope. Each wants to put war behind it.

A common pattern of commitment to economic reform holds some promise for improving the lives of the peoples of the region, as well as for cementing better relations between these nations and their neighbors and with the West. The question can be raised whether beginning the process of normalization with the countries of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, would encourage or discourage economic reform. From our study, the answer appears to be that economic reform would be encouraged by beginning the process of normalization.

In considering the question of improved relations with these countries in the future, it is important to appreciate that these are all states in transition. We can only speculate on where that transition will ultimately take them. At this point in time,

though, one finds striking the contrast between the spirit of economic reform manifest in each of these countries, on the one hand, and their apparent ideological rigidity, on the other. The degree to which real political reforms take root will, of course, ultimately color the depth and nature of future relations with us.

There are other important issues to be considered -- issues regarding the plight of Cambodian refugees, political detainees in Vietnam, humanitarian and discrimination issues related to the treatment of those who served with us in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and narcotics control and interdiction. We pressed the respective governments on these and other issues, and urge the State Department to continue to do so.

There is much that can be done in this region, perhaps in part by our Government and certainly by non-governmental organizations. Solely by way of example, one opportunity for important work lies in the humanitarian program for Amerasian youngsters and family members who pass through a transit center in Vietnam on their way to the United States. Thousands more will pass through its doors. While this center provides housing, often for many months, only very rudimentary English instruction and sewing and jewelry-making classes are available to the in-transit residents. The scene cries out for assistance to arm these people with the language and employment skills for the difficult transition ahead.

The region has seen much suffering. And, its needs are great. But we also found reason for hope -- in the domestic changes underway, in momentum for peace in Cambodia, in the search for a more positive relationship with this country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of our findings, discussed above, we believe that progress in both accounting for the fate of America's missing-in-action in the Vietnam War and moving toward a comprehensive peace settlement in Cambodia can be advanced by a number of actions on the part of our Government. Accordingly, and with due regard to the expertise in, and jurisdictional authority of, several committees of the Congress, we offer the following recommendations for appropriate executive and legislative consideration. We recommend that:

1. the U.S. Government clarify the priority it attaches to resolving the POW/MIA issue -- which, we urge, reflect that it truly considers it a high priority -- and that it allocate a commensurate level of resources to that effort;
2. (a) responsibility for policy formulation, coordination, and operations be vested in the Secretary of Defense; and (b) that the POW/MIA Interagency Group be disbanded;
3. in carrying out such responsibility for POW/MIA affairs,

the Secretary of Defense establish a single office -- headed by a highly motivated and able officer of at least one star rank, such position to be rotated at appropriate intervals -- to be in charge of all POW/MIA activities and to whom all elements carrying out those activities report;

4. the Secretary reorganize those elements carrying out POW/MIA activities, particularly JCRC and CILHI, to assure integration and uniform reporting within a single command structure; and immediately replace current incumbents in command/director positions who have served in that capacity for five or more years;

5. the Secretary take all possible steps, coordinating as necessary with other involved Departments, to accelerate efforts to achieve as full an accounting as possible of the fate of America's missing in action, to include such specific measures as:

(a) deploying in Vietnam and Laos, particularly, (rather than in Hawaii or Bangkok) such additional personnel as are deemed to be needed to expand efforts currently carried out under the auspices of the JCRC and CILHI; pressing Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia for the right to assign such personnel for extended in-country stays of up to six months; and assigning certain of those personnel to work independently to clear landing zones near crash sites to reduce the time required by excavation teams to reach remote sites;

(b) strongly encouraging the governments of Vietnam and Laos to designate personnel for the United States to train to assist in our excavation efforts in those countries;

(c) pursuing aggressively an arrangement under which in-country teams can increase their access to excavation sites and the safety of such transportation (through negotiation to permit the use of U.S. helicopters and pilots, or in the alternative, arrangements for training Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian pilots to fly U.S. owned or leased helicopters which could be given to those governments upon completion of our Government's efforts);

(d) stimulating further cooperation from the governments of the region through increasing the school-building activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (through the Corps and possibly also through other Department assets such as Navy Seabee units) in Laos, and possibly replicating those efforts in Vietnam and Cambodia, (consideration should also be given to such humanitarian assistance as construction of health clinics); and

(e) developing more reliable mechanisms for ground transportation of U.S. personnel in the field in Vietnam (to include consideration of deploying utility vehicles donated by the Japanese during the Persian Gulf crisis if they are readily available and could be serviced by dealers in Vietnam in lieu of the current practice of using vehicles which must be flown to Guam to be repaired);

6. the Secretary limit to an advisory role the involvement of nongovernment entities in the area of POW/MIA affairs, and that the Secretary consider establishing a Federal advisory committee

through which such nongovernment entities might provide guidance;

7. the Secretary (a.) review the classification procedures applicable to intelligence-gathering in POW/MIA affairs, and take all necessary measures to declassify information on, and gained through, such intelligence-gathering, to the maximum extent possible; and (b.) strive to reduce the clandestine character of POW/MIA search activities (recognizing that that secretiveness may have more to do with the professional backgrounds of those assigned to such missions than to the requirements of the search itself);

8. the Secretary, after carrying out the above recommendations and any other actions to further efforts to provide as full an accounting as possible of the fate of those missing in action, personally communicate with the American people through electronic and print media, to the extent possible, to explain in full the means through which the Department is working to resolve the issue and the degree of success it has had, with the aim of enhancing public confidence in that process and minimizing the suspicions which have clouded that effort;

9. the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of State, develop a coordinated "master" plan for carrying out POW/MIA operations, which identifies the precise roles, responsibilities, and interaction of and among the respective Governments, agencies, and officials involved;

10. the Secretary prepare for the Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs (General Vessey) a follow-up list of additional compelling cases for resolution to be taken up upon completion of the original list of 119 "discrepancy cases" (with an eye to dispelling concerns that still more compelling cases were not included among the original 119);

*11. the Secretary of State consider -- in light of both the progress already made toward realizing a comprehensive, lasting settlement of the civil war in Cambodia and actions taken by Vietnam -- recommending to the President taking a first step or steps (consistent with the Secretary's assessment of the progress achieved) toward normalization of relations with Vietnam (to include our Government's carrying out the steps outlined in Phase I of the "roadmap"), and particularly toward recommending (a) the grant of an exception to the trade embargo to permit telecommunications links between the two countries, taking into account how that step is in our own country's best interest, its humanitarian significance, as well as Vietnam's substantial progress toward development of a market economy; and, (b) lifting the 25-mile travel ban on diplomats representing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the United Nations and easing the travel restrictions on officials of Vietnam and Cambodia who seek to visit the United States;

12. in light of the steps already taken by Vietnam, the

Secretary -- upon the signing of a Paris Conference/United Nations agreement on a Cambodian political settlement -- begin immediately the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam as set forth in the April 1991 "roadmap", to include speedy action to facilitate telecommunication links as described in recommendation number 11, above; and

13. The Secretary of State consider any other steps within that official's control which might further U.S. Government efforts to hasten the process of obtaining as full an accounting as possible of the fate of America's missing in action as well as public confidence in that accounting, to include:

(a) determining whether provisions of Vietnamese law may deter or inhibit some Vietnamese citizens from relinquishing or identifying the whereabouts of remains of U.S. MIA's, and, if so, exploring with the Government of Vietnam legal remedies to encourage such citizens to return such remains to include consideration of our Government's instituting a policy of providing modest financial rewards in instances where the remains were subsequently identified as Americans; and

(b) coordinating with officials of the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to request their assistance in enabling family members of U.S. MIA's/POW's to move freely about those countries, and to encourage and facilitate the efforts of family members so interested to do so.

*The delegation recognizes that progress toward, and potentially imminent signing of, an agreement on a Cambodian political settlement may make this recommendation moot.

ITINERARY

Saturday, August 3

6:30 pm - 7:30 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ken Quinn at Andrews Air Force Base.

7:30 pm - 7:45 pm: Press Conference at Andrews Air Force Base.

11 pm: Depart Washington, DC for Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

Sunday, August 4

2 am: Arrive Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.

*** Sleep ***

11 am - 12 pm: Brunch with CINCPAC Rear Admiral Larry Vogt.

12 pm - 1 pm: Briefing for members and staff by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) staff: Lt. Col Joe Harvey (Commander, JCRC); Lt. Col. Roger Gaebel (Negotiations officer); Major Jim Moye (Operations officer); LCDR Sharon Armour (Executive officer); Mr. Ray Spock (Casualty Data Division officer); Captain Chad Pohlers (Senior Analyst) at JCRC, Barbers Point - Hawaii.

1 pm - 2 pm: Briefing for members and staff by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) staff: Lt. Col. Johnnie Webb (Commander, CILHI); First Sergeant Richard Huston (First Sergeant); Captain William Hudson (Operations officer); Chief Warrant officer Michael Gosnell (Adjutant); Major Jimmie Schmidt (Odontologist); Mr. H. Thorne Helgesen (Lab Administrator); Dr. Kim Schneider (Anthropologist) at CILHI.

2:30 pm: Depart Hawaii for Bangkok, Thailand.

Tuesday, August 6

1 am: Arrive Bangkok, Thailand.

*** Sleep ***

Tuesday, August 6 (Cont.)

8 am - 9 am: Coffee for members and staff with the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand at the Imperial Hotel: David Hendrix (County Corp. officer, Citibank N.S.A.); Harold Vickery (Director of Vickery, Prapone, Pramuan & Worachai, ROP); Toby Marion (General Manager, Caltex Oil Thailand T.T.D); David Lyman (Partner of Tilleke & Gibbins ROP); Thomas Seale (Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand); Kenneth Lambert (Chairman, KLPL Asia); Raymond Eaton (Chairman, Export Development Trading); Beth Krasna (Director, Krasna & Associates); Jerry Loupee (Managing Director, Himont Asia Pacific);

Richard Blue (Representative, The Asia Foundation); David Copeland (Managing Director, Black & Veatch International); Douglas Gardner (Chief of Finance & Admin., Maekong Committee); Tom Olson (Country Manager, American President Lines); Jack Phillips (Resident Manager, Premier oil Pacific LTD); William Reinsch (Managing Director, Transpo International LTD); Annick Hemsin (Director, Tilleke & Gibbons Consultants LTD).

8 am - 10:30 am: Working breakfast for members and staff with Deputy Chief of Mission Victor Tomaseth (US Embassy - Bangkok) and Special Assistant to the Ambassador Andre Sauvageot at the Imperial Hotel.

11 am - 2 pm: Briefing and working lunch for members and staff with Major Frye and Colonel Kohl of JCRC and CILHI at the US Embassy - Bangkok (includes briefing for members only).

2 pm - 3 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) staff: Glen Cooper and Don Stern at the US Embassy - Bangkok.

3:30 PM: Depart Bangkok, Thailand for Vientiane, Laos.

4:30 pm: Arrive Vientiane, Laos.

4:30 pm - 6:30 pm: Briefing for members and staff by Charge D'Affaires Charlie Salmon at the US Embassy - Vientiane (including several embassy staff).

6:30 pm - 10:30 pm: Reception and Dinner for members and staff with Charlie Salmon, US Embassy staff, and Lao officials (See attached list) at Charlie Salmon's Residence.

Wednesday, August 7

7:45 am - 8:45 am: Working breakfast for members and staff with US experts assisting the government of Laos on economic reforms and UN representatives at Charlie Salmon's Residence.

9 am - 10 am: Meeting for members and staff with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Soubahn Srithirath of Laos.

10 am - 11 am: Meeting for members and staff with Vice President of the National Assembly Thongsing Thamoavong of Laos.

11 am - 12 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Phoun Sipraseuth of Laos.

12 pm - 1 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Phao Bounnaphonh of Laos.

1 pm: Depart Vientiane, Laos for Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

3:30 pm: Arrive Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

4:30 pm - 6 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong of Cambodia.

7 pm - 10 pm: Meeting and Dinner for members and staff with Deputy Prime Minister Kong Som Ol, Deputy Foreign Minister Long Visalo, Member of Parliament Dr Abdul Xoyome, Member of Parliament Ms. Som Kim Suol, Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs Sim Suong, and Director of the Department of the America's Theam Chuny.

10 pm - 11 pm: Press interviews.

Thursday, August 8

7 am: Depart Phnom Penh, Cambodia for Hanoi, Vietnam.

10:30 am: Arrive Hanoi.

12 pm - 2 pm: Working Lunch and Briefing for members and staff with Bob Destatte, Researcher at US MIA office in Hanoi, at Boss Hotel.

2 pm - 3 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Director of the Americas Department Mr. Dang Nghiem Bai at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (old French Governor's Palace), including Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Officials.

3 pm - 4 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials.

*** Delegation split into two groups.

Group A: Reps. Carper, Kolbe, and Skaggs.

4 pm - 6 pm: Visit to Prosthetics Center (AFMA Center) hosted by Director Dang Hanh Loc and Le Duc Loi (engineer).

Group B: Reps. Peterson and Gilchrest.

4 pm - 6 pm: Visit former POW prison compound. Reps. Peterson and Gilchrest attended.

*** Delegation regroups

7 pm - 10 pm: Dinner for members and staff at the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted by Mr. Dang Nghiem Bai and staff of the Americas Department.

Friday, August 9

8 am: Depart Hanoi for Ho Chi Minh City.

10:30 am: Arrive Ho Chi Minh City.

2 pm - 3 pm: Visit to the Amerasian Transit Center for members and staff with ATC Director Mr. Le Van Thien and ATC Deputy Director Mr. Tuan.

3 pm - 4 pm: Visit to the Orderly Departure Program for members and staff with Alison Krupnick (consul).

5 pm - 6 pm: Meeting for members and staff with Vice Chairman of the People's Committee Pham Chanh Truc, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs office of HCPL City Huynh Ngoc An, Economic Advisor Nguyen Hau, at the residential palace.

Saturday, August 10

7 am: Depart Ho Chi Minh City for Da Nang.

9 am: Arrive Da Nang.

*** Delegation split into two groups.

Group A: Reps. Carper, Peterson, and Kolbe.

9 am - 10 am: Visit with Vietnamese members of the 14th Joint U.S.-Vietnamese Excavation Team: Director Nguyen Dinh An, Ngo Van Tran, Doan Ngoc Dau, and Mai Quy Trung.

10 am - 11 am: Visit with US and Vietnamese members of the 14th Joint US-Vietnamese Excavation Team: Investigation & Recovery Team Commander Bill Bell, Investigation Team Chief James Webb, Team Medic Garry Bolduc, Team Analyst Keith Flanagan, Team Analyst Stephen Thompson, Grave Recovery Specialist Randall Nash, and Grave Recovery Specialist Tommy Taylor.

Group B: Reps. Skaggs, Rhodes, and Gilchrest.

9 am - 11 am: Tour of Da Nang.

*** Delegation regroups

11 am: Depart Da Nang for Hanoi.

1 pm: Arrive Hanoi.

2:30 pm: Meeting for members and staff with General Secretary, Vietnamese Communist Party, Do Muoi, including Foreign Ministry officials.

4:30 pm Depart Hanoi for Hawaii.

*** Cross international date line

Saturday, August 10

2 pm: Arrive Hawaii. Press Conference.

3 pm - 5 pm: Discussion with CINCPAC General Fields and Major General Christmas.

Sunday, August 11

6 am: Depart Hawaii for Colorado (initial disembarkation) and for Washington, DC

BRIEFINGS RECEIVED IN
PREPARATION FOR TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following meetings and briefings were held prior to departure for Southeast Asia, August 3, 1991:

DATE	WITH
July 22	Khenthong Nouanthasing, Second Secretary, Embassy of Laos
July 23	Jim Webb, former Secretary of the Navy
July 24	Bill Herod, Editor Indochina Digest, trade journal Robert Muller, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
July 25	Rep. Lane Evans, who recently traveled to Vietnam General Vessey, President's Special Emissary to Vietnam Marie Huhtala Acting Director, Office of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia affairs; Scot Marciel, Laotian Desk Officer; Frank Light, Vietnamese Desk Officer; Department of State
July 29	Ann Mills Griffiths, National League of Families Kien Pham, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bob Sheets, Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA, Defense Intelligence Agency Lionel Rosenblatt, President, Refugee International Senator John McCain, who recently traveled to Southeast Asia Gerritt Gong, Resident Scholar on Southeast Asia, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
July 31	Allen Pell Crawford, Investigative Journalist, Washington Post Bill Franke & Steve Hayes, 'Operation Smile', private humanitarian relief operation in Vietnam Paul Mather, former Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center Senator John Kerry, who recently traveled to Southeast Asia
Aug 1	Chris Lamb, Former Australian Ambassador to Burma and

Thailand, now based in Washington.

Jay Winik, National Defense University

Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian
& Pacific Affairs

Aug 1 Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Captain Red McDaniel, Col. Mike Peck

Aug 3 Ken Quinn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who
recently returned from Southeast Asia

STATEMENT

Tracy Usry, Chief Investigator, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Republican Staff

*Before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
November 15, 1991*

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, let me thank you again for this opportunity to address you today.

I will address your questions from last week in the order they were asked, citing the page and line number of the transcript of last week's hearings, which correspond to each of your questions.

1. (9-20); Senator Kerry: "But in fact, it is true, it is not, that nine Americans were turned over to the US in 1973 from Laos, who were nominally Pathet Lao Prisoners? Those were counted as repatriated from Laos."

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record, a copy of a document, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated 7 Dec 1977, addressed to Captain Raymond A. Vohden, USN, Principal Advisor Office of PW/MIA Affairs, OASD/ISA, Room 26252, The Pentagon, Washington DC 20301. Subject: Pathet Lao Knowledge on U.S. Prisoners.

The correspondence provides a summation of information held by DIA regarding the degree of knowledgeability possessed by the Pathet Lao on U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos. Page five of the document states in part: "...the nine U.S. personnel who had been captured in Laos and who were released in Hanoi during Operation Homecoming were all captured by North Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and moved to North Vietnam for detention."

2. (15-9) Senator McCain: "So your allegation that the two Thai Special Forces identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate is false."

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record a declassified, sanitized, U.S. Air Force Message, date and time group 052635Z Mar 73, from 13AF/JHRC Clark AB Phil, to AIG 7819. This is a Homecoming Air Force Message, Special Report 007. Subject: Debriefing. The message relates to the debriefing of two Thai military returnees by U.S. personnel. The returnees identified North Vietnamese personnel who dealt with POWs. The identifications were made by picking out photographs from the Defense Intelligence Agency Publication, North Vietnamese Personnel associated with U.S. POWs (AP-355-8-1-70 INT) dated 1 Jun 70. The Thais identified thirteen North Vietnamese who dealt with American Prisoners of War as guards, interrogators or those who were involved in the torture of U.S. prisoners.

The second portion of the document references the two Thai personnel selecting photographs of approximately three hundred U.S. personnel with whom they were imprisoned. The photographs were selected from Volume I of the DIA Pre-capture Photographs of Missing in Action in Southeast Asia (u) 4DI-367-2-72. The photographs identified, according to the message were of personnel all listed as returnees during Operation Homecoming. In section three of the report, it states

that the Thais also identified personnel from the photograph volume provided by DIA who were not listed on the list of returnees, they are as follows:

DIA ID NO.	NAME	CURRENT STATUS
S134	Shelton, Charles E.	Captured
T204	Templin Edwin B. "Skip"	MIA
M010	Mamiya, John M. "Charley"	MIA
W026	Watkins, George H.	MIA
F075	Fr??tag, John (uncertain)	MIA
D033	Dooley, James B. (Camp Unity)	MIA
T025	Teague, James E.	Captured
M019	Mason, William H. (Camp Unity)	MIA
00670	Olson, Betty A. (Uncertain)	MIA
C158	Carrol, Roger W. (Zoo)	MIA
M602	Mitchell, Archie E.	Unreadable

3. (16-3) Senator McCain: "A U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi, who was that POW?"

(16-16) "So his allegations basically Mr. Chairman, has been relayed to him with no basis in fact."

(16-20) "What facts do you have to back up your allegation that a U.S. POW had been...repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi."

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record an unclassified electronic message, date and time group 022148Z Apr 73.

From: LTC Parks, USAINTC OIC, Ft Gordon Ga

To: CDR USAINTC/DCE/ Ft Holabird MD

Info: DIA and others

This is a Homecoming Army Message

Subject: Homecoming Army Debriefing Report No. 31

Returnee: Deleted

Category 5

Name: Dooley, James E.

Date of LAST INFO: Nov 1971 Date Qualifier EST

Source Info: Either saw name on wall at Plantation gardens or was told.

Last Known Status: POW

Details of Last Contact: No contact: either saw name on wall or was told about name by another returnee.

Mr. Chairman, the family of LCDR Dooley has never been provided the name of the returnee who provided this information, other than this one report. As far as the family is aware, LCDR Dooley was never declared a POW, but is carried as MIA. I must add, that this report has never been cleared up, as far as the family is aware.

4. (19-8) Senator McCain: "I see and, finally, a communist propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi, dated after Dooley was shot down, shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley." Do you have knowledge of that?"

(19-18) "Yet the DIA and no government agency has that photograph, according to them."

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record the following:

A. A DOD Vietnam information form, dtd September 17, 1970, showing that Mr. Henry E. Dooley and wife identified photograph No. 46, shown to them by DOD personnel as possibly being their son, LT. James E. Dooley...

B. A second document entitled "Photo Comparison Analysis Results of a Christmas 1969 photo," dtd 1 Feb 1971, reflecting a comparison of 2 pre capture photographs of LT. J.E. Dooley with the same photo identified as Christmas 1969 film No. USN 46, the results of which, were inconclusive -- unable to judge.

C. A copy of the same photograph No. 46 depicting three men, one oriental and two occidental. His parents identified the man to the far right of the photograph possibly as being LT. James E. Dooley.

D. A copy of Memorandum for Navy, dtd 12 Feb 1971, Subject: Results of Photo Comparison No. -- the Number is left blank, but the document shows it is an analysis of photo 46.

5. Request from NOK of LT. James E. Dooley, unsigned, utilized to transmit the results of the analysis.

Mr. Chairman, these documents clearly indicate that the Department of Navy was aware of the photograph prior to September 1970, as well as later, since they showed it to the Dooley family. The information I have just cited, all came from LCDR Dooley's casualty file, a copy of which was provided to the family.

I am told that the DIA also maintains a complete casualty file of each individual missing. If their position is that this photograph does not exist, or that they nor any other government agency has that photograph, I would submit this as a further example of the poor quality of work done by the DIA. This certainly is an indicator of sloppy case management, as well as inattention to detail.

Even more tragic, is the failure to expedite this matter in 1970, when the Dooley family was first shown the photograph. The request for analysis by the Department of Navy was not forwarded for action until February 1971, over four months after initial identification. I believe that this example also shows the lack of concern for timely reporting to the families, as well as DOD's lack of compassion for the families.

6. (20-1) Senator McCain: "Like your trip to Thailand that you just took" ... "Tell me about your trip would you Mr. Usry?"

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, during the latter part of July of this year, Congressman Clement (D-TN) arranged for one of his constituents to provide to myself, and staff of Senator Grassley, what Congressman Clement's constituent felt was compelling information concerning live Americans being held in Southeast Asia.

Judge Hamilton Gaden provided documentary and physical, as well as photographic evidence depicting what he felt were live American POWs being held in Southeast Asia. The most compelling evidence was that of a photograph of a Caucasian male and Oriental female, which, according to Judge Gaden, was LCDR Larry J. Stevens. Stevens was declared MIA during the war in Southeast Asia.

Since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Grassley's staff had already initiated some photographic comparison in the case of Cpt. Donald Carr, based on photographs submitted by Mr. Jack Bailey, we felt that this evidence could also be analyzed in a similar way. This information was discussed with the Minority staff and between July 30, and August 2, 1991, I travelled to Ft. Collins CO, to provide Dr. Michael Charney a Forensic Anthropologist at Colorado State University, with the questioned photograph as well as pre-loss photographs of LCDR Stevens.

Dr. Charney, utilizing a procedure called computer superimposition, determined that the pre-loss photographs of Stevens matched the forensic profile of the questioned photograph provided by Judge Gaden. The computer superimposition process creates a computer enhanced image of the face in question, and the image of the pre-loss photographs.

The images were then overlaid or superimposed upon each other. According to Dr. Charney, the images aligned 100%, and therefore he determined the two individuals in the two photographs were the same person. According to Dr. Patrick Fitzhorn, a Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Colorado State University, who created the computer images of Carr and Stevens, these images were exact to one hundredth of an inch.

Based on this identification, on the 2nd of August, I provided a briefing to Senators Helms and Grassley, as well as to another member of Congress. Through the efforts of this other member, a briefing for the Secretary of Defense was set for 5:30 pm on August 5th at the Pentagon. At 5:30, on August 5th, myself and another Senate staff member and a House staff member were present at the briefing I provided to Secretary Cheney and two of his staff.

At this time, I will provide the same briefing that I did for Secretary Cheney:

Chart 1:

Pre-loss photograph of Cpt Donald Carr, as well as photograph provided by Mr. Jack Bailey, which he indicates was taken in Laos and believes to be Donald Carr.

Photograph of the two computer enhanced images of both photographs.

Photograph of superimposition of both photographs.

Based on this process, Dr. Charney stated that in his opinion, the photographs were of the same

person, Cpt. Donald Carr.

Chart 2:

Pre-loss photograph of LCDR Larry J. Stevens, as well as a photograph provided by Judge Gaden, which he indicates was taken in Southeast Asia and believes to be LCDR Stevens.

Photograph of the two computer enhanced images of both photographs.

Photograph of superimposition of both photographs.

Based on this process, Dr Charney stated that in his opinion the photographs were of the same person, LCDR Larry J. Stevens.

Chart 3:

Pre-loss photograph of LT. USN Daniel Borah, as well as a photograph provided by Judge Gaden, which he indicates was taken in Southeast Asia and believes to be LT. Borah.

At the time of the briefing, the complete analysis of this photograph was not complete.

Chart 4: Proposal

1. Interview/Polygraph Sources
2. Utilize DOD Polygraphers of choice
3. OSD Observer
4. Audio tape entire interview and polygraph examination.
5. Use private interpreter (If not available, coordinate with JUSMAG Thai.)
6. QA determination of charts prior to departure from Thailand
7. Secure/remove sources from Thailand
8. DOD Provide support, Transportation and Funding.

Chart 5: Areas of Concern

1. Sources will not work with DIA/DOS
2. Sources are Laotian with limited time in Thailand
3. Photographs are dated
4. Excessive activity related to POW issue in Thailand, both official and private.

At the conclusion of the briefing, Secretary Cheney remarked that the evidence was compelling and instructed his staff to arrange the support requested in the briefing.

On August 7th, the team departed for Thailand. On August 14th, the source was polygraphed. The test results indicated that he was lying. He had never seen, talked to, or photographed any American POWs in Southeast Asia. The origin of the photograph therefore is unknown.

For the record, even though these leads did not pan out, it was the opinion of the Senators involved, as well as that of Secretary Cheney that the information I just provided you, had to be acted upon.

However, Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, an examination of the Carr photograph by DOD indicated several similarities between each of the Carr photographs. In fact, Department of Defense personnel have publicly stated on numerous occasions that there are striking similarities between each of the Carr photographs. All information concerning the Carr and Stevens photograph was released to the Defense Department.

7. (48-22) Mr. Chairman, in reference to your statement concerning the shootdown of Commander Hickerson, let me read to you from a live sighting report and subsequent evaluation by the JCRC.

The verbatim et literatim text of this live-sighting report follows:

PRIORITY

P 1500Z JAN 87 PSN 825245P26

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HA//J2/J3/J36//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

BT

[Redacted] SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 02458

CITE: [Redacted] 3038 JAN 87
SUBJECT: JCRC RPT HK86-102, CAPTURE OF AMERICAN
PILOT [Redacted]

2. [Redacted] INCIDENT SUMMARY: SOURCE PROVIDES FIRSTHAND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CAPTURE OF AN AMERICAN PILOT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1968 JUST OFF-SHORE IN THE AREA OF DO SON CITY, VICINITY XH 879916. END SUMMARY.

3. [Redacted] INFORMATION: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RELATED BY SOURCE TO INTERVIEWER AS FACT. "AT APPROXIMATELY 1200 HOURS ON 13 OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1968, SOURCE [Redacted] WHEN HE HEARD AN EXPLOSION AND SAW A SINGLE PERSON DESCENDING UNDER A FULLY DEPLOYED, TRI-COLOR PARACHUTE (RED, WHITE AND BLUE) AND LAND ON THE BEACH APPROXIMATELY 50 METERS EAST OF THE DO SON AIRFIELD AND 200 OR 300 METERS SOUTH OF NUE DOC (VICINITY XH 879916). SOURCE STATED THIS PORTION OF THE BEACH IS COMMONLY CALLED "SO NANG" (SOS NAWNGJ)). THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO EVADE BY SWIMMING OUT INTO THE WATER (EAST). HE SWAM APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS OFF-SHORE WHEN THE PAVN 50TH REGIMENT ELEMENTS WHICH WERE POSTED ON NUE DOC BEGAN FIRING 85 MM DKZ RIFLE LIMITING FIRE AHEAD OF THE SWIMMER TO LIMIT HIS MOVEMENT. THEN THE PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE FORCES AND THE DUYN HAI LOCAL FORCES BEGAN SWIMMING OUT TO THE MAN TO CAPTURE HIM. THE PILOT BEGAN FIRING AT THEM AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO TALK ON A SMALL, HAND HELD RADIO SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO DUE TO THE WAVES CAUSED BY THE RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE. WHEN SEVERAL OF THE PURSUERS CAME WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS OF THE MAN, THEY DOVE UNDER WATER AND CAME UP UNDER THE MAN TO SAFELY CAPTURE HIM. NO ONE WAS WOUNDED OR INJURED DURING THE CAPTURE. THE MAN WAS ESCORTED TO LAND AND WAS LOADED INTO A SIDECAR WHICH TRANSPORTED HIM ACROSS THE DO SON AIRFIELD. ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD, THE MAN WAS MOVED INTO A CHINESE AUTO WHICH DROVE AWAY ON ROUTE 14 (NUMBERED ROUTE 5 ON

AVAILABLE MAPS) IN THE DIRECTION OF HAI DONG.

[Redacted] THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE 24-25 YEARS OF AGE, HAD SHORT, VERY LIGHT BROWN OR BLOND HAIR, WAS APPROXIMATELY 1.8 METERS TALL, APPROXIMATELY 70 KILOGRAMS IN WEIGHT, WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION, DID NOT WEAR EYEGLASSES, HE WORE A ONE PIECE UNIFORM THAT HAD A LONG ZIPPER IN THE FRONT AND WAS THE COLOR OF RICE PLANT LEAVES. WHEN THE MAN ATTEMPTED TO EVADE AND RUN [illegible] INTO THE WATER, HE WAS CARRYING A HELMET, AND SMALL RADIO, AND A PISTOL. THE HELMET WAS LOST IN THE WATER, BUT THE RADIO AND PISTOL WERE CONFISCATED BY THE CAPTURING TROOPS. ONCE THE CAPTURING FORCES HAD THE MAN ON THE BEACH, THEY BOUND HIS ARMS BEHIND HIS BACK AT THE ELBOWS BUT LEFT HIS FEET AND LEGS FREE. HE WAS BLINDFOLDED BEFORE HE WAS LOADED INTO THE SIDECAR. SOURCE WATCHED THE HANDLING OF THE MAN BY THE SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD IN THE AREA WHERE THE MAN WAS LOADED INTO THE CHINESE AUTO. [3 lines redacted] HE RAN OUTSIDE AND DOWN TO THE BEACH TO WATCH. HE RECALLED SEEING A HELICOPTER AND FIVE OR SIX JET AIRCRAFT CIRCLING AND APPARENTLY SEARCHING FOR THE MAN IN THE GENERAL AREA OF XH 875919. SOURCE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING OF THE PILOT'S AIRCRAFT, CRASH SITE, OR LOCATION OF WRECKAGE. DELCOADR.
[illegible] T

Mr. Chairman, I will now read the verbatim et literatim reproduction of the text of the subsequent evaluation of the live sighting report I just read:

101800Z APR 87 PSN 362526P24

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO COMNAVMLPERSOCOM WASHINGTON DC//NMPC N64//

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HO//J36// DIA WASHINGTON DC//
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
JCS WASHINGTON DC//DCIC-PW-MIA/J5//

[Redacted]

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT HK86-102 [Redacted]
NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

A. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 151000Z JAN 87

1. [Redacted] ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [Redacted] SOURCE OF REF A, REVEALS A PROBABLE CORRELATION TO REFNO 0872-0-01.

2. [Redacted] REFNO 0872: ON 22 OCTOBER 1967, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, JAMES E. DOOLEY WAS FLYING AN A-4 ATTACK BOMBER. THE AIRCRAFT, SERIAL NUMBER 150116, CRASHED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XH860693, APPROXIMATELY 2000 METERS SOUTH OF DO SON, HAIPHONG PROVINCE, VIETNAM. NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN AND NO ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNAL WERE HEARD. A THOROUGH AERIAL SEARCH OF THE AREA WAS CONDUCTED, BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVAL. UPON HIS REPATRIATION AFTER BEING HELD PRISONER OF WAR, ONE AMERICAN SERVICEMAN STATED THAT HE HAD EITHER SEEN LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S NAME WRITTEN ON A PRISON WALL OR HEARD IT WHILE A PRISONER IN HANOI. A FOLDER DETAILING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S CASE WAS PRESENTED TO OFFICIALS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY JCRC DURING A POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING HELD IN AUGUST 1984. LIEUTENANT DOOLEY IS CARRIED IN THE PRESUMPTIVE STATUS OF DEAD, BODY NOT RECOVERED.

3. [Redacted] LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S INCIDENT OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR KILOMETERS OF GRID COORDINATES XH879916. THE TIME OF DAY AND MONTH CORRELATE TO LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S INCIDENT; HOWEVER, THE SOURCE REPORTED THE INCIDENT AS OCCURRING IN 1968 AND THE ACTUAL YEAR OF THE INCIDENT WAS 1967. THE SOURCE'S REPORT OF AIRCRAFT SEARCHING FOR THE DOWNED PILOT CORRELATES WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIEUTENANT

DOOLEY'S INCIDENT.

4. (U) THIS EVALUATION MAY BE RELEASED TO NOK BY COMNAVJLPERSCOM UPON DELETION OF SOURCE'S NAME FROM PARAGRAPH ONE. A SANITIZED COPY OF REF A FOR RELEASE TO NOK BY COMNAVJLPERSCOM WILL BE FORWARDED VIA REGISTERED MAIL.

5. (U) THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL EVALUATION. EVAL - JAC.

Mr. Chairman, this sighting report was correlated to the shootdown of Navy Pilot James Hickerson, who was repatriated during Operation Homecoming during 1973.

Now, for the record I will read to you a letter from Mr. Hickerson, to a LCDR Dooley family member. The verbatim et literatim reproduction of Mr. Hickerson's letter follows:

[Address Deleted
for Privacy]
April 24, 1989

Ms. Pam Hicks
[Address deleted for
Privacy]

To Whom It May Concern:

My name is Captain J. M. Hickerson, USN (Ret) - POW 22 December 1967 to 14 March 1973. I do not believe that the captured American pilot, subject of JCRC Report HK86-102, was me. There are too many discrepancies between the JCRC Report HK86-102 and my capture:

- 1.) I was not shot down on 22 December, not October or November;
- 2.) My parachute was all white, not red, white and blue;
- 3.) If I had landed 50 meters from an airfield, I would have been aware of it;
- 4.) I swam no more than 50 yards, not 200 meters;
- 5.) I did not attempt to use my pistol;
- 6.) There were no waves;
- 7.) I was transported away on the back of a bicycle, not in a sidecar, and I was never in an automobile;
- 8.) I was wearing Marine fatigues (2 piece), not a one piece flight suit;
- 9.) There was a solid, approximately 800 ft. overcast in the area, making it unlikely that 5 or 6 jets plus a helicopter would have been flying under an overcast that close to Do Son.

Despite the fact that the location and date of the described capture was approximately mine, considering the above, I do not believe that the captured pilot reported in JCRC Report HK86-102, was me.

Very Respectfully,

(signed)

J.M. Hickerson
Captain, USN (Ret)

Mr. Chairman, I will now read to you from my notes of a telephone conversation between myself and Mr. Hickerson, which transpired at 2:45 PM on Mar 6, 1990. The verbatim et literatim reproduction of my notes follows:

1445/6 Mar 90 - telecom J. Hickerson

-Landed on Beach

weapon in gear, no radio

overcast that day - under overcast

- no airfield in sight!

- no transport across hard

- stripped to shorts, blind folded

tied behind him - sat on bicycle

Jetty sticking out in water

No Airplanes circling - heard none all afternoon

shot at him - 37 mm

Mr. Chairman, I have in front of me correspondence from the Department of Navy, Naval Personnel Command, dtd 17 Aug 79, addressed to Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Subject: Request information ICO of LCDR James E. Dooley. The verbatim et literatim reproduction of the text of the letter follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL COMMAND
NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-5000
IN REPLY REFER TO
1771

Ser N64DD/0844

17 Aug 89

From: Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command (N-64DD)

To: Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI 96862-5200

Subj: REQUEST INFORMATION ICO OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. DOOLEY, USNR, 008-30-3710/686509 REFNO 0872-0-01

1. This is in response to Mrs. Elizabeth H. Dooley's questions she had at the National League of Families Conference in July. She has discrepancies about some of the facts concerning her son's case. Would you review the file on Lieutenant Commander Dooley and check to see if any of her claims can be validated. Please send your response directly to us. The questions are listed below.

(1) Please check to see if there is any pattern to the crash site investigations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

(2) In reference to JCRC msg 251800Z Jul 88; In reference to para #7 - CDR Hickerson stated that the report referenced was not his and he would rewrite the deposition, was the reinterview conducted? If so what were the result. Was the source mentioned proven to be reliable?

(3) Check to see if LCDR Dooley is on the top priority 70 name discrepancy list, have there been any negotiations attempted since 1967 on LCDR Dooley case?

(4) Do we need official deposition of this fact to have report possibly correlated to LCDR Dooley?

2. If you have any questions, please feel free to reach me toll-free at 1-800-443-9298.

3. Thank you very much for your assistance.

(signed)

DAVID W. OSWALD, III
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve
Special Assistant, POW/MIA Affairs

Encl:

(1) JCRC unclassified msg dtg 251800z dtd Jul 88

Mr. Chairman, to date the finding that JCRC message 251800Z Jul 88 pertains to Hickerson has not been changed, although CPT Hickerson's statement maintains the live-sighting report does not pertain to him.

Mr. Chairman, I again state as we stated in the Minority Staff Report, DIA has a mindset to debunk. As cited previously, this is a fine example of faulty analysis. This live sighting report is definitely not that of Hickerson as the Defense Department indicates. Whether or not it is of Dooley is another matter. Since the shutdown has not been properly correlated to anyone to our knowledge, it could very well be that of Dooley. This evidence, plus the evidence outlined in answer to Senator McCain's questions, make a case that LCDR Dooley was in fact captured by the North Vietnamese, and that he was not released during Operation Homecoming.

Mr. Chairman, I will now address those seven problem areas mentioned in my previous statement to the Committee on November 7th, 1991, that the Minority staff investigation did not have the budgetary resources to properly pursue.

1. Attempts by the Administration to infiltrate private activist groups.

I believe that the testimony of Mr. Sampley to this committee last week supports our position. However, I am offering additional documentation to support that position. This documentation will also support our next problem area listed.

2. Illegal surveillance and investigation of individual activists of this issue by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record several pieces of correspondence either originating from Mr. John R. Mead, Suite 106, 333 Cobalt Way, Sunnyvale, CA 94086 or addressed to him. The correspondence from Mr. Mead in all instances is addressed to various individuals within the US Government, to include the Attorney General of the United States, the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice, the Counsel to the President, as well as the Internal Revenue Service.

The correspondence to Mr. Mead is from various government agencies indicating that they have received his correspondence and are acting upon it. Mr. Mead's correspondence addresses his concern with the Administration:

- 1) utilizing private organizations to spy on him;
- 2) conducting character assassination on him; and,
- 3) the Defense Department conducting surveillance of him.

He specifically identifies Mr. Richard Childress of the National Security Council as well as individuals affiliated with the Center for POW/MIA Accountability Inc.

I would also like to introduce for the record, a memorandum prepared by Dr. Harvey

Andrews, a former member of Senator Grassley's staff, dated September 11, 1989. The memorandum addresses Dr. Andrews' review of the file concerning Mr. Mead's allegations.

I wish to point out that Dr. Andrews is a retired Defense Criminal Investigative Service Special Agent, with over thirty years of criminal investigative experience. The verbatim et literatim text of his memorandum, which evaluates Mr. Mead's allegations, follows:

September 11, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: KRIS KOLEŠNIK
FROM: HARVEY ANDREWS

SUBJECT: Review of Public Integrity file, Department of Justice

Ref: Mead complaint

On August 28, 1989, the Office of Public Integrity, Department of Justice, was asked to produce its file on the investigation of a complaint filed by John R. Mead, re: unlawful surveillance by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), ect [sic]. Mr. Jack Keeny produced a three page declination of prosecution based on Mead's complaint, stating that this paper summarized their inquiry. Mr. Keeny would not allow the paper to leave his office.

Upon review by both Kris Kolesnik and myself, the declination paper was found to be a superficial inquiry of the complaint by Mead which was conducted by Defense Department's oversight office. DIA through the oversight inquiry never denied a surveillance of Mead, but stated it did nothing illegal. The portion of the complaint dealing with a civil rights violation was not referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), nor was there any evidence that other potential criminal violations in Mead's complaint were ever investigated by FBI. The paper was a self-serving document that cleared DIA of any wrongdoing.

Mr. Keeny was asked to provide the full file on this matter and he said he would have to take it up with some unidentified office. Subsequently, Mr. Keeny called and said the complete file would have to be withheld because of the "third agency rule."

3. Questionable identification by the Armed Services Graves Registration Office (ASGRO).

Mr. Chairman, I have before me a synopsis of an ASGRO board determination, as well as documented evidence concerning the identification of Mr. Mark V. Dennis. Mr. Mark V. Dennis was a member of the Naval Services who according to the Defense Department was killed in action during the Vietnam conflict. The government's position, both the Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii and the ASGRO board feel that the remains are those of Mr. Dennis. However, Mr. Dennis' family submit compelling evidence that the remains are not Mr. Dennis' remains, and may not even be caucasian, but mongoloid.

The principal area of difference, besides unscientific examination by CIL-HI, is that the height does not fit that of Mr. Dennis. The Government's contention is that the remains are those of an individual who is 67 1/4 inches in height. They base the identification in part on Mr. Dennis' medical records which reflect his height as 67 1/4 inches tall.

However, his enlistment form reflects his height as 69 inches tall and his family has submitted sworn documentation, to include affidavits as well as photographs indicating that Mr. Dennis was indeed 71 to 72 inches tall. The difference if one were to accept the medical examination of the remains at face value, is 3 3/4 inches minimum. Considering that the determination of the height of remains is approximately 67 1/4 inches tall, this minimum difference could be far greater.

I would like to cite a second example which I viewed in the files of Dr. Michael Charney, a Forensic Anthropologist at Colorado State University. He showed me a photograph of remains, of the upper portion of a skull at about the hair line, and a lower jaw. From this, the government expert reconstructed a face and determined it to be the remains of an individual listed as missing in action.

The ASGRO board supported the identification. I grant you, that facial reconstruction from remains is an established scientific procedure which has been around for some time. In fact, this procedure has even been used in the past in various states by law enforcement authorities, to make identifications of remains.

However, in order to be able to reconstruct a face from remains, enough of the skull must exist to recreate the face. The skull has certain landmarks on it which are required in order to do facial reconstruction. Some of these landmarks are: eye sockets; nasal passage; brow ridge; cheek bones; upper lip area as well as the lower jaw.

These skull landmarks are required in order to determine such things as distance between eyes in relation to the nose; size and shape of nose; fullness of face as well as the shape of the lower portion of the skull from the nose down. Granted that even if some of the landmarks are missing, re-construction can still be accomplished; however when none exist, I would submit accurate facial reconstruction cannot be accomplished. Yet, in this case, ASGRO accepted the identification. Therefore, in this example, the individual has now been "accounted for," his case "resolved," and his name removed from the Missing in Action list.

4. Questionable liaisons between administration, activist and identified members of organized crime.

Mr. Chairman, a staff member of one of this committee's members and myself, were allowed to review an extract of certain documents. These documents came into the hands of the Foreign Relations Committee majority staff, while Congress was conducting its Iran-Contra investigation in 1987. This extract of documents recorded numerous meetings between:

- 1) a member of the White House National Security Council's staff;
- 2) a prominent and high-ranking member of a POW family organization; and,
- 3) a known organized crime figure. **C L O S E D**

The documents we reviewed recorded numerous meetings between these three people. Upon completion of the meetings, in many instances, the known crime figure would depart to another state, to meet with other identified members of organized crime. The extract reflected that the crime figure referred to the other individuals by name as well as initials.

The appointment diaries of this individual were provided to a Congressional Staff member, after they were seized by the Washington, D.C. Police who were involved in an investigation of harassment against a media person. This known crime figure was in fact involved in a harassment campaign against the media individual. We were told that these diaries are maintained in the archives of the Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff.

5. The failure of DIA to address the MIA/POW issue for World War II and Korea.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record, this binder containing all reference material in our report that deals with World War II and Korea. After reviewing the DIA files for those three hundred some unaccounted for personnel in Korea, I must state that these documents are a lot more complete than their files.

For the record, as of the date of publication of our minority report, no active work was being done concerning World War II personnel, according to the DIA POW/MIA office.

For the record, on three separate instances, I offered not only to the DIA, but to the Office of the Vice President, all information we had concerning those unaccounted for in World War II and Korea. They expressed no interest in the documents.

6. Sanctioned rescue missions by the Department of Defense after 1973.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you yourself during the hearings indicated that you were going to check into this area. I can tell you that the Minority staff has interviewed individuals whom have either:

- 1) reviewed extensive signal and photographic intelligence for planning purposes of such missions;
- 2) trained for; or
- 3) deployed for such rescue missions, which have never been made public.

The Minority staff will share this information with the Committee in an appropriate setting. However, Mr. Chairman, for the record, the implications of our sources information are:

- 1) that the knowingly United States abandoned men in Southeast Asia after the war;
- 2) into the 1980s, the United States government had extensive and high quality intelligence of the location of at least some of these prisoners; and,
- 3) that despite having this intelligence, the United States government publicly, as well as privately to members of Congress, maintained that there was "no credible evidence" that POWs were alive and being held in Southeast Asia.

7. Problems with the Central Identification Laboratory -Hawaii (USACIL-HI) including:

- 1) Unscientific methods used to identify remains;
- 2) USACIL-HI personnel lying to previous Congressional committees; and
- 3) Premature closure of a criminal investigation by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command.

The substantiation of even a portion of the allegations would have been an embarrassment to the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I have already addressed some of the problems that exist within CIL-HI. Let me address them further.

Although there was a Congressional hearing concerning the CIL-HI's operation, certain issues were never resolved. These include:

1. Review each of the remains identifications made through the utilization of a procedure called "Morphological Approximation" which has no scientific foundation, and is not a recognized procedure by the United States Anthropological community.

2. What were the results of the preliminary inquiry conducted by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command with regard to Dr. Sam Dunlap's complaint. Dr. Dunlap testified before Congress that the investigation was shut down prematurely, by order of the Secretary of the Army.

The House Congressional committee did not follow-up on Dr. Dunlap's allegation, but merely accepted U.S. Department of Army testimony that the investigation was not prematurely closed.

In subsequent interviews I conducted with the CID investigators who ran the investigation of CIL-HI, and with the case officer for the CIL-HI investigation, who was stationed at the Headquarters of the CID Command, confirmed Dr. Dunlap's allegation that the investigation was closed prematurely.

The consensus of opinion of the CID investigators and case officer involved in the CIL-HI investigation felt the reason the investigation was prematurely closed was that the results would have embarrassed the US Government.

3. Certain U.S. government officials who testified before the House Congressional hearings lied. Documentation, which I will provide for the record, in the form of personal correspondence from various personnel employed, clearly show this duplicity.

(B) Finally, the "examination" of CIL-HI procedures conducted by a panel hired by the Department of Army may have reached an invalid conclusion. The participants of this "examination" made a basic, and perhaps, faulty assumption about each of the identification of remains they reviewed.

The assumption this panel made was that the examination results reviewed were accurate, based on a review of case documents, not the actual remains. It was assumed by this panel that all relevant medical information for each case was accurate.

However, when one of the panel members at a later date had the opportunity to actually review remains of some these cases, he found great inconsistencies in the data in the case files, and the actual remains. Therefore, this panel member has asserted that the conclusion that the panel which he sat on, may possibly be invalid. The panel's conclusion was that while they recommended some changes in CIL-HI's operations, they felt that the integrity of CIL-HI's identifications was sound.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, again let me thank you for this opportunity to address the committee.

ENCLOSURE A



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 DEC 877

U-48,614/D8-4H

TO: Captain Raymond A. Vohden, USN
Principal Advisor Office of
PW/MIA Affairs
OASD/ISA
Room 26252
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

COLONEL (RET.) EARL P. HOPPER
14043 NORTH SAN DRIVE
GLENDALE, ARIZONA 85306
(602) 579-9051

SUBJECT: Pathet Lao Knowledgeability on U.S. PWs

1. The enclosed report provides a summation of information held by DIA regarding the degree of knowledgeability possessed by the Pathet Lao on U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos.

2. In part four of the report, it is indicated that Appendix H displayed an ID card showing only the top portion of an individual's head. It has now been determined that this individual is [REDACTED], USA (killed-in-action/body not recovered), who was a member of the C-47 crew downed over the Plaines des Jarres area of Laos on 23 March 1967.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Enclosure a/s

Bruce L. Heller
BRUCE L. HELLER
Commander, USN
Chief, PW/MIA Branch
Resources and Installations
Division
Directorate for Intelligence
Research



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

PATHET LAO KNOWLEDGEABILITY
REGARDING U.S. UNACCOUNTED-FOR PERSONNEL

This document summarizes information held by DIA regarding the degree of knowledgeability possessed by the Pathet Lao (PL) on U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos. This information will be presented in three major sections: (1) Past Pathet Lao Statements regarding U.S. PW/MIAs; (2) Recent (after 1973) Pathet Lao Statements concerning Knowledgeability of U.S. PW/MIAs; (3) Recent Information reporting PL Efforts to Obtain Information on, and Remains of, U.S. Personnel. Additionally, a detailed evaluation of recently acquired Pathet Lao films which demonstrate PW/MIA knowledgeability will be presented.

Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Laos, the Pathet Lao had, on many occasions, made statements which tend to indicate that they had knowledge of U.S. PWs in that country. Enclosure 1 provides a compendium of such Pathet Lao statements.

In sharp contrast to these pronouncements, the Pathet Lao have, since the termination of Operation Homecoming, claimed to have no knowledge of U.S. personnel unaccounted for in Laos. Enclosure 2 illustrates and briefly evaluates recent (after 1973) Pathet Lao statements concerning their knowledgeability of U.S. unaccounted-for personnel.

Within the past year, a number of reports have been received which indicate that the present Lao Government has initiated efforts to search for the remains of unaccounted-for U.S. personnel. Enclosure 3 provides a summary of the information contained in these reports.

Recently, Pathet Lao propaganda films were obtained through intelligence channels. A few of these films contained very short segments which show that the Lao possess information on U.S. personnel lost in Laos. Enclosure 4 provides a summary of the information depicted on these films.

PAST PATHET LAO STATEMENTS REGARDING U.S. PWs

- In September 1968, Soth Petrasy, who was at that time, the permanent Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, told a U.S. official that "pilots are generally kept near the area in which their plane is downed and therefore may be found throughout Laos from the south to the north."

- During a conversation with U.S. personnel and Soth on 1 May 1971, Soth was asked if the Pathet Lao had not released a list of prisoners similar to that released by North Vietnam. Soth said that the situation in Laos was different from that in North Vietnam because bombing of North Vietnam had ceased. He added that in Laos there is no means of communication between villages even under normal conditions. Soth stated that it was often not possible because of U.S. air activity to reach the site of a downed plane to ascertain the fate of the pilot. For these reasons, Soth ventured, it was impossible for the Pathet Lao to compile a complete list. At this meeting, he further stated that prisoners were being held in various regions of Laos and were well treated.

- In the course of a February 1972 interview, Soth made a statement to the effect "that some tens of prisoners are presently being held" by the Pathet Lao.

- During an April 1972 interview, Soth spoke about prisoners, including many U.S. airmen, being detained in secured areas inside various caves in northern Laos.

- On 21 April 1972, Soth reportedly stated that "there are many American PWs held in liberated areas of Laos," but he would not provide specific figures.

- During an April 1972 interview with a Swedish correspondent, Prince Souphanouvong, formerly the Chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front Central Committee and currently the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos, was asked to comment on the Pathet Lao policy toward captured enemy soldiers and American pilots. In response, Prince Souphanouvong made the following statement:

"The LPP (Lao Patriotic Front) has made public a concrete policy toward enemy soldiers or agents captured or giving themselves up, including GIs. All the American pilots engaged in bombings or toxic chemical sprays of Lao territory are considered criminals and enemies of the Lao people. But once

captured, they have been treated in accordance with the humane policy of the LPP. The question of enemy captives, including U.S. pilots, will be settled immediately after the U.S. stops its intervention and aggression in Laos first, and foremost, ends the bombing of Laos territory."

Prince Souphanouvong's statement, together with statements made by Soth Petrasy, indicate that the Pathet Lao held American prisoners.

RECENT PATHET LAO STATEMENTS CONCERNING THEIR
KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF U.S. UNACCOUNTED-FOR PERSONNEL

*at 5th Avenue +
Hiroshi
Hiroshi*

- On 6 April 1973, after the completion of Operation Homecoming, a U.S. Senator met with Soth Petrasay, who was the permanent Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane. During the course of their discussion, Soth stated: "The LPP (Lao People's Forces) has released all U.S. prisoners captured in Laos." However, the nine U.S. personnel who had been captured in Laos and who were released in Hanoi during Operation Homecoming were all captured by North Vietnamese forces operating in Laos and moved to North Vietnam for detention. There were a small number of U.S. personnel who were known to have been captured by the Pathet Lao who were not accounted for during Operation Homecoming. There is no information on these individuals to indicate they were alive subsequent to 1968.

- The only U.S. prisoner acknowledged by the Pathet Lao since Operation Homecoming was Mr. Emmet J. Kay, a U.S. civilian, who was captured on 7 May 1973 and released on 18 September 1974. On 6 September 1974, Phoumi Vongvichit, the PL Deputy Prime Minister, stated categorically to then U.S. Ambassador Charles Whitehouse that Mr. Kay was the only prisoner being held by the PL. However, it was subsequently ascertained that another U.S. civilian, Mr. Charles Dean, and his Australian companion, Mr. Neil Sharnan, had been captured in Laos in early September 1974. To date, the Pathet Lao have denied any knowledge of these two individuals although there was conclusive evidence that they were still alive as of February 1975.

- On 19 and 20 March 1977, the Presidential Commission on Missing and Unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia visited Vientiane. At that time Noupban Sithpassay, Lao Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs made the following statement:

- "Now I wish to assure you that there are no Americans who have been captured and are alive in Laos. The Americans that the Lao have captured during the war have all been returned to the U.S."

However, as was previously mentioned, the latter part of his statement is definitely contrary to known facts.

REPORTS OF LAO EFFORTS TO SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS
OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR U.S. PERSONNEL

Information received over the years indicates that the Pathet Lao did not have an organized system to account for enemy crash/gravesites. However, during the Presidential Commission's visit to Vientiane in March 1977, Lao officials stated that there was great difficulty in finding MIA information and remains in the rugged terrain, particularly in view of the country's small population and lack of material means. The Lao Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs assured the commission that "the Government of Laos has ordered before and will order again for the people of Laos to seek information and remains." During both formal and informal meetings, responsible Lao officials agreed to receive further MIA case files and other pertinent material to assist in their search.

In recent months, information has been received through intelligence channels which report that the Lao have initiated efforts to locate and exhume the remains of unaccounted-for U.S. personnel in various areas of Laos. These reports indicate that the Pathet Lao investigations have been primarily concentrated in traditionally Pathet Lao controlled territory. An analysis of the information appears generally accurate with relation to the type of aircraft involved and the incident locations.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNNCZCFJA29
 OTTOSYU/ANMIAA45037 4642032- -RUEBJFA.
 NY
 O 0324037 MAR 73 052635Z
 FM 13AF/JHNC CLARK AD PHIL
 TO AIG 7819
 INFO RUMOREA.
 BT

NO FOREIGN DISSEM LINDS JOPREP JIFFY JOCRC
 THIS IS A HOMECOMING (FORMERLY EGRESS, RECAP) AIR FORCE MESSAGE.
 THIS IS SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 387.
 SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING

REFERENCE: DIA/DI'S NEW JOURNAL MATTERS
 1. ON 5 MAR 73

DEBRIEFED PER
 REF MSG USING DIA PUB NORTH VIETNAMESE
 PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH US S. POWS (AP-359-8-1-72
 INT) DATED 1 JUN 72. DI-367-14-72 NOT AVAILABLE
 AT TIME OF DEBRIEFING. DEBRIEFING WAS CONDUCTED
 BY (HOMECOMING ESCORT) AND

THIS DEBRIEFING EXCEEDS

PAGE 2 ANMIAA45037
 THE NORMAL SOUNDS OF HOMECOMING PHASE II
 DEBRIEFINGS BUT WAS DEEMED NECESSARY

THE FOLLOWING
 INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED ON OWN PERSONNEL:
 (1) PHOTO 1A IS LT. VUONG, DESCRIBED AS CRUEL.
 (2) PHOTO 1B IS SGT TWO, REPORTED TO HAVE STRUCK
 AMERICAN POWS ON ORDERS FROM US1 INDIVIDUAL.
 (3) PHOTO 1A IS SAME AS PHOTO 1A.
 (4) PHOTO 1C IS POSSIBLY SGT CHUNG.
 (5) PHOTO 2A IS NAMED MAY.
 (6) PHOTO 2B IS POSSIBLY SGT MAN, A NERIC.
 (7) PHOTO 2C IS SGT THANG, REPORTED TO HAVE HIT
 AMERICAN POWS.
 (8) PHOTO 3C IS LT. NICH Y FROM AIG THAILAND.
 (9) PHOTO 47 IS 1/LT NICH DESCRIBED AS VERY CRUEL
 AND HAVE ORDERS TO PHOTO 48 TO TORTURE POWS.
 (10) PHOTO 49 IS SGT NONG, DESCRIBED AS "TORTURE
 EXPERT" AT CAMP UNIT

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE B

Dooley, Dennis

DATE: 12/12/73

716

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PAGE 3 RHMIAA5237

(K) PHOTO 5015 SAME AS PHOTO 4974
 (L) PHOTO 5016 SAME AS PHOTO 4975
 (M) PHOTO 5017 DESCRIBED AS AN JOURNALIST
 ALL NAMES WERE WRITTEN

BOTH RETURNEES HAVE BEEN
 WORK THE KNOWLEDGE OF VIETNAMESE

NO TAPE WAS USED ON THIS PORTION OF
 THE DEBRIEFING BECAUSE INFO WAS OBTAINED PRIMARILY
 BY MANUALLY POINTING AT PICTURES IN DIA PUBS.
 2. (SNF) DURING THIS DEBRIEFING, THE TWO RETURNEES
 WERE ALSO SHOWN VOLUMES OF THE DIA PRECAPTURE
 PHOTOGRAPH OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN
 ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (D) 367-2-724. RETURNEES
 WERE COOPERATIVE AND ENTHUSIASTIC, ESTABLISHING A
 RED: BILITY BY IDENTIFYING NEARLY THREE HUNDRED
 PERSONNEL WHO ARE ON LIST OF RETURNEES
 FROM THE DIA PHOTO ALBUM.
 3. (SNF) THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL WERE IDENTIFIED
 BY PHOTOS AND DO NOT APPEAR ON THE LIST

PAGE 4 RHMIS55937

OF RETURNEES:

DIA ID NO.	NAME	CURRENT STATUS
5154	SHELTON, CHARLES E.	CAPTURED
7204	WILKINS, JOHN P.	MIA
4325	WILKINS, GEORGE H.	MIA
7000	WILKINS, JOHN (UNCERTAIN)	MIA
3053	WILKINS, JOHN (UNCERTAIN)	MIA
7325	WILKINS, JAMES E.	CAPTURED
5019	WILKINS, WILLIAM H. (COMP UNITY)	MIA
38223	OLSON, BETTY A. (UNCERTAIN)	MIA
2158	CARROLL, ROGER V. (200)	MIA
2159	COOK, DAUGHT H. (200)	MIA
1502	MITCHELL, ARCHIE E.	MIA

IS TAPE USED FOR SAME REASON IN PARA.

THE ABOVE:

(SNF) THE TWO THAI RETURNEES ALSO STATED THAT A
 MAJ LT. CHAI CHAN HARNAVEE WAS WITH THEM AT
 AND UNITY. ALSO THEY READ AN NVN NEWSPAPER
 CALLED "QUAN DOC DAN NVN" THAT IDENTIFIED WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 5 RHMIAA5237

PHOTOGRAPHS THREE THAIS AMONG TWENTY THAI ARMY MEN
 CAPTURED IN LAOS. THEIR NAMES WERE LI THAVEE,
 MSST EVA, AND A CIVILIAN NAMED DUSIT. THE TWO THAI
 RETURNEES SAID THEY BELIEVED THERE WERE MANY MORE
 THAI CAPTIVES IN NVN AND THE PLAIN DES TARS.
 2. (SNF) SUGGEST ROYAL THAI GOVT BE CONTACTED
 AND ASKED TO MAKE THAI RETURNEES AVAILABLE
 FOR FUTURE DEBRIEFINGS ON CASUALTY RELATED
 INFORMATION
 GDS 21
 BT
 15037

Downgrade To UNCLASSIFIED
 By Authority Dept of AFBL KXX
 On APR 26 1977
 Action By Thomas W. Anderson

UNCLASSIFIED

50-714 79

ENCLOSURE C

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

U-48,332/DB-4H

TO: CDR John G. Colgan, USN
Special Assistant for PW Matters
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Pers-Og
Room 2802
Washington, D.C. 20370

SUBJECT: Declassification of Documents Pertaining to
LCDR J. E. Dooley, USN (KIA/PFOD)

Reference: Pers-Og-wp's letter, dated 2 February 1977,
subj: Declassification of documents.

In response to referenced request, enclosed is a sanitized
copy of USAINTC OIC FT GORDON GA Msg 022148Z Apr 73 per-
taining to LCDR Dooley.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Enclosure a/s


BRUCE L. HELLER
Commander, USN
Chief, PW/MIA Branch
Resources and Installations
Division
Directorate for Intelligence
Research

TRUE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DIA: DIA(20)
 DISTR CJCS(05) HOME(01) FILE(1)
 (027)

TRANSIT/022148Z/030029Z/002:41TOR0930027
 DE RUCLDIA #5500 0922150
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 022148Z APR 73
 FM LTC PARKS USAINTC OIC FT GORDON GA
 TO RUEOHBA/CDR USAINTC/DCE/FT HOLABIRD MD
 RUEKJCS/DIA/DI-6 WASH DC
 RUEFHQA/AIR FORCE OPERATIONS CENTER WASH DC
 RUEADWD/DA/DAMI-DOO-HP WASH DC
 RUEADWD/DA/DAAG-PSC WASH DC
 RUEOLKN/NAVINTCOM WASH DC
 RUEBJFA/NAVBUPEPERS WASH DC
 RUEFHQD/7602AINTLG/INFPB FT BELVOIR VA
 RUWTFJA/AFMPC/DPMSC RANDOLPH AFB TEX
 RUEOFIA/CMC/AD2A/DNA WASH DC
 INFO RUMOREA/CDR JCRC/NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB TAHI
 BT

UNCLAS

SECTION ONE OF TWO

THIS IS A HOMECOMING-ARMY MESSAGE. INFO RELEASABLE BY SERVICE
 CASUALTY DIVISIONS ONLY. FOR HOMECOMING ACTION OFFICERS ONLY.

SUBJ: HOMECOMING ARMY DEBRIEFING REPORT NO: 31

REFERENCE: JCR-D-7CS-24000

1. (U) RETURNEE:

NAME

J CATEGORY 5: CREW/SQUAD/PATROL/TEAM MEMBERS, ETC.

NAME: DOOLEY, JAMES E.

DATE OF LAST INFO: NOVEMBER 1971 DATE QUALIFIER: EST

SOURCE OF INFO: EITHER SAW NAME ON WALL AT PLANTATION GARDENS OR
 WAS TOLD.

LAST KNOWN STATUS: (POW)

DETAILS OF LAST CONTACT: NO CONTACT: EITHER SAW NAME IN WALL OR
 WAS TOLD ABOUT NAME BY ANOTHER RETURNEE.

UNCLASSIFIED

TRUE COPY

ENCLOSURE D

PHOTO COMPARISON SERVICES IN NORTH VIETNAM

Fill this form to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Pers-G23, Washington, D. C. 20370. If no identification is made, complete item 2 only.

When next of kin makes an identification, fill out the form in its entirety; obtain photograph of the PW from next of kin which can be used for scientific comparison, showing the PW from the same angle, if possible, as shown in the movie. Photographs provided by next of kin will be returned.

Delays in completion of scientific comparison should be anticipated due to the nature of the process and to the expected volume of requests.

Next of kin should be cautioned that identifications made from poor quality photographs will not be verifiable by scientific comparison.

Date Sept 12, 1970

1. Name of PW/MIA James E. Dooley
2. Name of viewing next of kin HENRY F. DOOLEY & Mrs
3. Number on identifying photograph, and position of subject if more than one PW is in the picture 46 - MAN ON RIGHT
4. Identification: Instantaneous Hesitant ✓
5. Facial or physical characteristic which aided next of kin most in identification Short - light hair - slight
6. Remarks: Not certain of identification

Henry F. Dooley
Signature
Dooley (S)

50-714-84

Date of Report: 1 Feb 1971

PHOTO COMPARISON ANALYSIS RESULTS: Christmas 1969 NO.

1. (U) Summary of request: (Date received:)
 - a. Please compare the attached 2 pre-capture photographs of James E. Dooley with the Christmas 1969 film obtained by Representative Zion, especially prints numbered DIA USN 46 USAF .
 - b. See attached overlay for exact location of image to be compared.
2. (U) Summary of comparison performed:
 - a. The following frames were chosen for comparison with the photographs submitted: 46
 - b. 2 technicians working independently of each other analyzed the identifiable features listed below.
3. Results of analysis:
 - a. (U) Quality of pre-capture photographs submitted: Adequate/inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.
 - b. (U) Quality of frames in Christmas film: Adequate/inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.
 - c. The following features were considered similar
 - (1)
 - (2)
 - (3)
 - (4)

50-714 85

- (5) _____
- (6) _____
- (7) _____
- (8) _____
- (9) _____

d. [REDACTED] The following features were considered dissimilar:

- (1) _____
- (2) _____
- (3) _____
- (4) _____
- (5) _____

e. [REDACTED] Conclusion:

- (1) In view of the similarity in general appearance and significant number of similar features, _____ could be the subject of the questioned photographs.
- (2) In view of the significant number of differences in distinguishable features _____ probably is not the subject of the questioned photograph
- (3) In view of the quality of photography and the small number of distinguishable features which could be compared, no conclusion can be reached.

f. (U) The same image has been compared with pre-capture photographs of _____ Air Force. _____ Navy. _____ Marine. _____ Army, and _____ civilian personnel.

PHOTO COMPARISON ANALYSIS INDEX SHEET

NAME: Dooly, James E.

SERVICE: USN

STATUS: Missing

DATE DOWNED: 28 Oct 67


	I	II	III	IV
OTHER				
OF REPORT	<u>16 Feb 71</u>			
IDENTIFIED PHOTO	<u>2 Pre-capture</u>			
UNIDENTIFIED PHOTO	<u>since 1966 film</u> <u>USN # 46</u>			
RESULTS	<u>6</u>			
REMARKS				

SPECIAL COMMENTS:

1 - Certain
2 - Highly Probable
3 - Possible

4 - Unlikely
5 - Certainly Not
6 - Unable to Judge

#46



50-714 88



1 FEB 1971

DATE: 1 Feb 1971MEMORANDUM FOR: *May*SUBJECT: Results of Photo Comparison.
Case NO. _____REFERENCE: Request from NOK of *Ed. James E. Hordberg*
was this fine

1. Transmitted herewith are results of photo comparison analysis between the ~~Christmas 1969~~ film of American PWs in North Vietnam and photographs submitted with reference.

2. The evidence cited in the attached report does not constitute definitive proof of the status or identity of individuals portrayed in the questioned photographs. Therefore, the report is not sufficient evidence for basing legal or administrative action involving rights of missing or captured personnel, or their next of kin. This Agency will accept no responsibility for any such action based on this evidence.

3. All materials received from your office in connection with subject request are returned herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF: _____

Attachments:

- (1) Christmas 1969 comparison NO. _____
- (2) Materials submitted with request
 - (a) Overlay _____
 - (b) precapture photos
 - (c) Other: _____

ENCLOSURE 2

P 151100Z JAN 87 PSN 025245P26

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI PRIORITY

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
JCS WASHDC//J5/PN-WIA//
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/MR CHILDRESS//

87 JAN 15 14 36
BCEDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PN-WIA//

BT

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK 02458

CITE: JCRC RPT 0308 JAN 87
SUBJECT: JCRC RPT HK06-102, CAPTURE OF AMERICAN
PILOT

2. INCIDENT SUMMARY: SOURCE PROVIDES
FIRSTHAND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CAPTURE OF
AN AMERICAN PILOT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN OCTOBER
OR NOVEMBER 1968 JUST OFF-SHORE IN THE AREA
OF DO SON CITY, VICINITY XM 87916. END SUMMARY.

3. INFORMATION: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
WAS RELATED BY SOURCE TO INTERVIEWER AS FACT.
AT APPROXIMATELY 1200 HOURS ON 13 OCTOBER OR
NOVEMBER 1968, SOURCE

WHEN
HE HEARD AN EXPLOSION AND SAW A SINGLE PERSON
DESCENDING UNDER A FULLY DEPLOYED, TRI-COLOR
PARACHUTE (RED, WHITE AND BLUE) AND LAND ON THE
BEACH APPROXIMATELY 50 METERS EAST OF THE DU SON
AIRFIELD AND 200 OR 300 METERS SOUTH OF NUI DOC
(VICINITY XM 87892). (JCRC NOTE: THE PILOT-THIS
POINT AT VICINITY XM 877916. SOURCE STATED THIS
PORTION OF THE BEACH IS COMMONLY CALLED "SO
HANG" (SOS HANG)). THE PILOT ATTEMPTED TO
EVADE BY SWIMMING OUT INTO THE WATER (EAST).
HE SWAM APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS OFF SHORE
WHEN THE PAVN 50TH REGIMENT

ELEMENTS WHICH WERE POSTED ON NUI DOC BEGAN FIRING
85 MM DKZ RECOILESS RIFLE LIMITING FIRE AHEAD
OF THE SWIMMER TO LIMIT HIS MOVEMENT. THEN
THE PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE FORCES AND THE
DUYEN HAI LOCAL FORCES BEGAN SWIMMING OUT TO THE
MAN TO CAPTURE HIM. THE PILOT BEGAN FIRING AT
THEM AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO TALK ON A SMALL, HAND
HELD RADIO SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO
SO DUE TO THE WAVES CAUSED BY THE RECOILESS RIFLE
FIRE. WHEN SEVERAL OF THE PURSUERS CAME WITHIN
APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS OF THE MAN, THEY DOVE
UNDER WATER AND CAME UP UNDER THE MAN TO SAFELY
CAPTURE HIM. NO ONE WAS WOUNDED OR INJURED DURING
THE CAPTURE. THE MAN WAS ESCORTED TO LAND AND
WAS LOADED INTO A SIDECAR WHICH TRANSPORTED HIM
ACROSS THE DU SON AIRFIELD. ON THE WEST SIDE
OF THE AIRFIELD, THE MAN WAS MOVED INTO A CHINESE
AUTO WHICH DROVE AWAY ON ROUTE 14 (NUMBERED
ROUTE 5 ON AVAILABLE MAPS) IN THE DIRECTION OF HAI

ONE.

THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE 24-25
YEARS OF AGE, HAD SHORT, VERY LIGHT BROWN, ORANGE
DYE, HAIR, WAS APPROXIMATELY 1.8 METERS TALL,
PROXIMATELY 70 KILOGRAMS IN WEIGHT, WAS IN
GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION, DID NOT WEAR EYEGLASSES,
DRORE A ONE PIECE UNIFORM THAT HAD A LONG ZIPPER
THE FRONT AND WAS THE COLOR OF RICE PLANT
LEAVES. WHEN THE MAN ATTEMPTED TO EVADE AND RUN
INTO THE WATER, HE WAS CARRYING A HELMET,
A SMALL RADIO, AND A PISTOL. THE HELMET WAS
STAYING IN THE WATER, BUT THE RADIO AND THE PISTOL
WERE CONFISCATED BY THE CAPTURING TROOPS. ONCE
THE CAPTURING FORCES HAD THE MAN ON THE BEACH,
THEY BOUND HIS ARMS BEHIND HIS BACK AT THE
KNEES BUT LEFT HIS FEET AND LEGS FREE. HE WAS
FOLDED BEFORE HE WAS LOADED INTO THE SIDECAR.
SOURCE WATCHED THE HANDLING OF THE MAN BY THE
CAPTURING TROOPS FROM HIS LOCATION ON THE WEST
SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD IN THE AREA WHERE THE MAN
WAS LOADED INTO THE CHINESE AUTO.

HE RAN OUTSIDE AND DURN
TO THE BEACH TO WATCH. HE RECALLED SEEING A
HELICOPTER AND FIVE OR SIX JET AIRCRAFT CIRCLING
AND APPARENTLY SEARCHING FOR THE MAN IN THE GENERAL
AREA OF XM 8390 AND XM 8490. SOURCE ADDITIONALLY
RECALLED THAT THE PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE ELEMENT
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CAPTURE WAS STATIONED
AT THE BORDER POST #34 (DOK BIEN PHONG 34) WHICH WAS
LOCATED AT THE NORTH END OF THE DU SON AIRFIELD,
VICINITY XM 875919. SOURCE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING
OF THE PILOT'S AIRCRAFT, CRASH SITE, OR LOCATION OF
RESCUE. DELCLOADR.

11/17/79
1.3 METERS
"6.98 KILOGRAMS"



59

TAGLEY, JAC AL
LIEUTENANT



1277



1010022 APR 87 PSY 302526P24

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO COMNAVHILPERSCOM WASHINGTON DC//NMPC N60//

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36// DIA WASHINGTON DC//VFP//PII 22
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PM-1A//
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
JCS WASHINGTON DC//JCJCS-PH-1A/J5//

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT MK86-102
MSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

4. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 151000Z JAN 87

1. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SOURCE
OF REF A, REVEALS A PROBABLE CORRELATION TO REFNO 0872-0-01.

2. REFNO 0872: ON 22 OCTOBER 1967, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, JAMES E. DOOLEY WAS FLYING AN A-4 ATTACK BOMBER. THE AIRCRAFT, SERIAL NUMBER 150115, CRASHED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XNR60693, APPROXIMATELY 2000 METERS SOUTH OF DO SON, HAIPHONG PROVINCE, VIETNAM. NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN AND NO ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNALS WERE HEARD. A THOROUGH AERIAL SEARCH OF THE AREA WAS CONDUCTED, BUT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVAL. UPON HIS REPATRIATION AFTER BEING HELD PRISONER OF WAR, ONE AMERICAN SERVICEMAN STATED THAT HE HAD EITHER SEEN LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S NAME WRITTEN ON A PRISON WALL OR HEARD IT WHILE A PRISONER IN HANOI. A FOLDER DETAILING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S CASE WAS PRESENTED TO OFFICIALS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY JCRC DURING A POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING HELD IN AUGUST 1984. LIEUTENANT DOOLEY IS CARRIED IN THE PRESUMPTIVE STATUS OF DEAD, BODY NOT RECOVERED.

3. LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S INCIDENT OCCURRED WITHIN FOUR KILOMETERS OF GRID COORDINATES XNR791163. THE TIME OF DAY AND MONTH CORRELATE TO LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S INCIDENT; HOWEVER, THE SOURCE REPORTED THE INCIDENT AS OCCURRING IN 1968 AND THE ACTUAL YEAR OF THE INCIDENT WAS 1967. THE SOURCE'S REPORT OF AIRCRAFT SEARCHING FOR THE DOWNED PILOT CORRELATES WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LIEUTENANT DOOLEY'S INCIDENT.

4. (U) THIS EVALUATION MAY BE RELEASED TO NOK BY COMNAVHILPERSCOM UPON DELETION OF SOURCE'S NAME FROM PARAGRAPH ONE. A SANITIZED COPY OF RFP A FOR RELEASE TO NOK BY COMNAVHILPERSCOM WILL BE FORWARDED VIA REGISTERED MAIL.

5. (U) THIS IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYTICAL POSITION AND NOT A FINAL EVALUATION. EVAL - JAC.

3/87
JAC

ENCLOSURE F

631 Corriente Ct.
 Camarillo, California
 April 24, 1989

Ms. Pam Hicks
 P. O. Box 287
 Bondville, VT 05340


To Whom It May Concern:

My name is Captain J. M. Hickerson, USN (Ret) - POW 22 December 1967 to 14 March 1973. I do not believe that the captured American pilot, subject of JCRC Report HK86-102, was me. There are too many discrepancies between the JCRC Report HK86-102 and my capture:

- 1.) I was shot down on 22 December, not October or November;
- 2.) My parachute was all white, not red, white and blue;
- 3.) If I had landed 50 meters from an airfield, I would have been aware of it;
- 4.) I swam no more than 50 yards, not 200 meters;
- 5.) I did not attempt to use my pistol;
- 6.) There were no waves;
- 7.) I was transported away on the back of a bicycle, not in a sidecar, and I was never in an automobile;
- 8.) I was wearing Marine fatigues (2-piece), not a one piece flight suit;
- 9.) There was a solid, approximately 800 ft. overcast in the area, making it unlikely that 5 or 6 jets plus a helicopter would have been flying under an overcast that close to Do Son.

Despite the fact that the location and date of the described capture was approximately mine, considering the above, I do not believe that the captured pilot reported in JCRC Report HK86-102, was me.

Very Respectfully,


 J. M. Hickerson
 Captain, USN (Ret)

ENCLOSURE G

1445/6 mar 90 - telcom J Hickerson

Landed on Beach

weapon in gear no radio

overcast that day - under overcast

- no airfield in sight!

- no transport around beach

Stripped to shorts, blindfolded

tied behind him - sat on bicycle

getty stuck out - water

no airplanes early - heard none all afternoon

shot out in - 37 mm

ENCLOSURE H



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20370-5000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1771
Ser N64DD/0544
17 Aug 89

From: Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command (N-64DD)
To: Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI 96862-5200

Subj: REQUEST INFORMATION ICO OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. DOOLEY, USNR, 008-30-3710/606509 REFNO 0872-0-01

1. This is in response to Mrs. Elizabeth H. Dooley's questions she had at the National League of Families Conference in July. She has discrepancies about some of the facts concerning her son's case. Would you review the file on Lieutenant Commander Dooley and check to see if any of her claims can be validated. Please send your response directly to us. The questions are listed below.

(1) Please check to see if there is any pattern to the crash site investigations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.

(2) In reference to JCRC msg 251800Z Jul 88; In reference to para #7 - CDR Hickerson stated that the report referenced was not his and he would rewrite the deposition, was the reinterview conducted? If so what were the results. Was the source mentioned proven to be reliable?

(3) Check to see if LCDR Dooley is on the top priority 70 name discrepancy list, have there been any negotiations attempted since 1987 on LCDR Dooley case?

(4) Do we need official deposition of this fact to have report possibly correlated to LCDR Dooley?

2. If you have any questions, please feel free to reach me toll-free at 1-800-443-9298.

3. Thank you very much for your assistance.

DAVID W. OSWALD, III.
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve
Special Assistant, POW/MIA Affairs

Encl:

(1) JCRC unclassified msg dtg 251800Z dtd Jul 88

ENCLOSURE I

, NYC

HQ SJVL

MAY 11 1984 20:11 4879459

GA

20CJUS 310 DAN STRYKER
US7108221907 EVFCH WSHATTN: ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPT. OF JUSTICE

HAVE TRIED SINCE JAN 13, 1984 TO LODGE A COMPLAINT REGARDING ILLEGAL POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF MR. RICHARD CHILDRESS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE CENTER FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY INC., A SUPPOSED TAX-EXEMPT CORPORATION. INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CENTER HAVE ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL AND EXTORTION AFTER RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM MR. CHILDRESS FOR THEIR TRAVEL. MR. CHILDRESS WAS ADVISED OF THIS ACTIVITY ON JANUARY 13TH, 1984 AND ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CONNECTION WITH THE CENTER AND INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

INDIVIDUALS WITH THE CENTER SAID THEY HAD A DIRECT WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI, IRS AND OTHER USG AGENCIES. IT APPEARS THEY WERE CORRECT AS COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FBI, THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DIA, AND IRS WITH NO APPARENT RESULTS.

REQUEST THAT A FORMAL INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED OF THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. CHILDRESS AND THE CENTER FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS, CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL MISUSE OF OFFICE AND AUTHORITY.

JAN R. MEAD
SUITE 106, 333 CORDILL WAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
(408) 947-5733

172211HQBJVL

NNNN

CCI NYC

1 MSGS RCVD

GEHCD:EMJ:ab
186-11-0

Washington, D.C. 20535

JUN 20 1984

Mr. John R. Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, California 94086

Dear Mr. Mead:

The Public Integrity Section has received a telex dated May 11, 1984 from you to the Attorney General. M. Marshall Jarrett, a trial attorney in the Public Integrity Section has reviewed your telex and spoken to you on the telephone regarding the allegations contained therein. Pursuant to Mr. Jarrett's telephone request to you, please provide to him in writing a detailed description of all the facts which you believe give rise to a violation of federal criminal law. Mr. Jarrett's address is P.O. Box 50168, F Street Station, Washington, D.C. 20004-0168.

Sincerely,

Gerald E. McDowell

Gerald E. McDowell, Chief
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division

John R Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, Calif 94086
(408) 947-5733
July 16, 1984

Mr. H. Marshall Jarrett
Attorney at Law
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Jarrett:

The following information is provided in response to your telephone request and Mr. McDowell's letter.

The attached documentation should be reviewed first to establish the general background. It represents part of the records that have been accumulated since March 1983 through the present date. Much of the supporting documentation is in the hands of other persons; however, can be obtained on reasonable notice.

It was not until January 1984 that I reluctantly accepted the probability that individuals at the responsibility level of Mr. Childress were involved in the activities described herein. Since that time I have had occasion to be in a position to verify that Mr. Childress is an active, willing participant in these activities.

During my analysis of events over the last eighteen months one thing has become very visible. There is a serious misuse of official position and authority by Mr. Childress and by other persons within the Department of Defense including Mr. R. L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The following is a general breakdown of some issues and general supporting information for each. Names and contact information of witnesses to each point and supporting documentation is available and can be obtained on reasonable notice as needed.

In the following breakdown when I state Childress, I am referring to Mr. R. T. Childress of the National Security Council, his associates and persons under his direction and/or control.

Illegal Political Relationship - Childress and 'Center for POW/MIA Accountability'.

An illegal political controlling relationship exists between Mr. Childress and the Center for POW/MIA Accountability in such a manner that the 'Center' acts for Mr. Childress and is his private force. The 'Center' is described as a Non-profit Tax-exempt corporation based in Washington, DC. Some of the activities of the 'Center' are described herein.

Supporting Information:

Representatives of the 'Center' acknowledged that they were political in nature with a political mission and scheduled to go out of business in November 1984. This statement was made during a question and answer session after a presentation to 'Project Freedom' in Phoenix, Arizona.

Representatives of the 'Center' stated that they had access and approval at the highest level including the NSC with instant access to an unnamed individual on the White House staff. This statement was made several times but specifically during their trip to California in July 1983 and in Las Vegas during October 1983.

Childress acknowledged on January 13, 1984 that the 'Center' was his investigative group and his Public Awareness Briefing team.

Childress acknowledged on January 13, 1984 that representatives of the 'Center' visited his office and he approved their travel to California to talk to my associates and me.

See the attached documentation for more information on this trip.

Release of Classified Information

Childress has willfully, knowingly and illegally authorized the release of, released or provided information that was classified and furnished in confidence to the Defense Intelligence Agency to persons without a need to know and who did not hold a valid security clearance.

Supporting Information:

On his trip to California in July 1983, Allen could quote 'word for word' information provided in confidence to DIA. When queried, he said he had received it from his 'high level' contacts within the USG.

Childress stated on January 13, 1984 that personnel of the 'Center' were provided with all reports from all sources to evaluate and investigate as appropriate. This apparently included whatever reports were prepared by DIA during my discussions with them during June 1983.

I have been assured by representatives of DIA that they did not give out the information provided to them however they had no control over the information after it left their office.

Other cases of selective release have been reported and appear to be true.

Misuse of Office and Authority

Mr. Childress has used his office for political purposes to interfere and intervene in the activities of private organizations.

Supporting Information:

Mr. Childress has condoned and possibly approved the use of attempted blackmail, threats of official prosecution, threats of physical harm and other actions by his agents (Personnel of the 'Center', its advisors, associates and consultants) against myself and others. Threats of physical harm were made by Mr. Monaghan and others against myself and my associates. Threats of prosecution were made by Mr. Allan and Monaghan. Mr. Allen stated that if we did not do as they wanted we would be ruined.

Mr. Childress has used his position, office and authority to deliberately interfere with and influence the actions of private non-profit organizations interested in the POW/MIA issue. This has apparently been done to suppress any independent inquiry or publicity that may not support his public position on the matter. Mr. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense has also been involved in this matter.

Childress has used personal intimidation and threats of governmental sanctions against the League in an effort to insure that Ann Griffiths remain as the Executive Director of the National League of Families (A paid position as an employee of the League). Mr. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense has also used this approach.

See attached documentation for additional information.

Violation of Civil Rights of myself and others

An extensive Character Assassination has been conducted against myself and my associates thru several sources but they appear to be coordinated thru the 'Center'. Everyone involved is associated with the 'Center'.

Supporting Information:

Representatives of the 'Center' (Butler and Allen) have told third parties (in person and via interstate telephone) not to do business with me or my company as we were under investigation by the FBI for illegal acts and anti-American activity.

Representatives of the 'Center', their advisors and consultants have deliberately, knowingly and willfully conducted a character assassination campaign against my associates and myself. They have repeatedly told third parties that we are 'under investigation for illegal, criminal and un-American acts'. This has occurred from September 1983 until the present date.

See attached documentation for additional information.

Threats of Damaging Official Actions:

It has become apparent during the last few months that the threats expressed by Mr. Allen and other persons associated with the 'Center' had merit and that I should have been more aware that they were serious.

Supporting Information:

During their trip to California in July 1984 Mr. Allen and Mr. Hebert stated that they had 'arrangements' with both the FBI and IRS. The FBI would perform checks on all personnel they were interested in and perform other services as needed. IRS would 'take care' of them and insure that they had no tax problems and provide other services that were not named.

Allen stated several times that if we did not do what they wanted that things would go very bad for us.

From the events of the last few months it is apparent that there is an attempt to carry out these threats.

See attached documentation for more information.

Illegal Surveillance

Several times during the last few months I have been informed by different persons that Mr. Childress and/or DIA Representatives have approached people known to be interested in POW/MIA activities and asked them to join groups and report back on the intentions and actions of these groups.

Supporting Information:

It is my understanding that this type of 'undercover' activity is unlawful in general and that the military in specific is not allowed to infiltrate civilian groups or conduct undercover investigations of same.

Statements of individuals approached are available.

Comments

It has become evident that if a person (or group) does not embrace the position expressed by current USG Representatives (Mr. Childress and DIA)) and they are active in the issue of POW/MIA affairs that they are then in for trouble. It apparently does not matter if a person is acting in good faith or is just expressing a political position.

Character assassination appears to be a standard tactic employed by the USG Representatives and their agents. The comments made about myself and others with whom I have come into contact over the last few months have ranged from 'Liars' to 'Anti-American Radicals' to 'Senile' and worse.

The charges I am making are serious and are not being made without a lot of thought and investigation. It is my intention to continue until the matter is resolved regardless of expense or time.

Additional information is available to fully support all charges I am making however is in safekeeping at this time.

I sincerely hope that your office will be able to determine who is responsible for these illegal actions and can take appropriate action.

Please advise me if I can provide any additional information.

Sincerely,



GENMcD:FSE:pam
186-0

Washington, D.C. 20530

18 AUG 1984

Mr. John R. Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, California 94086

Dear Mr. Mead:

This will acknowledge the Public Integrity Section's receipt of your letter dated July 16, 1984 and the accompanying materials.

Sincerely,

Gerald E. McDowell, Chief
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division

Suite Nbr 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
(408) 947-5733

August 21, 1984

The Honorable Fred Fielding
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

Your assistance is respectfully requested in having the matters described in the attached material investigated. Basic documentation on these matters has been provided to DOJ and DIA.

The events over the last year have forced me to accept that some officials of the USG are willfully and deliberately maintaining a policy of deception and self interest which is not in accordance with the expressed policy of the current administration nor in the interests of the United States.

This policy includes preventing information and reports from reaching the president; taking aggressive reprisal action against those who express disagreement or do not support their position; suppressing data which is not in agreement with their interests and illegal political interference in the affairs of private organizations.

The reprisal actions have included threats of prosecution, character assassination, violation of civil rights, intimidation, interference in commerce and other criminal acts.

For over six months I have been trying to work within the established legal channels to have an official investigation started. Until my TELEX to the Attorney General I could not even obtain acknowledgment that I had made a complaint.

With all due respect to the Attorney General's office and personnel I feel that my complaint will be buried and that no action will be taken unless I continue to press the matter thru every channel possible.

As the current focus of my complaint is within the NSC and DOD I hope that any action you may consider would be by persons who are not under the control of nor subject to review by persons within the NSC or DOD.

Sincerely,

MSB C43418 SENT AT 03 SEP 84 01:39:34

:TY

:GET C43418

:TY

ACCEPTED

2589510+/IRS WSH

TO: COMMISSIONER ROSCOE L. EGGER

YOUR ASSISTANCE IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED IN OBTAINING AN ANSWER TO MY PREVIOUS REQUESTS MADE VIA MAIL ON MAR 10 1984, ON APR 6 1984 AND AGAIN ON MAY 17 1984, FOLLOWED BY MANY PHONE CALLS DURING MAY, JUNE, JULY AND AUG.

MY REQUESTS WERE: 1) THAT I BE ADVISED IF 'THE CENTER FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY' HAD A VALID TAX-EMPT STATUS AND, 2) THAN AN INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED INTO THE POLITICAL CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. R.T. CHILDRESS OF THE N.S.C. AND THE CENTER; AND INTO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY HIM AND/OR HIS AGENTS.

I REGRET TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE OF ANY TYPE TO MY REQUEST BY YOUR SERVICE.

AS PROVEN BY RECENT HISTORY 'STONEWALLING' AND 'COVERUP' ARE NOT NEW TO OUR GOVERNMENT BUT POLITICAL MISUSE OF THE IRS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 'IN THE PAST'.

MANY PERSONS HAVE ADVISED ME OF THE VINDICTIVE ACTION YOUR SERVICE MAY TAKE BECAUSE OF MY COMPLAINT BUT I WILL PURSUE THIS MATTER BY ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WITHIN MY POWER.

I ONLY HOPE THE CONSTITUTION STILL MEANS WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK REDRESS OF A WRONG AND THAT IT DOES NOT PLACE 'PUBLIC SERVANTS' ABOVE THE LAW.

YOUR POSTIVE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS MATTER AND THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MYSELF AND OTHERS IS REQUESTED.

IF YOU CAN NOT - OR WILL NOT - ADDRESS THIS MATTER REQUEST THAT YOU SO ADVISE ME - IN WRITING - AND STATE THE REASON.

JOHN MEAD
SUITE 106
333 COBALT WAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
(408) 947 5733

C43737 SENT AT 03 SEP 84 17:42:21

ET C43737

ACCEPTED

:TY

7108221907+/EVFCH WSH

TO: ATTY GEN SMITH

YOUR ASSISTANCE IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED IN OBTAINING INFORMATION REGARDING MY COMPLAINT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BY MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND/OR THEIR AGENTS.

MY REQUEST WAS THAT AN INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED INTO THE POLITICAL CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. R CHILDRESS OF THE N.S.C. AND A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION AND ALSO INTO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY HIM AND/OR HIS AGENTS OR ASSOCIATES.

THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO ACTION TAKEN BY YOUR DEPARTMENT. AS FAR AS I CAN DETERMINE NO PERSON WITH DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED HAS EVER BEEN ASKED A QUESTION OR INTERVIEWED. IT HAS BEEN OVER SIX MONTHS SINCE MY FIRST WRITTEN COMPLAINT ADDRESSED TO YOU WAS MAILED. ALSO I AM NOW INFORMED THAT MR. JARRETT 'IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE' WHEN I CALL TO CHECK ON THE STATUS.

THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS (POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL) CONTINUE AND THE PERSONS INVOLVED REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS AND CONTINUE TO ABUSE THEIR OFFICE AND POSITION OF TRUST BY THEIR ACTS.

AS PROVEN BY RECENT HISTORY 'STONEWALLING' AND 'COVERUP' ARE NOT NEW TO OUR GOVERNMENT BUT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE IMMUNE TO 'POLITICAL MISUSE' - AT LEAST IN THIS ADMINISTRATION.

IF THE ACTIONS I HAVE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION DO IN FACT REPRESENT THE POLICY OF THE USG THEN WE NO LONGER HAVE A 'GOVERNMENT OF LAW' OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.

MANY PERSONS HAVE ADVISED ME OF THE VINDICTIVE ACTION THAT MAY BE TAKEN AND THE PERSONAL DANGER INCURRED BECAUSE OF MY COMPLAINT BUT I WILL PURSUE THIS MATTER BY ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WITHIN MY POWER. I ONLY HOPE THE CONSTITUTION STILL MEANS THE RIGHT TO SEEK REDRESS OF A WRONG AND THAT IT DOES NOT PLACE 'PUBLIC SERVANTS' ABOVE THE LAW.

YOUR POSTIVE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS MATTER AND THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MYSELF AND OTHERS IS REQUESTED.

IF YOU CAN NOT - OR WILL NOT - ADDRESS THIS MATTER I REQUEST THAT YOU ADVISE ME - IN WRITING - AND STATE YOUR REASONS.

JOHN MEAD
SUITE 106
333 COBALT WAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086

September 11, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: Kris Kolesnik
FROM: Harvey Andrews
SUBJECT: Review of Public Integrity file, Department of Justice
Ref: Mead complaint

On August 28, 1989, the Office of Public Integrity, Department of Justice, was asked to produce its file on the investigation of a complaint filed by John R. Mead, re: unlawful surveillance by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), etc. Mr. Jack Keeny produced a three page declination of prosecution based on Mead's complaint, stating that this paper summarized their inquiry. Mr. Keeny would not allow the paper to leave his office.

Upon review by both Kris Kolesnik and myself, the declination paper was found to be a superficial inquiry of the complaint by Mead which was conducted by Defense Department's oversight office. DIA through the oversight inquiry never denied a surveillance of Mead, but stated it did nothing illegal. The portion of the complaint dealing with a civil rights violation was not referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), nor was there any evidence that other potential criminal violations in Mead's complaint were ever investigated by FBI. The paper was a self-serving document that cleared DIA of any wrongdoing.

Mr. Keeny was asked to provide the full file on this matter and he said he would have to take it up with some unidentified office. Subsequently, Mr. Keeny called and said the complete file would have to be withheld because of the "third agency rule."

ENCLOSURE J

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Usry.

Let me just say that I think that everyone respects your commitment to this issue. You have certainly put a lot of time and energy into it.

One of the questions I have, having looked at the report, is, and I do not want to say this sweepingly about the report, but there are some statements that I think make some sort of leap to a conclusion that may be sort of all encompassing in its nature.

Let me give you an example, for instance. On Page 5-3 to 5-4 you talk about the issue of the prisoners left in Laos, and you make the following statement, quote, "Notwithstanding the fact that no U.S. POWs held by Pathet Lao forces have ever been repatriated." I believe that is on Page 5-4, down in the last paragraph.

"These statements were made notwithstanding the eighty men cited by Henry Kissinger held by the North Vietnamese, and notwithstanding the fact that no U.S. POWs held by the Pathet Lao forces have ever been repatriated."

But, in fact, it is true, is it not, that nine Americans were turned over to the U.S. in 1973 from Laos, who were nominally Pathet Lao prisoners? Those were counted as repatriated from Laos.

Mr. Usry: Sir, it's my understanding that the nine people -- the nine prisoners that were repatriated were, in

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Dooley, they would have communicated it to us?

Mr. Usry: No, sir, I'm not aware of it.

Senator McCain: You were not aware of that. Well, if you were not aware of that fact, Mr. Usry, you did a very incomplete job, because you could have asked any one of the POWs, former POWs, or asked anyone who was involved in the issue, that our primary goal was to keep track of all the names of anyone that we had any information about.

So your allegation that the two Thai special forces identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate is false.

"Finally, a propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi dated after Dooley was shot down shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley." What photograph was that?

Mr. Usry: Sir, if you would submit that question for the record, I would be more than happy to answer it after I consult my notes.

Senator McCain: You made a very serious allegation here, Mr. Usry, and I am surprised that you would not even know what photograph it is.

Mr. Usry: Well, I think the difference between your information and my information, sir, is, one, your information is firsthand and mine is secondary, dependent upon other people.

However, you have only brought in two examples or two

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1 instances concerning the Dooley issue and there are more than
2 those that caused us to come to the conclusion that we did.

3 Senator McCain: "A U.S. POW who had been repatriated
4 said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell
5 in Hanoi." Who was that POW?

6 Mr. Ury: That information has not been provided to us
7 because the Department of Defense, at the time we were doing
8 this inquiry, would not share any information concerning POWs
9 with us unless there was a Senator present with us at the time
10 we were going through the documents.

11 The Senators' schedules precluded us from looking at
12 those documents for more than a four-day period.

13 Senator McCain: So your allegation --

14 The Chairman: Will you yield for a minute? I'm confused
15 by that?

16 Senator McCain: So his allegation basically, Mr.

17 Chairman, has been relayed to him with no basis in fact.

18 Mr. Ury: I don't agree with that statement at all,
19 Senator.

20 Senator McCain: What facts do you have to back up your
21 allegation that a U.S. POW had been -- who had been
22 repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a
23 prison cell in Hanoi?

24 Mr. Ury: Besides that information, which was provided
25 to us by family members, there was additional information

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1 custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow
2 inmate.

3 Do you have any factual information on that?

4 Mr. Ury: With me?

5 Senator McCain: Any knowledge of that fact.

6 Mr. Ury: Again, I will address the statement I made
7 earlier.

8 Senator McCain: I see. And, finally, "A Communist
9 propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi, dated
10 after Dooley was shot down, shows a partial profile of a
11 person that strongly resembles Dooley." Do you have any
12 knowledge of that?

13 Mr. Ury: I have the photograph.

14 Senator McCain: You have the photograph?

15 Mr. Ury: I do.

16 Senator McCain: Where is that photograph?

17 Mr. Ury: It's up in my office.

18 Senator McCain: Yet the DIA and no government agency has
19 that photograph, according to them.

20 Mr. Ury: Well, that may very well be the case, keeping
21 in mind that not all information concerning all missing
22 prisoners goes to DIA because there's a lack of the faith in
23 the way they have operated in the past.

24 Senator McCain: I see. It goes to you?

25 Mr. Ury: Some of it does on occasion, yes, sir.

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1 Senator McCain: Like your trip to Thailand that you just
2 took?

3 Mr. Ury: That's correct.

4 Senator McCain: Tell me about that trip, would you, Mr.
5 Ury?

6 Mr. Ury: Are there any thing specific you would like to
7 know or would you like to start from the beginning?

8 Senator McCain: I would like for you to answer the
9 question. I said tell me about the trip. That is what I
10 would like for you to do, Mr. Ury.

11 Mr. Ury: Sir, I would be more than happy to provide you
12 the briefing that I provided to the Secretary of Defense which
13 led to the trip, if you're interested.

14 Senator McCain: The Secretary of Defense says that
15 absolutely nothing was gained from that trip.

16 Mr. Ury: Well, that's his opinion, sir. I don't
17 necessarily agree with that. There is still a questioned
18 photograph.

19 Senator McCain: That necessitated a trip to Thailand?

20 Mr. Ury: That's correct.

21 Senator McCain: What did you do there, Mr. Ury?

22 Mr. Ury: We contacted the individual that provided a
23 photograph that after forensic examination indicated it might
24 be possibly be or in the words of the forensic anthropologist,
25 "was, in fact, Lieutenant Commander Stevens." The individual

1 something you will have to address later.

2 Senator Grassley: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

3 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

4 Mr. Ury, before we excuse you temporarily until later,
5 let me just emphasize why Senator Daschle and others of us are
6 concerned and why it is so important, and I think you
7 understand this importance.

8 Mr. Ury: Oh, yes.

9 The Chairman: There are a lot of families, a lot of
10 people listening, a lot of folks who hang on every nuance of
11 every single assertion with respect to this issue. Now, in
12 your report here, which I read yesterday incidentally, you
13 suggest as a matter of fact, because it says, and I read from
14 your report, "In 1973 a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said
15 he saw Dooley's name written on a wall of a prison cell. Two
16 Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnam
17 custody identified his photograph. Finally, a Communist
18 propaganda photograph shows a partial profile," and so forth.

19 I have information here on the actual debrief of Captain
20 Hickerson, and while you assert that he was not swimming and
21 so forth, let me read to you from it.

22 He told debriefers, quote, "He collapsed his parachute,
23 he found himself face to face with about 100 civilian
24 personnel. He immediately separated from the parachute and
25 started running out into the shallow water. After going a



An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs

By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Republican Staff

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Second Printing: September, 1991

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

May 23, 1991

Dear Colleague:

On October 29, I released an interim report prepared by the Minority Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations based upon an on-going investigation of the POW/MIA issue. That investigation has continued. It was not, and was never intended to be, a search for specific POW/MIAs.

Such an effort would be beyond the scope of the resources available to the Minority. Rather it was an attempt to ascertain whether the agencies of the U.S. government responsible for POW/MIAs were doing the job they were supposed to do—that is, to find any POW/MIAs who might still be alive.

The interim conclusions are very disturbing. After examining hundreds of documents relating to the raw intelligence, and interviewing many families and friends of POW/MIAs, the Minority Staff concluded that, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the real, internal policy of the U.S. government was to act upon the presumption that all MIAs were dead.

As a result, the Minority Staff found, any evidence that suggested an MIA might be alive was uniformly and arbitrarily rejected, and all efforts were directed towards finding and identifying remains of dead personnel, even though the U.S. government's techniques of identification were inadequate and deeply flawed.

These conclusions, although welcomed by the families and friends of POW/MIAs who had direct experience with the U.S. government's POW establishment, were hotly rejected by that establishment.

However, on February 12 the Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIA) resigned. Colonel Millard A. Peck, a man who had accepted the position with high motives and a sense of deep dedication, felt that he could no longer fulfill the demands of duty, honor, and integrity under the policies which he was asked to implement.

In a detailed and forthright letter, which did not become public until May, Colonel Peck confirmed that a "cover-up" has been in progress. He spoke of a "mindset to debunk." He said that there was no effort to pursue "live sightings." He stated that "any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago." Lastly, he criticized the U.S. government's treatment of the families and friends of the POW/MIAs.

The entire text of Colonel Peck's letter appears — verbatim — at the end of this report.

The fact that Colonel Peck's conclusions were so similar to the conclusions of the Minority Staff is a matter of regret, rather than a vindication. I had hoped that the Minority Staff investigators would be able to alter their preliminary findings, because the implications of a deliberate effort by the U.S. government to deceive the American people is a matter that all of us would prefer to believe unthinkable.

However, as the Minority Staff pursued its investigations, it became clear that the U.S. experience with the Vietnam POW/MIAs is not unique in history. Echoes of similar experiences in dealing with other, and earlier Communist regimes on the subject of POW/MIAs came up with increasing frequency. Although substantial portions of the current report had already been prepared, I directed the staff to track down the historical precedents. I felt that these precedents were absolutely necessary to an understanding of the present problems, even though it necessarily delayed the release of the report.

Of course, this fundamental historical research required a massive undertaking to find the original documents, most of them formerly classified, in the National Archives and in the issuing agencies. Accordingly, readers will find in this report something which has never before been attempted: An historical analysis of the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs in the hands of the Bolshevik regime after World War I, the Soviet regime after World War II, the North Korean regime after the Korean War, and the Vietnamese regime after the Vietnam War.

In each case, the same dismaying scenario appears: On the Communist side, the regimes denied holding U.S. prisoners, contrary to many credible reports, while in fact they were holding the U.S. POW/MIAs as slave laborers and as reserve bargaining chips to get diplomatic recognition and financial assistance. On the U.S. side, our government downplayed or denied the reports of POW/MIAs, and failed to take adequate steps to prove or disprove the reports, while elements in our government pursued policies intended to make diplomatic recognition and financial support of the revolutionary regimes possible.

I find this evidence convincing; doubters should examine the cables and classified memoranda cited in Part I which tell the full story. Part II examines anecdotal evidence which the Minority Staff has chosen to illustrate the massive problems with the U.S. government's handling of the POW/MIA issue — problems which were only suggested in the Interim Report.

While investigation into the present problems continues, it is evident from the work already done by the Minority Staff that more time and more resources need to be devoted to the work. Senator Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire), a long-time stalwart in the ranks of those dedicated to the POW/MIA cause, has introduced S. Res. 82, to establish a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. S. Res. 82 has already attracted wide bipartisan support, and deserves the support of every Senator.¹

¹ Since the first printing of this report, the United States Senate unanimously agreed to create a Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to further investigate U.S. Policy toward POW/MIA matters.

This report has required many hundreds of hours of work, not only from the Minority Staff, but from many dedicated persons who shared their experiences and research with the Minority Staff. I would be especially remiss were I not to mention Dr. Harvey Andrews, Thomas Ashworth, John M. G. Brown, and Mark Sauter of CBS affiliate, KIRO-TV, Seattle, Washington. Needless to say, the conclusions are those of the Minority Staff, and not necessarily of those of Messrs. Andrews, Ashworth, Brown, and Sauter.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

JESSE HELMS:j1



An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs

By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Republican Staff

Thursday, May 23, 1991

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PROLOGUE TO PART I

Throughout this century, the United States, as a nation, has anguished over the plight of American prisoners of war, both known and missing. The emotional ordeal of the families, the debt which the nation owes to those who have put their lives on the line for their countries, and the human dignity of each and every single soldier, or sailor, or airman ought to have an incalculable bearing on our national policies and our honor.

On the record, the U.S. government has professed to give these concerns "the highest national priority." Off the record, this priority vanishes. Instead, other considerations emerge: Grand visions of a foreign policy of peace and reconciliation; desire for a new economic order of trade and investment; ideological imperatives to downplay the hostility of antagonistic systems; and the natural tendency of the bureaucracy to eliminate its workload by filing cases marked "closed" instead of finding the people.

Last October, the Minority Staff published an Interim Report based on hundreds of interviews and reviews of raw intelligence data in Department of Defense (DOD) files. The Interim Report suggested that DOD was more interested in manipulating and managing the issue than in finding living POWs listed as missing. But as the investigation proceeded, the weight of evidence of failure—a failure of the U.S. Government to meet its sacred trust—became overpowering.

Was it really possible that officials in the Executive Branch charged with the solution of POW/MIA issues could have failed so miserably to respond to the needs of the American people? Was it simply that the emotions of the POW/MIA- concerned community were making an objective appraisal of DOD's work impossible?

The resignation of the director of DOD Special Office for POW/MIA Matters, Col. Millard A. Peck, submitted on February 12, but made public only last month, offered unexpected and extraordinary support for the findings of the Interim Report. (Col. Peck's memorandum of resignation appears verbatim as the Epilogue to this report.) But the question remained: Was it credible that such a failure could occur? To answer that question, it was necessary to turn to history.

PROLOGUE TO PART I

THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War is not yet history, but the brief span of fighting provided several examples of the inability of the U.S. Government to cope with the problems of accounting for the missing--examples which are still fresh from the newspapers.

Inaccurate battle casualty reporting resulted in the next-of-kin of Daniel J. Stomaris and Troy A. Dunlap being officially notified by DOD that the soldiers had been Killed in Action (KIA); in fact, these men were slightly wounded or taken prisoner by the enemy. Several other soldiers--Army Major Rhonda L. Corum, for example--were taken prisoner by the enemy but were not listed as POW or MIA or KIA; their subsequent release by the Iraqis came as a surprise to the American public and the national media.

But the most bizarre case was that of SPC Melissa Rathbun-Nealy. SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPC David Lockett were co-drivers of a HET (Heavy Equipment Transport), captured by Iraqi soldiers after their HET and another one became separated from a convoy. As the two vehicles proceeded north, they came under enemy fire. The second vehicle managed to escape, but Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were surrounded and captured.

After her capture by Iraqi forces, Rathbun-Nealy's duty status was initially listed as "unknown," then changed to "missing." However, she was never listed as "missing in action" (MIA) or "prisoner of war" (POW). It should be noted that "missing," under U.S. Army regulations, is quite distinct from MIA. "Missing" is reserved for personnel unaccounted for in non-combat operations. From the Army's point of view, the convoy was a non-combat operation, even though it was under heavy enemy fire. Therefore, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were never listed as MIA or POW, even though the Army had information that they had been captured under fire. This distinction is an important illustration of how DOD uses technical distinctions to avoid a finding of POW/MIA.

In a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Leo Rathbun, Lt. Colonel J. G. Cole, Chief POW/MIA Affairs, demonstrates how DOD, even in real-time cases, fails to follow up obvious leads or to ask obvious questions. In the narrative that follows, it should be kept in mind that Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett must have been an astonishing pair of prisoners to the Iraqi mindset because Rathbun-Nealy is a Caucasian female, and Lockett is an African-American male. Since Corum was the only other U.S. female prisoner, it should not have been hard in Iraq to seek out a pair of prisoners fitting the description of a white female and a black male.

Colonel Cole wrote:

At approximately 3 pm, (January 30, 1991) just north of Khafji, the convoy drove by a Saudi M-60 tank that had recently received extensive battle damage and was partially blocking the road. The occupants of the second HET then heard two explosions and the sound of debris striking their vehicle, observed what they perceived to be enemy troops ahead near the archway into town, and immediately initiated a U-turn along the road. At this time they estimated that they were 100-150 meters behind the lead vehicle, which was continuing north. After completing the turn, the crew looked back and saw that the other HET (driven by Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett) had tried to turn about, but had become stuck. Melissa and SPC Lockett were observed to be still in their vehicle as the enemy troops approached. There was no indication that they attempted to return fire or flee.

PROLOGUE TO PART I

Last seen being surrounded by enemy troops, Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett were listed as "missing." But DOD had more information as well. Colonel Cole wrote further:

There were no signs of fighting or blood, but personal gear had been scattered around the area, and weapons were missing. As the Marines were searching around the vehicle shouting for the soldiers, they were confronted by several Iraqi foot soldiers at the HET and an armored personnel carrier approximately 50 meters north, headed in their direction. No shots were exchanged by the Marines who departed the area and called in attack helicopter support which destroyed the APC within 30 meters of the HET....The Marines returned to the area the following morning where they collected some of the personal equipment and found the vehicle running but found no trace of Melissa or SPC Lockett....During the battle in and around Khafji several Iraqi soldiers were captured.

One would assume that the capture of Iraqi soldiers in the area would have given the opportunity to find out positively whether or not the pair had been captured. And indeed the Iraqi soldiers gave such information:

Following interrogation of the enemy prisoners of war by Saudi forces, two reports were received. One concerned information provided by an Iraqi lieutenant who said he had witnessed the capture of an American male and female. He further stated that both had been injured and that the white female had sustained an injury to her arm. The second report received from Saudi forces concerned two other Iraqi prisoners of war from a captured patrol who indicated they had seen a white female and a black male near the city of Basrah, Kuwait [not far from the site of the abandoned HET].

To the lay observer, this sounds like a good "live-sighting" report, based on circumstances that almost exactly dovetail with the circumstances of the missing soldiers. But when Mr. Leo Rathbun asked Colonel Cole why his daughter was not listed as MIA, Cole replied that the Iraqi officer could not make "a positive identification"--as though there were hundreds of pairs of white female and black male soldiers captured in the area.

Colonel Cole explained further that the U.S. interrogators had no current picture of SPC Rathbun-Nealy to show the Iraqi officer (although of course her picture was appearing in every newspaper in the Western world.) Had they thought of it, no doubt DOD would have demanded that the Iraqi witnesses produce the fingerprints of the captured pair before accepting the live-sighting report as genuine.

Because there was no "positive identification" Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett could not be listed as POW/MIA. Had there been an extended war and extended negotiations to secure the return of prisoners, the name of neither one would have appeared on any list of POW/MIAs being sought. They were listed only as "missing," that is, unaccounted for but not known to be in enemy hands. Had a difficult negotiation been required to secure a return of listed POW/MIAs, Iraq need never have returned Rathbun-Nealy and Lockett because they were not on the list. Fortunately, the war was so brief and so powerful that all prisoners were returned without question.

The case of SPC Rathbun-Nealy and SPC Lockett is a vivid illustration to keep in mind when considering the bureaucratic mindset that refuses to go outside of artificial restrictions in order to find real people. If the case had been prolonged, if the report had come months or even years later, if the vivid memories of the event had gathered dust in DOD files, the same facts would have true.

 PROLOGUE TO PART I

But DOD would have dismissed the reports as unverified live-sightings and stamped their cases "presumed dead." This is an important case to keep in mind when examining the fragments of other cases left over from other wars.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This report originally proposed to study the problem of POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War—or more properly, the Second Indochina War. Yet as more and more information became available, it became obvious that the concerns raised in the Interim Report released last October—the policy that there was "no evidence" of POW/MIAs, that all POW/MIAs should be presumed dead, that evidence to the contrary should be discredited and dismissed, and all of these combined with the determined pursuit only of remains of the dead, while dismissing hope of finding anyone alive—all formed a pattern with an uncanny similarity to earlier wars of this century.

Moreover the negotiating techniques of the adversary in the Vietnam War—a denial that POW/MIAs existed, a demand for diplomatic recognition and financial aid from the United States, a suggestion that POW/MIAs might be found if recognition and money were forthcoming—all of these had been seen before. And all of them had emerged in U.S. dealings with Communist regimes since 1917.

As a result, it was necessary to broaden the scope of this investigation to study the historical background. The study that follows is based upon an examination of hundreds of once-secret cables, instructions, and memoranda now in the National Archives and the files of appropriate agencies.

The study begins with a largely forgotten page of American history—the U.S. Expeditionary Force in Siberia in 1917-1919. The sudden rise of the Bolshevik regime, the creation of the Red Army, and the perceived threat to Allied armies and territory in Eastern Europe led to furious fighting near Murmansk, and the capture of thousands of Allied, including American, soldiers by the Red Army. The attempt to get them back in the face of the intransigence and deception of Bolshevik diplomacy faded as the U.S. Government itself lost interest in their fate.

A series of parallel events occurred after World War II when the government of Joseph Stalin seized control of hundreds of prisoners of war, including Americans, and millions of displaced persons caught in Nazi prison camps as the Red Army was allowed to move into Eastern Europe. The anguished secret cables of Ambassador Harriman and the classified accounting provided by General Eisenhower made it clear that Stalin refused to account for either POWs or civilians once they fell under Communist control, while nevertheless demanding that Russian or Eastern European prisoners "liberated" by the West be forcibly returned to the Soviet Union.

The Korean War is closer to present memories, yet documents from that period also suggest the abandonment of 944 American prisoners, and a disinclination by the United States to follow up on their disappearance.

Finally, the fate of POW/MIAs of the Vietnam war may be tied to the diplomatic history of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. Some may agree, as Col. Peck indicated, that the real

 PROLOGUE TO PART I

abandonment of the American POW/MIAs took place at the Paris Conference, and that the present POW/MIA policies of the U.S. Government are merely an implementation of flawed decisions taken at that time.

Part II of this report presents a more detailed analysis of present POW/MIA policies with selected concrete examples.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

U.S. POWs IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY

The war that Americans call the Vietnam War is really, from the standpoint of history, the Second Indochina War. The French have the dubious distinction of having fought the First Indochina War—a most important fact to know in order to understand that the Communist Vietnamese act out of an acquired experience of warfare with Western countries. Moreover, the Vietnamese, as Communists, have had the additional benefit of the experience of other Communist regimes in dealing with the United States and European powers. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that the problems which the United States has had in dealing with prisoners of war and the missing in action are not the result of chance, but of historic Communist policy.

Indeed, history reveals that policy. In the years after World Wars I and II, the Soviet regime, and later their North Korean cohorts, held American soldiers and citizens captive in the aftermath of these wars. A 1954 *New York Times* article gives some insight into Communist attitudes towards POWs. In January, 1954, three Americans, two held by the Soviets and one by the Chinese Communists, were repatriated. *The New York Times* reported:

All three confirm that the Soviet bloc and the Chinese Communists are holding in their jails and slave camps many foreigners, including soldiers, and civilians, women and children...according to State Department figures, the total number of Americans held by the Soviets and their European satellites exceeds 5,000...Many of these Americans, like many Europeans, were residents in the Iron Curtain countries caught by the Communist tide; others were deported from German war prisoner camps; some, like Cox were simply kidnapped.¹

The fact is that Soviet and Asian Communist regimes view POW/MIA's, living or dead, not as a problem of humanitarian concern but as leverage for political bargaining, as an involuntary source of technical assistance, and as forced labor. There is, therefore, no compelling reason in Communist logic to return POWs, or their remains, so long as political and economic goals have not been met. The logic of the Vietnamese position requires them to conceal, to dissimulate, to titillate, and to dole out actual information grudgingly, piece by piece, but always in return for very practical results.

This perverse thinking is shocking to Americans who are straightforward and honest in interpersonal dealings. Yet we should instead be surprised if this were not the case. Indeed, the policy began with Lenin. From the time of the Bolshevik treatment of POWs from the American

¹The Other Russians, *The New York Times*, January 5, 1954.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Expeditionary Force in World War I, to the Soviet treatment of POWs in World War II, to the North Korean actions in the Korean War, and finally in the First and Second Indochina Wars—POWs, including MIAs, were used by Communist regimes as cynical bargaining tools in contravention of international law.

In 1973, the Vietnamese used POWs in an attempt to blackmail the United States into providing nearly \$5 billion in so-called "reparations." Both the United States and Vietnam asserted in that year that "OPERATION HOMECOMING" brought home all known prisoners. The Vietnamese believed that they had a deal—a dirty deal, to be sure, in which prisoners would be exchanged for cold cash. It was a deal brokered by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger via a secret hand-carried letter. It would be perfectly consistent with the historical Communist policy to hold back prisoners against their will, and even the remains of the dead, to exchange for dollars at a later date. The evidence of this investigation, therefore, must be weighed against the probabilities of the historical background.

Most of this information is not well-known by the American public; however, all of it is based on open-source material, including official U.S. Government documents that have been declassified and collected from official agencies through Freedom of Information Act requests and through research from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I

U.S. problems in accounting for POW/MIAs did not suddenly emerge in the Second Indochina War; in fact, the basic Communist tactics were already evident at the birth of the Soviet Union in the Bolshevik Revolution.

Today, most Americans have forgotten that there were two main fronts during World War I—the Western Front, which was the center of Allied attention, and which today still receives the most focus; and the Eastern Front, which occurred when the Bolshevik Regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans and withdrew Russian forces from participation with the Allies. Thereupon, the Allies grew apprehensive about the German threat to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel, and sent the Allied Expeditionary Force to Siberia to protect the rear.

As a result of the fighting against Soviet Bolshevik forces around Archangel in 1918-1919, there were many casualties, and eyewitness accounts of hundreds of U.S. and British and French personnel who disappeared. Nevertheless, official cables from the U.S. military attache at Archangel cited much lower numbers than the eyewitness reports of missing personnel. The U.S. government policy concerning these and others in the two categories of missing in action (MIA) and killed in action, body not recovered (KIA-BNR) from the American Expeditionary Force in Russia, as detailed in a November, 1930 memorandum from the U.S. Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated the following:

An administrative determination has been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing.¹

In other words, all of the men who were MIA were determined to be KIA-BNR on the date they were reported as missing.

Public outcry over this practice resulted in the formation of the 1929 VFW/U.S. Graves Registration Expedition, which was able to identify or account for 86 sets of remains. Many others were never identified. However, given the technical and scientific limitations of forensics in 1929, the amount of time elapsed and the number of nationalities involved, some of the remains may have been misidentified.

¹ Memorandum "To: Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject: Alleged confinement of American Officers and Soldiers in Russian prisons," November 12, 1930.

THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I

In 1921, the *New York Times* reported that

the American prisoners held by the Soviet Government of Russia have been told by the Bolsheviks that they are held because the United States government has not made vigorous demands for their release....²

It was widely known that the Bolsheviks held many American POWs and other U.S. citizens against their will. In fact, the new Soviet Government attempted to barter U.S. POWs held in their prisons for U.S. diplomatic recognition and trade relations with their regime. The United States refused, even though the Soviets had at one time threatened "...that Americans held by the Soviet government would be put to death...."³

President Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, in response to the Soviets demand for recognition and trade relations in return for U.S. prisoners, said that

the United States will not consider any suggestions of any character from that government until the Americans now held as prisoners are permitted to leave the country.⁴

But several months later the United States concluded the Riga Agreement with the Soviet government to provide humanitarian aid to starving Russian children. The Riga Agreement had specific requirements that the Soviet authorities must release all Americans detained in Russia, and to facilitate their departure. The U.S. Government was expecting 20 prisoners to be released; but U.S. authorities were surprised when 100 Americans were released.⁵

In fact, not all American prisoners held by the Soviets were released. The Soviets held some back, presumably for leverage in any future negotiations with the United States. However, in 1933 when Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized the Soviet government, these prisoners were not released, and other than the apparent recovery of 19 sets of remains, no satisfactory accounting of the MIA/POWs that were held by the Soviets was made by the United States.

Since an administrative determination had been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing, as far as the United States government and laws of the United States were concerned, these men were legally dead. Other than to a small number of U.S. government officials with access to the intelligence about these men in Soviet concentration camps and prisons, these men were legally, and otherwise generally considered, to be no longer alive. One such intelligence document dated November 20, 1930 cites an affidavit taken by the U.S. Justice Department of Alexander Grube, a Latvian-American, who was identified

² "Captives' Release Repeatedly Sought," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1921.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Herbert Hoover, *Herbert Hoover, An American Epic*, Volume III, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), pp.427-433.

as a "Russian seaman." He had been imprisoned in the Soviet gulag, including in the infamous Lubianka Prison, where he states he saw four American Army officers and 15 American soldiers, and was then transferred to Solovetz Island Prison where he met "many" American soldiers and civilians. Grube further warned the U.S. government that any inquiry made to Soviet officials of specific individuals will result in their immediate execution.

This episode in the history of World War I illustrates succinctly the major problems which still affect attempts to account for and ensure the repatriation of U.S. military personnel captured by Communist regimes in the aftermath of World War II, the Korean War, and the Second Indo-China War: 1) The bureaucratic and legal assertion by the U.S. Government that the men who were MIA were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing or sometime thereafter; 2) the attempts by the Communist regime to use prisoners as barter for economic and diplomatic benefits; 3) the dissimulation and lies of the Communist regime about the existence and location of prisoners; 4) the on-again, off-again return of remains; and 5) where there is no clear military victory over the Communist enemy, the vulnerability of U.S. POW/MIAs who are at the mercy of the reluctance of the enemy and U.S. government to pursue a clear, open policy for their repatriation.

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND THE EASTERN FRONT

During World War I (1914-1918), military personnel captured by Germany and the Central Powers on the Western Front were returned home when the U.S., British, or Western European allies liberated the POW camps, or after the capitulation of Germany and its allies in November, 1918. An accurate, detailed accounting of these POWs in Europe was possible because the United States, as a member of the Allied Forces, was the victor. Victory afforded American officials complete access to the German records of American POWs and the territory in which they were imprisoned.

However, Russian prisoners who were still held in Central Powers prison camps presented a problem for the Allies after their victory. At the beginning of the war, Russian forces fought with the Allies. But after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks withdrew Russian troops from the fighting after signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers in March, 1918. Some of the Russians held in German camps had Bolshevik sympathies, while others did not. The Allies hoped to sort out the Bolshevik soldiers, and recruit the anti-Bolsheviks to fight against the new regime in Russia. According to a War Department cable:

It is believed that a period of one or two months would suffice to discover which of the soldiers could be used for the work in question and which ones would be too thoroughly imbued with bolshevist [sic] ideas to be trusted. The former could then be sent to the Ukraine and the latter left in concentration camps.⁴

However, once defeated, the Germans could no longer manage the camps, and attempted to turn the Russian POWs loose, letting them head east for the Russian border. But the Allied

⁴ War Department cable No. 1272, Military Intelligence, Subject: RUSSIAN PRISONERS ARRIVING IN FRANCE FROM GERMANY, December 17, 1918.

Commissioners were still afraid of turning them loose for fear that the Russians would join the Red Army, and in February, 1919, the Allies took control of these German camps.⁵

France, in particular, did not want any liberated Russian POWs from Germany "to go into the interior of France, possibly on account of the Bolshevik [sic] danger."⁶ In fact, when the Germans released the Russian prisoners of war, 50,000 of them

found their way to France. They expected a warm welcome from their former allies; they were interned without delay.⁷

The Allies also were apparently concerned about American, British, and French POW/MIAs who might still be held prisoner as a result of combat with the Bolshevik Red Army in northern Russia, and may have wanted the Russian prisoners for bargaining leverage.

After Brest-Litovsk took the Bolshevik forces out of the war, German and Austro-Hungarian forces were free to move into the Ukraine and Baltic states. The German action was perceived by Allied forces as a threat to the northern Russian ports of Murmansk and Archangel, where tons of Allied war material were still stored. Further, the U.S. government wanted to provide for the safe evacuation of Czechoslovak forces who had been fighting with Russia against the Central Powers.

The group of soldiers numbered over 5,000 volunteers and draftees, mostly from Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The troops were placed under British command, and, in violation of their stated mission, were used in combat operations in support of the British and French plans to secure that part of Russia from the Germans and the Red Army.

A report from Colonel J.A. Ruggles, the U.S. military attache in Archangel, dated November 25, 1918, lists casualties divided into categories such as Killed In Action (KIA), Missing In Action (MIA), etc.⁸ These were casualties from the 339th U.S. Infantry Regiment which had been sent to Archangel in the late summer and early fall of 1918 to serve under British command.

During the winter of 1918, after a series of poorly planned and executed Allied military operations, the Red Army finally prevailed on the field over the heavily outnumbered Allied forces. There were a few spring and early summer victories for the Allies, but in the summer of 1919 Allied forces began to withdraw from Archangel. The 339th Regiment returned to the United States via

⁵ See report of the YMCA, *Service With Fighting Men*, William Howard Taft, et al. eds. Associated Press, N.Y. 1922, pp.320-322. "It was exceedingly difficult for these Allied authorities to decide just what should be done with these men. There were a menace to Germany as they were; if they were returned to Russia, they might join the Red forces."

⁶ War Department cable No. 1272, December 17, 1918.

⁷ *Service With Fighting Men*, pp.320-322.

⁸ See telegram to the War Department, Military Intelligence Branch, No. 2045-221, November 26, 1919.

THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I

Europe in the summer of 1919. By the spring of 1920, all U.S. and allied troops were out of Soviet territory. During their withdrawal, British forces seized a number of Russian Bolsheviks as hostages to trade for British POWs and MIAs who were still held by the Bolsheviks, and made room for about 5,000 White Russian emigrants who wanted to leave their homeland before the Red Army overran the territory. When Archangel was finally taken by the Bolshevik forces, 30,000 citizens¹¹ were executed by the Cheka¹² forces.

"HUNDREDS WERE MISSING FROM OUR RANKS"

It is difficult to accept the official U.S. accounting of U.S. casualties of the 1918-1919 Northern Russia Expedition, particularly because all men who were MIA were officially determined to be KIA-BNR on the date they were reported as missing. According to several accounts, several hundred U.S., French, and British soldiers were left unaccounted for during the fighting in Northern Russia. Indeed, the official history of the Expedition states there were "hundreds missing from our ranks."¹³ However, official cables from the U.S. military attaché at Archangel cited approximately 70 MIAs, excluding French and British missing personnel.

Negotiations with the Bolsheviks for the repatriation of the missing failed. Col. Ruggles stated:

Negotiations for the exchange of prisoners have been terminated by orders from General Pershing, after having been delayed, although under discussion from both sides, through failure of the Bolshevik commander to obtain authority from Moscow.¹⁴

In fact, the Bolsheviks wanted diplomatic recognition in return for the release of Allied POWs; at the suggestion of the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S. Secretary of War reminded the U.S. Military Attaché at Archangel of this fact in a May 12, 1919 letter: "the United States has not recognized the Bolshevik regime as a government either de facto or de jure."¹⁵ The negotiations never resumed.

¹¹ *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, George Kennan, (Boston: Little and Brown and Company, 1960).

¹² The Cheka was the all-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage, the Bolshevik's secret police; it was the forerunner of the GPU, the State Political Directorate, which in turn preceded the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which became the KGB, the Committee for State Security.

¹³ Two Company I officers, 1st Lieutenants Dwight Fister and Albert May, met with Bolshevik officers in an attempt to secure the release of captured Allied servicemen. They recorded the meeting: "We had 500 Russian prisoners. They had seven of ours. We were worried about hundreds of missing from our ranks and arranged a truce to effect an exchange...Negotiation was difficult. Interpreters were not very efficient. But the Reds learned what we were up for, and haggled. The end was, they traded us two of the seven Americans for the 500 Russian soldiers, and we had to toss in a round of cigarettes to seal the bargain. We never did learn what had become of the missing."

¹⁴ Telegram No. 221, "To: Military Intelligence, From: Archangel, U.S. War Department," April 14, 1919.

¹⁵ See a May 12, 1919 letter to the Acting Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk, from the U.S. Secretary of War: "I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter ('NE-M'), dated April 28, 1919, regarding the negotiations with the Bolshevik government in Russia for the exchange of Allied prisoners, referred to in cablegram No. 230 from the Military Attaché, Archangel, Russia. In accordance with your suggestion, a cablegram was sent to the Military Attaché on May 1, reminding him that the United States has not recognized the Bolshevik regime as a government either de facto or de jure."

THE AEF AND WORLD WAR I

Throughout the summer and fall of 1919, 3,315 replacements were sent to Siberia to rotate out many of the original U.S. troops.¹⁶ The 1919 and 1921 reports of the Secretary of War records the casualties for the Archangel fighting and the Siberian expedition as follows:

Killed in Action.....	137 (including 28 presumed killed)
Died of wounds.....	43
Died of disease.....	122
Died of accidental causes..	46
Suicide.....	5
Total deaths.....	353

The totals listed above from the combined 1919 and 1921 official annual reports of the Secretary of War conceal the fact that out of the 144 combat deaths of American soldiers officially reported in 1919 in Northern Russia, 127 of those deaths, or 88% of those official combat death figures were made up of some 70 MIAs declared dead, and another 57 soldiers who were declared KIA-BNR.¹⁷

This fact was left out of the official Secretary of War report on U.S. casualty figures from combat in Northern Russia. The vast majority of these missing men never received a proper accounting. Further, the practice of the Secretary of War of lumping the MIA and the KIA-BNR figures together as those killed in action necessarily calls into question the general credibility of these official figures. One historian makes note that ten U.S. POWs from the Archangel Expedition were repatriated through Finland and Sweden.¹⁸

LUBLANKA PRISON

In fact, there is evidence that some of these men were actually alive and held in prisons and concentration camps in Russia by the Communists. A November 12, 1930 memorandum which detailed an affidavit taken by the U.S. Justice Department from a "Russian seaman" stated:

He arrived March 1, 1927 in Lublanka Prison at Moscow where he saw four (4) American Army Officers and fifteen (15) American soldiers who had been there since 1919...that he subsequently was transferred to Solovetz Island Prison where he met many American soldiers and civilians, and names two of them as Mr. Martin or Marten and Mr. G. Heinsainkrut, both of whom he thinks are American Army Officers sent to the island from Vladivostok. He also mentions one Roy Molner whom he states had been a sergeant in the U.S. Army at Archangel from which place he had been sent as a prisoner.¹⁹

¹⁶ Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1919, Office of the Chief Military History, Washington, p. 25.

¹⁷ Telegram No. 2045-297 "To: Military Intelligence, From: Archangel, February 4, 1919.

¹⁸ Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1919, p. 74.

¹⁹ War Department Memorandum, "To: Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Subject Alleged confinement of American Officers and Soldiers in Russian prisons," November 12, 1930.

An internal U.S. government letter which evaluates the information provided by the Russian seaman states:

I have looked into this question and find that at least one case that has an important bearing on it, namely the case of William J. Martin, Company A, 339th Infantry, which regiment served in Archangel or North Russian Expedition. Under date of Feb. 3, 1919 a report from Archangel showed Martin missing in action. Under date of March 14, 1921 we made a determination showing: "Was killed in action January 19, 1919. This determination was no doubt predicated on the unexplained absence of the soldier for about two years [until the KIA-BNR determination was made]. I also found another case which may possibly be involved, it is that of Lindsay Retherford, up in my mind because of the mention by the Russian sailor of Alfred Lindsay. Lindsay Retherford was reported missing and a similar determination [KIA-BNR] was made in his case."²⁵

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS HOLDING AMERICANS"

Three years later, in 1933, the United States recognized the Bolshevik government. In 1934, 19 sets of remains were reported as "identified" by the U.S. Graves Registration. In the separate 1929 VFW/Graves Expedition 86 remains of the 127 missing or KIA-BNR from battles fought by the American Expeditionary Force at Archangel were claimed to have been identified. This left 41 unaccounted for from the Archangel post. Further, that of the 86 remains "identified," it is likely that a number of these "identifications" stretched the capacity of forensic science at that time.

Refugees from Russia fleeing into Europe during the late 1920s continued to report that a number of Americans were still held by the Soviet government in forced labor camps. It is noteworthy that some of the U.S. troops sent to Archangel were themselves U.S. immigrants from Eastern Europe, or the sons of U.S. immigrants from Eastern Europe who had been drafted into the American Army. It has been speculated that the Soviets kept them because of their national origins, or the national origins of their families.²⁶

The U.S. Government did not publicly admit that U.S. military personnel remained in the custody of the Red Army in Russia upon the return of the American Expeditionary Force in Russia. However, on April 18, 1921, the *New York Times* reported:

It has been demonstrated that the Soviet government is holding Americans in the hope that the United States will agree to recognize the Soviet [government] or enter into trade relations with it or release communists from prison in this country....²⁷

²⁵ See U.S. government letter, "To: Mr. Huckleberry evaluating the affidavit taken by the U.S. Justice Department," November 8, 1930.

²⁶ See Benjamin D. Rhodes, *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia, 1918-1919*.

²⁷ "Captives Released Repeatedly Bought," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1921.

Three months later, President Harding responded to an appeal from Moscow for "bread and medicine" for the "children and the sick." He instructed a member of his staff, Herbert Hoover, to cable a reply to Moscow that the American Relief Administration would

undertake relief for one million Russian children and provide some medical supplies for their hospitals—but subject to certain conditions.²⁸

August 20, 1921, a formal agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the "Riga Agreement," was concluded. Among the conditions for U.S. aid to the Soviets was the following:

The Soviet Authorities having previously agreed as the absolute sine qua non of any assistance on the part of the American people to release all Americans detained in Russia and to facilitate the departure from Russia of all Americans so desiring, the A.R.A. [American Relief Administration] reserves the right to suspend temporarily or terminate all of its relief work in Russia in case of failure on the part of the Soviet Authorities to fully comply with this primary condition....[emphasis added].²⁹

The United States government expected the repatriation of approximately 20 U.S. citizens; but, in fact, more than 100 Americans were repatriated as a result of this agreement.

As Herbert Hoover wrote in his autobiography:

The provision for release of American prisoners was suggested by Secretary Hughes, who informed me the Department knew that there were about twenty of them. More than a hundred American prisoners in Russian dungeons were released on September 1, [1921].³⁰

Even so, reports continued to be received by the Department of State that more Americans were still held in Russia. The discrepancy between the official information in the hands of the U.S. government—20 Americans held, and the actual number of more than one hundred released—gave the U.S. Government its first taste of negotiating for Americans held against their will by Communists.

²⁸ Herbert Hoover, p. 428.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 433.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 433.

WORLD WAR II

World War II was a great military victory for the United States Armed Forces. In both the European and the Pacific theaters, the enemy unconditionally surrendered. However, despite the total victory in Europe by Allied forces, thousands and thousands of U.S. soldiers—perhaps as many as 20,000—were never repatriated from prisoner of war (POW) camps, prisons and forced labor and concentration camps.

These American soldiers were being held in Nazi prison camps, along with other Allied POWs and some Nazi captives, when they were overrun by the Red Army. Thus, hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs who had been held by the Nazis, as well as millions of Western European citizens, or Displaced Persons, came under Red Army control. Indeed, this number increased because General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, decided to stop the U.S. and British drive eastward into Germany, in order to wait for Soviet forces driving West, so that U.S. and Soviet forces could meet in Berlin.

"CREDITS" FOR REPATRIATION

One such American GI was Martin Siegel, who was held prisoner in Stalag IV-B, Muhlberg (a Nazi POW camp in eastern Germany overrun by a Red Army tank battalion).¹ Siegel was the U.S. POWs' intermediary and translator with Major Vasilii Vershenko, the officer in command of the Red Army tank battalion that overran the camp.

The first question the Siegel asked Major Vershenko was, "When were the U.S. POWs to be repatriated?" Vershenko said he was primarily concerned with the "Russian prisoners held in a separate compound at Stalag IV-B" as "they had to be interviewed individually since they felt that there were many cowards, traitors and deserters among them and they had to be dealt with expeditiously."² Secondly, with regard to the repatriation of U.S. and Allied POWs now under Red Army control, the Soviet Major stated "the Russians and the Americans had agreed to a pact wherein the Russians would receive 'credits' for each American POW returned," and the Soviet officer told Siegel, the repatriation of U.S. POWs was a "complex logistical matter."

¹ Private letter from Martin Siegel, detailing his experiences in a German POW camp overrun by the Red Army, May 17, 1990.

² *Ibid.*

WORLD WAR II

The Russian Major's view of the repatriation process for U.S. and Allied POWs under Red Army control for financial or economic 'credits' probably accurately reflected his view of Soviet repatriation policy. In fact, the Russian Major's view paralleled the assessment of the Soviet's repatriation policy by U.S. Major General R.W. Barker. Barker was the Allied Chief Negotiator for the repatriation of Allied POWs under Red Army control. Barker wrote in a report to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Headquarters that after more than four hours of discussions with his Red Army counterparts

the SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters of the Allied European Forces] representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release. This latter point was further borne out by subsequent events.³

Meanwhile, Siegel, the American GI still held in Stalag IV-B (who is still alive) decided that as a result of

the callousness of his [Major Vershenko's] response and the officious tone in which this information [about repatriation] was given, [it] gave me real pause... That night, my bunkmate, Cpl. William Smith of the 9th Division shared our mutual concerns and [we] decided to take off on our own. The next evening, we "liberated" two Russian bicycles, got thru a gap in the wire where a Russian tank was parked and took off West to where we thought the American Army would be.⁴

They made it safely to American lines, but only after a "two week adventure" that included making another escape after "being captured by a band of fanatical Hitler Youth" still at large in Soviet occupied Germany.

Siegel and his partner made a wise decision to escape. A cable from the Ninth United States Army to the Supreme Allied Headquarters dated May 17, 1945 describes the deteriorating conditions in Siegel's former POW camp, Stalag IV-B Muhlberg, after the two GIs escaped:

Reports received that 7,000 United States and British ex-PWs formerly in MULBURG [Stalag IV-B] and NOERREISAU need medical supplies, additional medical attention and food. Many have left because of conditions. Reports indicate camp leader doing all in his power to enforce stay-put order. Russians alleged to have threatened to use force to prevent escape. [emphasis added]⁵

Thus, through completely different personal experiences, a GI—Siegel—and a General—Barker—came to essentially the same conclusion about Soviet repatriation policy. The GI risked escape rather than trust the Soviets to repatriate him. The General concluded, and reported to

³ Memorandum by Major General R. W. Barker, "Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons," dated May 23, 1945.

⁴ Siegel, as cited.

⁵ Siegel, as cited.

⁶ Cable, "From: CG Ninth United States Army, To: For Action: CG SHAEF FORWARD ATTENTION G-1 PWX, REFNO: IX-21617," May 17, 1945.

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Supreme Allied Headquarters that

British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release.⁷

After Siegel--the intrepid GI--and his partner escaped to Allied controlled territory, Siegel found that his

concerns for other prisoners left behind at IV-B were treated with initial skepticism, then annoyance at my persistence, and finally with reassurances that the matter "would be investigated."⁸

It should be noted that Major Vershenko's comments about economic 'credits' were not wholly inaccurate. Weeks before V-E day (Victory in Europe) Soviets had requested a \$6 billion credit line from the United States, the equivalent of \$59.8 billion in 1991 dollars⁹, or slightly more than the U.S. costs for the Gulf War. 'Credits' from the United States, were, in fact, an active Soviet consideration throughout the repatriation period. Indeed, the Secretary of State, prior to a mid-April 1945 meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Commissar Molotov, received a pre-meeting briefing memorandum, one of the points of which was the Soviet request for \$6 billion.¹⁰

"MAKE THEM WORK"

The Soviet rationale for not repatriating Allied soldiers and citizens, however, was motivated by more complex and more repugnant reasons than credits alone. In the memoirs of former Secretary of State under President Truman, James F. Byrnes, there appears an illuminating conversation the Secretary had with Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. In September, 1945, several weeks after Japan's surrender, Byrnes recounted that while in London:

Mr. Molotov came to see me, on instructions from Moscow...[Molotov] wanted to complain of the way in which the surrender terms [with Japan] were being carried out. He complained particularly about the way the Japanese Army was being demobilized. It was dangerous, he said, merely to disarm the Japanese and send them home; they should be held as prisoners of war. We should do what the Red Army was doing with the Japanese it had taken in Manchuria--make them work...No one can say accurately how many Japanese prisoners have been taken to the Soviet Union. In mid-1947, the best guess was that approximately 500,000 were still there.¹¹

⁷ Memorandum, From: Major General R. W. Barker, "Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons," May 23, 1945.

⁸ Siegel, as cited.

⁹ Computed by the Congressional Research Service according to Price Index of the Office of Budget Management, in FY 1992 U.S. Government Budget, p. 17, Historical Tables.

¹⁰ State Department memorandum, "To: the U.S. Secretary of State, regarding an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov," April 19, 1945. The memorandum contains a list of nine points with a brief description of U.S. policy on each point.

¹¹ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,), pp. 213-214.

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The problem of accounting for POW/MIAs was complicated by the fact that the Soviets were just as uncooperative in the repatriation of the millions of displaced civilians. In Europe, as well as in the Far East, the Soviets guarded a sea of prisoners--human capital and slave labor in their view--who were not only Allied and Axis POWs, but also hundreds of thousands of displaced Western European citizens, as well as Eastern European citizens, who desperately wanted to flee from Red Army occupied territory. Nationalities of smaller countries of Western Europe, like the Dutch, and Belgians, as well as formerly Nazi occupied countries like France, tragically, had little military, political or diplomatic leverage with the Soviet government to secure the repatriation of their citizens at the end of the War. As a result, tens of thousands of Dutch and Belgians, and hundreds of thousands of French were never repatriated by the Soviets.

The French in particular bore the brunt the Soviet "make them work" policy. This policy was implemented by the Soviets not only with regard to the Japanese POWs captured in the Pacific theater, but also with regard to hundreds of thousands of French, Dutch, Belgian, and other Western Europeans who were caught in Soviet occupied territory in Europe.

A window through which a glimpse of the fate of these citizens--in this particular case, French POWs--can be seen is the following cable from the Allied Command's Mission in France, to the Supreme Allied Headquarters for all of Europe. Sent May 30, 1945 (Victory in Europe, VE day was May 7, 1945) the cable read:

Accordance your telephone request, cable from Fifteenth Army French Detachment to Oesgral CHERIERE MMFA Hotel CONTINENTAL PARIS of 25 May is paraphrased for your information.

Report of Lt D HAVERNAS, according to confirmed reports, Russians still do not release thousands of French ex-PWs and civilians, forcing them to work. Many transferred eastwards to unknown destination. Please inform high authority. 700 ex-PWs are evacuated daily from this area to UDINE. Civilians held under difficult food and accommodation conditions. [emphasis added]¹²

"DISCREPANCY OF OVER 1,000,000 WESTERN EUROPEANS"

The next day, a cable detailing the magnitude of the masses of Allied prisoners of war and displaced citizens held in Soviet territory was sent from Supreme Allied Headquarters signed by Eisenhower, to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. Eisenhower wanted an explanation from the Soviets for the slow pace of repatriation of these citizens. The "discrepancies" between the Allies' most up-to-date figures of various displaced Western European citizens and prisoners of war known to be in Soviet occupied territory, and the number actually repatriated by the Soviets, were outlined by Eisenhower.

Latest available displaced persons and prisoners of war figures show almost 1,600,000 Western European (French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxemborgese) either repatriated from or at present held

¹² Cable SECRET ROUTINE, "To: SHAEF FORWARD, From: SHAEF MISSION FRANCE, to SHAEF FORWARD G-3," REF NO: MF-1447, May 30, 1945.

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in SHAEF area. Soviet delegates at LEIPZIG conference stated only 300,000 Western Europeans in their area. Combined working party on European food supplies, composed of representatives from UNRRA, SHAEF, USSR, UK, and USA, including Soviet delegate LIUSHENKO, estimated approximately 3,000,000 displaced Western Europeans in enemy-held territory at beginning 1944. This discrepancy of over 1,000,000 Western Europeans is causing the Dutch and French Governments considerable anxiety.¹³

More than two weeks later, Eisenhower sent another cable to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow with more detailed numbers of "discrepancies". Again, Eisenhower requested a detailed Soviet response to his concerns over these unrepatriated prisoners of war and other Allied citizens in Red Army occupied territory. The cable, dated June 19, 1945, stated:

2. A further approach to the Soviets regarding numbers of western Europeans in Soviet occupied area of Eastern Europe is urgently necessary. About 1,200,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 remain in SHAEF-occupied area. French insist total POW and displaced persons is 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted trekkers, discrepancy is still very great. About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated, with less than 25,000 in the SHAEF area. Total Dutch estimate of deportees is 340,000.¹⁴

"OF PERSONS FROM WESTERN EUROPE...[I]...CAN NOT SAY MUCH ABOUT THEM"

In response to Eisenhower's cable, the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow sent the Soviet government a letter dated June 20, 1945, parts of which are quoted below:

Dear General Golubev:

We have been requested by General Eisenhower to make an urgent appeal to you for an estimate of the number of displaced Western Europeans who are now in Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe.

Thus far, about 1,200,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 French remain in German areas occupied by British-American forces. This makes a total of 1,300,000 French accounted for, exclusive of those who still remain in Soviet-controlled territory. French authorities insist that the total number of prisoners of war and displaced persons amount to 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted individuals, there still remains a great discrepancy.

About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated. Less than 25,000 Dutch still remain in Germany under control of British-American forces. However, the Dutch authorities estimate that there were originally 340,000 Dutch nationals deported, thus leaving a great discrepancy.

¹³ Cable, "TO: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FOR DEANE, FROM: SHAEF MAIN SIGNED SCARF (Eisenhower)," REF NO: S-89942, May 31, 1945.

¹⁴ Cable, SECRET ROUTINE, "TO: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW for DEANE FROM: SHAEF MAIN signed SCARF, S-91662," June 19, 1945.

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The Belgian authorities also reported a discrepancy but it is comparatively smaller than those of the French and Dutch....¹⁵

In the French and Dutch cases, the "discrepancy" figures are astonishing. Even assuming that a quarter of a million French citizens were "trekkers"--a seemingly exaggerated estimate--heading West to Allied lines, 850,000 French citizens still were not repatriated from Red Army occupied territory.

With regard to the Dutch citizens, assuming one quarter of the total Dutch "discrepancy" number were "trekkers," then some 116,250 Dutch citizens still were not repatriated from Soviet occupied Europe. It is understandable, as Eisenhower stated in an earlier cable to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, that these figures were "causing the Dutch and French governments considerable anxiety."

In late June, the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow sent Eisenhower a cable with the Soviet reply. The Soviet reply was not encouraging. The cable read:

Upon receipt of S-91662 dated 19 June, we presented the queries contained therein to [Lieutenant General] GOLUBEV [Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation] and have received the following reply [from the Soviets]:

In answer to your letter of 20 June:

1. I do not have the exact data on the moving around of persons from Western EUROPE and therefore cannot say much about them.

2. I know that there have been freed by the Red Army:

French: About 230,000 of which 202,456 persons have already been sent home and about 50,000 who are getting ready to be sent home.

Belgians: 27,980 persons freed of which 25,920 have been sent home, the remainder in the process of being turned over.¹⁶

The discrepancy between the Soviet numbers for both the French and the Dutch and SHAEF's numbers is unsettling, as is the Soviets' claim that they "cannot say much about" the hundreds of thousands of Western European soldiers and citizens who apparently disappeared in Red Army occupied territory.

¹⁵ See letter, "To Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, From: Major General John R. Deane, Commanding General U.S. Military Mission, Moscow," June 20, 1945.

¹⁶ Cable, "TO: SHAEF MAIN FOR EISENHOWER, FROM: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FROM GAMMELL AND DEANE," REF NO: M-24784, June 25, 1945.

"NOT EVEN VERBAL ASSURANCES WERE TO BE HAD"

However, even before Eisenhower had received his reply, the Soviets had informed U.S. military officials at a separate meeting in Halle, Germany, that "all political prisoners held in German concentration camps overrun by the Red Army had been released." Furthermore, Allied officials reported to the Secretary of State with respect to the "category of displaced persons, not even verbal assurances were to be had."

The results of the Allied-Soviet meeting in Halle, Germany, were detailed in a memo sent to the U.S. Secretary of State and is quoted below. The meeting produced an agreement on a plan for repatriation

agreed to by representatives of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Supreme Command Red Army, at Halle, Germany, May 22, 1945, for the most expeditious overland delivery of Allied and Soviet ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons liberated by the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army. The two delegations were headed Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, and Major General R.W. Barker, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, SHAEF.¹⁷

This meeting, more than any other, determined the fate of hundreds of thousands of people trapped in the Red Army occupied territory of Eastern Europe. This memorandum, which was sent June 1, 1945 to the U.S. Secretary of State, explains that at the Halle, Germany, meeting the Red Army refused to permit the Allies

to fly transport aircraft into Soviet-occupied territory. Although General Golubev would not agree to the incorporation of a paragraph providing first priority delivery of U.S. and U.K. ex-prisoners of war, he gave his most solemn personal assurances that all U.S. and U.K. ex-prisoners of war would, in fact, be given preferential treatment. A request for second priority for Western European ex-political deportees, in accordance with the desires of the Western European governments that such persons be repatriated before their respective ex-prisoners of war and other displaced persons, was countered by the flat assertion that all political prisoners held in German concentration camps overrun by the Red Army had been released and that there were, accordingly, no more political prisoners in Soviet-occupied territory. With respect to this category of displaced persons, not even verbal assurances were to be had.¹⁸

Thus, as far as former political prisoners were concerned, the official Soviet position was that all political prisoners had been released. With regard to the repatriation of displaced persons who found themselves in Red Army occupied territory at the end of the War, "not even verbal assurances were to be had."

¹⁷ Memorandum, SECRET, "To: Secretary of State, From: Heath, Deputy to Robert Murphy, Subject: Overland Exchange of Ex-Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Liberated by all Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army," June 1, 1945.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

"HOUSED NOT IN HUTS BUT IN DUG-OUTS"

The following U.S. intelligence report from OSS-CIG files, dated April-May 1945, may provide some insight into the fate of the hundreds of thousands of French, Dutch, and Belgians of whom the Soviets would not even give "verbal assurances":

1. Informant, a Pole forced to serve in the German Army, was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1944. He was kept for a time in the Transit Camp in KAUNAS, then NINSK until he was deported across SIBERIA to the SEVINSKAYA camp near VLADIVOSTOK. At the end of 1945 - April, he escaped and tried to get to Europe. He was, however, arrested by the NKVD after he had got beyond MOSCOW, and placed in the P.O.W. and Internee Camp in TAMBOV, which was occupied by Germans, French, Americans, British, Dutch, Belgians. The prisoners numbered, in the informant's [sic] estimation, well over 20,000; they were both military and civilian, most likely overrun by the Russians during the offensive.

2. All prisoners were forced to work, and the food they were given was very bad and monotonous. They were housed not in huts but in dug-outs.

3. The monotonous food caused some strange disease which made the legs and arms swell. After a time men afflicted with this disease died. Informant was told that more than 23,000 Italians, more than 2,500 French and approximately 10,000 Roumanian [sic] and Hungarian prisoners had died in this manner. There were also many casualties among Poles and other nationalities.

4. Prisoners in this camp included men of very high culture and learning and great experts in many fields of science. Informant observed that German engineers were employed on a special task - the drawing up of blue-prints for a four engined aircraft, which would carry about 500 men and achieve a speed - it was alleged - of 1,000 kilometers per hour. The Russians were extremely interested in these blue-prints, and men working on the invention were granted all possible facilities both in work and the conditions of life in the camp.

5. ...there were also some Belgians and Dutch, and others, including some English men and several score Americans, the presence of whom in this camp is probably unknown to the British and U.S.A. authorities. When he was leaving, these Englishmen and Americans asked him urgently (as did the French officers and men) to notify the Allied authorities of their plight. Informant succeeded in reaching France with a convoy of Allied nationals.¹⁹

"HUNDREDS OF OUR PRISONERS WANDERING ABOUT POLAND"

In anticipation of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and citizens who would have to be repatriated in the wake of the Western allies and Red Army victory over the Nazi forces, the Western Allies and the Soviets agreed February 11, 1945, at the Yalta Conference to provisions which would expedite their repatriation. These provisions allowed their respective military officers into Allied and Soviet controlled territory at various collection points in each country throughout

¹⁹ Document SECRET, Office of Strategic Services - Central Intelligence Group, report number 45584, titled "U.S.S.R. P.O.W. and Internee Camp near TAMBOV," April-May 1945.

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Europe, in order to process, arrange for transportation and otherwise oversee the registration and the care and feeding of the soldiers who were to be repatriated. The locations where these repatriation officers were to be sent was agreed to, as well as that these officers would be assigned liaison officers to assist them in the repatriation process.

Less than a month after the signing of the Yalta agreement, in an URGENT TOP SECRET Personal Message to the President, U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman cabled from Moscow:

Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled.²¹

Specifically, Harriman stated in the same cable "I am outraged" that

the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our prisoners are first collected, to evaluate our prisoners, particularly the sick, in our own airplanes, or to send our supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1,000 miles from point of liberation, where they are urgently needed.²²

Furthermore, Harriman in the same cable stated:

For the past ten days the Soviets have made the same statement that Stalin has made to you, [FDR] namely, that all prisoners are in Odessa or entrained thereto, whereas I have now positive proof that this was not repeated true on February 26, the date on which the statement was first made. This supports my belief that Stalin's statement to you is inaccurate.²³

In fact, Harriman in the same cable wrote:

there appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering about Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don't like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and the Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor. In addition we have reports that there are a number of sick or wounded who are too ill to move. These Stalin does not mention in his cable. Only a small percentage of those reported sick or wounded arrive at Odessa.²⁴

Odessa was a Black Sea port in the Ukraine, through which some 2,900 U.S. soldiers were processed and repatriated. It is the only camp in the entire Soviet occupied zone in Europe in which

²¹ Cable, URGENT TOP SECRET, "A Personal Message for the President, From U.S. Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman," March 8, 1945.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

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U.S. contact personnel were allowed--the Yalta agreement notwithstanding--and was the source of much of Harriman's outrage.

"GREAT DIFFICULTIES...IN REGARD TO THE CARE AND REPATRIATION OF OUR LIBERATED POWs"

Six days later Ambassador Harriman sent another cable to Washington, this time to the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. It deserves to be quoted at some length:

I assume the Department has been informed by the War Department of the great difficulties General Deane [head of the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow] and I have been having with the Soviet Government in regard to the care and repatriation of our liberated prisoners of war. In the beginning it appeared that the Soviet authorities were going to interpret our agreement substantially as we did, namely that we be allowed to send our contact officers to several points within Poland to which our prisoners first find their way, to fly in emergency supplies and to evacuate our wounded on the returning trips of the planes, although in Soviet planes rather than United States planes. We obtained authority for one contact team of an officer and doctor to go to Lublin with one plane load of supplies and they have done extremely useful work there. No other teams or supplies have since been permitted and authority for the Lublin team to remain has recently been withdrawn. The Soviets have now contended that Odessa is the only present 'camps and points of concentration' referred to in the [Yalta] agreement to which our contact officers are to be permitted.

...Our prisoners have suffered serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, etc., in finding their way to concentration points in Poland and on the long rail trip to Odessa because we have been stopped from sending in our contact teams and emergency supplies. A considerable number of sick and wounded are still hospitalized in Olan. I have been urging for the last two weeks General Deane be permitted to survey the situation with a Red Army officer. This was first approved in writing with the qualification that arrangements must be made with Polish authorities. An officer of our military mission informally approached the Polish Embassy here and was advised that no Polish authorization was necessary as it was entirely with the competence of the Red Army. We have been unable, however, to get authorization for Deane's trip.

It seems clear that the Soviets have changed their point of view during the last several weeks and are now rigidly determined that none of our officers shall be permitted in Poland.

I saw Molotov again today about the situation. He maintained that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its obligation under the agreement and both the Red Army authorities and the Polish Provisional Government objected to the presence of our officers in Poland. When I pressed him on what valid objection the Red Army could possibly have, he pointed out that we had no agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. In spite of my contention that this was a Soviet responsibility he kept reverting to the above fact. I then directly asked him if he was implying that we should make such an arrangement with Poles and if so, whether the Red Army would remove its objections. He did not answer this question directly but left me with the impression that he wished me to draw that deduction.

I am satisfied that the objection comes from [the] Soviet Government and not the Provisional Polish Government as our military mission had been in informal contact with the Polish Embassy here who have been extremely cooperative as have all Polish authorities including the Polish Red Cross to our prisoners in Poland.

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I feel that the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government by dealing with it in this connection as the Soviet are doing in other cases. General Deane and I have not (repeat not) been able to find a way to force the Soviet authorities to live up to our interpretation of our agreement. Unless some steps be taken to bring direct pressure on the Soviets, our liberated prisoners will continue to suffer hardships, particularly the wounded and the sick.

...It is the opinion of General Deane and myself that no arguments will induce the Soviets to live up to our interpretation of the [Yalta] agreement except retaliatory measures which affect their interests unless another direct appeal from the President should prove effective. We therefore recommend that the first step be a second request from the President to Marshal Stalin. In the meantime, however, we recommend further that the [State] Department and War Department come to an agreement on what retaliatory measures we can immediately apply in the event an unfavorable answer is received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

Consideration might be given to such actions as, or combination thereof (One) That General Eisenhower issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa; (Two) That Lend-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government additional to our fourth protocol commitments for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort; (Three) That consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of our agreement according to any reasonable interpretation.

I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Deane requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall [Eisenhower's second in Command, a British officer at Supreme Allied Headquarters].

HARRIMAN²⁴

President Roosevelt sent the following PERSONAL and SECRET cable for Marshal Stalin on March 18, 1945:

In the matter of evacuation of American ex-prisoners of war from Poland I have been informed that the approval for General Deane to survey the United States prisoners of war situation in Poland has been withdrawn. You stated in your last message to me that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and to evacuate the sick. I have information that I consider positive and reliable that there are still a considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland and also that there have been, certainly up to the last few days and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American prisoners either at Soviet assembly points or wandering about in small groups not in contact with Soviet authorities looking for American contact officers.

I cannot, in all frankness, understand your reluctance to permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to

²⁴ Cable, "To: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S. Secretary of State, From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, No. PH-1449," March 14, 1945.

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meet each of your requests. I now request you to meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Ambassador Harriman to explain to you in detail my desires.²⁵

March 22, 1945, President Roosevelt received Marshal Stalin's reply:

I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland.

With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Polish soil as of March 16, I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.

With reference to the request contained in your message I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the given instance the matter concerns the interest of Soviet armies at the front and of Soviet commanders who do not want to have around odd officers who, while having no relation to the military operations, need looking after, want all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things that divert the attention of the commanders and their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to any extent.

I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet camps—better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in U.S. camps, where some of them were lodged with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful persecutions, including beating, as has been communicated to the U.S. Government on more than one occasion.²⁶

President Roosevelt apparently accepted Marshal Stalin's explanation since Ambassador Harriman's and General Deane's suggestion to allow

...our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of our agreement according to any reasonable interpretation.²⁷

was rejected. In fact, four days after Marshal Stalin's reply, General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Chief of Staff, issued an order on a "revised policy" to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow and other Allied European Commands which read:

²⁵ Cable, "From: President Roosevelt, To: Marshal Stalin," March 18, 1945.

²⁶ Cable, PERSONAL and SECRET, "From: Premier J. V. Stalin, To: President Roosevelt," March 22, 1945.

²⁷ Cable, "From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, No. PH-1449," March 14, 1945.

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Superseding WARK-54401 to Deane and Gilles is revised policy publicly liberated prisoners: Individual interviews authorized provided personnel briefed beforehand against disclosure camp intelligence activities, evasion and escape briefings equipment. Censor all stories. Delete criticism Russian treatment...²²

This new policy of censoring all stories of Russian mistreatment of U.S. POWs effectively ensured that the public perception of the Soviet Union was that the Soviet Union was a stout ally of the United States. In fact, there was good reason to order the censorship of all stories criticizing Soviet treatment of U.S. POWs that the Red Army had "liberated" from Nazi control. A SECRET OSS report dated June 18, 1945, detailed an

informal interview with Lt. Col. William F. Fessell...who recently returned from Russia where he was stationed at...Odessa, since early this year, mainly as a contact man with the Russians on problems connected with repatriation of American prisoners of war freed by the Russians. Toward the end of his stay he apparently became persona non grata with the Russians for he was suddenly ordered to leave by the American command and take the first boat out of Odessa, regardless of where it was going.²³

Under the subtitle of "Treatment of American PWs" the OSS report read:

American PWs freed by the Red Army were in the main treated very shabbily and came to hate the Russians. Many of them were robbed of watches, rings, and other personal possessions which they had managed to retain even after extended periods of captivity under the Germans. Their food at Odessa was very poor, consisting mainly of soup with cucumbers in it and sour black bread. The Russians generally tended to throw obstacles in the way of repatriation, frequently calling off shipments at the last minute and insisting always upon clearance from Moscow for every prisoner released. American PWs at Odessa were guarded by Russian soldiers carrying loaded rifles with fixed bayonets, and Russian security was more stringent there than German security had been in the various Salago and Orlage. A number of American officers who went to Poland at various times to coordinate the hunt for liberated PWs were ordered out very quickly at Russian insistence.²⁴

Despite the fact that Moscow was clearing the release of every U.S. prisoner held in Red Army territory--literally releasing them one at a time--U.S. forces were ordered:

that no repeat no retaliatory action will be taken by US forces at this time for Soviet refusal to meet our desires with regard to American contact teams and aid for American personnel liberated by Russian forces.²⁵

²² Order, "From: Allied Supreme Command, U.S. Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, To: the Military Mission in Moscow, and other European commands," March 26, 1945, No. WARK-58751.

²³ Office of Strategic Services, Report No. ERS/18645/1/22 - USSR - General.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ See copy of orders, "To: Commanding General of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations Allied Force Headquarters Cassino, Italy, From: Headquarters Communication Zone European Theater of Operations US Army Paris, France, signed Major General J. E. Hall," April 20, 1945.

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"SOME INCLINATION TO BLACKMAIL US"

The Soviets also refused the British contact teams access to their prisoners in Red Army controlled territory who came under Soviet control when the Red Army overran Nazi prison camps. A British government cable dated April 20, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State, Sir Orme Sargent, to Lord Halifax, then the British Ambassador to the United States reads

It is clear that Soviet Government will not allow our contact teams into Poland. The Russians deny the existence of any British prisoners of war in Poland but we have evidence that there are prisoners of war concentrated at Cracow and Czestochow and in hospitals. This is a clear breach of the Yalta agreement...We have therefore turned to the Red Cross channel...²⁶

The same day that Lord Halifax received the above telegram, Sargent, sent Lord Halifax a telegram which concluded that the Soviets have

some inclination to blackmail us into dealing with Warsaw authorities.²⁷

In other words, the Soviets were attempting to force the British to give de facto recognition to the Soviet puppet Polish Provisional government, the same demand that Ambassador Harriman believed was being pressed by the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in order to end the "serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et cetera,"²⁸ of U.S. soldiers, about which Ambassador Harriman cabled the U.S. Secretary of State.

The U.S. and British forces, meanwhile, were living up to the Yalta agreement. Soviet liaison officers were infused into the Allied command structure, and these Soviet officers went about their business of assisting Allied forces to repatriate, forcibly or otherwise, Soviet and Eastern European citizens and soldiers who were in Allied controlled territory. As cable from Eisenhower's Deputy Commander, a British Marshal, states

that we now have 153 Soviet Liaison Officers working under the direction of Major General Dragon who is charged with the responsibility of assisting us in the problem of repatriation.

2. That each Army Group has an organization to handle repatriation matters, and in these organizations we have woven Soviet Liaison Officers who are doing valuable work.²⁹

²⁶ Telegram, "From: Acting Secretary of State, To: Lord Halifax," No. 3936, April 20, 1945.

²⁷ Telegram, "From: Acting Secretary of State, To: Lord Halifax," No. 3923, April 20, 1945.

²⁸ Cable, "To: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U. S. Secretary of State, From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow," No. PH-1449, March 14, 1945.

²⁹ Cable, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED TEDDER (Eisenhower's Deputy Commander British Marshal Tedder)," REF NO. S-94080, June 29, 1945.

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Soviet liaison officers assisting with repatriations of Soviets in Allied control, were taken to one camp, set up--in accordance with the Yalta agreement--for Soviet citizens and soldiers, in Bari, Italy where, as reported to the U.S. Secretary of State in a TOP SECRET cable:

Russians were permitted and encouraged to set up their own camp administration. Russians of all categories are accepted at Florence camp, outfitted with clothing, PX supplies and same facilities as for United States personnel. After minimum processing they are flown to Bari to await shipment to Russia. When Soviet military missions representatives were taken to inspect both camps, they [Soviet liaison officers] expressed pleasure and said treatment was 'too good.'²⁴

"THEY BEGGED TO BE SHOT...NINE MEN HANGED THEMSELVES"

Less than a week after the Secretary of State received the above cited cable, he received a pre-meeting briefing memorandum to prepare for his meeting with the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. With regard to the repatriation issue, the Secretary of State was advised to assure Mr. Molotov,

that we have no intention of holding Soviet citizens after the collapse of Germany regardless of whether they desire to return to the Soviet Union or not.²⁵

In other words, the United States was fully committed to the policy of forcible repatriation. The Yalta agreement included the principle of "forced repatriation" of all Soviet citizens, meaning, any Soviet citizen, regardless of whether they wanted to return to the Soviet Union, were forcibly sent back to life under Stalin. This agreement, the Allies initially believed, would result in the repatriation of all of their soldiers and citizens. This provision of the Yalta agreement, in large part, the Allies abided by, despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of those forcibly repatriated to Soviet control were either shot or sent to forced labor camps.

In fact, when Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, Commander, First U.S. Army inquired of Eisenhower's staff at Supreme Allied Headquarters,

as to how much force an Army Commander should use in the control of displaced Russians...Talking with Judge McCloy today, he agreed that of course an Army Commander could use any force necessary to insure the success of his operations.²⁶

²⁴ Telegram, TOP SECRET "To: Secretary of State," Department of State, No. ASB 1304 April 13, 1945.

²⁵ State Department memorandum to the U. S. Secretary of State, regarding an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov. April 19, 1945. The memorandum contains a list on nine points and a brief description of U.S. policy on each point.

²⁶ RESTRICTED letter, "To: Lieutenant General Hodges, Commanding, First U.S. Army, From: John C. H. Lee, a Major General on Eisenhower's Supreme Allied Headquarters staff," April 13, 1945.

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Many Soviet citizens did not want to return to Soviet occupied territory, since those Soviets captured by the Germans, and recovered by Allied forces, were often recovered in German work camp uniforms. These Soviets captured by the Germans had been given the option of starving or joining a labor battalion. Most joined German labor battalions. Once repatriated to the Soviet Union, many of these Soviets were imprisoned immediately in slave labor camps. However, the Soviets sent to slave labor camps were considered lucky, since the others were often shot.

As a result, Soviet citizens and soldiers in Allied control were extremely reluctant to be repatriated. The following description is of an attempt by Allied soldiers to repatriate 399 former Russian soldiers by train to the Soviet Union:

All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear gas and some force to drive them out. Tear gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are in the hospital for self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were sent off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped enroute. A number of men in the group claimed they were not Russians...²⁷

SOVIETS DENY ACCESS TO CAMPS IN PACIFIC THEATRE

In the Pacific theater, even though the Soviets were late-comers in the war effort against Japan, they managed to take control of territory just across the Soviet Union's contiguous borders with Manchuria, China--as well as the northern islands of Japan. In doing so, the Soviets were able to seize some Japanese POW camps holding Allied prisoners.

In 1945, during the closing days of the war with Japan, U.S. military intelligence "Mercy Teams" were sent into China and Manchuria to arrange for the well-being of the Allied POWs in Japanese camps. Generally, Japanese troop commanders cooperated with the Mercy Teams, but the Soviets (as in Europe) and Chinese Communists denied Mercy Teams access to camps in areas under their control.

A cable from the Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany states that the State Department "has been anxious in handling" the return of Soviet citizens and soldiers from Western Europe "to avoid giving the Soviet authorities any pretext for delaying the return of American POW's of Japanese now in Soviet occupied zone, particularly Manchuria."²⁸

²⁷ Memorandum, "To: the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy), From: Mr. Parker W. Bahrman, Munich," January 28, 1946.

²⁸ Telegram, "To: the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) at Berlin, From: Secretary of State, No. 740.62114/6-2745," August 29, 1945.

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The Soviets even sent a delegation to Hanoi to forcibly repatriate any French Foreign Legionnaires POWs in custody of the Japanese who were identified as citizens of the Soviet Union, or as citizens of any of the east bloc nations, were surrendered by the Allies to the Soviets.⁴¹

"76,000 AMERICAN POWs STILL...WITHIN RUSSIAN ZONE"

Five days after victory was announced in Europe (V-E day) the Associated Press, from Allied Advance Headquarters in Reims, France reported that

Nearly half of the estimated 200,000 British and 76,000 American prisoners of war still in Germany are believed to be within the Russian zone of occupation and Supreme Headquarters has twice requested a meeting or an agreement to arrange their return.⁴²

Ten days later, a meeting between the Soviet and Allied command took place. The meeting, at Halle, Germany, on May 22, 1945, was

for the purpose of conferring with representatives of the Russian High Command on the matter of repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons.⁴³

Lieutenant General K.D. Gohubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, led the Soviet delegation, and Major General R.W. Barker, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, SHAEF led the Allied delegation.

One of the points of discussion at this meeting was the failure of the Soviets to provide U.S. and British liaison officers permission to visit their fellow soldiers who were formerly POWs held by the Germans and who were now being held in camps in Red Army occupied territory. In a cable from Eisenhower's Deputy Commander, British Marshall Tedder, to various Allied Command officials and U.S. diplomats, Marshall Tedder describes Soviet duplicity and policy on this matter:

Before the HALLE Conference we had made numerous attempts to visit PW Camps in the Russian Zone and always met a firm refusal. After the HALLE Conference General GOLEBEV asked to visit Camps where Russians were being kept. We agreed and asked him for permission to visit Camps in the Russian Zone. He agreed to allow 1 of our Officers to visit 5 Camps. One of my

⁴¹ Archimedes L. A. Paul, Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross, pp. 4, 141-147, and 178-179 on the deliberate shooting of U. S. Army Captain John Birch, the head of a Mercy Team, by Chinese Communist troops denying him access to a POW camp under their control.

⁴² "SHAEF Asks Russians About Freed PWs," Associated Press dispatch, ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, Reims, France, May 12, 1945.

⁴³ Report, "From: Major General R.W. Barker, Subject: Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, To: The Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF (Allied European Forces)," May 23, 1945.

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representatives started on the trip accompanied by a Russian Major who stated he had the necessary orders. After visiting the first and nearest Camp the Russian Officer produced orders signed by General GOLUBEV restricting our Officers visit to the one Camp. This is the only instance of Soviet authorities permitting US or British Officers to visit Camps in their area, which is in sharp contrast to the liberal policy pursued by us.⁴⁴

"AMERICAN POWs WERE, IN EFFECT, BEING HELD HOSTAGE"

From the beginning of the six day conference in Halle, Germany, it was for the Allies, a difficult meeting. In his post meeting report, Barker wrote:

When the Russian Mission was finally assembled it numbered some forty officers and forty to fifty enlisted men. Among the Russian officers were one Lieutenant General and six Major Generals. The Russian party arrived in requisitioned German vehicles of all makes, and American type armored car, fully equipped (armed), and a radio truck, which was in operation most of the time. All Russian male personnel were heavily armed with pistols, sub-machine guns and rifles.⁴⁵

The meeting began with the Soviets refusing to allow repatriation of Allied soldiers by air transport, which made the entire repatriation process much more cumbersome and logistically difficult. As Barker described:

After opening statements...I proposed the immediate initiation of steps looking toward prompt release and return to Allied control of all British and American prisoners of war then in Russian custody, using air and motor transport. This proposal was firmly resisted by General GOLUBEV, who cited all manner of local administrative difficulties which precluded the operation. He stated that serviceable airfields did not exist, which was known by myself to be not the case and I so informed him. The Russian position was very clear that neither now, nor at any time in the future, would they permit Allied airplanes to be used for the movement into or out of their territory of prisoners of war or displaced persons, except "Distinguished persons, sick and wounded."⁴⁶

After the initial meetings with the Soviets, lower level discussions were held by the parties in an attempt to work out mutually acceptable arrangements. However, as Barker wrote, these meetings "having proven futile," the decision was made that all discussions were to be

carried on directly between the heads of the Missions, with certain members of their respective parties in attendance. On the Russian side, those present numbered normally from twenty to twenty-five, including several general officers. The SHAEF representatives in attendance normally were myself, General MICKELSEN, Brigadier VENABLES and two to four representatives of the technical services.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Cable, SECRET, "To: AGWAR FOR WARCOS, From: SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED TEDDER, REF. NO: S-94080," June 29, 1945 describing camp visit incident in late May, 1945.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

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Barker wrote that it was after the first four-hour session of the meeting in Halle, Germany that

the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied European Forces) representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release.⁴

This is the first high level report that openly suggested that the Soviets may not repatriate all of the Allied POWs in Red Army occupied territory. In fact, after six days of meetings with the Soviets, Barker concluded that

There is every indication that the Russians intend to make a big show of rapid repatriation of our men, although I am of the opinion that we may find a reluctance to return them all, for an appreciable time to come, since those men constitute a valuable bargaining point. It will be necessary for us, therefore, to arrange for constant liaison and visits of inspection to 'uncover' our men.⁵

"ONLY SMALL NUMBERS OF U.S. POWs STILL REMAIN IN RUSSIAN HANDS"

On May 19, four days before the start of the Halle meeting, a cable signed by Eisenhower at the Allies Supreme Headquarters, stated that:

Numbers of US prisoners estimated in Russian control 25,000.⁶

After the Halle meeting, given Barker's conclusion that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians and that the Soviets were reluctant to return them all, for an appreciable time to come, since those men constitute a valuable bargaining point,⁷ the return of all US and British POWs held in Red Army occupied territory appeared to be in serious doubt.

Furthermore, a TOP SECRET May 31, 1945 letter from Major General John R. Deane, the U.S. Army Commanding General of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow to Lt. General Slavin, the Assistant Chief of the Red Army in Moscow indicated that the Soviets were still holding over 15,500 U.S. "liberated" POWs. Deane's letter stated:

I have had a cable from General Marshall in which he states he has received information which indicates that 15,597 United States liberated prisoners of war are now under control of Marshal Tolbukhin.⁸

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Cable, SECRET PRIORITY, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER, REF. NO: S-88613," May 19, 1945.

⁷ Letter, TOP SECRET, "To: Lt. General Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red Army, People's Commissariat for Defense, Moscow, U.S.S.R., From: Major General John R. Deane, U.S. Army, Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, No. 1009," May 31, 1945.

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On May 30, 1945, more than three weeks after Germany surrendered, General Kenner, Eisenhower's Surgeon General at SHAEF Headquarters, received a memorandum on the subject "Displaced Persons, Allied ex-PW and German PW."⁹ The following accounting from the Kenner memorandum detailed the number of Allied ex PW and Displaced Persons Allied Supreme Command reported were being held captive in territory occupied by the Red Army on May 30, 1945:

2. Russian Sphere.

	PW	DP
Belgian	50,000	115,000
Dutch	4,000	140,000
British	20,000	
U.S.	20,000	
French	250,000	850,000

The Kenner memorandum, dated May 30, 1945, stated 20,000 Americans remained under Red Army control. Major General Deane requested information from the Assistant Chief of the Red Army in Moscow about over 15,500 Americans the Soviets were believed to be holding in a letter dated May 31, 1945. Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile these facts with a cable signed by Eisenhower on June 1, 1945, which read:

C. It is now estimated that only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands. These no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps. They are being received now only in small driplets and being reported as received.

Everything possible is being done to recover U.S. personnel and to render accurate and prompt reports thereon to the War Department.¹⁰

The claim of the second Eisenhower cable that "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands" and that these "no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps," directly contradicts the information in the Kenner memorandum which states, a mere 48 hours earlier, that 20,000 U.S. POWs were still being held by the Red Army. Furthermore, it directly contradicts the information in General Deane's letter dated the day before that "information which indicates that 15,597 United States liberated prisoners of war are now under control of Marshal Tolbukhin." Given the contents

⁹ Memorandum, "To: General Kenner, Eisenhower's Surgeon General at SHAEF Headquarters, Subject: Displaced Persons, Allied ex-PW and German PW, No. SHAEF 383.6-2 MED," May 30, 1945.

¹⁰ Cable, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER, REF. No. FWD-23059," June 1, 1945.

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of Major General Dean's TOP SECRET letter, and given the contents of the Kenner memorandum, the Eisenhower cable of June 1 appears to be an attempt to gloss over a serious problem.

At any rate, the Eisenhower cable was merely following the official U.S. news propaganda line. On the same day as the cable stating "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands," *The New York Times* reported the War Department had announced that

"substantially all" of the American soldiers taken prisoner in Europe are accounted for, Under-Secretary Robert P. Patterson said. "This means that it is not expected that many of those who are still being carried as missing in action will appear later as having been prisoners of war."⁴⁴

In other words, on June 1, 1945, the U.S. government's public position was that most American GIs taken prisoner have come home and been repatriated, even though the classified cable traffic for the previous fortnight was reporting between 15,000 and 20,000 still held.

"ITEMS 'POWs (Current Status)'... ARE STILL LARGE"

On June 5, 1945, Allied command, from its headquarters in Paris, France, announced that 25,000 of some 90,000 men who had returned from German POW camps after the Allied military victory were men who had been listed as Missing in Action (MIA).⁴⁵ Given that 90,000 U.S. soldiers had returned at the time of the announcement, and that the U.S. War Department, for the European Theater had records of 77,500 U.S. "Prisoners Taken," 102,500 Americans should have returned from Europe, not 90,000.⁴⁶

In other words, the sum of 77,500 known POWs and 25,000 returned MIAs equals 102,500 American soldiers; however, only some 90,000 were repatriated. These numbers may be summarized in tabular form:

Total Prisoners Taken	+ Repatriated MIAs	= Total To Be Repatriated
77,500	+ 25,000	= 102,500

However, the total number of men who were repatriated in June, 1945, were only 90,000. The net number not repatriated, therefore, is as follows:

⁴⁴ "10,000 Ex-Captives Coming By Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1945.

⁴⁵ "25,000 Missing U.S. Soldiers Turn Up Alive," *New York Herald Tribune*, June 6, 1945.

⁴⁶ See chart "CAPTURED OR INTERNED UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL," December 7, 1941 - October 31, 1945, compiled by the Statistical Branch, Department of Defense, January 7, 1946.

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Total To Be Repatriated	- Actual Repatriated	= Total Not Repatriated
102,500	- 90,000	= 12,500

The conclusion is that even a rudimentary assessment of the Allies' own figures suggests that some 12,500 Americans were never repatriated from Red Army controlled territory.

However, the 12,500 figure is significantly lower than the 20,000 POWs known to be in Soviet control as detailed in the Kenner memorandum, which was written 48 hours before the War Department's announcement that "it is not expected that many of those who are still being carried as missing in action will appear."⁴⁷

Was the figure of 20,000 U.S. POWs still held in Red Army occupied territory cited in the SHAEF memorandum to General Kenner correct? Was the real figure closer to 12,500 Americans kept as slave laborers and hostages by the Red Army, as indicated by the Allies' own public figures announced by Lt. Colonel Schweitzer? Or, was the correct number of American soldiers not repatriated by the Soviets the figure cited by Major General Deane, in his May 31, 1945 letter to the Soviets, that "indicated" 15,597 American soldiers were under the control of Marshal Tolbukhin?

On February 25, 1946, some eight months later, the Chief of the Strength Accounting Office, in the War Department's Chief of Staff Office, transmitted to the National Headquarters of the Red Cross in Washington, D.C., a "chart showing Missing in Action (including captured) U.S. Army personnel for the period 7 December 1941, through 31 December 1945."⁴⁸

In his letter Ballard stated:

It will be noted that the items "Prisoners of War (Current Status)" and Missing in Action (Current Status)" are still large. The reason of course is that as of 31 December 1945 these categories reflected latest definite reports available for statistical compilation, and the situation to date has not materially changed. You will appreciate that for statistical purposes these casualties cannot be moved to other categories until detailed disposition records have been processed. In many cases, final disposition must await a legal determination of death under PL 490 which may take up to next September, even though investigation to date leaves little logical doubt that a given man is permanently lost....

The foregoing data was classified "Restricted", but has been approved for release to you.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See "10,000 Ex-Captives Coming By Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1945.

⁴⁸ Letter, To: Maurice Pate, Esq., Director, Relief to Prisoners of War, National Headquarters, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., From: L.L. Ballard, Jr., Lt. Col., Chief, Strength and Accounting and Statistical Office, OCS (Office of the Chief of Staff), February 26, 1946.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

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The chart enclosed with Ballard's letter revealed the following statement, as of December 31, 1945, for the German theaters:

Captured		Other Missing in Action*	
Returned to Mil. Control	P.O.W. (Curr. Stat)	MIA	
		Declared Dead	(Current Status)
90,937	5,414	11,753	2,997

**"LITTLE LOGICAL DOUBT THAT A GIVEN MAN IS
PERMANENTLY LOST"**

Figures for "Prisoners Not Returned to Military Control," compiled by the Statistical Branch of DOD list 6,595 men in that category as of October 31, 1945.^a According to the cable above, as of December 31, 1945, 5,414 men were still listed as "P.O.W. (Current Status)". Therefore, between October 31, 1945 and December 31, 1945 the U.S. Department of Defense figures for "Prisoners Not Returned to Military Control" decreased from 6,595 to the number listed above, 5,414.

Because the number of U.S. prisoners repatriated between October 31, 1945, and December 31, 1945, totalled only 435, (stragglers, no doubt) the decrease in the number of prisoners listed in the P.O.W. (Current Status) category from 6,595 to 5,414 cannot be explained merely by the repatriation of 435 POWs still returning from Red Army occupied territory. This still leaves a decrease of 646 men from P.O.W (Current Status) unexplained.^a

The remaining decrease in the number of men still listed as POWs (646) can, however, be explained by the War Department issuing Presumed Findings of Death for these individuals. In fact the numbers in the category of known POWs not returned in June, 1945 were likely close to 20,000, as the Kenner Memorandum stated.

This number would not include MIAs, but only known POWs.

By the end of October, the War Department was likely able to make legal Presumed Findings of Death in the majority of these cases, leaving the number of "Prisoners Not Returned to Military Control" not 12,500, but 6,595.

^a Chart, "MISSING IN ACTION U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL," German and Japanese Theaters, December 7, 1941 - December 31, 1945, Source: "Battle Casualties of the Army" January 1, 1946, from the Strength Accounting and Statistics Office, February 25, 1946.

^a See chart "CAPTURED OR INTERNED UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL," dated December 7, 1941 - October 31, 1945, compiled by the Statistical Branch, Department of Defense, January 7, 1946.

^a Roughly only 1,000 POWs were repatriated in the last half of 1945.

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The figure of 11,753 Declared Dead under the category Other Missing in Action, in the chart of casualty figures for December 31, 1945, actually represent Presumed Findings of Death (PFDs), as authorized by U.S. law. These PFDs were made from both the MIA (Current Status) list and the P.O.W. (Current Status) list, decreasing the numbers in those categories and increasing the number in the Declared Dead category.

As a result, Lt. Col. Ballard felt obligated to explain to the Director of the Relief to Prisoners of War of the Red Cross that for "statistical purposes" the numbers in the Prisoner of War (Current Status) and the Missing in Action (Current Status) were "still large." Ballard explained to the Red Cross that "these casualties cannot be moved to other categories" until each man can be found, legally, to be dead. This finding of death occurs, as Lt. Col. Ballard points out, after an "investigation to date leaves little logical doubt that a given man is permanently lost."^a

The most striking aspect of these documents is the revelation that the War Department's Chief of the Strength Accounting and Statistic Office, in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the War Department, main function was to resolve each outstanding case by determining—as soon as enough time elapsed to make it legally possible—that each man is "permanently lost," and therefore, dead.

The thrust of the War Department's efforts were not in the direction that most Americans would expect their government to proceed; that is, to make a thorough effort to determine the fate of each man. Given the obvious and observed policy by the Soviet government to hold citizens and soldiers from Western countries, known to senior U.S. officials, Lt. Col. Ballard's efforts should have been concentrated on determining where the Soviets were holding these men, and not merely to "await a legal determination of death under PL 490 which may take up to next September."

Thus, the bureaucratic precedents created in World War I in the cases of "presumed dead" among these missing from the American Expeditionary force were once again followed. Thousands of U.S. personnel who were known to be POWs held by the Germans in World War II, but, were not repatriated once the territory they were being held in was occupied by Red Army, and were legally determined to be dead.

"NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE OF ANY LARGE NUMBERS"

Where were these thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Europeans? Nearly a month after the Eisenhower cable claimed that "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands" and that these "no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps," Eisenhower sent a SECRET PRIORITY cable to General Deane in Moscow which read

^a Letter, To: Maurice Pate, Esq., Director, Relief to Prisoners of War, National Headquarters, American Red Cross, Washington D.C., From: L.L. Ballard Jr., Lt. Col., Chief, Strength and Accounting and Statistical Office, OCS (Office of the Chief of Staff), February 26, 1946.

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Possibility that several hundred American prisoners of war liberated from Stalag Luft 1, Barth, are now confined by the Russian Army in the Rostock area pending identification as Americans is reported by an American who recently returned from such confinement.

S/Sgt. Anthony Sherg was one of 1000 air force officers and non-commissioned officers who left Stalag Luft 1 immediately prior to assumption of control in Barth by the Red Army in order to obtain rumored air transport from Wismar. The group of ten in which Sgt Sherg travelled was arrested by Russian soldiers and held in jails in Bad Döberan, then Rostock. Ten other Americans were soon under similar circumstances in Rostock.

Russian authorities demanded identification papers, which no prisoner possessed, and refused to consider dog tags proof of the Americans' status. The Americans were well fed and well treated but Sherg complains there was no disposition to speed identification and evacuation. After 25 days he escaped from jail and made his way to British Forces.

From his own observations and conversations with other former prisoners he believes several hundred Americans may be held in like circumstances in the Wismar-Bad Döberan-Rostock Area.⁴⁴

"LAGER CONFINES WILL NEVER BE REPATRIATED"

In fact, there continued to be many reports of Americans being held by the Soviets. For example, the catalogue of the National Archives lists a memorandum from the State Department Special Projects Division, date February 6, 1946, regarding a conversation between Colonel Kavanaugh, from War Department and Captain George, and Mr. Baily, regarding Doolittle fliers interned by the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ These fliers were never repatriated.

Again, a letter to the leader of France's National Constituent Assembly dated August 17, 1946 from the Deputy of the Bas-Rhin stated:

I have brought to the attention of the Minister for ex-Prisoners of War the testimony of Mr. Joseph Bogenschütz, 55 Grand Rue, at Mulhouse (Haut Rhin), who was repatriated on last July 7 from Russia, from Camp 199-6 at Imskaya, which is 70 kilometers from Novosibirsk [...]. Bogenschütz states that he wrote at least three cards a month through the Red Cross (Red Crescent) since September 1944 and that none of these cards ever arrived. Bogenschütz, in addition thereto, alleges that there still remain American, British, Belgian, Polish, Rumanian, Luxemburg, etc. nationals in the Camp.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Cable, "To: DEANE MOSCOW, HQ 21st ARMY GROUP c/o SHGAP signed SCARF (Eisenhower), From SHAEF MAIN, No. 6990," June 25, 1945.

⁴⁵ Listed in the catalog of the National Archives as Memo No. FW 740.00114 PW. However, the actual document is missing. The Doolittle fliers were crew members of the daring surprise "Doolittle raid" on Tokyo, a one-way bombing mission in April, 1942 by 16 B-24 bombers, from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet.

⁴⁶ Copy of translation of a letter written on Republic of France's National Constituent Assembly stationery, Paris, dated August 17, 1946, signed Henri Meck, Deputy of the Bas-Rhin.

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Another example is a report from the Headquarters of the United States Forces in Austria, to the Director of Intelligence, the General Staff of the U.S. Army, dated June 15, 1946 which stated:

SUBJECT: USSR - American Army Personnel in Confinement

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following information was obtained from a former forced laborer who claimed to have been confined in an unregistered lager with Subject personnel. Informant claimed to have been released through an error committed by the commandant of the Moscow hospital where she was transferred because of infantile paralysis.

Approximately 60 km from Moscow, in the direction of Kaline, there is an unregistered labor camp. The confines, 150 men and 50 women, work in coal mines in the vicinity of the camp. Among those confined are 3 American Air Force soldiers who were captured by the German Wehrmacht, Czechoslovakia, during April 1945. These men are:

Charlie, 21 years, 170 cm, blond, blue eyes, has paralyzed right shoulder.

Joe...165 cm, dark blond, dark eyes, has stomach wound and is confined in lager infirmary.

Albert, 27 years, 170 cm, black hair, brown eyes, has stiff left hip and burn scar on left side of face, is from Texas.

The lager confines will never be repatriated and are not permitted to write letters.⁴⁷

The reasons that the Soviets kept U.S. POWs and other Western European citizens and POWs are difficult for the citizens of free countries to fathom. However, one may speculate on at least five explanations:

First, for economic concessions, or as Major Vershenko stated, for 'credits.'

Second, to satisfy the Soviet view—as described by Molotov—that it "was dangerous" merely to disarm an adversary (or in the case of the U.S., an ally who may be a future adversary) but it was also necessary to "make them work."

Third, as a source of slave labor to rebuild their industrial base.

Fourth, as the British cable stated, to satisfy the Soviet "inclination to blackmail us into dealing with Warsaw authorities" and for other political concessions.

Fifth, to ensure that the Allies forcibly repatriated Russian and other eastern European citizens who did not wish to return to their countries under Soviet control.

⁴⁷ Memorandum, CONFIDENTIAL, "To: Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army, Washington D.C. From: C. P. Bilzel, Colonel GSC, Director of Intelligence for the Headquarters, United States Forces in Austria," July 13, 1948.

The daughter of one such U.S. Army officer—Major Wirt Thompson—was never told that in 1955 a German POW repatriated from the Soviet concentration camp system reported to the United States government that while he was in prison, he met her father. The German repatriate told American officials that Thompson told him that he had been imprisoned at Budenakaya prison near Moscow, and also in the Tayshet labor camp after World War II. Not only was Thompson's daughter "overwhelmed" when she found out early in 1991 that this information existed, but she wondered how her family could have been told by the United States government in 1944 that Major Thompson had been killed in action, body not recovered.⁶

⁶ See "Men Who Never Returned," Editorial, *The Washington Times*, March 13, 1991.

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Unlike the result in World War II, Allied forces did not achieve a military victory in Korea. The Korean War ended at the negotiating table between Communist North Korean representatives and United Nations representatives.

With regard to POW repatriation, the North Koreans initially demanded an "all-for-all" prisoner exchange. The United States was reluctant to agree to this formula based on its World War II experience with the Yalta agreement and mandatory repatriation, knowing that thousands of those forced to return to the Soviet Union were either shot or interned in slave labor camps, where most of them died. After two long years of negotiations, the North Koreans agreed to the principle of voluntary or "non-forcible repatriation." This agreement stated that each side would release only those prisoners who wished to return to their respective countries.

Operation BIG SWITCH was the name given to the largest and final exchange of prisoners between the North Koreans and the U.N. forces, which occurred over a one-month period from August 5, 1953 to September 6, 1953.¹ Chinese and North Korean POWs were returned to North Korea, and U.S. and other U.N. troops were returned to South Korea. Approximately 14,200 Communist Chinese POWs elected not to return to the Peoples Republic of China; while 21 American POWs elected to stay with the Communist forces, and likely went to China. These 21 Americans are defectors and obviously are not considered as unrepatriated U.S. POWs.

However, U.S. government documents state that the U.S. government knew that nearly one thousand U.S. POWs—and an undetermined number of some 8,000 U.S. MIAs—were still held captive after operation BIG SWITCH and were not repatriated at the end of the Korean War. These U.S. POWs were never repatriated.

Three days after the start of operation BIG SWITCH, the *New York Times* reported that

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, retired commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, estimated tonight that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.²

¹ *Korean War Almanac*, Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry, Facts on File, pp. 33,62.

² "8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1953.

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"LEAVES A BALANCE OF 8,000 UNACCOUNTED FOR"

A report by the U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea, five days into operation BIG SWITCH, stated:

"Figures show that the total number of MIAs, *plus known captives, less those to be US repatriated, leaves a balance of 8,000 unaccounted for.*" [emphasis added]¹

The report mentions numerous reports of U.N. POWs who were transferred to Manchuria, China, and the USSR since the beginning of hostilities in Korea.² Specifically, the report stated

many POWs transferred have been technicians and factory workers. Other POWs transferred had a knowledge of Cantonese and are reportedly used for propaganda purposes.³

The number of known U.S. POWs not repatriated from the Korean War was cited by Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army in January, 1954, in a memorandum he wrote four months after the conclusion of operation BIG SWITCH. Section 3, Part B reads:

B. THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS BELIEVED TO BE STILL HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE COMMUNISTS (SECRET)

1. There are approximately 954 United States personnel falling in this group. What the Department of the Army and other interested agencies is doing about their recovery falls into two parts. First, the direct efforts of the UNC Military Armistice Commission to obtain an accurate accounting, and second, efforts by G2 of the Army, both overt and covert, to locate, identify, and recover these individuals. G2 is making an intensive effort through its information collection system world-wide, to obtain information on these people and has a plan for clandestine action to obtain the recovery of one or more to establish the case positively that prisoners are still being held by the Communists. No results have been obtained yet in this effort. The direct efforts of the UNC [United Nations Command] are being held in abeyance pending further study of the problem by the State Department.

2. A further complicating factor in the situation is that to continue to carry this personnel in a missing status is costing over one million dollars annually. It may become necessary at some future date to drop them from our records as 'missing and presumed dead.' [emphasis added]

¹ Report, U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea, (CCRAK). CCRAK SPECIFIC REQUEST Number 66-53.

² The United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China and, as a result, the U.S. did not deal directly with the Chinese throughout the negotiations.

³ (CCRAK) Report, REQUEST Number 66-53.

⁴ Memorandum, SECRET, TO: Secretary of the Army, Subject: The Twenty-One Non-Repatriates and the Unaccounted-For Americans Believed to be Still Held Illegally by the Communists, From: Assistant Secretary Milton, January 16, 1954.

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In fact, the Defense Department did in fact "drop them" from DOD records as "missing and presumed dead," as were the non-repatriated U.S. POWs from the American Expeditionary Force in World War I and World War II. In a memorandum to Milton from Major General Robert Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 of the U.S. Army, Young updates Assistant Secretary Milton on the progress on dropping the U.S. POWs from DOD records:

2. Under the provisions of Public Law 490 (77th Congress), the Department of the Army, after careful review of each case and interrogation of returning prisoners of war, has placed 618 soldiers, known to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following categories:

313 - Finding of Death - Administratively determined, under the provisions of Public Law 490, by Department of the Army.

275 - Report of Death - reported on good authority by returning prisoners.

21 - Dishonorable Discharge.

4 - Under investigation, prognosis undecided. Missing in Action for over one year.

2 - Returned to Military Control.¹

The number had already been dropped from 954 to 618 through a series of presumed findings of death for the "unaccounted-for Americans believed to be still held illegally by the Communists." Presumed findings of death were also used to whittle down the number of U.S. soldiers listed as MIA.

According to the "Interim Report of U.S. Casualties," prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of December 31, 1953 (Operation BIG SWITCH ended September 6, 1953), the total number of U.S. soldiers who had been listed as Missing in Action from the Korean War was 13,325. Still listed as MIA in January 1, 1954 were 2,953, and the figure for died, or presumed dead, was 5,140. 5,131 MIAs had been repatriated and 101 were listed as "Current captured."²

"THESE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO BE 'NEGOTIATED FOR'"

On June 17, 1955, almost two years after the end of operation BIG SWITCH, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, issued an internal report titled, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War." The report admitted that,

¹ Memorandum, SECRET, TO: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, April 29, 1954.

² See "Interim Report of U.S. Battle Casualties," as of December 31, 1953 (Source: Progress Reports and Statistics, OSD, as of January 25, 1954).

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After the official repatriation efforts were completed, the U.N. Command found that it still had slightly less than 1000 U.S. PWs [not MIAs] "unaccounted for" by the Communists.⁹

Although frank and forthright, this report--written by staff of the Office of Special Operations--provides a glimpse into the thinking of those involved in the Korean POW issue. Sections of the report follow:

At the time of the official repatriation, some of our repatriates stated that they had been informed by the Communists that they (the Communists) were holding 'some' U.S. flyers as 'political prisoners' rather than as prisoners of war and that *these people would have to be negotiated for through political or diplomatic channels*. Due to the fact that we did not recognize the red regime in China, no political negotiations were instituted, although [the] State [Department] did have some exploratory discussions with the British in an attempt to get at the problem. The situation was relatively dormant when, in late November 1954, the Peking radio announced that 13 of these 'political prisoners' had been sentenced for 'spying'. This announcement caused a public uproar and a demand from U.S. citizens, Congressional leaders and organizations for action to effect their release.¹⁰ [emphasis added]

The eleven U.S. "political prisoners," were not the only U.S. servicemen the Chinese held after the Korean War. The *New York Times*, reported

Communist China is holding prisoner other United States Air Force personnel besides the eleven who were recently sentenced on spying charges following their capture during the Korean War. This information was brought out of China by Squadron Leader Andrew R. MacKenzie, a Canadian flier who was released today by the Chinese at the Hong Kong border. He reached freedom here two years to the day after he was shot down and fell into Chinese hands in North Korea. Held back from the Korean war prisoner exchange, he was released by the Peiping [sic] regime following a period of negotiations through diplomatic channels. Wing Comdr. Donald Sizoo, his brother-in-law who was sent here from Canada to meet him, said guardedly at a press conference later that an undisclosed number of United States airmen had been in the same camp with Squadron Leader MacKenzie. Wing Commander Sizoo said none of the Americans in the camp was on the list of eleven whose sentencing was announced by the Chinese November 23, 1954.¹¹

"AMERICAN POWs REPORTED IN ROUTE TO SIBERIA"

Despite some political inconvenience to the Department of Defense, the government felt that the issue and controversy had been controlled. The conclusion of the report, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," stated:

⁹ Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, titled "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ "Freed Flier Says Peiping is Holding More U.S. Airmen, Canadian Now in Hong Kong Brings News of Americans Other Than 11 Jailed," *The New York Times*, December 6, 1954.

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Such as they are, our current efforts in the political field, plus the 'stand-by' alternatives developed by the military, represent the full range of possible additional efforts to recover personnel now in custody of foreign powers. On one hand, we are bound at present by the President's 'peaceful means' decree. The military courses of action apparently cannot be taken unilaterally, and we are possessed of some rather 'reluctant' allies in this respect. The problem becomes a philosophical one. If we are 'at war,' cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this type of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral 'fire fights' we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political course of action something like General Enkinde outlined which would (1) instill in the soldier a much more effective 'don't get captured' attitude, and (2) we should also push to get the military commander more discretionary authority to retaliate, fast and hard against these Communist tactics.¹²

Reports of the fate of these Americans continued to come to the attention of the United States government. One such report, a Foreign Service Dispatch (cable) by Air Pouch dated March 23, 1954, sent from the U.S. diplomatic post in Hong Kong to the State Department in Washington, sheds some light on the fate of hundreds of U.S. POWs captured during the Korean War. The report reads:

American POWs reported en route to Siberia

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probably true and the evaluation of the source as unknown reliability. The full text of the initial Air Liaison Office report follows:

First report dated March 16, 1954, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington, G2.

"This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli (Lupia), 49 degrees 50'-117 degrees 30' Manchuria Road Map, AMSL 201 First Edition, on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available Hong Kong for questioning for the next four days."

Upon receipt of this information, USAF, Washington, requested elaboration of the following points:

¹² Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

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1. Description of uniforms or clothing worn by POWs including ornaments.
2. Physical condition of POWs.
3. Nationality of guards.
4. Specific dates of observations.
5. Destination in Siberia.
6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian clothing accompanying movement of POWs.
7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned.

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below.

FROM USAIRLO SGN LACKEY. CITE C4 REUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven questions.

(1) POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy inasmuch as weather considered early spring. Source identified from pictures service jacket, field, M1943. No belongings except canteen. No ornaments observed.

(2) Condition appeared good, no wounded all ambulatory.

(3) Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate bisecting platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian trainmen wore dark blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train uniform but he knows the trainmen are military wearing regular train uniforms.

(4) Interrogation with aid of more fluent interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside city of Manchouli about three months later with POW train headed towards station where he observed POW transfer. Source was impressed with second observation because of large number of Negroes among POWs. Source states job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouli every time subsequent POW shipments passed through Manchouli. Source says these shipments were reported often and occurred when United Nations forces in Korea were on the offensive.

(5) Unknown.

(6) Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who manned train.

(7) Three POWs observed in station restaurant appeared to be 30 or 35. Source identified Air Force non-commissioned officer sleeve insignia of Staff Sergeant rank, stated that several inches above insignia there was a propeller but says that all three did not have propeller. Three POWs accompanied by Chinese guard. POWs appeared thin but in good health and spirits, were being given what source described as good food. POWs were talking in English but did not converse with guard. Further information as to number of POWs observed source states that first observation filled a seven passenger car train and second observation about the same. Source continues to emphasize the number of Negro troops, which evidently impressed him because he had seen so few Negroes before.

Comment Reporting Officer: Source is very careful not to exaggerate information and is positive of identification of American POWs. In view of information contained in Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 dated 5 February 54, Reporting Officer gives above information rating of F-2. Source departing Hong Kong today by ship. Future address on file this office.

In this connection the Department's attention is called to Charity Interrogation Report No.

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619, forwarded to the Department under cover of a letter dated March 1, 1954, to Mr. A. Sabin Chase, DRF. Section 6 of this report states, "On another occasion source saw several coaches full of Europeans who were taken to USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him."¹³

"PRISONERS IN PEACE AND REFORM CAMPS WILL NOT BE EXCHANGED"

The report from Hong Kong was specifically discussed in Major General Young's April 29, 1954 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hugh Milton, II. Young, responding to Milton's request to "consolidate information on prisoners of war which may remain in Communist hands," states in his memorandum written six months after the last U.S. POW returned from North Korea, that the above quoted intelligence report

corroborates previous indications UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities....reports have now come [to the] attention [of the] U.S. Government which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war from Korea had been transported into Soviet Union and are now in Soviet custody. Request fullest possible information these POWs and their repatriation earliest possible time."¹⁴

One CIA intelligence report, which had an information date as of October 1950 - February 1951, confirmed that hundreds of Negro troops were held by the North Koreans. The CIA report stated:

1. One Republic of Korea soldier who was captured by the Communists on 29 October 1950 was sent to a war prison camp at Pyoktong (125-26, 40-36) in North P'yongan. This camp in early November had about 1,000 American war prisoners, of whom about 700 were negroes, approximately 1,500 ROK prisoners, and about 300 civilian employees of the United Nations forces.¹⁵

A different three page CIA intelligence report, on Prisoner of War Camps in North Korea and China, with information dated January-May, 1952, described the Chinese Communist system of camps for U.N. POWs.

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

1. In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Pu Ksan Li Ch's) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in Pyongyang, under Colonel No-man-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1153), an intelligence

¹³ Cable, Foreign Service Dispatch "From: AMCONGEN, Hong Kong, To: The Department of State, Washington, by Air Pouch, signed Julian F. Harrington, American Consul General, at: Taipei, Moscow, London, Paris, No. 1716," March 23, 1954.

¹⁴ Memorandum, SECRET, "To: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1," April 29, 1954.

¹⁵ Report, CIA, No. 50 6582, Country: Korea/China; Date of Info: October 1950 - February 1951.

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officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.

2. The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed 'peace camps,' detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungchun. Peace camps were also at Kaiyuan Kasien (124-05, 42-36) and Pech'ŭ (123-43, 41-20).

3. Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on re-indoctrination of the prisoners.

4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in peace and reform camps will not be exchanged. [emphasis added]

5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK [Republic of Korea] officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being reintegrated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

...13. On 6 January four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Naisao Nan Kuan Chaili, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Naisao Nan Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.¹⁷

"...DEVOID OF ANY FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER..."

In an attempt to resolve the unrepatriated U.S. POW problem from the Korean war by diplomacy, the United States officially communicated with the Soviet government on May 5, 1954. The official U.S. diplomatic note to the Soviet Union stated:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to request the Ministry's assistance in the following matter.

¹⁷ Report, CIA, "Subject: Prisoners-of-War Camps in North Korea and China," No. SO 91634, July 17, 1952.

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The United States government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States Government desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time.¹⁸

On May 12, 1954, the Soviet Union replied:

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America, received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on May 5, 1954, the Ministry has the honor to state the following:

The United States assertion contained in the indicated note that American prisoners of war who participated in military actions in Korea have allegedly been transferred to the Soviet Union and at the present time are being kept under Soviet guard is devoid of any foundation whatsoever and is clearly far-fetched, since there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.¹⁹

The Soviet response predicates denial of access to the men on its refusal to characterize the U.S. personnel as "prisoners of war." In fact, the Soviets made it a practice to refuse to acknowledge the U.S. citizenship of the U.S. soldiers; as a result—from the Soviet's standpoint—the Soviet denial is accurate.

Nor was this lesson — that the Soviets do not acknowledge the citizenship of U.S. POWs — ever learned. According to a April 15, 1991 press advisory issued by the United States Department of State, the United States once again requested that the Soviets "provide us with any additional information on any other U.S. citizens who may have been detained as a result of World War II, the Korean conflict or the Vietnam War," a request that repeated the mistake of asking for information only about U.S. citizens that the State Department made 37 years earlier.

The State Department also made a point of including in its recent press advisory the government's usual statement that "in the interest of following every credible lead in providing families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones."²⁰ Furthermore, according to the press advisory, the State Department specifically asked the Soviets only about "two U.S. planes shot down in the early 1950s,"²¹ and did not ask the Soviets any specific questions about any non-repatriated POWs from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. It seems apparent that if the Department of State had expected to get solid information from the Soviet government, then the State Department would have sent a much more comprehensive and appropriately phrased request.

¹⁷ See diplomatic note.

¹⁸ U.S. State Department press release 249, May 13, 1954.

¹⁹ See United States Department of State press advisory, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, "USSR: Allegations of U.S. POWs in the USSR," April 15, 1991.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

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The sincerity of the State Department's declared intention to follow "every credible lead in providing families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones" is, therefore, suspect. One U.S. government document dated January 21, 1980, a memorandum from Michael Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, reveals the cynical view and attitude of at least one U.S. government official with regard to the non-repatriation issue,

a letter from you is important to indicate that you take recent refugee reports of sighting of live Americans 'seriously'. This is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game, and you should not be the whistle blower. The idea is today that the President [Carter] is determined to pursue any lead concerning possible live MIAs.²¹

"...POWs WHO MIGHT STILL BE IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY..."

The executive branch's disinformation tactics against concerned mothers and fathers extended to Congressmen and Senators. One case is found in a December 21, 1953 letter sent to the Secretary of State from Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson with regard to a constituent letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas, who wrote Senator Johnson about a *U.S. News and World Report* article titled "Where are 944 Missing GI's?"

The first reaction of the Secretary of State's office was to call Johnson and dispose of the matter by phone. However, as a written reply was requested, Thurston B. Morton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, was tasked to reply. The evolution of the text of Morton's letter to Johnson—which took four rewrites to complete—definitively illustrates the ambivalence with which the United States government has approached the non-repatriation issue. The four drafts still exist today, and they illustrate how the State Department artfully sought to mislead the future U.S. President, and the most powerful leader in Congress at the time.

The first draft of the State Department's response contained the following text:

On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoners of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on the list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated.²²

²¹ Memorandum, National Security Council, "To: Zbigniew Brzezinski, From: Michael Oksenberg," January 21, 1980.

²² Letter, first draft "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thurston B. Morton," file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153.

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This entire section was crossed out by Morton, but a persistent foreign service officer sent Morton back the second draft, with the section quoted above unchanged, as well as a new sentence at the end of the introductory paragraph which read:

He [Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas] can be assured that efforts are being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody and may be interested in having the following information about this matter.²³

The second draft also contained a new page which followed the paragraphs used in the first draft. The second page of the second draft read:

General Clark, in a letter of September 24 [1954], two and a half weeks after Operation BIG SWITCH ended] to the Communist side, stated that he considered their reply wholly unacceptable, and pointed out that by signing the armistice agreement the Communists had undertaken a solemn obligation to repatriate directly or to hand over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission all of the captured persons held by them at the time the armistice was signed. He pointed out that this obligation was binding upon them and applied to all United Nations Command persons regardless of where captured or held in custody. I am enclosing a copy of General Clark's letter of September 24 which you may wish to send to your constituent.

On November 21, the United Nations Command provided the Communist side with a revision of its original list of unaccounted for Allied personnel which it had presented to the Communists on September 9. The revised list contained a total of 3,400 names, and the figure for United States prisoners of war unaccounted for was increased by eight to a total of 952.

On November 21, the United Nations Command protested in the Military Armistice Commission to the Communists that they had still failed to give a satisfactory reply concerning the list of unaccounted for United Nations Command personnel, and pointed out that additional evidence provided by three Korean prisoners of war who recently defected to the United Nations side corroborated the United Nations Command statements that the Communists were withholding prisoners of war. The United Nations Command demanded that the Communists "hand over to the custody of the Custodian Forces of India all those prisoners that your side still retains."

Ambassador Arthur Dean has also referred to this problem in the course of his negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom.

Your constituent may be assured that it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and the United Nations Command will make every effort to accomplish the objective.²⁴

Assistant Secretary Morton rejected all the proposed changes in the second draft by crossing them out. The third draft of the letter to Johnson was so disagreeable to Morton that he typed out two sentences and attached it to the draft and crossed out all other sentences that related to the State Department's reply. As a result, the final letter read:

²³ Letter, second draft "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thurston B. Morton," file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153.

²⁴ Ibid.

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing G.I.s?" on page 27 of this publication.

I am enclosing copies of a statement recounting the efforts being made to secure the return of American prisoners of war who might still be in Communist custody which I believe will be of assistance to you in replying to your constituent. As the statement points out, it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and we will do everything possible to accomplish this objective. (emphasis added)

With regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning (German) prisoner-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

Sincerely Yours,

For the Secretary of State,

Thurston B. Morton*

It is noteworthy that Morton's letter contained no specific or accurate information, as contrasted with the three rejected drafts which had such information. The rhetoric of the State Department could not go beyond the word "might" to describe the possibility of U.S. soldiers being held by Communist forces. On the one hand, the State Department was taking credit for having released two Americans from the Soviet gulag and for investigating "every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments," but on the other it was dismissing any real possibility that there could be more POWs in Communist prisons. Meanwhile, the State Department knew that the North Koreans had not returned nearly 1,000 U.S. POWs, as well as an undetermined number of the 8,000 MIAs who were actually captured alive and imprisoned by the North Koreans.

* Letter, final "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thurston B. Morton", file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153, January 20, 1954.

"THEY...WOULD HOLD ME LIKE THEY HAD DONE THESE OTHER GUYS"

The People's Republic of China, as noted earlier, released a Canadian Squadron Leader thirteen months after the last U.N. POW was repatriated by the Communist forces three months after Operation BIG SWITCH. In 1973, Chinese Communists repatriated two American POWs who had been captured during the Korean War, along with a pilot, Philip Smith, who was shot down over the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war. During interrogation sessions in Smith's seven years of solitary confinement in a PRC jail, these two U.S. POWs from the Korean War were paraded before him. Smith said the Chinese told him:

they wouldn't release me, and would hold me like they'd done to these other guys until I recanted.²⁷

Most Americans would find it incomprehensible that the Chinese would hold U.S. POWs from the Korean War, and release them two decades later; yet, to the Chinese Communists, this policy had some rationale.

At the conclusion of Operation BIG SWITCH, the United States Government left U.S. POWs, held against their will, in custody of the North Koreans, the mainland Chinese, and the USSR. Whether any of these men are still alive is tragically-unclear.

The fate of the more than 8,000 men listed as MIA who were administratively found to be "presumed dead" is a mystery. No rebuttal was ever made to General Van Fleet, who stated in the fall of 1953 his belief that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.²⁸ "A large percentage" translates into thousands of U.S. soldiers who were never repatriated by the Communist forces after the Korean war.

Seven years after operation BIG SWITCH, one Foreign Service Dispatch to the State Department in Washington contained the names of two U.S. Korean POWs working in a Soviet phosphorus mine.²⁹ The cable, "sanitized" by the United States government, originally contained the names of the two U.S. POWs. However, but the names were blacked out in the sanitized version. According to the United States government, the names were blacked out to protect the abandoned POWs' "privacy." It is absurd that the U.S. government, having abandoned soldiers to a life of slave labor and forced captivity, is attempting to protect the same abandoned soldiers' "privacy."³⁰ Perhaps this example best illustrates the U.S. approach to repatriating our abandoned POWs.

²⁷ "ExPOWs Recall Psychological Terror, Coercion," *The Free Press Enterprise*, January 22, 1991.

²⁸ "8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1953.

²⁹ Cable, "From: the American Embassy in Brussels, To: the State Department in Washington," September 8, 1960.

³⁰ "Men Who Never Returned," Editorial, *The Washington Times*, March 13, 1991.

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The war widely known as the Vietnam War was the second war fought by Communist forces in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese forces, after defeating the French, fought the Second Indochina war against the United States and U.S.-backed forces. In the final analysis, however, this war was a political and moral defeat for the United States.

As a result, the United States was forced at the Paris Peace Conference to negotiate its withdrawal from Southeast Asia from a weak military and political position. Internal divisions in the United States and mounting political pressure to extricate the nation from the war, exacerbated this weak negotiating position. As a result, the United States, as in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, found itself, once again, unable to guarantee the repatriation of all U.S. POWs and MIAs who were alive and held captive.

The United States' chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference, Henry Kissinger, admitted as much in his book, *Years of Upheaval*, published in 1982. Kissinger wrote:

Equally frustrating were our discussions of the American soldiers and airmen who were prisoners of war or missing in action. We knew of at least eighty instances in which an American serviceman had been captured alive and had subsequently disappeared. The evidence consisted of either voice communications from the ground in advance of capture or photographs and names published by the Communists.¹

Operation HOMECOMING, the name given to the last repatriation of U.S. POWs by the North Vietnamese began February 12, 1973, and ended March 29, 1973. A grand total of 591 United States servicemen were repatriated.

However, news reports and other documentation stated that the United States Government knowingly left men—perhaps thousands of men—in the captivity of Communist forces in Southeast Asia.

On January 27, 1973, an agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris, France. Signatories to this agreement were the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). This agreement consisted of a preamble, and nine chapters, covering 23 Articles and four protocols.

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) pp.33-34.

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In Chapter VII, Articles 21 and 22 outlined the future relationship between the United States and the Republic of North Vietnam. These read in part,

Article 21: ...In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indo-China.

Article 22: The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each others independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each others internal affairs. At the same time, this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indo-China and South East Asia.

The Paris accord stated that the return of prisoners of war, would be

carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal.

"THERE ARE NO MORE PRISONERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."

The United States did not receive the list of Americans POWs the whom North Vietnamese admitted they were holding in captivity until after the peace accords were signed. Significantly, the list included only nine Americans captured in Laos. While these men were captured in Laos, they were not prisoners of the Pathet Lao, but were handed over to, and held by, the North Vietnamese after their capture.

In fact, it was widely known that the Pathet Lao were holding many other U.S. POWs. On March 25, one news report stated:

U.S. sources believe that a substantial number of the missing [in Laos]—perhaps as many as 100—still may be alive. The conclusions are based on inspections of crash sites by search teams and on intelligence reports.¹

The absence of names on the U.S. POW list handed over by the North Vietnamese of Americans captured in Laos and held by the Pathet Lao was one of the great blunders of the Paris Peace Accord negotiations and caused great confusion and emotional duress among family members of missing and captured personnel.

¹ United Press International dispatch, Vientiane, Laos, March 25, 1973.

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One news report stated, three days after the Paris Peace accords were signed:

The North Vietnamese have failed to furnish the United States with a list of American fighting men taken prisoner in Laos, Pentagon officials and an organization of POW families said Sunday. Mrs. Phyllis Galanti, board of chairman of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia told a reporter there are no Laos names on lists provided to U.S. authorities in Paris Saturday after the Vietnam cease-fire agreement was formally signed. Everything we have been told had led us to believe there would be a list, said Mrs. Galanti. Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedhelm said it is true that no Laos list was provided. We do expect to receive a list Friedhelm said.³

In fact, the United States government never received such a list. Two weeks later, one news report carried the United States government explanation for the absence of names of American POWs held by Pathet Lao. The report quoted State Department officials who stated

they believe that the list of nine persons submitted by North Vietnam was incomplete and that there are more Americans held by Laotian Communists.⁴

In other words, the U.S. government's explanation for the lack of names of U.S. POWs held in Laos was that the North Vietnamese and the Laotians were holding back the names. Indeed, the next day, the Pathet Lao confirmed that they were holding back names. According to a news report from Laos, the Pathet Lao publicly announced through

a Communist Pathet Lao spokesman...[that]...his group is holding American prisoners of war who will be released after a cease-fire goes into effect. Soth Petray, the Pathet Laos permanent representative in Vientiane, declined to give any details about American POWs in Laos. But he said the Pathet Lao leadership has a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held and that both sides in the cease-fire negotiations are ready to exchange prisoners once the fighting ends. The exchange will take place in Laos, Soth said. If they were captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos, he told UPI. [emphasis added]⁵

The Pathet Lao wanted a cease-fire agreement and were holding American prisoners until such an agreement between the United States and the Pathet Lao was reached. However, State Department officials, responding to the Pathet Lao statement quoted above:

pointed out today that the Pathet Lao statement was not consistent with more detailed statements made by Kissinger and that it was possible that Kissinger's statements were based on some misunderstanding in his dealings with the North Vietnamese.⁶

³ Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., January 30, 1973.

⁴ The Washington Post, February 18, 1973.

⁵ United Press International dispatch, Vientiane, Laos, February 19, 1973.

⁶ Pathet Lao Says No to Truce, No American POWs, The Washington Post, February 18, 1973.

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Mr. Kissinger's misunderstanding was that the United States believed, as Kissinger stated in a January 24, 1973 press conference, that

American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi.⁷

However, during the 60 day cease-fire period required by the Paris Peace accords, American airmen were still flying combat missions and being shot down in the secret war over Laos. Mr. Kissinger's misunderstanding was never cleared up, and at the conclusion of Operation HOMECOMING more than a month later, no American prisoners of war held in Laos were released by the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao. These men, and the men that the Pathet Lao forces publicly stated they were holding after the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, have never come home.

On March 26, 1973, the North Vietnamese announced that the last American prisoners of war would be repatriated March 27 and March 28, 1973. The hopes of the nation and of family members that American prisoners of war held by the Pathet Lao would be released by the North Vietnamese were crushed. As one news report stated

North Vietnam told the United States Sunday it intended to release the last group of American prisoners it holds at Hanoi's Gia Lam Airport on Tuesday and Wednesday, but said the U.S. demand that it also release POWs captured in Laos is beyond the jurisdiction of the [Paris] agreement. [emphasis added]⁸

The North Vietnamese publicly concurred with the Pathet Lao's policy with regard to the repatriation of the U.S. POWs the Pathet Lao were holding. Two weeks into this stalemate over the repatriation of U.S. POWs held by Pathet Lao, between the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese on one side, and the United States on the other, the United States announced that

There are no more prisoners in Southeast Asia. They are all dead.⁹

Furthermore, one news report quoted a United States government spokesman, who stated,

Rumors that there were hundreds of U.S. Servicemen held in Laotian prison camps, does the families [of the missing] a disservice.¹⁰

These statements were made notwithstanding the eighty men cited by Henry Kissinger held by the North Vietnamese, and notwithstanding the fact the no U.S. POWs held by Pathet Lao forces have ever been repatriated. Clearly, both of the above United States Government statements were demonstrably false; they were designed—one can only speculate—to persuade the media that information with regard to prisoners still alive in Southeast Asia had no foundation whatsoever, and furthermore, only compounded the emotional anxiety of anxious and grieving family members. The

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Associated Press dispatch, Saigon, South Vietnam, March 26, 1973.

⁹ Statement issued by the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1973.

¹⁰ United Press International dispatch, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1973.

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fact of the matter is that the Pathet Lao publicly admitted to holding U.S. POWs in Laos, and Kissinger implicitly agreed when he said

American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi.¹¹

Yet the U.S. government abandoned any attempt to bring them back home, by announcing "they are all dead."¹²

THE KISSINGER HAND-CARRIED LETTER

Five days after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, Kissinger hand-carried a letter, dated February 1, 1973 to the North Vietnamese Prime Minister a letter which detailed the Administration's interpretation of Article 21 of the Paris Peace Accords, which pledged that the United States would

contribute to the healing the wounds of war and post-reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The letter, and the commitments it implied, were not revealed even to the highest-ranking Senators and members of Congress. The text of the letter follows:

The President wishes to inform the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the principles which will govern United States participation in the postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam. As indicated in Article 21 of The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, the United States undertakes this participation in accordance with its traditional policies. These principles are as follows:

- 1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.
- 2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of \$3.25 billion of grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties. This estimate is subject to revision and to detailed discussion between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
- 3) The United States will propose to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the establishment of a United States-North Vietnamese Joint Economic Commission within 30 days from the date of this message.
- 4) The function of this Commission will be to develop programs for the United States contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam. This United States contribution will be based upon such factors as:

¹¹ "Pathet Lao Says No To Truce, No American POWs," *The Washington Post*, February 18, 1973.

¹² Statement issued by the Department of Defense, Washington D.C. April 13, 1973.

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a) The needs of North Vietnam arising from the dislocation of war;

b) The requirements for postwar reconstruction in the agricultural and industrial sectors of North Vietnam's economy.

5) The Joint Economic Commission will have an equal number of representatives from each side. It will agree upon a mechanism to administer the program which will constitute the United States contribution to the reconstruction of North Vietnam. The Commission will attempt to complete this agreement within 60 days after its establishment.

6) The two members of the Commission will function on the principle of respect for each others sovereignty, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. The offices of the Commission will be located at a place to be agreed upon by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

7) The United States considers that the implementation of the foregoing principles will promote economic, trade and other relations between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will contribute to insuring a stable and lasting peace in Indochina. These principles accord with the spirit of Chapter VIII of The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973.

UNDERSTANDING REGARDING ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

It is understood that the recommendations of the Joint Economic Commission mentioned in the Presidents note to the Prime Minister will be implemented by each member in accordance with its own constitutional provisions.

NOTE REGARDING OTHER FORMS OF AID

In regard to other forms of aid, United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs could fall in the range of 1 to 1.5 billion dollars depending on food and other commodity needs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.¹³

It is unfortunate that the North Vietnamese did not understand the important Constitutional caveat inherent in the Kissinger hand-carried letter. Any funds paid to the North Vietnamese, or any funds to purchase any aid given to the North Vietnamese, would have to be appropriated by the United States Congress.

But Congress knew nothing of the Kissinger commitments. Had key Senators and Congressmen been told of the policy, they would have had the opportunity to tell the President that voting for billions of dollars of aid or funds for North Vietnam would have been an admission of culpability. The United States had failed in its mission to protect South Vietnam from the totalitarian Communist regime in the North.

The suffering, brutality, death and dehumanization borne by the Vietnamese people since the war is proof that the American goals in Vietnam were correct. However, the failure of the

¹³ The U.S. State Department Bulletin, June 27, 1977, pp.75-76.

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civilian leadership to achieve those goals had to do more with the collapse of political leadership in the United States than with the morality of the goals. Congress realized full well, if Kissinger did not, that the soothing word "reconstruction" actually meant "reparations." The American people would never pay reparations when no crime had been committed. Congress saw Kissinger's plan as a betrayal and an admission of guilt.

However, there is no doubt that the North Vietnamese concluded that the President's emissary had pledged billions of dollars in reparations to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Two weeks after the date of the letter delivered by Kissinger, the United States and the North Vietnamese announced the formation of the Joint Economic Commission, in fulfillment of paragraph (3) of that letter. The announcement, according to one news report stated that

The United States and North Vietnam will create a Joint Economic Commission to oversee rebuilding of the war-torn country with U.S. dollars; the two sides announced Wednesday. A communique issued by the White House and Hanoi on four days of talks by President Nixon's envoy, Henry A. Kissinger, and North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi listed no specific figures for U.S. post war aid.¹⁴

Negotiations were underway between Kissinger and the North Vietnamese to implement specific aspects of the Kissinger letter. However, the White House was beginning to understand the depth of the political problems it was going to have with its aid plan. One news report from Paris stated the U.S. negotiators refused to acknowledge whether reparations to North Vietnam were being discussed, or the amounts which were being discussed. According to the report,

U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives met Monday to discuss American postwar reconstruction aid to the North Vietnamese...the American peace delegation declined to confirm the opening of the talks on President Nixon's plan for the postwar financing of North Vietnam's reconstruction...Nixon answered Congressional critics by saying aid money would come out of Defense and Agency for International Development funds instead of the domestic budget. The president said giving money to help North Vietnam rebuild its bombed country would contribute to lasting peace and stability in the area.¹⁵

In fact, U.S. reparations to North Vietnam were being discussed in Paris, France from April through June of 1973. The negotiations were extensive and detailed. A list of specific items was drawn up for the first year of U.S. aid. Among some of the items on the list:

700,000 square meters of prefabricated housing and warehouses; 200,000 metric tons of steel building supplies; 50,000 cubic meters of timber; 40 million meters of cloth; 2,000 metric tons of Rayon fibers; between 2,650 and 2,900 tractors, bulldozers and excavators; three repair plants for the equipment; 20,000 metric tons of steel tubes; 25-50 tug boats; 3 floating ports and 3 cranes, one floating 600

¹⁴ United Press International dispatch, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1973.

¹⁵ United Press International dispatch, Paris, France, March 7, 1973.

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metric tons of barges; 570 trucks; 10 diesel locomotives; between 250-500 freight cars; 10,000 metric tons of rail; 10 6-25 ton pile hammers; 15,000 metric tons of synthetic rubber; 10,000 metric tons of caustic soda; 10,000 metric tons of steel; 5,000 metric tons of steel alloy; 2,500 metric tons of copper; 3,000 metric tons of high tension copper cable; 50,000 metric tons of coal; 1 million meters of tire cord; among other specific aid negotiated.

The negotiators had even drawn up a larger list of aid items to be given to North Vietnam as reparations by the United States from 1973 thru to 1978.

Political problems, however, were working against the Administrations plans to aid North Vietnam. One news report three weeks after the United States and North Vietnam announced the creation of the Joint Economic Commission illustrates the problems the senior Administration officials were encountering on Capitol Hill,

Secretary of State William P. Rogers Wednesday refused to rule out reconstruction aid to North Vietnam by presidential order if Congress fails to appropriate the funds...Rogers three times called for restraint by members of Congress in making adverse comments on the aid issue, at least until American troops are out of Vietnam and all American prisoners are released [emphasis added]¹⁶

One other news report stated:

Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Tuesday the Nixon administration will seek prior authority from Congress for any economic assistance program to Vietnam...in a Monday session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Rogers asked that the controversy over aid be kept to a minimum for the next month or so. Such a recess in debate would allow the release of American prisoners to be completed and would also provide time for the administration to formulate its proposals...While the North Vietnamese did not list a number of prisoners they wanted freed, *The New York Times* reported from Saigon today that American sources set the demand at 5,000 [emphasis added]¹⁷

In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese reported by *The New York Times*.

The number of prisoners which *The New York Times* reported that the United States government demanded from the North Vietnamese—5,000—correlates with the statement of a former employee of the United States government. This former National Security Agency (NSA) employee said in a sworn affidavit that the North Vietnamese repatriated only 15% of the U.S. servicemen they held in captivity. In other words, according to this source, the North Vietnamese kept 85% of the American POWs who were alive after March 28, 1973.

¹⁶ Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1973.

¹⁷ Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., March 8, 1973.

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"A SOVIET, A CHINESE AND A VIETNAMESE GREETED THE PILOTS..."

Some evidence suggests that a number of nonrepatriated Americans may have been turned over to Soviet control, and subsequently transported to the Soviet Union. A former U.S. military serviceman, assigned to the NSA provided the Minority Staff sworn affidavits that during the Vietnam war he "tracked" a certain number of U.S. servicemen from their point of capture to their release to the Soviets for debriefings by the both North Vietnamese and Communist Laotians officials. This has not been corroborated, but information provided to the Minority Staff indicates that American POWs may have been sent to the Soviet Union for interrogation and subsequent use of their special skills.

Indeed, a declassified CIA report gives graphic details of a debriefing incident in Vinh Phu Province involving a group of U.S. pilots captured in Vietnam. Soviet personnel were present at the debriefing. At the conclusion of the debriefing, the U.S. POWs were turned over to a new set of guards who evidently wore distinct uniforms, suggesting a different kind of custody.

A review of declassified documents asserts that the phosphate plant described was a site for transfer of U.S. POWs to Soviet custody. Declassified portions of the CIA document available to the Minority Staff are as follows.

Report No. CS-311/04439-71
Date Dist-10 June 1971

Country: North Vietnam

DOI: 1965-June 1967

Subject: Preliminary debriefing site for captured U.S. Pilots in Vinh Phu Province and presence of Soviet Communist and Chinese Personnel at the site

1. A preliminary debriefing point for U.S. pilots shot down over Vinh Phu Province, North Vietnam (NVN), was located at the Lam Thao district, Vinh Phu Province. Two U.S. pilots were taken to the debriefing point on one occasion in 1963; eight in 1966; and unknown number in 1967. The prisoners were escorted to the site by personnel of the Armed Public Security Forces (APSF), and students from a nearby school served as perimeter guards. Each time prisoners were brought to the site they rode in an open car of Chinese origin resembling an American jeep. Some of the escort guards rode in a lead car and others rode in two cars following the prisoners. Upon their arrival at the plant, the guards lined up, forming a corridor through which the pilots entered the building. At this point a Soviet, a Chinese, and a Vietnamese greeted the pilots and led them into the building. The pilots usually remained in the building for several hours. When they emerged they had changed from uniforms into civilian clothing. [deleted] said [deleted] had told him the foreigners were Soviet and Communist Chinese. Soviet personnel had been stationed at the plant since its construction in 1963, but in 1965 the number of Soviets was reduced to three or four, and it remained at that level as of June 1967. About 20 Communist Chinese personnel arrived at the plant in 1966 and there were still about 20 there as of June 1967 as far as [deleted] knew, the Soviet and Communist Chinese personnel got along well.

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along well.

2. After shaking hands with the Soviet and Chinese, the prisoners were led to a different vehicle from the one which brought them to the site. They were escorted from the plant by a different set of guards who wore yellow and white uniforms and were armed with rifles and pistols. [Deleted] did not know the destination of the prisoners.

In a previous chapter, U.S. government intelligence cables, and diplomatic and other official memorandum, and correspondence showed that U.S. prisoners were seen being transferred to Communist China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War. The Korean War precedents give verisimilitude to the assertions received by the Minority Staff, that U.S. POWs were sent and kept in the Soviet Union; although the available evidence is not yet conclusive.

"PRISONERS RETURNED AFTER FULFILLMENT OF THE PROMISE"

United States government officials have been told by North Vietnamese officials that the North Vietnamese government was still holding U.S. POWs well after the conclusion of OPERATION HOMECOMING. Lt. Col. Stuart A. Harrington, who worked on the POW/MIA issue as a military intelligence and liaison officer with the North Vietnamese and Peoples Republic of China from 1973 to 1975, stated that North Vietnamese officials told him U.S. POWs would be returned when the reparations that Kissinger promised to the North Vietnamese were paid. In his book, Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam, 1973-1975, Harrington wrote:

U.S. casualties under North Vietnamese control would be accounted for and prisoners returned after fulfillment of the promise. [emphasis added]¹⁴

The North Vietnamese--apparently--were waiting for the reparations that Kissinger had promised them, before the vast majority of American POWs reported by *The New York Times* were to be repatriated. Doubtless the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao held the prisoners back as human collateral. It should be noted that the 5,000 POW figure cited by *Times* is slightly less than twice that of the United States official POW and MIA totals. However, it is possible that the 5,000 figure reflected the total number of individuals believed to be held by Communist forces in Southeast Asia at that time. This total would have included the total number of covert or "Black Cowboy" POWs and MIAs who were not factored into the official United States government MIA and POW casualty figures for the entire Second Indochina war throughout Southeast Asia.

The North Vietnamese knew well enough that the internal political dynamics of the peace movement in the United States had forced the United States to the bargaining table in a weakened condition. Through this same political network, they clearly saw that it was unlikely the U.S.

¹⁴ Stuart A. Harrington, Peace With Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam 1973-1975 (Novato: Presidio Press, 1983).

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Congress would vote for billions in reparations.

The political resistance to aid to North Vietnam grew, for among other reasons, because of numerous news reports that detailed North Vietnamese torture of repatriated U.S. POWs:

Reports from returning prisoners of war of torture and mistreatment by Hanoi [which] have stirred new attacks in Congress against U.S. aid for North Vietnam. Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said the torture stories have not changed his own position that aid to Hanoi would help ensure the peace. But, he added, he does not know what effect the stories will have on getting aid through Congress. "Even before this it looked difficult," stated Rep. Joel T. Broyhill, (R-VA), who said the stories convince me that not a cent of American aid money should be spent on rehabilitating a country that is apparently run by savages.²⁰

On April 6, 1973, the United States Senate voted

to bar any aid to North Vietnam unless Congress specifically approves.²¹

The 88-3 roll call vote in the Senate, combined with the general political sentiment in Congress, indicated there was very little chance that Congress was going to vote for the Administrations request for aid to North Vietnam.

The final death-knell for the payment of reparations to North Vietnam occurred a week later when

Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert...served notice he will introduce a proposal to prohibit any U.S. aid for Hanoi. The Louisiana Democrat also said justification for President Nixon's request for \$13 billion aid to Southeast Asia so far is either nebulous or nonexistent.²²

It was the very next day after Chairman Herbert announced his intention to introduce a proposal to prohibit aid for Hanoi, that the United States made its definitive statement that there were no more Americans alive in Southeast Asia and that "rumors" did the families a disservice.²³

Several weeks later, in June, 1973, the American Embassy, Saigon, sent a cable to the Secretary of State, in Washington, D.C. which documents one of the attempts to cover up evidence that the U.S. Government abandoned U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia:

Subject: PW REPORT BY NVA DEFECTOR
REP: STATE 112133

1. NVA Rallier/Defector Nguyen Thanh Son was surfaced by GVN to press June 8 in Saigon. In follow on interview with AP, UPI and NBC American correspondents, questions elicited information that

²⁰ Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1973.

²¹ Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1973.

²² Associated Press dispatch, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1973.

²³ United Press International dispatch, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1973.

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he had seen six prisoners whom he believed were Americans who had not yet been released. American officer present at interview requested news services to play down details: AP mention was consistent with embargo request, while UPI and NBC after talk with Embassy press officer omitted item entirely from their stories.

2. Details on rallier's account being reported SEPTTEL through military channels by BRIGHT LIGHT message today. WHITE HOUSE.

This cable appears to be an active step on the part of the U.S. government to insure there would be no media reports of American servicemen still being held captive in Southeast Asia, since such reports would have conflicted with the United States government's policy statement that there were no U.S. POWs left in Southeast Asia, because "they are all dead."

In a September, 1978 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Special Committee on Southeast Asia, Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) asked former Under Secretary of State Philip Habib about the existence of any

agreements we are not aware of, secret memorandum that this committee is not aware of?

Mr. Habib responded to Congressman Gilman's question in this fashion:

There is no agreement or secret memorandum which this Committee is not aware of in this respect. There were, as the Committee is aware, some letters and exchanges. With respect to those letters, I think the committee has been informed of the content of those letters and exchanges.

Mr. Frank McCloskey (D-IN) then stated:

With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, this committee asked the Secretary of State and you the same question before we went to Hanoi last December. You did not advise us of that secret [Kissinger hand-carried] letter and we discovered its existence only when we got to Hanoi. We didn't have any idea the letter existed. We asked you in November if there were any secret agreements that we should know about before we went to Hanoi and we were not advised by you or the Secretary of State of the letters existence or of the \$3.25 billion figure which we later ascertained.

Mr. Habib, in response to Mr. McCloskey's question, stated:

That [the letter] is not an agreement. It never developed into an agreement. I didn't know of the existence of the letter...either.

Given the intensity of the negotiations which both the United States and the North Vietnamese undertook specifically at the time to implement the contents of the secret letter, including the creation of the Joint Economic Commission and extensive negotiations, it is hard to accept Mr. Habib's assertion that the letter did not constitute—at least as far as Kissinger represented to the North Vietnamese—a secret executive agreement.

THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR

The House Committee's final report stated:

After the war, when the provisions for gaining an accounting failed to be followed, the State Department tried other means to achieve that end. It tried government-to-government appeals, demands, and protests. It enlisted the assistance of international humanitarian organizations, sought the aid and support of third-party nations and the pressure of world opinion. Short of recommencing the war there were few remaining alternatives on the diplomatic level. North Vietnam was already under a total embargo, and when South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fell to Communist forces in 1975, South Vietnam and Cambodia were soon included in the embargo.

Perhaps if Congress and the American public had known of the existence of the secret letter, perhaps if Congress had been given a full accounting of the information on MIAs possessed by the U.S. government, instead of a cover-up, then a concrete plan for implementing the provisions for gaining accounting of captives as described in the Paris Peace Accords, might have been implemented. But there was no way that Congress, with honor, could be blackmailed into accepting the payment of reparations with its tacit implication of surrender to a ruthless Communist regime.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

9 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, US Army
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War
and Missing in Action

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in
North Korea from 1975 to 1982

REFERENCE: Memo for the DDI in Colonel Schlatter,
dtd 19 Feb 88, Same Subject

1. In response to your request, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] three separate reports of
such sightings, which are attached:

- o The first report, dated April 1980, indicates that [REDACTED] sighted two Americans in August 1986 on the outskirts of P'yongyang. [REDACTED] about 10 military pilots captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea.
- o The second report, also dated in April 1980, apparently describes the same incident [REDACTED]
- o In the third report, dated March 1988, [REDACTED] indicated sighting as many as 11 Caucasians, possibly American prisoners from the Korean war, in the fall of 1979 on a collective farm north of P'yongyang. [REDACTED]

PROLOGUE TO PART II

The original plan of the Minority Staff was to review the U.S. government's handling and evaluation of "live-sighting reports." These reports are first-hand narratives by witnesses who believe that they have seen American military personnel alive in various locations in Southeast Asia. They provide tantalizing glimpses of POW/MIAs who then vanish into the mist of a bureaucratic nightmare at DOD. For example, American POW/MIAs from the Korean War were reportedly seen alive as late as 1982 in the censored CIA document (obtained under a FOIA request) dated 1988 which is reproduced on the opposite page. There is no reason to believe that this is the last report on U.S. POW/MIAs held in North Korea.

For Vietnam, the U.S. Government has at least 1,400 such reports, including reports that have been received up until the publication of this report in May, 1991. In addition, the U.S. Government has received thousands and thousands of second-hand reports--accounts often full of vivid detail, such as "my brother told me he saw 11 American POWs being transported in a truck at such and such a place."

Yet, amazingly, the U.S. Government has not judged a single one of these thousands of reports to be credible. Instead, the policy enunciated by an official statement of the U.S. Government in 1973 was that "There are no more prisoners in Southeast Asia. They are all dead." That policy--in the face of extensive evidence that all U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia were not dead--evolved to the U.S. government's present policy that there is no credible evidence that there are any U.S. POWs still alive in all of Indochina. In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first-hand live-sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In reviewing hundreds of the raw intelligence files on the 1,400 reports, Minority Staff investigators found a predisposition by DOD evaluators to ignore corroborative evidence, and has little interest to follow-up what normal searchers would consider as good leads. Many cases, of course, were quite properly disposed of.

Yet often DOD evaluators seemed more intent upon upholding the validity of the "no credible evidence" policy.

It is contrary to common sense that all of the reports--all 1,400--are spurious, especially in the light of such obvious contradictions as the actual return of the unfortunate Private Robert Garwood in 1979.

PROLOGUE TO PART II

Garwood was a battle casualty taken into custody by the North Vietnamese under fire. However, his court martial as a collaborator and deserter solved two problems for DOD: By bringing up the charges DOD sought to redefine his case as a voluntary expatriate and therefore not technically a prisoner--and it enabled DOD evaluators to dismiss fully 64% of the live-sighting reports as sightings of Garwood. Since Garwood reported that he had been moved from prison to prison, the faulty logic of DOD seemed to demand that any report from the prisons he cited must have been a sighting of Garwood. The policy that there was "no credible evidence" of living prisoners made it necessary to assume that other U.S. prisoners in those prisons could not and did not exist.

Garwood was convicted of one count of simple assault on a fellow POW, one count of aiding the enemy by acting as a translator, interpreter, and interrogator, one count of wearing black pajamas--the enemy uniform--and one count of transporting an AK-47 (unloaded) during a patrol. Whether these convictions added up to meaningful collaboration with the enemy or not, it was never proven that he was a voluntary deserter. Nevertheless the living proof that the "no credible evidence" policy was not correct, thoroughly discredited the policy.

Convenient as the Garwood case was for DOD, the embarrassment still remained. Garwood was alive. There had been a live-sighting report on him in 1973 after DOD had publicly issued the "they are all dead" policy. Indeed, documents and witnesses available to the Minority Staff show that CIA and DIA knew of Garwood's location, as well as other so-called U.S. deserters in Vietnamese custody, after 1973.

And these reports of Garwood, obviously, proved to be correct. Since Garwood was alive in Indochina from 1973 to 1979, DOD policy was salvaged to some degree by his court martial. As a "collaborator" he may have been in North Vietnamese custody in 1973, but he no longer fit the definition of "prisoner." Nevertheless, Garwood, upon his return, reported seeing another presumed deserter, Earl C. Weatherman, alive in 1977. He stated also that a third presumed deserter, McKinley Nolan, was also alive after 1973. It may be assumed that Garwood was not reporting a live-sighting of Garwood in these cases.

Indeed, a list has circulated among POW/MIA families purporting to show that 20 U.S. personnel listed as deserters, or AWOL, were left in North Vietnamese custody after OPERATION HOMECOMING, the 1973 prisoner exchange. Four others are listed as disappearing under unexplained or unusual circumstances. The Minority Staff takes no position on the validity of this list, but it does note that almost all of the individuals cited appear on a DIA alphabetic list entitled "U.S. Casualties in South East Asia," dated 2/26/80, but are conspicuously absent from a similar DIA list dated 8/22/84.

Garwood stated publicly upon his return as well as to Committee investigators when questioned that he had seen at least thirty U.S. POWs off loading from a box car in Vietnam in the late 1970s. In the light of what appears to be a compelling need on the part of DOD to uphold the "no credible evidence" policy, the Minority Staff believes that every live-sighting should be pursued vigorously without prejudgment. Even if one POW who was detained in South East Asia is still alive, then no resources of the U.S. Government should be spared to locate him and effect his return to the United States if he so desires.

PROLOGUE TO PART II

In recent days, the Government of North Vietnam has announced that it is willing to open its territory to relatives to search for any POW/MIAs or their remains. While that is an encouraging development, DOD should reciprocate with a similar gesture. DOD should open its territory too. The files of live-sighting reports and second-hand reports should be made available to families of the POW/MIAs and to any qualified investigator, particularly to Senators, Members of Congress, and their staffs.

Such openness has not, up to this time, characterized the operations of DOD's Special Office of POW/MIA Affairs. On February 12, the Director of that office, Col. Millard A. Peck wrote a letter of resignation to his superior decrying the mind-set of cover-up and the policies of the U.S. POW/MIA interagency group, which have prevented a vigorous search for POW/MIAs who might still be living.

Observers described Colonel Peck as a man who had accepted the position with high motives and a sense of deep dedication. Yet his letter shows that he felt that he could no longer fulfill the demands of duty, honor, and integrity under the policies which he was asked to implement.

Nevertheless, he did not rush to seek publicity for himself. Colonel Peck's resignation first became known and was discussed publicly at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in early April, but his memorandum of resignation, written February 12, 1991 did not become public until May, 1991.

The verbatim text of the colonel's letter appears at the end of this report. It is in itself a sufficient commentary on the findings of this report.

Colonel Peck confirms that a "cover-up" has been in progress. He speaks of a "mindset to debunk"—that is, to discredit witnesses rather than to ascertain the truth of their statements. He says that there was no effort to pursue "live sightings." He states that "any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago." He also criticizes the U.S. government's treatment of the families and friends of the POW/MIAs.

These statements should be evaluated in the light of Colonel Peck's long career of faithful service in the U.S. Army, including three combat tours in Vietnam, for which he was awarded numerous medals of gallantry, including the nation's second-highest award, the Distinguished Service Cross. These are serious charges put forth by a man who knows their seriousness. Moreover, he is one of the few who have intimate knowledge of the way the U.S. Government's POW/MIA policy operates.

Finally, the Minority Staff notes that Colonel Peck's conclusions are remarkably similar to the conclusions which were contained in the Minority Staff's Interim Report on U.S. POW/MIA in Southeast Asia published in October, 1990. The staff arrived at these conclusions independently, having worked for nearly a year before Colonel Peck was appointed to the POW/MIA office. Our only acquaintance with him was during the few days in which his superiors allowed only Senator Grassley and staff to review live-sighting reports under strict constraints. Because of the atmosphere of tension surrounding these issues in the Executive Branch, our observations were limited to the fact that Colonel Peck was a competent professional acting according to his instructions. We now know in addition that he is a person of sound judgment and integrity.

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

The Department of Defense (DOD) has been gathering reports on live sightings of American prisoners since the United States became involved in the war in Southeast Asia. Live-sighting reports are defined as first-hand eye-witness accounts of a person or persons whom the witness believes to be an American POW or American POWs seen in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The DOD states that it has received in excess of 1,400 first-hand live-sighting reports since the end of the Second Indochina War (1955-1975). With the exception of a very small percentage of live-sighting reports that remain "unresolved," DOD has concluded that the vast majority of live-sighting reports do not pertain to any American POWs still in Southeast Asia. Given DOD's record of disproving these hundreds of live-sighting reports, there is little reason to assume that the few live sighting reports that are still "unresolved" will ever be determined by DOD to be valid eye-witness accounts of American POWs.

In the opinion of staff, many of the "resolved" live-sighting reports should be re-examined. There are numerous instances in which the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to explain away the validity of a report with a flawed or, at least, questionable analysis. Among the common explanations used by DIA to resolve live-sighting reports are the following: that a particular report in question is:

- 1) a fabrication;
- 2) a sighting of Soviet, Cuban, or other East bloc advisors;
- 3) a sighting of volunteers from Western countries working in Southeast Asia;
- 4) a pre-1979 sighting of Robert Garwood, the American POW who returned in 1979 and was, later, convicted of collaborating with the enemy;
- 5) a sighting of American civilians detained for various violations of the Vietnamese criminal code;
- 6) a sighting debunked or discredited—in other words, disregarded—because the source's statement was found to be inconsistent with information DOD considered to be factual; or,
- 7) an out-of-date sighting of POWs who were repatriated during OPERATION HOMECOMING (1973).

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

Many times such rationales are valid for particular reports; however, the same explanations are also used in a rigid, bureaucratic manner in order to resolve reports and close the files. Staff reviewed hundreds of classified and declassified live-sighting reports. In the opinion of staff, many live-sighting reports were closed prematurely and disregarded when minimal additional effort may have resolved the veracity of live-sighting reports.

In some instances, the analysis and conclusion that these sightings do not refer to American prisoners cannot be supported by the contents of the respective files. The findings, in these cases, were premature or, worse, could not be supported by the facts of the case. Moreover, DIA's analysis in a general sense reflects an approach by DOD that appears to be geared toward disproving each live-sighting report, rather than each report receiving, as proscribed by official DOD policy, the "necessary priority and resources based on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive."

Thus, DOD has been able to construct a rationale to discredit "officially" nearly each and every live-sighting report. Staff found instances where DOD merely excluded from its analysis certain details of a valid sighting, such as a source's statement about the number of POWs sighted, their physical condition, a description of the camp or cave they were held in, whether they were shackled, or, whether they were gesturing for food. By the exclusion of such corroborating details, the report could — under the convoluted DOD bureaucratic process — be labeled a fabrication. Furthermore, the exclusion of these details would not be known to anyone reading just the summary of the live-sighting report, or even by reading DOD's analysis of the report. Only by reading the "raw intelligence" can one learn such details.

DIA's greatest effort at corroborating a source's report is directed at the source's information about themselves, the source's description of the location of the live-sighting, and the source's explanation of how and when the sighting occurred. Great effort is not expended, however, to corroborate whether American POWs were in fact being held prisoner, or were working at or being transported through a particular location.

Any slight indicators of what DOD felt was an inconsistency in the source's description of the time, location, or circumstances of the sighting was used by DIA to erode, and therefore disprove the credibility of the source and/or the source's information. This lack of credibility of the source becomes the basis by which the source's live-sighting report is disregarded. It should also be noted that the debunking of such reports was not confined just to allegations of inconsistencies in the source's information; some live sighting accounts were dismissed for what, in the opinion of staff, seems to be dysfunctional analytical reasoning.

Once an analyst makes a conclusion, it seems to be cut in stone. In other words, the DIA is reluctant to change its conclusions concerning some individuals even when reliable evidence to the contrary is presented for review. Although it is obvious that the reliability of sources varies, it appears that DIA starts with the premise that every source is lying, and then works toward

¹ See Department of Defense "POW/MIA Fact Book," 1990.

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

substantiating that premise. A more positive procedure would be to make every possible effort to substantiate the information before setting it aside.

One example of DIA's debunking mentality is illustrated by the case of U.S. Navy pilot LCDR James E. Dooley.² Dooley was shot down, October 22, 1967, conducting a bombing run near Hanoi flying an A-4E aircraft. He crashed just south of Do Son, Haiphong Province, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Fellow pilots saw Dooley's aircraft after it was hit, watching it go down gradually until it hit about one mile offshore in the vicinity of Do Son. They did not see him eject from the aircraft. Limited observation by fellow pilots, weather, and the swiftness of the incident may have led to some confusion over whether or not Dooley survived the crash of his aircraft.

Dooley is officially listed as KIA-BNR. Dooley was not returned or accounted for during OPERATION HOMECOMING in 1973. In 1987, a North Vietnamese refugee was interviewed by U.S. intelligence personnel at a refugee camp. The refugee described the shootdown of an American jet aircraft he witnessed in 1968 while in the area of Do Son, Haiphong Province. According to the source, he saw the pilot bail out with a tri-colored parachute and try to swim out to sea to escape capture. The pilot fired a pistol, while swimming out to sea, at his pursuers before being captured. The refugee said, the captured pilot was stripped of his one-piece flight suit, placed in the sidecar of a motorcycle, driven across Do Son airfield and taken away by North Vietnamese officials to a waiting Chinese automobile.

An early DOD evaluation of the fisherman's information concluded the fisherman probably witnessed the shootdown of a Navy pilot named J. M. Hickerson, who was shot down two months after Dooley in the same general area of Dooley's shootdown. Hickerson was captured, and repatriated from North Vietnam in 1973.³

However, after OPERATION HOMECOMING, information that Dooley was alive began to surface. In 1973, a U.S. POW who had been repatriated said he saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi. Two Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate. Finally, a Communist propaganda photograph of captured U.S. pilots in Hanoi, dated after Dooley was shot down, shows a partial profile of a person that strongly resembles Dooley.

In April 1989, former POW Hickerson, in a written statement, described the details of his parachute landing and capture. Hickerson was disturbed that the fisherman's eyewitness account of the shoot down of an American Navy pilot was wrongly attributed to his shoot down. In his statement, Hickerson pointed out that he landed on the inside of the peninsula at Do Son, and therefore, he could not have been swimming out to sea when he was captured, as the fisherman described. Furthermore, Hickerson wrote, he did not fire his pistol before capture, as the fisherman

² After Dooley was shot down he was promoted to his current rank, Lieutenant commander, which was shortly before the U.S. Navy declared him dead.

³ Message, "From: JCRC, Barbers Pt., HI, To: COMNAVMLPERSCOM, date/time group 101802Z," April 1987, which references an earlier Cable, "From: JCRC, Bangkok, Thailand, date/time group 151000Z," January 1987.

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

described. Hickerson stated that his parachute was all white, not tri-colored as the fisherman stated. Hickerson further stated that when he was shot down he wore a Marine utility uniform, consisting of pants and shirt, not a one piece flight suit as the fisherman described. Finally, Hickerson was taken to prison riding on the back of a bicycle, not in a car as the fisherman described.

Despite these sharply contrasting differences between the actual events of Hickerson's capture, and the fisherman's description of the shoot-down he witnessed, DOD refused to change its original conclusion that the captive witnessed by the fisherman was Hickerson.⁴ The fisherman may indeed have witnessed a capture, but the description of events more closely resembles the capture of Dooley, not Hickerson. In other words, a significant question remains: was Hickerson's shoot-down correlated to the fisherman's live-sighting report—despite the significant factual discrepancies between the two events—only because Hickerson was repatriated, and therefore the fisherman's live-sighting could be "resolved"?

In a message dated April 10, 1987, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center at Barbers Point sent an evaluation of the Dooley file to the National Security Council (Col. Childress), noting Dooley was listed in a "presumptive status of dead, body not recovered."⁵ The message says that Dooley's case was presented to North Vietnamese officials in August 1984 as a case under consideration during a POW/MIA technical meeting in Hanoi. What was the status of the JCRC inquiry in 1984? Were they looking for remains, or were they trying to ascertain the fate of a person believed to have been a POW in Hanoi's custody and not accounted for?

As with a number of cases in JCRC's files, there are conflicts. It is not known how many potential cases of mismatch in casualty incident information there are in DOD files. The Dooley case is but one example of questionable analysis of live-sighting information by DOD of unaccounted-for airmen and soldiers from the Second Indochina War.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Beyond the problem of flawed, or questionable analysis are more fundamental problems. Staff has identified numerous weaknesses in the methodology and procedures for collecting and analyzing information from refugees. These weaknesses may be found in the procedures for soliciting the information, follow-up interviews, mobilization of adequate manpower, weak linguistic capabilities, the improper methodology for identification of sources, and the failure in many cases to obtain native language statements from sources during initial contact.

The primary responsibility for collecting this information originally rested with the JCRC, a Joint Chiefs of Staff organization within DOD. Presently, that responsibility rests with DIA. After the fall of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) government in 1975, JCRC offices were stationed within Thailand to carry out this mission.

⁴ Cable, "From: JCRC Barbers Pt., HI, To: COMNAVJLPERSON, time/date group 251800Z," July 1981.

⁵ The Navy issued a DD Form 1300, 12/4/73, changing Dooley's status from missing to dead, body not recovered.

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

In Thailand, the procedure for collecting POW information was as follows: JCRC officials, depending on the availability of resources, traveled to various refugee centers to collect information on purported live-sightings of U.S. POWs within Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. At each refugee camp, JCRC officers would make announcements in the camps requesting that any refugees who have knowledge of American POWs should report, at a certain time, to a certain location, for debriefing. On occasion, volunteer workers at refugee camps, when initially processing the arriving refugees, would also elicit such information, and report it to JCRC.

The problem with this procedure is that it depends too much upon the initiative of frightened, confused refugees, who have been traumatized by their experience of fleeing their country, and are deeply suspicious of any governmental authority, even one that is trying to help them. The practice of making a general announcement—often referred to contemptuously by government officials as the "cattle call," with the subsequent interviews as the "round-up"—could easily be seen as a threat or danger signal to anyone who had contact with American POWs; contrariwise, it might suggest to a refugee with a manipulative mind that providing information, even if false, might be a way to get ahead in the refugee resettlement system. In the first case, opportunities to get valid reports are lost through fear; in the second, false reports are encouraged.

A more effective method is the so-called "canvassing method." Each refugee is asked questions about possible POW sightings as part of their initial refugee processing, thereby making it unnecessary for a prospective informant to stand out publicly, and lowering the threshold of resistance to discussing the topic. However, the canvassing method requires that JCRC personnel be stationed within easy reach of the refugee camps, a practice which was not followed.

Another failure in collecting information from refugees involves follow-ups to initial interviews. Follow-up procedures require JCRC officials to conduct interviews once a source indicates having information pertaining to American POWs still in Southeast Asia. The information would then be sent to DIA for analysis and follow-up interviews, if necessary. Originally, DIA provided to the JCRC staff additional questions to be asked; however, since JCRC did not have adequate manpower to cover the number of refugees pouring out of Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), and Vietnam, this procedure was not followed.

In excess of 300,000 Asian refugees fled from these countries; yet JCRC staff never exceeded thirty-four officials in number on-site in Southeast Asia. The cumbersome nature of this procedure impeded the timeliness of the follow-up interviews. As a result, the information collected was dated and, therefore, its usefulness was diminished.

Limited manpower and the methodology used for both initial and follow-up interviews were major weaknesses in JCRC's collection procedures. Initially, this limitation was especially true of the shortage of trained linguists. Indeed, DOD recognized this problem and sought to increase manpower. In 1987, DIA groups were established throughout Southeast Asia to collect POW information first-hand. This effort was code-named "STONE BEACH." The program added greatly to the quality, quantity and timeliness of information provided by the refugees.

LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS

The STONEY BEACH program enabled subsequent debriefings of refugees to be conducted in a more comprehensive manner. Unfortunately, once information was obtained, no effort was spared to utilize other intelligence methods available to corroborate selected content of these live-sighting reports.

"BLACK" OPERATIONS

Notwithstanding numerous government documents available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), documents in public archives, and published works, most of the extensive covert military operations throughout Southeast Asia between 1955 and 1975 remain classified. As a result, DOD's list of U.S. personnel lost while on covert, or "black" military operations in Southeast Asia (i.e., Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, and the southern provinces of the Peoples Republic of China) is highly suspect.

As a result, this precludes a presentation of evidence that the lists of POW/MIA and KIA-BNR from Southeast Asia are skewed as a result of withholding of casualty counts from black operations. But the continued effort by the U.S. government to keep records of these operations classified, or to withhold information related to these operations under FOIA exemptions tends to indicate information on U.S. casualties related to these activities may not be accurate. An early 1970s Senate hearing on military operations on Southeast Asia was given classified information on losses from classified operations in Southeast Asia, but that information remains classified and is not included in this report.

Needless to say, due to the covert nature of classified operations, they must remain secure even when personnel involved disappear. According to sources interviewed for this report, if an individual on a covert "black" military or intelligence operation is lost i.e. either captured MIA or KIA-BNR--he might be declared dead immediately (KIA-BNR); or he might be listed MIA, followed by a presumptive finding of-death issued after 12 months elapsed. According to these sources, benign cover stories were sometimes prepared to explain the disappearance of individuals lost on covert or classified missions in Southeast Asia to reflect a MIA or KIA-BNR status. If such a cover story remains as the official account of such casualties, then it would impact on any future evaluations of an individual casualty file because the official case file contains erroneous information as to circumstances or location of the casualty.

One source interviewed alleges that, in order to protect the existence of some classified operations conducted during the Second Indochina War, U.S. casualties from these operations may have been explained away as training accidents in an entirely different geographic location (e.g., Thailand or Okinawa), or as battle losses in areas of South Vietnam even though the loss occurred in another Indochina location (e.g., Laos, Cambodia, or North Vietnam). If casualty information has been manipulated, as alleged by some people, to protect the secrecy of special operations, then what guarantee is there of any oversight of accountability for U.S. personnel who were declared KIA-BNR or MIA from such covert operations?

"BLACK" OPERATIONS

Due to the classified nature of these covert or special warfare missions, there exist no easily accessible records of those involved in these missions; therefore, "presumptive findings of death" might be based upon faulty data in such individual case files. Or, if the review boards for individual casualty cases for persons lost during classified operations in Southeast Asia had access to the true circumstances of the loss, then they might be able to make an absolute finding of death in some cases rather than prolonging the agony of the survivors by publishing faulty findings based on circumstances contrived to conceal covert operations.

In order to arrive at a true accounting for U.S. personnel from "black" operations in Southeast Asia, the following fundamental questions must be answered:

- 1) When did the United States begin covert operations in Southeast Asia?
- 2) Which U.S. agencies or military departments participated in such operations?
- 3) How many U.S. citizens served in Southeast Asia on classified operations during those years?
- 4) What were the losses of personnel in these operations?
- 5) Where did the losses occur?
- 6) What efforts have been made to account for those persons who failed to return from the classified missions?

The extent of United States covert operations in Southeast Asia identifiable through nonclassified, or declassified sources indicates a large number of U.S. military and civilian personnel were lost on these missions. DOD has publicly stated, after release of this investigation's Interim Report last October, all personnel lost on covert missions during the Second Indochina War are on the public casualty lists and that there is no secret list of casualties from covert operations in Southeast Asia.

However, sources interviewed by staff indicate otherwise. Are the public versions of these lists accurate as to the time, date, place, and status of the individuals engaged in classified operations when lost? Are survivors from classified operations the source of live-sighting reports of American POWs in Laos? There is reason to question DOD further on this problem of losses related to classified or covert operations in Southeast Asia.

One case in point is the combat loss of a U.S. Air Force communications/navigation site located on top of Phou Pha Thi, Sam Neua Province, Laos, known as Site 85.

Site 85 provided the Air Force with all-weather capabilities for bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, North Vietnam. Its primary electronic navigation system was known by the acronym TACAN. The site was identified with a nearby classified landing strip operated under CIA covert

"BLACK" OPERATIONS

funding and known as Lima Site 85. The former Air Force TACAN site on Phou Pha Thi is generally referred to as "Site 85."

The site was classified, its mission classified, and the circumstances of these March 1968 battle casualties remained classified for many years. Even today, much of the information related to Site 85's equipment, purpose, effectiveness, and battle loss is still classified.

Site 85 was built in 1967, over the objections of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, and manned by a handpicked team of Air Force technicians in 1968. The Air Force technicians for Site 85, listed as Lockheed Aircraft Systems employees on paper, had been discharged from the military and were paid through Lockheed. The Air Force promised that their service credit would be restored once their classified mission was completed. This cover was necessary to avoid violating the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Peace Accords for Laos prohibiting foreign military presence in Laos.

Site 85 was attacked by Pathet Lao forces March 10, 11, 1968. Eleven U.S. Air Force personnel were lost when the site was overrun by Communist forces. Except for four personnel lifted out by an Air America helicopter during the battle, the remaining eleven personnel manning the site that day are officially listed KIA-BNR.

Almost immediately after the attack, the Thai and Hmong indigenous forces which provided security to the site, were ordered to destroy it with heavy weapons fire before retreating from the mountain top on March 11. These U.S. sponsored, CIA led indigenous guerrilla troops carried out their orders. To insure the complete destruction of the site, American A-1 aircraft in Laos attacked the site with rocket and machine gun fire.

After the successful Communist attack on the mountain site, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos declared the eleven missing Air Force personnel dead. No U.S. bodies were recovered or, for the most part, none identifiable with this group were seen after the attack. Finally, U.S. jet fighters were brought in from out of country to finish the destruction of the mountain site with bombs and rockets. On March 12, 1968, the U.S. indigenous guerrilla force from the mountain site were all accounted for at a rendezvous point. They had no Site 85 survivors with them.¹

However, the Thai sergeant in charge of the indigenous guerrilla force guarding Site 85 told Committee staff that three of the Air Force technicians at the TACAN site were taken prisoner by the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao attacking force. He gave this information to American intelligence officers in 1968.

A review of POW live-sighting documents, declassified under FOIA rules and released in 1978, contain reports that three American prisoners were brought to a village near Site 85 by North Vietnamese troops about the time of the attack on Site 85. Documents from these files also refer to Americans held in the caves near Site 85, while other caves in Sam Neua were used by Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, and advisers from the Peoples Republic of China.

¹ According to a declassified CIA message, the heavy weapons fire and initial air attacks used to destroy the site were carried out on March 11, 1968.

'BLACK' OPERATIONS

Throughout the declassified POW files used by this staff, it was not uncommon to see reports that American prisoners were seen in these caves in Sam Neua Province. No bodies were ever recovered from Site 85 by U.S. forces, and there are no eyewitnesses to say that all eleven missing men were killed in the battle.

The Air Force officer in command of Site 85 and other similar activities in Laos was at the unit's Udorn, Thailand headquarters when Site 85 was overrun. According to him, he was told the destruction of Site 85 was not attempted until after there was reasonable evidence that no Americans were still alive on the mountain top.

But a declassified CIA report of the incident shows the destruction of the site by the indigenous guerrilla force and American A-1 aircraft was started almost immediately. The jet aircraft bombing of Site 85 on March 12 was a day or more sooner than what the former commander believed to be the truth. According to reports of the loss of Site 85, aerial photos taken on March 11 and 12, 1968 show bodies on the ground, but the bodies cannot be identified as non-Asian or, U.S. military personnel assigned to Site 85.

Then, in September 1990, an Air Force captain traveling in Laos while conducting research related to his doctoral study arranged to interview a Pathet Lao general officer. During the interview, the Lao officer claimed to have taken part in the March 10-11, 1968 assault on Site 85. The Lao officer told the Air Force captain that three U.S. Air Force technicians survived the Phou Pha Thi mountain battle and were turned over to North Vietnamese troops for transport to North Vietnam.¹

This information corroborates the Thai sergeant's report that three U.S. personnel were captured during the battle for Site 85.

In view of this most recent information on survivors from Site 85, the prisoner of war intelligence reports concerning three Americans seen at a village near Phou Pha Thi after the attack on Site 85 and other POW reports for that time period need to be reviewed and reevaluated to determine if any of them pertain to the Site 85 personnel. If three men survived the battle at Site 85, why haven't they been accounted for by the North Vietnamese? What was their actual fate? Given that no prisoners were ever repatriated from Pathet Lao control this incident takes on even greater significance.

The Air Force losses at Site 85 are only one example of the controversy over U.S. casualties in Southeast Asia as a result of covert, or classified military operations. Cross-border operations by U.S. Special Forces (SF), Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), and Marine Force Recon sometimes resulted in their members never being seen or heard from again. Air Force air support operations in Laos under the name of the "Ravens" resulted in numerous casualties, while

¹ Cable, From: JCRC Bangkok, TH, To: CDR, JCRC Barbers Point, HI, time/date group 110910Z, September, 1990, provides this information without names of individuals. Institute of East Asian Studies, *Indochina Chronology*, Vol. IX, No.3, July-September 1990, p.42, identifies the captain as Timothy Castle. Another source identified the Lao as Singkha Sikkhotounamaly.

'BLACK' OPERATIONS

members of the Ravens were officially listed as "civilians" serving in Laos. Navy SEAL, swift boat, or riverine force operations into North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia remain classified, including their non-recovered casualties. The so-called "black operations" undertaken by DOD organizations, the Department of State, and the CIA in Indochina are still not openly discussed by veterans.² Moreover, military history monographs and a number of other books have been published on Navy Riverine Forces in Southeast Asia, but preliminary research shows the true story of these shallow draft boats is still buried in U.S. Navy files.

Who has accounted for their battle casualties and how accurate are those records? In addition to the military operations, there is ample evidence of Americans participating as civilians in covert operations, or classified activities outside of the Republic of Vietnam (e.g., Air America, Continental Air Services, CIA para-military operations). Who accounts for those losses resulting from such "civilian" activities?

U.S. military and civilian losses in Southeast Asia during the entire period of the Second Indochina War must be reviewed for accuracy, as well as a means of providing information to the next of kin of these battle casualties. DIA, in its news release concerning the Interim Report released by Committee staff in October 1990, asserted that all American casualties are accounted for on its lists of MIA, POW, or KIA-BNR for the war in Southeast Asia. Without cross checking between operational reports from covert and/or classified missions and unclassified casualty lists, this will remain an open question.

² See Christopher Robbins, *The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1987); Shelby L. Stanton (Novato: Presidio Press, 1985). These are two well-documented works on clandestine or special warfare operations in Indochina. *The Ravens* describes clandestine air operations in Laos and *The Green Berets at War* describes Special Forces operations in Indochina from 1955 through 1973.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Two methods are used by DOD to account for missing Americans in Southeast Asia. One is the statutory presumptive finding of death in individual cases; the other is categorizing casualties as Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered (KIA-BNR). In either case, when human remains are repatriated from Southeast Asia, they are identified against persons in these two categories. When an identification is made, the individual is accounted for as having died while in the Indochina War zone.

Individually, members of the military services, or U.S. Government employees who were missing while serving in Indochina and remain unaccounted for, can be declared dead by the secretary of the military service or head of the government agency responsible for that individual.¹ Basically, the U.S. Code permits the secretaries and/or heads of agencies to declare an individual dead after the person has been missing for 12 months under circumstances indicating he or she may have died. Each case is decided on its own merits and cases may be reopened if sufficient evidence is presented indicating the individual may still be alive, although not physically returned to U.S. control.

Both presumptive findings of death, and KIA-BNR status strongly prejudice subsequent evaluations of live-sighting information. For example, live-sighting information is much more likely to be disregarded in the field as a result of an individual having been already assigned to one of the legal status-of-death categories without identifiable human remains to substantiate the status.

Supposedly, KIA-BNR status has a stricter evidence criteria than does a presumptive finding of death. However, even KIA-BNR status has its problems when it comes to accounting for missing Americans in Indochina. Two illustrative cases of KIA-BNR problems—that were not among classified files reviewed by staff—follow.

In one case, a Vietnamese source identified the picture of a U.S. Marine as a person he saw in the custody of North Vietnamese forces. However, the U.S. official debriefing the source concluded the source was mistaken because the Marine identified in the photograph by the Vietnamese source was officially listed as KIA-BNR.² As a result of the U.S. official's conclusion, this live-sighting report is considered to be "resolved." Since even in the extremely short Gulf War, Americans officially reported to be killed in battle were in fact captured, and later repatriated by

¹ Authority for "presumptive findings of death" was found in Title 5 USC, Section 5565 through 5566 for civilian employees; Title 37 USC, Section 555 through 557 for U.S. military personnel. These codified sections of law are implemented through regulations issued by the various departments and agencies responsible.

² This case was taken from DIA's 1978 declassified message traffic titled "Uncorrelated Information Relating to Missing Americans in Southeast Asia."

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the Iraqis, it is likely that some servicemen reported to be KIA-BNR were in fact captured in Southeast Asia.

In another case, a U.S. serviceman who was reportedly last seen wounded on a Vietnam battlefield was subsequently listed as KIA-BNR. But a year afterward, he had to be reclassified as POW when a handwritten letter from him, dated after his presumed death, was found on the body of a dead Viet Cong soldier in South Vietnam. The letter was addressed to the serviceman's family and talked of life in a Viet Cong prison camp. Based on this information, the Marine Corps changed the corporal's status to POW and promoted him in absentia to sergeant. At the conclusion of OPERATION HOMECOMING in 1973 he was not repatriated. Since then, based on a lack of evidence that he is alive, the serviceman has been found, presumptively, to be dead.

IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS

Part of DOD's solution to "resolve" POW/MIA or KIA-BNR cases is to identify recovered remains of individuals from Southeast Asia, and match those remains with unaccounted-for or missing Americans on the Vietnam-era casualty lists. However, the Committee has reviewed numerous cases that pieces of bone, or bone fragments were the basis for the identification of the remains of POW/MIA or KIA-BNR cases. These cases, if measured against court room body identification and death evidence criteria, would not be acceptable in court proceedings, except to infer, or to provide circumstantial evidence that something happened to a human being(s) at that location. Furthermore, a scientific evaluation of remains identification methodology used by DOD can be most politely described as not being based on any known and accepted forensic procedures.

In many cases, remains identified by DOD show that there is a probability that such remains are likely of the persons thought to have perished at a particular place. This determination is further complicated since individual skeletal were consumed by natural or in some cases, manmade forces. However, proof that bone fragments belonging to an individual were recovered is sorely lacking in many instances.

In some cases, DOD has made "identifications" of individual servicemen based on less than a handful of bone fragments. Further, in some cases, this finding was made by DOD, despite live-sighting reports that some of the individuals declared dead, and there remains "identified" at a crash site, were seen in captivity after the supposed date of death.

For example, on October 5, 1990, at Arlington National Cemetery, DOD buried the "remains" (bone fragments) of four U.S. servicemen presumed to have died when a helicopter crashed in Laos during the war. These remains were buried with full military honors. Then, their names were taken from the unaccounted-for list, and added to the list of those accounted for from the Second Indochina War. However, according to family members, and admitted by DOD, two of the caskets of "remains" contained no bones at all—no physical matter, whatsoever. The two coffins were empty.

The burial charade was based on specious deductive DOD procedures. The aircraft

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manifest for that flight listed four American military personnel and nine South Vietnamese troops on board the helicopter when it crashed in Laos. Based upon the flight manifest documentation, the identification of a ring belonging to one of the Americans on the flight, and supposed positive identification of two teeth (one each allegedly identified for the two persons whose caskets had bone fragments in them), each of these cases were closed with everyone accounted for and buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery.

These remains buried October 5, 1990 could not be identified as a specific individual by any known or accepted scientific forensic analysis. In the statements released to the press at the time of these "burials," DOD referred to "remains" and new cases "accounted for." Clearly, the implication in these statements is that physical remains had been recovered and restored to the families of the servicemen. Yet that is not what DOD means. DOD obviously has its own language, its own definitions of ordinary words, and its own purposes—mainly "resolving" cases—to be served.

Furthermore, there is some information that at least one of the four Americans may have survived the helicopter crash in Laos, but his actual death took place much later and he was buried at the Pathet Lao prison camp in which he was being held. In 1986, a Laotian eyewitness, a member of the Royal Laotian Army, reported that he had been imprisoned with Captain Nelson—one of the four "buried" at Arlington National Cemetery. The Laotian stated that he nursed Captain Nelson until he died, and that he was the one who buried Nelson. The Laotian identified a photograph of Captain Nelson, and provided DOD specific locations, geographical details as well as a hand-drawn map of the camp, with Nelson's grave site marked. Although the Laotian's report did indeed confirm the death, the death was not the result of being killed in action. Moreover, the alternate explanation of his death revealed the flaws in DOD methodology. Despite this evidence, DOD made a determination that the Laotian was not credible, and closed the case.³

THE MORTICIAN

Another problem in identification arises from the Vietnamese practice of warehousing remains of U.S. POWs for purposes of barter. In 1979, a former North Vietnamese government official, commonly referred to as "The Mortician," defected to the United States. The Mortician testified before the United States Congress that he was personally responsible for preserving and storing in excess of 400 remains of American servicemen. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency, uncharacteristically, has publicly vouched for The Mortician's credibility with regard to his statement that he cared for the U.S. remains. These remains are warehoused in Hanoi.

To date, since the end of hostilities with North Vietnam, only 255 sets of remains of U.S. servicemen have been returned to the United States. Many of these remains have been recovered as the result of "joint-excavations" of plane and helicopter crash sites by United States and Vietnamese government personnel. Characteristic of the complete lack of cooperation the Minority Staff of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has received from the Executive branch throughout in this inquiry, DOD has consistently refused give the Committee the

³ Statement by Senator Helms (R-NC) printed in the *Congressional Record*, Friday, October 5, 1990, "The Mock Burial of MIAs," pp.S14625-S14627.

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number of U.S. remains, out of the total 255, that have been excavated, despite the Committee's repeated requests for this information.

Given the statement of The Mortician, it is apparent that the Vietnamese have not returned many of the remains of U.S. servicemen in their possession. Even assuming that every one of the 255 remains returned to the United States was from the Vietnamese warehoused stock—which the Committee knows is not the case—they would still have 145 remains stored in Hanoi.

While this policy of doling out remains of U.S. servicemen, one set at a time, in an on-again, off-again fashion, may be repugnant to Americans, it accurately reflects the Vietnamese government's ideology, history, and the repatriation policies of its Communist allies.

THE CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY

The responsibility for forensic identification of remains of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in the Pacific theatre rests with the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CIL-HI). According to DOD, by early 1990 CIL-HI had identified 255 sets of repatriated remains from Indochina as the remains of U.S. personnel unaccounted for from the Second Indochina War. For a number of years, CIL-HI has been identifying remains of missing U.S. personnel from the Korean War and World War II's Pacific Theater still being discovered or, in a recent case, returned by foreign governments.⁴

A prominent physical anthropologist, Dr. Michael Charney, Professor Emeritus, at the University of Colorado and an internationally recognized expert in the science of forensics has conducted an extensive review of physical remains "identified" as missing Americans from Southeast Asia by CIL-HI. He concluded that it was scientifically impossible to have identified the cases he reviewed from the bone fragments returned to the next of kin.

In fact, according to Charney, the misidentification of these individuals had to be intentional, since there was no scientific basis to make any type of identification. Dr. Charney has reviewed CIL-HI's identification of remains in many other cases. According to Dr. Charney, CIL-HI has falsely identified as many as eighty separate sets of remains of U.S. servicemen previously listed as MIA or KIA-BNR.

Dr. Charney has leveled these serious charges against CIL-HI both publicly and to Committee staff. Dr. Charney states,

This facility [CIL-HI], entrusted with the analysis of mostly skeletonized remains of our servicemen and women in the identification process, is guilty of unscientific, unprofessional work. The administrative and technical personnel have engaged knowingly in deliberate distortion of details deduced from the bones to give credibility to otherwise impossible identification.

Dr. Charney also went on to say that CIL-HI has blatantly and deliberately lied about a large number of the remains CIL-HI has identified. Dr. Charney states that, in his professional opinion,

⁴ In May 1990, North Korea returned five sets of remains of U.S. servicemen from the Korean War.

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CIL-HI technicians have in some instances made identifications of remains based on human remains or other material not capable of providing such an identification. He further states that many of the technicians who performed the identifications lacked advanced training in the field of forensic anthropology. Prior to 1986, CIL-HI's technicians referred to themselves as "doctors," when, in fact, they had never been awarded doctorates in medicine or any other recognized scientific or medical discipline.

After 1986 U.S. House of Representatives hearings on the CIL-HI facility⁴ in which Dr. Charney and Dr. George W. Gill, another expert in the field of forensic anthropology, both testified on about CIL-HI, the Army attempted to correct the deficiencies in procedure and staffing identified by Drs. Charney and Gill, as well as other witnesses. The Army hired recognized experts with doctoral credentials for the staff, even though the senior anthropologist—who had the final authority to make identifications at CIL-HI—was a person with questionable academic credentials.

The senior anthropologist, a longtime employee of CIL-HI, did not hold a doctorate in the field of anthropology but had worked in the field of forensic anthropology since the end of World War II. To accomplish his tasks at CIL-HI he insisted on using a theory he developed for the identification human remains, a theory that was roundly rejected by the anthropological scientific community.

Between 1985 and 1987, Dr. Charney reviewed CIL-HI's identification of thirty sets of repatriated remains from North Vietnam and he concluded that CIL-HI had wrongly identified these remains as those of individual U.S. servicemen from the MIA or KIA-BNR lists. In each of these cases, the physical matter available to the CIL-HI forensic examiners (bone parts and fragments) was not sufficient to identify a specific individual by sex, race, height, weight, physical peculiarities, etc. In order to make their so-called "identifications", CIL-HI technicians responsible for identifying remains, in some instances, employed forensic methods and procedures not recognized by the international community of professional forensic anthropologists.

According to Dr. Charney, the CIL-HI technicians deliberately misidentified remains as individual U.S. servicemen off the list of unaccounted for during the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. He believes the only conceivable reason for this demonstrable pattern of misidentification was a desire to clear the lists of MIA while deceiving the MIA families through the return of so-called identified remains.

Dr. Gill, former secretary of the physical anthropology section, American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and a member of the board of directors of the American Board of Forensic Anthropology, substantiates Dr. Charney's statements concerning CIL-HI. Dr. Gill has publicly stated

It is clear from the bones that the problem in the CIL-HI reports results either from extreme carelessness, incompetence, fabrication of data, or some combination of these things.

⁴ U.S. Congress, House, "Activities of the Central Identification Laboratory," Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Session, 1986.

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These charges levied by Dr. Charney and Dr. Gill against CIL-HI have not been refuted by DOD, and this inquiry has found no evidence that contradict Dr. Charney or Dr. Gill.

PRESUMPTIVE FINDINGS OF DEATH

The problem of accountability for individual American casualties has been addressed by every administration since the 1973 conclusion of the Second Indochina War. During the Carter Administration, for example, a DOD commission—politically sensitive questions are best handled by Commissions, especially if the object is to show the government is taking action to resolve the issue of unaccounted for servicemen—was established to review the status of individual MIA cases.

In these cases, for purposes of compensation to the next-of-kin, the commission issued the following directive:

The Commission has used the date of April 1, 1973 as the last date of entitlement to prisoner of war compensation in cases where the actual date of death is not known and where a finding of death has been issued after that date...[because]...the last known prisoner of war was returned to the control of the United States.⁵

The commission further stated:

There have been reports of sightings of Americans in Southeast Asia after that date [April

1, 1973], but neither the identities or status of those persons nor the reliability of the reports are known to be established...Therefore, the Commission finds that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, April 1, 1973 is the last date when members of the U.S. Armed Forces were held prisoners of war by a hostile force in Southeast Asia.⁶

After a presumptive finding of death has been issued, surviving spouses, next of kin, or children are entitled to government-sponsored death benefits, e.g., six-months pay for spouses of deceased military members, government life insurance, etc. The individual is then removed from the active roles of the military service or agency responsible for him/her.

Among the issues yet to be determined by this inquiry are the following:

- 1) Was all intelligence reviewed pertaining to each individual who was presumptively found to be dead?
- 2) Have any cases ever been reopened and the presumptive finding withdrawn based upon live-sighting information, or any cases where the date of presumptive death was not changed to match information received well after the initial finding?

⁵ As declared in the legal presumptive finding of deaths that were issued by the Commission.

⁶ Ibid.

THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE

On May 6, 1991, the newspaper *Figaro* published in Paris a statistical summary of the fate of French forces fighting in Indochina who had been taken prisoner. The French forces were composed of French nationals, French Legionnaires, Africans and North Africans, indigenous members of the French Expeditionary Force drawn from Indochina, and local forces from Laos and Cambodia.

The statistical table was compiled by the Historical Service of the French Army and shows that of 39,888 prisoners held by the Vietminh, 29,954 were not repatriated. This total includes 2,350 French nationals and 2,867 Legionnaires who were taken prisoner but not repatriated.

Today in France there is great interest in the fate of French prisoners of the Indochina war. Owing to the efforts of French Senator Jean-Jacques Beucler, what has come to be called the "Boudarel Affair" became front page news in France in February, 1991.

The Boudarel Affair involves the discovery of Georges Boudarel, a Frenchman who acted as a deputy political commissar in Vietnamese prison camps during the First Indochina War. He was in charge of brain-washing and interrogating French prisoners, and has been accused of being an accessory to torture. Nothing was known of his whereabouts for years. Then it was discovered that, after serving in the Communist International underground in Southeast Asia and in Eastern Europe, he had obtained a teaching post at a university in France.

A new book by a former prisoner who charges that he was tortured by Boudarel has just appeared in France. Written by Claude Bayle, *Prisonnier au Camp 113* is a detailed revelation of life as a prisoner of the Vietnamese revealing the primitive conditions under which thousands of French prisoners were held.

FRENCH POWS IN INDOCHINA

In 1946, after a series of armed clashes with Ho Chi Minh's forces in North Vietnam, France agreed to allow Ho's group to establish an autonomous state of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as a somewhat-independent state within French Indochina. The DRV's capital became Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh and the Indochina Communist Party in control.

Problems persisted between the French colonial government and the DRV. As various other political factions and nationalist forces within Indochina collectively resisted French colonial rule of Indochina, armed conflicts intensified. Finally, in late 1946, the Vietnamese communists and various nationalist forces combined into a revolutionary army that is commonly referred to as the Viet Minh. A full scale "war of liberation" was started in 1946 to remove the French colonial

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government from Indochina. The Viet Minh took to the mountains and jungles to wage their war. When the Viet Minh left the cities of Vietnam they took several hundred French prisoners, military and civilian, into the jungles and mountain highlands with them. The Viet Minh's war with France, now referred to as the First Indochina War, refers to the period 1946 through 1954, when the Geneva Peace Accords were signed by the French and Viet Minh. The war also included revolutionary factions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The 1954 Geneva Accords required France to withdraw its colonial government from Indochina, provide for an exchange of prisoners, repatriation of remains of war dead, and division of Vietnam (i.e., North and South Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel) pending elections for public determination of a form of government and the unification of Vietnam into a single state.

During the war, the largest group of French prisoners taken by the Viet Minh was at the battle at Dien Bien Phu, North Vietnam. On May 8, 1954, when the French forces surrendered to the Viet Minh, about 6,500 French troops (including French regulars, Foreign Legionnaires, colonial troops from Africa and North Africa, and colonial troops from Indochina, as well as some civilians with the troops at Dien Bien Phu) were taken prisoner by the Viet Minh. French casualties related to Dien Bien Phu were approximately 2,242 KIA and 3,711 MIA. During the war, about 39,000 French-forces POWs were taken by the Viet Minh, with approximately 11,000 were returned during repatriation.¹

None of France's war dead from Dien Bien Phu or other battle sites in North Vietnam, and none of its war dead from Viet Minh prison camps or military hospitals were repatriated. By contrast, all French prisoners held by nationalist or communist forces in Laos and Cambodia were returned or accounted for, as were many of the remains of French war dead in those two areas.

According to historians on the First Indochina War, the high rate of deaths in Viet Minh camps occurred because of the harsh conditions in those isolated camps. Also, prisoners with severe wounds, such as head, chest, and abdominal wounds, stood little chance of survival in these camps because of a total lack of medical treatment facilities and/or supplies.² In addition to the harsh camp conditions and inadequate medical facilities, the Viet Minh marched the French prisoners taken at Dien Bien Phu many miles to camps, causing many deaths during the march. And, during the prisoner exchange, the Vietnamese again marched the French prisoners over long distances, causing the death of a number of the prisoners en route to exchange points.

Only a very small number of French Union troops were able to escape after the siege at Dien Bien Phu. Seventy eight are recorded as having successfully made it back to French custody by traveling overland towards Laos. Of that number, nineteen were Europeans, the remainder were troops indigenous to Indochina.³

¹ Bernard B. Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1966), pp.483,484. App. B., Table III provides the breakdown of French losses at Dien Bien Phu. The table includes three American pilots from the Taiwan based Civil Air Transport (CAT) company.

² During the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh had only one qualified medical doctor for 50,000 of their own troops. After the surrender, the French military doctors had to provide medical care for both the Viet Minh and the French POWs. Bayle's new memoir gives dramatic details.

³ See Fall, pp.442-447.

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There are reports that some French POWs were kept in forced labor status, while others were given years of indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine and North Vietnam's anti-colonial philosophy at re-education centers before being returned to French African and North African colonies. The Vietnamese separated officers from non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officers from other enlisted troops. The separated colonials from *Legionnaires*, and French regulars from all other troop. They further separated the prisoners by race and emphasized the differences in races between the Europeans, the blacks, and the Arabs. Reeducation (Marxist-Leninist indoctrination) was concentrated on African and North African colonial troops.⁴

Just as the Soviets did at the conclusion of World War II in the Pacific and Europe in 1945, after the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the Soviets sent a delegation to North Vietnam to repatriate, forcibly, French Foreign Legion POWs identified as former nationals of Soviet bloc nations.⁵

The North Vietnamese repatriated some *Legionnaires* and large numbers of colonial troops from non-Soviet bloc countries directly to their homelands, via China, without notification to the international commission overseeing the Indochina prisoner exchanges. As a result of the forced repatriations by the Soviets and unreported repatriations by North Vietnam, there are great disparities in accounting for French POWs released by the North Vietnamese after the 1954 Geneva Accords.

In 1962, about forty "Metropolitan" French POWs were returned to France. After their return, the French government charged these former POWs as deserters, or "ralliers" and court martialled them, giving some of them prison sentences of up to five years and no back pay for the period they were prisoners in North Vietnam. Another group of about twenty Metropolitan French POWs chose to remain in North Vietnam. This latter group was court martialled in absentia for capital crimes committed during the war and elected to remain in North Vietnam rather than return to France and face execution.

Writer William Stevenson, a noted BBC correspondent who covered the French Indochina War, told the staff about interviews he had with French soldiers held captive by the North Vietnamese. He was of the opinion that the French prisoners seemed to be mentally deficient, possibly as a result of their long, harsh imprisonment, or severe brainwashing techniques known to have been employed by the North Vietnamese.⁶ Robert Garwood, a former U.S. POW who

⁴ See Fall, pp.438-442.

⁵ As noted, the Soviets carried out a similar policy in 1945 in Hanoi at the end of World War II.

⁶ "Rallier" is a term used by the French and Viet Minh to describe persons who rallied to the opposite cause. U.S. military intelligence documents from the Second Indochina War reviewed for this research also use the term "rallier" to describe an American serviceman who went over to the National Liberation Front or North Vietnamese side.

⁷ Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place*, pp.438-442. Survivors of Viet Minh brainwashing techniques had a myriad effect on the French POWs. Some carried guilt for their conduct in prison after their release; colonial soldiers became revolutionaries after return to their home states; and, oddly, *Legionnaires* and paratroopers became the French extreme right-wing militarist.

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voluntarily returned from Vietnam in 1979, stated that, during the mid-1970s, he saw French prisoners used as forced laborers in a North Vietnamese dairy farm not far from Hanoi. Garwood believed the French POWs he saw were former *Legionnaires* who had not yet earned French citizenship when taken prisoner during the First Indochina War.⁸ Because of that, they had no home country to accept them after the war.⁹

During the 1954 French withdrawal from North Vietnam, the French left the North Vietnamese construction equipment, railway equipment, and various pieces of land and water transport equipment, as well as other stores of non-military supplies already in North Vietnam. From 1955 until sometime in the 1970s, the French government paid the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) an estimated \$30 million, via Hungarian banks, for maintenance of French military graves. In return, the North Vietnamese periodically repatriated remains of French military dead to France. However, all the remains repatriated were exhumed from graves already known to French authorities. The best information available indicates none of the war dead from Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh prison camps, or the death marches were ever repatriated to France.¹⁰

In 1971, to resolve the lingering problem over the unaccounted-for POW/MIA from the First Indochina War, the French Foreign Minister declared all unaccounted for French POW/MIA in Indochina dead. According to author/historian Bernard Fall, the actual number of French casualties in the First Indochina War was never made public. In 1973, the French resumed diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

ANOTHER REPATRIATION EXPERIENCE

In 1975, after the successful invasion into South Vietnam by North Vietnamese and Communist forces, the North Vietnamese captured two high-ranking South Korean officials who were assisting the South Vietnamese in the defense of their country. The North Vietnamese promptly imprisoned the two South Koreans. During their imprisonment, the South Korean government negotiated continually with the Vietnamese for the release of the two South Koreans.

The two South Koreans remained imprisoned throughout the years of negotiation for their release. The Vietnamese never admitted—not even once—that the South Korean POWs were being held in prison. Even after the South Korean government presented the Vietnamese government incontrovertible photographic evidence that showed that the two South Korean POWs incarcerated in Vietnam, the Vietnamese government continued to deny holding the men.

Five years after the South Koreans were captured—in 1980—the Vietnamese government repatriated the two prisoners to South Korea. Still, after their release, the Vietnamese government denied that it ever held the men.

⁸ Individuals must complete, honorably, their initial six-year enlistment in the Legion to be eligible French citizenship.

⁹ Garwood's information on French POWs still being used as forced labor by the North Vietnamese was not verifiable without access to classified files.

¹⁰ Source material for the French Experience includes books by Bernard B. Fall, Jules Roy, and Archimedes L. A. Paul. Testimony of Anita Leane before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, April 1976, was also used. Other material was developed through interviews conducted by staff.

EPILOGUE COLONEL PECK'S MEMORANDUM

[The following is a verbatim et literatim reproduction of Colonel Miland A. Peck's memorandum of resignation.]

DATE: 12 FEB 1991

ATTN: POW-MIA

SUBJECT: Request for Relief

TO: DR

1. PURPOSE: I, hereby, request to resign my position as Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW-MIA).

2. BACKGROUND:

a. Motivation. My initial acceptance of this posting was based upon two primary motives: first, I had heard that the job was highly contentious and extremely frustrating, that no one would volunteer for it because of its complex political nature. This, of course, made it appear challenging. Secondly, since the end of the Vietnam War, I had heard the persistent rumors of American Servicemen having been abandoned in Indochina, and that the Government was conducting a "cover-up" so as not to be embarrassed. I was curious about this and thought that serving as the Chief of POW-MIA would be an opportunity to satisfy my own interest and help clear the Government's name.

b. The Office's Reputation. It was interesting that my previous exposure to the POW-MIA Office, while assigned to DIA, both as a Duty Director for Intelligence (DDI) and as the Chief of the Asia Division for Current Intelligence (JSI-3), was negative. DIA personnel who worked for me, when dealing with or mentioning the Office, always spoke about it in deprecating tones, alluding to the fact that any report which found its way there would quickly disappear into a "black hole."

c. General Attitudes. Additionally, surveys of active duty military personnel indicated that a high percentage (83%) believed that there were still live American prisoners in Vietnam. This

EPILOGUE: THE PECK MEMO

idea was further promulgated in a number of legitimate veterans' periodicals and professional journals, as well as the media in general, which held that where there was so much smoke, there must be fire.

d. Cover-up. The dark side of the issue was particularly unsettling because of the persistent rumors and innuendoes of a Government conspiracy, alleging that U.S. military personnel had been left behind to the victorious communist governments in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and that for "political reasons" or running the risk of a second Vietnam War, their existence was officially denied. Worse yet was the implication that DIA's Special Office for POWs and MIAs was an integral part of this effort to cover the entire affair up so as not to embarrass the Government nor the Defense Establishment.

e. The Crusade. As a Vietnam veteran with a certain amount of experience in Indochina, I was interested in the entire POW-MIA question, and willingly volunteered for the job, viewing it as sort of a holy crusade.

f. The Harsh Reality. Heading up the Office has not been pleasant. My plan was to be totally honest and forthcoming on the entire issue and aggressively pursue innovative actions and concepts to clear up the live sighting business, thereby refurbishing the image and honor of DIA. I became painfully aware, however, that I was not really in charge of my own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA. What I witnessed during my tenure as the cardboard cut-out "Chief" of POW-MIA could be euphemistically labelled as disillusioning.

3. CURRENT IMPRESSIONS, BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE:

a. Highest National Priority. That National leaders continue to address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the "highest national priority" is a travesty. From my vantage point, I observed that the principal government players were interested primarily in conducting a "damage limitation exercise", and appeared to knowingly and deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and "busy work". Progress consisted in frenetic activity, with little substance and no real results.

b. The Mindset to Debunk. The mindset to "debunk" is alive and well. It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office, which is not necessarily the fault of DIA. Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a responsive "action arm" to routinely and aggressively pursue leads. The latter was a moot point, anyway, since the Office was continuously buried in an avalanche of "ad hoc" taskings from every quarter, all of which required an immediate response. It was impossible to plan ahead or prioritize courses of action. Any real effort to pursue live sighting reports or exercise initiatives was diminished by the plethora of "busy work" projects directed by higher authority outside of DIA. A number of these grandiose endeavors bordered on the ridiculous, and - quite significantly - there was never an audit trail. None of these

EPILOGUE: THE PECK MEMO

taskings was ever requested formally. There was, and still is, a refusal by any of the players to follow normal intelligence channels in dealing with the POW-MIA Office.

c. Duty, Honor and Integrity. It appears that the entire issue is being manipulated by unscrupulous people in the Government, or associated with the Government. Some are using the issue for personal or political advantage and others use it as a forum to perform and feel important, or worse. The sad fact, however, is that this issue is being controlled and a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort, and may never have been.

d. POW-MIA Officers Abandoned. When I assumed the Office for the first time, I was somewhat amazed and greatly disturbed by the fact that I was the only military officer in an organization of more than 40 people. Since combatants of all Services were lost in Vietnam, I would have thought there would at least be a token Service representation for a matter of the "highest national priority." Since the normal mix of officers from all Services is not found in my organization it would appear that the issue, at least at the working level, has, in fact, been abandoned. Also, the horror stories of the succession of military officers at the O-3 and O-6 level who have in some manner "rocked the boat" and quickly come to grief at the hands of the Government policy makers who direct the issue, lead one to the conclusion that we are all quite expendable, so by extrapolation one simply concludes that these same bureaucrats would "sacrifice" anyone who was troublesome or contentious as including prisoners of war and missing in action. Not a comforting thought. Any military officer expected to survive in this environment would have to be myopic, an accomplished sycophant, or totally insouciant.

e. The DIA Involvement. DIA's role in the affair is truly unfortunate. The overall Agency has generally practiced a "damage limitation drill" on the issue, as well. The POW-MIA Office has been cloistered for all practical purposes and left to its own fortunes. The POW Office is the lowest level in the Government "efforts" to resolve the issue, and oddly for an intelligence organization, has become the "lightning rod" for the entire establishment to the matter. The policy people manipulating the affair have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the shadows, while using the Office as a "toxic waste dump" to bury the whole "mess" out of sight and mind to a facility with the limited access to public scrutiny. Whatever happens in the issue, DIA takes the blame, while the real players remain inviolable. The fact that the POW-MIA Office is always the center of an investigation is no surprise. Many people suspect that something is rotten about the whole thing, but they cannot find an audit trail to ascribe blame, so they attack the DIA/POW-MIA "dump", simply because it has been placed in the line of fire as a cheap, expendable decoy.

f. "Suppressio Veri, Suggestio Falsi". Many of the puppet masters play a confusing, murky role. For instance, the Director of the National League of Families occupies an interesting and questionable position in the whole process. Although assiduously "churning" the account to give a tawdry illusion of progress, she is adamantly opposed to any initiative to actually get to the heart of the problem, and, more importantly, interferes in or actively sabotages POW-MIA analyses or investigations. She insists on rewriting or editing all significant documents produced by the Office, then touted as the DIA position. She apparently has access to top secret, codeword message traffic, for which she is supposedly not cleared, and she receives it well ahead of the DIA intelligence

EPILOGUE: THE PECK MEMO

analysis. Her influence in "jerking around" everyone and everything involved in the issue goes far beyond the "war and MIA protestor gone straight" scenario. She was brought from the "outside", into the center of the imbroglio, and then, cloaked in a mantle of sanctimony, routinely impedes real progress and insidiously "muddles up" the issue. One wonders who she really is and where she came from.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Stalled Crusade. Unfortunately, what began on such a high note never succeeded in embarking. In some respects, however, I have managed to satisfy some of my curiosity.

b. Everyone is Expendable. I have seen firsthand how ready and willing the policy people are to sacrifice or "abandon" anyone who might be perceived as a political liability. It is quick and facile, and can be easily covered.

c. High-Level Knavery. I feel strongly that this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.

d. "Smoke and Mirrors". From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with "smoke and mirrors", to stall the issue until it dies a natural death.

e. National League of Families. I am convinced that the Director of this organization is much more than meets the eye. As the principal actor in the grand show, she is in the perfect position to clamor for "progress", while really intentionally impeding the effort. And there are numerous examples of this. Otherwise it is inconceivable that so many bureaucrats in the "system" would instantaneously do her bidding and humor her every whim.

f. DIA's Dilemma. Although greatly saddened by the role ascribed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, I feel, at least, that I am dealing with honest men and women who are generally powerless to make the system work. My appeal and attempt to amend this role perhaps never had a chance. We all were subject to control. I particularly salute the personnel in the POW-MIA Office for their long suffering, which I regrettably was unable to change. I feel that the Agency and the Office are being used as the "fall guys" or "patsies" to cover the tracks of others.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

 E P I L O Q U E : T H E P E C K M E M O

a. One Final Vietnam Casualty. So ends the war and my last grand crusade, like it actually did end, I guess. However, as they say in the Legion, "je ne regrette rien..." For all of the above, I respectfully request to be relieved of my duties as Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

b. A Farewell to Arms. So as to avoid the annoyance of being shipped off to some remote corner, out of sight and out of the way, in my own "bamboo cage" of silence somewhere, I further request that the Defense Intelligence Agency, which I have attempted to serve loyally and with honor, assist me in being retired immediately from active military service.

MILLARD A. PECK
Colonel, Infantry
USA

 DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE
SUMMARY OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE

- * Director - National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (also served as a Director in the mid-1970's);
- * Director - International Institute for Prisoners of War;
- * Member - National Alliance of Families of America's Missing Servicemen - World War II/Korean War/Cold War/Vietnam War;
- * Member - POW-MIA Connecticut Forget-Me-Nots, Inc.
- * Author of THE INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE and MANIFESTOS ON THE INDO-CHINA POW-MIA ISSUE;
- * Director and President - Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos, Inc;
- * Among the first Americans invited to Hanoi after the fall of South Vietnam (invited by Phan Hien, then Deputy Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in October 1976 to discuss the provision of reconstruction and development aid to the SRV in return for an accounting of American POW-MIAs);
- * Travelled to Laos, 1974, 1975, 1988, 1990 (twice) and 1991 and to Thailand several dozen times in 1984-88;

I have been employed by Union Carbide Corporation for the past thirteen and one-half years. I presently hold the position of Manager of Project Finance and Treasurer of Latin America and Africa.

ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

The Mandate for the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIAs

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

This Committee was formed to put the POW-MIA issue to rest and with it the suffering, acrimony, confrontation, distortion and deceit which has characterized it from all sides. The turmoil and tragedy surrounding the issue has done nothing but pit the public against their Government. A recent national poll shows 70% of Americans believe POWs were left behind. Yet, the Government maintains it did not happen.

Thus, your charter is a profound one. Your efforts will require serious research on the POW-MIA issue including going through the classified intelligence data in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, the very fact that this data is classified is one of the principal problems obfuscating the issue. In addition, your efforts will have to go beyond the Vietnam War to the Korean War and World War II as many feel the Vietnam POW-MIA issue had a strong precedent in those wars.

Moreover, you will need to hear the testimony of the experts outside Government and the POW-MIA activist organizations such as Stephen Arkin, William Paul and James Sanders. Individuals such as these have conducted many years of research on the subject. Beyond them you should hear the testimony of both the Government and individuals outside Government involved in the issue. Indeed, I am honored to have the opportunity to appear before you.

Very basically, the elements of your mandate are straightforward. Fulfilling them is the only way to put the issue to rest and help this country heal. The elements are:

- * To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in captivity in Indochina and, if so, why. (Fulfilling this mandate will make a very important contribution toward precluding future POW-MIA debacles such as we have experienced in Indochina.)
- * To recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for the POW-MIAs. This should include a plan to bring home the live POWs. You will have to address whether an accounting should be a precondition to normalization of relations -- this is an immediate concern for the Committee.
- * To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in captivity in Korea and, if so, why. Also, to recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for them.
- * To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in

captivity in World War II and, if so, why. Also, to recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for them.

- * To opine as to the efficacy of the both the Government's efforts to obtain an accounting and its POW-MIA intelligence operations. However, I strongly recommend you adopt a "no fault" policy in doing so.
- * To investigate the Glomar Java Sea incident, as it is closely linked to the POW-MIA issue.
- * To set standards which will delineate what is "as full as possible an accounting of the POW-MIAs." Participants outside Government should work with you in this regard such that the public accepts a final accounting. This is because so very few people trust the Government regarding an accounting. Indeed, the polls indicate the American public is deeply suspicious of the Government's policy and actions on POW-MIAs.

I firmly hope that you will approach this complex subject with open minds and clear slates. It deserves your most complete attention.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue

Brother of Major Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12.13.68

October 29, 1991

ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

A POW-MIA Conspiracy and Cover-up? It's in the Policy!

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

The loud and in many cases credible voices charging a conspiracy and cover-up on the POW-MIA issue will not go away until you address the two things most responsible for the charges:

1. The large and growing body of evidence clearly showing that servicemen were abandoned alive and in captivity at the end of the Vietnam War and the growing body of evidence indicating that POWs still are alive in Vietnam and Laos;
2. The fact that POW-MIA intelligence data still is classified despite the War having been over for 18 years. Indeed, POW-MIA intelligence still is classified for the Korean War and World War II. As long as the Government classifies such data, charges of a conspiracy and cover-up will stick; it is just not possible to understand why such data is classified unless the Government is trying to hide the truth about live POWs. "National security" is an excuse which simply does not hold water after so many years.

Beyond this, though, is the conspiracy and cover-up embodied in the Government's POW-MIA policy itself; the policy, too, is in vital need of your investigation. Very simply, the Government has concocted and rigorously pursues a POW-MIA policy which actually precludes the return of live POWs! To understand this deliberate paradox, you should consider the elements of the policy:

- A. "The POW-MIA issue is humanitarian, not-economic." To the Vietnamese the issue never was, is not now and never will be humanitarian. To realize this, all one has to do is read the testimony of Congressmen and other officials who visited Vietnam after the War verifying that to the Vietnamese the issues of POWs and economic reconstruction of Vietnam were absolutely linked. The Vietnamese consistently raised the two subjects together. And, of course, the Laotians merely mirrored their sentiments.

To me, the Vietnamese still are telling us the issues are linked. They consistently say to us, "We do not have the money or the manpower to search our remote provinces for missing Americans." What they really are saying is, "Look, give us some aid and trade -- and look who we found in the jungle." In other words, the Vietnamese want something for the POWs and need a face-saving way of giving them back! They are telling us they have our POWs and want to give them to us, but that they need (1) something for them, and (2) a face-saving way to let them go.

Very importantly, this affirms the need to make a return of the

live POWs and an accounting for the missing a precondition to normalization of relations with Vietnam and Laos. I firmly believe that unilaterally normalizing relations with Vietnam and Laos will lead them to kill the live POWs because the bargaining power they represent will have been obviated (by us, to compound the paradox).

- B. "The answers to the POW-MIA issue are in Hanoi, not Washington." This element of the policy is the ultimate cowardice, and the policy makers who formulated it should be excoriated for their complete avoidance of responsibility. It was our Government which sent the servicemen to Indochina, it was our Government which abandoned them, and it is our Government which is responsible for bringing them home. The answers are in Washington, not Hanoi. The policy makers do not have enough integrity to either tell the truth about the issue nor formulate a policy which will bring the live POWs home. Indeed, to avoid that responsibility they have subordinated the POW-MIA issue to other foreign policy objectives (normalization) such that the POWs are in danger of being forever wiped off the slate. This is something this Committee dearly needs to rectify. When government avoids responsibility for its actions, as has been happening so long with the POW-MIA issue, we as Americans have lost.
- C. "When somebody brings us proof of a live POW, we will move heaven and earth to bring him home." This is fraudulent on three fronts: (1) it shifts responsibility for proof of live POWs away from the Government to individuals such as myself; (2) the Government itself is sitting on mountains of classified evidence of live POWs which no one else can see; and (3) even when presented with proof, as in the case of Donald Carr, the Government proves itself impotent.
- D. "We have more intelligence resources than ever before dedicated to the POW-MIA issue." This is the classic Government approach to any problem -- throw more money at it (and it still will not be resolved). It does not take 500 intelligence analysts and a POW-MIA office in Hanoi to "resolve" the POW-MIA issue. Indeed, such a smoke-and-mirrors approach is certain to fail because the deceitful policy itself says there are no live POWs! All it takes is the Secretary of State getting on an airplane to Hanoi and Vientiane with a mandate from the President to negotiate the necessary deal to bring home the live POWs. And, we have all the bargaining chips we need in the form of normal commercial and diplomatic relations to strike such a deal. It is that simple.
- E. "We have looked into our files and we can't find any proof of live POWs." Here, the Government is trying to have its cake and eat it, too. This Committee needs to do the looking. The evidence is overwhelming that POWs were left behind alive and in captivity, the evidence is overwhelming that they still are alive today, and the Committee needs to take the initiative and do the right thing: tell the truth and bring the men home.

Much of the problem regarding the POW-MIAs boils down to no one in our Government, including five Presidents, having the courage to serve them as they served their country, and no one in our Government having the integrity to be accountable for them (which is the real issue of accountability). Won't this Committee please change that? The time is due; the POWs deserve it, their families deserve it, and the country deserves it. Time and results clearly demonstrate that the Defense and State Departments are not going to honorably and decently resolve the Indochina POW-MIA issue; rather, they are trying to make it go away through their ruthless deceit and cowardice.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue
 Brother of Maj. Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12.12.68

October 29, 1991

ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

The Role and Activities of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

(Please also refer to the attached document, "The National League of Families: Undemocratic, Unfair and Unswervingly Dedicated to Defending the U.S. Government's Lies, and Deceit on the Indochina POW-MIA Issue".)

I have been a member of the League since 1971. I served two terms on the Board of Directors in the mid-1970's and was elected to the current Board this past summer with the second-highest vote count.

You may be aware that the Executive Director of the League and the past Board opposed the formation of the Select Committee. Indeed, the Executive Director and leadership of the League oppose almost every initiative which is not "policy correct", i.e., which is not supportive of the Government's POW-MIA policy. And now, the Executive Director of the League and her entrenched minions on the Board continue to hold this Committee in high contempt, as evidenced by their statements to the membership in the League Newsletter. For example, the Executive Director states in the October 21, 1991 Newsletter, "Hopefully, the (Select) Committee will not attempt to determine whether POWs are held or the extent to which accountability can be achieved..." To the family members, as opposed to the totally pro-Government Executive Director, these certainly should be two of the Committee's principal mandates.

The Executive Director and the entrenched members of the Board serve but one purpose which, sadly, is not the POW-MIA families. Rather, it is serving and only serving the Government's POW-MIA policy, a policy itself which has been formulated and is being pursued to make sure that no living POWs return from Indochina to the embarrassment of the Government. The League is little more than a mouthpiece for the Government and the Executive Director is for all practical purposes a spokesperson for the Government. The statistics for family participation in League activities affirm the families' dismay and frustration regarding League activities: only 22% of eligible family members even bothered to vote in the last election of Directors, and a 25% quorum consistently cannot be raised at the League Annual Meetings. It would appear that the family members have given up hope on the League. Furthermore, the League's financial support primarily is through non-family contributions including United Way.

I ran for the Board of Directors hoping to transform the League into an entity serving the families instead of the Government. I now realize that this is impossible. Even though I am a Director

of the League, I cannot have access to the League mailing list. Nor can I have any comments inserted into the Newsletter. Other barriers against family members seeing anything but official Government policy go far beyond this; indeed, no voices contrary to the Government's policy are ever invited to address the League or have their comments in the Newsletter. This includes well-known experts on the POW-MIA issue. The League is entirely a one-sided play, and the current League leadership is firmly dedicated to keeping it that way.

The Government's POW-MIA policy would not have what little credibility it does were it not for its very successful co-option of the League in the early 1980's. By bringing the Executive Director under its wings President Reagan could say, as does President Bush today, that he had the support of the family members in his "highest national priority" POW-MIA policy. Such a statement was and is part of the conspiracy which has deliberately kept the POWs from coming home. With so few families participating in the League and with those who do only being fed the pro-Government line, neither the League nor the Government can claim that the families support Government policy. Indeed, the League cannot validly claim to represent the families.

I believe the standard for evaluating the effectiveness of the League, and for that matter the effectiveness of the Government's POW-MIA policy, is accounting for the POW-MIAs and bringing home the live POWs. I cannot imagine any other standard which is relevant. The League and the Government have utterly and unequivocally failed. They have failed the live POWs, they have failed their families and they have failed their country. For the Select Committee to not prevail where the League and the Government have failed would be to lose the greatest opportunity ever to set the record straight on America's POW-MIAs and to deny this country the chance to finally close the books on the Vietnam War and get on with its future.

I would like to note that I do not believe the Executive Director of the League and certain Board members do not want the live POWs to come home. Rather, in blindly accepting the Government's POW-MIA policy they are unwittingly endorsing abandoning the live POWs because the policy has exactly that purpose and consequence.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue
Brother of Major Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12.13.68

October 29, 1991

THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES: UNDEMOCRATIC, UNFAIR AND UNSWERVINGLY
DEDICATED TO DEFENDING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S LIES AND DECEIT ON THE
INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE

By: Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue, Member of the League Since 1971 and
Brother of Maj. Morgan J. Donahue, USAF - MIA in Laos 12/13/68

The U. S. Government's POW-MIA policy has been debilitated by a series of coverup allegations over the years from individuals within Government and individuals and entities outside Government. Each time, the Defense Department or the State Department "investigate" the allegations and say, "Trust us; we've taken a look and affirmed there is no coverup." One thing the American public can count on is the inevitability of more allegations because anytime the Government says, "Trust us," you can bet it is lying. The Indochina POW-MIA issue is no different in this regard than Watergate or the Iran-Contra deal. Thank God that the American public knows better.

One way the Government perpetuates its lies on the issue is through the National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Southeast Asia. The League is merely a mouthpiece for the Government's policy, and this brief statement explains how the League goes about it.

Fundamentally, dissenting opinion has no forum within the League. Members are forbidden access to the membership roster or the League mailing list. Questions at the Annual Meeting are severely limited and no press is allowed during the General Session at the Annual Meeting.

Once upon a time, dissenting opinion could be put before the membership in the form of resolutions passed at Regional Meetings. Those resolutions were distributed to the membership for voting prior to the Annual Meeting in mailings accompanied by the voting for Board members. However, the Board also exhorted members to vote against resolutions which were considered contrary to League "direction." Thus, members would read only the resolutions and the recommendations to vote against them. No defense or explanations of the resolutions were allowed. And, the recommendations to vote against the resolutions usually were paragraphs or a page long when the resolutions themselves were only a few sentences. Members never had a chance to hear the other side and never had a chance to even ask questions. This year, the Regional Meetings were dropped, so not even the resolutions can be put before the membership.

At the other extreme, the Executive Director of the League has a totally unencumbered forum from which to espouse the Government's POW-MIA policy. She also distributes her personal views at will in periodic mailings (for example, her 6/14/91 letter) at League expense and in the Newsletter. Opposing opinions are never printed in any League document; rather, opinions and events contrary to her opinion

are attacked without the membership ever having the chance to make up their own minds by being given both sides of the story.

The Executive Director and the Board say that the League speaks for the POW-MIA families on the issue, and State/DoD often cite the League as the "voice" of the families. This, true to League form, is just another deception. In the first instance, many families have joined the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen - World War II/Korean War/Cold War/Vietnam War. In the second, there is a universe of POW-MIA families and nobody knows how many belong to the League such that it represents the "voice." Finally, it is not certain as to what comprises a "family." In all probability the League would have folded years ago if membership had not been extended to aunts, uncles and grandparents.

Dissenting opinions are vehemently suppressed at the Annual Meeting and dissenters who either state or distribute opposing opinions are threatened with the hotel Security Department and arrest, as I was at last year's Meeting for merely passing out some literature. Questions are not allowed of Government officials at the Meeting except to innocuous junior-level personnel such as those representing CIMH and JCRC.

Experts on the POW-MIA issue from outside Government whose knowledge or opinions differ from the Government/League position never are invited to appear at the Annual Meeting, nor are their positions ever printed in League documents. Some of these individuals are widely acclaimed for their knowledge and research on the POW-MIA issue; examples include Bill Paul, Tom Ashworth, Jim Sanders, Eugene Tighe, Sen. Robert Smith, former Cong. John Rowland, former Cong. Billy Hendon and members of the POW-MIA research team of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican staff. The only opinions presented to the League membership are those in support of Government policy. Does anyone think, concomitantly, that Col. Millard Peck, who recently resigned as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special POW-MIA Office, will be invited to appear at the Annual Meeting to present a different view of the Government's policy? Of course not. Indeed, the League has become a party to the Government's coverup.

Of course, who will be invited to appear before the Annual Meeting? Only representatives of the U.S. Government -- the very same people who formulated and now perpetuate the Government's lies on the issue.

Sadly, the whole POW-MIA issue has come to the point where to know the truth one has to go outside the League and the Government. The truth is that American servicemen were knowingly abandoned alive and in captivity in Indochina and remain there today. The League and the Government are so dedicated to suppressing that truth and instead lying about the issue that they have concocted a policy which precludes the live POWs from coming home.

If the Government and the League wanted the live POWs home, they would be home. It is that simple.

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REPORT NO. CS-311/0626R

DATE DISC. 3/ November 1971

COUNTRY: Laos/North Vietnam/Thailand

DOI: 1966 - Early 1971

SUBJECT: 1. See Lao Nak Sat Weekly Bulletin Containing Photographs and Details of American Prisoners Captured by the Pathet Lao

2. Location and Details of a PL Prison Near the NAMS Supreme Headquarters in San Xuan Province, Laos

ACQ: Laos, Vientiane (22 October 1971)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1-594/2-1870

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Vietnam pledged to return American prisoners from Laos in Hanoi, an underlining that was apparently contradicted by Soth's statement.

Soth's statement.

The exchange will take place in Laos, Soth said. "If they were Phouma met for an hour Saturday with the special Pabai Lao

captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos," he told UPI.

HONOLULU (UPI)—American planes are continuing to bomb Laos and Cambodia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific announced Saturday.

U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, are continuing bombing operations at the request of the Laotian and Cambodian governments. Fifty fighter-bombers, about 833 strategic bombers and Phalanx jets are being used to bolster troops trying to hold onto government-claimed territory before cease-fire can be arranged for Laos and Cambodia.

U.S. Barge

PHNOM PENH (UPI) — Khmer Rouge gunners ambushed a Mekong River supply convoy Friday night, sinking an American ammunition barge and badly damaging two cargo ships, transportation company sources reported Saturday.

The sources said the attack occurred three miles south of the naval base at Nakh Luang, 32 miles southeast of Phnom Penh.

disclosed. Government sources said that in a cabinet session Friday Souvanna failed to get approval for tentative areas of agreement that have been worked out so far in the private talks.

Continued fighting was also reported going on in south-central Laos with increased airstrikes by American F42 bombers, F411 swing-wing bombers, and tactical fighter-bombers being flown to support CIA sponsored irregular troops.



Appendix 'A' to P17/V/1
 dated 11 October 1973

1. In VERMONT jail there are believed to be the following FVIs:
 - a. NVA - 150
 - b. FL between 40 and 60For both types those who have already been let out are none.
- c. Used in paper-type work (INA/FL)
- d. Set free (NVA)
- e. Drafted into FVR (FL).

2. TAH and FV in FL hands are believed to number between 2000 and 3000, divided thus:-

- a. Now serving in FL units
- b. Used for pioneer type work
- c. Still in jail.

4. In July 1973 an ITA unit reported to their superiors that 15 Thais had escaped from Chonburi (IO 2157). There was also to be an escape very early and was related to the Thai never to return. The operation for these 30 run has been described as an escape, but cannibalizing there are no more details available to this intramural report.

a. Category A: Last known to be alive on the ground - 86
b. Category B: Probably died in captivity - 33
c. Category C: Died in incident (but still listed as MIA) - 30
d. Category D: Probably captured - 9
e. Returned alive - 10

47
פסוקים



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

Colonel V.J. Donahue, USAF, Retired.
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach FL 32931

Dear Colonel Donahue

We are in receipt of three classified documents that were originated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which have been associated with your son, Major Morgan Donahue. They are identified as follows:

CIA 082022Z Apr 87 (Secret), CIA Cite 391100
CIA 091931Z Jul 87 (Secret), CIA Cite 345934
CIA 181916Z Feb 88 (Secret), CIA Cite 907494

The CIA has declined release of sanitized copies of these documents to you under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, they have asked that we advise you of your right to appeal their decision in this regard through the CIA Information Review Committee. Their address is: Central Intelligence Agency, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Washington, D.C., 20505.

Please contact me on our toll free telephone line (800-331-5501) if you have further questions concerning this matter.

Sincerely

George E. Atkinson
GEORGE E. ATKINSON
Chief, Missing Persons Division

1 Atch
FOIA Exemption
Explanation Sheet

*BEST
LSR*

Source in USA Address Phone 76 Unavailable
to be released
information.

April 20, 1987.

MR. Kimball Gaines, Col. USAF
Chief S.P. ofc. POW/MIA
Defense Intel. Agency
Washington D.C.
20301

Sir:

I have information about 2 dead
Military people in Laos. MC Adams and
Cleve. I have photocopies of their
dogtags. The first is a Marine and the 2
Second is in the National Guard
(Chigago).

I also have information about one
live prisoner (Morgan Jefferson Donahue)
D.O.B. 2nd May 1944 / Airplane A.C-119 / No.
32981* and 5 others unknown.

This is very urgent because my
friends in Laos are afraid. The live
prisoners will be killed or moved. If
we hurry maybe we can rescue them.

Note: * The 5 digit no. is the number of the aircraft
generally on the National Database (NDB). The numbers are the for
this, even if the tail number is 10 digits in length. The number on the
the 5th side of the aircraft. For more info. see the attached Handy 70

Q.

I do not have and cannot get the real dogtags from the dead soldiers. My friend who had them was killed by someone who wanted them for money. Only he knew where the bodies were. Perhaps he told someone. My letter did not say this. I received the letter at the end of March but took this long in finding your name.

Since my English is not very good you can call my English teacher, who helped me write this letter, her name

deleted is _____ and her phone is _____

Her address is _____

I speak Lao and Thailand
Can talk to you through an interpreter
American only. I do not trust any
Asian people.

Please answer quickly.

Sincerely,

N.D. DIA refused to
give me the
name, residence
information, or
phone number of both
the source and
the English teacher.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

IMP!

Colonel V.J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach FL 32931

1. MAY 1990 Note!

Dear Colonel Donahue

We are in receipt of three classified documents that were originated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which have been associated with your son, Major Vincent J. Donahue. They are identified as follows:

CIA 0820222 Apr 87 (Secret), CIA Cite 391100
CIA 0919312 Jul 87 (Secret), CIA Cite 545934
CIA 1819162 Feb 88 (Secret), CIA Cite 907494

The CIA has declined release of sanitized copies of these documents to you under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, they have asked that we advise you of your right to appeal their decision in this regard through the CIA Information Review Committee. Their address is: Central Intelligence Agency, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Washington, D.C., 20505.

Please contact me on our toll free telephone line (800-531-5501) if you have further questions concerning this matter.

Sincerely

George E. Atkinson
GEORGE E. ATKINSON
Chief, Missing Persons Division

1 Atch
FOIA Exemption
Explanation Sheet

*1. Note: Sanitized documents are those from which the source of information and the method of collection of such information have been deleted. When this action has been taken, the documents are virtually anonymous and are not subject to the public domain. Obviously, the CIA does not subscribe to that procedure.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

19 DEC 1990

Colonel V. J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Reference: F88-1300

Dear Colonel Donahue:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your 23 November 1990 letter regarding three CIA documents located by the Air Force in response to your request to them for information regarding your son, Major Morgan Jefferson Donahue.

We will be in touch regarding your concerns in the near future. In the meantime, your patience and understanding will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

John H. Wright
John H. Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator

MFR

U.S. 1 Please no report to the Air Force for information regarding Morgan. Document this letter and the blue form the Air Force and the CIA. More documentation!

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

4405 later
29 APR 1991 date

Colonel V. J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

Reference: F88-1300

Dear Colonel Donahue:

This is a follow-up to our 19 December 1990 letter regarding your 23 November 1990 request for documents pertaining to your son, Major Morgan Jefferson Donahue, USAF.

We have finished our review of the three documents referred to in your 23 November letter and have forwarded our determinations to the Air Force for their direct response to you.

This concludes all CIA action on your request.

Sincerely,

John H. Wright
John H. Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-8001

Colonel V. J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
PO Box 1256
Cocoa Beach FL 32931

JUN 1991

Dear Colonel Donahue

As I promised in my 13 May 1991 telephone call, we have attached a copy of a sanitized report which was recently received from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Additionally, CIA officials requested we inform you that they are unable to confirm that the individual cited in this report is your son, nor can the agency vouch for the veracity of the information contained in the report.

The CIA further stated that they have reviewed the other two reports dated 8 April and 9 July 1987 and determined that both documents must continue to be withheld in their entirety.

Please continue to contact us if we can be of assistance to you.

Sincerely

William R. Frampton
WILLIAM R. FRAMPTON
Senior Liaison Officer
Missing Persons Division

- 2 Atch.
1. Explanation of Exemptions
2. Msg 181916Z Feb 88

W. R. Frampton

*Note letter of 21 Nov 91 from
Randolph - specifically the
asterisked paragraph wherein
these 3 documents are described
as "sanitized". It is that
paragraph (2) of the AF letter
of 14 May 91. Only one
document is considered releasable.
This is arbitrary & illegal!*

EXEMPTIONS

INFORMATION ACT:

- (X1) applies to material which is properly classified pursuant to an Executive order relating to national defense or foreign policy.
- (X2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices Agency;
- (X3) applies to the Director's statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence and methods, as well as the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, members of personnel employed by the Agency, in accord with the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949, respectively;
- (X4) applies to information such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person on a privileged or confidential basis;
- (X5) applies to inter- and intra-agency memoranda which are advisory in nature;
- (X6) applies to information release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals; and
- (X7) applies to investigatory records, release of which would (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source, (E) disclose investigatory techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.

PRIVACY ACT:

- (A) applies to information concerning other individuals which may not be released without their written consent;
- (B1) applies to polygraph records; documents or segregable portions of documents, release of which would disclose intelligence sources and methods, including names of certain Agency employees and organizational components; and, documents or information provided by foreign governments;
- (B2) applies to information and material properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (B3) applies to investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, or access to classified information, release of which would disclose a confidential source; and
- (B4) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process.

*Any or all of the above notations
cover the waterfront. The Agencies
are covered & keep from families when
we choose to withhold information
which is really releasable from the
hands of the missing men of the
American people!*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

Colonel V.J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
PO Box 1256
Cocoa Beach FL 32931

12 AUG 1991

Dear Colonel Donahue

As I promised in my 9 August 1991 telephone call, the attached letter which we recently received from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with attachments is forwarded for your information.

We are forwarding this material in keeping with our policy of providing everything we receive which relates to your son, Major Morgan J. Donahue.

If you have any questions concerning this information or if we can be of further assistance in this regard, please call us on our toll free telephone line (800-531-5501).

Sincerely

William R. Frampton
WILLIAM R. FRAMPTON
Senior Liaison Officer
Missing Persons & Inquiries Division

1 Atch
DIA/POW-MIA Letter,
U-0663, dated 1 Aug 91,
w/5 Enclosures.

FEB APR 1991

3

ZTUW BULHMGCA0146 1973170

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK TH 3414

1. SUMMARY: ON 18 JUL 91, US EMBASSY BANGKOK RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THAT CITIZEN. I

CLAIMS TO HAVE A TEAM WHICH LOCATED AND PHOTOGRAPHED
BONNAGE IN RESPONSE TO A DEMAND OFFER PUBLICIZED BY A
THAI COMPANY. REQUESTS THAT THE US EMBASSY VERIFY
THE COMPANY'S EXISTENCE AND PROVIDE DATA ON BONNAGE ALONG
WITH THE FAMILY CONTACT ADDRESS. ENCLOSURE TO SOURCE'S
LETTER IS A COPY OF THE DEMAND OFFER AND A COPY OF THE
PHOTO ALLEGEDLY TAKEN OF BONNAGE ON 4 JUL 01 AT AN
UNSPECIFIED PLACE IN LAOS.

2. TRANSLATION OF LETTER:

9 JULY 1951

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DETAILS ON THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN
PUS.
TO: AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
REF: ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRISONARY ENTERPRISE
ENCL: 1. COPY OF ANNOUNCEMENT (3 SET)
2. ONE PM INDEX

ACCORDING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRISONERS (ENCLOSURES 11-1801 TELEPHONE 314-687) TO ANNOUNCE THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN PW USAF CAPT NORMAN J. FLETCHER BOWEN, WHO DISAPPEARED DURING THE WAR IN LAOS ON 13 DECEMBER 1960, BOWEN WAS DISAPPEARED IN VARIOUS VILLAGES ALONG THE TULLI LAO BORDER IN SALANG PHONGN PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO THE DETAILS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT (ENCLOSURES) I REQUEST THE US EMBASSY TO INVESTIGATE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:

- 1. IS THERE REALLY A PERMANENT ENTERPRISE COMPANY?
IF SO WHERE IS IT LOCATED? HOW ARE THEY INVOLVED IN THIS
MATTER, OR IS THIS PROPAGANDA TO DECEIVE THE PEOPLE?

- 2. WHEN CAPTAIN ROMANIE IS FOUND WHAT WILL HAPPEN?

I WISH TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. PARENTS' HOMES
- 2. ADDRESS OF PARENTS AND PHONE NUMBER.
- 3. CONDITIONS OF THE PARENTS, E.G.:
 - 3.1 METHOD OF CONTACT WHEN NECESSARY IS FOUND
 - 3.2 LOCATION TO TURN OVER THE PV
 - 3.3 AVERAGE OF RETURN
 - 3.4 TIME LIMIT
 - 3.5 ONLY STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN

1. I SUSPECT THAT I AND MY TEAM SEARCHED OUT DOMAGNE AND DISCOVERED HE WAS HIDDEN ALIVE AND HELD UNDER LOCAL PROTECTION ALONG THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER AND IS LYING WITH A LAO WIFE, WITH DAUGHTER AND SON. THE TEAM QUESTIIONED CAPT DOMAGNE AND (HE) WANTS TO RETURN TO AMERICA IF BY MY TEAM WILL HELP HIM. DOMAGNE WANTS A LETTER FROM HIS FATHER AND A FAMILY PHOTO FROM THE U.S. AS EVIDENCE CAPT DOMAGNE CAN RELY ON. AT THE SAME TIME MY TEAM PHOTOGRAPHED DOMAGNE ON 4 JUL 91 (ENCLOSURE).

ACCORDINGLY I ASK FOR DETAILS.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNATURE)

P.S. CONTACT ME AT

1800 PRINCE

TRANSLATION OF ENCLOSURE TO LETTER OF PARA 2

ABOVE:
 BEGIN QUOTE
 PRICHMAN ENTERPRISE
 O. BOX 12-1250 TEL 314-4071

PAGE 3
HISTORY OF SOLDIER WHO DISAPPEARED IN VN - LACS
NAME MORGAN JEFFERSON SCHMIDT
NAME USAF CAPTAIN
NUMBER 640-887, 742 FR
DOB 2 MAY 1944 AGE 34
POB HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA USA
HEIGHT 180 CM
WEIGHT 79.2 KG
BT

SECTION 02 OF 02 LAMARCA TN 31145

SUBJECT: TIME CLAIMS TO HAVE FOUND MORGAN JEFFERSON
BONHAM IN RESPONSE TO BWARD POSTER (U)

MAIN DARK BROWN
 EYES BROWN/BLACK
 NAILS FILLING ON LOWER FRONT TOOTH
 CAPT BROWNE WAS PROMOTED TO CAPT AFTER HE DISAPPEARED.
 HE WAS FORMERLY A 1ST LT PILOT ASSIGNED TO UNIT 66 AT NKP
 AIRBASE (CAMBODIA). HIS DUTY WAS TO FIND DOWNING
 TARGETS AND DROP FLAMES AND BURNING OIL TO DOWN, BETWEEN
 AIR AND GROUNDLEVEL. WHEN HE CRASHED HE WAS 60 KILLES
 FROM HOCHMUTTEL.

ON THE MORNING OF 10 DEC 60 CAPT. BERNARD AND CREWMEN(S) TOTALING SEVEN PERSONS, CAME OFF THEIR ROUTINE MISSION WHILE CARRYING MATERIALS ABOARD HELICOPTER 057. WHILE IN FLIGHT, THE HELICOPTER BECAME UNSTABLE AND COLLIDED. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED, KILLING 057 CREWMAN BERNARD. THE C-123 CRASHED IN THE FOREST NEAR ROAD KM 104. AT ANY DATE, THE C-123 CREWMAN, WHO PROCEEDED BEFORE THE CRASH, LANDED IN A TREE AND SURVIVED WITH THE AID OF A HELICOPTER. UNTIL THE TIME HE WAS GIVEN CREWMAN(S) PANCHAS(5) IN THE DARK WOODS, HE COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE OTHER CREWMAN(S). THE C-123 CREWMAN GAVE AN INTERVIEW AT TWO AIRFIELD. THE C-123 AIRCRAFT WERE 75 KILOMETERS FROM THE AIRFIELD NEAR 31 PHONE VILLAGE NORTHWEST OF POMPONBE VILLAGE. A LAW RECORDED REPORT (SIC).

[illegible]

DOMENE'S FATHER TRAVELLED TO VIETNAM TO INVESTIGATE AND MEET WITH US OFFICIALS WHO SAID THAT MORE THAN 100

AMERICANS WERE UNDER DETENTION. THEY REFUSED TO IDENTIFY THE PRISONERS OR THE LOCATION WHERE THEY WERE HELD UNTIL AFTER THE WAR.

DOMANIK'S FATHER HAS CONTINUED TO INVESTIGATE AND IS CONVINCED DOMANIK IS ALIVE IN LAOS. THEREFORE HE WANTS TO KNOW IF SOMEONE IS ABLE TO HELP HIS SON OR PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINT HIM NOW, OR HELP HIM ESCAPE. HE WILL PROVIDE A REWARD, CONTACT HIM AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS, AND HE WILL FLY HERE TO TALK IMMEDIATELY.

ROMANUK'S FATHER GUARANTEES TO MAINTAIN SECRECY ABOUT ANYONE WHO HELPS BY NOT GIVING ANY OFFICIAL INTERVIEWS TO THE LAO OR THE AMERICANS.

ADDRESS OF DONALD'S FATHER
PO BOX 11-1254

PHOTO DONALD
PHOTO OF DONALD IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT
PHOTO TAKEN ON 45 JUL 91
END CLITE

4. NO COMMENT -- THE PHOTO HAS SHOWN UP PREVIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED TO PH "G-SEN". COPY OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOS WILL BE FORWARDED TO DIA/OW-MIA BY POLCH.

r



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

Colonel V.J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach, FL 32931

Dear Colonel Donahue

In our 14 Oct 1988 letter, we forwarded a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report containing information which allegedly related to your son, Major Morgan J. Donahue.

The photocopy maps mentioned in the DIA report, which were not available at the time we forwarded the material to you, are attached for your information and retention.

If we can be of further assistance, please contact us on our toll free telephone line (800-531-5501).

Sincerely

George E. Atkinson
GEORGE E. ATKINSON
Chief, Missing Persons Division

1 Atch
Maps

29 NOV 1988

MSGNO 94 (PCIX) *09/08/88 *05:09:35.0.0*
ICZC 10:08:02 (PC)
EMI DTG : 88090804203806
RTTSZTUM RUEKJCS6415 2520820-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS
R 080820Z SEP 88
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CHC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAH/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEACHC/CHC WASHINGTON DC
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 080811Z SEP 88
FM USDAO BANGKOK THAILAND//PW-MIA//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAH/DAH3//
INFO RUEADWD/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR CHILDRESS//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//J5/OJCS-PW-MIA//
RUHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DDO/PCS/LC/MIL//
RUHQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUEKRL/USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
RUEHGP/USDAO SINGAPORE
RUEHML/USDAO MANILA RP
RUEHKG/USDAO HONG KONG
BT
EZ1:

SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK THAILAN 46415

EZ2:
THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE
SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0456-88.
COUNTRY: (U) THAILAND (TH).
SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0456-88/NAMES OF ALLEGED
LIVE PW IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. THIS
REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 880822
SOURCE:

*NOTE: STONY BEACH
= DIA SECTION
HANDLING THE
MIA ISSUE*

SUMMARY:

SENSURED
PROVIDED A LIST OF VALID PW/MIA NAMES AND A MAP OF ANOTHER PW DETENTION SITE OBTAINED FROM LAO RESISTANCE SOURCES. ALLEGED US PW ARE SAID TO BE HELD IN EASTERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. ENCLOSURES. 1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SOURCE SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING TRANSCRIBED ENGLISH LANGUAGE LIST TO THE US NAVAL ATTACHE, BANGKOK. SOURCE STATED THAT THE NAMES ARE THOSE OF LIVE PW CAPTIVES PRESENTLY HELD IN LAOS WHICH WERE FURNISHED TO *SENSURED* BY LAO RESISTANCE PERSONNEL (MFI). THE ORIGINAL IS FORWARDED AS AN ENCLOSURE.

REDACTED	CAPT	USAF
REDACTED	T/SGT	USAF
REDACTED	CAPT	USAF
REDACTED	T/SGT	USAF
REDACTED	CAPT	USAF

WORGAN DONAHUE
SINCE ALL NAMES CROSSCHECKED WITH VALID MIA CASES.

STONY BEACH REQUESTED THAT THE US NAVAL ATTACHE TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH SOURCE. THIS MEETING OCCURRED ON 22 AUG 88 AT 1830 HOURS.


2. AT THIS MEETING, SOURCE PRESENTED STONY BEACH INTERVIEWERS WITH A PHOTOCOPY OF A MAP SKETCH OF THE SITE WHERE ADDITIONAL LIVE US PW ARE ALLEGED TO BE HELD. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS SKETCH WAS ALSO OBTAINED FROM LAO RESISTANCE PERSONNEL. IT BEARS THE APPARENT UTM COORDINATES "(XD.6537)", PROBABLY //UTMCOORDS 88XD6537//, WHICH WOULD PLACE THE SITE IN EASTERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. THE PHOTOCOPY MAP IS FORWARDED AS AN ENCLOSURE.

3. SOURCE DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERTAINING TO THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE TWO DOCUMENTS, AND STATED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR STONY BEACH TO MEET THE RESISTANCE PERSONNEL INVOLVED. SOURCE DID, HOWEVER, INVITE STONY BEACH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THESE DOCUMENTS OR OTHER ITEMS/AREAS OF INTEREST. THE QUESTIONS ARE TO BE PASSED TO SOURCE THROUGH *SENSURED*

4. TWO DAYS LATER, THE US NAVAL ATTACHE PASSED STONY BEACH TWO PHOTOCOPY MAP SECTIONS PROVIDED BY SOURCE. BOTH ARE OF EASTERN SAVANNAKHET

PROVINCE. ONE HAS A MARKER HIGHLIGHTING COORDINATES XD6537, APPARENTLY THE POINT DESCRIBED IN BT 66415 NNNN NNDD

*Not included
in that which
I received.*



R 180649Z NOV 85 PA 039699P36

SUBJ: JCRC RPT TAY-605; HEARSAY OF AMERICAN PRISONERS
IN LAOS

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE REPORTS HEARSAY OF 260 AMERICANS CURRENTLY BEING HELD IN A CAVE IN LAOS. SOURCE STATED THAT IS ABLE TO OBTAIN RECENT PHOTOGRAPHS OF SEVERAL OF THE PRISONERS

WHICH WERE OBTAINED FROM A LAO CONTACT.

3. INFORMATION: SOURCE REPORTS THAT "WITHIN THE PAST MONTH" HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH A LAO WHO HAS TOLD ABOUT AND SHOWN PROOF OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WHO ARE BEING HELD IN LAOS. SOURCE STATED THAT THE LAO, WHOSE NAME DOES NOT WISH TO REVEAL AT THIS TIME, RECENTLY CROSSED INTO THAILAND FROM LAOS AND MADE CONTACT WITH SOURCE. THE LAO TOLD THAT HE HAD OBSERVED A LOCATION IN RUGGED MOUNTAINS IN THE TRI-BORDER (LAOS, VIETNAM, CAMBODIA) AREA WHERE 260 AMERICANS ARE PRESENTLY BEING HELD. SOURCE WAS TOLD THAT UNTIL RECENTLY THERE WERE 270 PRISONERS, BUT TEN HAD DIED DUE TO POOR HEALTH. SOURCE STATED THAT HAD MAILED A LIST OF SIX NAMES TO JCRC AND INQUIRED IF JCRC REP HAD RECEIVED THE LIST. WHEN INFORMED THAT JCRC HAD NOT RECEIVED SUCH A LIST OR ANY OTHER MAIL FROM SOURCE, SOURCE STATED THAT COULD ONLY RECALL THAT ONE OF THE SIX PEOPLE ON LIST WAS A MAN NAMED "MR. MORGAN." STATED THAT RECALLED THIS NAME BECAUSE IT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE, BUT WHEN ASKED WHY, WASN'T SURE.

4. SOURCE STATED THAT HIS LAO CONTACT HAD COME TO THE AREA HIMSELF AND OBSERVED THAT THE 260 PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD IN A CAVE AT THE FOOT OF A LARGE KARST MOUNTAIN. THERE IS ONLY A SINGLE ROAD INTO THE VALLEY, AND IT IS WELL GUARDED; ONLY RESUPPLY TRUCKS TO THE CAVE-PRISON ARE ALLOWED IN. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, LAO CONTACT IS RELATED TO ONE OF THE GUARDS WHO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HELPING THE AMERICAN PRISONERS RETURN TO FREEDOM IF HE AND HIS MEN COULD ALSO BE ACCOMMODATED. SOURCE SAID THAT THE LAO SHOWED HIM SIX RECENTLY SHOT COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH SHOWED EIGHT OR NINE OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS AT THE CAVE-PRISON. SOURCE SAID THAT DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE CAVE, BUT THAT HIS FRIEND HAD BEEN THERE AND COULD PROBABLY DRAW A MAP SHOWING THE LOCATION.

*Notice how
the Govt treats
live sightings in Laos
on news.*

** Thanks
to the duplica-
tion of the
US Govt.*

Ex/ (2)

5. SOURCE STATED THAT WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE, BUT INSISTED IN KNOWING THE TERMS OF THE 2.4 MILLION DOLLAR REWARD. HAD HEARD ABOUT IN THE NEWS RECENTLY. JCRC REP EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS NOT OFFERING A REWARD AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE PRIVATE GROUP WHO IS ADVERTISING THE REWARD. JCRC REP ALSO POINTED OUT THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INQUIRING RECENTLY ABOUT THE REWARD, AND CAUTIONED SOURCE NOT TO BE TOO QUICK TO BELIEVE EVERY RUMOR HEARS. SOURCE INSISTED THAT THE INFORMATION WAS VALID, STATING THAT SAW THE PHOTOS HIMSELF. JCRC REP IMPRESSED ON SOURCE THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE GROUP WHO WAS OFFERING THE REWARD WAS SINCERE, NOTHING COULD BE DONE UNTIL THE USG HAD A CHANCE TO EVALUATE THE INFORMATION SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE. SOURCE AGREED, AND SAID WOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE PHOTOS AND A MAP SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE CAVE AND SEND THEM TO JCRC BY REGISTERED MAIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DEPENDING ON WHEN SEES LAO SINCE NEXT.

*This is
the reason
the Congress
won't have
it put together
for our justice
system. Further
the Congress
will never
act on this
news.
It has the
State Dept
with its absurd
CIA agencies
(DoD, CIA, DIA)
highly upset
by it. The
Govt has
more than
offered money
recently.*

NI
EXPENSE

1 160605Z DEC 87 PS: 697053P30

FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

O CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

NFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

IA WASHINGTON DC//VD-PA//

ECDEF WASHDC//JASD-TSA/PA-MIA//

MCDNSUL UODRN

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//VSC/MR CHILDRESS//

JCS WASHDC//JS/PA-MIA//

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

7BJ: JCRC RPT T87-0851 POM HUNTER REPORTS OFFER
TO AMERICAN POW BIO-DATA

SUMMARY: SOURCE REPORTS A CONTACT

DURING WHICH

DISPLAYED BIOGRAPHIC DATA AND A FINGERPRINT CARD OF AN
ALLEGED AMERICAN POW.

SOURCE STATED THAT RECENTLY
INTERCEPTED ONE OF SOURCE'S "MEN" AND INFORMED HIM
THAT HE HAD INFORMATION ABOUT AN AMERICAN PRISONER. HE
THEN SHOWED SOURCE'S "MAN" TWO PIECES OF PAPER; ONE WAS
PRINTED BIO-FORM FILLED IN IN HANDWRITING. SOURCE'S
MAN RECALLED THAT THE NAME ON THE FORM WAS "MORGAN SAY-
JAY" (SOURCE'S OWN PHONETIC SPELLING). THE OTHER PIECE
OF PAPER WAS CHEMICALLY TREATED TO TAKE FINGERPRINTS AND
ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED THE LATENT FINGERPRINTS OF THE
AMERICAN PRISONER.

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX041 MCN = 89236/44163 TOR = 892362345

ATTICZYUW RUEKJCS8475 2362342-CCCC--RUEALGX.

ZNY CCCCC

HEADER

R 242342Z AUG 89

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

R 241825Z AUG 89

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

TO RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

INFO RUEHBK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUMQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

BT

CONTROLS

C-0961/PW-MIA

BODY

SUBJ: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE LAO SOURCE IN THAILAND WITH PW INFO (U)

REFS: A. DIA/PW-MIA MSG 151945Z MAY 89, SUBJ: POSSIBLE LAO

SOURCE IN THAILAND WITH PW INFO (U).

B. DIA/PW-MIA MSG 121940Z JUN 89, SUBJ: SAME AS REF A.

1. THIS IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF UPDATES ON LETTERS SENT
FROM THAI RESIDENT

2. IN HIS LATEST LETTER, DATED 22 JULY 1989, STATES
THAT AMERICAN POW CAPTAIN MORGAN DONAHUE IS BEING HELD IN THE
AREA OF LAO BAO, ON THE LAO-VIETNAM BORDER, AND THAT WITH THE SUM
OF 30,000 BAHT, CAN GET BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FROM HIS
SOURCES WITH REGARD TO DONAHUE. ASKS THAT HIS NAME NOT
SHOW ON CORRESPONDENCE (BEARING THE MONEY) FROM BUT
THAT THE MONEY BE SENT IN CARE OF LAO REFUGEE

3. ENCLOSED WITH LETTER IS A PHOTOGRAPH OF AN
ALLEGED PW, WITH THE ANNOTATION, "BENTSONT BILLY, H-J-R, 418-70-
7247A, CATHOLIC, USA". THE NAME BILLY BENSON FIRST SHOWED UP IN
REPORTING IN 1987 WITH CLAIMS THAT HE WAS A PW. THE NAME IS
BOGUS; THERE IS NO ONE NAMED BENTSONT, BENTSON, OR BENSON MISSING
OR UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

ADMIN

BT

18475

WJMM

*(1,500.00 U.S.)

SECTION 11 OF THE SCHEDULED TRADING ACT, 2002

SI01A1 (U) 170 6 024 0317-81.

CONTR: (U) LROS (LAL)

SUBJECT: 119 G 024 0317-00/WEARSAY OF ALLEGED PH
IN KHOUANG AND SON HUA (P), LA. (U)

MARKING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET PERFORM.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EO: (U) 60342C

REQS: (U) 9-WF-7430-2A
SOURCE:

[illegible][illegible]

2. : ACCORDING TO THE LAO CAPTAIN, CAPTAIN
HORGAN'S FATHER, VINCENT JEFFREY SON HORGAN, FAILED IN
AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HIS SON LAST YEAR THROUGH AN LNC
CONDUCTED HEADED BY : THE
FATHER WAS MADE CONTACT WITH ANOTHER LNC, AND TWO OF
THE FATHER'S REPRESENTATIVES, A MISSIONAL NE OF
PHAP (NFI), WILL ARRIVE IN THAILAND IN LATE APRIL FOR
DISCUSSION WITH THE GROUP CONCERNING "HORGAN'S"
RESCUE. THE "CAPTAIN" CLAIMED THAT HE HAS A NUMBER OF
THIS LNC BUT DID NOT PROVIDE THE LOCATION OF THE
MEETING.

3. -) THE LHM "CAPTAIN" ALSO MENTIONED THAT AN AMERICAN CITIZEN LIVING IN BROWN, WAS RECENTLY DISCOVERED. THE "CAPTAIN" FURTHER CLAIMED THAT HIS GROUP INCLUDED A LAD FROM SUMMITTOWN PROJECT WHO HAD BEEN 32 "PP" WORKING ON AN AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION PROJECT IN SUM MITTOWN SOMETIME IN THE RECENT PAST, AND WAS PREPARED TO GO BACK AND TAKE PHOTOS. THE LAD WAS ONLY IDENTIFIED AS: CAME AN ELEPHANT USED FOR FIELD CLEARING PROJECTS.

SECTION 02 OF 02 HANGLOU TOL/PK- 20024

THIS IS A STORY REACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) ITN 6 824 0317-00

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

SUBJECT: ITB 6 024 0317-00/HEARSAY OF ALLEGED PW

4. TO BE USED BY THE "PANTS MEN" TO BE USED BY THE "PANTS MEN"

TO GIVE THEIR COOPERATION TO THE "CAPTAIN".
 BUT HE WAS TO BECOME INVOLVED AND PERISHED

Attn: Dana Chwan
MS 10420

Phone (013) 932-5183
063-6535

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY OF service record

[illegible]

[REDACTED] JAPANESE BANGKOK TH 30591
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] 3330 MAY 85.
 [REDACTED]
 WFO NEW ARTICLE - AMERICANS IN CAPABILITY, AND
 NEW-THAT-1981
 NEW-THAT-1981

... THAT AN ARTICLE WAS JUST BEEN CALLED TO OUR ATTENTION WHICH APPEARED IN THE HAI LANGUAGE "HONG KONG" MAGAZINE, ISSUE OF 15 APRIL 1953. THE ARTICLE IS LOCATED ON THE FRONT PAGE, BUT THE TEXT APPEARS ON PAGES 4 AND 7. THE INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

[illegible]

HOW CAN ANY AMERICAN READING THIS NOT DEMAND YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE ACTION

Classification cancelled (changed to UNCLASSIFIED)
by authority of CAC, JACC, BARBER, MORGAN
WAC 231010000 JUN 85

UNCLASSIFIED

ARMED GUARDS WERE GUARDING THE DETAINEES.

BEIDES THIS CAMP, THERE ARE 21 AMERICAN SOLDIERS WILL BE RESTRAINED IN THE CAMP OF MUANG KHAMHEU IN MUANG KHAMHEU PROVINCE. SO ALTOGETHER THERE ARE 74 AMERICAN PRISONERS.

THE LAB LIBERATION SOLDIER ALSO INFORMED THAT FROM THE GROUP OF 53 AMERICANS, 3 ARE NOT QUALIFIED BECAUSE THEY ARE OLD. THESE THREE ARE ASSIGNED TO GET FOOD, AND THEY ARE PERMITTED TO GO TO THE VILLAGE TO GET FOOD FOR THE OTHER AMERICANS. ALTHOUGH THERE THREE ARE ONLY ONE AND ARE ELECTED AMONGST THEM, TWO IN THE

-- REGARDING THE OTHER 21 AMERICANS DETAINED AT MANAGAHUAT, IT IS REPORTED THAT 8 OF THE MEN HAVE DIED IN PRISON SINCE THEY WERE TAKEN IN 1951.

THE LAO LIBERATION SOLDIER ALSO INFORMED THAT THEY HAVE ACCUMULATED THE CORPSES OF 5 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AT THE LAO BEE. THE AMERICAN CORPSES ARE

1. MR. GUY WILL-LA GRANGE ILLINOIS.

77. MR. WENZEL CHARLES ILLINOIS 170387292 P. 053.
ROMAN CATHOLIC.

1. MR. SIMONS REQUESTED 092420715.

3 FOR THE OTHER 2 CORPSES. THEY ARE STILL UNIDENTIFIED.
END OF ARTICLE.

1. ICI DOUG OF ABOVE NAME'S CORRELATE TO AIR FORCE
MEMBERS WINTER, CHARLES J III REFNO 1807-0-021, AND
TIMPSON, ROBERT E. REFNO 1807-0-091. COPY OF THE
ARTICLE ABOVE IS BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO BDM
AND DIA.
REF: OADR

11-16403

333

ON THIS IMMEDIATELY!!



NATIONAL
FORGIVE-ME-NOT ASSOC.
FOR POW-MIA'S, INC.

WALTER B. O'REILLY
National Director
Co-Chairman Special Events

National Hdqrs. P.O. Box 1872
P.O. Box 14489 New Port Richey, FL 34856-1872
Brandon, FL 34200 (813) 648-3017

1402 JAN 08 PS 1706750P33

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

J CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI//PRIORITY//

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36// PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC//J2-Pa// PRIORITY JCS WASHDC//J5/Pa-MIA// PRIORI
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE AMCONSUL UDDOM
AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//NPCC//
SECDEF WASHDC//JASD-ISA/Pa-MIA// PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/HR CHILDRESS// PRIORITY

BT

SECTION 01 OF 03 LIAISON BANGKOK 00004

JAN 80
SUBJ: JCRC RPT T83-01;

2. SUMMARY: SOURCE ALSO PROVIDED THE NAMES OF THREE ALLEGED AMERICAN PRISONERS WHICH THE VIETNAMESE WERE CONSIDERING RELEASING TO GENERAL VESSEY ON THE OCCASION OF HIS VISIT TO HANOI IN AUGUST 1987. END SUMMARY.

11. ASKED JCRC REP IF HE WAS AWARE THAT DURING THE AUGUST "VESSEY VISIT" TO HANOI, THE VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO TURN OVER SEVEN OR EIGHT LIVE POW'S. VESSEY "TOLD THEM THAT THEY WANTED TO HEAR". IT TURNED OUT, HE CONTINUED, THAT VESSEY WAS NOT AS FORTHCOMING AS THEY HAD HOPED, AND SO NO PRISONERS WERE TURNED OVER. SOURCE STATED THAT IN THE MEETING, HE

PROVIDED HIM WITH THE NAMES OF THREE OF THE AMERICANS THE VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO RELEASE. THEY WERE AMERICAN REMAINS.

ALL THE PROSPECTIVE RETURNEES WERE ALLEGEDLY HELD IN A LOCATION ON THE LAO SIDE OF THE LAO/VIETNAM BORDER DURING THE TALKS. SOURCE STATED THAT AFTER PROVIDING THE ABOVE INFORMATION, CONTACT WITH HIM

Bud

Rader

Someone just mailed me this paper in 17

50-714 264



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

Colonel V.J. Donahue, USAF, Retired
Box 1256
Cocoa Beach FL 32931

2 OCT 1991

Dear Colonel Donahue

The attached document, which we recently received from the Department of State, has been declassified/sanitized and is forwarded for your information.

Contact us when we can be of assistance to you.

Sincerely

William R. Frampton

WILLIAM R. FRAMPTON
Senior Liaison Officer
Missing Persons & Inquiries Division

1 Atch
JCRC LNO 011231Z
Apr 86 Message

000104
 0 011301 000 00
 FM JCRC DAIJON BANGLA DH
 TO - CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
 INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J306//
 JCS WASHDC//J5//
 SECRET WASHDC//POLSD//SAFPM-MJ//
 DIA WASHINGTON DC//DIO-PH//
 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC/NM CHALLENGE//
 SECSTATE WASHDC//DIP/PS/C//
 AMEMBASSY USDAOH
 AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
 AFMPC BANGLA PHM APO TS//PMPC//

~~SECTION 02 OF 02 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 10-085~~

REF: [REDACTED] 2243 100 04

SECRETION 02 OF 02-100000-00-00

1993

COL. JAC. - 11. COL. BATHUR

TAGS: NOPS, LA
SUBJECT: SANCOS II PROGRAM

8. [REDACTED] STATED THAT JEFF BONGHOM, BROTHER OF
HIA HONGAN BONGHOM, IS CURRENTLY DURING FEW
POW SEARCH EFFORTS INTO LARS (WHO ARE IN CAMBODIA
AND TWO ARE IN SAMARONI, HE STATED THAT JEFF
BONGHOM WORKS FOR HONG CAMBODIA IN HONG BONG
BUT TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO THAILAND.

8. CONRAD ASKED [REDACTED] IF HE COULD REVEAL THE NAMES OF THE "FINANCIAL BACKLIES" ALLIRED TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SEC. [REDACTED] RESPONDED THAT ALL SUCH [REDACTED] WOULD BE TOLD THAT THEY INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. [REDACTED] SAID HE PUT UP LITTLE MONEY BUT WAS PROUD OF HIS SHARE IN THE [REDACTED] BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] CAN SHOW RESULTS. [REDACTED] CLAIMS THAT [REDACTED] WAS CONTRIBUTED "GROWTH" AND THAT HE [REDACTED] HAS SEEN THE CANCELLED CHECKS. HE ADDED [REDACTED] THAT [REDACTED]

ALLEGEDLY WAS TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE REGRETTED THAT HE COULD NOT DO MORE TO RECOVER AMERICAN ASKS WHILE HE WAS PRESIDENT; THAT WATERGATE DISTRACTED HIS ATTENTION AND EFFORTS. NOW, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] FEELS THAT HE MUST TRY TO MAKE UP FOR THE PAST BY SUPPORTING PRIVATE EFFORTS TO RECOVER THE FUND.

7. BEGIN COMMENT: IN PASS ALONG THE ABOVE FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH. EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD TURN OVER ALL OF HIS PERSONAL INFORMATION TO THE CHIEF, IN CONTINUOUS, HOWEVER, TO REFUSE TO DEAL WITH ANY OTHER NEG. OFFICIAL. CHIEF WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP THE [REDACTED] CHANNEL OPEN AND REPORT ACCORDINGLY AS REQUESTED BY CHIEFS BUREAU AND WASHINGTON OFFICE. AT THE SAME TIME, CHIEF WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE [REDACTED] TO DEAL WITH CHIEF AND REPRESENTATIVES. PARTICULARLY

ACTION INFO CJCJ(4) 03:19 2011 23:01 0005(4) 2471
CNC 00(1) SECDEF(01) USDP(11) ASD-PH(11) US-PW(2)
DPR(01) AT-2(1) NM-2(1) NM-2(1) NM-2(1) NM-2(1)

+ICE WASHINGTON DC
 +CSA WASHINGTON DC
 +CRO WASHINGTON DC
 +CSA WASHINGTON DC
 +AMPL FT ATTORNEY

8201
S17 1111 111

WMA SPENT LIQUID 60

AFTER CONSUL TRANSFERS FROM UDORN IN EARLY JULY
BRING UNCLAS. MCI: CAGR B)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

21 AUGUST 1987

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF

1. BACKGROUND: ON 7 AUGUST 1987, DIRECTED THAT AN INTERVIEW BE CONDUCTED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL WITH

FOR THE PURPOSE OF

OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION PURPORTEDLY REGARDING U.S. PW'S
 STILL IN CAPTIVITY IN THE AREA BETWEEN SEPONE, LAOS AND KHE
 SANH. SRV. SOMETIME BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF

FORWARDED TO A FROM CONTAINING THE
INFORMATION HAD IN HIS POSSESSION. I LATER INFORMED
BY TELEPHONE THAT I WISHED TO INTERVIEW
DIRECTLY AND SET UP A TIME AND DATE FOR THE INTERVIEW;
SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO MEET ME AT

A. HAD REPORTED OTHER INFORMATION DURING 1986 THAT PROVED TO BE OF NO VALUE. HE ALSO UNDERWENT A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGARDING THAT INFORMATION THAT RESULTED IN INDICATIONS THAT HE WAS DECEPTIVE TO QUESTIONS RELATING TO DELIBERATELY PROVIDING FALSE PW/MIA INFORMATION AND CONSPIRING WITH OTHERS TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION TO THE USG. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] WANTED TO "CLEAR HIS NAME" BY PROVIDING FURTHER INFORMATION.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

REF ID: A66913

Confidential - 1
+ to ally source
document

B. AFTER ARRIVING IN ON 13 AUG 1987, :
 CONTACTED AND MET WITH IN HIS OFFICE WHERE HE
 REITERATED HIS DISLIKE FOR (HE HAD DONE SO OVER THE
 TELEPHONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS DURING THE PERIOD WHEN I WAS
 NEGOTIATING FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH WHEN ASKED
 WHY HE MAINTAINED A RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HE
 OBVIOUSLY DISTRUSTED, RESPONDED THAT HE DOES SO IN
 THE HOPE THAT PW/MIA INFORMATION MAY PROVE
 ACCURATE. ALSO DURING THE 13TH OF AUGUST, I MET WITH
 IN WHO INFORMED ME THAT IS
 CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FOR
 POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE NEUTRALITY ACT. IS ALSO
 OF INTEREST TO THE DEA.

2. ON 14 AUGUST 1987, I MET WITH AND INTERVIEWED
 HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
 INFORMATION.

A. DURING A DINNER MEETING IN AUG 1986 THAT HAD BEEN
 ARRANGED BY, KNOWN ASSOCIATE OF
 MET A MAN NAMED AMONG OTHERS AT
 THE MEETING WAS AN INDIVIDUAL CALLED ALSO AN
 PROCLAIMED LAO RESISTANCE
 LEADER. THE DINNER WAS ARRANGED IN ORDER FOR

MEET PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE OR SEARCH FOR
 US PW/MIA INFORMATION. SINCE THAT MEETING, HAS
 MAINTAINED OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH IS
 DESCRIBED AS ABOUT

B. AFTER A TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH (DATE
 UNRECALLED MET WITH HIM AT ROOM IN HIS -
 HOTEL IN BANGKOK, THE MEETING TOOK PLACE ON
 APPROXIMATELY 20 JUL 1987. NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT.
 STATED THAT LAO CHINESE "SCOUTS" FROM A
 ORGANIZATION HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A FORAY NEAR THE
 LAO/VIETNAM BORDER AND PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION ON US
 PW'S AND GAVE SIX PHOTOGRAPHS OF AN ALLEGED AMERICAN
 PW AND OF THE CAMP IN WHICH HE WAS KEPT. THE PHOTOS WERE
 TAKEN ABOUT 45 TO 60 DAYS PRIOR TO THE

(SEE ATTACHED PHOTOS). ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THEY SAID THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 US PW'S ARE BEING KEPT AT VARIOUS CAMPS IN GROUPS OF SEVEN TO TEN IN AN AREA BETWEEN SAPHONE, LAOS AND KHE SANH, SRV. THE SENIOR PRISONER WAS A MAN NAMED "MORGAN" WHO REPORTEDLY HAS A FAMILY IN TAMPA, FLORIDA. MORGAN WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE WRITTEN A LETTER IN 1968 TO [REDACTED]

HOW THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY THE SCOUTS WAS UNCLEAR TO [REDACTED]

ANOTHER AMERICAN PW KEPT IN THE CAMP WAS A MAN [REDACTED]

WHO

SUFFERS FROM A PARTIAL MEMORY LOSS. SOME OF THE PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN "MENTAL ISOLATION" AND SOME WERE NARCOTICS ADDICTS ACCORDING TO THE SCOUTS. THE AREA IN WHICH THE PW'S WERE KEPT WAS PROTECTED BY [REDACTED] (VIETNAMESE). [REDACTED] COULD PROVIDE NO FURTHER AMPLIFYING INFORMATION.

C. ON ABOUT THE 28TH OF JULY, 1967, [REDACTED] MET AGAIN [REDACTED] MET WITH [REDACTED] IN A DIFFERENT ROOM. [REDACTED] WOULD NOT DISCLOSE EXACTLY WHICH ONE. AT THAT MEETING [REDACTED] SIMPLY PROVIDED [REDACTED] WITH A HAND SKETCHED MAP OF THE LAO/VIETNAM BORDER REGION FROM THE EAST CHINA SEA TO THE SAVANNAKET AREA. ON THE MAP AN AREA IS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD WRITTEN ON THIS DOCUMENT WHICH WAS APPROXIMATELY 11X14 INCHES IN SIZE. HE WROTE THE ENGLISH AND THE ARABIC NUMERALS. THE OTHER WRITING ON IT IS IN LAO. ACCOMPANYING THE SKETCH ON A SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER WAS AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE LAO; THEY ARE MOSTLY PLACE NAMES AND CORRESPOND TO THE ARABIC NUMERALS [REDACTED] HAD WRITTEN ON THE SKETCH. [REDACTED] COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT PROVIDE A NARRATIVE OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH [REDACTED] ON THIS OCCASION EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE MAP WAS OF THE AREA IN WHICH THE CAMPS WHERE THE 50 US PW'S ARE KEPT. HE WOULD NOT FURNISH THE ORIGINAL (WHICH WAS A XEROX COPY) AND PROVIDED INSTEAD AN 8X10 INCH COPY.

D. [REDACTED] CONSIDERS THE INFORMATION "SOFT" AND STATED THAT HE REQUESTED [REDACTED] TO OBTAIN FURTHER PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE AMERICANS IN THE BORDER REGION. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PHOTOS ARE SO UNDEREXPOSED AS TO BE ALMOST USELESS BUT SUGGESTED THAT THE DIA COULD DO SOMETHING TO ENHANCE THEIR QUALITY. HE SAID THAT [REDACTED] WAS TO GET IN CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE U.S. AS SOON AS HE COULD GET FURTHER PROOF. [REDACTED] DID NOT AT FIRST WISH TO DIVULGE NAME BECAUSE HE WANTED TO MAINTAIN SOLE CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] AND DID NOT WANT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USG QUESTIONING [REDACTED] DIRECTLY. AFTER IT WAS EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT SOME OF

THE PERSONS WITH WHOM HE HAD DEALT DURING 1986 HAD
CONNECTIONS WITH THE SRV INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND THAT
NEEDED TO KNOW ALL INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED,
RELUCTANTLY GAVE NAME AND DESCRIPTION.

E. I REQUESTED THAT CONTACT ME DIRECTLY IN THE
FUTURE, FURNISHED HIM WITH FOUR OF THE OFFICE'S TELEPHONE
NUMBERS AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO CALL COLLECT. HE WAS
CAUTIONED THAT HE SHOULD NOT INTIMATE TO ANYONE THAT HE
WORKS FOR THE DIA, NOR WAS HE BEING TASKED BY US TO DO
ANYTHING. AS IN THE PAST, ANY INFORMATION THAT HE COULD
PROVIDE WOULD BE WELCOMED.

F. ONE OF THE TOPICS TOUCHED UPON DURING THE INTERVIEW
WAS ALLEGED MEETING WITH OF
BANGKOK. HAD INFORMED ME DURING A RECENT VISIT
THERE THAT HAD COME TO HIM STATING THAT WAS
IN THAILAND TDY FROM THE DIA AND REQUESTED ADVANCE FUNDING
FOR HIS TRIP. OF COURSE, DEMURRED. WHEN THIS
WAS BROUGHT UP DURING THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW,
DENIED THAT HE TOLD HE WAS TDY FROM THE DIA, THAT
WAS A SUPPOSED SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR PW/MIA INFORMATION
AND SIMPLY WAS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE
MIGHT NOT HAVE TO USE HIS OWN MONEY WHILE HE WAS WAITING FOR

MEN TO PRODUCE THE FACTS THAT NEVER
WORKED FOR THE DIA, AND DOES NOT NOW WORK FOR WERE
EMPHASIZED TO HIM.

3. ON 17 AUGUST 1987, I REQUESTED TO DETERMINE
IF THE PHOTOGRAPHS PROVIDED BY THE ONE PROVIDED BY
AND THE "MAT" PHOTO ALLEGED TO BE OF
WERE OF THE SAME INDIVIDUAL AND TAKEN
AT THE SAME LOCALE.

4. ON 17 AUGUST 1987, A
SEARCH WAS MADE FOR ANY UNIT NUMBERED IT
WAS FOUND THAT A REGIMENT SUBORDINATE TO AN UNIT
LOCATED IN EXISTS, AND A
REGIMENT WITH THAT NUMBER IS SUBORDINATE TO THE
OF THE. SINCE THE LATTER IS A
UNIT, A PORTION OF IT MAY BE LOCATED
ALONG WHICH TRAVERSES THE AREA DEPICTED BY
THE SKETCH. THERE IS NO BRIGADE,
IN OUR HOLDINGS.

5. COMMENTING ON THE QUALITY OF THE LAO LANGUAGE ON
THE SKETCH MAP, NATIVE LAO SPEAKER SAID THAT
THE INDIVIDUAL WHO DID THE WRITING WAS PROBABLY
ABOVE THE THIS CONCLUSION WAS BASED ON

R 090516Z SEP 87 PS: 167415F26

FM JCRC LIAISON HANOI TH

TO CDH JCRC BARREWS P1 H1

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//

JCS WASHDC//J5/PW-MIA//

SECDEF WASHDC//DASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMCONSUL UDORN

DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAH/DAH-3//

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//AS/LR CHILDRESS//

SUBJ: JCRC RPT 147-3441

MEMBER INVOLVED

WITH MIA SEARCH

REF: A. USDAO HANOI/PW-MIA 070633Z AUG 87: IIR 6 024

0053 87

B. DIA/DAH-3 022316Z SEP 87 (IIR 6 024 0053 87

EVAL)

HE DECIDED TO QUIT HIS ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE CASE: MORGAN JEFFERSON DONAHUE. SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT GAVE HIM A COPY OF A FLYER WRITTEN IN LAO EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DONAHUE'S LOSS. SOURCE LATER OBTAINED INFORMATION ABOUT AN INCIDENT WHICH HE BELIEVES MAY RELATE TO DONAHUE (WHICH WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPARATE REPORT.) SOURCE SAID HE FELT SORRY FOR THE FAMILY, AND WISHED TO 074 73 503 33-5 2881 03 73/83131 -6 83-53 59 59,-0738 CASE.

Note - New found from King



Department of State

TELEGRAM

14

POL 27-7 VIET

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 082

PAGE 01 SAIGON 10389 111159Z

43
ACTION OPN-01

INFO OCT-01: EA-11 AOP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 OODE-00 PM-07 M-02 INK-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 AS-01 10-13 RSR-01 /WBB M 056328

O 111035Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2984

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAIGON 10389

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MOPS, VS
SUBJECT: PW REPORT BY NVA DEFECTOR

REF: STATE 112133

1. NVA RALLIEN/DEFECTOR NGUYEN THANH SON WAS SURFACED BY GVN TO PRESS JUNE 7 IN SAIGON. IN FOLLOW UP INTERVIEW WITH AP, UP, AND NBC AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS, QUESTIONS ELICITED INFORMATION THAT HE HAD SEEN SIX PRISONERS WHOM HE BELIEVED WERE AMERICANS WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN RELEASED. AMERICAN OFFICER PRESENT AT INTERVIEW REQUESTED NEWS SERVICES TO PLAY DOWN DE-
TAILS, AP MENTION WAS CONSISTENT WITH EMERGO REQUEST, WHILE UP AND NBC AFTER TALK WITH EMERGO PRESS OFFICER OMITTED ITEM ENTIRELY FROM THEIR STORIES.

2. DETAILS OF RALLIEN'S ACCOUNT BEING REPORTED SEPTU THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS BY BRIGHT LIGHT MESSAGE TODAY.
WHITEHOUSE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
RECEIVED BY <u>SS</u>	DATE <u>1-29-87</u>
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE	
TS AUTH.	REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐	
DECLASSIFIED ☐ RELEASABLE ☒	
RELEASE DENIED ☐	
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS	

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ROUTINE

R 091900Z MAR 88 PSN 119755P28

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36// DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 JCS WASHINGTON DC//JCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//

NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT T87-485 (U)

A. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 160605Z DEC 87

1. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
 SOURCE OF REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC FILES. THIS
 IS NOT A FINAL EVALUATION.

2. "MORGAN SAYSON" IS NOT AN UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUAL.
 EVAL - RLJ

NOTE: "Sayson" is a Lao pronunciation
 of Jafferson (Morgan's middle name)
 & has been known to him!

ROUTINE

R 081900Z JAN 88 PSN 798796P46

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36// DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PH//
 SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
 WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
 JCS WASHINGTON DC//JCJCS-PW-MIA/J5//

NSC FOR MR. CHILDRESS

SUBJ: EVALUATION OF RPT T87-344

A. JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH 090516Z SEP 87

1. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
 SOURCE OF REF A, REVEALS NO CORRELATION TO DATA IN JCRC
 FILES. THIS IS NOT A FINAL EVALUATION.

2. THE SOURCE'S LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOSS OF A C-123 AIRCRAFT
 IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT ITS CORRELATION TO
 ANY OF THE FIVE UNRESOLVED INCIDENTS IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE WHICH
 INVOLVED C-123 AIRCRAFT OR AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD BE MISTAKEN FOR
 C-123 AIRCRAFT.
 EVAL - RLJ.

LAO SOURCE INPUT

20, 2 1987.

Dear ☒ About the United States Prisoner of wars
I have kept all information since 19, 2, 1981. Right now we almost have
the real information. One of our agent describes all details about the
U.S.P.O.Ws. They told me to contact you and they gave me the Prisoners
names but all incomplete detail.

1) Mr. Hacktor he has a wife and child living in the United
states. This man also lives alone they said it would be very difficult
to get him alive they are 100% sure they can get him with the head if
necessary. 2) Mr. Morgan Sheffer, Sundom. He was born 2-5-1944, his plane
A.C. 123. The Plane serial N 32931. He lived with other 6 Americans. It
would also be very difficult to rescue him because they have a strongly
security, if you need his picture, B.I.D. Or signature it's possible they
can get it, besides these things, if we have the plane, signal for the plane
, and quick landing they are 100% sure we can get them. The P.L. Agent said
they will send their people to our camp to serve as collateral for the
rescue plans are not successful they will die for us. the
rescue plans are successful what is the United States going to do help
or support them? Please send us the information and complete details.
they said this Operation would cost \$1,500.00. Before actually launching
the Operation they will not accept this money however if they are unable
to rescue the P.O.Ws. They will not get the money would you please check
their names if it's true, if it's true please get plane and \$1,500.00. and
send them to me. In the near future we will know about position of the
P.O.Ws. If the Pl. are brave enough to really risk their lives we will
the victory.

How do you feel about contacting each other? do you want me
to phone you and if so do you have any secret code that we can use if you
have a secret code please send it to me as soon as possible. If the United
states agrees to send the rescue team to me, I will not provide as the
same team because the old Commando team was well known by Thai and
we don't want to know or get involve with us anymore. Now

the better plan is to send as soon as possible, we are afraid
the U.S. P.O.Ws. will change their location. The U.S. POWs are instructors.

Please keep all this information secret don't tell any body
because it would be dangerous for the P.O.Ws. In my team no one knows yet

* Please inform of the situation

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

YES, AMERICA DID LEAVE PRISONERS OF WAR BEHIND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA !!
IT'S TIME TO BRING THEM HOME.

Prepared by

DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE
(BROTHER OF MAJ. MORGAN J. DONAHUE, USAF, MIA - LAOS, DEC. 13, 1968)

FEBRUARY 1990

Distributed by

Connecticut Chapter
National Forget-Me-Not Association for POW/MIAs, Inc.

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

YES, AMERICA DID LEAVE PRISONERS OF WAR BEHIND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA !!
IT'S TIME TO BRING THEM HOME.

The following timeline of newspaper articles, press releases, Congressional testimonies and other documents explains how and why American POWs were left behind in captivity in Southeast Asia. It also explains why Vietnam and Laos continue to hold American POWs today.

Because the POWs were alive when the war ended and because there is no evidence that they have since died, we can conclude only that they are alive and in captivity today. Does America have enough integrity to bring them home, NOW? If we do not, then we have forfeited that for which they believed they were fighting: America's freedom and dignity. If every resource is not marshalled to bring them home, now, then as a country we will have fallen to the lowest moral standard. As friends of mine have observed, when one American is not worth the effort to be found, we as Americans have lost.

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

For background regarding POWs in Indochina, this Timeline starts with the following:

January 4, 1965 Newsweek, "Vietnam: Fortune's Scapegoat," p. 24.

"After the fall of Dienbienphu in May 1954, a fresh inscription was chiseled in the gray stone war memorial in the little Breton town of Pleudihen. Lettered in gold, it read: 'Yves Le Bray, mort pour la France.' (died for France) And on All Saints Day every year thereafter, someone from the Le Bray family joined in placing a wreath beside the plaque honoring Yves and other heroes of Pleudihen who had died for France.

Last week, however, who should be sipping 'vin rouge' in a local cafe but Yves Le Bray-rather the worse for wear, but still alive....

Le Bray's lost decade began...when he was a 21-year-old PFC serving as a radioman with a French artillery battalion near the port of Haiphong, in North Vietnam. Ambushed while on night patrol, Le Bray spent the next six months in a Communist prison camp. And at war's end, instead of being returned to France like most of his fellow prisoners, he was packed off by the North Vietnamese Government to Langson, near the Chinese border, to become a slave laborer....

Having lost all trace of him, French authorities presumed that Le Bray had been killed in action and thus it was that his name was added to the 'monument aux morts' back in Pleudihen....

Eventually, more than ten years after his capture, the French Legation in Hanoi found out about Le Bray, obtained his freedom, and sent him winging homeward aboard an Air France Jet."

COMMENT: Following the French defeat in Indochina, the North Vietnamese proclaimed that all the French POWs had been given back to France and that there were no more French POWs in captivity. Le Bray was living proof to the contrary. Today, the Vietnamese say the same thing about American POWs. Rigidly following the Stalinist model, the North Vietnamese did not consider captured French servicemen as POWs, nor do they so consider captured American servicemen as POWs. Rather, the POWs are "war criminals" who in the Stalinist doctrine are stateless individuals. Thus, the North Vietnamese could and do say they have been holding no Frenchmen, Americans, nor any POWs, while at the same time it is precisely what they have been doing.

January 23, 1973 1971 Vietnam Peace Agreement, Chap. VIII, Article 21. (The Agreement was initialed and announced on January 23, 1973 and was signed January 27, 1973.)

"The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

the peoples of Indo-China. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indo-China."

COMMENT: The Paris Peace Agreement, negotiated by Henry Kissinger and ratified by Congress, committed the United States to rebuilding North Vietnam and all of Indochina. President Nixon, in a secret letter to Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong (quoted later), affirmed the amount of that reconstruction aid at \$3.25 billion, with food and other commodity aid of up to \$1.5 billion. In other words, to induce North Vietnam to sign the Agreement the United States promised to "pay up." In a very real sense, the United States tried to buy its way out of the war. The choice of words, "Era of Reconciliation" and "Post-War Reconstruction" were tremendous embellishments given the reality of the situation in Vietnam, and served to falsely build North Vietnam's expectations.

The North Vietnamese, having no reason to trust the United States, needed collateral for their own protection regarding the United States' promise to provide aid. That collateral was the POWs. Indeed, as is shown later, the North Vietnamese linked release of the POWs to aid at the very beginning of the Peace Talks. Because of the incredibly intense efforts to rescue downed pilots and other servicemen during the war, the North Vietnamese knew how much the POWs meant and held many of them back as a downpayment on the promised aid. In effect, the United States promise to provide aid to Hanoi put a price on the POWs' heads of \$4.75 billion. These are the POWs who did not come home during Operation Homecoming.

The North Vietnamese -- not the United States -- provided the list of American POWs to be repatriated from Vietnam. (There was no list for the POWs in Laos.) The United States naively accepted the list knowing full well it was incomplete. Major General Eugene Tighe, USAF, then Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said that according to United States intelligence sources he had fully expected the North Vietnamese list to have 600 more names than were on it. To the United States intelligence community, the list for our POWs in North Vietnam was 600 names short.

January 24, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S., N. Viets to Exchange POW Lists."

"...Kissinger said those held by the Communists will be released in groups at about 15-day intervals throughout the 60 days allotted for repatriation.

'American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be released to us in Hanoi,' he said. 'They will be received by American medical

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

evacuation teams and flown on American planes to places of our own choice,...."

COMMENT: According to Henry Kissinger, the release of the POWs held in Laos was the responsibility of the North Vietnamese under the terms of the Paris Peace Agreement. However, not only was the war in Laos still underway, including intense bombing by the United States, but also the Laotians claimed sovereignty over the American POWs there. (This is explained in detail later.) That sovereignty was affirmed by the North Vietnamese. At this stage, though, there were two critically important points in Kissinger's comment: first, his verification of the existence of American POWs in Laos; and, second his confusion over their status.

January 29, 1973 The New York Times, "Communists List 585 POWs."

"...The Defense Department spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, said that the Communists' lists were 'incomplete' because they did not include American servicemen known to have been captured in Laos. He emphasized that the United States would continue to press the other side for a listing of prisoners held in Laos....

There have been conflicting statements from United States officials on whether North Vietnam was required to turn over a list of American prisoners held in Laos under the agreement or the accompanying protocols."

COMMENT: Not surprisingly, given Kissinger's misunderstanding about the POWs in Laos, even other American officials did not understand the situation.

January 30, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Reds Fail to List POWs Taken in Laos."

"The North Vietnamese have failed to furnish the United States with a list of American fighting men taken prisoner in Laos, Pentagon officials and an organization of POW families said Sunday....

Some military officers suggested the North Vietnamese might be holding back on this information to deter further U.S. bombing of the North Vietnamese supply trails through Laos. More than 120 American bombers hit Laos and Cambodia after the Vietnam cease-fire....

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said it is true that no Laos list was provided.

He said the matter is being discussed with the North Vietnamese through diplomatic channels in Paris.

"We do expect to receive a list," Friedheim said....

Laos is not covered by the Vietnam cease-fire, although Henry A.

INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE

Kissinger, the chief U.S. peace negotiator, has said the U.S. government has firm expectations there will be an early halt to the fighting there....

In explaining the agreement with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, Kissinger told a White House news conference that "American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi."

COMMENT: The United States complained that the North Vietnamese had not provided a list of POWs held in Laos and reiterated the American perception of the Agreement that those POWs were the responsibility of the Vietnamese. The suggestion by some United States military officers that the POWs were being held back deliberately was most certainly correct, both as a deterrent to further bombing in Laos and as a downpayment on promised American aid.

January 31, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes. "Fate of 56 POWs is still a mystery."

"The Defense Department said Monday 56 American servicemen previously carried by the United States as prisoners of war remain unaccounted for by North Vietnam.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said their names 'are not on the two lists we have received so far.'

These lists, handed to U.S. officials in Paris Saturday by the North Vietnamese, identified 555 U.S. fighting men held in Communist prison camps in North and South Vietnam as well as the names of 55 POWs the Communists said died in captivity.

In turning over these lists, the Communists also failed to furnish information on Americans taken prisoner in Laos or provide clues to the fate of more than 1,300 Americans still missing in action throughout Southeast Asia....

The State Department said 'We firmly expect to have a list of POWs to cover Laos.'

Presumably Washington is pressuring Hanoi for its Laos list, although State Department spokesman Charles Bray declined to specify what diplomatic effort was underway."

COMMENT: The United States not only acknowledged that all of the known POWs in Vietnam had not been accounted for but also reiterated our knowledge of the existence of POWs in Laos. Ultimately, the United States repeated the mistake it made in Korea of accepting the enemy's list of American POWs despite our own intelligence that many more men were being held back. Indeed, as cited by then Major General Eugene Tigue previously, the belief among the intelligence community was that there should have been 600 more men than the 555 identified by the North Vietnamese. The 56 were "hard core" POW cases.

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February 1, 1973 Former President Nixon's "Message to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong" (This letter was kept secret during and after the negotiations and was finally declassified and published in The Department of State Bulletin on June 27, 1977, p. 674.)

"The President wishes to inform the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the principles which will govern United States participation in the postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam....

1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.

2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the appropriate program for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of \$3.25 billion of grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties....

3) The United States will propose to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the establishment of a United States-North Vietnamese Joint Economic Commission within 30 days from the date of this message.

4) The function of this Commission will be to develop programs for the United States contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam. This United States contribution will be based upon such factors as:

(a) The needs of North Vietnam arising from the dislocation of war;
(b) The requirements for postwar reconstruction in the agricultural and industrial sectors of North Vietnam's economy.

5) The Joint Economic Commission will have an equal number of representatives from each side. It will agree upon a mechanism to administer the program which will constitute the United States contribution to the reconstruction of North Vietnam. The Commission will attempt to complete this agreement within 60 days after its establishment.

6) The two members of the Commission will function on the principle of respect for each other's sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. The offices of the Commission will be located at a place to be agreed upon by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

7) The United States considers that the implementation of the foregoing principles will promote economic, trade, and other relations between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will contribute to insuring a stable and lasting peace in Indochina. These principles accord with the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973....

In regard to other forms of aid, United States studies indicate that the appropriate program could fall in the range of 1 to 1.5 billion dollars depending on food and other commodity needs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

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COMMENT:

In this communication to Pham Van Dong, President Nixon delineated the United States reconstruction package for North Vietnam at \$3.25 billion, with a supplement for food and commodity aid of up to \$1.5 billion. Note that the package applied to North Vietnam only. (Laos and Cambodia were not mentioned.) Although per Article VIII, Chapter 21 of the Paris Peace Agreement the United States referred to the rebuilding of North Vietnam in only the most general of terms, in this letter Nixon put \$4.75 billion on the table, just for the North Vietnamese. The existence of this commitment was kept secret from Congress and the American people.

No matter how any Westerner interprets it, to the Vietnamese a deal had been made. Holding back POWs became their security for the deal to be consummated. What the North Vietnamese did not anticipate, though, was that Nixon would choose to abandon the POWs instead of providing the aid. (This is explained later.) Also, Principle #7 of the letter was an unequivocal statement to the North Vietnamese that the United States also would pursue normal commercial relations with them in the future. This did not and has not happened.

February 16, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S., Hanoi Tell Plan To Rebuild Vietnam."

"The United States and North Vietnam will create a joint economic commission to oversee rebuilding of the war-torn country with U.S. dollars, the two sides announced Wednesday.

A communique issued by the White House and Hanoi on four days of talks by President Nixon's envoy, Henry A. Kissinger, and North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi listed no specific figures for U.S. post war aid.

But the language displayed a new cordiality between the two nations."

COMMENT:

Note that the details of the aid package, i.e., \$4.75 billion, still were kept secret by Nixon and Kissinger and that reference was made only to "rebuilding" North Vietnam with American dollars.

With this narrower public announcement, the United States even more deeply committed itself to providing reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. We had promised aid as part of the Agreement (Article 21), we had fixed that aid at \$4.75 billion (secret letter from Nixon to Pham Van Dong), and now we went public with a program to implement aid. The North Vietnamese could not have had a clearer understanding of our intentions.

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February 17, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Laos POW Release Tied to Truce."

"A Communist Pathet Lao spokesman said Saturday his group is holding Americans prisoners of war who will be released after a cease-fire goes into effect in Laos.

Soth Petrasy, the Pathet Lao's permanent representative in Vientiane, declined to give any details about American POWs in Laos. But he said the Pathet Lao leadership has a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held and that both sides in the cease-fire negotiations are ready to exchange prisoners once the fighting ends.

White House advisor Henry Kissinger has said that North Vietnam pledged to return American prisoners from Laos in Hanoi, an undertaking that was apparently contradicted by Soth's statement.

The exchange will take place in Laos, Soth said. "If they were captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos."...

Continued fighting was also reported going on in south and central Laos with increased air strikes by American B52 bombers, F411 swing-wing bombers and tactical fighter-bombers being flown to support CIA-sponsored irregular troops.

U.S. Embassy officials said Soth's comments Saturday were the first reference the Pathet Lao has made to American prisoners since the cease-fire went into effect in Vietnam Jan 28."

February 18, 1973 The Washington Post, "Pathet Lao Says No Truce, No American POWs."

"The Communist Pathet Lao said today [February 17, UPI] that they will not free American prisoners of war until there is a cease-fire in Laos. It also said that the release would take place in Laos, rather than in North Vietnam."

COMMENT:

These were very important pronouncements by the Pathet Lao: first, in that they confirmed that they were holding American prisoners, and second, in that they, and not the North Vietnamese, would release them. Thus, Kissinger's understanding of the Paris Peace Agreement -- that the prisoners in Laos were the responsibility of the North Vietnamese and would be released at the same time as the prisoners in Vietnam -- was completely contrary to the Vietnamese and Laotian understanding.

Another confirmation of prisoners in Laos was a Pathet Lao military training film produced, "Twenty-Five Years of Revolution", showing dozens of captured American pilots. The film was shown to recruits in Pathet Lao training camps. Copies of the film which are shown to Lao soldiers today have the POW scenes clipped out.

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February 10, 1973 The Washington Post, "Prisoners Claim VC Torture."

"American prisoners released by the Vietcong have claimed they were kept chained in cages in dense jungle along the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia.

One man said he had been caged for months without contact with other American prisoners or with anyone who spoke English....

According to the hospital sources, many were bitter about their treatment by the Vietcong."

COMMENT: The torture issue became the factor which ultimately blocked the aid package and caused Nixon to abandon the POWs, as explained later.

February 21, 1973 1973 Laos Peace Agreement (Cited in Treaties and Alliances of the World published by the U.S. State Department.)

"A peace agreement between the Government of Laos and the 'Pathet Lao' was signed on Feb. 21, 1973. It comprised 12 articles, of which the first laid down the general principles on which the future of Laos should be based....

Art. 10(c) 'The two parties take note of the declaration of the US Government that it will contribute to healing the wounds of the war and to post-war reconstruction in Indo-China. The Provisional National Union Government will hold discussions with the US Government in connexion with such a contribution regarding Laos.'

COMMENT: Although the Laotian treaty was between the Royal Lao and Pathet Lao and was not a treaty signed by the United States, the Lao parties did take careful note of the Paris Peace Agreement and said, "Give us the same!" regarding reconstruction aid. In other words, as the Paris Peace Agreement provisions extended to "all the Peoples of Indochina" (see page 2), the new Provisional National Union Government in Laos felt it was entitled to American aid, too. Indeed, it went so far as to say that discussions would be conducted with the United States on the aid issue.

Inevitably, the situation regarding the POWs in Laos thus became the same as in North Vietnam, except that in Laos all the POWs -- not just some of them -- were held back as collateral.

February 23, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Rogers: Don't Bar N. Viet Aid."

"Secretary of State William P. Rogers Wednesday refused to rule out reconstruction aid to North Vietnam by presidential order if Congress fails to appropriate the funds....

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Rogers three times called for 'restraint' by members of Congress in making adverse comments on the aid issue, at least until American troops are out of Vietnam and all American prisoners are released."

COMMENT: Rogers' statement was very important. Kissinger and Nixon knew they had made a substantial promise to the North Vietnamese and that the aid was the quid pro quo if all the POWs were to be released. Therefore, they could not afford to default on the aid and threatened to get it by Presidential order instead if Congress did not appropriate it. (As Secretary of State, Rogers had become point-man in the attempt to get Congress to appropriate the aid funds.)

This article also revealed that Congress was beginning to vacillate about the aid package when the first prisoners came back and told about their torture in captivity.

March 2, 1973 President Nixon's News Conference (Cited in Presidential Documents: Richard Nixon 1973).

In answer to a question by Courtney R. Sheldon of the Christian Science Monitor, "...first, with regard to Laos, the agreement there was made by the Royal Laotian Government, and it is an agreement which we, of course, supported and we accept."

COMMENT: Here, by acknowledging and supporting the intra-Laotian peace treaty, the United States committed itself to providing aid to Laos, too. As was the case with regard to the United States promising aid to North Vietnam to induce it to sign the Paris Peace Agreement, the United States provided similar inducement to the Pathet Lao to sign a treaty with the Royal Lao. Nixon and Kissinger could not use American military power to win the Indochina war, so they turned to the all-powerful dollar.

March 7, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S., N. Viet Paris Envoys Discuss Reconstruction Aid."

"U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives met Monday to discuss postwar reconstruction aid to North Vietnam, diplomatic sources said.

William H. Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Nguyen Co Thach, North Vietnamese deputy foreign minister, opened talks for the North Vietnamese peace talks delegation sources said.

The American peace delegation declined to confirm the opening of the talks on President Nixon's plan for the postwar financing of North Vietnam's reconstruction. The proposed aid already has prompted criticism in congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has demanded Congressional approval of any aid to Hanoi.

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Diplomatic sources said that Hanoi and Washington officials were discussing the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission which would channel American aid to North Vietnam and prove plans for the postwar reconstruction.

Nixon answered Congressional critics by saying aid money would come out of Defense and Agency for International Development funds instead of the domestic budget. The president said giving money to help North Vietnam rebuild its bombed country would contribute to "lasting peace and stability in the area."

COMMENT: It is important to note that the discussions were held with Nguyen Co Thach, who was aware of Nixon's secret letter and who today is Foreign Minister of Vietnam. Thach clearly understood the \$4.75 billion deal, yet today we tell him the POW issue is humanitarian. To him it was and is economic. Keep in mind that Thach handles POW negotiations with the United States today.

Knowing that the aid was the price to be paid for the POWs in Laos and the unrepatriated POWs in North Vietnam, and facing opposition from Congress to the aid because of the torture issue, Nixon escalated the issue and threatened to secure the funds from the Defense Department and Agency for International Development budgets. This revealed Nixon's dilemma and desperation: he had to have the money to get the POWs, but he could not get Congress to appropriate it.

March 8, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Rogers: We'll Go to Congress For Hanoi Aid OK."

"Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Tuesday the Nixon administration will seek prior authority from Congress for any economic assistance program to Vietnam....

At one point he was asked if the administration felt it had authority to provide aid without congressional approval.

"Not to my knowledge," the secretary answered."

COMMENT: Nixon's capitulation on Congressional approval of aid attenuated the acrimonious debate. While this reversal was not uncommon for Nixon, it is surprising in view of his previous statements.

It is fundamentally important to note that this capitulation turned the fate of the POWs over to Congress. However, Congress was entirely unaware that the return of POWs demanded a \$4.75 billion price. Congress did not perceive the North Vietnamese linkage between aid and the POWs because it had never seen the details of the aid package as spelled out in Nixon's letter of February 1 to Pham Van Dong. Congress simply did not know that the POWs were in its hands.

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March 25, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S. Fears Laos POWs Will Be Used as 'Pawns'."

"U.S. officials said Friday that despite continued efforts, they have been unable to learn anything more of the fate of an undetermined number of American prisoners of war in Laos.

The officials said no new light had been shed on the total number or whereabouts of the Laos POW's. Concern mounted that the Communists plan to hold them back as pawns in the continuing struggle in Indochina.

The question of Laos POW's has become an issue in the continuing release of American prisoners by North Vietnam, with the United States ordering a holdup in the withdrawal of its last troops from South Vietnam until the Communists say when and where they will turn over nine Americans -- seven military and two civilians -- whose names appeared on a list of Laos POW's provided by the North Vietnamese.

In addition to the nine there are approximately 320 Americans listed as missing in action in Laos. Most of them are air-crewmembers downed during combat missions.

U. S. sources believe that a substantial number of the missing--perhaps as many as 100--still may be alive. The conclusions are based on inspections of crash sites by search teams and on intelligence reports.

Friday was also marked by the expiration of the formal 30-day deadline for the formation of a coalition government in Laos. So far there has been little progress toward setting up the coalition under provisions of the cease-fire signed last Feb. 21, with government officials accusing the Communist Pathet Lao of causing the delay."

[Both Petrasz, the Pathet Lao spokesman] "broke a long silence on POW's last month to say they were holding Americans and that persons captured in Laos would be returned in Laos, despite U.S. contentions that North Vietnam had agreed to release Laos POW's in Hanoi.

The Pathet Lao declined to give further details about prisoners. In contacts since then, U.S. officials say they have been unable to learn anything more.

The list of nine American and one Canadian names was provided by the North Vietnamese when the United States inquired why no Laos POW's were included in the 535 names turned over at the time the Vietnam cease-fire was signed."

COMMENT: This tells it all in Laos. The POWs held in Laos became pawns in the uncertainty and confusion which characterized the United States interpretation of the Agreement and subsequent events regarding the POW/aid linkage. It is very important to note that when the United States complained at the last minute about the North Vietnamese failure to return POWs from Laos, the North Vietnamese produced nine POWs who had been captured in Laos and subsequently moved to Vietnam. Despite our awareness that

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there were POWs imprisoned in Laos, which was affirmed by the North Vietnamese and the Laotians themselves, not one of these POWs was released; they were held back as pawns and as collateral. Also, the nine POWs captured in Laos and released from Hanoi had been held separately from the other POWs captured in Vietnam. They had never been integrated into the regular POW system. (For a personal account of this isolation read Ernie Brace's book, A Code To Keep. According to Brace's testimony before the House Select Committee on Missing Persons on April 9, 1976, all the prisoners captured in Laos who ended up in the Hanoi prison system were segregated from the other prisoners and held separately in a group known as the 'Lulu' group. In January 1973, the Lulu group was told of the Paris Peace Agreement but were informed they would not be released until there was a peace settlement in Laos. In March 1973, they were informed they would be released with the other American POWs.)

Two additional considerations warrant comment. First, in April 1973, Seth Petrasz told my mother and father in person that the Pathet Lao were holding over 100 American POWs. Second, there was a great discrepancy in our government's POW numbers in Laos. Whereas the tally purportedly was 320 in 1973, today it is approximately 560 (which implies that the live POW count was/is 175.) The real number is an ultra classified secret, because Laos officially was a neutral country per the Geneva Protocols of the early 1950's and the United States was not supposed to be involved in the war there.

March 26, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "New Snag Stalls Prisoner Release."

"North Vietnam told the United States Sunday it intended to release the last group of American prisoners it holds at Hanoi's Gia Lam Airport on Tuesday and Wednesday, but said the U.S. demand that it also release POWs captured in Laos 'is beyond the jurisdiction of the agreement [the Paris Peace Agreement].'"

COMMENT: Here, North Vietnam told the United States unequivocally that the POWs in Laos were the responsibility of the Laotians and not the North Vietnamese. In other words, if the United States wanted the POWs from Laos returned it would have had to deal with the Laotians and offer a similar aid package to Laos, as well.

March 27, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Hanoi Drags Feet."

"Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation, said the Pathet Lao 'have assured us that the American POWs they hold will be released' and that the Pathet Lao said they 'are making preparations for the release.'"

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"It is for this reason we are insisting that the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of the prisoners take place with no relation to the POWs held by the Pathet Lao," said Tin."

COMMENT: The North Vietnamese reiterated that there were POWs in Laos and that the situation regarding these POWs was unrelated to the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and the prisoner exchanges in the two Vietnams; it was up to the United States and the Laotians.

Note that by this time everybody -- the North Vietnamese, the Laotians, the State Department and Defense Department -- had affirmed that there were POWs in Laos. There could be no more compelling proof than three separate governments saying there were POWs in Laos. However, not one of these POWs was released. They continue to rot in jungle prison camps today -- some dying slow, cruel deaths, and abandoned by their own country.

April 3, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Torture Stories Dampen Chances Of Hanoi Aid."

"Reports from returning prisoners of war of torture and mistreatment by Hanoi have stirred new attacks in Congress against U.S. aid for North Vietnam."

President Nixon has said he plans to ask Congress for such aid as 'an investment in peace.'

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said the torture stories have not changed his own position that aid to Hanoi would help ensure the peace. But, he added, he does not 'know what effect the stories will have on getting aid through Congress.'

'Even before this it looked difficult,' Mansfield said.

Sen. James L. Buckley, R-NY, called on Secretary of State William P. Rogers to issue the 'strongest possible protest' to North Vietnam over treatment of U.S. prisoners of war.

In a statement Sunday Buckley also urged President Nixon to 'carefully reconsider any proposal for economic assistance to North Vietnam in light of the POW reports on treatment and prison conditions.'

Rep. Joel T. Broyhill, R-Va., said the stories 'convince me that not a cent of American aid money should be spent on rehabilitating a country that is apparently run by savages.'"

COMMENT: Congress was now starting to say "No" to aid for North Vietnam. The amazing aspect of this was that Congress was unaware that Nixon had promised the North Vietnamese \$4.75 billion in his secret letter of February 1 and that the North Vietnamese had tied this to the release of the POWs whom they held back as collateral.

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April 7, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Senate: No Aid to N. Viet Less We OK It."

"The Senate voted Thursday to bar any aid to North Vietnam unless Congress specifically approves....

The ban on use of funds already appropriated for other purposes was added to a bill to revalue gold in support of the recent devaluation of the dollar in foreign exchange.

Administration spokesmen in the Senate pointed out also that no Indochina aid proposal has been submitted to Congress and said President Nixon is not going to make any such proposal until observance of the January cease-fire in Vietnam is assured.

Continued U.S. bombing in Cambodia became an issue in debate. An amendment by Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., to cut off funds for any further U.S. military operations in and over any part of Indochina was ruled out of order.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., demanded an end to bombing in Cambodia as a price for his support of aid to Indochina.

"How can we speak of rebuilding when B52 bombers, day after day, are still making some of the heaviest bombing runs of the war?" Mansfield asked in a Senate speech."

COMMENT: Congress now explicitly stated to Nixon there would be no aid for North Vietnam. Moreover, the war in Cambodia was still going on and U.S. bombing was about to resume in Laos (as stated below). Nixon's and Kissinger's interpretation of the Agreement as extending to all of Indochina was ludicrous. I believe that Nixon and Kissinger were so desperate to get out of this undeclared and catastrophic war that they knowingly signed a sham agreement.

April 13, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Hanoi Aid Opposed By Hebert."

"House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert has served notice he will introduce a proposal to prohibit any U. S. aid for Hanoi.

"We might as well bite this bullet right now," Hebert told his committee.

The Louisiana Democrat also said justification for President Nixon's request for \$1.3 billion aid to Southeast Asia so far 'is either nebulous or nonexistent.'...

Hebert said he will introduce the amendment prohibiting aid to Hanoi to the bill.

None of the weapons money likely would go to the North Vietnamese anyway, but Hebert's statement put his weight against the controversial

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Hanoi aid that President Nixon has said he may ask for later."

COMMENT: Hebert, a very powerful Congressman, cited \$1.3 billion as Nixon's aid request to all of Southeast Asia. Apparently Nixon had conveyed the smaller sum to Congress in early April in hope of getting at least some funds to try to fulfill his commitment to the North Vietnamese. However, Hebert said, "No", to any funding.

At this stage, all was now lost for Nixon regarding his pledge to the North Vietnamese. He could not get the funding and he knew that without it the North Vietnamese would not release the POWs they held back. The same was true for the POWs in Laos, as the Laotians, too, were looking for American aid in return for our POWs.

April 14, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "POW-Unit Boss: No Living GIs Left in Indochina."

"The Pentagon's prisoner of war task chief said Thursday there are probably no more live American soldiers loose anywhere in Indochina.

Dr. Roger Shields also said there is no evidence that any POWs had been executed in captivity, with three exceptions....

The Pathet Lao in Laos and the insurgent forces in Cambodia will hopefully provide more information about fate of the Americans missing in those countries, Shields said, but 'we have no indication at this moment that there are any Americans alive in Indochina.'

Rumors that there were hundreds of U.S. servicemen still in Laotian prison camps 'do the families (of the missing) a disservice,' he said."

COMMENT: This is the culmination of the great POW tragedy. Unable to get the funding for the aid he had promised the North Vietnamese (and implicitly, the Laotians), Nixon defaulted on his aid commitments and abandoned the POWs. With this announcement (by his POW spokesman at the Pentagon, Dr. Roger Shields) Nixon slammed the door on the North Vietnamese and the Laotians and on the POWs who he and his State and Defense Department staffs knew were still in captivity. He cut and ran on the POW-aid subject and abandoned the POWs whose very existence the State and Defense Departments had been affirming all along.

April 18, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "New U.S. Air Raid in Laos."

"The United States resumed bombing of Laos Monday after accusing the North Vietnamese of violating the seven-week-old cease-fire by overrunning a Laotian village and air field....

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Defense Department spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said Monday that only a few hours earlier the North Vietnamese -- using both infantry and tanks -- overran Tha Vieng, a village and air strip on Route 4 between the Plain of Jars and city of Paksane.

Less than four hours later the Pacific command in Honolulu announced, 'at the request of the Royal Laotian government, U.S. aircraft, including B52s, April 16 conducted operations over Laos.'

COMMENT: This headline is self-explanatory: United States involvement in the war in Laos commenced again, effectively eliminating any chances of getting the POWs released from Laos.

July 23, 1973 In The Congressional Record Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) quotes from an article in the U.S. News & World Report, "Mystery of Missing GI's."

"North Vietnam is known--by Hanoi's own claims--to have captured men who were not returned, not listed as dead, and not accounted for.

No National Red Cross team has ever been allowed to visit and inspect the places where American prisoners were held....

No prisoners held in Laos have been sent back, and no accounting made of the dead.

The nine POWs supposedly repatriated from Laos actually had been held in North Vietnam....

Among the families of the MIA's, there is growing suspicion that some captured Americans are still alive in North Vietnam and Laos, being held as pawns for further bargaining with the U.S. over final terms of the war's settlement....

U.S. officials are reluctant to comment on this possibility. But one says openly: 'We do not think that everyone now on the missing list is dead.'

COMMENT: Not all Americans were fooled by the cover-up regarding American POWs in Indochina.

Also, it is very important to note that with the U.S. having officially denied that there were any American POWs in Indochina, the Vietnamese and Laotians had no alternative other than to echo that denial. They could not go public and say, "Look, we held your POWs back," in violation of the Paris Peace Agreement. Paradoxically, Nixon's pronouncement that there were no POWs in Indochina forced the Vietnamese to say the same thing.

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July 21, 1976 Transcript from Hearings of The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. (selected pages)

Undersecretary of State Philip Habib: "Already before the Paris negotiations began, we were conscious of the need to account for our men because of the Communist side's refusal throughout the conflict to provide complete information on our prisoners of war, as required by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. As a result, we knew we would have to do all we could by all available means to obtain information about our missing personnel.... the Communist side bracketed the release of prisoners with what they described as 'U.S. responsibility for war damage in Vietnam' in a single numbered point. Although humanitarian issues such as POW/MIA's have been subjects of disagreement in the settlement of other past conflicts, I know of no instance in which an adversary so openly treated this humanitarian problem in this way. We thus recognized from an early date what we were up against and accounting for the missing a basic element of our own negotiating strategy.

I might note that international law, as framed in the Geneva Conventions, does not permit the linking of humanitarian obligations to other issues in the way done by the North Vietnamese....

Congressman Benjamin Gilman, R-NY: "...when we were in Hanoi there were references made to some agreements made between our Government and Vietnam with regard to postwar repatriations. Can you set forth for us just where we stand with regard to those negotiations? Were there any agreements we are not aware of, secret memorandum that this committee is not aware of?"

Mr. Habib: "There is no agreement or secret memorandum which this committee is not aware of in this respect. There were, as the committee is aware, some letters and exchanges. With respect to those letters, I think the Committee has been informed of the content of those letters as they bear on the question which the committee has raised. That is my understanding...."

Congressman Paul McCloskey D-CA: "With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, this committee asked the Secretary of State and you the same question before we went to Hanoi last December. You did not advise us of that secret letter and we discovered its existence only when we got to Hanoi. Can you tell this committee now why we went to Hanoi without being advised of the existence of that letter which was known to the Secretary of State, especially after we asked you about it?..."

We didn't have any idea the letter existed. We asked you in November if there were any secret agreements that we should know about before we went to Hanoi and we were not advised by you or the Secretary of State of the letter's existence or of the \$3.25 billion figure which we later ascertained."

Mr. Habib: "That is not an agreement. It never developed into an agreement. Very frankly, Mr. Congressman, I didn't know of the existence of the letter at that time, either...."

Mr. Habib, when questioned further concerning President Nixon's letter to Phan Van Dong and when advised that Henry Kissinger had said

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that he could not produce Presidential papers: "Let me make the answer very specific. There is no agreement, there was no agreement, there never was an agreement as far as I know, and I think I would know at this stage. We have researched it and there is no agreement with respect to the question of aid involved in that letter."

COMMENT: Through Mr. Habib's testimony the State Department acknowledged that the United States was aware that the Vietnamese firmly linked the POW issue to the aid issue within the parameters of the Paris Peace Agreement and Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter. That is to say, the North Vietnamese tied the POW issue to reconstruction aid at the beginning of the Paris Peace Negotiations!! This is why they kept POWs as collateral on the aid that Nixon promised. Habib then contradicted himself by stating that the letter did not constitute an "Agreement" to provide aid. To the Vietnamese, who held back POWs pursuant to the letter, it was an unambiguous agreement. (If you do not believe this, put yourself in the shoes of the Vietnamese and reread the letter on page 5.)

It is hard to tell whether Habib was telling an outright lie in his testimony or was just intent on confusing the POW issue further so as to protect the State Department against claims that the POWs had been abandoned. Both interpretations probably are correct.

April 1, 1977 Excerpts of Testimony by Leonard E. Woodcock before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. (Mr. Woodcock, former head of the AFL-CIO had been appointed by President Carter to head a Presidential Commission to study the POW issue -- the Woodcock Commission. The Commission went to Hanoi and Vientiane for discussions with the Vietnamese and Laotians.)

"The Lao made clear to the Commission that the MIA issue was linked to U.S. assistance, expressing the belief that the two problems should be resolved together since both resulted from the war."

Mr. Woodcock (speaking to Chairman Lester Wolff D-MT): "They were saying to us what had been said right along, that their obligation with regard to the MIA's they felt, was lodged in paragraph 8(b) of the Paris accord, and our obligation to them in healing the wounds of war and reconstruction was lodged in paragraph 21, and those two were linked."

COMMENT: The position of the North Vietnamese and Laotians regarding the POW/MIAs was firm and consistent: the United States would have to pay for their release per our written commitments.

For the United States government today to consider the POW/MIA issue as "humanitarian" is a cruel distortion of the facts. In the beginning we made it an economic issue, and the Vietnamese and Laotians continue to this day to

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hold us to our commitment.

January 23, 1981 The Morning Star, North Carolina, "Witness says Garwood told of POWs who stayed."

"Marine Pfc. Robert Garwood reported seeing 'a couple of hundred other Americans' still in captivity in Vietnam and complained of being unable to make that information public, a Navy psychiatrist testified Thursday.

'Garwood said he didn't know exactly who the Americans were, but that he was upset and concerned that he was not debriefed like other people,' Capt. Benjamin R. Ogburn told a jury of five Marine officers in the court-martial of Garwood....

After listening to Ogburn's testimony, presiding judge Col. R.E. Switzer ruled that his statements about POWs remaining in Vietnam were irrelevant and should be stricken from the record and disregarded by jurors.

Previous attempts by the defense to introduce testimony about remaining POWs in Southeast Asia also had been rejected by Switzer."

COMMENT: By this time the deliberate distortions perpetrated by the Defense and State Departments regarding the POW issue had turned into a cover-up. Even Bobby Garwood's testimony that he had seen American POWs was stricken from the record.

Essentially, the State and Defense Departments were circling their wagons to protect themselves. Since careers were at stake regarding the policy that there were no American POWs in captivity, all steps had to be taken to protect that policy and the people who perpetuated it.

June 28, 1981 House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Servicemen Held Against Will." Dialogue between Congressman Stephen Solars (D-MT) and Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe (USAF-Retired) on the POW issue.

Mr. Solars: "And that there are still--and this is a somewhat different question--American servicemen being held against their will in Indochina?"

General Tighe: "My conviction would be 'yes' in answer to both questions, sir."

Mr. Solars: "Now, have you testified to that effect previously, General?"

General Tighe: "I have not been asked the question in exactly that same way, Mr. Chairman, as far as personal convictions are concerned."

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Mr. Solarz: "What leads you to that conclusion, because obviously that is a conclusion that ought to be given great weight, I think, by every member of this committee and the Congress? I am very interested to hear it."

I want to say, with all due respect to the people in your agency, that that was not an impression I had previously received.

Maybe I was not listening carefully enough, but my impression, frankly, listening to other reports I got in private briefings before my trip to Indochina in January was that while there are a lot of reports, whenever they could be tracked down they turned out to be unfounded and the chances are that probably nobody was still alive there.

But you feel otherwise, and I would like to know what leads you to that conclusion."

General Tighe: "I would like to defer that to the closed session. But I suggest that this is a very fast-moving train of evidence. I would also like to clarify the means at our disposal to verify each of these reports that I claim to have checked as much as possible."

When you are dealing with a totally uncooperative government or governments, our ability to check is very, very circumscribed."

Mr. Solarz: "We will go into that in closed session. But your testimony is that in your judgement the weight of the evidence indicates that there are Americans still alive and being held against their will in Indochina."

General Tighe: "Yes, sir."

Mr. Solarz: "Are you absolutely certain of that?"

General Tighe: "That is my own personal judgement, sir."

COMMENT: There was no more informed and professional opinion on the POW subject than General Tighe's. Since this testimony was given, the Departments of State and Defense have gone to extraordinary lengths to hide the truth.

September 29, 1986 The New York Times, "P.O.W.'s Alive in Vietnam, Report Concludes."

"A Pentagon panel, after a five-month review of intelligence files, has concluded that American prisoners of war are still alive in Southeast Asia."

[According to Lt. General Eugene Tighe, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency], "...a large volume of evidence points to the likelihood that Americans are being held by the Vietnamese Government...."

"There were as many differences as you could imagine," he said of the refugee reports. "They ran the gamut from first-hand sightings to hearsay. But when you have that large volume of evidence that points in those directions, why that's what you conclude."

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COMMENT: After this clear statement to the press, a toned-down summary report was issued by the panel. The full report remains classified for no reason other than it would reveal the truth that the State and Defense Departments knowingly left men behind. Allegedly, General Tighe was ordered to tone down the summary.

May 18, 1988 Observer-Reporter, Washington, PA, "Laos wants aid in return for missing soldiers."

"The United States should give Laos humanitarian aid if it wants the country to account for Americans missing in the Indochina war, a senior government official said Saturday."

"We have fulfilled our obligation with the excavation," said Vice Foreign Minister Souphanh Sritthirath. "We are awaiting the humanitarian gesture from the U.S.A."

COMMENT: As recently as 1988 the Laotians were still saying that the United States would have to pay for the POWs. The Laotian Foreign Minister made these comments after an excavation of an American crash site in Laos. A previous investigation of a crash site in Laos had proven that our government had again lied regarding the POW issue.

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FINAL COMMENT:

It is exceedingly difficult to believe that the government of the United States has not brought home the POWs who served their country in the Vietnam War. The evidence is overwhelming and compelling that POWs were left behind and are alive and in captivity today. A man could be sentenced to death by a court in the United States today based on far less evidence than we have that American prisoners are alive and in captivity in Indochina. The heartbreaking tragedy is that nothing substantive has been done to bring them home. Instead, the Departments of State and Defense feed us a diet of distortions, half-truths, obfuscations and deceptions regarding the facts of the POW issue. These agencies are so skilled at disseminating misinformation and confusing the issue that it is easier for them to lie than it is to speak the truth. Ultimately, it appears their job is to keep the POWs from coming home rather than bringing them home. Under any circumstances, it is clear that if the government of the United States truly wanted the POWs home, they would be home. However, since bringing the POWs home involves undoing the big lie and admitting mistakes were made, which is unacceptable to the State and Defense Departments, the POWs continue to suffer in the jungles of Vietnam and Laos.

Originally, the POWs may not have been intentionally abandoned. However, Nixon's and Kissinger's strategy for ending the war was so ill-conceived and so self-contradictory that the POWs were swept under the carpet as a consequence. Ultimately, the strategy was so faulty that Nixon and Kissinger forced themselves into abandoning the men. Subsequently, all the resources of the State and Defense Departments have been brought to bear to justify that course of action and to convince the American public the POWs do not exist.

Sadly, if resolving the POW issue and bringing the men home were up to the private sector, all the men would have come back to their families many years ago. Instead, the issue remains hopelessly encumbered by the bureaucratic processes of government -- turf battles, careers, perks, and the ever-incomprehensible conduct of foreign policy.

Fundamentally, the POW issue is an economic one. The Vietnamese and Laotians have what we want: the POWs. We have what they so desperately need: aid and trade. There are many ways to find the middle ground and bring the men home, but our "leaders" in Washington are so inept and dishonest as to preclude this from happening within the present POW policy.

To Vietnam and Laos there has not been a final settlement in the war and there will not be until they receive American aid and trade as they feel they were promised. To me and many Americans there has not been a final settlement in the war until all the POWs are home. Vietnam and Laos are desperate for our aid and trade: are we not desperate for our POWs?

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For years the Vietnamese have been telling us they do not have the money and manpower to search the remote provinces for missing Americans. What they really are saying is this: "Give us the aid that you promised us and see what we just found in the jungle." The Vietnamese need a face-saving way of giving back the POWs and need something (American trade and investment) in return for them. To ensure that the live POWs do not come home to the embarrassment of the State Department which has maintained they do not exist, the United States considers the POW issue "humanitarian." This is a cruel hoax; we are the ones who made it an economic issue in the first place, and the Vietnamese consider it an economic issue to this day. If we want these forgotten Americans repatriated, we are going to have to put some aid on the table to Vietnam and Laos. There are many ways to do this, including through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

An acid test for the credibility of our government on the POW issue is declassification of all the intelligence files pertaining to the POW/MIAs. Such classification truly serves no purpose today, and until intelligence is declassified the policy-makers in Washington have no credibility. They are perceived by the American people as merely trying to hide the truth and protect themselves.

.....

I would like to extend great appreciation to Kathy and Bill Shemeley of the Connecticut Forget-Me-Nots, without whose time, energy, research, and perpetual support this Timeline would not have been possible. I dedicate it to Kathy and Bill, to my brother, to all the POWs, to my mother and father and to all the many Americans who do care and who, as I, have worked hard to tell the truth about the POWs.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue
27 Britannia Drive
Danbury, Connecticut 06811

NOTE: Original documents are reproduced in this Timeline as they were printed, including misspellings, grammatical errors, and typographical errors.

Exhibit A

The Center for **POW/MIA** Accountability, Incorporated

OVERVIEW

The concept of a private fact-finding organization to compliment the U.S. Government's efforts in resolving the dilemma of nearly 2,500 Americans missing in action from the Vietnam War was conceived in early 1981. Following detailed analysis of the issue it was determined that the most effective method for resolution was on a government-to-government basis. It was also ascertained that a private group knowledgeable in POW/MIA matters with skills in research, analysis and evaluation of information would serve a vital role by educating the public and encouraging its support for resolution while concurrently assisting the Government.

In the fall of 1982, a group of Vietnam veterans experienced in domestic and international business affairs pooled their expertise and knowledge of POWs and MIAs to form an association, "The Center For POW/MIA Accountability." The Center was chartered in the District of Columbia in 1983 as a nonprofit corporation with the intent that it would exist until the POW/MIA issue was resolved. Subsequently, the Center was granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Because the Center is task-oriented towards resolution of the issue, it is not open to general membership thus precluding administrative and financial burdens inherent to large organizations. Membership is comprised solely of its board of directors and advisory council.

To fund operations the Center relies on donations and support from the private sector but does not solicit nor accept monies from POW/MIA families or from any government agency.

The Center has a comprehensive library of current and historical POW/MIA data. These data, as well as information received from Indochinese refugees and Americans in Europe and Southeast Asia, are screened, correlated and evaluated with pertinent factors relayed to the Government and selected interest groups. Concurrently, the Center conducts awareness programs whereby the public is educated on the POW/MIA issue. Periodic presentations are made to professional and fraternal organizations, veterans' groups and during selected public events. Relevant information

(Over)

is also disseminated to the public by participation in radio and TV talk shows and by published articles and news releases to the print media.

The Center interacts with and maintains a working relationship with Government agencies responsible for POW/MIA affairs and with leading private organizations. In this way, the combined productive efforts of all parties will hasten attainment of common goals to resolve this tragic episode in American history.

The Center does not engage in nor endorse any activity in conflict with the policies of the United States Government.



The Center for **POW/MIA** Accountability
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Harry C. Aderholt, Director
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Milton Copulos, Director
Veteran combat intelligence officer. Syndicated columnist,
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FACT SHEET

Veteran's Vigil Society

"The Purpose of the Society is to maintain a 24 hour color guard
at the Vietnam Veteran's Memorial until all of the Vietnam MIA
POW's are accounted for."

40 G Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20013
(202) 789-1550

WHO

THE VETERAN'S VIGIL SOCIETY: A non-partisan group of veterans organized in
1982 by Vietnam veterans Dave Morgan and Terry McConnell in Cleveland, Ohio.

WHAT

The Society is asking for help from the American public to:

- o Support the POW/MIA cause.
- o Write their Senators and Congressmen to appeal for an
accounting of the 2,500 POW/MIAs whose whereabouts are
unknown.
- o Petition Hanoi for a full and complete disclosure.
- o Help generate grass roots support in their home state
for the Vigil.

WHY

Two thousand five hundred loyal American citizens still remain
unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Obviously not all were killed in action
or died in captivity. Some, possibly hundreds, are presumed alive and
imprisoned. Facts are slowly being brought to light which support this
belief. The unescapable conclusion is that a full and complete disclosure
has not been rendered by Hanoi. There have been more than 450 confirmed
sightings of Americans by new refugees. Recent defectors admit to the
existence of prisoner of war camps long after all our POWs supposedly were
returned. Hanoi has a history of holding prisoners after peace is declared.

The Society seeks to educate the American people about the true
plight of their unfortunate bretheren. The members of the Society and its
supporters remember that their own name could be chiseled in cold black
granite, along with 50,000 other Vietnam Veterans. The Society believes
that the public will no longer allow the POW/MIA topic to be "swept under
the rug."

WHERE

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4201 W. 130 Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44135
(216) 941-7427

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Greenwich Time, Friday, January 31, 1993

Nation/World

MIA-POW coverup discounted Resident calls charges against government 'inane'

WASHINGTON — The head of a military family that claims the U.S. government is covering up the existence of prisoners in the hands of a minority of the military has charged that "there has been a systematic effort to suppress information which conclusively proves the existence of prisoners."

"These are allegations based on support, insinuation and biased interpretation," said Herbert.

Retired Army Col. Earl J. Hopper, who was discharged in 1969, said that he thought "there has been a suppression of information" about prisoners.

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Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., promised Hopper that he would try to help him gain access to all information.

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RICHARD HERBERT



SOLDIER OF FORTUNE'S

POW/MIA SPECIAL

Exhibit B
1 of 2

Bo Gritz:
Hero or
Huckster?

75c issue
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SPRING
1983



Operation Lazarus Expose Pawns Of War
The Brooks: An American Family Tragedy
True Gritz: The Hoaglund Hoax
POWS: The French Experience



EDITOR'S NOTE

Meddling with another man's folly is always thankless work. Rudyard Kipling: *The Rescue of Pluffles*

FROM the very beginning back in 1981 when *Soldier of Fortune* began "The POW-MIA Project," our main problem has been to separate the truth from the half-truths, distortions and out-and-out lies that are being peddled in the name of the cause.

While the antics and schemes of Laotian warlords, like Phoumi Nosavon and Kham Bou, or self-styled adventurers, like Bo Gritz, Sean O'Toole or Scott Barnes, may seem transparent and even somewhat amusing, dealing with them is enormously expensive and time-consuming. And James G. "Bo" Gritz has consumed the most time—certainly as of late.

Although it is easy to dismiss Gritz as "the Clifford Irving of mercenaries" as one skeptical *Time* Magazine editor did, or as the "Elder Gantry of mercenaries" as an even more skeptical SOF editor did, we must be careful to keep these latest antics in perspective with the larger POW/MIA issue.

While Gritz's credibility won't likely recover from his attempt to steal a war story from a real Vietnam hero, and my staff may not soon recover from the hours and they've put into this special issue, we must remind ourselves that Gritz is not really the issue here.

The issues are two-fold: One, are there any POWs still being held in Southeast Asia? and, two, did Gritz produce any proof of American POWs during his time in Southeast Asia?

Answering the last question is easy, as Gritz himself admitted before Congress: No. His source agents were disreputable, his photographs didn't come out and his witnesses are worthless.

The stories of Barnes and O'Toole fall into the same category—wonderful tales, composed of few facts and a lot of imagination.

But as you have read in the stories written by Milt Capules and Will Brownell, there is both a logical reason and some evidence to indicate that there are Americans still being held against their will there. Without doubt, the Vietnamese are playing games with the remains of Americans killed in Vietnam.

While working on this special project, we received messages from two line individuals. One was a letter from George Brooks, a former head of the National League of Families, who was fortunate enough to have his son's body returned from Laos last year, but who is fighting for the rest of the unaccounted-for Americans.

The other was an official statement from Rear Adm. Allan G. Paulson, who heads the Defense Intelligence Agency, the government agency involved with the investigation of the POW/MIA issue.

Paulson said, "What concerns me greatly is the extent to which he, Gritz, is becoming identified with the issue. The thought exists that if he becomes discredited, so might the issue. The fact that Mr. Gritz produces nothing, doesn't erode an iota the possibility that prisoners may exist."

Brooks wrote: "As one who has been deeply involved for more than 13 years in the problem of returning Americans, this is a message of concern for prisoners in Southeast Asia. I am concerned that a damaging back lash may develop as a result of the recent Gritz caper. What has erroneously been termed a rescue attempt, should be known for what it really was, a widely pre-publicized personal attention-getter. A conclusion may be drawn by some that since this 'heroic effort was made' and came up dry, that there are no prisoners held in captivity in Laos."

"Such an easy conclusion would fly in the face of facts gathered tediously over a long period of time. Testimony from eyewitnesses indicating that there are Americans in captivity, in the form of successful polygraph examinations and testimony of recently retired DIA Director Gen. Eugene Tighe that he believes Americans are being held in captivity. The general officer's opinion was based on the results of intensive, secret, factual evidence. Once one learns that men are being held in torturous captivity, it is impossible to walk away from it. When you read a serviceman's letter to his wife, written from his prison cell, can you refuse to be concerned for her or him?

"I hope not."

However many men or remains are there is not important to us. If it were only one, our attitude would be the same.

Every effort should be taken to reach a resolution. Even if that resolution were to be only the end of doubt for the families, it would be worth it. Over the last two years, we have exposed a number of the illegitimate efforts which have preyed on the families and we have contributed to or supported a number of legitimate efforts. We have no intention of stepping.

—Jim Graves

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Our special thanks for help and assistance to: Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, Gen. Helme C. Adairholt, Col. Chuck Allen, James P. Monaghan, Fred Zabitosky, Earl Bleacher, Tom Smith, Gen. Vang Pao, Milt Capules, Will Brownell, Hilda de Berrier, Col. Charles M. Beckwith, Walt Shumate, Charles "Check" Miner, Col. Lewis Millett, George and Gladys Brooks, Jim Morris, Danny, B.K. Dick and to the *SURVIVE* Magazine staff who picked it up in the end.

✱ 2B

Exhibit C



SOF MIA

LIBERTY CITY

SOF's POW Patrol
in Laos Yields
Yellow Rain

by Thomas D. Reisinger

LIBERTY City was the codename for SOF's outpost in communist Laos. It was constructed to serve as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for our planned POW/MIA mission.

Built of bamboo and thatch, it sat on high ground above the Mekong. Zigzag trenches linked defensive bunkers we built to ring the compound in case the Laotians decided to foreclose on our lease. To the best of our knowledge, Liberty City was the only permanent anti-communist installation in Laos in the late 70s and early 80s—until we closed it down after five months.

You've seen Liberty City before in SOF. Our January 1984 cover photo showed the site as it looked when we took Bob Brown up to see what he'd paid for in his continuing efforts to obtain a full accounting of United States POWs and MIAs. That article simply described the Laotian anti-communist resistance effort at that time as we did not want to compromise anti-communist POW/MIA efforts. However, sufficient time has passed to allow us to tell the story of Liberty City, also known as FOB 81. Some names have been changed for names de guerre assigned to protect those who may be innocent.

It all started with an inspiring phone call from Washington, D.C. in SOF's office in mid-March 1981. It was from three ex-Special Forces Vietnam Vets who had been recruited by Lieutenant Colonel James "Bo" Gritz for a POW/MIA rescue mission which went belly-up. Medal of Honor winner Fred Zabitosky, Son Tay Raider Earl Bleacher and 20-year Special Forces veteran James Monaghan as well as others from the Gritz team had become disillusioned with Gritz when he could not provide the necessary funding or intelligence for his proposed mission. They called Brown, who had been following the progress of the objective Gritz sponsored, and asked him to assist them in setting up a new mission. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, The National League of Families (NLF), and SOF's own money and the SOF and Brown felt additional contributions would be



Unarmed NLF soldier tries to man Liberty City's perimeter, just in case of communist discovery.

needed. At a meeting at the Brooks' New York residence, Brown and the three ex-SFers convinced George Brooks and his wife, Gladys, to fund Gritz's effort.

Zabitosky recalls that in subsequent meetings Bob Brown asked if "Earl and I would go to work for SOF so we if there were U.S. POW/MIAs held against their will in Laos and what it would take to get them out."

Zabitosky, Bleacher and Monaghan agreed the SOF project offered some hope as it had the advantage of solid funding which was lacking in Gritz's effort.

The next three years would find the SOF POW/MIA team, consisting of SOF staffers and their associates, journeying to the mountains and often dangerous environs of Laos by the Vietnamese through before the Thailand's "Golden Triangle" and into communist-occupied Laos where Liberty City (FOB 81), was established to serve as a launch area from which rescue teams and/or intelligence agents could infiltrate Laos

to search for U.S. POW/MIAs.

The SOF team, after making an estimate of the situation, decided to convert General Vang Pao, the H'mong general who led the CIA-sponsored "Secret War" against the communists in Laos. We hoped he could provide a source of reliable intelligence through his anti-communist contacts still deep inside Laos.

His appearance, along with his encouragement, at Brown's Boulder home marked the first concrete move by SOF in its search for POW/MIAs.

"Gentlemen," the General began, "I realize what you really want is information about your missing comrades in Southeast Asia. I can help to provide such aid. But, let me give you a quick pro quo: I want the following before anything can be given by my side and what I want will have to be in three phases. First, I want the names of chemical biological warfare against my people in Laos by the Vietnamese through before the Thailand's "Golden Triangle" and into communist-occupied Laos. Secondly, in exchange, I will have my organization turn over 17 sets of remains of missing Americans to you. Thirdly, you must assist me in arming and

Dallas Times Herald

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Mystery of MIAs

Veterans, families claim U.S. cover-up on Vietnam POWs

By JIM HENDERSON

Staff Writer

The controversy. More than 2.6 million Americans went to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War years and nearly 2,500 of them never came home, dead or alive. They are still unaccounted for. Not are known to be dead or presumed to be, their remains either held in foreign warehouses or lost at aircraft crash sites in the remote jungles of Vietnam and Laos.

Only these essential facts are known.

Nearly 10 years after the last Americans were airlifted from the roof of the embassy in Saigon, officially ending the U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, the growing suspicion — some would say obsession — that live Americans are still being held captive is mounting into a dramatic controversy nearly as bitter, although smaller, as that which surrounded the war itself.

The families of the missing have organized two sprawling camps. There have been charges of a government "cover-up" by influential congressmen. The issue has divided Vietnam veterans, some of whom talk privately of a yearning to return in uniform to the name of the war to blame the survivors they are concerned over.

Former high-level military officers have said intelligence officials of withholding information from President Reagan, and intelligence officials have responded that they are not in a position to do so.

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that in the hands of the intelligence community, the lives of Americans are being kept secret.

last summer was chairman of the National League of Families of American Prisoners. "I personally think that if the evidence is submitted to the President, he would take whatever action is necessary to get them home."

Albure, undaunted however, says a Pentagon official, asking not to be identified, "if any Americans were being held captive, we have the capacity of proving that. We have been unable to prove it."

If the evidence is not conclusive, fragments of it are convincing enough to create questions in the minds of some of the foremost military figures of the Vietnam war.

Last March, in Philadelphia, to address a group of Vietnam veterans, retired Gen. William Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. troops in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying there are "indications" that some of the missing Americans may be alive.

"The matter has got to be brought to a head," he said. "How many are still alive, no one knows."

Retired Gen. Mike Hooley, a former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, expressed similar reservations about the official position of the government.

"Some of the evidence is pretty shaky," he says, "but I can't help but have the feeling that it is getting kind of a short shrift."

The evidence

The book is nearly 2 inches thick, 230 heavily bound pages of depositions, maps, declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports. Some Department officials, congressional hearing transcripts,

personal correspondence, notes, maps, communications, newspaper clippings, Defense Intelligence Agency documents and observed last names of prisoners and government officials.

It is, in essence, a collection of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, a Washington-based, umbrella group that represents 25 Vietnam organizations around the country.

"Historically, the American public was led to probably about the POW problem," says Mike Van Alta, a Vietnam veteran who now runs an electrical contracting business in northern Virginia and publishes a monthly newsletter critical of the government's handling of the issue. He has headed the veterans group's efforts to prove there are Americans in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The evidence, he says, "includes of CIA-confirmed locations and numbers of prisoners, reports by refugees who saw these men alive as recently as two years, fingerprints, aerial photos and even pictures. The civilian population in America has no idea of the depth of the information."

Van Alta says the documents he has assembled also show that government officials "have tried to conceal the evidence by 'misleading' refugees who reported sighting live Americans and by downgrading some accounts of the sightings and public debate of the POW issue."

As proof, that the "cover-up" began even before the war ended, Van Alta and the veterans group have distributed a June 1973 State Department cable from the U.S. embassy in Saigon to the secretary of state concerning a defector, named Nguyen Thanh Son, who claimed to have seen 30 American prisoners who were not

released under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.

"In follow up interview with AP, UPI and NBC correspondents," the cable says, "intelligence information that he had seen 30 prisoners who had been 'American' was not believed." "The cable," said Son, "was never released. American officials present at interview requested more services to play down the cable. AP mention was consistent with exchange frequent, while UPI and NBC, after talk with military press officers, omitted news entirely from their stories."

Included in the book is evidence and declassified CIA reports on the tracking of POWs up to the end of American involvement in Vietnam in 1973.

"We left live Americans over there, and we know we were leaving live Americans there," Van Alta says.

The veterans group claims, for example, that 550 Americans were missing in Laos, but the remains of only four have been returned from that country. In the early days of the war, the government of Laos published photographs of 20 pilots who were in captivity. None has been accounted for.

Since the end of the war, information on U.S. survivors has come mainly from refugees fleeing Laos and Vietnam. "As of July 15, 1964, DIA has over 1,200 reports on Americans in Southeast Asia,"

640 are eye-witnesses," the citation says in its literature.

In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs last August, Lt. Gen. James Williams, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that 125 of those eye-witness reports were "under continuing investigation" and 60 were being "actively pursued." But he concluded his statement by saying, "We cannot yet prove any American is now being held captive."

Williams has had difficulty in converting some members of Congress from both political parties.

At these same hearings, Rep. Douglas Applegate, an Ohio Democrat who had offered a resolution directing the President to obtain a full accounting of Americans in Southeast Asia, said he had obtained a refugee report "never investigated by the Defense Intelligence Agency — of 40 live Americans in northern Laos. The live sighting of our boys was made on April 24, 1962."

Applegate said he was "furious that ... government agencies are covering up — just another and withholding information for whatever reason."

Earlier, former North Carolina Congressman Bill Hendon, a Republican who worked six months as a Pentagon consultant after leaving the House at the end of last year, claimed that he had seen classified reports that proved Americans were still captive in Southeast Asia.

Although the Pentagon disputes Hendon's charges, he persisted in convincing the DIA of covering up POW information. Last August, he was quoted in his hometown newspaper, The Salisbury Citizen, as saying, "I know who

"There is plenty of evidence (of survivors) in the hands of the intelligence community. I personally think that if the evidence is submitted to the President, he would take whatever action is necessary to get them home."

— Earl Hopper, retired colonel

congressmen are told on this issue, as opposed to what I saw at the Pentagon."

He accused government officials of trying to suppress the information to cover their initial mistake of abandoning the survivors. "It is not national security," he said, "to let a job security for the bureaucrats who have been sitting on this for 12 years."

While the Pentagon was trying to discredit Hendon's charges, Vice President George Bush was granting him "Billy Henson is an expert on this." Bush said during a campaign stop in Asheville last March. "The country needs an elected official up there for whom this is a major interest."

Another former Republican congressman, John LaBouffeur of Long Island, N.Y., published an article in the New York Times last August in which he alleged that POWs were still alive in Laos and the DIA knew of them.

LaBouffeur, who served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Task Force on Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, wrote, "Gen. Eugene Tipton, who was at the time (of the war) and director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, recently testified that he believed that our men were still held in Laos. Privately, DIA analysts concede that POWs are still alive there, differing only on how many there are. The most recent estimates range from 20 to 240."

"Hundreds of known refugee reports, verified with no other numbers, describe similar scenes."

The rebuttal

The other photograph was released on a Friday and intelligence officials were told it was smuggled out of Laos by a refugee who claimed it was released from there.

It was a photograph of an American, identified as a former prisoner of war, who was released from Laos. "We got just another one here," the source says. "We haven't really lost anything."

Exhibit D 1 of 4

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1

2.

Reassuring future soldiers puts urgency on POW issue

"We have to end this thing," says retired Gen. Healy. "Not just for these men and their families, but for the next generation, for the young kids coming down the road. If they are called into the service, they have to have a reasonable expectation, that this country is going to stand behind them, that this (unmounting a soldier) is not going to be forgotten like it was in Korea."

Dallas Times Herald

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Mystery of MIAs

Veterans, families claim U.S. cover-up on Vietnam POWs

By JIM HENDERSON

Staff Writer

The controversy: More than 3.4 million Americans went to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War years and nearly 2,800 of them never came back, dead or alive. They are still unaccounted for. "Are we known to be dead or presumed to be dead, their remains either held in foreign countries or lost at aircraft crash sites in the remote jungles of Vietnam and Laos."

'We left five Americans over there, and we knew we were leaving five Americans there.'

— Mike Van Alta, Vietnam veteran

Nearly 10 years after the last Americans were airlifted from the daily ending the U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, the growing suspicion — some would say optimism — that five Americans are still being held captive is continuing into a domestic controversy nearly as hot, although smaller, as that which surrounded the war itself.

The families of the missing have organized into opposing camps. There have been charges of a government "cover-up" by influential congressmen. The issue has divided Vietnam veterans, some of whom talk privately of a journey to return in uniform to the scene of the war to locate the survivors they are convinced are there.

Former high-level military officers have said "intelligence officials of established reputation have suggested that cover-up is a possibility." The issue has divided Vietnam veterans, some of whom talk privately of a journey to return in uniform to the scene of the war to locate the survivors they are convinced are there.

There is plenty of evidence in the public domain that the U.S. government has covered up the fate of the missing. A report published in 1973

last summer was chairman of the National League of Families of American Prisoners. "I personally think that if the evidence is submitted to the President, he would take whatever action is necessary to get them home."

"Andrew, undoubtedly being," says a Pentagon official, "noting not to be identified, if any Americans were being held captive, we have the capacity of proving that. We have been unable to prove it."

If the evidence is not conclusive, fragments of it are swirling around in even questions in the minds of some of the foremost military figures of the Vietnam era.

Last March, in Pittsburgh to address a group of Vietnam veterans, retired Gen. William Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. troops in Vietnam from 1964 to 1969, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying there are "indications" that some of the missing Americans may be alive.

"The matter has got to be brought to a head," he said. "How many more will die, no one knows."

Retired Gen. Mike Hooley, a former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, expressed similar reservations about the official position of the government.

"Some of the evidence is pretty shaky," he says, "but I can't help but have the feeling that it is getting kind of a short shrift."

The evidence

The book is nearly 3 inches thick, 230 heavily bound pages of depositions, maps, declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports, State Department cables, congressional hearing transcripts,

personal correspondence, maps, maps, memoranda, newspaper clippings, Defense Intelligence Agency documents and assorted fact sheets of private and governmental origin.

It is, in turn, a detailed plan, the one being advanced by the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, a Washington-based umbrella group that represents 25 veterans' organizations around the country.

"Historically, the American public was led to probably about the POW evidence," says Mike Van Alta, a Vietnam veteran who now runs an electrical contracting business in northern Virginia and publishes a monthly newsletter critical of the government's handling of the issue. He has headed the veterans group's efforts to prove there are Americans in captivity in Southeast Asia.

The evidence, he says, "includes" of CIA-confirmed locations and numbers of prisoners, reports by refugees who saw them men alive as recently as last year, fingerprints, aerial photos and even pictures. The civilian population in America has no idea of the depth of the information.

Van Alta says the documents he has assembled also show that government officials have tried to conceal the evidence by "intimidating" refugees who reported sightings and by discrediting news accounts of the sightings and public debate of the POW issue.

As proof, that the "cover-up" began even before the war ended, Van Alta and the veterans group have distributed a June 1973 State Department cable from the U.S. embassy in Saigon to the secretary of state concerning a detainee named Nguyen Thanh Ben, who, claimed to have seen the American prisoners who were captured.

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released "under the 1973 Paris Peace Accords."

"In follow on interview with AP, UPI and NBC correspondents," the book says, "interviews elicited information that he had seen prisoners who had been taken to the United States. Americans 'said' had been released, American officials 'said' at interview requested news services to 'play down' details. AP mentioned war minister with embargo request, while UPI and NBC, after talk with military press officers, wanted less entirely from their sources."

Included in the book is evidence that declassified CIA reports on the tracking of POWs up to the end of American involvement in Vietnam in 1975.

"We left five Americans over there, and we know we were leaving five Americans there," Van Alta says.

The veterans group dates, for example, that 164 Americans were missing in Laos, but the remains of only four have been returned from that country. In the early days of the war, the government of Laos published photographs of 30 pilots who were in captivity. None has been accounted for.

Since the end of the war, information on U.S. survivors has come mainly from refugees fleeing Laos and Vietnam. "As of July 15, 1984, DIA has over 2,850 reports on Americans in Southeast Asia,"

640 are eye witnesses," the book says in its literature.

In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs last August, Lt. Gen. James Williams, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, acknowledged that 193 of those eye-witness reports were "under continuing investigation" and 84 were being "actively pursued." But he qualified his statement by saying, "We cannot yet prove any American is now being held captive."

"Williams has had difficulty in convincing some members of Congress from both political parties."

At these same hearings, Rep. Douglas Applegate, an Ohio Democrat who had offered a resolution directing the President to obtain a full accounting of Americans in Southeast Asia, said he had obtained a refugee report "never investigated by the Defense Intelligence Agency — of 64 live Americans in northern Laos. This live sighting of our boys was made on April 26, 1982."

Applegate said he was "furious that ... government agencies are covering up past mistakes and withholding information for whatever reason."

Earlier, former North Carolina Congressman Bill Hamilton, a Republican who worked six months as a Pentagon consultant after leaving the House at the end of last year, claimed that he had seen classified reports that proved Americans were still captive in Southeast Asia.

Although the Pentagon disputes Hamilton's charge, he pointed to evidence the DIA of covering up POW information. Last August, he was quoted in his hometown newspaper, The Asheville Citizen, as saying, "I know what

congressmen are told on this issue, as opposed to what I saw at the Pentagon."

He accused government officials of trying to suppress the information to cover their initial mistake of shrouding the survivors. "It is not national security," he said, "it is job security for the bureaucrats who have been sitting on this for 13 years."

While the Pentagon was trying to discredit Hamilton's charge, Vice President George Bush was pressing him. "Bully Hamilton is an expert on this," Bush said during a campaign stop in Asheville last March. "The country needs an elected official up there for whom this is a major interest."

Another former Republican congressman, John LaBouffeur of Long Island, N.Y., published an article in the New York Times last in August in which he alleged that POWs were still alive in Laos and the DIA knew of them.

LaBouffeur, who served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Task Force on Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, wrote: "Gen. Sharon Tague, who was at the time [of the war] and director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, recently testified that he believed that our men were still held in Laos. Privately, DIA analysts concede that POWs are still alive there, differing only in how many there are. The most recent estimate ranges from 60 to 263."

"Hundreds of recent refugee reports, verified with US defense missions, describe similar scenes."

The rebuttal

The color photograph was received on a Friday and intelligence officials were told it was smuggled out of Laos by a refugee who claimed it from eastern Laos.

It was a photograph of an American military plane in a single, during a mission. The plane was shot down by a North Vietnamese missile. The plane was shot down by a North Vietnamese missile. The plane was shot down by a North Vietnamese missile.

2

Intelligence analysts claim reports POWs in Vietnam hard to verify

A task force of experts was summoned to the Pentagon on the project over the weekend. By Saturday afternoon, according to one analyst, the group had determined, through various clues the photograph held, that the location was in Thailand.

By Monday, a defense attaché in Southeast Asia had interviewed the Comintern. He was, indeed, an American. He was, indeed, in Vietnam in Thailand to study Eastern religions. The photograph was a hoax.

That episode is cited by intelligence analysts to illustrate the difficulty of sorting through and verifying the hundreds of reports that are received concerning American POWs.

In his report to Congress last August, Gen. William, DIA director, said that of the 543 reports "alleged to be first-hand live sightings" reports, 150 "are known to be fabrications." (Most of the reports, 446 of them, were received "through a determination that they correlate with individuals since accounted for," he said.)

Pentagon spokesmen say they believe many of the "fabrications" are advanced by refugees trying to gain entrance into the United States or others motivated by a \$1 million reward offered by the National Foreign-Disaster Assistance for POW/MIA's Inc. for proof of live Americans in Southeast Asia. "We operate on the assumption that each report is true," says a Pentagon official. "We do everything we can to make this an effective process."

He cited another example of a promising line sighting that ended with serious questions about its veracity and the credibility of the source.

In that case a refugee reported having seen 50 Americans in a London prison, for which he provided a name and general description. He even sketched a map of the compound. It was immediately verified that a prison by that name existed in that location.

From files on the hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees who have settled in the United States, analysts were able to locate seven, living in different cities around the country, who had been in that prison. In interviews with intelligence agents who visited each city, the refugees were unable to confirm that Americans had been held in the prison.

Each was asked to draw a map of the prison. All their maps were similar, indicating that they all had the same knowledge of the prison. However, the map drawn by the refugee who reported the sighting did not match the map drawn by the other refugees.

Analysts say various methods, many of them classified, are available to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for checking the live sightings. "We know that the live sightings of Americans in North Vietnam are still hanging in the air and from which light does not come," an official said.

Frequently, Pentagon officials dispute their critics as being their claims on out-of-date or incomplete information. To the Pentagon's critics, that is a frustrating argument.

In the case of former Rep. Hord's claims of a cover-up, the Pentagon responded that he had seen only portions of some files, not the entire picture. Yet he was a member of the committee that allegedly refuted Hord's charges in 1975 classified by the Pentagon and is discussed with congressional committees only in closed sessions.

Most of the documents that have been supplied by the veterans group are more than 4 years old, the Pentagon argues. But several contained since 1975 remain classified.

Bob Crossman, head of the National Foreign-Disaster Assistance in Florida, says the government's position is the "closing to critics" "go as far as to find out what happened in the prisons."

"Add 'Don't think a former George Bush major, who now lives in Washington, D.C., has been and serves as chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Committee. 'We are totally convinced that our mission is correct.' And there are live men, POWs, in the government's possession."

The politics

By some accounts, 30,000 Americans who fought in World War II were never accounted for, as were thousands more who fought in Korea. Yet the incomplete accounting did not generate the political furor that is building over the open books that remain on Vietnam.

After these wars, which ended in victory or stalemate, the U.S. had access to the areas where Americans might have been incarcerated. If all the questions were not answered, at least there was an opportunity to erase lingering voices of American soldiers languishing in enemy prisons.

Vietnam was different. The war ended in defeat. The withdrawal of the U.S. was swift, and insufficient. Paper for counting the live sightings of Americans was still burning in the American embassy as North Vietnamese tanks clustered on and from which light does not come through the streets of Saigon. The Americans who were left behind, dead or alive, became a spot on the American psyche, a brain that wouldn't go away.

"Throughout the years of President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the U.S. government took the quiet position that those missing in action were presumed dead. And the governments of Laos and Vietnam insisted they had no knowledge of Americans still in captivity. The pursuit of an accounting was mostly viewed as a humanitarian, non-political matter."

As a presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan promised to give the POW/MIA issue the highest national priority, and as President, he vowed that his administration would proceed on the assumption that "at least one" American was still being held prisoner in Southeast Asia. In writing terms he told the National League of Families that if given conclusive evidence of live prisoners, he would do

4002018 4

Reassuring future soldiers puts urgency on POW issue

REASSURING — From Page 11
whatever was necessary to get them out.

Reagan has repeated that vow throughout his tenure. On Memorial Day he again pledged that "We write no last chapters ... we put away no books."

Reagan's rhetoric, intended to reassure the families of those still on the missing list, had the effect of politicizing the issue for the first time. By acknowledging the possibility of a POW, he gave encouragement to veterans groups determined to prove their case.

By failing to acknowledge what some of them veterans consider conclusive evidence, he has given rise to the claims of a political cover-up.

"If he acknowledges that he knows they are there," says one veteran, "then he has to keep his promise to get them out. Now's the time to do that! He'd have an Iranian-hostage type situation on his hands."

Many of the veterans' leaders, many of whom are Republicans, are hesitant to criticize Reagan personally. One of them is Tom Bursh, the chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Coalition. Bursh is a Republican and was one of five finalists for the position of Secretary of the Army under Reagan.

"I don't want to embarrass the President," Bursh says. "I just want to get the facts out. I don't believe he has all of the information his intelligence agencies have."

The issue became overly politicized last August when Reagan supporters, including at least one member of the White House staff, tried to thwart the veterans group parade in Dallas on the eve of the Republican National Convention.

At Bursh says the purpose of the parade was to "insure public awareness of the issue" and to

force a personal meeting with Reagan as the coalition's evidence could be turned over to him.

He blames a telephone and letter-writing campaign by Dick Childers, who works on the staff of the National Security Council, and veterans associated with the federally funded Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program in Dallas with "sabotaging" the event.

Medal of Honor winner Roy Benavente, of El Campo, Texas, received telephone calls and letters from Tom Martin, chairman of the Dallas Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program chapter, urging him not to participate as grand marshal of the parade. "He said it would not only be embarrassing to me but to the President," Benavente says. He attended anyway. "Why? It's all over for us except giving these guys out," he says.

Chairman, director of the National Foreign-Disaster Assistance, received a call from Childers advising him and his organization not to participate. "He said there were procedures already set up to get in Dallas, and there was a possibility of violence," Crossman says. He received a subsequent phone call and letter from Martin, who said him the event was an attempt to embarrass the President. Crossman came to Dallas anyway.

Several other organizations, including the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Gold Star Mothers and the Shriners withdrew from the parade after receiving similar notices from Reagan supporters. On Saturday before the parade, he had 44 organizations scheduled to take part," Bursh says. "By Saturday, the number was down to 14."

"The Department of Defense coalition members say, had given us support to the event but withdrew at the last minute, depriving the organizers of military vehicles and adding daily problems. Only a Marine color guard 'replaced' the command decision not to participate."

pace," according to Mike Van Atta, one of the organizers.

Martin, who was not on the federal payroll because his position as chairman of the VVLF is voluntary, said he opposed the event because of the timing.

"It was becoming a political issue, and it shouldn't be," he says. "July 30 was National POW/MIA day and there was an observance in Times Square. They could have come here then, and I would have been behind them 100 percent. But they chose Aug. 18 (the day before the opening of the Republican convention), and they did it to embarrass the President. I didn't like it."

"For several years, the veterans groups were devoting their energies to lawsuits and legislation to compensate victims of Agent Orange exposure. With that battle essentially won, they have not the accounting for POWs and MIAs as their top priority."

But there is another reason for the increased activism — the urgency of time and the reassurance for future soldiers.

"The average age of Vietnam veterans is now 34. Some of the photos shot down in the war, if any remain alive, would be approaching old age."

"We have to end this thing," says retired Gen. Healy. "Not just for these men and their families, but for the next generation, for our young kids coming down the road. If they are called into the service, they have to have a reasonable expectation, that their country is going to stand behind them, that this (accounting of missing) is not going to be forgotten like it was in Korea."

4

3.

SEND *** TELEX
MSG C43418 SENT AT 03 SEP 84 01:39:34

TY
GET C43418
TY

ACCEPTED

2589510+/IRS WSH
TO: COMMISSIONER ROSCOE L. EGGER
YOUR ASSISTANCE IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED IN OBTAINING
AN ANSWER TO MY PREVIOUS REQUESTS MADE VIA MAIL ON MAR
10 1984, ON APR 6 1984 AND AGAIN ON MAY 17 1984, FOLLOWED
BY MANY PHONE CALLS DURING MAY, JUNE, JULY AND AUG.

MY REQUESTS WERE: 1) THAT I BE ADVISED IF 'THE CENTER FOR
POV/HIA ACCOUNTABILITY' HAD A VALID TAX-EXEMPT STATUS AND,
2) THAT AN INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED INTO THE POLITICAL
CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. R.T. CHILDRESS OF THE
N.S.C. AND THE CENTER; AND INTO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIONS
TAKEN BY HIM AND/OR HIS AGENTS.

I REGRET TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE OF ANY TYPE
TO MY REQUEST BY YOUR SERVICE.

AS PROVEN BY RECENT HISTORY 'STONEWALLING' AND 'COVERUP' ARE
NOT NEW TO OUR GOVERNMENT BUT POLITICAL MISUSE OF THE IRS
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE 'IN THE PAST'.

MANY PERSONS HAVE ADVISED ME OF THE VINDICTIVE ACTION YOUR
SERVICE MAY TAKE BECAUSE OF MY COMPLAINT BUT I WILL PURSUE
THIS MATTER BY ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS
WITHIN MY POWER.

I ONLY HOPE THE CONSTITUTION STILL MEANS WE HAVE THE RIGHT
TO SEEK REDRESS OF A WRONG AND THAT IT DOES NOT PLACE
'PUBLIC SERVANTS' ABOVE THE LAW.

YOUR POSITIVE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS MATTER AND THE
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MYSELF AND OTHERS
IS REQUESTED.

IF YOU CAN NOT - OR WILL NOT - ADDRESS THIS MATTER REQUEST
THAT YOU SO ADVISE ME - IN WRITING - AND STATE THE REASON.

JOHN MEAD
SUITE 106
333 COBALT WAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
(408) 947 5733

Exhibit E 1 of 11

* TELEX

C43737 SENT AT 03 SEP 84 17:42:21

ET C43737

ACCEPTED

TY
7108221907+/EVFCH WSH
TO: ATTY GEN SMITH
YOUR ASSISTANCE IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED IN OBTAINING
INFORMATION REGARDING MY COMPLAINT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
BY MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND/OR THEIR AGENTS.

MY REQUEST WAS THAT AN INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED INTO
THE POLITICAL CONTROLLING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. R
CHILDRESS OF THE N.S.C. AND A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION AND
ALSO INTO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTIONS TAKEN BY HIM AND/OR
HIS AGENTS OR ASSOCIATES.

THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NO ACTION TAKEN BY YOUR
DEPARTMENT. AS FAR AS I CAN DETERMINE NO PERSON WITH
DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED HAS EVER BEEN
ASKED A QUESTION OR INTERVIEWED. IT HAS BEEN OVER SIX
MONTHS SINCE MY FIRST WRITTEN COMPLAINT ADDRESSED TO YOU
WAS MAILED. ALSO I AM NOW INFORMED THAT MR. JARRETT
'IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE' WHEN I CALL TO CHECK
ON THE STATUS.

THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS (POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL) CONTINUE AND
THE PERSONS INVOLVED REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS AND CONTINUE
TO ABUSE THEIR OFFICE AND POSITION OF TRUST BY THEIR ACTS.

AS PROVEN BY RECENT HISTORY 'STONEWALLING' AND 'COVERUP' ARE
NOT NEW TO OUR GOVERNMENT BUT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS
SUPPOSED TO BE IMMUNE TO 'POLITICAL MISUSE' - AT LEAST IN
THIS ADMINISTRATION.

IF THE ACTIONS I HAVE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION DO IN FACT
REPRESENT THE POLICY OF THE USG THEN WE NO LONGER HAVE A
'GOVERNMENT OF LAW' OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS.

MANY PERSONS HAVE ADVISED ME OF THE VINDICTIVE ACTION THAT
MAY BE TAKEN AND THE PERSONAL DANGER INCURRED BECAUSE OF MY
COMPLAINT BUT I WILL PURSUE THIS MATTER BY ALL POSSIBLE
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WITHIN MY POWER. I ONLY
HOPE THE CONSTITUTION STILL MEANS THE RIGHT TO SEEK REDRESS
OF A WRONG AND THAT IT DOES NOT PLACE 'PUBLIC SERVANTS'
ABOVE THE LAW.

YOUR POSITIVE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING THIS MATTER AND THE
PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MYSELF AND OTHERS IS
REQUESTED.

IF YOU CAN NOT - OR WILL NOT - ADDRESS THIS MATTER I REQUEST
THAT YOU ADVISE ME - IN WRITING - AND STATE YOUR REASONS.

JOHN MEAD
SUITE 106
333 COBALT WAY
SUNNYVALE, CA 94086

John R Mead
Suite Nbr 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
(408) 947-5733

August 21, 1984

The Honorable Fred Fielding
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Fielding:

Your assistance is respectfully requested in having the matters described in the attached material investigated. Basic documentation on these matters has been provided to DOJ and DIA.

The events over the last year have forced me to accept that some officials of the USG are willfully and deliberately maintaining a policy of deception and self interest which is not in accordance with the expressed policy of the current administration nor in the interests of the United States.

This policy includes preventing information and reports from reaching the president; taking aggressive reprisal action against those who express disagreement or do not support their position; suppressing data which is not in agreement with their interests and illegal political interference in the affairs of private organizations.

The reprisal actions have included threats of prosecution, character assassination, violation of civil rights, intimidation, interference in commerce and other criminal acts.

For over six months I have been trying to work within the established legal channels to have an official investigation started. Until my TELEX to the Attorney General I could not even obtain acknowledgment that I had made a complaint.

With all due respect to the Attorney General's office and personnel I feel that my complaint will be buried and that no action will be taken unless I continue to press the matter thru every channel possible.

As the current focus of my complaint is within the NSC and DOD I hope that any action you may consider would be by persons who are not under the control of nor subject to review by persons within the NSC or DOD.

Sincerely,

DUPLICATE

U.S. Department of Justice



GEMCD:FSE:pam
186-0

Washington, D.C. 20530

16 AUG 1984

Mr. John R. Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, California 94086

Dear Mr. Mead:

This will acknowledge the Public Integrity Section's receipt of your letter dated July 16, 1984 and the accompanying materials.

Sincerely,

Gerald E. McDowell, Chief
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division

*NOTE:
1st in only 1984
SPECIFIC Ltr to Mead.*

John R Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, Calif 94086
(408) 947-5733
July 16, 1984

Mr. H. Marshall Jarrett
Attorney at Law
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Jarrett:

The following information is provided in response to your telephone request and Mr. McDowell's letter.

The attached documentation should be reviewed first to establish the general background. It represents part of the records that have been accumulated since March 1983 through the present date. Much of the supporting documentation is in the hands of other persons; however, can be obtained on reasonable notice.

It was not until January 1984 that I reluctantly accepted the probability that individuals at the responsibility level of Mr. Childress were involved in the activities described herein. Since that time I have had occasion to be in a position to verify that Mr. Childress is an active, willing participant in these activities.

During my analysis of events over the last eighteen months one thing has become very visible. There is a serious misuse of official position and authority by Mr. Childress and by other persons within the Department of Defense including Mr. R. L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The following is a general breakdown of some issues and general supporting information for each. Names and contact information of witnesses to each point and supporting documentation is available and can be obtained on reasonable notice as needed.

In the following breakdown when I state Childress, I am referring to Mr. R. T. Childress of the National Security Council, his associates and persons under his direction and/or control.

Illegal Political Relationship - Childress and 'Center for POW/MIA Accountability'.

An illegal political controlling relationship exists between Mr. Childress and the Center for POW/MIA Accountability in such a manner that the 'Center' acts for Mr. Childress and is his private force. The 'Center' is described as a Non-profit Tax-exempt corporation based in Washington, DC. Some of the activities of the 'Center' are described herein.

Supporting Information:

Representatives of the 'Center' acknowledged that they were political in nature with a political mission and scheduled to go out of business in November 1984. This statement was made during a question and answer session after a presentation to 'Project Freedom' in Phoenix, Arizona.

Representatives of the 'Center' stated that they had access and approval at the highest level including the NSC with instant access to an unnamed individual on the White House staff. This statement was made several times but specifically during their trip to California in July 1983 and in Las Vegas during October 1983.

Childress acknowledged on January 13, 1984 that the 'Center' was his investigative group and his Public Awareness Briefing team.

Childress acknowledged on January 13, 1984 that representatives of the 'Center' visited his office and he approved their travel to California to talk to my associates and me.

See the attached documentation for more information on this trip.

Release of Classified Information

Childress has willfully, knowingly and illegally authorized the release of, released or provided information that was classified and furnished in confidence to the Defense Intelligence Agency to persons without a need to know and who did not hold a valid security clearance.

Supporting Information:

On his trip to California in July 1983, Allen could quote 'word for word' information provided in confidence to DIA. When queried, he said he had received it from his 'high level' contacts within the USG.

Childress stated on January 13, 1984 that personnel of the 'Center' were provided with all reports from all sources to evaluate and investigate as appropriate. This apparently included whatever reports were prepared by DIA during my discussions with them during June 1983.

I have been assured by representatives of DIA that they did not give out the information provided to them however they had no control over the information after it left their office.

Other cases of selective release have been reported and appear to be true.

Misuse of Office and Authority

Mr. Childress has used his office for political purposes to interfere and intervene in the activities of private organizations.

Supporting Information:

Mr. Childress has condoned and possibly approved the use of attempted blackmail, threats of official prosecution, threats of physical harm and other actions by his agents (Personnel of the 'Center', its advisors, associates and consultants) against myself and others. Threats of physical harm were made by Mr. Monaghan and others against myself and my associates. Threats of prosecution were made by Mr. Allen and Monaghan. Mr. Allen stated that if we did not do as they wanted we would be ruined.

Mr. Childress has used his position, office and authority to deliberately interfere with and influence the actions of private non-profit organizations interested in the POW/MIA issue. This has apparently been done to suppress any independent inquiry or publicity that may not support his public position on the matter. Mr. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense has also been involved in this matter.

Childress has used personal intimidation and threats of governmental sanctions against the League in an effort to insure that Ann Griffiths remain as the Executive Director of the National League of Families (A paid position as an employee of the League). Mr. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense has also used this approach.

See attached documentation for additional information.

Violation of Civil Rights of myself and others

An extensive Character Assassination has been conducted against myself and my associates thru several sources but they appear to be coordinated thru the 'Center'. Everyone involved is associated with the 'Center'.

Supporting Information:

Representatives of the 'Center' (Butler and Allen) have told third parties (in person and via interstate telephone) not to do business with me or my company as we were under investigation by the FBI for illegal acts and anti-american activity.

Representatives of the 'Center', their advisors and consultants have deliberately, knowingly and willfully conducted a character assassination campaign against my associates and myself. They have repeatedly told third parties that we are 'under investigation for illegal, criminal and un-american acts'. This has occurred from September 1983 until the present date.

See attached documentation for additional information.

Threats of Damaging Official Actions:

It has become apparent during the last few months that the threats expressed by Mr. Allen and other persons associated with the 'Center' had merit and that I should have been more aware that they were serious.

Supporting Information:

During their trip to California in July 1984 Mr. Allen and Mr. Hebert stated that they had 'arrangements' with both the FBI and IRS. The FBI would perform checks on all personnel they were interested in and perform other services as needed. IRS would 'take care' of them and insure that they had no tax problems and provide other services that were not named.

Allen stated several times that if we did not do what they wanted that things would go very bad for us.

From the events of the last few months it is apparent that there is an attempt to carry out these threats.

See attached documentation for more information.

Illegal Surveillance

Several times during the last few months I have been informed by different persons that Mr. Childress and/or DIA Representatives have approached people known to be interested in POW/MIA activities and asked them to join groups and report back on the intentions and actions of these groups.

Supporting Information:

It is my understanding that this type of 'undercover' activity is unlawful in general and that the military in specific is not allowed to infiltrate civilian groups or conduct undercover investigations of same.

Statements of individuals approached are available.

Comments

It has become evident that if a person (or group) does not embrace the position expressed by current USC Representatives (Mr. Childress and DIA)) and they are active in the issue of POW/MIA affairs that they are then in for trouble. It apparently does not matter if a person is acting in good faith or is just expressing a political position.

Character assassination appears to be a standard tactic employed by the USC Representatives and their agents. The comments made about myself and others with whom I have come into contact over the last few months have ranged from 'liars' to 'Anti-American Radicals' to 'Senile' and worse.

The charges I am making are serious and are not being made without a lot of thought and investigation. It is my intention to continue until the matter is resolved regardless of expense or time.

Additional information is available to fully support all charges I am making however is in safekeeping at this time.

I sincerely hope that your office will be able to determine who is responsible for these illegal actions and can take appropriate action.

Please advise me if I can provide any additional information.

Sincerely,

9

GENCD:RMJ:ab
186-11-0

Washington, D.C. 20530

JUN 20 1984

Mr. John R. Mead
Suite 106
333 Cobalt Way
Sunnyvale, California 94086

Dear Mr. Mead:

The Public Integrity Section has received a telex dated May 11, 1984 from you to the Attorney General. H. Marshall Jarrett, a trial attorney in the Public Integrity Section has reviewed your telex and spoken to you on the telephone regarding the allegations contained therein. Pursuant to Mr. Jarrett's telephone request to you, please provide to him in writing a detailed description of all the facts which you believe give rise to a violation of federal criminal law. Mr. Jarrett's address is P.O. Box 30168, F Street Station, Washington, D.C. 20004-0168.

Sincerely,

Gerald E. McDowell

Gerald E. McDowell, Chief
Public Integrity Section
Criminal Division

-10

, NYC

HQ SUVL

MAY 11 1984 20:11 4079459
 SA
 ZCZCJUS 310 DAN STRYKER
 US7108221907 EVFCH WSH

ATTN: ATTORNEY GENERAL
 DEPT. OF JUSTICE

HAVE TRIED SINCE JAN 13, 1984 TO LODGE A COMPLAINT REGARDING ILLEGAL POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF MR. RICHARD CHILDRESS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE CENTER FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY INC., A SUPPOSED TAX-EXEMPT CORPORATION. INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CENTER HAVE ENGAGED IN ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL AND EXTORTION AFTER RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM MR. CHILDRESS FOR THEIR TRAVEL. MR. CHILDRESS WAS ADVISED OF THIS ACTIVITY ON JANUARY 13TH, 1984 AND ACKNOWLEDGED HIS CONNECTION WITH THE CENTER AND INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

INDIVIDUALS WITH THE CENTER SAID THEY HAD A DIRECT WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI, IRS AND OTHER USG AGENCIES. IT APPEARS THEY WERE CORRECT AS COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE FBI, THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DIA, AND IRS WITH NO APPARENT RESULTS.

REQUEST THAT A FORMAL INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED OF THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. CHILDRESS AND THE CENTER FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS, INTERNAL ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL MISUSE OF OFFICE AND AUTHORITY.

JAN R. HEAD
 SUITE 106, 333 COWLEY WAY
 SUNNYVALE, CA 94086
 (408) 947-5723

172211HQBVL

NNNN

CCI NYC

1 MSGS RCVD

100: 00000222 017
 26 OCT 88 2004
 CN: 25163
 CHRG: SVC
 DIST: SVC

CONFIDENTIAL VIETNAMESE
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3260
 INIC RUHAWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHJCS/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0841
 RUHJUL/AMCONSUL ULCRN 3742
 RUEHJCS/DIR JCRC FARRERS PT HI
 21
 CONFIDENTIAL VIETNAMESE 2745

CONNECTIVE COPY (TEXT)

NSC FCB CELLERS; DIA FOR VC-PW; SECDEF FOR ISA

I.C. 1222: DICI: OADR
 TAGS: FBI, MCP3, CASC (LONG, DONNA), (COFF, JAMES), LA
 SUBJECT: ARREST CASES OF MS. LONG AND MR. COFF

REF: STATE 332244

1. CONFIDENTIAL INKING TEXT.

2. VIET MINISTRE SCIENCE RETURNED SATURDAY EVENING AND THIS MORNING, OCTOBER 21, THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT TWO, MRS. KANAKA FROMMACHAND, ASKED ME TO COME SEE HER. SHE WAS RELAXED, COURTEOUS AND FRIENDLY AND WANTED TO DISCUSS THE ARRESTS OF LONGA ICAG AND JAMES COFF.

3. SHE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE LAO GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ACTIONS OF THOSE TWO INDIVIDUALS WERE PRIVATE, THAT THEY WERE NEITHER ENCOURAGED NOR SUPPORTED BY THE USG. THE LAO DID NOT WANT THIS INCIDENT TO AFFECT COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES ON POW/MIA MATTERS. TO THAT END, SHE CONTINUED, MR. CHILDRESS OF THE NSC AND TAO-GEORGE ICAG HAD DISCUSSED SOME ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED FUTURE INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND, AND WHICH WOULD ALSO PREVENT FURTHER SIDIS' TISSIS TO CONTINUE MAKING PROGRESS ON POW/MIA CASES.

4. NONWITHSTANDING, WHILE THE USG DID NOT SUPPORT THESE PRIVATE AND HARMFUL ACTIVITIES, SOME REP. SCIP. PREPARED TO CONGRESS SIMILAR TO, AND THE LAO GOVERNMENT EXPECTED THAT THE USG MIGHT RAISE THE EFFECT OF THAT SUPPORT WITH THE CONGRESS. TO THAT END, SHE SAID, THAT SHE WOULD AND IF THE USG WENT TO MAKE A DECLARATION EXPLODING SUCH ACTIVITIES IT MIGHT HAVE NEGOTIATED THE ARREST CASES MORE RAPIDLY.

5. KANAKA THEN REFERRED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE AMEMBASSY AND THE LAOICA MINISTRY IN 1985/1986 REGARDING THE ARREST OF JON ROBERT PHILLIPS AND THE COMMITMENTS THE LAO GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. TO REPAY EXPENSES INCURRED IN MR. PHILLIPS' INTENTIONAL AND IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL. SHE WAS NOT,

Exhibit F 10f 15

CONFIDENTIAL

EAP/VLC:DESTANDER:0673R
10/27/88 EXT 73132
EAP:DLAMBERTSON

EAP/VLC:CHTWINING
EAP/VLC:MMHARINE
CA/OCS/EMR:MMHONEY

IMMEDIATE VIENTIANE

IMMEDIATE NSC WASHDC, SECDEF WASHDC, BANGKOK, UDORN,
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//VO-PW//, RUHQBP/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

NSC FOR CHILDRESS, SECDEF FOR ISA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

DECL:OADR

PREL, MOPS, CASC (LONG, DONNA), (COPP, JAMES), LA

ARREST CASES OF MS. LONG AND MR. COPP

REF: VIENTIANE 2745

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSY IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT THE USG CANNOT ACT AS BROKER OR GUARANTOR FOR THE PAYMENT OF LAO CHARGES/FINES OF ANY SORT BUT CAN FACILITATE PAYMENT FROM INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE U.S. THROUGH NORMAL OCS TRUST PROCEDURES. WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT RELATIVELY LIGHT FINES WOULD NOT FURTHER COMPLICATE THE RESOLUTION, IMPOSITION OF HEAVY FINES WHICH COPP AND LONG WERE UNABLE TO PAY MIGHT STIMULATE ADDITIONAL ACTION ON THE PART OF THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE U.S., WHICH WE HARDLY BELIEVE THE LAO WANT TO ENCOURAGE.

3. A DRAFT USG STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES IN PARA 4 WOULD BE MADE AFTER THE RELEASE OF LONG AND COPP. PLEASE SUGGEST THAT THE LAO PREPARE A DRAFT STATEMENT OF THEIR OWN WHICH CAN BE USED TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE AND TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND CONCERNING COMPLICATIONS CAUSED BY PRIVATE ACTIVITIES AND THESE

2F

CONFIDENTIAL

2

REWARD OFFERS.

4. BEGIN TEXT: WE WELCOME THE RELEASE OF MS. DONNA LONG AND MR. JAMES COPP BY THE LAO GOVERNMENT AND APPRECIATE THE REAFFIRMATION BY THE LAO OF CONTINUED COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE DESPITE THIS LATEST INCIDENT. THIS EPISODE AGAIN DEMONSTRATES THAT SUCH PRIVATE INITIATIVES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO RESOLVING THE POW/MIA ISSUE. THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION. ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THE INTENSITY OF CONCERN SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE, SUCH ACTIVITIES NEVERTHELESS CAN AND HAVE IN THE PAST JEOPARDIZED ONGOING LAO-U.S. COOPERATION. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT REWARD OFFERS REINFORCE A PERCEPTION WIDELY HELD IN INDOCHINA, PARTICULARLY AMONG REFUGEES, THAT INFORMATION AND REMAINS ARE ITEMS OF BARTER. REWARDS HAVE BEEN OFFERED BEFORE, BUT HAVE PRODUCED NO POSITIVE RESULTS. WE ALSO NOTE THAT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION WITH LAOS HAS INCREASED RECENTLY AND WE ANTICIPATE MORE PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE POW/MIA ISSUE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. END TEXT. 44

JCS WASHDC
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 4

3F

Editorial

Monday, November 21, 1966

Laos confounds POW efforts

WASHINGTON — The possibility that American prisoners of war are still alive in Southeast Asia tantalizes many Americans. But some Americans are more than tantalized — they are irritated to the point of doing something about it.

Jack
Anderson
columnist



Two North Carolinians, Dennis Long and James Cogg, spent 23 days locked up in Laos after they crossed the Mekong River from Thailand to Laos seeking information on POWs. They were released Nov. 12, a little worse for wear. Their hard ride across the border will be nothing more than a footnote in the voluminous negotiations for the return of American servicemen, dead or alive.

But their capture gives Americans a clue as to why the campaign to free POWs, if there are any alive, is the slowest rescue on record.

Confidential State Department sources from the U.S. Embassy in Laos in Washington during the time that Long and Cogg were held reveal that the talks over the simple conversion of American airplane crash sites are based on 10-to-100-fives.

The United States has smashed its way for a private group to build at least one medical clinic in Laos. That group, AmeriCarus of Concord, is a conservative organization that puts its money where its politics are. Founder Bob Mansley told us that the clinic is not a humanitarian trade for information about POWs, but is a way "not trying to get the door open."

It is clear from the State Department cables that the Laotian government expects much more in return for granting the United States the privilege of recovering its war dead.

Several cables from the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, to the State Department include complaints from Laotian officials that the construction of the clinic was delayed. The complaints are "indicative of a Lao perception that they have been generous in helping us on POW/MIA matters and we have been less than generous in responding to their humanitarian needs," the embassy reported. Before the United States cable for the right to survey more crash sites in Laos, the cable says, "we should carefully consider as well what we may be willing and able to provide the Lao to assist with their humanitarian needs." The cables talk of a second clinic to be built in the same region of a crash site that the United States wants to observe.

The arrest in Laos of Long and Cogg, according to the embassy, didn't help matters. The two belong to the National Steering Committee for American War Veterans, chaired by Ted Kennedy of Illinois, N.C. More than two years ago, the group began collecting money to offer as a reward for the return of any live American POW from Southeast Asia. That reward is set up to \$1.4 million and includes pledges of \$10,000 each from 21 members of Congress.

Hairs rise on the backs of necks at the State Department when a reward is suggested. It comes too close to paying for hostages. But Sampley and his group think the U.S. government is doing the same thing when it arranges favors for Laos in exchange for the right to search for dead bodies. Sampley isn't interested in remains. "I want live prisoners," he told our associate Daryl Glavin. "It's a very humane program (the reward offer), if the prisoners of war do not exist, they can't be hurt by it."

State Department spokesman Alan Almeyer refused to talk about the details of negotiations in the confidential cables. "We have agreed with the government of Laos to help to the extent that we can with the humanitarian concern," Almeyer said.

The cables carrying information from the U.S. Embassy about Long and Cogg showed that Laotian officials would have liked the U.S. government to publicly denounce the reward offers from members of Congress. After the release, Almeyer did not criticize the congressmen. He would only repeat the State Department's opposition to reward schemes.

Before the release, Laotian officials had also hinted that they wanted the State Department to pay for the cost of keeping Cogg and Long locked up, but the cables show the State Department diplomatically avoided that issue.

When Sampley and Long were arrested in Washington as Veterans Day to protest the continued denials of Cogg and Long, the State Department varied all any public embarrassment by calling a deal. Sampley and the veterans passed the hat and collected \$1,300.

The Laotians called it a fine, but Sampley figures it was the cost of room, board and transportation for Cogg and Long. The money was wired to Laos and the two were set free.

0 9 2250662 OCT 96
TM STATE WASHDC
TO BUREAU/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 0255
INFO BUREAU/NSC WASHDC 0231
RUEVJCS/ JCS WASHDC 7323
RUEVJCS/AMEMBASSY HANOI 6617
RUEVJCS/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEVJCS/JCRC LIAISON PANGKONG TH
RUEVJCS/CDR JCRC BANGKOK TH
RUEVJCS/CDR USCILHI FT SHAFTER HI
RUEVJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC 0000
RUEVJCS/DIA WASHDC//VO-24//
P*

C O N T I D N T I A L STATE 3775F

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

THIS: PRCL, MOFS, LA, US

SUBJECT: EXCAVATION COMMITMENT AND HAWAII TRIP

REF: A. VIENTIANE 2293 P. SECRET 022517 OCT 66

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE APPRECIATE YOUR WELL CONSIDERED VIEWS ON TIMING OF OUR FORTHCOMING ACTIVITIES. VICE MINISTER CHUNHAF REAFFIRMED THAT AT LEAST TWO EXCAVATIONS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. IF THIS IS NOT WIDELY KNOWN IN VIENTIANE, THAT CAN BE A PROBLEM. WE AGREE.

3. HOWEVER, TENTATIVE THINKING ON OUR PART IS THAT IF WOULD BE USEFUL TO SCHEDULE AN EXCAVATION FOR THE OCTOBER 22-28 PERIOD, THEN HAVE THE LAO VISIT HAWAII BEGINNING NOVEMBER 7. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED TO THAT THEY CAN BE PRESENT AT OUR LAPS AND SEE JUST HOW WE WORK WITH WHAT HAS BEEN PICKED UP DURING AN EXCAVATION.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE HUMANITARIAN AID QUESTION, THE LAO HAVE EMPHASIZED BOTH TO YOU AND TO US THE NEED TO HAVE PROGRESS IN MEETING THEIR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNDERSTANDING WORKED OUT WITH AMERICANS THAT THE ORGANIZATION WILL CONSIDER A SECOND CLINIC ONCE THE FIRST ONE IS COMPLETED IS A SERIOUS SIGN OF OUR INTEREST AND COMMITMENT.

5. REQUEST THAT YOU PROCEED ON BASIS OF THE FOREGOING IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LAO AUTHORITIES. WE WILL OF COURSE BE HAPPY TO ENTERTAIN ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS EXPRESSED THAT HAVE AS TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN ENDEAVORS TO CONSIDER FOR THE FUTURE. PLEASE ADVISE.

8 OCT 88

Clinic
Americans

4F

5F

CONFIDENTIAL

COPP WERE UNDERTAKING.

4. PLEASE ADVISE RESULT

VV

17 OCT 88

IMMEDIATE VIENTIANE

ROUTINE BANGKOK, UDORN, SECDEF WASHDC, DIA WASHDC

SECDEF FOR ISA, DIA FOR VO-PL

DECL: OADR

CASC, PREL, MOPS (LONG, DONNA), (COPP, JAMES), LA

ARRESTS: CASE OF MR. JAMES COPP AND MS.
DONNA LONG

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. RESPONDING TO A DESIRE EXPRESSED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SOUBANH SRITHIRATH IN NEW YORK THAT WE FIND A WAY TO PUT THIS CASE BEHIND US, RICHARD CHILDRESS OF NSC AND CHARGE DONE SONVORACHIT AGREED OVER THE WEEK-END ON A SCENARIO DESIGNED TO EFFECT RAPID RELEASE OF THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY STATEMENTS ISSUED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS INTENDED TO REEMPHASIZE OUR COOPERATION ON POW/MIA ISSUES AND TO NOTE THAT THE KIND OF ACTIVITY WHICH LONG AND COPP WERE UNDERTAKING JEOPARDIZES THAT WORK.

3. SOUBANH SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED TO DONE THAT HE THOUGHT THIS KIND OF FORMULA WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE AND THAT HE WOULD CARRY THE IDEA BACK WITH HIM TO VIENTIANE. NOTE THAT HE HAS LEFT THE UN AND SHOULD BE ARRIVING IN LAOS IMMINENTLY.

4. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE THE POINT TO FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT THE FASTER THE RELEASES OCCUR AND THE

CONFIDENTIAL

6F

CONFIDENTIAL

2

MORE LENIENT LAO AUTHORITIES ARE WITH THE DETAINEES, THE MORE POSITIVE OUR STATEMENT CAN BE. AT THE SAME TIME, A GOOD LPDR STATEMENT WILL BE MOST USEFUL TO US IN OUR EFFORTS ON THE HILL AND ELSEWHERE TO DISCOURAGE IN THE FUTURE THE KIND OF INDEPENDENT ACTIVITY LONG AND COPP WERE UNDERTAKING.

4. PLEASE ADVISE RESULTS OF DISCUSSION WITH THE LAO.

VV

7F

CONFIDENTIAL

0 080445Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2140
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 2685

DEPT FOR EAP/VLC ONLY FROM ACTING CHARGE

R.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: 1A

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL NO. 291

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MANY THANKS BORYOUNG O-1. IT ARRIVED AT JUSTOCHIE EIGHT TIME WHEN WE WERE, AS YOU MAY HAVE DIVINED, FEELING A BIT BRUISED. UNDERSTAND -- ALL TOO WELL -- POINTS WERE REF. PARA 4.

3. "ARREST CASE". WE HAVE DISPATCHED (AND WILL REPORT IT FORMALLY) DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING CONSULAR ACCESS TO LONG AND COPP, AND NOTING THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND OUR VICE-CONSUL AND A CONSULAR ASSISTANT TO PASS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. I HOPE THAT THE LAO WILL REALIZE THAT CONTINUED DETENTION OF THESE TWO ONLY GIVES THEM THE PRELUCE THAT THEY DELIBERATELY SOUGHT. I URGED SOMBAT, AND ANYONE ELSE I COULD BUTTHOLE -- AS DID LISA -- TO RELEASE THEM TOUT SUITE. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE, AND MR. CHILDRESS MAY WANT TO KNOW, THAT THE LAO HAVE BEEN FRANK TO SAY THAT THIS CASE WILL NOT AFFECT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS, OR OUR COOPERATION ON POW/MIA MATTERS. SOMBAT ACTUALLY OPENED HIS MOUTH AND RAISED HIS VOICE TO MAKE THAT POINT WITH ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

4. SITUATION COPY. WE ARE DOWN TO FOUR OFFICERS, AND IF LISA HAS TO FLY TO PAYSSE THAT WILL LEAVE ME THE ONLY BODY ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST, PLUS OUR NEW ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AND ONE COMMUNICATOR. WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD STAVE OFF HA FOR THE NEXT WEEK. IF I CAN EVER FIGURE OUT THEIR FORMAT CHANGES (AND I HAVE READ THEIR MULTITUDINOUS REFS) I WILL SEND IN A NEW SECTION 6 ON A LAO LABOR FORCE WHICH DOES NOT EXIST.

5. VISITS. GIVE HARRIS OUR BEST. ASSURE HEY WE HAVEN'T SOLD THE STORY OR REIMPOSTERED FOR SOA IN TERRY TELL PLUM. GOOD LUCK IN HANDLING YOUR CAMBODIAN VISITS. MAY

8F

0 101000Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3215
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 2685

DEPT FOR EAP/VLC ONLY FROM ACTING CHARGE

R.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: 1A

SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL NO. 291

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. JIM STEELE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM SEEING DONNA LONG AND JAMES COPP. THE TWO APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, AND MADE NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT MALFEASANCE. THEY ARE BEING HELD NOT IN THE EMBASSY, NOT IN JAIL FOR ST, BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY NOT AT LIBERTY. THE LAO STILL HAVE NOT CHARGED THEM, BUT ACCORDING TO MS. LONG, TOLD THEM THAT THEY WOULD BE RELEASED "WHEN THEIR STATEMENTS WERE CLEAR". WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT THAT MEANS, AND WILL PURSUE THE QUESTION OF CHARGES WITH MEA TOMORROW. MESSAGES FROM THEIR FAMILIES WERE DELIVERED, AND THE LAO DID PERMIT COPP TO HANDOVER TO JIM A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS. COPP DOES NOT SEEM NOT WANT ANY INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN OUT ABOUT HIM OTHER THAN TO HIS FAMILY. LONG ON THE OTHER HAND HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO COMMENTS TO THE PRESS. OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE AVID PANTYON PRESS CORPS MAY THEREFORE READ RATHER STRANGELY.

3. THE STORY THEY TOLD JIM IS NOT RPT NOT IN ACCORD WITH THAT SENT TO UDORN (SEE UDORN 32R) BY THE THAI AUTHORITIES. ACCORDING TO LONG AND COPP THEY DID CROSS THE RIVER, DID LAND ON THE LAO SHORE, AND DID PASS OUT PILLS TO THE LAO VILLAGERS. THEY WERE, AFTER THEIR ARREST, VISITED BY THAI POLICEMEN, BUT THEY HAD THE IMPRESSION THE POLICE WERE IN LAOS TO PURSUE INVESTIGATION OF A STOLEN MOTORCYCLE RATHER THAN ON THE AMERICANS' BEHALF.

4. WE WILL HOPE FOR AN EARLY RELEASE, BUT AT THIS TIME CANNOT SAY WHEN -- OR EVEN IF -- THAT HAPPY EVENT WILL OCCUR. MAY
BT
#2685

9F

UNCLASSIFIED

EAP/VLC:DESTAVER:DL6SR
10/28/88 EXT. 73132
EAP/VLC:CHTWINING

EAP/VLC:MUMARINE
EAP/TB:VTOMSETH
DOD/ISA:AGORMAN

24 OCT 88

IMMEDIATE BANGKOK

ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, JCS WASHDC,
DIA WASH DC, SECDEF WASHDC, CDRJESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI//APOF/H//+

NSC FOR CHILDRESS, CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA, SECDEF FOR ISA+

N/A

PREL, MOPS, PREF, VH, LA, MY, US

-- SRV INQUIRY ON ALLEGED USG REWARD TO
REFUGEES FOR MIA REMAINS

DIA FOR VO-PW

REF: BANGKOK 54570 DTG 261114Z OCT 88 (NOTAL)

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY REDMAN'S WORDS AS QUOTED BY
RADIO THAILAND (REF) EXPRESS USG POLICY. WE MAINTAIN
THAT THE ISSUE IS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND WE
DO NOT OFFER REWARDS FOR INFORMATION OR REMAINS.

2. THREE AMERICANS WERE IDENTIFIED FROM THE REMAINS
RETURNED BY REFUGEES FROM LAOS IN THE EARLY 1980'S, BUT
NONE SINCE HAVE BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED. A
VIETNAMESE REFUGEE IN MALAYSIA TURNED OVER REMAINS
DURING AN INTERVIEW IN JUNE 1988. THESE REMAINS PROVED
TO BE THOSE OF A U.S. SERVICEMAN. THE REFUGEE
QUALIFIED FOR RESETTLEMENT WITHOUT REGARD TO THIS
ACTION AS HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS A REFUGEE WERE CLEARLY
EVIDENT UNDER THE LAW. THERE WAS NO LINKAGE AND NO
REWARD WAS OFFERED NOR PROVIDED.

10F

UNCLASSIFIED

R 180940Z OCT 88
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUHQBP/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUHHHMA/CDR USCILHI FT SHAFTER HI
RUEHDK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3223
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OASD/ISA-PW/MIA//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC//OCJCS-FOW/MIA/J-5//
RUEADWH/NSC WASHDC
BT
CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE VIENTIANE 2694

NSC FOR CHILDRESS/

STATE FOR EAP/VLC/

USCINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: DTRA, MOPS, LA, US
SUBJECT: LAO HAWAII TRIP

REFS: A. JCRC LIAISON 3481 (BANGKOK 52665), B. CDR
JCRC 180517Z OCT 88.

1. LAO ACCEPTED SCHEDULE PROPOSED REF A-FOR THEIR HONOLULU TRIP
WITHOUT ANY PROBLEMS, AND REQUESTED EMBASSY CONVEY THEIR THANKS
FOR THE EFFORTS ADDRESSEES HAVE MADE ON THEIR BEHALF.

2. EMBASSY OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT THE TOTAL PER DIEM SUMS
WOULD BE HANDED TO THE DELEGATION BY SMSGT GADOURY AT BANGKOK
AIRPORT THE MORNING OF OCT. 24, AND THAT THOSE MONIES WOULD HAVE
TO COVER THEIR EXPENSES THROUGHOUT THE TRIP. THERE WAS NO
DEMUR TO THAT ARRANGEMENT, AND AGAIN THE LAO SAID THANK YOU FOR
U.S. ASSISTANCE. MAY

BT
#2694

U.S. pays cash
to Lao officials

NNN177413
M A F

11F

SOLVING THE CAMBODIA PROBLEM.

10. A/S SIGUR ASKED IF THE LAC OBJECTED TO AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (IPKF). SOUBANH SAID THAT THE "INDOCHINESE" POSITION WAS NOT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE U.N. RESOLUTION ON CAMBODIA, BECAUSE THE U.N. ONLY RECOGNIZES ONE SIDE -- THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. THUS, IF AN IPKF WERE PLACED TO THE U.N., IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT IT. A/S SIGUR SAID THAT WE SEE AN IPKF AS NECESSARY, BUT WE KNEW IT HAD TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES; IT CAN'T BE IMPOSED.

11. SOUBANH NOTED THAT THE 1954 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS A GOOD PRECEDENT SINCE IT WAS NOT UNDER THE U.N. A/S SIGUR ASKED WHETHER THE LAC SUPPORTED FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S CURRENT IDEA TO HOLD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. SOUBANH SAID THE LAC WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE IDEA, BUT THINK THAT THE SIALONG/HUN SEA MEETING SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY FORUM TO DECIDE ON SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES -- AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHAT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE CAN DO. A/S SIGUR ENDED BY NOTING THE SITUATION APPEARS MORE HOPEFUL, WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TALKING AND MEETING. SOUBANH RESPONDED BY REITERATING THAT THE SPEECH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD A GOOD IMPACT. A/S SIGUR ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED INCLINED TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, AND THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER BOGACHEV IN PARIS IN LATE OCTOBER/EARLY NOVEMBER.

12. MR. LAMPERTSON NOTED THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE SOUBANH'S CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS FACED BY OUR EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE, E.G., LIMITS ON STAFF AND SPOUSE NUMBERS, ETC. FACING THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD ENABLE THE EMBASSY TO OPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY AND WOULD BE GOOD FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SOUBANH SAID HE WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THESE ISSUES.

WALTERS
BT

12F

0 421312 SEP 88

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7805
INFO RUEBCE/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN IMMEDIATE 2414
RUEHRR/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 4952
RUEHPP/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 7889
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 4906
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 4952
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2334
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5062
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 1996
RUMJTS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 1927
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 02964

PARIS FOR KAFEDA

P.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNGA, CR, US
SUBJECT: A/S SIGUR'S MEETING WITH LAO VICE FM SOUBANH,
SEPTEMBER 29, 1988

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. TAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIGUR, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS LAMPERTSON, SPECIAL ASSISTANT DALEY, AND TAP/VLC SOMERS (NOTETAKER) MET WITH LPDR VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SOUBANH SRIITHIRATE, MPA OFFICER BOUNPOET (FORMER CHARGE IN WASHINGTON) AND CURRENT CHARGE DONE SOUVORCHIT ON SEPTEMBER 28 IN NEW YORK.

POW/MIA ISSUE

3. A/S SIGUR THANKED SOUBANH FOR LPDR COOPERATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE. SOUBANH SAID IT WAS THE POSITION OF THE LPDR TO TRY ITS UTMOST TO FULFILL THE AGREEMENTS DISCUSSED DURING HIS MEETING LAST WEEK WITH NSC DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS CHILDRESS, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR GRIFFITHS AND TAP/VLC DIRECTOR TWINING (TO UNDERTAKE TWO SITE EXCAVATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR).

4. SOUBANH SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE CHILDRESS GROUP THAT THE U.S. HAD TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE NEEDS OF THE LAO POPULATION. MR. LAMPERTSON NOTED THAT THE DELAYS IN SHIPMENT OF MATERIALS FOR A CLINIC TO BE BUILT IN SAVANNAKHET HAD BEEN OVERCOME AND THE MATERIALS NOW SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED IN BANGKOK. AFTER PROCESSING THE MATERIALS SHOULD REACH LAOS BY OCTOBER 7. SOUBANH NOTED THAT AFTER MEETING THE CHILDRESS GROUP HE HAD SENT A TELEGRAM TO LAOS TO CALM IMPATIENCE THERE OVER DELAYS IN THE CLINIC PROJECT.

NARCOTICS

5. SOUBANH ALSO NOTED HE HAD TOLD THE CHILDRESS GROUP

3 OCT 88

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for
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THIS UNPDAC PROJECT. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE WITH THE LPDR IN THE NARCOTICS AREA BOTH THROUGH UNPDAC AND EVENTUALLY BILATERALLY. SOUBANH RESPONDED THAT BILATERAL ASSISTANCE MAY BE POSSIBLE IF THERE WERE A PROJECT PROPOSAL MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT. MR. LAMPERTSON SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO DEVELOPING SUCH A PROPOSAL. SOUBANH ADDED THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE COULD COORDINATE THESE ACTIONS.

6. SOUBANH REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING LAOS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WROLESKI IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUANCE OF A RECENT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON NARCOTICS. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD MET HER IN JUNE AND IF HE WERE TO MEET HER AGAIN WOULD EMPHASIZE THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE LPDR IN NARCOTICS CONTROL. MR. LAMPERTSON NOTED THAT THE REPORT HAD BEEN RELEASED IN AUGUST BUT HAD BEEN PREPARED TOO EARLY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN STEPS. HE REITERATED THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER COOPERATION ON NARCOTICS IN THE FUTURE.

RELATIONS WITH THAILAND

7. A/S SIGUR ASKED ABOUT LAO RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. SOUBANH SAID THAT MANY DELEGATIONS HAD VISITED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, RANGING FROM OFFICIALS TO ACROPATS. LENDING AN APPEARANCE OF NORMAL RELATIONS, BUT FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS REMAINED. NEVERTHELESS, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CONDUCTIVE TO SOLVING THE BORDER PROBLEM AND THE LAO WERE EAGER TO DO SO. CONTACT HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO ARMIES, SO THERE WAS NO REASON FOR DIPLOMATS NOT TO SPEAK TOGETHER. SOUBANH SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE U.S. TO HELP REALIZE A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, WHICH WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN INDOCHINA AND THE U.S. (A/S SIGUR DID NOT RESPOND.)

CAMBODIA

8. MR. LAMPERTSON ASKED ABOUT SOUBANH'S EXPECTATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP OF THE JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING (JIM). SOUBANH SAID THAT THE LAO APPROVED OF THE UNGA SPEECH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN BECAUSE IT REFLECTED THE RESULTS OF THE JIM (I.E., REFERRING BOTH TO VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL AND THE PREVENTION OF A RETURN TO POWER BY THE KHMER ROUGE). SOUBANH SAID THE JIM WORKING GROUP MEETING IN OCTOBER SHOULD ELKP PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HUN SEN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK IN PARIS IN NOVEMBER. SOUBANH SAID HE PERSONALLY THINKS THE NOVEMBER MEETING WILL BE DECISIVE; HE ANTICIPATED THAT HUN SEN WOULD PRESENT CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IT WOULD BE UP TO PRINCE SIHANOUK TO RESPOND, ALTHOUGH PRINCE SIHANOUK WAS MANY COMMITMENTS WITH THE OTHER SIDE AND IS SUBJECT TO MANY OUTSIDE FORCES. SOUBANH NOTED THAT NOT EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS PRINCE SIHANOUK'S THINKING, BUT A SOLUTION REQUIRES PRINCE SIHANOUK TO "BE HIMSELF".

9. A/S SIGUR TOLD SOUBANH THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS PRINCE SIHANOUK VERY STRONGLY; HE THINKS HE UNDERSTANDS HOW TO BRING TOGETHER VARIOUS FORCES TO RESTORE PEACE TO HIS COUNTRY. SOUBANH SAID THE LAO DO NOT OPPOSE PRINCE SIHANOUK, AGREEING TO THE PROPOSAL FOR HIM TO LEAD THE

P 060624Z OCT 88 ZDK CTR HCM 23541
FM JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
TO RUEKJCS/DASD WASHINGTON DC//PA// PRIORITY
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI //J632// PRIORITY
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK//USIS/PAO//
RUMJUT/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE//USIS/PAO//
RUHQBPA/JCRC BARBERS PT HI
BT
UNCLAS LIAISON BANGKOK 00633

UNCLASSIFIED 3464 DDT 88

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS-NEWS QUERIES REGARDING ARREST OF
U.S. CITIZENS IN LAOS; RE: POW/MIA ISSUE

REF: TELECON BETWEEN MAJ BOYD, USCINCPAC/J6323 AND LTC
SCHNEIDER (DASD/PA), 5 OCT

1. AT SAME TIME AS THE CURRENT POW/MIA INVESTIGATION MISSION WAS IN VIETNAM, TWO AMERICAN CITIZENS WERE ARRESTED BY LAO POLICE WHILE THEY WERE PASSING OUT REWARD NOTICES ALONG THE MENONG RIVER FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF POW/MIA'S. THIS GENERATED NEWS MEDIA QUERIES FROM LOCAL UPI AND NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENTS WHO WERE ALSO COVERING THE POW/MIA MISSIONS.

2. THE QUERIES ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE U.S. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPOSEDLY SPONSORING THESE INDIVIDUALS. THE PAD REFERRED THESE QUESTIONS TO DASD/PA. THE QUESTION WAS ASKED IF THIS ACTIVITY HINDERED U.S. GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS THE CURRENT OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND VIETNAM. PAD DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE INCIDENT IN LAOS AND SAID THAT, IN GENERAL, THE U.S. DISCOURAGES PRIVATE POW/MIA SEARCH ATTEMPTS BECAUSE THEY MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF U.S. LAW AND THE EFFORTS MAY NOT HAVE THE TECHNICAL MEANS NOR EXPERTISE TO DEAL WITH ANY FINDINGS.

3. AN OCT 6 BANGKOK POST STORY SAID THAT A SECOND GROUP OF MIA ACTIVISTS HAS ARRIVED IN BANGKOK TO PASS OUT MONEY STAMPED WITH A REWARD OFFER FOR THE RETURN OF A LIVE U.S. POW. MR. TED SAMPLEY, IDENTIFIED AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE FOR AMERICAN WAR VETERANS, SAID A FOUR-PERSON GROUP PLANNED TO DUMP \$2,000 WORTH OF U.S., VIETNAMESE, LAO, SOVIET AND INDOONESIAN CURRENCY IN PLASTIC BAGS INTO THE MENONG RIVER BORDER OF THAILAND AND LAOS.

4. MAJ BOYD SENDS.
BT

15F

Associated Press

"Even though Laos is a communist country, we have people who live there permanently," Donald Stader said in a telephone interview from Washington. "We have an embassy there. What inside scoop could Ms. Long and Mr. Copp provide? Who did they talk to?"

"Our role was to see that Ms. Long and Mr. Copp were treated properly and released," Stader said. "From what we were told by the Laotian embassy, we were pleased. We had no reason to protest. Ms. Long and Mr. Copp never complained to our consulate that they were not being treated well. Anything else is somebody's image of a Hollywood world."

Ms. Long, of Jacksonville, and Copp, of Hampstead, were released Saturday.

11/15/88

Demand for confession worries relative

The sister of one of two North Carolinians who are being held in Laos said Wednesday that she is confused by reports that officials there want the pair to confess before they are released.

Tsui Tumin said she received a report from United Press International that Thongkai Kamnueith, a Laotian brigadier general, issued a statement demanding that her sister, Donna Long, and James Cope, have to "confess their wrongdoing and tell whether they entered the country on a spy mission."

"What are they supposed to be confessing to?" Ma. Tumlin said. "It's really getting scary now. It's like they are trying to get them to confess that they're spies, but they're not."

they're not."

Mr. Long of Jacksonville and
Copp of Hampstead were arrested
Oct. 3 on the London side of the

The two hired a fishing boat from Thailand to carry them across the river, where they were attempting to distribute money marked with messages promoting a \$2.4 million reward for anyone who brings a living American prisoner of war out of Southeast Asia and turns him over to a representative of the International Red Cross.

American officials say the Leontian government has not notified them of any formal charges against two North Carolinians. That makes embassy officials optimistic that the two will be released without judicial proceedings against them.

Donald Stator, a State Department spokesman, said there has been no confirmation of a report in which a Legion official told CBS proceedings against them.

News that the country was going to expel the two.

That leads us to believe that they are trying with the idea," Stater said. "If they tell it to us, it's official. If they leak it to the news media, they can deny it later."

"If there is a charge, that means there must be a process to resolve

the charge. Without one, they can released them if they want to, they can do it easy."

Ma Long and Copp are members of the National Steering Committee for American War Veterans, a group which has pledged the reward fund as part of its efforts to account for Americans listed as missing in action from the war in Indochina. The group believes there are still living American prisoners of war in Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam.

3 MiA activists temporarily held

THREE American activists attempting to publicize a reward for the safe return of American prisoners of war they believe are held in Indochina were arrested on a technicality by police in Bangkok, fined and released, police said yesterday.

"We charged them as foreigners changing residence without informing the authorities," said Li Komsan Suerin, a police investigator in Bangkok's Phnom district bordering Laos, 375 miles from the border with Laos.

Komsan said the arrests on Monday came on instructions from Bangkok to stop the three Americans from releasing reward notices into the Mekong River that forms the border between Thailand and Laos.

Police identified the three American MiA activists as Amos R. Townsend, 51, from Manchester, New Hampshire, Michael Bales, 38, from Ohio, and George Handyside, 33, from Atlanta, Georgia.

They were fined \$80 each for violation of a rarely-enforced regulation on foreigners residing in Thailand. — UPI

NATION DEC 7, 88 P4

Three MiA activists arrested and fined

THREE American activists attempting to publicize a reward for the safe return of American prisoners of war they believe are held in Indochina were arrested on a technicality, fined and released, police said yesterday.

"We charged them as foreigners changing residence without informing the authorities," said Pol Li Komsan Suerin, in Nakhon Phanom.

Pol Li Komsan said the arrests on Monday came on instructions from Bangkok to stop the three Americans from releasing reward notices into the Mekong River that forms the border between Thailand and Laos.

Police identified the three American MiA activists as Amos R. Townsend, 51, from New Hampshire, Michael J. Bales, 38, from Ohio, and George R. Handy, 33, from Georgia.

They were fined 2,000 baht (approximately \$80) each for violation of a rarely-enforced regulation on foreigners residing in Thailand.

Their behaviour indicated that they were not serious about their arrest, but we have no law to charge them

on that, so we had to charge them for failing to inform immigration police of a reward for the safe return of American prisoners of war they believe are held in Indochina," Pol Li Komsan said.

The policeman said the three Americans registered in a hotel in Bangkok and later moved to rent a house in Nakhon Phanom.

The three could not be reached for comment, but police said they were seeking information on missing Americans and would publicize a reward of their safe return.

The \$2.4 million reward, put up by conservative American legislators, is meant to persuade officials from Laos to help them contact with at least one of their prisoners.

Washington has disavowed such independent private efforts to resolve the fate of the 5,000 Americans listed as missing since the Vietnam war.

It says there is no information to prove that American prisoners are still held in Indochina, but does not have the information to eliminate that possibility.

336

Bangkok Post 7/9/88

337

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

RE: Meeting with Senator Dole,
Wednesday, April 14, 1971

This meeting was held at the Senator's request so that he could report briefly to the President on the activities of the National Committee and on his trips around the country.

The conversation centered primarily on the reaction to the Vietnam speech and a feeling that we definitely have the people going our way and that it's a matter now of continuing to stay on the offensive.

The Chairman reported that the moods of the audiences in all of his meetings seem to be more optimistic than it has been in the past, but there is an overwhelming sentiment, on all sides, to end the war as soon as we can.

The President gave the Chairman some suggested talking points on how to handle the war question and particularly the question of setting a specific date.

There was also some discussion of the Prisoner of War problem and the Chairman made the point that this is a tender-box that is about to explode and there is real danger of great numbers of POWs reversing their support of the President. He suggested, therefore, a fairly major move for cosmetic purposes and the President asked that this possibility be explored.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President, the Chairman, and I walked across West Executive to the West Lobby entrance and the President went on to the residence.

Exhibit I (1)

COPY FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES - NIXON PRESIDENT

24

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: SBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
 FROM: MICHEL OKSENBERG *MO*
 SUBJECT: Renewed League of MIA Families Request for Appointment

Once again, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia seeks to meet you (Tab B).

They have nothing new to say, and I am capable of summarizing any developments for you. So I recommend turning down the request, and I will call Ann Griffiths separately to say you have instructed me to see her.

However, a letter from you is important to indicate that you take recent refugee reports of sighting of live Americans "seriously." This is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game, and you should not be the whistle blower. The idea is to say that the President is determined to pursue any lead concerning possible live MIAs.

Do not offer an opinion as to whether these leads are realistic. Apparently you revealed skepticism to Congressman Gilman, and my recommended letter to the League walks you back from that.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Ann Griffiths.

Exhibit 5 1 of 2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INFORMATION

March 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON
 FROM: MICHEL OKSENBERG *MO*
 SUBJECT: *National* League of Families Meeting with the President

Your response to my memorandum of March 7 asks why State cannot pursue the issue of the American defector.

State has pursued this issue, and the defector is now on his way home.

The point is that his return will generate new stories about the MIA issue and particularly about the possibility that additional Americans remain in Hanoi.

My own view is that it would be politically wise for the President to indicate his own continued concern with the MIAs.

This is a "right wing" issue, and I think it gains the President some politically to indicate his continued interest in the issue -- particularly since he may be moving on the Vietnam front in the months ahead and since the Administration had implied earlier that it believed Vietnamese assurances that there were no live Americans left in Hanoi.

*I think the
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 is*


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 Min. 100, Tim & Anne
 Weller*

PS

2J

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Vietnam War horror continues for those yearning for loved ones missing in action. Ann Mills Griffiths (below) heads a controversial support group



A 'SUPPORT' GROUP'S TURMOIL

Kim of missing servicemen find dissonance in the ranks at the League of Families

By Cathryn Donohue
The Washington Times

The young woman approaches, nods, speaks confidentially. Twenty-eight years old, daughter of a Navy pilot downed 26 years ago over the Gulf of Tonkin, she offers what in this setting is disapproved information.

"I have," she says, in the tone one might use to hawk contraband, "copies of the Senate Foreign Relations minority staff report."

Welcome to the July annual meeting of the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, the nation's largest group of POW-MIA relatives where many takes the subtlest of forms.

Here there is the mutiny of an ID badge incorrectly worn, there an impermissible question asked aloud. Mutiny is inappropriate applause or possession of material that contradicts the organization's official line — such as the young woman's copy of the Senate committee report, published in May, that accuses the U.S.

government of abandoning the nation's POWs.

Once little-known, the 3,783-member League of Families drew national attention early this year with the resignation of the POW-MIA chief at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

That official, Col. Millard A. Peck, charged at the time that the league's executive director, Ann Mills Griffiths — a member of the administration's top policy body on POW-MIA issues — not only opposes attempts to solve the question of missing Americans, but actively sabotages

such efforts.

Since then, the 21-year-old League of Families has been in the spotlight. At issue: Can an organization that represents families seeking help from the U.S. government itself without slowing progress in the search for the missing? Turmoil within the group tells the story.

This month a newly seated Senate select committee — spurred by Col.

See KIN, page A6

Special Report, page A7.

From page A1

Peck's charges and by summer's first page, photos of men said to be missing U.S. soldiers — began to color the government's conduct of POW-MIA matters. Among its chief news, the panel will hear from one of the league's own rebels.

But even at July's grand ballroom of the downtown JW Marriott Hotel, relatives of the 2,273 Americans still unaccounted for in Indochina gather for reports from government officials and military brass, the subtle signs of mutiny show — as do the league's countermeasures.

Here Vietnam vets in white polo shirts, known to league members as "bouncers," "moons" or "Gestapo," guard floor mikes against impermissible questions. The vet patrol against interlopers, agitating at the ID badges members must wear, on pain of ejection, around their necks.

Here Helen Haggerty, the Navy pilot's daughter, who now is a Hill navy Georgetown, slips copy after copy of the Senate report (reproduced at her own expense) to other members. They do not know of the report's existence — because to the League of Families' board of directors the report is anathema. As such, it has gone unmentioned in league newsletters.

Here there is Halman of Walnut Springs, Texas — 17 years a league member, the sister of an Army sergeant lost in South Vietnam in 1968 — slashes among her papers a copy of S.R. 82, the bill that would give rise to the Senate's select committee on POWs and MIAs.

The league's board has opposed S.R. 82 as an attempt to reopen charges of "cover-up" on POW-MIA issues. The board has not pulled the membership. But at the Marriott, the bill's partisan advocates hope of a formal vote. With only 294 members here, there is no quorum.

And as the board chairman turns aside floor requests for a straw poll, S.R. 82's case is closed.

It is a scenario played out repeatedly in the five years since the board raised the quorum requirement from 50 members to 300, says retired Army Col. Earl F. Hopper of Glendale, Ariz. Col. Hopper, 70, the father of an Air Force pilot shot down in 1968, is a charter member of the league and a former board chairman.

The stifled quorum requirement, he says, gives members less and less of a voice in league business.

Almost as if to prove it, as Col. Hopper steps up to speak for S.R. 82 he will find the hands of white shirts on his floor mike.

Were they trying to stop him from speaking or were they trying to help? Accounts differ. But later Col. Hopper draws an upshot from one of the veterans stationed outside the ballroom. Bill later that week, Rodney A. Anderson of West Buxton, Maine, past chairman of the Maine Vietnam Veterans' Vigil Committee, tells a reporter what he thinks of the league. "Democracy talks for itself," Mr. Anderson says. "That might not be the ideal case down there."

The league has been described as a "family support" group. It began in 1968 as just that — as an informal newsletter written by a POW wife in California. The newsletter was circulated, with Pentagon help, among POW families that hoped to bring their men home alive.

Incorporated in Washington in 1970 and still headquartered there — where Executive Director Ann Mills Griffiths now writes the bi-monthly newsletter — today the league is a major, if sotto voce,

player in the government game. The league's budget, last year was \$622,000, not a true measure of its influence.

Its goals have changed with the times to include "the fullest possible accounting" of the missing; this is discovery and identification of all remains possible and reputation of remains. That is itself a point of contention. Discoveries can live men back.

But "family support" is more fitting also.

The mother and brother of Larry James Stevens (the Navy lieutenant named as one of the three men in the enigmatic "MIA" photo on front pages over the summers) discovered that when they approached Mrs. Griffiths at the July conference. They asked her why, with her inside knowledge, she had not informed them of the photo early on. It's not league policy, they were told.

"My son said, 'Do you mean, Ann, that this is not a support group for families?'" says Gladys Fleckenstein of Big Bear, Calif., a close friend of Mrs. Griffiths at one time. "She looked daggers at us and said, 'Go see your casualty officer. You need psychiatric help.'"

Mrs. Griffiths, who refused repeated requests for a formal interview for this article, declares by telephone at deadline: "I did not say, 'You need psychiatric help.' That is blatantly not true." Moreover, she says, it is the responsibility of the military service casualty officer, not the league, to report to families on individual cases.

It may be a measure of the changed relationship between the two women that Mrs. Griffiths adds "I have witnessed as well."

Gone is the once-upon communication among families, except through informal networks of their own. "To preserve 'family privacy,' league members' names are kept from all but the staff and its most trusted officers, even from the elected board of directors. That gives the staff, principally Mrs. Griffiths, unbreachable control."

Today, in fact, Ann Mills Griffiths is synonymous with the League of Families. Stubby, bustling, a clean sweater at 50, she is a divorced mother of three, a high school grad with a steel-trap mind. And in one sense, she inherited the job.

Her older brother, Lt. Cmdr. James Mills, was shot down over North Vietnam in 1966. Their father, E.C. "Bus" Mills, helped spark the POW-MIA families movement in California. He became the league's executive director for a year in 1973. But Mrs. Griffiths' daughter, Ann, stepped into the job in 1978 and has worked at it since. Today her sister, Judith Taber, is the league's western regional coordinator.

Yet, at \$66,000 a year, Ann Mills Griffiths is a hired hand who serves at the board's pleasure. And it is a measure of her power that even when the board tried to dismiss her, it couldn't.

It happened in 1984, say league members who served on the board then. Spurred by what they considered unauthorized activity by Mrs. Griffiths, board members advertised for a new executive director. They found one, only to have Mrs. Griffiths' close friend and White House contact Richard Childress of the National Security Council staff, intervene.

"I remember Dick standing up and saying that he wrote the attorney for the U.S. government on the POW-MIA issue," says Michael Clark of Santa Barbara, Calif., now an Air Force pilot shot down over Laos in 1969.

"Dick" said he had written two strategies, one that included the league and one that didn't. Mr. Clark says "And that if we didn't agree to keep Ann as executive director, he would activate the other strategy."

That "other strategy" would deny any new director access to classified data and membership in the Interagency Group, the government's top policy body on POW-MIA affairs.

"We would then be considered on the same level as any other POW-MIA group," Mr. Clark says, "and we would not have the special status that the league had now."

Rather than forgo its privileges, the board caved in, recalls Mr. Clark, who sat in on the meeting as a regional coordinator.

So it is the power of secrets — secrets the board itself is denied — that Mrs. Griffiths wields, even now that Mr. Childress has left government.

Given classified access in 1979 through a simple secret clearance, Mrs. Griffiths today boasts a top-secret State Department clearance.

Appointed in 1980 to a newly formed Interagency Group for POW-MIA affairs that she herself has described as a step in the families, Mrs. Griffiths has transformed the panel into the government's top policy body on the issue. The IAG includes representatives from the State and Defense departments, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DIA — and Ann Mills Griffiths.

Thus league policy mirrors administration policy. "When the U.S. government wishes to speak out without fear of rebuttal, they write it. And Ann signs it," Earl Hopper says.

To some seasoned observers, the arrangement works in one's benefit.

"There is something wrong when your major advocacy group is part of the government effort. You can't distinguish between those that want something done and those that may not want something done," says retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe.

Once director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Gen. Tighe originated the idea of giving Mrs. Griffiths classified access.

Just as, to the public, Mrs. Griffiths appears a government-licensed spokesman, within government itself Mrs. Griffiths acts as family advocate. The technique is said to work wonders.

"She goes up the line and up the line until somebody rolls over. And somebody will always roll over because they don't want to go against the families," says one observer of Mrs. Griffiths' approach to Pentagon brass.

Sometimes even heads roll. A Department of Defense official informed a closed-door meeting of the league's board in July that Ann Mills Griffiths had targeted Col. Peck, the DIA's chief of POW-MIA affairs, long before the colonel resigned in February alleging a government cover-up.

55%
Exhibit K
1 of 28

2K

Ronald J. Knecht, who investigated Col. Peck's charges for Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, told the board that "sometime last fall" Mrs. Griffiths contacted the Defense Department "to say Peck should be relieved of his duties," says Jeffrey C. Danielson of Danbury, Conn., a newly elected board member.

"You could have drawn that conclusion," says Mr. Knecht in response. "She indicated to DOD that

she was not satisfied. But she was one of several people who were not satisfied," Mrs. Griffiths says simply. "I have no ability to have anyone in the U.S. government removed."

But it may not be always the brass that gets hurt. Daniel Maslowski, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who in 1987 served as a POW-MIA adviser to Richard Armitage (then a deputy assistant secretary of defense), says Mrs. Griffiths' interference led him to quit after six months.

"The last straw," Mr. Maslowski says, came when Mrs. Griffiths stepped in to stop him from passing information to a family (which he names, but not for publication) about a turnover of remains.

"I wanted to pass the information to the family. Everyone in my office wanted to pass it to the family. All of DOD agreed until Ann said: 'No, we're not going to tell them. The league has decided.' After that I found out it was a family she was on the outs with.

"If she doesn't like somebody, she

won't give them the same information," Mr. Maslowski says. "It's like 'I'm going to show you I have more power than you do.'"

Mrs. Griffiths calls that a "crazy" story, one that defies everything she has ever done to free up information. "I don't know what he's talking about."

"I know of no more successful advocacy group than the League of Families," Mrs. Griffiths says. "We get the U.S. government to adopt our priorities and policy."

3K

Memo may bolster critics of family support group

By Cathryn Donohoe
The Washington Times

When an Army colonel charged with monitoring the fates of American prisoners of war resigned in February, accusing higher-ups of roadblocks and coverups, he singled out the head of the nation's largest support group for POW families as "intentionally impeding the effort" to find surviving soldiers in Indochina.

Today, against the backdrop of a new Senate inquiry into how thoroughly the government is investigating reports of so-called "live sightings," a memorandum has surfaced that may give credence to critics' claims that Ann Miller Griffiths, executive director of the private support group, is improperly helping government officials mollify POW families.

In a Feb. 24 memo, a copy of which has been obtained by The Washington Times, Mrs. Griffiths specifically advises a Pentagon rear admiral on how to respond to a letter from a former member of her own group, the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The Griffiths memo, labeled "SENSITIVE," could become a point of testimony today as Col. Millard Peck, who resigned in February as chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Office of POW-MIA Affairs, testifies before the Senate Committee on Rules.

The panel with DIA for insights on (Mrs. Dickinson's) assertions that Mark Danielson was 'reported to be alive on the ground' would be enlightening," Mrs. Griffiths suggests.

"All information which pertains or may pertain to her brother has been provided; no new information has been collected or received which could reveal 'his whereabouts,'" is the wording Mrs. Griffiths suggests

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE MCDONALD/BILL JORDAN

From: Ann Griffiths

Subject: RESPONSE TO MIA

Date: February 24, 1991 SENSITIVE

Lee Dickinson Dickinson goes back a long way with the League; even working in the League's office during my father's tenure as executive director, 1973-74. She became increasingly disaffected and receptive to Earl Napper's "approach," as did her parents who became extremely bitter. She needs to hear the following from DOD:

- Reiteration of current policy on normalization of relations, expanded by what "peace and respect" means, i.e. Vietnam's needs governed largely by the seriousness of any efforts to resolve the issues.

- We are aware of no "collateral" surrenders, orders, not would you consider such, despite recognition that there were several years of political apathy and lack of serious attention by the U.S.

...not use this information of "no" for efforts to resolve. Most importantly to issue which held the answers on those missing in Vietnam as well as over 575 in Cambodia and Laos.

Note: After you draft, send over and I'll give input.

Danielson Dickinson of Tuthill, S.D. Mrs. Dickinson had written to the admiral in January, asking his help in finding her brother, an Air Force captain shot down over Vietnam in 1972.

As background, Mrs. Griffiths told the admiral that Mrs. Dickinson had become "increasingly disaffected" to the support group and "receptive" to dissidents who have challenged Mrs. Griffiths' leadership.

"A check with DIA for insights on (Mrs. Dickinson's) assertions that Mark Danielson was 'reported to be alive on the ground' would be enlightening," Mrs. Griffiths suggests.

"All information which pertains or may pertain to her brother has been provided; no new information has been collected or received which could reveal 'his whereabouts,'" is the wording Mrs. Griffiths suggests

to the admiral for a reply.

Mrs. Griffiths gave him the strategy tips in her role as a member of the Interagency Group for POW-MIA Affairs, the government's top policy-making body on the issue. Some of her critics have charged that Mrs. Griffiths' dual roles as both government official and head of a POW advocacy group seriously compromise the interests of families hoping for information about missing loved ones.

Reached by phone last night, Mrs. Griffiths defended her memo as a proper exercise of both roles.

"There is nothing there that is wrong," she said. "I'm advocating that the U.S. government be direct. It sounds responsible and factual. That is my job, to be responsible and factual and try to get this issue resolved."



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST, SUITE 219
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-1904

UPDATE LINE: 202/659-0131

May 23, 1989

The Honorable Manuel Lujan
Secretary of the Interior
18th and C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20040

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As previously noted in my correspondence of April 19th, the League of Families has undertaken a national project condemning the exploitation of the POW/MIA issue now taking place at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial by those standing vigil on a permanent or semi-permanent basis.

At the six League regional meetings recently concluded, tremendous support for this project was received from family members, concerned citizens and veterans group representatives in attendance. Representing all POW/MIA family members of the League, the following resolution was overwhelmingly passed in all regions:

RESOLVED, that the National League of Families condemns the exploitation of the POW/MIA issue taking place at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial; and be it further

RESOLVED, that the National League of Families calls upon the Department of Interior and all veterans organizations to take appropriate action to eliminate this desecration.

Prior efforts to dissuade the illicit activity at the Memorial were unsuccessful. While we recognize that legal ramifications bear on this matter, it is our hope that the Department of Interior will aggressively seek to restore appropriate honor and dignity to the most actively visited memorial in our nation.

Thank you.

Respectfully,

Ann Mills Griffith
Ann Mills Griffith
Executive Director

cc: Honorable Edward J. Derwinski
Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs

Honorable G.V. Montgomery
Chairman, Committee on Veterans Affairs

Honorable Robert J. Lagomarsino
Chairman, House Task Force on POW/MIA

5K



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST, SUITE 219
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-1904

UPDATE LINE: 202/659-0131

April 19, 1989

The Honorable Manuel Lujan
Secretary of the Interior
18th and C Streets, NW
Washington, D.C. 20040

Dear Secretary Lujan:

The League has long been concerned about the desecration occurring at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial, using the issue of our missing relatives as the basis. The nearly 3,600 POW/MIA family members who comprise the League have witnessed this spectacle since Christmas Eve, 1982.

As Executive Director, I tried for quite a long time to work with those holding POW/MIA vigils at the Memorial in an effort to ensure that illegalities and unsavory incidents did not occur. The League's efforts in this regard were to no avail.

There have been viable groups of individuals who have manned POW/MIA information booths at this site, but they are the minority. They come to Washington for a specified period, such as Veterans Day, National POW/MIA Recognition Day and on other occasions which lend themselves to public focus on the issue. The problems associated are too difficult to convey in a single letter, but it is our hope that you will assign someone to look into this matter and meet with the League as well as veterans organizations' representatives to seek a solution.

The individuals and organizations now "permanently installed" at this highly visible site are desecrating the sanctity and serenity of the Memorial, its purpose and the service of those Americans whose names are listed, including our missing relatives. The misinformation being spread on the POW/MIA issue is undermining League and U.S. Government efforts to resolve this humanitarian problem. Sadly, the American people are being misled into donating funds which are not accounted for in compliance with Federal or District of Columbia law for non-profit organizations.

6K

The POW/MIA families have passed a resolution condemning the destructive activities now taking place at the memorial, a copy of which is enclosed. Also provided for your information is an enclosure which is being distributed to all of the major national veterans organizations, seeking their help in correcting this problem. Prior efforts to encourage responsible cooperation by those manning the booths have been unsuccessful; therefore, other means must be pursued.

In short, this travesty should be ended for the benefit of the American people as a whole, as well as those concerned with the public perception of veterans and the POW/MIA issue. It is our sincere hope that you will seek to remedy this national disgrace.

Respectfully,

Ann Mills Griffiths
Ann Mills Griffiths
Executive Director

Enclosures

cc: Board of Directors
Regional Coordinators
Veterans Adhoc Committee

7K

Sunday, February 15, 1987

Official raps MIA protesters

By The Associated Press
12 FEB 17

Washington—A White House official says some of the protesters claiming the government is dragging its feet on the POW-MIA issue are "cranks" who are harming U.S. efforts to learn more about missing servicemen in Southeast Asia.

Richard Childress of the National Security Council said Wednesday that protests directed at the administration and the Pentagon government have brought complaints from the Pentagon.

Childress, who directs Asian affairs, including talks on the POW-MIA issue, said U.S. officials agree the protests are posing difficulties.

"They (the Pentagon) told us this kind of activity can harm cooperation," Childress said. "It's not helpful to the process. And we agree with them."

About 25 persons, many of them children of U.S. servicemen shot down over Laos or soldiers captured during the Vietnam War, attempted to deliver more than 1,500 packages of food, medicines and other items last month to the Pentagon Embassy in Washington. They were blocked by police after depositing about 150 packages, which were addressed to men missing in action in that country.

The activities caused the Reagan administration has not done enough to press Vietnam and Laos for information about the missing men or to release any who may still be held alive.

The protests have been led by Vietnam veterans, family members and other activists. Childress, in talking to reporters, referred to the embassy protesters as "Ted Sampley and his North Carolina cronies."

Sampley is a Kinston, N.C., contractor and former Green Beret who was among the leaders of the embassy protest. Contacted by telephone, he said the U.S. government has not made an adequate effort to secure information from the factions and the government. He charged that Childress, as a member of the National Security Council, has "tried to disrupt our activities."

Speaking to the American Legion's annual Vietnam memorial, Childress said protests have "stalled somewhat and exacerbated the delays" in cooperation by the governments of Vietnam and Laos in obtaining remains or other information about the 2,621 Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.

Sampley can be as pushy as they come. He is furious in his efforts to get his message out, and he is willing to let horns, if necessary, with anyone who stands in his way. That includes newspaper editors who might not embrace Sampley's latest idea



Daily News

A Freedom Newspaper

Ever striving for coastal Carolina to be a better place to live

Our opinion

'Crazies' with a cause

Richard Childress apparently worries more about Hanoi's perceptions of this country's interest in bringing home missing servicemen from Southeast Asia than he does about the American people's perceptions of their government's POW-MIA efforts.

Childress is the National Security Council's man in charge of negotiating for the release of any POW-MIAs being held captive in years after the Vietnam War. While we share his growing frustration at the country's inability to move off Square One, his positions on the subject can seem downright insensitive to the heart-felt need for final word on the missing loved ones and former brothers-in-arms.

Government officials such as Childress and others such as Ann Mills Griffiths of the National League of Families maintain the government is doing all it can to determine if there really are captive Americans in Southeast Asia and, if there are, to bring them home. They stress cooperation with the communists and push for unity in the negotiations, regardless of how ill-conceived and ineffective the government's position has proven to be.

Meanwhile, the official line in Washington is that there is a "strong possibility" that American servicemen from the Vietnam War are still being held prisoners in Southeast Asia. President Reagan has said accounting for the 2,621 missing Americans is a "highest national priority."

A group of Vietnam veterans, POW-MIA family members and other supporters — dubbed the "Rambo Faction" — have continued to press the government to act as if Rambo's words meant something. A key faction member is an eastern North Carolina veteran: Kinston contractor Ted Sampley, a former member of the Army's Special Forces who now serves as deputy coordinator of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition.

Sampley can be as pushy as they come. He is furious in his efforts to get his message out, and he is willing to let horns, if necessary, with anyone who stands in his way. That includes newspaper editors who might not embrace Sampley's latest idea

for a story. Most certainly, he is a valued customer of the phone company and the Postal Service.

Sampley and other members of the Rambo Faction have tried a variety of tactics in their campaign for more government accountability with varying degrees of success — and taste. One veteran has twice locked himself in a bamboo cage and begun hunger strikes. Faction members have protested at the Washington-area homes of top government officials. They have been arrested for chaining themselves to the White House gate. The group's newspaper has taken some rather vulgar shots at its critics through words and cartoons.

The faction, led by Sampley, struck a nerve with Childress when it attempted to deliver more than 1,500 "care packages" addressed to missing American servicemen, to the Pentagon Embassy in Washington. (Lose has accounted for practically none of the 600 Americans said to be missing in that country.)

Some of the packages were later delivered to the homes of Childress and Frank Carlucci, Reagan's national security adviser. Childress has since labeled Sampley and his cohorts "North Carolina crazies" who have staked efforts to win the cooperation of the Southeast Asian governments.

It seems that Childress wants Sampley and other Americans to accept with blind faith that there are recalled suggestions will soon produce a breakthrough. Given the track record, that is difficult to do.

Sampley is a rebel with a cause, and U.S. negotiators might do well to borrow from his unbridled passion for information about the missing servicemen. But Childress can only complain. "Think about how it's portrayed in Hanoi."

We hope that Childress is correct when he says Hanoi is "watching" the protests over the location on POW-MIAs. If the Vietnamese are watching, maybe they are getting the message that even if the U.S. government is willing to accept 14 years of her and bones as a suitable response to POW-MIA concerns, the American people are not.

8K



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST, SUITE 210
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-5504

201/223-6446

UPDATE LINE 201/699-0135

PRESS RELEASE

EMBARGOED UNTIL APRIL 29, 1990
Washington, D.C.

CONTACT: Betsy Cox
703/768-7445
April 30, 1990:
202/223-6846

POW/MIA Families React to Unwarranted Attack

Jack Anderson's and Dale Van Atta's April 29th column, "POW/MIA group becomes part of bureaucracy," is a revealing example of the distortion and exploitation for which they have become well-known, tragically this time at the expense of the POW/MIA families.

Mr. Anderson's and Mr. Van Atta's involvement in the POW/MIA issue has ranged from support of irresponsible purported rescue missions to providing a forum for conspiracy and coverup theorists. In both instances, credibility and evidence were lacking. Attempts to provide Mr. Van Atta with factual information, including substantive briefings from the Defense Intelligence Agency, have been ignored and refused. He chose instead to indulge in such tactics as attempting to coerce government officials to illegally pass classified documents.

The vast majority of over 3,600 POW/MIA family members of the League endorse League policy and have a great deal more at stake than either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Van Atta. Rather than listening to a few self-appointed "experts," Mr. Anderson and Mr. Van Atta would have been wise to recognize the tragedy that the POW/MIA families have endured for over two decades. Their failure to do so makes this cheap and unfounded attack all the more pathetic.

11K

MEMORANDUM TO PAUL WOLFOVITZ

From: Ann Mills Griffiths

Subject: ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED POW/MIA MATERIAL

Date: August 2, 1990

On August 1, letters from ASD/LA Dave Gribbin were sent to Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) giving them full access to cases of interest on the POW/MIA issue. In addition, Mr. Gribbin suggested that the Senators may wish to invite staff of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, with the appropriate clearances and with responsibility for the POW/MIA issue, to accompany them to review of the classified material.

An additional August 1 letter was sent to Representative Billenson stating that Congressman Bob Smith (R-NH) would be provided the same opportunity, along with staff of the Armed Services or Intelligence Committees, under the same clearance criteria. Mr. Gribbin's decision to pursue this course (which I understand was strongly opposed by JSA, DIA and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army) has far reaching ramifications about which I feel you and the Secretary should be aware.

As you know, the President, Vice President, Secretary Cheney, you Bob Kimmitt and others have firmly committed the U.S. Government to pursuing resolution of the POW/MIA issue as a matter of highest national priority. These pledges were taken at face value and gratefully received by POW/MIA families. If implemented, this course makes a mockery of the Bush Administration's commitments.

On any matter of highest national priority, sensitive information is not subject to indiscriminate release outside of the parameters established by the Congress itself, i.e. the respective Select Committees on Intelligence and responsible staff members with appropriate clearances. This path, if followed, sets a precedent for similar access on other issues; such a step would not be considered, much less approved, on Cambodian, Soviet, Chinese, Middle East or other matter of importance to the U.S. In short, the President's and Secretary's pledges will be viewed as nothing more than hollow tokenism.

Mr. Gribbin's communications authorize access to individual Members of Congress who have been loudest in proclaiming that USG officials are not pursuing this issue with integrity or priority. (Examples are enclosed.) Their records are replete with implications, or outright assertions, that the USG is involved in a conspiracy to coverup evidence that Americans are being held captive in Southeast Asia.

12K

I have no concern that Members of Congress or staff will uncover anything which would lend credence to the charges of conspiracy against which we have collectively fought since the 1983-86 time frame. On the contrary, while problems are continuously identified and remedied, there is a great well of talent in DIA's Special POW/MIA Office.

My concern is that if this decision is implemented, the above message - that the POW/MIA issue is one solely of rhetorical priority - will be made clear throughout the U.S. Government. Equally or more important, Hanoi will perceive that stated U.S. policy on this issue is no longer valid and that resolution of the fates of America's POW/MIAs is not an issue which they need to seriously address.

Beyond these significant policy considerations, there will be a severe negative impact throughout the intelligence community. One can anticipate immediate CIA and NSA action to pull their documents and information from the files currently held by DIA. Department of State, the FBI and DEA, as well as friendly foreign intelligence services and others with ongoing investigations and cooperative programs will cease all cooperation on POW/MIA related matters. Sensitive sources and methods will be exposed which will have an adverse effect on source cooperation and reporting. Strategies will be exposed and negotiations will be compromised by revealing the extent of U.S. knowledge and intelligence gaps to those from whom we are seeking information.

As outlined in Mr. Gribbin's letters, DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will necessarily be available to assist the Members of Congress and staff during their review of the material. This will usurp critical manpower from important and serious efforts to accomplish the objectives stated by the President and Secretary Cheney. The current level of personnel in DIA's POW/MIA office was established as a result of the Reagan/Bush priority, hard earned and absolutely mandatory. Squandering their time and efforts to participate in a "witch hunt" against themselves does nothing to help resolve the issue and, in fact, lends credence to those most involved in accusations that a "mindset to debunk" exists in that office.

Finally, indiscriminate release such as Mr. Gribbin has now invited will potentially subject POW/MIA family members to further, tragic exploitation by "activists." I am appalled by this action from an individual who obviously knows little about the issue but is seeking to pander to Congress by sacrificing principle and the integrity of the President and Secretary Cheney. He clearly has no understanding of what this will mean in the broader sense, not to mention POW/MIA.

cc: DIA/Boyster
NSC/Watson

13K



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1804 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 12021 222-4840

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REGIONAL COORDINATORS

F.OM: Ann Mills Griffith, Executive Director

SUBJECT: MORE ALLEGATIONS FROM THE DESPERATE

DATE: JUNE 8, 1987

Unnamed persons (Ted Sampley is reportedly involved along with some cohorts of Bo Gritz) held a press conference on June 5th to launch another unfounded attack on Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs Richard Childress and me. They now allege that I conspired to "launder money for the White House." This ludicrous charge, like those before, is untrue; however, it again proves the increased desperation of some individuals who apparently will stop at nothing to try to discredit and undermine those directly implementing efforts to resolve the issue.

The truth is that money which went to Thailand was solicited and spent by John LeBoutillier, not by the White House, in his attempt to gain proof of live prisoners, supposedly a priority of those making the accusations. Former Congressman John LeBoutillier asked for a valid non-profit group which could accept contributions and disperse them in support of his efforts to seek information and evidence of living U.S. POWs. Since it was not a League project and knowing that Support Our POW/MIAs still retained that status, I contacted Betty Bartels about the possibility. LeBoutillier had not yet formed Skyhook II (Account for POW/MIAs) but was attempting to raise funds to support his information-gathering activities and pledged to turn over any information to the U.S. Government. Betty agreed to receive and disperse the funds, based on LeBoutillier's assurance as a sitting Member of Congress that nothing illegal would be undertaken and that the efforts were not counter to U.S. Government policy or law; however, neither the League nor Betty knew how the funds were spent. This was and is clearly under John LeBoutillier's purview, but we have no reason to believe his funds were ever spent illegally. LeBoutillier's sources of funds from conservatives, as a conservative Republican, are logical. Obviously, some of the names involved would overlap with conservative contributors to the Contras. To infer LeBoutillier's efforts had a connection to Iran-Contra, five years later, again shows a lack of knowledge and sleazy tactics by those seeking to exploit the current political environment.

Needless to say, I have never accepted any POW/MIA funds from any source for unofficial uses, nor would I dream of doing so. The slanderous accusation that I "was secretly paid at least \$4,000 of the laundered money" is also included in the public release. The "fringes" appear to have finally stepped across the line legally. I received a cashier's check for \$3,500 in December 1983 for the February 1984 trip to Vietnam and Laos. I was unable to discuss the trip with the board in advance due to government classification. A private donation was used. I also received a Support Our POW/MIA's check in October, 1983, in the amount of \$362.25 to reimburse my personal expenditure for hosting a dinner for Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach and his delegation, the initial session which

who has been of
Directors -
could not tell
me the whole story.

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established high level dialogue between U.S. and Vietnam in February 1984. These legitimate expenditures were privately funded and the disbursements are documented on the August 1984 State of California Tax return (Form 199) of Support Our POW/MIA's.

Interestingly, those who claim that I have no interest in live POWs use as negative my efforts some five years ago to support what was then a responsible private initiative to obtain evidence of living POWs. The contradiction is obvious; but it is clear that these people will try anything to remove those directly involved in implementing the President's priority. In earlier years, before the issue gained the level of attention and serious policy it deserves and now has, all of us searched for any possible means of getting evidence to return our men. The list now is extensive; however, numerous individuals have been taken in by the likes of Bo Gritz, Jack Bailey, Scott Barnes and Mark Smith, to name a few. These circumstances have generated serious caution, and the League has not endorsed the activities of LeBoutillier's Skyhook II. Attempting, in 1982, to assist a Member of Congress who had been helpful in 1981 by gaining official White House approval of the \$100,000 in medical assistance to a hospital in Vientiane made sense in the issue's history.

This latest attempt also regurgitated old allegations that Armitage is a drug trafficker, using the most notorious drug trafficker in Southeast Asia as a "reliable source," interviewed by (of all people) Bo Gritz, another "reliable source." Also they falsely claimed that Childress is under investigation for trying to bribe LeBoutillier to discredit Billy Hendon, charges previously addressed by Congress and found to be untrue, and even denied by LeBoutillier.

One must wonder if these latest activities are due to recent legal problems of Gritz and company or the known competition between Gritz's operatives and those of LeBoutillier. The unscrupulous tactics being used should result in U.S. Government officials backing off direct involvement, and it would if they were not men of character. I've cautioned before that such a result is predictable. The wisdom of public visibility on the POW/MIA issue can be questioned when all it gets you is attacks, unfounded allegations and accusations of wrong-doing. I urge serious thought by those of you in leadership positions. You, not only the Board Chairman and the League staff, must continue to visibly speak out in support of those in whom you have confidence. I have yet to hear any viable substitute policy to Return our men. If we lose people like Armitage, Childress and others I could name who are less willing to be visible, the issue will suffer immeasurably, perhaps fatally.

The support of high level DOD, HSC, State Department, JCS and DIA officials is critical to the issue. The same holds true for the Congress; yet recall how viciously Congressmen Solarz, Gilman and Solomon, plus Senator Murkowski, have been attacked. Now that policy is in place and being implemented, attacking those responsible for bringing the priority into reality is ignorant, foolish and totally destructive.

As for myself, I'm very tired of such stupidity and viciousness; however, we must again recognize that the nature of this latest attack proves that those who so desperately are trying to force my resignation from the League or the resignation of government officials do not care about our loved ones, alive or dead. I deeply resent the unnecessary time which must be spent answering false charges or reacting to other demands which have absolutely nothing to do with

achieving the League's objectives. I have never wasted League time or resources and do not intend to start now! Our efforts must focus on working to return our men not on those who apparently concentrate on nothing but attacking the League and the government.

Most of us have quite understandably become cynical about individuals or groups who come to us claiming they can resolve the issue, have proof of POWs, can work with the resistance to get proof, etc. We have paid our dues and tried everything we could think of through the years. Even now, we listen to every proposal, hoping that this time it will be valid. The illusive Smith video tape is just another example of family-member vulnerability and how much we all want to believe.

Ironically, those who demand, accuse, allege, play on frustration and emotion or otherwise distort the truth are desperately concerned that President Reagan will leave office without the issue having been resolved. With all the complaints, attempts to remove the President's designated representatives and allegations of coverup or worse, you would question why they are concerned? Do they actually recognize the value of current policy and priority? I hope so; yet they continue to abuse those responsible for bringing us as far as we have come, unsatisfactory as is the pace of results. You can't have it both ways.

Should anyone think that the President is not fully aware of the current situation, don't kid yourselves. This President is involved and will be until he leaves office. Regardless of allegations to the contrary, he is knowledgeable and supports those implementing his policies, as does the President's special POW/MIA emissary, General Vessey.

I ask your support and prayers for strength, confident that the 1987-88 election will again signal those trying to destroy the League that the families recognize the truth. Each year, there is great concern about the outcome of the elections. I know some are apprehensive now, recognizing that those elected to represent the families are crucial to continued viability of the organization. It would, indeed, be tragic if the League opted out of the process at this critical juncture. You should take some comfort, however, in learning that despite the minority extremist activities, they all focus on the League and even run for League office. Obviously, they are not making it outside of the League. It should be clear to all that if the League becomes unrealistic and irresponsible, the Congress and the Executive Branch as well as the media, not to mention the Indo-Chinese Governments, will disassociate. Some in the Congress and the media already believe those involved in the issue are not rational due to minority activities. Should the League join them, we will have no one to blame but ourselves; however, those who will suffer the most are those we are fighting to return, and their families.

Such responsibility is not easy, and there are no promises of success. All we can do is make the best effort, tell the truth and hold firm in the face of irrational attack and adversity. Our missing loved ones and the League's membership deserve no less.

On a final note, I will continue to pursue all possible channels to return our men alive as long as it is reasonable and legal, which this was. In addition, I will not support efforts that are illegal or counterproductive. Should the League not want this from their executive director, then the League should find someone else to do the job.

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Griffiths: No clear evidence

Executive Director of National League of Families also says she knows of no wrongdoing by POW/MIA groups at Vietnam Memorial vigil sites

For U.S. Veteran News and Report
By F.A. Wright

The executive director of the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia says she only occasionally reviews live-sighting reports, frequently forgets key details of the POW/MIA issue and does not believe there is any evidence of live POWs.

"I think there is not yet clear evidence that there are live prisoners of war," Ann Mills Griffiths said in a deposition given recently in a \$60,000 slander and libel lawsuit filed against the League of Families.

In the deposition, Griffiths portrayed herself as little more than a pawn of the League's board of directors who has become increasingly reliant on the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for her information and opinions on the POW/MIA issue.

Griffiths also said she supports tight controls on government release of information about POWs and MIAs because members of the public interested in the issue are not intelligent enough to assimilate such information and form the appropriate conclusions.

"The possibility always exists . . . that put all together and distributed selectively, (information) can get taken out of context or inadvertently mixed up, which would cause difficulties in pursuing the issue as best it could be pursued," said Griffiths.

Griffiths's deposition was taken July 6 in Washington, D.C., as a result of the lawsuit filed against the League of Families by Homecoming II, a non-profit POW activist organization based in Kinston, N.C. The year-old suit charges that officials of the League of Families disseminated false information about the activities of Homecoming II to damage its public reputation and cut into its fund-raising activities.

One of the more surprising revelations made by Griffiths under questioning by attorney Bill Bennett, who represented Homecoming II in the deposition, was that she pays little attention to the most recent live sighting reports and frequently forgets information given her about them.

On a recent trip to Vietnam, long-distance runner Stan Cottrell said he saw a group of men he believed were Americans. Col. Joseph Schlatter of the DIA said analysts have spoken with Cottrell several times but are still evaluating his sighting.

Griffiths: "Only a synopsis that he could not state that he saw American prisoners. He was unclear about that."

The suit, filed July Court in New Bern, N.C., charges that League of Family officials, including Griffiths, tried to publicly portray Homecoming II as "corruptly and dishonestly sensationalizing the POW/MIA issue for personal and financial gain."

The League has but in the deposition support several le. have been highly cr



Ann Mills Griffiths: She refused to support employees who have been highly critical of the Homecoming II group.

Griffiths, however, did not take the report seriously enough to study it in detail herself, instead relying on the DIA and a subordinate to evaluate the information.

Bennett: "What League officials have talked to Mr. Cottrell?"

Griffiths: "Mary Currall (the League's director of operations)."

Bennett: "What is your understanding of how that conversation went?"

Griffiths: "I don't recall the details of it."

Bennett: "She did not give you a report of that conversation?"

Griffiths: "I'm saying I don't recall the details of the conversation."

Bennett: "Do you recall any of the details of the conversation?"

II activities. Among Betsy Cox, the League relations.

Cox and Currall v 10, 1989 issue of Star that some of the "P" the Vietnam Mem D.C., were distribut ing information abo

Homecoming II most popular vigil s.

Cox called som- "blatantly false. We people misinforme: Currall charge: "POW/MIA vendor image of Vietnam:

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The suit, filed July, 1989 in U.S. District Court in New Bern, N.C., charges that League of Family officials, including Griffiths, tried to publicly portray Homecoming II as "corruptly and dishonestly sensationalizing the POW/MIA issue for personal and financial gain."

The League has denied the charges, but in the deposition Griffiths refused to support several league employees who have been highly critical of Homecoming

badgering and misleading people who come to the memorial.

Griffiths refused to support Cox and Currall or their statements.

Bennett: "Do you have any reason to believe that either one of them were accurately quoted in this article?"

Griffiths: "I can't attest to the accuracy of the quotation."

Bennett: "Do you have any reason to believe that either one of them were inaccurately quoted?"

Griffiths: "I simply cannot attest to the accuracy of the quotations since they weren't mine."

Prior to the Stars and Strips article, Griffiths had written twice to the Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan claiming "desecration" of the memorial by "POW/MIA vendors" and vigils and asked for an investigation.

"The individuals and organizations now 'permanently installed' at this highly visible site are desecrating the sanctity and serenity of the Memorial, its purpose and the service of those Americans whose names are listed, including our missing relatives," Griffiths wrote to Lujan on April 19, 1989. "The misinformation being spread on the POW/MIA issue is undermining League and U.S. Government efforts to resolve this humanitarian problem. Sadly, the American people are being misled into donating funds which are not accounted for in compliance with Federal or District of Columbia law for non-profit organizations."

Although she signed the letter, Griffiths said in the deposition she had no personal knowledge of "people being badgered at the memorial, or of any illegals, or of any desecration because she has visited the Vietnam Memorial only once since it was erected in 1982."

Bennett: "Can you tell us from your personal opinion and understanding of how the memorial has been desecrated?"

Griffiths: "No."

Bennett: "You don't have a personal opinion as to whether the memorial has been desecrated?"

Griffiths: "An opinion?"

Bennett: "Any personal understanding?"

Griffiths: "I have no direct experience."

Bennett: "What do you mean by direct experience?"

Griffiths: "Visits to the memorial."

Bennett: "Have you ever visited the memorial yourself?"



refused to support several league critical of the Homecoming II group.

II activities. Among them are Currall and Betsy Cox, the League's director of public relations.

Cox and Currall were quoted in the July 10, 1989 issue of Stars and Stripes as saying that some of the "POW/MIA vendors" at the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C., were distributing false and misleading information about the issue.

Homecoming II maintains one of the most popular vigil sites at the memorial.

Cox called some of the information "blatantly false. We cannot afford to have people misinformed."

Currall charged in the article that "POW/MIA vendors" are "tarnishing the image of Vietnam veterans" and are

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POW

21K

Agents sue top spinning backs for 'renegeing' on contracts □ Sports

THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

For 118 Years, The South's Standard Newspaper

FRIDAY, MARCH 27, 1987

25 CENTS

Children of MIAs fight guerrilla war over fate of fathers

By Ron Myers

KINGSTON, N.C. — The last time any of the new Army Special Forces Sgt. 1st Class Bobby Bischoff's sons saw him was in the jungle of Laos, firing a machine gun at advancing North Vietnamese soldiers. Bobby was a member of the 1st Special Forces Group, which was a part of the 11th Airborne Division. Bobby was a member of the 11th Airborne Division. Bobby was a member of the 11th Airborne Division.

"I want to move this issue forward. If it means getting in trouble, if it means going to jail, I'm going to do it."

— Bobby Bischoff

...the children of missing men are doing. They are just getting themselves through the same grief their mothers went through years ago," said a senior Pentagon official, who asked that his name not be used.

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See: MIAs, Page 5-A



Among those engaged in a civil disobedience campaign to draw attention to the fates of MIAs are (from left) Ted Sampley, Bobby Bischoff, Bobby Bischoff, Sherrill Standerwick, Robin Owen Bell and Karen Standerwick. Also are (from left) Ted Sampley, Bobby Bischoff, Bobby Bischoff, Sherrill Standerwick, Robin Owen Bell and Karen Standerwick.

MIAs

From Page 1-A

Some were toddlers when their fathers went to Southeast Asia and have only vague memories of them. Others were not yet born and know their fathers only through photographs.

The group has mounted a guerrilla campaign of civil disobedience aimed at drawing attention to what members say is government inactivity or indifference in the fate of 2,417 men still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. "The North Carolina cranes" is the way a White House aide referred to some of the more militant sons and daughters of missing men.

Some argue that the activism of these children of Vietnam soldiers will bring only pain and more frustration.

"It's a shame what some of these children of the missing men are doing. They are just getting themselves through the same grief their mothers went through years ago," said a senior Pentagon official, who asked that his name not be used.

The children say they have no choice.

"Many of the permits are getting old and tired and if the children don't keep this issue alive, no one will," said Robin Owen Bell, a real estate salesman from Prichard, Ala., whose father is missing in Laos.

The U.S. government says it cannot prove conclusively that Americans are being held at POWs in Southeast Asia, but is operating on the assumption that some remain in captivity. Many POW/MIA activists, including the "North Carolina cranes," say the government has sufficient evidence to prove the existence of POWs but is playing with words to allow itself deniability in the event none are ever returned.

"The weight of the evidence that they are there is overwhelming. That's why the children of these men are fighting so hard on this," said Ted Sampley, a Hampton contractor and Special Forces veteran who served two tours in Vietnam.

Recent activities of some of the members of the most militant group of POW/MIA activists, which is believed to number about 500, have increased the wrath not only of the White House, but also the leadership of the nationally recognized National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia and more moderate activists. These activities included:

□ Locking themselves inside bamboo cages on the front lawn of former White House Chief of Staff Don Regan.

□ Houndcuffing themselves in the White House lawn.

□ Stacking about 1,000 CARE packages addressed to POWs in Laos in the driveway of National Security Council head Frank Carlucci in a blinding snowstorm after being turned away from the Lincoln Embassy.

□ Giving a "Rambo of the Year" award to three women who snatched a POW/MIA flag past Secret Service agents and planted it on the White House lawn.

□ Discouraging a neo-violent twenty band for certain government officials and board members of the National League of Families with cream pies, rotten tomatoes and water balloons.

□ Staging a short-lived occupation of the Washington office of the National League of Families.

Further polarizing the two sides is the publication of an underground newspaper called the Bamboo Connection, that ranges from lightly satirical to openly violent in its treatment of government officials and private individuals with whom its editors do not agree. The paper shows up regularly in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill and has surfaced as far away as Thailand.

Some of the more vocal activists also have joined the newly formed American League of Prisoners and Missing in Laos, a group that has about 300 members but is not recognized by either the government or the National League of Families.

"Never before have we ever had people ready to do the things we're doing now," said Sampley, who has spent most of the past 11 years pursuing the POW/MIA issue.

On Monday, March 23, Sampley, Bischoff, and his wife will be among six persons arraigned in a Washington, D.C., court on charges they illegally entered and occupied the offices of the National League of Families on March 4. Except for Sampley, all these arrested have fathers who are among the nearly 600 Americans unaccounted for in Laos.

Ann Mills Griffiths, executive director of the National League of Families, said the activities of this group have attracted far more attention than they deserve.

"These kinds of efforts make a mockery of the seriousness of the issue and the priority that is assigned to this issue," Ms. Griffiths said in an interview in her Washington office.

Ms. Griffiths, who has a brother missing in Vietnam, says she understands the frustrations left by the activists but cannot condone their actions.

"Your frustrations have to evidence themselves in something positive and that is not happening here," she said. "As frustrated as we are, we have the best opportunity now, for live prisoners and an accounting, that we've ever had."

The MIA activists include in their ranks not only the sons and daughters of missing men but also a handful of Special Forces combat veterans of Vietnam. Their activities have not been confined simply to civil disobedience and protests.

Activists helped convince the British Broadcasting Corporation to spend more than a year researching and filming a show on live POWs, called "We Can Hold You Forever," that was seen in Atlanta in January.

They helped convince H. Ross Perot to get reinterviewed in the POW/MIA issue and Perot is now quietly collecting information on live POWs.

They helped convince the government to undertake an examination of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to determine if they were covering up information about live POWs. Indeed Gen. Eugene Tigh, former head of DIA, concluded there was no cover-up but said he emerged from last year's investigation more convinced than ever that POWs are being held in Southeast Asia.

Ms. Griffiths said the antics and efforts of these activists, particularly by those of the sons and daughters, undermine many years of work on the POW/MIA issue and send a signal of disrespect to the Vietnamese and Laotians.

"This is playing right into the hands of the enemy," said Ms. Griffiths.

The activists say they are tired of the snail's pace of negotiations between the U.S. and Vietnam over the POW/MIA issue.

"All we want is for [the U.S. government] to tell us the truth," said Sampley. "We're going after the government to make them say they [the POWs] are there. If they do that, then the case is on to the Vietnamese and we'll go after them."

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GRIFFITHS DODGES DUE PROCESS TO AVOID LIBEL SUIT

SPECIAL TO U.S. VETERAN
By Tom Cartwright

Ann Mills Griffiths, controversial executive director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, has made scores of trips to communist Vietnam, the confidante and traveling companion of U.S. government officials, supposedly seeking an accounting of U.S. missing in action from the Vietnam War.

They have accounted for none alive, not even with her "help," but Griffiths apparently has no equal when it comes to becoming missing herself, particularly to avoid due process of law.

Griffiths is under subpoena of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, New Bern Division, to provide oral testimony in a libel and slander action brought against the League by a volunteer POW-MIA group, the Homecoming II Project, based in Kinston, N.C.

Griffiths successfully avoided process servers for months.

NEVER AT OFFICE

Griffiths is supposed to be the full time executive director of the League, a post which pays her \$75,000 annually, plus perks, but she was, according to underlings, never in her office when the process servers appeared with the Federal subpoena. When they waited outside of the League office to serve her when she was arriving or leaving, they were harangued in the hallways by her assistants, who said they were interfering with the conduct of League business.

Nor does Ms. Griffiths have a personal phone, or a home where she can be served, at least process servers could not find one.

"You would think that her board of directors, if they have any power or influence over her at all, would insist that she comply with the law," Ted Sampley, national director of Homecoming II, stated.

"It is one thing for her to issue memorandums and missives from the inner-sanctum of her office, slandering and libeling people, good and decent people who are volunteering their time for a cause and not for pieces of silver," Sampley added, "but obviously quite another to have to support such libel under oath."

Finally, on June 28, Griffiths' attorney accepted service of the subpoena at his office, since it was felt that process servers would use the opportunity of Griffiths' scheduled appearance before a House subcommittee public hearing to serve the papers. The hearing was scheduled for 2 p.m. the same day before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, chaired by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.). Her attorney threatened "sanctions" against Homecoming II if any effort was made to serve her, to "embarrass" her at the hearing.

The hearing on the POW-MIA issue was widely viewed as "a dog and pony show" by many who attended, to provide something for Griffiths to impress the ever-dwindling number of League families who would be holding their annual meeting in Washington two weeks later, featuring Vice President Dan Quayle and Senate Minority Leader, Robert Dole (R-Kan.).

FURTHER STALLING TACTICS

Griffiths' attorneys had no more than accepted service of the subpoena, which set the date for her oral testimony for July 6 in Washington (for her convenience since her office is located there), when they pulled further stalling tactics.

Griffiths' attorneys petitioned the court to delay the presentation of oral testimony until after the League's annual meeting, which was set for July 12 to 15 in the Washington area, a fact they were well aware of when they accepted service. They contended that due to her supposed heavy schedule leading up to and during the annual meeting it would be very difficult for her to prepare and present the oral testimony on July 6.

Further, the League's slippery executive director petitioned the court that Sampley be barred from the session when she, finally, presents her oral testimony under oath. This was an astounding request since Sampley, as chairman of Homecoming II, is one of the targets of her alleged libel and slander.

Also being subpoenaed in the case by Homecoming II is Col. Joseph Schlatter, who has served as the officer in charge of POW-MIA affairs for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

One subpoena sent to the Department of Defense to call Col. Schlatter to present oral testimony was served on the wrong Schlatter by Pentagon security officials. Thus, more wasted time.

The subpoena was finally severed on the right, but reluctant, Schlatter when he appeared, with Griffiths, to give testimony at the Solarz subcommittee hearing.

In the latest stalling tactic, the DOD claims that the subpoena was not valid because of technicalities regarding the subpoenaing of



Ann Griffiths (left) and Mary Curral, Director of Operations for the League of Families, at a 1988 congressional hearing. Griffiths is the only member of the League staff who is related to a missing serviceman.

an officer attached to DOD. The problem is, Col. Schlatter is soon to be transferred to a new post in Japan, which will further complicate service of a subpoena.

AND MORE STALLING

"All of this is just an effort to subvert the due process of law, to stall and delay," Sampley said.

And, to make matters more difficult, Griffiths' attorneys are petitioning the court for a change of venue, from North Carolina to Washington, D.C., arguing that witnesses she plans to call for her defense would have to travel at great expense; plus find lodging, meals, etc., if a trial is held in North Carolina.

Her incredible list of witnesses includes Richard Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and now U.S. special envoy to arrange for an extension of a military base agreement with the Philippines; Richard Cheney, the current Secretary of Defense; Robert MacFarlane, former National Security Adviser to President Ronald Reagan; Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Richard Childress, former director of Asian and Pacific affairs for President Reagan's National Security Council; Col. Schlatter, etc.

"This is just another apparent effort of Griffiths to dazzle the court," Sampley said. "If we agree to the change of venue, then she probably will never call half of the people she claims she is going to at this point. As far as the expense involved in her witnesses being subpoenaed to court in North Carolina is concerned, many of them are U.S. government officials and it would not cost them anything. On the other hand, if she doesn't subpoena them, we just might. It's time they were all on the record, under oath, on this issue."

"It would seem to me that if Griffiths and her friends feel secure about what they have said and done, they would welcome the chance to support it in court," Sampley added.

Homecoming II alleges in its suit that the League has slandered and libeled it by name, both through the public media or private memoranda, with damaging and false information about its activities.

Homecoming II in the litigation is seeking \$50,000 in damages resulting from loss of revenue that resulted from the League's circulation of alleged false information about the organization, and at least \$10,000 in punitive damages resulting from loss of reputation, good name and ability to raise funds.

HAMMER THOSE WHO DISSENT

"Griffiths and the League has the attitude that every organization and every individual American who disagrees with their line, the government line, about our missing POWs and MIAs is crazy, or worse, and tries to hammer those who dissent from the 'official' line," Sampley said.

Homecoming II, he explained, is one of several organizations, which Griffiths has accused of obtaining funds through misinformation and by harassing parents by at The Wall (the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in Washington).

Among others blasted by Griffiths was the American Defense Institute and its director, U.S. Navy Capt. (Ret.) Eugene "Red" McDaniel, a Vietnam War

POW who endured the worst of the tortures of the North Vietnamese during several years of captivity.

Sampley, himself a highly decorated Green Beret with two tours of duty in Vietnam, explained that "Griffiths and thus the League is attempting to slander our organization, made up of volunteers, to tarnish our image which will in turn debilitate our fund-raising abilities."

In a letter, dated April 19, 1989, Griffiths charged that "individuals and organizations now 'permanently installed' at this highly visible site are desecrating the sanctity and serenity of the Memorial, its purpose and the service of those Americans whose names are listed, including our missing relatives. The misinformation being spread on the POW/MIA issue is undermining League and U.S. Government efforts to resolve this humanitarian problem..."

The letter was addressed to Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan, with the intention of getting his office to curtail the efforts of the organizations that she was attacking.

BOOKS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

"We have a marginal percentage in overhead and the majority of the money that we raise is returned to the POW issue in literature and printed material," Sampley explained. "We have never exploited or capitalized on this issue. Our organizational by-laws are set up so that none of the officers, including myself, receive a salary. Our books are open to the public."

"We have a valid permit to operate an information booth at the Lincoln Memorial, near the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial," Sampley added. "The permit is issued by the U.S. Parks Service to operate and obtain funds solely through sales, which includes the sale of T-shirts, POW-MIA bumper stickers and other POW-MIA and American war veterans' materials."

"Unlike the League, we don't play patty-cake with the U.S. government on the issue of our missing POWs and MIAs, we are not spoon-fed the government's line," Sampley continued. "And, yes, unlike the League, we do

Today, the League Says POWs Must Take Second Place to Other USG Foreign Policy Interests

Now, after years of claiming to be an independent, non-political advocate for the families of Americans missing in Southeast Asia and the voice of those still being held in captivity, the leadership of the League is finally publicly revealing its true colors.

The revelation came in a feeble attempt by the League in its May 21 newsletter to justify its complete support of a U.S. Government policy, that if not changed, will end the POW/MIA issue with the return of a "reasonable" number of remains and abandon those still alive in captivity.

The newsletter quotes columnist William Raspberry as saying in a recent article on the Iranian hostage crisis, "The answer is that the president knows what the anguished families may find difficult to accept: that the interests of the hostages must take second place to the interests of America."

Raspberry's comment, which accurately explains why the Bush Administration has adopted a "do nothing" policy on returning live hostages in the Middle East, is then incredulously used by the League as an excuse for rubber stamping the Bush's "do nothing" policy on returning live POWs in Southeast Asia.

"Mr., Raspberry's comment demonstrates precisely why the League must not come into conflict with existing foreign policy and national security interests of the U.S.," says the League.

In other, less patriotic sounding words, what the League is saying is that it has accepted what the anguished hostage families haven't been able to accept - that the interests of unreturned POWs in Southeast Asia must take second place to other American interests.

But rather than flatly admit it has sold out the men and families it professes to represent, the League wants its membership to believe that by continuing to be a team player and not rocking the political boat, the interests of the unreturned POWs will somehow take first place over other foreign policy interests.

believe that our government has for years covered up information about the fate of our missing, and we want to see the truth prevail and a full accounting of our missing. For that reason, we, along with other organizations who don't toe the official line, have become targeted and slandered as exploiters, liars and unpatriotic."

Homecoming II has a board of directors which includes four Vietnam veterans and four family members of Americans still listed as missing in action.

4 MAJOR PROJECTS

Homecoming II operates four major projects, including a biography collection effort, in which the biographies of all Vietnam War POWs and MIAs are being formulated and computerized in cooperation with the POW-MIA Network, a computer bank of information regarding POWs and MIAs based in Iowa. From all available sources, the "Bio-Project," as it is called, collects information on each POW and MIA, including in particular details concerning how and where the individual became lost and any information that may relate to his survival. The information is free to the public.

Through "truth litigation," Homecoming II is following the legal process in demanding access to intelligence reports pertaining to the live sightings of men still held in captivity and supports congressional legislation that will make public such information.

Through its Mekong Project, Homecoming II maintains a presence in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, which generates support for a \$24 million reward for the return of a live POW and collects data from neighboring Laos and Cambodia about the missing Americans.

Homecoming II operates a house in Washington, D.C. for housing and feeding scores of volunteers who maintain a vigil site near the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial. At the site, information packets are distributed for creating "public awareness of the POW-MIA cause," one of the stated principal aims of the Reagan and Bush administrations.

This blatantly self-serving rationale for betrayal is tantamount to telling the chickens to accept the hungry fox in their pen and ignore the continuing slaughter and growing pile of bones because the interest of the chickens will eventually take first place over the fox's interest.

Over eight years ago, the League leadership let the Reagan/Bush administration into their pen and during that time it has supported the continuing slaughter of our missing men by pointing to the growing pile of bones and calling it "significant progress."

No where is the government's seduction of the League more evident than in the complete turn around of Griffiths.

Prior to letting the government foxes into the pen she was guarding, Griffiths was a strong, outspoken advocate for the return of live American POWs as the League's first priority.

"We can wait for the bones," Griffiths said in a 1981 interview with Parade. "But there are live Americans being held over there. Some have been held for 15 years in God knows what conditions. The danger is, how much will I left when you've been waiting for your government to get you out for all this time? Every day counts now."

Today, every day that passes no longer counts.

Today, all Griffiths talks about it bones, as she openly praises Bush and the leaders of Vietnam and Laos for the return of remains.

And just as openly, Griffiths attacks family members and their supporters who dare to say, "There are live Americans over there - the bones can wait." Griffiths has been able to get away with this betrayal of both the men and the POW/MIA families by cleverly inflating the League's voting membership with families of the killed in action, bodies not recovered - the vast majority of whom have never expected anything more than the return of remains.

It's time for the POW/MIA families to either replace the present League leadership with people who represent their loved ones or join an organization that will.

The only other choice is for the families to accept that their loved ones must take second place to other American interests and hope that someday they get more to bury than a handful of unidentifiable remains in a flag draped coffin...

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES LEADERSHIP HAS BETRAYED MIA's AND POW's AND THEIR FAMILIES

When the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia was formed in 1970, it dedicated itself to protecting the interests of American POWs and MIAs.

The League also assumed the responsibility of providing a needed voice in Washington, D.C., for relatives of the missing men, whose voices often were callously ignored by members of Congress.

As the National League of Families prepares for its 21st annual meeting in Washington, D.C., July 12-15, it has become painfully obvious even to the casual observer that the leadership of this once noble organization has betrayed not only the MIAs and POWs it vowed to represent, but also has abandoned and humiliated the relatives who once sought solace in its membership.

The National League of Families is now stronger than ever in its political power base and ties to the federal government. At the same time, the League is weaker than ever in its moral resolve to bring a conclusion to this shameful chapter of U.S. government abandonment of American military men overseas.

The League's leadership has either been co-opted by the U.S. government, or, in the case of executive director Ann Mills Griffiths, bought out by government officials who recognize the political liability the issue represents to presidential administrations.

Even the League's board of directors, once a group of feisty, independent thinking individuals whose primary goal was accounting for the missing men, has become a herd of sheep installed by questionable voting procedures whose sole interest is to follow in lockstep the whims of the dictatorial Griffiths.

Griffiths is a prime example of the old saying that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The more power the government gave her, the more she wanted. She has installed herself as "executive director for life," much as Manuel Noriega did in Panama. When it comes to dictatorial demeanors, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu had nothing on Griffiths.

Griffiths and the League's board of directors long ago abandoned their quest for the truth on the POW/MIA issue. Instead, they saw in the issue an opportunity to obtain power, however illusory; to cozy up to foreign government officials; and to participate in government-sponsored junkies to Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. Through some strange turn of events it became more important for them to feel important than to fight for the issue.

The League's leadership has become like a ventriloquist's dummy. When the government speaks, the words come out of their mouths. Griffiths and the League's board of directors long ago abandoned any independent thought processes on the issue.

How far the League leadership has fallen in a few short years is readily apparent in the manner in which it now conducts its affairs.

The League once vehemently opposed mass burials without proper identification, claiming such actions were an effort by the government to close the books on POWs and MIAs. In 1984, Griffiths and the League opposed the burying the remains of the unknown soldier from the Vietnam War which were buried May 28 of that year in Arlington National Cemetery.

Now, the League leadership readily endorses such burials. With the Central Identification Laboratory's reputed ability to identify an individual from the smallest scrap of bone, whatever went into the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier must have been small enough to fit through the eye of a needle. This year the League has endorsed several mass burials without individual identification one in late February when remains the government said belonged to six Americans and two Vietnamese who died in a 1968 helicopter crash in Laos were inter-

red in Arlington. League officials participated in the ceremony, thereby sanctioning it.

The League once supported public dissemination of information that would demonstrate to the world that Americans were still being held in Southeast Asia, so long as that disclosure did not do so at the expense of specific individuals.

Now, the League leadership violently opposes disclosure of information that might indicate there are live Americans in Southeast Asia. It has fought against every effort to throw some light on the issue and is currently engaged in a massive campaign to stop H.R. 3603, the "Truth Bill." It is no small coincidence that the U.S. government also opposes H.R. 3603.

But the question remains: If the government believes all those people are dead, why is the information classified?

The League once encouraged diverse opinions among its members as a means of generating public interest in the issue.

Now, the League leadership actively discourages views and opinions different from its own and excommunicates those members who publicly voice those opinions. Wives, mothers, fathers, daughters and sons of missing men have been expelled from the League's membership role because they disagree with the vituperative and vindictive Griffiths. These relatives also have been denied access to classified information that Griffiths is allowed to see, even though she does not have the appropriate security clearances.

The League once sought help from any veterans organization because of the close bond veterans have with the missing men.

Now, the League leadership has abandoned veterans and sought to destroy through innuendo and legal action those organizations which do not agree with its views on the issue. The most specific attacks have come against Homecoming II and the National Steering Committee for American War Veterans.

The League once encouraged concerned citizens and the media to attend its annual convention.

Now, the League has restricted access to the convention and only those with special invitations who are deemed "acceptable" to the League leadership are allowed to attend. According to the League's May 21, 1990 newsletter, "Concerned citizen registration for the League's 21st Annual Meeting is by invitation from the League's national office or a current board member, state or regional coordinator. By restricting attendance to those members and concerned citizens whose opinions are viewed 'acceptable,' the League has severely limited its base of support and destroyed its credibility as an organization that represents all POW/MIA families.

The League once encouraged protest rallies against the Vietnamese and Lao to publicize the plight of the missing men.

Now, the League leadership condemns those who seek to pressure the Lao and Vietnamese into living up to their promises to account for the missing men. Now, says the League, "targeting specific embassies for protest demonstrations may be destructive."

Just as the U.S. government has become an apologist for socialist repression in China, Burma and the Baltic States, so, too, has the National League of Families leadership become an apologist for the governments of Laos and Vietnam and their refusal to account for the missing men.

The organization that established itself to represent American servicemen missing in action and prisoner of war in Southeast Asia now represent nothing but the U.S. government and its own self-serving interests.

The Washington Times

Letters

MONDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1991

No one has 'determined' that this is a hoax

I'm writing in response to the Oct. 13 news article by Susan Katz Keating, "Scams raise false hopes." This article was part of your Special Report on POW-MIAs.

In the article, Mrs. Keating writes that "letters in conjunction with a much publicized photograph were viewed by family members as proof that Albro Lundy Jr., John Robertson and Larry Stevens were alive. The letters and photograph have been determined to be fakes."

I am the daughter of Col. John Leighton Robertson, the man pictured on the left in the "much publicized photograph." This photograph has never been determined to be a fake. The Pentagon has spoken several times regarding other photographs that were found in a Soviet magazine; the photo of my father was never found in a magazine and was never said to be a fake. The identification of the photograph has not been discredited by the Pentagon; officials have never said that is not John Leighton Robertson, Albro Lundy Jr. or Larry J. Stevens in the picture.

After reading the article, I called the Pentagon and spoke with Lt. Tom Dowdy and Maj. Charlie Gittens of the Department of Defense Southeast Asia Office; I was assured that this photo had never been called a fake. As a matter of fact, I was told that on Oct. 12, at a meeting in New York, Carl Ford, acting assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, assured

the audience that at no time had the Pentagon established this photo to be a fake or a hoax.

I don't know whether my father is still alive or not.

I do know that he is pictured in a photograph taken sometime after Sept. 16, 1966 (his shoot-down date).

I do know that I have received more than 10 live sighting reports of my father in Southeast Asia.

I do know that I have never been asked for money to find my father.

I do know that a returned POW was interrogated with my father's ID card and dog tags, in perfect condition.

I do know that my father didn't explode with his plane.

I do know that his remains have never been returned to the United States.

I do know that the Vietnamese

returned nearly 1,000 French POWs from the French Indochina war 16 years after they claimed that they no longer held them.

There is compelling evidence that my father may still be alive and in captivity in Southeast Asia.

As a daughter, it is my responsibility to seek the truth regarding my father and bring him home if I can. But it is not only my responsibility, it is the responsibility of the American public and the U.S. administration to seek the truth regarding our POWs; it just happens to be my father.

It may be easier to just discount this photo as a fake or a hoax; but we deserve the truth, we must demand the truth. My father deserves at least that much.

SHELBY ROBERTSON QUAST
Oakton



Family members have identified these men as MIAs Col. John Robertson (left), Maj. Albro Lundy (center) and Lt. Larry Stevens.

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation



Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535
August 27, 1991

Honorable Stephen J. Solarz
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On July 31st and August 2nd, you conducted hearings concerning MIAs from the Vietnam War, in particular, the recently surfaced photograph that depicts three individuals that are purported to be MIAs. Carl W. Ford, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (DOD), was the principal witness for the Administration at the hearings. At the request of DOD, the FBI had been requested to conduct analyses on the photograph and documents associated with that document. Additionally, the FBI conducted other analyses in relation to the MIAs.

As you are aware, DOD requested the presence of FBI representatives in the event certain topics surfaced in the course of the hearing. We provided experts on fingerprints and photography. We believed that their presence was necessary so that an accurate and complete record would be established if questions arose concerning those issues. These issues were mentioned in the course of the hearing, but more information is available that will make the record more complete. I am taking this opportunity to provide that information and comment on another issue that was raised at the hearings.

By letter from you to Mr. Ford dated July 26, 1991, you requested an analysis of "finger and palm prints that the Lundy and Robertson families have received and have associated with their missing relatives." (In conversations with staff, it has been determined that this was a joint request with Congressman Robert J. Lagomarsino.) Since the FBI is the repository for fingerprints

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Honorable Stephen J. Solarz

of military personnel, DOD requested the prints for these individuals, in addition to the third person linked to the photograph, Lieutenant Commander Larry J. Stevens. A search of FBI fingerprint files did not disclose a record for these three individuals. There are many reasons why we may not currently have those fingerprints and an explanation for the record may be beneficial.

The most logical reason for the absence of these prints may be the policy for purging files. In the case of military prints, if DOD reports an individual killed-in-action (KIA) or otherwise deceased, the print is placed in a special file for seven years and then destroyed unless there is additional information furnished by the military. In testimony, Mr. Ford advised that the DOD had listed Major Albino L. Lundy, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Stevens as KIA based on eye witnesses' accounts of each incident. Relevant herein is a list of 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DOD in 1984. They were identified by DOD as being "Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." A search of our fingerprint files identified prints for 912 individuals from that list. The prints for the three individuals linked to the photograph were not among those with prints in file. All existing prints from that list are being maintained and are not subject to being purged.

Another explanation is that we never received fingerprints of those in question. But, it would perhaps be more than coincidental that the prints for three individuals linked to a single photograph would not have been submitted. This is particularly true given the policy of fingerprinting all military personnel. Unfortunately, due to the volume of civil prints alone, approximately 35 million individuals and 90 million cards, records of receipts are not maintained. In most instances, the only means to determine if there is a print on file is to check the index. The absence of an individual from the index only indicates the FBI does not currently have a file. This would not necessarily mean that the FBI never had a file. It could have been previously purged from the system, but, in most instances, there would be no record of the purge.

Fingerprints are frequently not capable of classification/retention due to their illegibility based on the quality of the inked prints that are submitted. When this occurs, the prints are sent back to the contributor with a request to obtain a legible fingerprint card for resubmission. It is not unusual

Honorable Stephen J. Solarz

to not receive a follow-up set of prints. As above, there would be no record if this occurred. As a point of reference, in the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 1991, the FBI Identification Division rejected over 790,000 fingerprint cards for this reason. Although historical figures are not available for the Vietnam War era, rejection rates for prints submitted by the military in the early 1980s were about 15 percent. Anecdotal information from the Vietnam War era indicates rejection rates may have been as high as 25 to 30 percent.

In the course of the hearing there was testimony that the photograph had been submitted to a photographic expert to determine if the middle individual was identical to Major Lundy. According to the testimony of Major Lundy's son, 16 positive points of identification were made. It is the opinion of the FBI's photographic experts that due to the poor quality of the photograph such an identification process is not possible. Further, positive identifications from photographs are dependent on scars, marks, and other individually unique features. Additionally, the positive identification points that were recited by the witness are broad-based characteristics common in large segments of the population. This does not reject the possibility that an individual may 'recognize' a particular person in a photograph, but it does reject the capability to make a positive identification through analysis, given the quality of the photograph and the absence of identifiably unique features.

One other issue raised at the hearing bears clarification. A Member raised the issue that the FBI had in its possession photographs of a possible MIA approximately six months before they were made available to DOD. As stated by the Member, these photographs were furnished to the FBI by a Congressman. However, no specific information was furnished the FBI that these photographs concerned a possible MIA. Even if they had been suspected to be MIA related, the FBI had no reason to believe that the photographs had not already been referred to DOD. Within a matter of a few days, these photographs were returned to the Congressman. I would also note that many communications between Congress and the FBI are considered to be privileged unless otherwise indicated. This is a privilege we do not take lightly, given the sensitivity of constituent and other matters that are referred regularly to the FBI. The FBI does not believe we acted improperly in this instance.

Honorable Stephen J. Solarz

The FBI remains committed to assisting Congress and DoD in the resolution of the status of the MIAs. Submissions by DoD are being handled on a priority basis. Should you be in need of additional information as to the FBI's role, please contact Charles E. Mandigo, Special Counsel, Congressional Affairs Office, telephone number 324-6028.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions
William S. Sessions
Director

① - Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
Room 4E813, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000

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3. 11 OCT 1991 DIA/PW-MIA MFR, telephone conversation with Bailey.
4. 11 OCT 1991 DIA/PW-MIA fax to Bailey: arrangements being made for Warren Gray and Bob Sheetz to travel to Bangkok to meet with Bailey and obtain his information on the sources in Nong Khai, in Vientiane and the PL General.
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6. 26 OCT 1991 Map showing a circled area which Bailey claims is the area where the Carr photos were taken.
7. 281100Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA and OASD/ISA -- Sitrep No. 1.
8. 280743Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA, OASD/ISA and State -- Summary of two meetings with Bailey and associates in Bangkok.
9. 281115Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Sitrep No. 2.
10. 291015Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Update on Carr investigation.
11. 291101Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Sitrep No. 3.
12. 300637Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Bailey reluctantly provided telephone numbers of the intermediaries in Nong Khai (proved to be bogus). JTF is considering polygraphing Bailey.
13. 300910Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Sitrep No. 4.
14. 301209Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Sitrep No. 5. Despite concerted effort by the JTF to determine the status of individual shown in the alleged Carr photos, the JTF effort has failed.
15. 311037Z OCT 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA and OASD/ISA -- Investigation.
16. 011137Z NOV 91 Stony Beach msg to DIA/PW-MIA -- Telephone call that Bailey intends to leave Thailand Sunday, 3 Nov.

NEW INTELLIGENCE ON CARR CASE

October 8, 1991

1. Captain Donald G. Carr is alive.
2. Intelligence on Carr's present position. Louang Manta
Luang Nam - Phong Salin Province.
Camp Comd Col. Diang Myuan, North Vietnamese. Maj.
Pisav Buokoe-Pl Commander. Gov. Buokaw Pising
3. Two New Locations with POWs
 - a. Kangtai
 - b. Phouyon
4. Intelligence on North Vietnam 379th and 337th Division
in Laos.
5. Intelligence on Bac Tie Camp Dien Bien Phu - Holding
several South Vietnam prisoners.


NVN District Chief at Bac Tie

1. Nguyen Due Minh - District Chief
2. Le Tuan Hoa - Organizer
3. Xiang On - Manager

Col Fouang - Commander
Team Fouak - 14 Officer Lt. Col. to Captain
3 to 5 American POWs
More than 200 South Vietnamese Prisoners

7. LAO PDR Defense Minister General Khamtai Siphandone
visited a Camp "POW" East of Samouh - Villay Tong Kong
at the foot of a mountain name Phou - Special Platoon
guarding under Lt. Phoui-2nd Lt. Boonta.
8. 379th Division is scheduled to move out of Lao in late
October 1991 after the rainy season is over.

Jack E. Bailey
Jack E. Bailey



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
AND MISSING IN ACTION
WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5390

FAX NUMBER: 703-693-5777

DATE/TIME: 10 OCT / 0945
9 OCT / 1715 (Carr's location)

FROM:

WARREN GRAY
NAME

PHONE #: (703) 614-4708

REMARKS:

JACK -- MY MEMORANDUM
OF THE MEETING THIS MORNING --
I HAVE FORWARDED TO COL COLE,
BANGKOK. AM ENCLOSEING A SUMMARY
OF THE RB-66 SUMMARY.

TO:

JACK BAILEY

714-638-5413

714-130-0649

DESTINATION FAX #

OFFICE

DESTINATION PHONE #

NUMBER OF TEXT PAGES: 2

DOCUMENT USED BY
BAILEY TO BRIEF
CARR. BART

RECEIVED IN DIA FROM
Team Bailey Oct 9, 1991

SUBJECT: Meeting With Jack Bailey

- Bob Sheetz told Jack that he wanted to make him a deal: that he and I would fly to Bangkok to meet with you and Jack Bailey to get all the information mentioned above. It was emphasized that we have to move on the Carr information. Jack does not know exactly when he will return to Bangkok, but did indicate that he would let us know. Will keep you posted.

CF: Jack Bailey via fax.

WARREN

NAME: MCEVEN JAMES ARTHUR

COMMENTS

[illegible]

(U) ABOUT FOUR TO FIVE MINUTES LATER, EQUAL IS OBSERVED A FIREBALL REFLECTION OFF OF THE CLOUDS TO THE NORTH OF THE TARGET AREA ASSIGNED TO SABRE 55. EQUAL IS TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO LOCATE THE FIREBALL TO THE CLOUDS TO THE NORTH OF THE TARGET AREA ASSIGNED TO SABRE 55. EQUAL IS TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO LOCATE THE FIREBALL TO THE CLOUDS TO THE NORTH OF THE TARGET AREA ASSIGNED TO SABRE 55, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL.

(U) NO PARACHUTES WERE REPORTED SEEN AND NO TRANSMISSIONS OR REFLECTORS WERE OBSERVED ON THE GUARD FREQUENCY. THE UNCRASHED AIRCRAFT WAS NOT LOCATED UNTIL 0823Z WHEN IT WAS OBSERVED BY A J-16 PILOT. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED AT AN ALTITUDE OF 23,000 FEET. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES (GC) YA 841 788. THE WRECKAGE WAS LOCATED ABOUT 800 FEET FROM THE SUPPLY OF A 4500 FOOT HILL. (REF 1)

(U) ON 24 OCTOBER 1988, A HELICOPTER OBSERVED CHAFF SCATTERED AROUND THAT CRASH SITE. SABRE 85 WAS CARRYING ABOUT 400 POUNDS OF CHAFF AT THE TIME OF ITS DISAPPEARANCE. (REF 1)

(U) ON 4 DEC 88 THE CRASH SITE WAS VISITED. A CHINOOK HELICOPTER LOWERED A GRAVES AND REGISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE AREA. HE WAS ON THE GROUND AT THE CRASH SITE FOR 30 MINUTES. HIS SEARCH FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE OF ANY BOOTIES OR PORTIONS THEREOF. THE AIRCRAFT HAD BURNED ON IMPACT AND ALMOST TOTALLY CONSUMED. THE AIRCRAFT A LARGE AREA AROUND THE CRASH SITE WAS ALSO BURNED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CRASH SITE HAD BEEN VISITED BY ANY OTHER PERSON. (REF 2)

(U) ON 28 APRIL 1968 FLYING SAFETY PERSONNEL WERE AIRLIFTED TO THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT AS THERE WAS AN AVAILABLE LANDING ZONE THEY WERE LOADED TO THE GROUND ON A FOREST EXTRACTOR TO GET TO THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT. STRUCK THE SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN CAUSING THE AIRCRAFT TO ROLL OVER ON ITS SIDE. A PARACHUTE WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE OPENED AND THE PASSENGER WAS EJECTED. THE AREA HAD BEEN ENVELOPED IN FLAMES. THE OCCUPANTS OF THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT EJECT PRIOR TO IMPACT. (REF 3)

UL) DURING THE EXISTENCE OF JCRC. THE HOSTILE THREAT IN THE AREA PRECLUDED ANY VISITS TO OR AROUND INSPECTIONS OF THE SITES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. THIS INDIVIDUAL'S NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA WERE TURNED OVER TO THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM WITH A REQUEST FOR ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. NO RESPONSE WAS FORTHCOMING. CAPT MANN, 1LT WEGER, AND 1LT MCNEVEN ARE CURRENTLY CARRIED IN THE PRESUMPTIVE STATUS OF DEAD, BODY NOT RECOVERED.

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11 OCTOBER 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bailey

1. At 1715 hours I called Jack Bailey to tell him to stop answering the telephone connected to his fax since I had a paper to send to him. Jack wanted to talk and told me the following:

- Said something important is going down in Thailand, that he has had several telephone calls from there, and CARR HAS NOT BEEN MOVED! therefore he needs to return to Thailand as soon as possible. He asked that I arrange for him to return on a military aircraft, or that I arrange for the Government to pay for his trip. Told him that I would forward his request to OSD/ISA.

- He says he has a videotape of Mr. X and that he wants to bring it to Thailand for our review.

- He stated that the Thai certificate in the new photos he has provided may actually be in an office in Burma, but he stated, "DO NOT RULE OUT THAILAND AS THE LOCATION". He also stated that based upon his review of the Carr photos, he thinks they were taken on a farm where the two Lao Princes lived, somewhere in Phongsaly Province.

2. Subsequent to Bailey's comments I called COL Jordan, OSD/ISA and relayed Bailey's request for transportation to Thailand.

D. WARREN GRAY

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SPECIAL OFFICE FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
AND MISSING IN ACTION
WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5360

FAX NUMBER: 703-692-5777

DATE/TIME: 11 OCT / 1550

FROM: Warren Gray

PHONE #: (703) 614-4708

REMARKS: A FOLLOW UP TO OUR
EARLIER FAX.

TO: JACK BAILEY
Garwood Grove, CA
OFFICE

DESTINATION FAX #

DESTINATION PHONE #

NUMBER OF TEXT PAGES: 1

TRANSMISSION REPORT

THIS DOCUMENT (REDUCED SAMPLE ABOVE)
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11 OCTOBER 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JACK BAILEY

SUBJECT: Meeting in Bangkok

Jack: Bob Sheetz has directed that I initiate travel plans for him and me to travel to Bangkok to meet with you and obtain the information on the sources in Hong Khai, in Vientiane and the Pathet Lao General in Bangkok. The Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA will hold hearings on 29, 30 and 31 October; Bob wants to leave immediately after the hearings.

I have been asked to pass the following questions to you:

- Do you know exactly when you will be returning to Bangkok?
- If you plan to return earlier than the Senate hearings, would you please let us know so that we can alert COL John Cole? If you do arrive there prior to the hearings, Bob Sheetz and I will join you in Bangkok and assist COL Cole in the investigation.
- Based upon our meeting with you on 9 October, this office is now obligated by law to notify the next of kin of the five individuals that you identified as POWs. Do you have further information about any of the five people you named: Hrdlicka, Billipp, Allen, Hagen and Lilly? Would like to know full names, locations, and what proof is there that any are alive?
- We understand from your meeting with the Secretary of Defense that your primary source for the Carr information, Mr. X, can be made available to interviewers, and that he will take a polygraph examination. Is it true that he will be available and that he will take the polygraph?
- Is there anything we can do to help in this matter?

Would appreciate your response; I will be on leave next week, therefore please pass any response to Chuck Trowbridge. Telephone numbers are 703-614-4708 or 697-2498; the fax number is 703-697-5333. Thanks in advance.

Sincerely,



WARREN GRAY
Chief, Current Operations Branch
DIA/POW-MIA.

LEVEL 4
CDSN = 14X524 MCN = 91285/00471 TOR = 912850009
PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS607 2850009 -RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER
P 120009Z OCT 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

P 112130Z OCT 91
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//POW-MIA//
TO RUEHNR/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
INFO RUEHRC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA(PW-MIA)//
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J3-S(PW-MIA)//
RUEHQH/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36//
RUEKQBA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
RUMTFB/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE LA
RUMATIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDO/ICOG//
RUMTIAA/DINHA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//B51/B52//
RUEHNR/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
BT
CONTROLS

C-1003-91/POW-MIA

BODY

SUBJ: TEMPORARY DELAY IN CARR PHOTO INVESTIGATION (U)

1. ON 8 OCTOBER 1991, RETIRED USAF OFFICER JACK BAILEY, THE SOURCE OF THE PHOTOS ALLEGED TO BE CAPTAIN DONALD G. CARR, MET WITH SECDEF; HE WAS ACCOMPANIED IN THE MEETING BY KEPS MCCLOSKEY AND VISCLOSKEY. AS A RESULT OF THAT MEETING, DIA HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CEASE AND DESIST ON INTERNAL DATA ASPECTS ONLY OF THE ON-GOING CARR PHOTO INVESTIGATION FOR A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS. THIS EFFECTIVELY PUTS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF YOUR INVESTIGATION ON HOLD UNTIL 22 OCTOBER 1991.
2. WE ARE AWARE THAT A LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR LAMBERTSON HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT WITH A FORMAL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE, THAT THE THAI POLICE HAVE BEEN CONTACTED FOR ASSISTANCE AND THAT PHOTO PACKETS HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATED TO THE THAI POLICE IN OUTLYING PROVINCES. WE ARE AWARE THAT DURING YOUR ON-GOING INVESTIGATION YOU HAVE VISITED NO LESS THAN FIVE ENCLOSURES OR CAGES THROUGHOUT THAILAND IN A SEARCH FOR THE ALLEGED DETENTION FACILITY SHOWN IN THE PHOTOS PROVIDED BY BAILEY. YOUR CONTINUING SEARCH ALONG THE BORDER IN THAILAND FOR SOURCE INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE CARR PHOTOS IS ALSO AFFECTED. WE DESIRE THAT THESE ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND MUST NOW BE PUT IN ABeyANCE FOR THE SHORT TERM.
3. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ON 9 OCTOBER 1991, JACK BAILEY MET WITH DIA/POW-MIA AND OSD/ISA PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS THE NEW INFORMATION HE HAD OBTAINED IN THAILAND WHICH RESULTED IN HIS RETURNING TO COMUS TO MEET WITH SECDEF. IN A PAPER PREPARED FOR SECDEF BAILEY WROTE THAT "CAPTAIN DONALD G. CARR IS ALIVE". WHEN PRESSED FOR PROOF OF THIS STATEMENT, BAILEY STATED THAT HE HAD NO DIRECT PROOF, THAT THE INFORMATION WAS HEARSAY AT BEST. HE THEN STATED THAT CARR AND 20 - 30 OTHER AMERICAN PRISONERS HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS AREA IN LAOS NORTHWEST INTO LUANG NAM THA PROVINCE TO A LOCATION 22

PAGE FOUR

LIABILITIES FROM THE BURMA AND CHINA BORDERS. BAILEY STATED THAT HE HAS HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIS PRIMARY SOURCE IN LAOS, AN INDIVIDUAL NAMED (PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS MR. X), AND THAT HE IS HAVING TO WORK THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES IN HONG KAI, THAILAND TO CONTACT WITH REGARD TO HIS UPCOMING RETURN TO BANGKOK.

BAILEY SAYS HE IS WILLING TO REVEAL THE NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE INDIVIDUALS IN HONG KAI, AND TO PROVIDE STUNT BEACH WITH THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF HIS PRIMARY SOURCE IN VIENTIANE, ALTHOUGH HE STATES THAT THIS SOURCE IS LOCATED SOMEWHERE IN LAOS BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND THAKHEK. BAILEY ALSO PROMISED TO SECURE THAT HE WOULD MAKE BOTH THESE INTERMEDIARIES AND "MR. X" AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH BY STUNT BEACH WITHIN TWO WEEKS TIME.

4. AFTER THE REVELATIONS ABOUT CARR AND OTHER AMERICAN PRISONERS BEING MOVED TO LIANG NAM THA PROVINCE, BAILEY STATED THAT HE WAS ALSO AWARE OF ANOTHER GROUP OF FIVE AMERICAN POWS,


WHO HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM CENTRAL LAOS TO A POINT ON THE VIETNAM BORDER. "AS YOU KNOW, THIS INFORMATION WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED TO THE FIVE FAMILIES; IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME HE HAS SURFACED NAME. TWO YEARS AGO BAILEY CLAIMED THAT 'WAS ALIVE AND ABOUT TO BE RESCUED, HOWEVER, WHEN THE FAMILY CALLED HIS NAME AND THREATENED TO TAKE HIM TO COURT, BAILEY BACKED OFF. HE STATES THAT HIS SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION IS A PATRIOT LAO (PL) GENERAL LIVING IN BANGKOK; BAILEY AGREED TO PUT STUNT BEACH PERSONNEL IN TOUCH WITH THE PL GENERAL AFTER HIS RETURN TO BANGKOK. BAILEY IS NOT CERTAIN WHEN HE WILL RETURN TO BANGKOK, HOWEVER, DID STATE THAT HE WOULD NOTIFY DIA/PM-HIA WHEN HE WAS GOING TO DO SO. BAILEY WAS INFORMED BY THE CHIEF, PM-HIA THAT HE AND CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH CHIEF ARE READY TO TRAVEL TO BANGKOK TO JOIN THE CHIEF, STUNT BEACH THAN TO RECRUIT HIS INFORMATION. IT WAS EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT WE TAKE HIS STATEMENTS SERIOUSLY AND THAT WE FULLY EXPECT HIM TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION PROMISED.

5. (U) LASTLY, TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING WITH JACK BAILEY, ON 10 OCTOBER 1991, DIA/PM-HIA TRANSMITTED A WRITTEN MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD (HVR) OF THE MEETING WITH BAILEY TO BAILEY'S HOME IN CALIFORNIA. THAT FAX HVR CLEARLY STATES THAT BAILEY AGREED TO AND WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE TWO INDIVIDUALS IN HONG KAI WHO ACT AS HIS INTERMEDIARY WITH THE PRIMARY SOURCE IN LAOS; THAT HE WILL PROVIDE THE TELEPHONE NUMBER IN VIENTIANE FOR HIS PRIMARY SOURCE FOR THE CARR INFORMATION; AND THAT HE WILL PUT STUNT BEACH PERSONNEL IN TOUCH WITH THE PATRIOT LAO GENERAL IN BANGKOK TO DISCUSS THE FIVE AMERICAN POWS. SINCE JULY 1991 BAILEY HAS PROMISED AT LEAST THREE TIMES TO IDENTIFY SOURCES AND ASSIST IN THE EFFORT TO FIND CARR; OF COURSE, THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED.

6. (U) NOTE THAT THE ADDRESSEE LISTING FOR THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN NECESSARILY EXPANDED SINCE OTHER AGENCIES ARE ASSISTING IN THIS SEARCH EFFORT AND SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION. WE ARE AWARE OF AND APPRECIATE THE TOTAL DEDICATION STUNT BEACH PERSONNEL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RESOLVING THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE. THE DIA/PM-HIA FOC FOR THIS ACTION IS CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH, (703) 614-4706.

ADMIN

ARSA CIRCLED BY JACK BAILEY
IN BANGKOK, THAILAND ON 26 OCT 91;
CLAIMED TO BE ARSA WHERE CAMP BEARS TAKEN



SECTION 01 OF 04 SAIGON TN 52717

59-054 07 92

SUBJECT: JTF POW INVESTIGATION, REFNO 1754; SITREP NO. 1
(U)

REF: A. AMERICAN UNION 130700Z JAN 66; (U) THIS SUPPORT
OF INDEPENDENTS: THE BURMESESE (ROYAL)
- B. DIA WASHINGTON DC/PO-PM/ 00215Z DEC 63; (U)
WANT CLOSING DOWN COMES AROUND
- C. JCRC LHO GENEVA 070000Z DEC 66; (U) JCRC RPT
TNO-477-140 NESTING/1600Z JAN 67/ 00215Z DEC 66; (U)

1 THE JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) WAS SET UP AT THE
2 DIRECTION OF OSWALDO, COORDINATED WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS
3 OF STAFF AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING A
4 THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT
5 AND VICE PRES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
6 DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. THE JTF WAS SET UP TO
7 COORDINATE THE ACTS OF OSWALDO B. CARR (DOWD 100-0-00) IN A
8 CAPACITATION IN THE LAD POWERS ASSOCIATE. THE JTF
9 WILL BE THE ULTIMATE COLLECTION OF JTF-ATF IS TO VERIFY THE
10 IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE PLOT, AND
11 TO RETURN HIM TO U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTROL, IF
12 APPROPRIATE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT IS TO REPORT
13 THE ACTING TASK FORCE TO DATE IN THE CURRENT ASSASSIN CASE
14 FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION. JTF-ATF WILL CONTINUE TO
15 PROVIDE PERMANENT SUPPORT IN THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION
16 WHICH IS CURRENTLY POWERED BY OSWALDO AND LAD. AS
17 INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS.

[illegible]

Summary of results, 105 Assets
JMS/MD 23/24 Oct

WE ESTABLISHED TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH MR. BAILEY THURSDAY AFTERNOON AFTER ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES. HE TOLD MR. BAILEY HE WANTED TO MEET WITH HIM IN HIS HOME TO PUT TOGETHER A COORDINATED PLAN USING HIS INVESTMENT ASSETS AND HIS INFORMATION. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS HOME TO ENSURE THAT NO INFORMATION WOULD BE LEFT BEHIND. MR. BAILEY BOOMERED ON THE MEETING, SAYING THAT ALL INFORMATION WAS IN BAILEY, AND SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH US IN THE HOTEL FOR A BREAKFAST MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, 24 OCT 91. BAILEY ALSO REMARKED THAT HE COULDN'T AFFORD TO PURCHASE A TICKET TO MEET WITH US AND PRESSING BUSINESS WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER THAT DAY AND SOME FAMILY ILLNESS THAT WOULD PREOCCUPY HIM FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY. WE AGREED TO PURCHASE THE TICKET FOR HIM AND TO

ON A SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONE CALL, DETERMINED THE INFORMATION THAT GABLEY HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED THE SECOND AND GSA, INCLUDING THE ALLIED DETENTION FACILITY BETWEEN SAN BAY AND JINING GAO AND THE CORRIDOR IN THE DETENTION FACILITY THAT PUT CHAN AND THE OTHER PIR'S LOCATION WERE SOUTHWEST LANE. DURING THIS CONVERSATION GABLEY REVEALED TO THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE ACCOMPANYING US TO THAILAND BUT WOULD PULL THE GUEST OUT. SHORTLY AFTER COMMENT, HE TELEPHONICALLY CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE PULLING THE DAY OFF.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

4. JOURNEY OF MEETING WITH BAILEY AND GROUP,
PRESIDENT HOTEL, BIRMINGHAM, 1200 WES, 26 OCT 51:
ATTENDEES: JACK BAILEY, A MEMBER OF BAILEY'S GROUP
(FURNISHED JUDGE PUGH WITH CARD, BEARING OF
"FIGHTER PLAN"); BAILEY'S PEOPLE ASSOCIATE/ASSISTANT
NAME

A DETAILED MANUSCRIPT (7001) (U) WAS
PREVIOUSLY FORN TO CIA. BASICALLY, THE SECOND WAS BE
PRODUCTIVE IN THAT EARLY'S LAD SOURCE WAS NOT
YET BEING CONTACTED. EARLY WAS INDICATING THAT HE WAS
BEING SURVEILLED BY SEVERAL HEARS AND THAT HIS "WORK"
WAS BEING MONITORED BY THE CIA IS BEING DONE. IT SHOULD
ALSO BE NOTED THAT EARLY'S STORY WAS SEVERAL HOURS
DISCREPANCY WITH PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED INFORMATION. IN
ADDITION, EARLY PROVIDED THE INFORMATION OF

ON GALEY'S TEAM WORKING ON THE CASE. AFTER
LEAVELY BECAME TOTALLY LACKING IN THE PROCEEDING
IMPORTANT PLACES, GALEY AND PUCKLE TO SHOW AS A
TIME LATER IN THE DAY IN WHICH BECAME INFO ON
BANK FUEL.

6. SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH DAILEY AND GROUP,
CONFERENCE ROOM NO. 1, AMERICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON,
D.C., 28 OCT 91.

A. MR. BAILEY ARRIVED AT THE U.S. BRANCH AS PREVIOUSLY
ARRANGED TO VIEW A VIDEO TAPING A MEETING HE HAD WITH LEO
BUTENBERG, INCLUDING A CONFERENCE LEO SPENT
TO WHICH BAILEY REFERRED AS AND DURING
TAPED SEVENTEEN, WHICH BAILEY STATED TOOK PLACE ON OR
ABOUT 28 APRIL 1980, HE WAS ASSISTED BY HIS TOL
APPROXIMATE

BAILEY IS TOLD THAT THERE ARE 100 AMERICANS BEING HELD IN THE AREA OF LOUANG NAMTHA - PHONG SALLY. (NOTE: WHEN THIS FIGURE WAS MENTIONED ON THE TAPE, BAILEY COMMENTED THAT HE "DISAGREED" WITH THIS FIGURE.)

C. DURING THE TAPED INTERVIEW WITH: BAILEY IS ALSO TOLD THAT HELICOPTER FLIGHTS TO DESUPPLY THE FACILITY WITH FOOD AND MEDICINES ARE MADE APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES A MONTH. ON TAPE, BAILEY TELLS THE THAT HE HAD A 1973 TELEGRAM "FROM VIETNAM" THAT "THEY ARE HOLDING 33." BAILEY INFORMS THAT "I AM 15 A RESEARCHER NUMBER 0017. I AM SAYING TO YOU THAT THE 33."

D. BAILEY STATED HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT HIS LEO CONTACTS BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD BEEN HOOKED. DURING THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION, BAILEY IS BEING REFERRED TO A MAP AND ATTEMPTING, WITH SOME DIFFICULTY, TO LOCATE PROMINENT GEOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL FEATURES SUCH AS "SAN KENNY" (SAN KERN), VIENTIANE, THE MONGKONG RIVER, AND LOEY PROVINCE, THAILAND. BAILEY, AT ONE POINT, ASKS "WHERE IS VIENTIANE ON THE MAP?" GETS UP TO POINT THE CITY OUT, POINTING TO THE MAP. EXPLAINS, "THAT IS THE MONGKONG." WHILE WORKING HE'S HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH THE MAP, HE COMMENTED THAT HE WOULDN'T WORKING WITH A VERY OLD MAP.

6. RESPONDING TO DAILEY'S QUESTION IF HE KNOWS OF ANY OTHER PLACEMEN, REPLIES THAT THEY ARE GOING TO DIFFERENT AREAS. ANSWERS LAD, WHO DAILEY IDENTIFIED AS SIXES THAT OF THE 23 (RESPONDING TO THE "WHY") UNDER ARE "ONE HERE, BUT NOT ONE OF THE NUMBER," ABOUT 20 ELEPHANTS FROM KING AND HILL. HE STATES THAT "ONE KING IS THE OTHER PLACE, NEAR ROUTE NUMBER 20."

F. AS THE TAP CONTINUES, DARLEY ASKS HIS CONTACTS IF THEY "WANT TO BEING OUT ONE, TWO OR THREE (FOUR) OF THE FIRST TWO?" BARNHARTT REPLIES THEY WANT TO BEING OUT TWO, BY MEMPHIS, ACCORDS BARNHARTT PREFERENCE TO LARRY THORNTON. DARLEY TELLS "DON'T SIGN HE THING AND YOU'RE GOING TO TAKE THEM ON - FOR SECURITY REASONS. WHEN ASKS THE LAD IF THEY WOULD PREFER TO CONTACT THEM BEHIND OPERATION WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT, OR IF THEY WOULD PREFER TO DO IT

RELEVANT DATA DELETED

[illegible]

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CHIEF, THAT BANK ACCOUNT, SWISS BANK ACCOUNT, ETC. ME INFORMED HIS CONTACTS THAT HE IS WORKING WITH WHO WAS PUT UP MONEY TO PAY FOR ACTIVITIES TO EXTRACT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, ADDING "ONE TIME HE PUT UP TWO MILLION DOLLARS." FINALLY, ME INFORMED HIS TWO CONTACTS THAT WHEN THEY OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION, THEY SHOULD CONTACT

14. AT THE END OF THE TAPE, BAILEY STATED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE TAPED MEETING, THE BOMB CASE HAD NOT YET SURFACED. HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD AT LEAST THREE OR FOUR ADDITIONAL MEETINGS UNTIL THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PROVIDED. BAILEY BELIEVED THAT THE "CARR" PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN IN LATE 1980 OR EARLY 1990.

1. BAILEY HAD WITH HIM A SECOND TAPE WHICH HE MENTIONED DURING THE AFTERNOON MEETING: THE LAO PROPAGANDA TAPE WHICH BAILEY CLAIMED ALLEGED TO REVEAL THE NUMBERS OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WHO WERE CAPTURED BY PATHET LAO. REVIEWING THE TAPE, NO SPEECH OR OTHER INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE WAS DISCLOSED.

6. SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH
GATLEY AND ASSOCIATES. SUMMARY. 27 OCT 91:

A. 0045 SURVIVOR TEAM CHIEF CALLED DAILY. ANDREWS, STATED THAT DARLEY WAS STILL ASLEEP AND THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN HEARD FROM THE MEN DARLEY SENT TO RETRIEVE.

8. 200P CALLED SHINY BEACH TEAM, STATED THAT THERE WAS STILL NO NEWS FROM THE PEOPLE SENT TO GET WHEN INFORMED THAT AN AIRCRAFT WAS STANDING BY TO MEET , AND THE PEOPLE SENT TO RETRIEVE HIM, SUBMITTED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE RETURNED.

C. 1115 BARLEY CALLED AND SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO GET A HAIRCUT, THAT THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE HEARD NEXT AND THE PEOPLE SENT TO RETRIEVE HIM, AND THAT HE WOULD CALL US BACK AS SOON AS HE HEARD ANYTHING.

0. 1200 SEVERAL ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO CALL BACK DALLAS
BUT ONE ANSWERED THE PHONE.

8. 1946 DAILEY GROUP CALLED AND STATED THAT THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WENT TO LAOS TO FIND AND GET RETURN TO BANHOM. ACCORDING TO THE TWO, THEY WOULD ARRIVE BANHOM WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. BY PREARRANGEMENT, "THEY" WENT ALONG WITH DAILEY BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO GET OFF THE TWO AND A SMALL BOAT.

7. THE FOLLOWING ROOM AND OTHER RESOURCES
WERE ALLOCATED IN THE INVESTIGATION SINCE THE AIRCRAFT
THE WASHINGTON-BASED JET CRASHED:

A. A USA POLYGRAPHER INTERVIEW 2200 HRS 27 OCT 91 OFF
 BUREAU NEW ORLEANS FOR ANOTHER OFFICE.

8. A BOB BOWLING C-12 AIRCRAFT AND CHIN TENG CHUCK

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

STAND BY FOR ORDERS TO PROVIDE AIR TRANSPORT IN SUPPORT OF JTY. THIS ASSET WAS ALSO DELETED FROM ANY OTHER CURRENT MISSION AND TOTALLY DEDICATED TO THE JTY.

C THE MAJORITY OF STATE BLACK TEAM MEMBERS (INCL)

01-254 07 01

11. AT THIS POINT WE STILL SEE THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS OF ACTION IN TWO PHASES, AS WE DISCOVERED EARLIER. IF THINGS WITH HALEY DON'T WORK OUT, THESE ARE THE OPEN SOURCE SEARCHES IN WASHINGTON BY WADSWORTH, POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, CURRENTLY ON HOLD, AND A THREE-PARTY INVESTIGATION IN LAGOS. FOR POLICE ONE, SOME REACH IS PREPARED TO GO TO THE TWO POLICE SECURITY AGENCY CENTER, THE CIVIL POLICE, THE ARMED FORCES POLICE, OTHER THAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AS REQUESTED, AND THE EXPANSION CONCEPT. ADDITIONALLY, THEY ARE PREPARING THE CONCEPTS FOR INCLUSION IN THE CONCEPTS FOR THE CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTS FOR CONCEPTS FOR CONCEPTS FOR CONCEPTS FOR ALL WELL THAT OPERATIONS OF THE PHASE IN THE CONCEPT, SOMEWHAT THAT WAS NOT BEEN DONE, WILL BE THE THIRD PART SOMEBODY THAT IS TURNING IN THE INFORMATION ON THE PHASE. THINGS WILL BE EXCLUSIVE ON THE PHASE, THE ONLY WAY WE CAN DO HALEY THIS IS PLAY OUR SYSTEMS OFF EACH

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

4 OUR COLLECTIVE ORIENTATION IS THAT IS A
CAPION THAT IS ORIENTING THE SHINY BUSINESS AND MAKING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCCESS. BARTLEY INDICATED THAT HE HAD
OFTEN HEARD NEW LAMB TIPS OF MONEY. HE FELT THAT
; IS BASICALLY HONEST AND IS WISE OUT OF CHERIDITY
AND TO PROVIDE LEGAL COUNSEL TO BARTLEY. HE BELIEVE HE WILL
BE HELPER. IF BARTLEY DOESN'T PROVIDE USEFUL INFORMATION
OR CONTINUES TO STALL.

22-000 OCT 51

[illegible]

NAME OF IN 57931

14-00000 OCT 92

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CARR INVESTIGATION TO DATE
(791530N OCTOBER 91)

1. HE MET WITH JACK BAILEY AND _____ AT
THE PRESIDENT HOTEL THIS AFTERNOON. THIS MORNING-
MEETING PRODUCED ONLY ONE PROSTIBUTION AND CERTAINLY
NO _____
A LATE OUTGOING FROM BARBERC WITH SOME
CONNECTIONS AS THE INTERMEDIARY TRYING TO GET
DOWN TO BARBERC. WHEN ASKED ABOUT BAILEY'S REPORT
YESTERDAY THAT _____ WOULD BE BARBERC (STAMP 2), BAILEY
REPLIED, "THAT'S A VERY _____ REPORTED TO BE" _____
THAT _____ WAS NOT ACHIEVING AT THIS POINT.

- [illegible]

3. CHANGES IN LACS ARE ON TRACK WITH
PLAYING OF RECORDS TO KEPT WITH [REDACTED] AND LACS
CONTAINED. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] WILL NOW
CONTAINED ONE ISOLATION, INVESTIGATION FOR A
CONNECTION OF THE RELEVANT FACILITIES IN CASE
REMOVED WITH THE PERSONNEL. INITIAL LACS RESPONSE
THIS WAS EXAMINED. CONSIDERATION AND PERFORMANCE
THE SUBJECT FROM THE OTHER LOCATION IS SCHEDULED FOR 7
REMOVED. LOCATION AND EXAMINATION OF THE 60-60, THE
LAST UNIT IN THE CHAIN IS LACS. RELATIVELY NOT 7
REMOVED UNIT. SUBJECT, THE CODE PROVIDED BY STEVEN
OFFICIAL. ALTHOUGH THE CODE PROVIDED IN THIS
LANGUAGE REVEALS AN INDIVIDUAL BELONGING THE BEST
SET FOR NUMBER OF THE CITY INTERNALLY IN THIS CASE.
HE MAY NOT BE RELAY THIS SET WITH THE POLICE OF
THIS AGENCY NOT BEEN CONTACTED.

RECEIVED JAN 15 1963

PPGIGI//
O 71101Z OCT 91
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DIAM-2// IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//RDMO-TSA/PW-MIA// IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC//NSC MR. TIM CARNEY//
JCS WASHDC//J5/JPCS-PW-MIA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/J3/J313/J323B//

USDAO OKLA LAMPH
HAWASSAY VIENTIANE

CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
USDIO HONG KONG

SECTION 01 OF 02 GANGEKKE TH 52951

20-004 057 91

SUBJECT: JTY PCN INVESTIGATION, REFNO 1754; SITREP NO. 3
(U)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON 29 OCT 91 SINCE THE EARLIER TRANSMISSIONS OF SITREPS 1 AND 2 IN THE Ongoing ALLIED CASE PHOTOGRAPHIC INVESTIGATION.

- 1400 HRS JACK BAILEY AND HIS ASSOCIATE
MET WITH JFF AT THE PRESIDENT HOTEL IN DALLAS AS
ARRANGED IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS DAY
RE SUBSTANTIAL ATTORNEY:

BARLEY STATED THAT HE HAD GOTT SEPARATELY WITH THE TWO
PEOPLE WHO HAD GONE TO KING ISLAND TO FIND ONE OF
THE PEOPLE SENT TO FIND .X

THE OTHER POWER SENT TO THE
WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ABOUT CASH'S LOCATION.
IS A BARELY SOURCE

BEING AND REFUSED TO SAY THAT HE IS IN DENIAL. MR. DAILY SAID THAT BOWMAN HAS CHANGED FROM HIS REPORT OF 28 OCT 61 THAT HE IS PRESENTLY LOOKING FOR A BETTER JOB AND EXPECTS TO

- [illegible]

GOVERNMENT ASSETS. BAILEY DID NOT OBJECT, BUT REQUESTED
THAT WHEN PEOPLE TALK TO HIM, THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO
ACCOMPANY THEM AND TALK TO THEM. BAILEY STATED THAT IF JTF
MEMBERS LOCATED AND FAILED TO ALLOW BAILEY TO
ACCOMPANY THEM TO TALK TO BAILEY WOULD MEET AGAIN
COOPERATE WITH US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. BAILEY ALSO
CONTINUED THAT A DOWNGRADE SEARCH FOR
COMMUNIST/PROGRESSIVE BECAUSE IT MIGHT CAUSE
TO LACK AND DISAPPEAR FROM SEARCH. BAILEY SUGGESTED THAT
IF JTF INTENDS TO SEARCH FOR
BEFORE THE SEARCH IS HANDLED. ON ITS OWN, IT SHOULD

8. DASLEY WAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE THE LAW 528 710 TAPE, AND NOTHING TO JAY TO COPY. DASLEY WAS REMINDERED THAT HE WAS PRESENTED IN ONE OF MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE TO THE PG-04 OFFICE WITH THE NAMES OF ALL KING'S MALE CONTACTS AND WAS FAILED TO DO SO. DASLEY SAID THAT AND THAT INFORMATION, WOULD BE BY IN A FBI HANDS, AND COULD BE ASKED FOR THE

INFORMATION WHEN SHE ARRIVED, DURING THE COURSE OF THE HEARING.

9. DAILY CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT CARBONS BEING HELD ON THE FIRM AND SUGGEST THAT JET GO IN THERE AND HAVE A LOOK AROUND.

7. GAILLY'S ASSISTANT ... PULLED OUT A
COVER AT THE END OF THE MEETING AND BEGAN SHOPPING
AROUNDS AT THE PARTICIPANTS' OFFICE DESK DRAWERS.

1

RELEVANT DATA OMITTED

4. WEN TOLD THAT SINCE HE (WALEY) HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE AS PROMISED, JIM WENZEL HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BEGIN TO WORK THE SEARCH FOR (JIM WALEY)

THE JECI LNO AND ONE DEBRIEFER WORKED THE SAME SCHEDULE BOTH DAYS.

THE JECI LNO AND ONE DEBRIEFER WORKED THE SAME SCHEDULE BOTH DAYS.

1. THREE VEHICLES AND DRIVERS (TWO STONY BEACH, ONE JECI) HAVE BEEN DEDICATED TO SUPPORT OF JIT ACTIVITIES.

A. COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

A. DURING THIS LATEST DISCUSSION WITH JACK BAILEY, HE STATED THAT THE LOCATION OF THE CARR ENCLASURE, WHERE THE PHOTOS ALLEGED TO BE TAKEN WERE TAKEN, IS LOCATED IN PHONGSALY PROVINCE, LAOS. WHEN BAILEY WAS GIVEN A PROVINCIAL MAP OF LAOS AND ASKED TO INDICATE THE LOCATION OF CARR, HE CIRCLED THE CITY OF LOUANG PHABANG, LOUANG PHABANG PROVINCE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS LATEST CLAIMED CURRENT LOCATION IS CONTRARY TO THAT PROVIDED DIA (IN WASHINGTON DC AT THE PERMANENT) ON 8 AND 9 AUGUST, 1981, AND DIFFERENT FROM THAT PROVIDED SECRET DURING THE WEEK OF 6 OCTOBER, 1981. BAILEY STATED THAT HIS INFORMATION FOR THE CURRENT LOCATION OF CARR IS ALMOST TWO YEARS OLD, THEREFORE HE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT CARR MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED SINCE THAT TIME. BAILEY CLAIMS THAT THE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN AT THE "TRUMP" IN AN AREA NEARBY BANGKOK ON WHICH PHONGSALY PROVINCE. ONCE LOUANG PHABANG PROVINCIAL BUREAU, ON 8 AND 9 AUGUST, 1981, BAILEY STATED TO DIA THAT THE LOCATION OF THE CARR ENCLASURE WAS BETWEEN BANGKOK AND BAN HAI, IN CENTRAL LAOS. HE STATED TO SECRET AND DIA REPRESENTATIVES ON 8 AND 9 OCTOBER 1981, THAT CARR WAS MOVED FROM THE BANGKOK AREA - BAN HAI AREA TO LOUANG PHABANG PROVINCE, SPECIFICALLY TO A LOCATION 22 KILOMETERS FROM THE BANGKOK AND CHANGKONG BUREAU. ON 21 OCTOBER, 1981, BAILEY INFORMED DIA/PHABANG BY TELEPHONE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION DURING THE DAY THAT CARR WAS NOT MOVED FROM AS HE REPORTED. HE STATED THAT CARR REMAINS IN THE BANGKOK AREA - BAN HAI AREA. DURING THE MEETING TODAY, WHEN BAILEY DISCUSSED THIS TODAY LOCATION FOR THE CARR ENCLASURE, IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT HE HAD REPORTED CHANGKONG LAOS TO DIA/PHABANG AND CHANGKONG LAOS TO THE SECRETARY BAILEY DISCUSSED THESE DISCREPANCIES WITH THE SECRETARY THAT HE WAS REPORTING SECOND-HAND HEARD INFORMATION TO DIA AND SECRET. AT NO TIME DURING HIS MEETING WITH DIA AND SECRET DID BAILEY STATE THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS ANYTHING OTHER THAN FIRST-HAND.

A. ONE OF PHONGSALY LNO AND DIA IS THE SELF-DECLARED LEADER OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC LIAISON FRONT, A LAO RESISTANCE FRONT. OVER THE YEARS HE HAS BEEN AT A POINT TO ESTABLISH CLOSELY WITH VARIOUS PHONGSALY AND CHANGKONG. ALL EXCEPT BAILEY'S OPERATION BECAUSE TERMINATED THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM AFTER LEARNING THE TRUTH, EXCEPT MAY BE. "SOURCES" LIKE HIM IN THE SUBJECTIVE OF CHANGKONG HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT IN LOUANG PHABANG PROV. OTHER "SOURCES" EMPLOYED WHICH WERE PROVIDED FROM THE BANGKOK OFFICE BECAUSE JEWELRY BAILEY AND ACTING AS A DRIVER - FOR CHANGKONG. CHANGKONGS - FOR THAT LAO/PHABANG SECOND EMPLOYMENT IN THE BANGKOK EAST.

THE INFORMATION ON IS CONTAINED IN RPTs A, B, AND C.

ZYUW HULMBKAJ045 3030638

3000377 UCL 51
1 USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
10 DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DAN/DAM-2// IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/LAPR (PW-MIA)// IMMEDIATE

BANGKOK TH 53045

SB-067 OCT 91

SUBJECT: FINAL UPDATE ON CARR INVESTIGATION (301030H OCTOBER 91)

1. THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY TWO NEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST MESSAGE, BOTH OF LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE. AFTER SOME PRODDING, BAILEY PRODUCED "LAST NIGHT. AT HIS REQUEST, WE LIMITED THE U.S. ATTENDANCE TO

IN ADDITION RELUCTANTLY PROVIDED THE PHONE NUMBERS OF THE INTERMEDIARIES IN BANGKOK. THE NUMBERS WERE BOGUS. PROVIDED NO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO THE CASE AND DEMONSTRATED SEVERE MEMORY PROBLEMS. WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO POLYGRAPH HIM, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT COME OFF. DETAILED SITREP FOLLOWS.

WE ARE STILL ON GOOD TERMS WITH BAILEY AND E IMPLEMENTING ALL THE THAI MEASURES UNDER THE TITLE OF HIS CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE USG.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

REGARDS.

BT

91-478 OCT 11

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON 29 OCT 91 SINCE THE EARLIER TRANSMISSION OF SITREP 8 IN THE ONGOING ALLIED COMMAND PHASED INVESTIGATION.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A CUP-OFTEA MEETING WITH JACK DANLEY'S INTERVIEWER SOURCE THE JTF TEAM LEARNED THAT 3 AMBASSADORS WERE STILL UNKNOWN. YES IDENTIFIED AS A LAO GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO DID PERSONALLY NEED TO VISIT LAOS IN LAOS WHERE AMERICAN PRISONERS ARE ALLEGEDLY HELD. THE OTH "IDENTITY ELEMENT NO ACCOUNT OF HIS

END
*** SEE AVAILABLE ***
000000

INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH HIS CLAIMED
SPYING TO REVEAL ANY SPECIFIC DETAILS.
IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED HIS REAL NAME AS WILL AS THE
NAME OF DALEY'S SECRETARY.
RELUCTANTLY PROVIDED THE PHONE NUMBER OF AN ALLEGED

2. AT 8000 HRS JACK BAILEY AND HIS ASSOCIATES MET WITH JAY AT THE FLORIDA HOTEL IN ORANGE, AS ADVISED IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AFTER THE 1400 TEXTING THE SAME DAY.
U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY: 8

WAS TO MEET WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING
BUTLER'S COMMITTEE. THE

4. GALEY INFORMED THE JAY THAT THEY WOULD MEET THE GROUP AT THE CENTRAL PLAZA HOTEL NEAR LAF POND ROAD, BANGKOK, AND REQUESTED THAT THE GROUP COME THERE. GALEY EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT ONE MEMBER OF THE MEETING WOULD BE AN AMERICAN. SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDING ONLY GALEY AGREE TO TRY TO INCLUDE IN THE MEETING WITH BUT WITHOUT THE ONE WHO REMAINS ABOUT THE MEETING. THE TWO GROUPS DEPARTED AND MET AT 2:00 P.M. AT THE CENTRAL PLAZA HOTEL AND

8. (LAW) GIVE THE INCLUSION OF FOREIGNLY BE ACCEPTABLE. A NEW MEMBER LATER

ARRIVED AND INTRODUCTIONS WERE MADE. BY WAY OF SELF-INTRODUCTION (EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS GRADUATED FROM LINCOLN UNIVERSITY IN SAN DIEGO WITH A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN 1977). SAID THAT HE HAD WORKED WITH JACK BAILEY ON AND OFF OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, BUT AT ONE POINT HAD BROKEN OFF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH BAILEY AFTER BEING WARNED BY ANOTHER AMERICAN THAT BOTH BAILEY AND HE WERE "BAD PEOPLE". MARIO REFUSED TO IDENTIFY THE PERSON WHO HAD WARNED HIM ABOUT BAILEY, SAYING THAT HE HAD TAKEN AN OATH NEVER TO REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

4. SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN, "LOOKING ALL AROUND THE COUNTRY" FOR INCLUDING SUCH PLACES AS BRIDGE MOUNTAIN, BIRMINGHAM, AND SEE CHANGING ONLY IN BEING ONLY PROSECUTE. SEARCH SEARCHING CONTACTING PERSONS WHO ARE, "VERY CLOSE" TO QUALITY TO CONTACT IS ONE TO MR. PAUL WATTS. "BUT HERE, "NOTHING AROUND A LOT." : STATED THAT HE HAD JUST MET SOMEONE TO BRIDGE MOUNTAIN TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR BRADLEY ALDRED THAT WOULD VISITED BRIDGE MOUNTAIN STATED EXTERIOR WITH PERSONS ON AT THE "IN PLACE" HOTEL IN THE SOUTHERN BRIDGE AREA.

7. ASKED TO DESCRIBE DIFFERENT
THAT HE IS A VERY "BIG GUY", AND SEEMS TO HAVE A
"TWO-TWO" LACK ABOUT HIM. SAID FURTHER THAT
SPEAKS CHINESE, AND WAS SPENT THREE YEARS
STUDYING IN THOSE SAME YEARS AND. ASKED IF
WORE GLASSES ON A MUSTACHE. SAID HE WAS
DIFFICULTLY SPEAKING.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

8. /HE ASKED TO EXPLAIN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH /HE STATED THAT IS A RELATIVE FROM HONG KONG. /HE EXPLAINED THAT HE IS CALLED /BECAUSE HE IS A VERY NOFT /UNDERSTANDING, WITH CONTACTS THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA. /HE ALSO FORMERLY A TRADER IN HONGKONG /HE STATED THAT HE IS A /HE STATED THAT HE IS A

[REDACTED] SAID THAT IN 1966, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] THAT
 WAS SUPPLIED IN THE SEARCH FOR FOREIGN INFORMATION.
 ONE TO [REDACTED] TO INFORM HIM THAT AN ASSOCIATE IN
 VICTORIA, WAS INFORMATION CONCERNING OFFICIALS POOL
 ASKED FOR A SPECIFIC CHARGES OF CRIMINAL CONCERNING
 OUTSIDE THEM [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 WAS NOT GOOD AND HE COULD NOT OFFICIAL SPECIFIC. [REDACTED]
 WHEN HE FIRST MET AND TALKED WITH [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 IT WAS ONLY GAILLY AND MAKE THE THIRD TYPE OF THE
 INTERVIEW GAILLY SAID [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 TYPE OF SEARCH TO THE SET ON 20 OCT 61. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SAID THAT HE HAD SPENT MOST OF THAT DAY WITH
AND TWO OTHER EXHIBITIVE COPIES, WHICH HE HAD
OBTAINED AFTER BEING WARNED NOT TO CHAPERONE WITH
ANYONE. THE ABOVE NARRATION WAS THAT OF THE

THAT HE GETS THROUGH FREQUENTLY BUT THAT HE HAS
 THOUGH HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF, HE SHOULD SIMPLY MULLY A
 LAST ONE OF THE ONE SIGNATURES MULLY OF THE
 CONSIDERATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE NOW
 WAS ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE AMERICAN FREEDOM
 ON THERE AND WITH THE COURT WORK PLACE. AND
 SAID HIS MEMORY WAS VERY BAD AND THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO
 MULLY ANY DETAILS. HE ADDED THAT HE REMEMBERED THAT
 AND TOLD HIM THAT SEVERAL AMERICAN POPS WERE
 BEING HELD AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS SUCH AS SAN JUAN,
 XIANG CHANG, FINEIN SALLY, AND OTHER LOCATIONS. AFTER
 HE WAS AFTER TOLD ABOUT "THE PLAN" 1970 REF

9 I WAS SHOWN THE PHOTOGRAPH ALLEGED TO BE THAT OF POH CAR AND ASKED IF THE PHOTO WAS TAKEN IN OUR OFFICE OF VIETNAM- I REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT THERE WHEN IT WAS TAKEN. ASKED HOW HE WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL TO A LOCATION WHERE AMERICAN POWS WERE BEING HELD. REPLIED THAT THIS IS A LEO MINISTRY OF TRADE OFFICIAL AND HAS TRAVELED WIDELY IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY. ASKED WHY A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WOULD REVEAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE OFFENSES GOING TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GAVE A ONE-HOUR OF POWER. "HONEY". DALLY INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT WANT MONEY FOR HISSELF, BUT WISH TO OBTAIN THE LAO GOVERNMENT. DALLY ASKED THAT REFERENCES TO MONEY IN THE VIDEO WOULD HAVE PROVIDED MONEY IF HE WERE TO BE GRANT OF THAT TO THE LAO GOVERNMENT. BUT MONEY AND OFFICIAL RES.

RELEVANT DATA DELETED

IN. CLAIMED THAT HIS ONLY SOURCE OF INFORMATION WAS
CONVENTION WITH REFERENCES TO
TWO OFFICERS WHO HE HAD MET NAMED "BOB" (WHO HAD
CLAIMED TO BECOME "BOB" AND "JOHN". DAILY STATED
THAT THESE TWO NAMES WERE NEW TO HIM, BUT THEY WERE
COMMONLY KNOWN IN THE AREA FACILITY AS BOB

11. WAS TOLD THAT IF HIS INFORMATION WAS TO BE CREDIBLE, IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR THE JET TO AT LEAST MAKE HIS OWN NAME. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS TEAM, STATED HIS TEAM WOULD BE ASKED FOR A TELEPHONE NUMBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO CONTACT ONE

22. WHEN DAILY WAS ASKED FOR THE TELEPHONE NUMBER OF TWO CONTACT IN BIRMINGHAM, DAILY STATED THAT SHE HAD THE NUMBER. WHEN DAILY BEGAN TO GIVE THE JTV AGENTS THE NUMBER, AGENT VERNON SPEER, REMINDING THAT SHE HAD PROVIDED THE

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

[illegible]

13. . BEFORE THE NEXTING ORANGE UP,
REMEMBERING THAT HE HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

25. AS THE MEETING DROKE UP, BAELEY STATED THAT HE WOULD CONTACT JIM MEMBERS, IF AND WHEN 25 LOCATED. [REDACTED] PREDICTED THAT [REDACTED] COULD BE LOCATED IN ABOUT FOUR DAYS.

16. STATED THAT HE IS 42 YEARS OLD. HE APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD PHYSICAL HEALTH, AND DID NOT SEEM TO BE SUFFERING FROM ANY APPARENT MENTAL DISTURBANCES. GAVE HIS CLASS INCAPABILITY TO RECALL ANY SPECIFIC HELPFUL INFORMATION IS VERY SUSPECT. WAS ASKED TO THINK IT OVER AND ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF HIS REMINISCENCES WITHIN

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

SECTION 01 OF 01 BANGOR, TN 31204

11-158 (B-8)

FORM NO. 104-101 (REV. 1-25-60)

1. (U) THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON 20 OCT 91 SINCE THE EARLIER TRANSMISSION OF SITREP 4 IN THE ONGOING ALLIED CASE PHOTOGRAPHIC INVESTIGATION. THIS SITREP IS THE FINAL MESSAGE OF THIS SERIES.

2. DESPITE A CONCEALED EFFORT IN SWEDEN BY THE
JERRY TAYLOR GROUP (JTG) TO DETERMINE THE SIDES OF
THE IRVINGTROND SHIP IN THE ALARMED CASE PORTAL, THE JTG
EFFORTS ARE FAILED. FROM THE BEGINNING, THE SIDINGS ON
PARLOR OF WESS KESSON REVEALS ONLY ON THE SHIP OF
COOPERATION PROVIDED BY NEW LAC (NET) JACK GABLY,
THE IRVINGTROND MUST FIRST GO THE PUBLIC PLAC IN
JULY 1981. DESPITE IMMEDIATE PROSECUTORS OF GABLY TO
CONFERRED, TO ONE SIDINGS AVAILABLE, AND TO BE OF
ONE ASSISTANCE IN THIS INVESTIGATION, DR. GABLY,
PROCEEDED ONLY LIMITED INFORMATION THAT WAS FOUND TO
BE OF LITTLE ASSISTANCE IN PROSECUTING THIS

INVESTIGATION. HE WAS CONTINUING TO ENGAGE STRICT
QUARTERS, MORE EXCISE AFTER EXCISE FOR HIS PLACING
FURNISH SOURCE, AND GIVE SO FAR AS TO CLAIM THAT HE
HAD NOT ONE STATEMENT'S ATTENTION TO HAD BEEN
RECEIVED WITH SOURCE ON GAIL. THE BOTTOM LINE ON THIS
INVESTIGATION IS THAT HE HAS NO CLAIM THAT HE
RECEIVED OF THE CASE FROM SOURCE THAT HE WERE
UNDER THE FURNISH MORE FIRST CONSIDER IN JULY 1961.

2. DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH SKERRY AND BOA
DURING THE WEEK OF 4 OCTOBER 1961, DARLEY MADE VERY
STRONG ASSURANCES TO ALL CONCERNED THAT HE WAS WILLING
TO COOPERATE TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF ROBERT G. CHAM.
HIS ASSURANCES INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

6. TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL SERVICE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH. CHECKS: AFTER
 STATEMENTS FROM DAILY TO THE JET SUCH AS: (CALL
 OR AVAILABLE ON 25 OCTOBER; WILL BE AVAILABLE
 RETURN 24 HOURS; 13 IN ADVANCE AND I WILL CALL
 JERRY EACH WEEK AFTERNOON TO PUT YOU IN CONTACT WITH
 HIM; TWO MORE INFO CHECKS; IF SERVICES WERE BEEN
 AVAILABLE TO CONTACT WILL BE AVAILABLE
 WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR DAYS (FROM 23 OCTOBER),
 RETURN LINE IS NOT. (SEE NOTE 25 OCTOBER)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-11-2011 BY 60322 UCBAW

TO PROVIDING THE TELEPHONE NUMBER IN VIENTIANE FOR CONVOY. BALELY DOES NOT HAVE THIS INFORMATION NOR DOES HE KNOW THE STATUS OF HIS VISAS AS HIS CURRENT POSITION ON OCCUPATION. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH WITH BALELY DURING HIS VISIT TO THE STATIONS, IN LATE FEBRUARY, ON WHICH HE JOINED THE CITY OF VIENTIANE, ACTING AS IF THEY WERE SOME SORT OF OFFICIALS. BALELY STATED THAT HE HAS NO INFORMATION THAT HE OR BALELY, OR ANY OTHERS, WOULD BE THE ISSUE BY PROCEEDING INTO ANY OTHER COUNTRY OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY OR CONVENTION. BALELY STATED THAT HE WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM DOING SO. FOR EXAMPLE, HE STATED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL BODY HE REFERENCED TO, HEATON, WAS A GROUP OF ABOUT 1000 MEMBERS OF EXCELLENT CRESTFUL QUALITY. BALELY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN VISITING 15,000 MILES (FROM U.S.) TO WASHINGTON FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING THE VIEW. CONSIDERABLE THE NEW PLAYERS ON OCCUPATION THAT HE INFORMED WAS NEVER REALLY MANAGED. WITHIN HE FINALLY FORMERED ONE OF THE ALLEGED PROBLEMS, THE PROBLEMS, AND CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN THE CITY. BALELY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN VISITING 15,000 MILES (FROM U.S.) TO WASHINGTON FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING THE VIEW.

C. TO PROVIDE THE NAMES, ADDRESSES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF HIS INTERMEDIARIES IN KING ISLAND. A GOAL OF THE PROGRAM IS TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT TO THE FBI ALL PERSONS WHO ARE REPORTEDLY ABLE TO CONTACT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES OF THE FBI-DRUG UNIT.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

BARRETT, DAILY STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE HAD CALLED HIS COMPANY IN ORDER THAT TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF _____ AFTER REPEATED REQUESTS FOR THE BOOKS, ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER, BARRETT'S FEMALE ASSOCIATE RELUCTANTLY PROVIDED A TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE INTERVIEWER. AN ATTEMPT TO CALL THE NUMBER REVEALED THAT IT WAS DEAD.

2. TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO A PAYMENT LAD GENERAL IN CHARGE AND THE CORRECT INFORMATION ABOUT THE OFFICE FOR IN LATE, EARLY.

COMMENT: GABLEY WOULD CONSIDERABLY ON
HIS POWER, ESPECIALLY WHEN ASKED FOR ACCESS TO THE
PUNNET LAB GENERAL. EXACTS TRAILING COMMENTS THAT
THE GENERAL IS IN SUMMER POWER, LARGELY NOT
AVAILABLE; THAT GABLEY IS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT THE
GENERAL FOR MORE INFORMATION; THAT IT WOULD BE BEST
TALK TO OTHER SOURCES ABOUT THE POW, WHOMSOEVER THE
JY SHOULD NOT WASTE ANYMORE TALKING TO THE PUNNET LAB
GENERAL. ON AN ALTERNATIVE, IF IS GABLEY UNSUCCESSFUL
THAT GABLEY HAS THEN BEEN ASKING TO A PUNNET LAB
GENERAL AND TO POWER TRICKS OFFICER FURNISHING MORE GABLEY
WOULD BE PUNNET.

4. THE LOCATION OF THE ALLIED BOMBING WRECKAGE WAS REPORTED TO BE HELD SUBJECTS IN QUESTION. ORALLY TOLD DAD ON 8/9 AUGUST 1991 THAT THE BOMBING WAS LOCATED BETWEEN BANGALORE AND DAD DAD, CHITRA, LAOS. HE TOLD SUBJECT AND DAD ON 8/9 AUGUST THAT CH AND DEED WENT TO A POINT 25 KILOMETERS FROM THE DAD AND CURRENT BOMBERS (CLASSED WITH DAD PROTECT, BANGALORE LAOS). WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE SUBJECT MEETING HE REPORTED DAD BY TELEPHONE THAT CH AND DAD

5. BALLELY'S DEDUCE FOR THE PURPOSE, & HE HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN AVAILABLE FOR DISCOVERY AND PROSECUTION PURSUED BY BALLELY, AND APPARENTLY IS THE ONLY PERSON THAT COULD HAVE BEEN THE PERSON WHO ACTUALLY THREW IT. IT SEEMS TO BEWY THAT BALLELY WAS NOT THAT MAN SPEAKING CONSENTLY WITH HIM. AND ONE OTHER THING, THROUGHOUT BALLELY IS CONSTANT IN PERSISTING THE LOCATION OF THE ALLIRED COUNCIL MEMBERS DECLARING, IT BEING PROVEN THAT IT IS NOT THEM. IT IS OTHER NAME AVAILABLE FOR DISCOVERY, THAT COULD BE ONE OF OUR OWN MEN WHO THE ALLIRED COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE. LARGELY, IT IS BEING MADE RECEIPT, THE CONTINUED LACK OF CONTACT WITH THE ALLIRED COUNCIL, BECAUSE THE LACK OF INFORMATION AS TO THE EXACT LOCATION WHERE THE PERSONS WERE KEPT, AND THE INABILITY TO BACK UP ANY OF THE CLAIMS MADE BY THE OTHER, AND THE COUNCIL HAS NO MORE TO SAY IN ONLY

6. ON 30 OCTOBER, THE JET PHONED BARTLEY TO MAKE HIS CONTACT. AVAILABLE FOR A PULMONARY EXAM, BEGINNING ON THE MORNING OF 30 OCT 51, AND AFTER BEING UNABLE TO CONTACT BARTLEY DIRECTLY, THE JET CONTACTED BARTLEY'S FRIENDS ACCORDING TO TELEPHONE AND TOLD THEM OF THE JET'S REQUIREMENT TO CONTACT A PULMONOLOGIST. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD COME WITH BARTLEY AND WOULD BE AT THE CALL. AT 1200, BARTLEY CALLED BACK AND INDICATED THAT HE WAS DURING "HOURS" WITH THE PULMONOLOGIST. HE TOLD THE JET THAT HE WOULD SHOULD CALL WITHIN 100 HOURS. AFTER BARTLEY WAS INFORMED THAT HE WAS ALREADY AGREED TO PULMONOLOGIST, THE JET'S PULMONARY TEST OF 1 OCTOBER VOLUNTARILY RETURNED TO CONTACT CASE. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD GET BACK WITH THE JET BY PHONE ON LATER THAN 2000-10.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

EXHIBIT A POLYGRAPH TEST TIME AND PLACE. THE JF
ATTEMPTED REPEATEDLY TO CONTACT GALEY DURING THE
GIVEN TIME-AND-DATE. IN SUMMARY, WITH AN EXCELLENT

7. "ACCEPT THE REALITY OF THE JOY TO SEEK RECOVERY OF THE GONE PRISONERS FROM WITHIN THE LIMITED CONFINEMENT OF JACK DALEY. IT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT SOME OUTSTANDING ACTINGS ARE BEEN BEHINDINGS OF THE STRAY BACK YEAR TO REVEALING WAS OFFERED. THESE INCLUDE CONTACT WITH THE GOVT GOVERNMENT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE EXPECT THIS WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL POLICE, MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT. AND HAS ASSOCIATES WELL PERSONALLY BE IDENTIFIED. WE ALSO EXPECT THIS WITH DETERMINATE WELL BEHOLD IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROOFPOINT. SOME IN THE ALLIED GAIN PRISON."

9. AS THE JTY MEMBERS CLOSE OUT THIS
THIRTEENTH DAY IN THAILAND AND RETURN TO REALITY, SO

TEAM OUTSTANDING. ESPECIALLY WORTHY OF HAS BEEN THE
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY STONY BEACH TEAM MEMBERS AND ITS
CHIEF BY JIM FALSON.

U.S.
VILLAGE, AND BY
DECESSION GANGLER AGENCIES. WE ARE AWARE THAT THIS
INVESTIGATION HAS IMPACTED DIRECTLY ON THE NORMAL
OPERATIONS OF STORM BEACH AND JACK LIAISON, AND WHEN
YOU CONSIDER THE EXPENSES TO MAINTAIN A POLYMER
AVAILABLE IN THAILAND, TO GET THE CSB AND CIA
HELPS TO THAILAND, AND TO EVEN FLY JACK BAILEY TO
THAILAND TO GAIN HIS COOPERATION, THIS INVESTIGATION
HAS BEEN COSTLY. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT WE HAD TO GO
TO THIS EXTENT TO LEARN THAT JACK BAILEY IS LESS THAN
A COOPERATIVE, ON VILLAGE, OR EVEN RELIABLE
PARTICIPANT.

REGARDING
ST

396

O 311037Z OCT 91
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DAM-2// IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA// IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

BANGKOK TH 53476

SB-072 OCT

91

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED CARR
PHOTOS (U)

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REPORT
THE ACTIONS TAKEN ON 31 OCT 91 CONTINUING THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED CARR PHOTOGRAPHS.

2. 0830 HRS. JACK BAILEY CALLED THE STONY
BEACH TEAM OFFICE, SAYING THAT THE REASON HE HAD
FAILED TO CALL THE PREVIOUS DAY AS PROMISED WAS THAT
HIS TELEPHONE WAS OUT OF ORDER. HE STATED THAT HE
COULD BE REACHED AT ROOM AT THE FLORIDA
HOTEL IN BANGKOK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF
AN ALLEGED SOURCE OF PW INFORMATION, BAILEY
ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT YET BEEN LOCATED. STONY
BEACH INSTRUCTED MR. BAILEY TO CONTACT THEIR OFFICE
WHEN HE IS FOUND.

2. AT 1300 HRS STONY BEACH BEGAN A SEARCH FOR
THE SUBJECTS OF THE PICTURES PORTRAYED BY JACK BAILEY
AS PW CARR AND HIS CAPTORS BY DELIVERING TO BANGKOK
U.S. MISSION AGENCIES COPIES OF THE PHOTOS AND LETTERS
OF REQUEST TO THE THAI LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY FOR
ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING AND MAKING AVAILABLE FOR
QUESTIONING THE PHOTO SUBJECTS.

BT

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O 011137Z NOV 91
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DAM-2/PW-MIA//

BANGKOK TH 53838

SB-0079 NOV 91

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
ALLEGED CARR INVESTIGATION (U)

AT 1230 HRS. 1 NOV. CALLED THE
STONY BEACH OFFICE AND SPOKE WITH
ASKED IF HE KNEW THE FIRST NAME OF
SENATOR GRASSLEY. REPLIED NEGATIVELY AND
ENQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF REPLIED
THAT THEY WERE PLAYING A "WAITING GAME". WHEN ASKED
FOR CLARIFICATION ABOUT WHAT HE MEANT, HE EXPLAINED
THAT "THEY HAD FEELERS OUT" BUT STILL HAD NOT LOCATED
WHEN ASKED WHO THEY WERE, REPLIED
ADDED THAT HE AND JACK INTENDED TO
LEAVE BANGKOK ON SUNDAY (3 NOV) IF THEY COULD NOT
LOCATE. SAID THAT JACK MAY RETURN NEXT
MONTH BUT HE DID NOT INTEND TO RETURN.

BT

DETAILED CHRONOLOGY, CARR PHOTO INVESTIGATION

- **MARCH 1989:** LTC (RET) BAILEY INFORMED COL MIKI, THE CHIEF OF THE DIA/ STONY BEACH TEAM IN BANGKOK THAT HE HAD PICTURES OF CARR WHICH HE WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE; BAILEY NEVER PROVIDED THE CARR PHOTOS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

- **JULY 1991:** THE ALLEGED CARR PHOTOS WERE MADE PUBLIC IN NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA. ACCORDING TO JACK BAILEY, THE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN IN FEBRUARY 1990.

- **8/9 AUGUST:** AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, BAILEY MET WITH DIA AND OSD REPS IN THE PENTAGON. PRIOR TO THE MEETING BAILEY AGREED TO PROVIDE THE NAMES OF ALL OF HIS SOURCES FOR THE CARR PHOTOS.

- DURING THE MEETING, BAILEY REFUSED TO DISCUSS HIS SOURCES.

- BAILEY IDENTIFIED AN AREA IN LAOS, BETWEEN KHANG KHAI AND BAN BAN, AS THE LOCATION FOR THE ENCLOSURE HOLDING CAPTAIN CARR.

- BAILEY PROMISED TO PROVIDE HIS SOURCE INFORMATION TO STONY BEACH REPS IN BANGKOK WHEN HE ARRIVED THERE LATER IN THE MONTH.

- **4 SEPTEMBER:** BAILEY AND SEVERAL OF HIS ASSOCIATES MET WITH STONY BEACH AND JCRC LIAISON PERSONNEL IN BANGKOK.

- ONCE AGAIN BAILEY REFUSED TO PROVIDE SOURCE INFORMATION.

- HE DID EMPHASIZE THAT THE CARR ENCLOSURE WAS IN THE AREA OF KHANG KHAI - BAN BAN, LAOS

- **11 SEPTEMBER:** STONY BEACH PERSONNEL CALLED BAILEY IN BANGKOK TO SEE IF HE HAD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION; HE DID NOT

- **19 SEPTEMBER:** STONY BEACH PERSONNEL CONTACTED BAILEY TO DETERMINE IF HE HAD NEW INFORMATION; HE DID NOT.

- **26 SEPTEMBER:** BAILEY WAS CALLED BY STONY BEACH PERSONNEL; HE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION TO OFFER. BAILEY WAS TOLD THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW INFORMATION FROM HIM, STONY BEACH WAS OBLIGATED TO BEGIN A SEARCH WITH THE HELP OF THAI AUTHORITIES. BAILEY ASKED FOR MORE TIME TO GAIN ACCESS TO HIS SOURCES.

- **30 SEPTEMBER:** BAILEY MET WITH CONGRESSMAN MCCLOSKEY AND STATED THAT HE DESIRED TO TURN OVER TO PRESIDENT BUSH ALL INFORMATION HE HAS ON CARR, TO INCLUDE FILES, SOURCE NAMES, LOCATIONAL DATA, ETC. HE CLAIMED THAT THE INFORMATION HAD TO GO TO THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE COULD TRUST NO ONE ELSE.

- **8 OCTOBER:** BAILEY, ACCOMPANIED BY CONGRESSMEN MCCLOSKEY AND VISLOSKEY, MET WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN THE PENTAGON.

- BAILEY CLAIMED THAT CARR WAS ALIVE, AND THAT HE AND 20 - 30 OTHER AMERICAN PRISONERS HAD BEEN MOVED TO NORTHWESTERN LAOS.

- BAILEY TOLD THE SECDEF THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE THE NAME OF HIS PRIMARY SOURCE FOR THE CARR INFORMATION, A MR. X, ALONG WITH HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER IN LAOS, AND THAT MR. X WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR POLYGRAPH IN BANGKOK.

- BAILEY ASKED THAT THE DOD INVESTIGATION INTO THE CARR PHOTOS BE DELAYED FOR 10 DAYS TO ALLOW HIM TO CONTACT HIS SOURCES.

- **9 OCTOBER:** BAILEY MET WITH DIA AND OSD REPS IN THE PENTAGON.

- WHEN ASKED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT THAT CARR WAS ALIVE, BAILEY STATED THAT HE HAD NO PROOF OF THIS INFORMATION, THAT IT WAS HEARSAY.

- HE STATED THAT CARR HAD BEEN MOVED TO LUANG NAM THA PROVINCE TO A LOCATION WITHIN 22 KILOMETERS OF THE BURMA BORDER.

- BAILEY PROVIDED SEVERAL NICKNAMES FOR MR. X, BUT NOT THE COMPLETE NAME. HE STATED THAT HE HAD NOT PERSONALLY TALKED TO THE INDIVIDUAL FOR A LONG TIME. BAILEY ALSO PROVIDED TWO ADDITIONAL PHOTOS OF HIS PRIMARY SOURCE, MR. X.

- BAILEY PROMISED TO PROVIDE STONY BEACH PERSONNEL WITH THE NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR HIS INTERMEDIARIES IN THAILAND, THROUGH WHOM HE KEEPS IN CONTACT WITH MR. X. HE AGREED TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION AFTER HIS RETURN TO THAILAND.

- BAILEY STATED THAT HE ALSO KNEW OF ANOTHER GROUP OF 5 AMERICAN POWS IN LAOS, AND THAT HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A PATHET LAO GENERAL LIVING IN BANGKOK. HE PROMISED TO MAKE THE GENERAL AVAILABLE TO STONY BEACH PERSONNEL FOR INTERVIEW, AFTER HIS RETURN.

- **11 OCTOBER:** DIA TRANSMITTED TWO MEMORANDUMS FOR RECORD OF THE MEETINGS WITH BAILEY BY FAX TO BAILEY IN CALIFORNIA. BAILEY WAS REMINDED OF ALL OF HIS PROMISES TO SECDEF AND DIA, AND WAS ASKED IF HE HAD FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT CARR OR THE 5 AMERICAN POWS. HE DID NOT.

- DURING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THE SAME EVENING, BAILEY TOLD DIA THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED THAT CARR HAD NOT BEEN MOVED.

- BAILEY ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT THE CARR PHOTOS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN NORTHERN LAOS OR IN BURMA, AND HE CAUTIONED TO NOT RULE OUT THAILAND AS THE LOCATION OF THE CARR PHOTOS.

- BAILEY STATED THAT IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE PHOTOS HAD BEEN TAKEN ON A ROYAL FARM IN PHONGSALY PROVINCE.

- HE ASKED THAT DOD ARRANGE FOR HIS RETURN TO THAILAND.

- 11 OCTOBER: BASED UPON BAILEY'S MEETING WITH SECDEF AND HIS SPECIFIC REQUEST THAT THE CARR INVESTIGATION BE PUT ON HOLD FOR 10 DAYS, DIA NOTIFIED STONY BEACH TO CEASE AND DESIST IN ITS INVESTIGATION FOR TWO WEEKS.

- 22 OCTOBER: DIA AND OSD PERSONNEL TRAVELLED TO CALIFORNIA TO MEET WITH BAILEY AND ACCOMPANY HIM TO THAILAND TO CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CARR PHOTOS.

- BAILEY STATED THAT MR. X WAS TRAVELLING TO BANGKOK FROM LAOS AND THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW ON 25 OCTOBER.

- BAILEY WAS UNABLE TO TRAVEL ON THE 23RD BECAUSE OF A DEATH IN HIS FAMILY, HOWEVER, DID ARRIVE IN BANGKOK ON 25 OCTOBER, ACCOMPANIED BY NORM TURNER.

- 26 OCTOBER: THE DIA/OSD/STONY BEACH TEAM MET WITH BAILEY AND TURNER IN BANGKOK.

- BAILEY COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS BEING FOLLOWED, PROBABLY BY CIA, AND THAT HIS TELEPHONE AND FAX HAD BEEN TAPPED. IT WAS EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT DOO HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH SUCH ACTIVITIES.

- BAILEY STATED THAT MR. X WAS NOT AVAILABLE, AND THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN MR. X WOULD BE AVAILABLE, THAT HE HAD A TEAM UP COUNTRY LOOKING FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. HE ADMITTED THAT PHUMANO NOSAVAN WAS PART OF THE TEAM LOOKING FOR MR. X. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT PHUMANO IS A LONG-TIME REPORTER OF FABRICATED PH-RELATED INFORMATION.

- BAILEY WAS REMINDED OF ALL THE PROMISES HE HAD MADE TO THE SECDEF AND DIA, BUT WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED.

- BAILEY STATED THAT THE CARR PHOTOS WERE TAKEN ON A FARM IN LUANG NAM THA PROVINCE, NORTHWESTERN LAOS. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT HE TOLD DIA THE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN AT KHAM KHAI - BAN BAN AND THAT HE TOLD SECDEF THE LOCATION WAS NEAR THE BURMA BORDER. HE STATED THAT HE HAD PROVIDED DIA AND SECDEF SECONDHAND HEARSAY INFORMATION.

- 26 OCTOBER: BAILEY VISITED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND SHOWED A VIDEO TAPE REPORTED TO CONTAIN BAILEY'S INTERVIEW OF MR. X.

- IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE VIDEO TAPE WAS OVER THREE YEARS OLD, MADE SOMETIME IN 1988.

- THE TAPE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CARR CASE. BAILEY STATED THAT THE CARR PHOTO APPEARED ABOUT A YEAR AFTER THE VIDEO TAPE WAS MADE.

- MR. X. WAS SHOWN IN SILHOUETTE ONLY, ALONG WITH OTHER LAO AND THAI PERSONNEL.

- DURING THE CONVERSATION THE FOREIGN NATIONALS MENTIONED TWO GROUPS OF POWS. 16P IN ONE LOCATION AND 33 IN ANOTHER. BAILEY OPTED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE GROUP OF 33 POWS, STATING THAT 16P POWS WERE A FANTASTIC NUMBER.

- THIS VIDEO TAPE WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER WHICH DEPICTED COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PH ISSUE.

- 29 OCTOBER: THE JOINT TEAM MET WITH BAILEY AND TURNER AGAIN. ONLY TO LEARN THAT BAILEY HAD NO NEW INFORMATION ON MR. X. BAILEY DID OFFER TO MAKE ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY, MARIO, AVAILABLE.

- BAILEY CLAIMED THAT MARIO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CARR CASE ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS EARLIER WHEN HE WAS APPROACHED BY AN EMPLOYEE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, BANGKOK. REPORTEDLY, THE EMPLOYEE TOLD MARIO THAT BAILEY WAS KEEPING MONEY FROM HIM, WHICH RESULTED IN MARIO DROPPING OUT OF THE OPERATION. BAILEY BLAMED THIS INCIDENT FOR HIS FAILURE TO RESCUE CARR.

- WHEN REMINDED ONCE AGAIN OF THE PROMISES THAT HE HAD MADE TO SECDEF AND DIA, BAILEY STATED THAT HE DID NOT REMEMBER STATING THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE THA NAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR HIS INTERMEDIARIES IN NONG KHAI.

- 29 OCTOBER: TEAM MEMBERS MET WITH MARIO TO DISCUSS MR. X AND THE CARR PHOTOS; MARIO WAS UNABLE TO DESCRIBE MR. X, ALTHOUGH HE HAD KNOWN X FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE CARR PHOTOS.

- MARIO WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE WHO REPORTEDLY APPROACHED HIM ABOUT BAILEY.

- 30/31 OCTOBER: THE DIA AND OSD TEAM MEMBERS RETURNED TO THE U.S.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

INFORMATION PAPER on POW/MIA Source Khambang Sibounheuang

Khambang Sibounheuang is a former Royal Lao Army serviceman, now a naturalized US citizen residing in Memphis, Tennessee. He states he was a Captain in the Royal Lao Army. Our best information is that he was an enlisted man in the Royal Lao Army. He is now bailiff for Judge Hamilton Gayden, a self-described POW/MIA activist. Khambang has been active in the POW/MIA issue for a number of years. This paper will outline Khambang's activities as known and documented by the Department of Defense.

Khambang is a former member of the Neutralist faction of the Lao resistance. He lead the organization in the United States for several years and at one point may have been its elected leader. Khambang was removed from his position with the Neutralist faction after the leader of the Neutralists, former Lao General Kong Le learned that Khambang had fabricated POW-related information and had attempted to use the POW issue for personal gain.

In the past, Khambang was associated with Bo Gritz and he was for a period Gritz's primary source of information for POW's. Khambang later became associated with retired-Major Mark Smith, another POW/MIA activist. His current relationship with Smith is unknown.

DoD's first involvement with Khambang occurred in 1985 when he approached DIA and offered to work the POW issue in exchange for \$4,000, which was to be used to support the Neutralist faction of the Lao resistance. Khambang's offer was rejected by DIA.

In November 1987, Life Magazine published an article about POW/MIAs. A prominent portion of that article was devoted to a photograph purported to depict an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, Charles S. Rowley. The photograph was provided by Khambang to Captain Eugene "Red" McDaniel, USN (Ret.). Captain McDaniel provided the photo to DIA in August of 1987, and investigation was underway when the photo was published by Life Magazine. Photo analysis established that the individual pictured was not Lieutenant Colonel Rowley. The Rowley family confirmed the photo analysis.

In 1990, Khambang passed bogus dog-tag information to his superiors in the Arlington (Virginia) Police Department where he worked as a clerk. The information was determined to be

fabricated and DIA traced the information back through the Arlington Police Department to Khambang. The Department was informed that Khambang was an established POW/MIA source of questionable reliability.

In the fall of 1990, Khambang passed a roll of film and other information related to the purported Borah photograph to Judge Hamilton Gayden, then his employer in Tennessee. Khambang received the information from a blood relative now residing in Thailand. Judge Gayden provided the information to the family, who then contacted Senator Bob Smith for assistance. The photos had not been made available to DoD until July 1991, when Senator Smith appeared on the Today Show with Daniel Borah, Sr. and the photographs. After receipt of the information, a joint Lao-U.S. team interviewed, photographed and fingerprinted the individual identified as Borah and photographed in Laos. The photo depicted not LT Daniel V. Borah, but rather a 77 year old Lao highland tribesman, Mr. Ahrao. Khambang told Bill Gadoury, a U.S. POW/MIA investigator in Bangkok, that the individuals who passed him the roll of film did so for the purpose of obtaining a reward.

Sometime during the summer of 1991, Khambang obtained another photograph, this purported to depict Navy Lieutenant Commander Larry Stevens, USN. (Stevens was also said to be depicted in the photograph of three individuals, positively identified by their families as Colonel John L. Robertson, LCDR Stevens and Major Albrow Lundy. The Stevens photo was said to have been taken in Vietnam and the individual identified as Stevens is pictured with his arm around an Asian woman. At the request of members of Congress, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was provided a DoD aircraft to transport Khambang to Southeast Asia to locate his sources of the "Stevens" photo. Khambang produced his source and the individual was polygraphed. He failed the polygraph and indicated deception in nearly all of his responses. DoD is continuing to investigate the "Stevens" photograph.

To date, Khambang has provided information on a number of occasions to POW/MIA activists and others interested in the POW/MIA issue. The descriptions above are illustrative, not exhaustive. Every dog-tag report, every report of remains, every photograph and every other report about POW/MIAs, with the exception of the as yet unsolved "Stevens" photo, provided by Khambang has proven to be false.

Prepared by Major C. W. Gittins, USMC, EAPR (POW-MIA), and Warren Gray, DIA (PW-MIA), x70555/44708



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

**DoD Response to Robertson, Stevens
and Lundy Testimony**

The following allegations were raised by the family members regarding DoD investigative efforts on behalf of the purported Robertson, Stevens and Lundy photographs. DoD Responses follow.

(Ms. Fleckenstein): As of September 16th, I received the information from the Defense Department that the picture had been analyzed by Dr. Charney, who I just told you that they didn't accept that, and that they would analyze it their selves. And I waited up until now. I've called and called trying to get the annalysis to me, whic I did not get, and didn't know about it until I arrived here yesterday morning and it was handed to me by Major Giddens.

The Department of Defense sent the photograph purported to depict Commander Stevens to Sandia National Laboratory on 13 September 1991. When Sandia completed its analysis the report was reviewed at DIA and then forwarded it to the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) in order to respond to direct family requests made to Carl Ford's Military Assistant. The report was obtained on late 5 November and was provided to Mrs. Fleckenstein personally by Major Gittins rather than forwarding it through the Navy Casualty Assistance Office. This accomodation was made in order to minimize the delay to Lieutenant Commander Steven's family in light of their participation in the Committee Hearings.

(Ms. Shelby Quast): And I guess I'm asking for some help. We have said this so many times, yet I continue to hear that it [the three man photo] has been in a magazine. It's simply people don't want to hear that. And I would like to, for the record, set it straight. It has never been found to be a fake or a hoax, or ever found to be in a magazine.

The Department of Defense has never stated that the three man photo is a hoax or fake. The facts surrounding the photograph of the three individuals identified by family members as Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy are as follows:

1) The photograph first surfaced during August 1990 in Thailand along with a report which was not correlated to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. The photograph was received along with a second photograph that was later located in

an Eastern-bloc magazine in Phnom Penh and which depicted a Soviet special forces military officer. The report that accompanied the first passing of the photo was that the two photos depicted four Americans from the same prison in Vietnam and that the three were friends and the fourth was separate from the other three, so two photos were taken.

2) There are no first hand live sighting reports of the three individuals that correlate to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. In every case, the reports are hearsay, second or third hand reports. The first report, does not have any name association to Robertson, Stevens or Lundy.

3) Flyers widely circulated in Southeast Asia by Red McDaniel's American Defense Institute provide basic biographical data on Colonel Robertson and Lieutenant Commander Stevens. Information contained within the flyer forms the basis for information associated with later iterations of the photograph. Associated reporting that goes beyond the basic biographical data is quite obviously wrong--almost humorously so.

4) The photograph has been altered. The placard that the men appear to be holding was added to the photograph after it was taken and printed, and a photo made of the alteration. The placard reflects basic data that appears on several other photographs, also reported by the sources of those photos to depict American POWs. The writing on the placard is by the same hand as the writing on a number of other alterations to photos purported to depict American POWs and later located in Soviet magazines.

5) The men in the photo appear to be holding rifles in the photograph. U.S. Government photo analysts have identified the butt of a rifle on the left side of the photo and the rifles are apparent under the placard.

6) A tape recording received with the photograph by one source and identified as the voice of Colonel Robertson by the source was rejected as a fraud by the Robertson family.

7) Captain Buchanan, Colonel Robertson's WSO stated that he did not know whether Colonel Robertson got out of the aircraft. He did not see Colonel Robertson subsequent to ejecting from the aircraft.

8) Congressman Peterson testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, that he was interrogated by the Vietnamese about Colonel Robertson with Colonel Robertson's dogtag and identification card. He also stated that the Vietnamese captors told him that Colonel Robertson had died and it was his (Peterson's) opinion that Robertson had died either in the crash or shortly thereafter.

(Ms. Quast) (Page 332): The third part I just wanted to touch upon quickly to

address the access to information. I have been promised at a very high policy level access to my father's file, but denied access by those people that have testified before this committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking what is the policy and who runs the show for POW policy.

Ms. Quast has met on several occasions with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford, Jr. On one occasion in Mr. Ford's office on August 22 at 1:30PM, Ms. Quast requested to see the entire DIA file on her father. Mr. Ford did not promise Ms. Quast that she could see the file. He stated that he would look into the matter because the file may contain sensitive classified information.

When Ms. Quast returned to see Mr. Ford, she reiterated her request to see the entire file. She was again told that the file contained classified information and she would not be provided access to the file. Mr. Ford assured Ms. Quast that his staff would compare the DIA file with the Casualty Assistance Officer's file maintained by the Air Force to ensure that she was in possession of all of the unclassified information on her father. Lieutenant Thomas Doughty, of Mr. Ford's staff, reviewed the DIA file and the Air Force file with Mr. George Atkinson, USAF Missing Persons Office, on 5 November 1991 and determined that Ms. Quast had been provided all but one document from the DIA file. This information was communicated personally by Lieutenant Doughty and Mr. George Atkinson to Ms. Quast during one of the recesses to the hearings.

(Senator Smith): So I am going to put all officials in control of these [fingerprints] on notice that I intend to know why, in the case of all of the live sighting reports, and all of the individuals involved in those reports, why we do not have fingerprints in the service jackets of those individuals. And if you do not know why, you better start looking because I want to know why.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the sole USG agency with the responsibility for maintaining fingerprints of American citizens. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records on servicemen. None of the services are required by law or regulation to maintain fingerprints in the service records of their individual servicemen. The national fingerprint database within the FBI maintains all service fingerprint records as well as the fingerprints of civilians who may be fingerprinted and their prints retained by the Government.

Congressman Solaz, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, requested an explanation of why the fingerprints of Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens and Major Lundy all are missing from the FBI database. At the Department of Defense request, FBI Director William Sessions provided the possible explanation for this state of affairs. Director Sessions' response is provided in pertinent part:

Since the FBI is the repository for fingerprints for military

personnel, DoD requested the prints for these individuals, in addition to the third person linked to the photograph, Lieutenant Commander Larry J. Stevens. A search of FBI fingerprint files did not disclose a record for these three individuals. There are many reasons why we may not currently have those fingerprints and an explanation for the record may be beneficial.

The most logical reason for the absence of these prints may be the policy for purging files. In the case of military prints, if DoD reports an individual killed-in-action (KIA) or otherwise deceased, the print is placed in a special file for seven years and then destroyed unless there is additional information furnished by the military. In testimony, Mr. Ford advised that the DoD had listed Major Albro L. Lundy, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Stevens as KIA based on eye witnesses' accounts of each incident. Relevant herein is a list of 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DoD in 1984. They were identified by DoD as being "Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." A search of our fingerprint files identified prints for 912 individuals from that list. The prints for the three individuals linked to the photograph were not among those with prints in file. All existing prints from that list are being maintained and are not subject to being purged.

Another explanation is that we never received fingerprint of those in question. But, it would perhaps be more than coincidental that the prints for three individuals linked to a single photograph would not have been submitted. This is particularly true given the policy of fingerprinting all military personnel. Unfortunately, due to the volume of civil prints alone, approximately 35 million individuals and 90 million cards, records of receipt are not maintained. In most instances, the only means to determine if there is a print on file is to check the index. The absence of an individual from the index only indicates the FBI does not currently have a file. This would not necessarily mean that the FBI never had a file. It could have been previously purged from the system, but, in most instances, there would be no record of the purge.

Fingerprints are frequently not capable of classification/retention due to their illegibility based on the quality of the inked prints that are submitted. When this occurs, the prints are sent back to the contributor with a request to obtain a legible fingerprint card for resubmission. It is not unusual to not receive a follow-up set of prints. As above, there

would be no record if this occurred. As a point of reference, in the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 1991, the FBI Identification Division rejected over 790,000 fingerprints cards for this reason. Although historical figures are not available for the Vietnam War era, rejection rates for prints submitted by the military in the early 1980s were about 15 percent. Anecdotal information from the Vietnam War era indicates rejection rates may have been as high as 25 to 30 percent.

It should be noted that the Department of Defense requested in 1984, well before this photo surfaced, a list of POW/MIAs for whom the FBI had fingerprints on file. At that time, Robertson, Stevens and Lundy's fingerprints were not within the FBI database. We can provide no further explanation for this phenomenon beyond that provided by the Director of the FBI, however, there is no conspiracy, cover-up or otherwise mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss of these files as has been suggested by some individuals at these hearings.

The fingerprints record of Captain Donald G. Carr another individual with a high profile POW/MIA photograph case, is on file with the FBI and available for comparison if that individual is located

(Mr. Albro Lundy) (Page 345): I have asked one photoanalysis that we've done to be passed around to the Senators. It's a simple photo overlay. Its done on acetate, and if you take a look at it—you just lift the acetate up—one of the photos is my father as a younger man and then the other photo is the copy of the photo drawn out. You see that it matches perfectly. All the features are the same, the head shape is the same, everything in regard to the photo is exact. That's a very simple analysis, something that could have been done very easily, I think by the Government immediately, but has never been done, or at least has never been provided to us.

The simple analysis described by Mr. Lundy was provided to Government photo analysis experts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI experts reaction was that the "analysis" had no basis in science, was not acceptable methodology in any professional association that they were aware of, and would not be accepted for admission as evidence in any court in the United States on the issue of identification by photograph. Despite its simplicity, the method described in the testimony is patently unreliable.

Mr. Lundy (Page 347): So I wrote a FOIA. . . . So if you can not read it, but the part that is highlighted says specifically, this is all the information in the file, there were no witnesses to this incident.

Mr. Lundy's FOIA request in 1985 was directed to the USAF. Their records had no indication that there were any witnesses to the incident in which Major

Lundy was lost. The sole witness statement was located in a file in JCRC during records search conducted pursuant to his 1991 FOIA request to ICRC. This report was provided to Mr. Lundy immediately by the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs when its existence became known.

(Mr. Lundy) (in response to the statement "Apparently some other families claim (the individual in the three person photo) is theirs" (Page 354): And none of the families that the DIA has talked about have come forward, have called and said, let me help you here, this is my son or this is my brother. Would it not be a relief to me? . . . I asked Chuck Gittins, I said please Chuck, contact those people. Please write them and tell them to contact me. I need to know, I need to know. I don't know if Chuck has done it or not, but they have not contacted me.

In a September meeting in PDASD Ford's office with PDASD Ford, Shelby Quast and Major Gittins, Mr. Ford explained to Mr. Lundy the fact that two other families had come forward to claim the pictured individual as their unaccounted for loved one. He also explained that the individuals claimed by the other families also bore a striking resemblance to the individual in the three-person photo. Mr. Ford reiterated that these families did not want to be thrust in the limelight and requested that the DoD not share their identities. Mr. Ford told Mr. Lundy that he intended to honor that request.

While Major Gittins was escorting Mr. Lundy out of the Pentagon after the meeting with Mr. Ford, Mr. Lundy stated in passing that he would like to speak to the two other families. Major Gittins reiterated Mr. Ford's explanation and stated that DoD would respect the request of the families. Mr. Lundy never requested Major Gittins make contact with the families. Mr. Lundy couched it as he would "really like to talk to the other families." Major Gittins surmises that the actual question was not asked so that it would not appear that Mr. Lundy was trying to get around the decision of PDASD Ford, but rather that Major Gittins would do so on his own initiative.

ADDENDUM (P. 1708-131)
FRIDAY, NOV. 15, 1991

29. Senator McCain asked Mr. Ford to provide, in writing, any DoD analyses done by the FBI, Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory or any other government scientific organization, of the quality of the forensic anthropological work of Dr. Michael Charney of Colorado State University. Mr. Sheetz also offered to provide for the record a copy of the report Dr. Charney did which positively identified a picture as MIA LT Daniel Borah, which subsequently turned out to be a 77-year old hill tribesman.

See attached.

Michael Charney, PhD, DABIA

Diplomate, American Board of Anthropology (DABIA)

25 October 1991

Mr. Tracy E. Usry, Chief Investigator
U S Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D C 20510

Dear Mr. Usry:

On 26 July you brought me a photograph, 2x2, of a Navy pilot and 24 negatives and their prints of a man in a wooded area. The Navy pilot photograph I was told was that of Daniel V Borah, Jr, shot down over Laos during the Vietnam War. Some of the photographs from the wooded area, said to have been taken in Laos, contain two men, one a young man of obvious mongoloid racial affinity. The other, an older man, appears to be a caucasoid.

The question, is the older man Lieutenant Daniel V Borah, Jr, USNR?

All twenty-four photos were examined by Dr Fitzhorn, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Colorado State University and myself to select one for comparison with the 2x2 photo of Lieutenant Borah. Problems arose in selecting a photo from the twenty-four to match, closely, with the angling of Borah. We petitioned Mr Usry to obtain other photos of Borah from his family. Several were sent by Borah's sister and father. Dr Fitzhorn chose one of Borah at age 22, as an usher at a wedding.

The photo from the twenty-four and that of Borah at 22 years were then digitized and superimposed. The technique is described in the attached report of Dr Fitzhorn.

An examination of the superimposition raises questions about the lack of closeness at the chin and left jawline. This is due to the slight differences between the two photos with that of Borah?, 1990, tilted forward slightly and turned to the left. That of Borah, 1968, is full face and not tilted. These differences are not enough to make for a mismatch. All other features but for the restreated hairline, coincide perfectly.

The man in the 1990 photo supposedly taken in Laos is Daniel V Borah, Jr.

faithfully,
Michael Charney
Michael Charney

Colorado State University

Department of
Mechanical Engineering
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523
303 491-6555
FAX 303 491-1055

September 25, 1991

Re: Digital Photographic Superimposition of September 12/20, 1991

To Whom it may Concern

Two photographs were selected by Dr. Michael Charney, Director of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory at Colorado State University and myself to perform a photographic superimposition. These were selected from two sets of photographs, one set from the late 1960's of a white male, and one set purportedly taken in South East Asia fairly recently. We selected one photograph from each set that provided the best match in facial angulation (head pitch, roll, and angle).

One photograph was a 12.5 x 18 cm color print of a male figure squatting in an open area outdoors. This photograph was previously annotated on the reverse with the following sequence, 38 12 N N-2-2 2 85. I placed a second set of marks, PAF-10, on the lower side of the reverse of the photograph for my own identification. The second photograph, appeared to be taken at a formal function (wedding?) and is a 12.5 x 18 cm black/white print. I annotated the reverse with the marks PAF-11 for identification.

I digitized both photographs using a Microtek 300dpi color/gray scanner interfaced to an Apple Macintosh IIx computer. The Macintosh computer runs Adobe Photoshop Software for image acquisition and processing.

Photograph 1 - (P1)

After image acquisition by color scanning at the maximum resolution, 300 pixels per inch, I then performed the following techniques on the first image.

1. The image was cropped to the facial region including hair and beard.
2. The image was uniformly scaled (aspect ratio remaining the same) 145% to a resolution of 602 x 808 pixels. This resizing was done to aid the manual superimposition described below. It should be noted that a positive resizing after scanning at maximum resolution loses pixel information. This photograph's resizing resulted in each original, unscaled pixel supplying information for approximately 1.5 resulting pixels. This resulted in an increase in noise, and a decrease in high frequency information.
3. A histogram equalization was performed to equalize color distribution.
4. After experimentation, it was determined that the green signal contained the highest quality image (most high frequency information). The red and blue signals contained a severe amount of noise. This was not unexpected due to the original color distribution in the print I received.

The resulting image was the processed 8-bits of green data from the original photograph, including background.

Photograph 2 - (P2)

After gray-scale image acquisition at 300 pixels per inch, I then performed the following techniques on

the second image


1. The image was cropped to the facial region
2. The image was uniformly scaled (aspect ratio remaining the same) 171% to a resolution of 600 x 779 pixels. The above discussion applies here as well.
3. A histogram equalization was performed to equalize gray-scale distribution.
4. All background information was removed by airbrushing/painting it out.
5. An edge-finding filter (possibly a Sobel filter. Adobe photoshop documentation is not available at this time) was applied.
6. A threshold mapping was applied to the resulting image to convert it from gray-scale to black and white.

The resulting image was a set of white edges on a black background.

The resulting images were loaded onto a Silicon Graphics Inc. 4D/210 GTXB Power Series graphics computer. This machine has a resolution of 1280x1024 pixels with two 24-bit frame buffers and a set of overlay and underlay bit planes 2 bits deep each. I then wrote a software suite in the C programming language to display both images in two modes - side by side, and superimposed. In superimposition mode, a set of rigid-body transformations were entered to graphically overlay P2 onto P1. Since P2 is displayed in black/white, P1 was displayed in one of the 24 bit frame buffers, and P2 was superimposed over P1 in the overlay planes. The transformations, entered interactively through the keypad, specifically consisted of any combination of (i) rotations *theta* degrees about the 'z' axis (out of the plane of the screen), (ii) uniform scalings *s* in 'x' and 'y', and (iii) 2D translations *tx, ty*. The transformation variables changed during each superimposition try are denoted by *italics*.

It should be noted that Dr. M. Charney is responsible for all decisions of similarity or fit between these two images; questions concerning the results of the fit itself should be directed to him. As well, requests for copies of photographs taken of the superimposition process and results should be directed at him. Please direct any technical questions concerning the image acquisition and processing performed, or the graphics hardware/software combination used, to myself.

Sincerely:



Patrick A. Fitzhorn, PhD
Associate Professor

Hardware and software used:

1. Microtek 300dpi color/gray scanner
2. Apple Macintosh IIx computer
3. Adobe Photoshop software
4. Silicon Graphics Inc. 4D/210 GTXB Power Series graphics computer
5. Custom superimposition software
6. Nikon F3 HP with 55mm macro lens and Kodakolor ISO-100 film

Michael Charney, Ph.D., D.A.B.A.
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Anthropology

25 July 1991

Mr Tracy E. Usry, Chief Investigator
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Usry:

I received two photographs from you in the first week of July, one of a Donald Gene Carr taken in 1961 at his wedding. He was 23 years of age. The other photo was a colour shot of a man in a stockade taken February 1990. The question was the identity of this second individual? Was it Carr?

Both photos were half-tones and not the best of study material. I asked for glossy photos if such existed. They were and I received them on 13 July 1991. Results of this study show that the person in the later photo, February 1990, is that of Donald Gene Carr, some thirty years later than his wedding photo.

(1) The two photos were put on 35 mm slides and projected by zoom lens to the same magnification. The ears were studied for morphological characteristics. They were similar as to earlobe, helix, tragus, concha. The two were then superimposed to see, initially, if the facial features coincided. They did.

(2) The two photos were then turned over to Dr. Patrick Fitzhorn, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Colorado State University for digital photographic superimposition by use of computer. The facial features, hairline, browridges, eyes, nose, mouth, lips, ears, chin, jawline, muscles of the cheek of the Feb 1990 were drawn by the computer in black and that of Donald Gene Carr, 1961, in red. The computer drew these lines with an accuracy of one-hundredth of an inch. The two were then superimposed and the resulting fit evidence of the sameness of the person in the two photos under study. The man in the February 1990 photo is Donald Gene Carr.

The two photos are not precisely the same as to the angle of the subject's pose. This accounts for certain discrepancies:

- (1) the 1961 photo shows Carr's head tilted. This was rotated 14 degrees to upright.
- (2) the length and width of the ears are not the same due to this difference of pose.
- (3) the top of the head in the 1990 photo could not be precisely drawn as the background blends with the hair thus obscuring the top of the head.
- (4) the eyes do not coincide as Carr in the 1961 photo is looking to the left.

Human biological diversity, individuality, is based on the science of inheritance. Darwin said that children will resemble but not exactly duplicate their parents. Over the years, the features of one's face will change, the soft tissue, with the onset of jowls, pouches under the eyes, crowfeet, thickening of the nose and the like. The underlying bony structure will, however, remain the same, but for some resorbing of the bone of the jaws as one loses teeth. The soft tissue of the face, eyes, nose, lips, ears, etc., take their position from the underlying bone and will stay the same. The distance relationship of these features is individual and will not be repeated exactly by another.

Michael Charney, Ph.D., D.A.B.A.
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Anthropology

faithfully,

Michael Charney

Michael Charney
emeritus professor of anthropology, Colorado State University
affiliate professor of biology
director, forensic science laboratory



August 1, 1991

Department of
Mechanical Engineering
Fort Collins, Colorado 80522
(303) 491-6538
FAX: (303) 491-1055

Re: Digital Photographic Superimposition of July, 22/23/24, 1991

To Whom it may Concern:

On Monday, July 22, 1991, I received two photographs from Dr. Michael Charney, Director of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory at Colorado State University. One photograph was a gray-scale print of a young, white male in a tuxedo (denoted P1 throughout this discussion), the second was a color print of an older white male (P2) in casual clothes. I digitized both photographs using a Microtek 300dpi color/gray scanner interfaced to an Apple Macintosh IIfx computer. The Macintosh computer runs Adobe Photoshop Software for image acquisition and processing. After image acquisition by gray-scale scanning at the maximum resolution, 300 pixels per inch, I then performed the following techniques on each of the images:

1. Each image was cropped using a rectangular mask isolating the head as much as possible.
2. Each image was uniformly resized (aspect ratio remaining the same) to an approximate resolution of 600x756 pixels. This resizing was done to aid the manual superimposition described below. Photograph P1 was resized to 114% of its scanned size, while P2 was resized approximately 500% to reach the desired size. It should be noted that a positive resizing after scanning at maximum resolution loses pixel information. P1's resizing was minor, resulting in each pixel supplying gray-scale information for 1.14 pixels. P2 was significantly resized however, by a factor of approximately five. This resulted in an increase in noise, and a decrease in high frequency information.
3. Each image's brightness and contrast were adjusted to compensate for scanning brightness.
4. A histogram equalization was performed to equalize gray-scale distribution. This proved especially valuable with P2.
5. A high-pass filter was applied with a pixel mask size of 10x10 to bring out high-frequency information, including edge information. Again, P2 was effectively enhanced by this method.
6. Contrast was increased to emphasize facial regions of interest.
7. A thresholding algorithm was applied to change the image from gray-scale to black and white.
8. The resulting images were cleaned by removing all pixel information outside the head area. Care was taken not to remove potentially important edges in the head region, or to add spurious edges during the cleaning process.

It should be noted that size-finding algorithms in Adobe Photoshop are extremely limited, thus none were used. Photograph P1 resulted in the best image with the least amount of noise. The head of the subject in the photograph was large in an absolute sense, and was set in relief against

a white background. As well, the photograph was of good quality. P2 contained substantially more noise due to the small, absolute size of the subject's head in the photograph (approximately 1/2 inch by 1/2 inch) and the poor photographic quality.

On Wednesday, July 24, 1991, the resulting images were loaded onto a Silicon Graphics Inc. 4D/20 graphics computer. This machine has a resolution of 1280x1024 with eight bit planes (256 colors). I then wrote a software suite in the C programming language to display both images in two modes - side by side, and superimposed. In superimposition mode, a set of rigid-body transformations were entered to graphically overlay P1 onto P2. I entered each of the transformations manually, recompiled the software, and then viewed the resulting superimposition. These transformations specifically consisted of (i) a rotation θ degrees about the 'z' axis (out of the plane of the screen), (ii) a uniform scaling s in 'x' and 'y', followed by (iii) a 2D translation (x, y) . The transformation variables changed during each superimposition try are denoted by italics.

The best fit, as pronounced by Dr. M. Charney, resulted when P1 was rotated 14° clockwise forming a close fit with the eyes in each image. This rotation was required since the head in P2 is not entirely vertical. The final scaling factor was 1 (coincidence and initial resizing was responsible for this result). The final 2D translation mapped the head outline of P1 onto P2.

It should be noted that Dr. M. Charney is responsible for all decisions of similarity or fit between these two images; questions concerning the results of the fit itself should be directed to him. As well, requests for copies of photographs taken of the superimposition process and results should be directed at him. Please direct any technical questions concerning the image acquisition and processing performed, or the graphics hardware/software combination used, to myself.

Sincerely:

Patrick A. Fitzhorn, PhD
Associate Professor

Hardware and software used:

1. Microtek 300dpi color/gray scanner
2. Apple Macintosh IIfx computer
3. Adobe Photoshop software
4. Silicon Graphics Inc. 4D/20 graphics computer
5. Custom superimposition software
6. Nikon F3 HP with 55mm macro lens and Kodakcolor ISO-100 film

Review of Dr. Charney's Photo Identification Procedure in the Carr POW/MIA Case

Gary A. Mastin
Organization 1421
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM 87185

1.0 Synopsis

In a report to Mr. Tracy E. Usry of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee dated July 25, 1991, Dr. Michael Charney, a forensic anthropologist at Colorado State University, stated that the 1961 wedding picture of Donald Carr and a photograph purportedly taken in Laos in 1990 show the same individual [1]. The report discusses two procedures used by Dr. Charney to reach his conclusion. The first procedure is a morphological comparison of ears. The second is a superimposing of "edge" images digitally extracted from the wedding and purported photographs. I have reviewed Dr. Charney's report. I have concentrated my attention on the "edge" superimpositions since my expertise is in digital image processing. It is my professional opinion that the superimposing of "edge" images, as described in Dr. Charney's report, is inconclusive for identifying the purported image as being that of Donald Carr. This report discusses the technical reasoning that supports my conclusion.

2.0 Review of Prof. Charney's Photo Identification Procedure

Dr. Charney makes the following comments in his report about his comparison of Carr's wedding photograph and the purported photograph of Carr.

"(1) The two photos were put on 35 mm slides and projected by zoom lens to the same magnification. The ears were studied for morphological characteristics. They were similar as to the earlobe, helix, tragus, concha. The two were then superimposed to see, initially, if the facial features coincided. They did.

"(2) The two photos were then turned over to Dr. Patrick Fitzhorn, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Colorado State University for digital photographic superimposition by use of a computer. The facial features, hairline, browridges, eyes, nose, mouth, lips, ears, chin, jawline, muscles of the cheek, of the Feb. 1990 (photo)

were drawn by the computer in black and that of Donald Gene Carr, 1961, in red. The computer drew these lines with an accuracy of one-hundredth of an inch. The two were then superimposed and the resulting fit evidence of the sameness of the person in the two photos under study. The man in the February 1990 photo is Donald Gene Carr."

Also attached to Dr. Charney's report was a detailed description by Dr. Fitzhorn of his digital analysis steps.

If I understand the report correctly, step (1) says that expert analysis of the ear structures showed enough similarity between the subjects in the wedding and purported photographs to warrant further investigation, and step (2) is the follow-on study that definitively identifies the subject in the unknown image as Donald Carr. I believe that an expert at identifying human subjects can identify subtle structural features in photographs that a layman would miss. I believe that these features can be crucial factors in identifying people. However, I do not believe that a definitive identification can be made solely from the "edge" images provided by Dr. Fitzhorn.

The "edge" extraction technique mentioned by Dr. Charney in step (2), and described in detail by Dr. Fitzhorn, is commonly used as a *preprocessing* step in digital image processing applications where information *reduction* is required. A typical example is in machine vision where a robot, usually under highly controlled lighting conditions, must reduce the amount of picture information it sees to bare essentials in order for the computer to rapidly find objects in three-dimensional space. Dr. Fitzhorn employed a technique called "high-pass filtering" to extract only those regions in the photographs with high contrast changes over small distances. After extracting only the high spatial frequencies, he then created binary images. These binary images are made by simply coloring all the high frequency information black (or red) and the remaining information white. The important issue here is that the edge images represent a subset of the available information in the original image. Carr's wedding photograph, as well as the purported POW/MIA image of Carr, are very high quality photographs. There are no spatial frequencies that corrupt the image and inhibit human analysis. Why should a photo interpreter believe a better interpretation of a high quality photograph can be made by throwing away much of the information in the image? This is my first criticism.

My second criticism has to do with the integrity of "edge" images. The definition of an "edge" in a digital image is somewhat subjective. Different "edges" can be extracted from a common scene due to changes in lighting or the addition of noise. What a person perceives as an edge on a face, regardless of lighting or noise, may be different from what a high-pass filter implemented on a computer designates as an "edge". Furthermore, the width and length of "edges" can be changed by redefining the spatial frequencies that are passed by the digital "edge" filter or by the presence of noise. Artifacts, perceived by the computer algorithm to also be "edges", can also be introduced by redefining the frequencies to be passed by the "edge" filter. In short, the "edges" of a human face are subjective, and their position is somewhat sensitive to the digital filter being used.

To emphasize my point, I have supplied two examples. Figure 1 is an unedited superimposition of an "edge" image created from Donald Carr's wedding photograph (blue) and an "edge" image created from the purported 1990 image of Carr (red). Note the alignment of the eyes, nose, eyebrows, etc. These images were created by a high-pass filtering technique similar to that used by Dr. Fitzhorn. Figure 2 is an unedited superimposition of an "edge" image created from an image of a Sandia National Laboratories employee (yellow) and an "edge" image created from a noisy photograph of a man known *not* to be the Sandia employee (blue). Note the overlap of the eyes, nose, eyebrows, etc. The same high-pass filter was used in both cases. Figure 2 is a counter-example to Figure 1. We know the "edge" images in Figure 2 show different individuals, yet the "edges" overlap just as in Figure 1. Figure 2 also emphasizes my point that the imaging conditions affect the "edges". The thickness of the blue edges is a result of film grain noise in the original photograph.

I agree that an overlapping "edge" image can yield additional clues to assist in an identification, but it is inappropriate to make an identification solely on the basis of overlapping "edge" images. The presence of overlapping "edges" in a superimposition of "edge" images is not definitive.

3.0 Conclusions

I believe that a definitive identification cannot be made solely on the basis of overlapping "edge" images for two reasons. First, "edge" images of two different individuals can overlap remarkably well as described above and shown in Figure 2. Second, if an identification cannot be made using all the information in the photographs, then throwing away good information by high-pass filtering cannot improve the reliability of the identification.

I have spent a considerable amount of time analyzing the Carr-photographs. My experience is that Carr's wedding and service record photographs, as well as the purported 1990 Carr POW/MIA photograph, are of a high enough quality to warrant direct examination. Information reduction, which is the result of creating high-pass filtered "edge" images, is inconclusive. In fact, we have shown that facial scars and markings correlate well between the wedding, service record, and purported photographs by simply digitizing the original negatives at a high spatial resolution [2]. The analysis of the original negatives described in reference [2] provides more information than the "edge" images analyzed in reference [1], and, in addition, shows a striking similarity between subtle features in the wedding, service record, and purported images. Nevertheless, I cannot state *conclusively* that the images show the same individual. Readers must draw their own conclusions.

4.0 References

1. M. Charney, Letter to Mr. Tracy E. Ustry, Chief Investigator, U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D. C., July 25, 1991.

2. G. A. Mastin, *Evaluation of the Carr POW/MIA Original Negatives*. Report to the DIA POW/MIA Office, Aug. 30, 1991.

Test_compare



Figure 2. Superimposition of binary "edge" images created from high-pass frequency filtering. The yellow "edges" were made from the photograph of a Sandia National Laboratories employee. The blue "edges" were made from the noisy photograph of a person known not to be the Sandia employee. Note the overlap around the eyes and nose.



Figure 1. Superimposition of binary "edge" images created from high-pass frequency filtering. The blue "edges" were made from Carr's wedding photograph. The red "edges" were made from the purported 1990 Carr POW/MIA photograph. Note the overlap around the eyes and nose.



Los Alamos

Los Alamos National Laboratory

29 October 1991

International Technology Division
P. O. Box 503, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544
(505) 667-6922; (FTS) 843-6922
KY-71 - ID#00295; (505) 667-9510; (FTS) 843-9510

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN:
Washington DC 20340-6150

Dear Bob:

We have completed our work on the POW/MIA photographs that you provided to us. Most of the photographs were obvious composites (e.g., Photos 1, 4, and 7). We were unsure as to what action should be taken with respect to other photographs (e.g., Photo 2). Most of our effort was expended against Photos 13, 17, and 18. We have enclosed enhanced facial views of the Subject 13 and CAPT Carr. These were prepared by IT-1. In our view, a strong possibility exists that the Subject 13 (the man in Photo 13) is an aged CAPT Carr (Photos 17 and 18). However, this assessment is not conclusive.

Thanks for allowing us to participate.

Sincerely,

Attachments:

1. Photographs (Enhanced 13B, 18A, Split 13/18)
2. Photographs (1-25, as provided)

Attachment #2 to Los Alamos Itr 28 Oct 91/Photos 1-25

1. Photo, three men standing holding sign
2. Photo, man kneeling next to seated child
3. Photo, man with camouflage hat, label "Gonzales Fredriec"
4. Photocopy of photo, five men standing with signs (3 pgs)
5. Photocopy of photo, man wearing plaid shirt with label (3 pgs)
6. Photocopy of photo, man with beard, label "WMER EHESTE..." (3 pgs)
7. Photocopy of photo, five men wearing construction type helmets
8. Photocopy of 2 photos; (1) man with beard wearing plaid shirt standing, (2) man with beard holding sign
9. Photo, man with beard holding person in arms
10. Photocopy of letter "Prichanant Enterprise" with photo at bottom
11. Photocopy of two photos
12. Photo of two men standing with child
13. Photo of man wearing blue shirt next to metal bars
- 13a. Photo of fence with barbed wire in foreground
14. Photos of men in thickset, one man slightly balding (11 photos)
15. Photocopy of photo, man with mustache
- 16a,b,c. Photocopy of three photos, pg 1 labeled IIR 6 024 0242 91
17. Photo, labeled on back CARR
18. Photo, labeled on back CARR
19. Photo, labeled on back CHRISTENSEN
20. Photo, labeled on back LUNDY
21. Photo, labeled on back Robertson
22. Photo, labeled on back STEVENS
23. Photo, labeled on back DOOLEY
24. Photo, labeled on back BORAH
25. Photo, labeled on back BORAH

PHOTOS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, AND 7

Images 4, 5, 6, and 7 are xerographic reproductions (i.e., "xerox" copies) for which direct photographic enhancements are of little to no utility. However, in Photo 1, itself a many generation copy, the sign appearing to be held by three men and the collar placard on Photo 3 are add-ons to extant photographs. That is, they are of a more recent generation than the backgrounds. In addition, the inscriptions in all these photographs appear to have been written by the same person. The numbers, lettering and spacing, e.g., the identical word "pho to" on Photos 1 and 7, suggests that English was not the native language of the writer. The elaborately rolled number "2" suggests the writer was South Asian (India to Vietnam).

PHOTO 2

No enhancement work was done on Photo 2. However, we note that the man in the photograph is married (based on wedding ring). The wearing of a watch and wedding ring on his right hand suggest that the image is inadvertently reversed. The man has a tattoo (appears to be a cross, dagger or anchor) on his right biceps (left if the image is reversed). The foot to the right (in the doorway) appears to be that of a young woman (based on grooming and morphology) possibly wearing a yellow skirt (showing as a small yellow triangle above foot). The photograph was taken with a flash with some separation from the lens (no redness in the pupils of the man and boy.) Based on the uniform fatigues and haircut, the photograph is possibly of the Vietnam War era.

PHOTO 8

Again this image is a xerographic reproductions of two photographs. While the image quality is extremely poor even for a xerographic copy, we see insufficient anatomical similarities to suggest that the man in Photo 8 is LTJG Larry Stevens (Photo 22).

PHOTOS 9, 10, 11, AND 12

Images 10 and 11 are poor quality xerographic reproductions. Photographs 9 and 12 are multigeneration copies. Within the uncertainties caused by the poor resolution (especially in the case of Images 10 and 11), the man shown in Photos 9 and 12 and on the right in Image 11 is the same person. The two men on Image 11 are not the same individual.

PHOTOS 13 AND 13A

Most of our efforts at enhancement were directed toward Photo 13 and, for comparison to CAPT Carr, Photos 17 and 18. The wedding picture of CAPT Carr, Photo 18, had been heavily airbrushed to the point that many facial features, that could have provided a more extensive basis of comparison, are completely masked. For example, the pattern of acne scars of the lower right and left cheeks clearly visible in Photo 17 have been airbrushed away in Photo 18.

Moreover, the forehead lines and lines under the eyes visible in Photo 17 are not obvious in Photo 18. Possibly, these were airbrushed away or, more likely, developed afterwards as a consequence of aging or environment exposure. These limitations aside, Photo 18 provides the most direct comparison to the subject in Photo 13 (hereafter called Subject 13) with regard to the head position relative to the camera.

The faces in Photos 13 and 18 were digitalized and rescaled to provide equal iris-to-iris spacing between (reference Photos 13B and 18A). Of course, this rescaling itself introduces a bias that favors the discovery of similarities. Optical densities were also balanced to the extent possible. Afterwards, a split image was generated using the using the left side of Carr's face in Photo 18A and the right side of the Subject 13's face (Photo 13B), reference Split 13/18. Photographic comparison of the enhanced photographs provided the following results.

Observed differences:

(1) Spacing and shape of the eyebrows are markedly different. CAPT Carr's eyebrows are arched and terminate near the upper part of the nose intersects the bridge. The Subject 13's eyebrows appear to fall within a rather straight line or slightly turned up on at the ends. However, these differences could be a product of aging, plucking of the eyebrows, or slight differences in camera angles.

(2) No hair is visible on the chest of the Subject 13, whereas hair is visible on CAPT Carr's chest in Photo 17. A small mole or nevus is also noted only on the chest of the Subject 13. These differences could be caused by aging and photographic resolution.

(3) Differences in the eye folds cause the geometry of the eye openings and canthi of CAPT Carr (in Photo 17) to differ from the eye openings and canthi of Subject 13. However, with age the eye folds become larger and sag.

(4) The acne or facial scars seen on CAPT Carr's face in Photo 18 are not noticeable on the face of the Subject 13. This absence could be attributable to resolution in the case of Photo 13. Moreover, acne scars tend to be reduced in size with aging.

(5) Subject 13's eye appear brown in color although vagaries in color processing, ambient lighting, and color film sensitivity can create erroneous colors. The color of CAPT Carr's eyes could not be determined directly. However, the detail present in CAPT Carr's irises in Photos 17 and 18 suggests gray, blue, or hazel eyes.

Observed similarities:

(1) Where feature morphology is determined by bone or cartilage, the features of CAPT Carr (wedding photograph) and of Subject 13 are identical within measurement error and remembering that equal

iris-to-iris spacing was forced. For example, the jaw, nose, nose bridge, eye orbits, zygomatic ridge, neck, laryngeal area, and cranium are essentially identical.

(2) While resolution is a problem in the case of Photo 13, the general shape, size and positioning of the ears of CAPT Carr and of Subject 13 appear essentially identical. The ear structures of the CAPT Carr and Subject 13 are similar. The upper helixes and upper antihelixes appear to form a similar "lambda" shape. However, poor resolution in the Case of Photo 13 makes a more definitive comparison of ears impossible.

(3) The smile formations (i.e., positionings and structures of the upper and lower lips, smile lines, cheeks) are striking similar.

(4) While Subject 13's hair is thinner (as would be expected), the hair lines and texture (waviness) are similar.

General Observations:

(1) The cage (or bars) shown in Photos 13 and 13A resemble those that one might see at a zoo, for example, as opposed to a prison. The single strand of barbed wire, shown in Photo 13A and appearing to be of a rather low height, is again suggestive of animal (versus human) confinement.

(2) While some gray is suggested in the temple area of Subject 13, the hair cut is exceeding dark for someone in their fifties. Of course, natural retention of hair color in older men is possible.

(3) Subject 13 shows no obvious signs of physical or psychological abuse. For example, he seems to have been well fed, general muscle tone seems good, his face is tanned (no evidence of his having worn a hat), the smile does not seem forced, and no contusions or bruises are evident. (Slight scarring might be present on the forehead.)

(4) The vegetation is tropical. The one plant in the center foreground of Photo 13A, is a variety of *Codiaeum variegatum pictum*, a common decorative, woody plant. The compound leaves on the two branches on the right side of Photo 13A suggest a plant of the genus *Mimosa*. The plant in the background over the left shoulder of Subject 13 appears to be a variety of the genus *Bambusa*. The flower spike and leaf in the upper left of Photo is tropical but its specific identity is unknown. The general impression is that the area is a cultured, as opposed to a wild area.

(5) Even though the area is tropical in appearance, Subject 13 shows no signs of perspiration, even in the area of the arm pits.

Conclusions Regarding Photos 13, 13A, 17 and 18:


No obvious differences, not explainable by normal aging, were noted to negate the possibility that Subject 13 is a older CAPT Carr. On the contrary, while not conclusive, the similarities between Subject 13 and CAPT Carr are suggestive that Subject 13 could be CAPT Carr. The possibility that two unrelated individuals could evince such striking similarities is improbable but not impossible.

PHOTOS 14A THROUGH 14K

The old man in this series of photographs is not the individual in Photos 24 and 25, identified as BORAN. Distinct differences exist in the structure of the ears, forehead slopes, and noses of the old man and BORAN.

PHOTOS 15, 16A, AND 16B

We did not analyses on these poor quality xerographs.




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SENT BY NEW MEXICO



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ปรีชาสิทธิ์ เอี่ยมศรี

REDACTED

และทุกเมื่อทุกเวลาถ้าจะขึ้นไปก็ขึ้น

๑. วัตถุประสงค์ของการจัดทำบัญชีรายวัน
 ๒. วิธีการจัดทำบัญชีรายวัน
 ๓. ขั้นตอนการบันทึกบัญชีรายวัน
 ๔. การตรวจสอบความถูกต้องของบัญชีรายวัน
 ๕. การนำข้อมูลจากบัญชีรายวันไปใช้ในการจัดทำงบการเงิน

ต้นนาข้าวได้ ก็ซบในน้ำจนเกินกว่าจะเรือจากคลองออกทันนาข้าว เพราะเรือถูกขวาง
เรือจากทางออกต้นนาข้าว ครั้นน้ำท่วมในทุ่งนาจึงพากันเอาดินมาถม
โดยวิธีถมจนได้คันไม้ไผ่คันหนึ่งมาปักไว้เป็นคันนาขึ้นอีกคัน

ห้องของมารา ไร้อาภากรรณกลั่นนาริาทั้งนี้

P.C. 30X 11-1254

แต่ในที่สุดแล้วต้องเขียนเป็นภาษาอังกฤษก็ว่าคำมคธเป็นภาษาอังกฤษ



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#12








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POINT PAPER

SMITH AMENDMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Amendment: Requires the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide any Member of Congress, upon request, full and complete access to all internal reviews relating to DIA's efforts to fully account for POW/MIA or unaccounted for U.S. military personnel. The amendment specifically cites three reports.

Background: Of the three reports cited in the amendment, only the report issued by General Tighe in 1986 is in written form; the other two were apparently oral briefings to the Director of DIA. An unclassified version of the Tighe report was released in 1986 and is available.

Discussion: The DIA maintains that all three reports, to the extent they exist, represent confidential advice to a former Director on the effectiveness of the internal workings of that agency. Because of the classification and sensitivity of these reports, the confidential sources and diplomatic relationships involved in Southeast Asia and because of the intended use of this information, DIA does not wish to release any internal report of this type. The administration would resist this amendment because of executive privilege. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its POW/MIA efforts but does not wish to invade the confidential relationship that existed between a former director and his hand-picked advisors. Further, DIA will make the entire Tighe report available to the Chairman and Ranking member of the committee, if they so desire.

Recommendation: Oppose the amendment because of the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved and the nature of these types of reports.

In draft form. Department of Defense. The subject of the amendment is the disclosure of intelligence related information on information concerning military personnel listed as prisoner, missing or unaccounted for in military actions. The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that these proposals are unnecessary and counterproductive, and should be opposed.

One proposal would require agencies whose funds are authorized under the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide the Member of Congress complete access to all classified information which possibly correlates to military personnel reported to be missing in action, unaccounted for, or a prisoner of war from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, or any other action involving the presence of U.S. military forces in a foreign country.

This proposal apparently would mandate full and unrestricted access to intelligence. This would be a drastic step that disregards the special protection necessarily given to intelligence sources and methods, especially sensitive human sources and technical systems. It disregards the principle of allowing the agency with which information originates to control its dissemination. The requirement to provide information fails to include any corresponding provision for the secure storage and handling of classified information. What is more, this proposal would have the effect of requiring dissemination of unvetted and uncorroborated information, a result that would add more to confusion and clarification of issues.

There is no need to proceed in such an ill-advised manner. Procedures in effect insure that appropriate committee members and committee staff are informed of POW/MIA-related events, briefed on POW/MIA cases of interest and afforded the opportunity to conduct a review of DIA's analytical conclusions. The implementation of the proposed amendment would totally circumvent the executive system of the U.S. Congress - specifically the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Both have direct oversight responsibilities on the POW/MIA issue. There is no instance where raw intelligence reports are given to an interested member of Congress; however, this amendment would be precursory to like requests on other subjects.

It is important to note that the Department of Defense has extended an invitation to members of the Congress, including the sponsor of the amendments at issue, to visit the DIA facility in the Pentagon to review POW/MIA cases of interest. DIA analysts would be present to answer any questions posed by the members. (To date, one Senator has responded to this invitation and has spent

DIA internal working draft.
Prepared by [illegible] for the [illegible] inquiry. [illegible] 9/11/88

Received from Mr. Costello
[illegible] 9/11/88

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE				COLLAB SUSPENSE				COORDINATION SUSPENSE			
SUBJECT											
Representative Robert Smith (R NH) and H.R. 5422											
INTERNAL ROUTING						PROVIDER ACTION OFFICE					
ACTION		COLLABORATION		COORDINATION		INFORMATION					
POW-MIA		GC				DR DD ED DI DI-3 VP					
REQUEST AND COMMENT Request a "department position paper" on the Smith Amendment to H.R. 5422 to be furnished to OSD/LL, Mr. Mark Bitterman, X76787, see attached document. The point of contact in DIO is Lt Col Dixon Jordan, 657-5101.											
SUS ELEMENT DISTRIBUTION 											
RETURN WITH COMPLETED ACTION TO						FINAL DISPOSITION					
for James S. Van Wageningen DI-3, X75101, 20246- (1187) (EDJ)											
KEYWORD SEARCH ENTRY											
THIS FORM BECOMES _____ UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)											

 GPO FORM 211
 (REV 5-81)

 UNCLASSIFIED
 CLASSIFICATION

GPO 10-10

Union Calendar No. 481

 101ST CONGRESS
 2D SESSION

H. R. 5422

[Report No. 101-725, Parts I and II]

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

August 1, 1990

Mr. BILLENSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

SEPTEMBER 19, 1990

Reported with amendments and referred to the Committee on Armed Services for a period ending not later than September 23, 1990, for consideration of such provisions of the bill and amendment as fall within the jurisdiction of that committee pursuant to clause 1(c), rule X

(Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in *italic*)

SEPTEMBER 28, 1990

Reported from the Committee on Armed Services with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

(Insert the part printed in **boldface roman**)

A BILL

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1991 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central

1 SEC. 504. DISCLOSURE TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OF CLAS-
 2 SIFIED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 3 REPORT RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL
 4 LISTED AS PRISONER, MISSING, OR UNAC-
 5 COUNTED FOR.

6 The Secretary of Defense shall provide to any
 7 Member of Congress, upon request, full and com-
 8 plete access to the classified report of the Defense
 9 Intelligence Agency commonly known as the
 10 Tighe Report, relating to efforts by the Special
 11 Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action of
 12 the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account
 13 for United States military personnel listed as pris-
 14 oner, missing, or unaccounted for in military ac-
 15 tions. The Secretary may withhold from disclosure
 16 under the preceding sentence any material that in
 17 the judgment of the Secretary would compromise
 18 sources and methods of intelligence.

WORKING PAPER

SECTION 504 OF H.R. 5422

The Committee on Armed Services of the House amended the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Bill referred to it by including Section 504 in the bill. This section, directing the Secretary of Defense to provide to any Member of Congress full and complete access to the so-called "Tighe Report," relating to efforts by the Special Office for POW/MIA of the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully account for U.S. military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions, was adopted after modification, pursuant to an amendment proposed by Representative Bob Smith.

This amendment is unnecessary inasmuch as the "Tighe Report" was made available to the four committees of Congress with oversight responsibilities for the POW/MIA issue in 1986 when the report was promulgated. Although the report is classified, it remains available for "in camera" review by Members of those committees exercising oversight of POW/MIA matters. Representative Smith has been so advised and has been invited to review the report.

Given the above described policy concerning congressional access to the "Tighe Report" Section 504 is totally unnecessary.

WORKING PAPER

Provided by
 DIA internal Affairs
 provided by POW/MIA for them
 in response to A.C.U. M.L. 4/11/15

WORKING PAPER

ACCESS TO POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTING CASES

Representative Bob Smith has previously proposed amendments which direct agencies whose funds are authorized under the Intelligence Authorization Act to provide any Member of Congress complete access to all classified information which possibly correlates to military personnel reported to be missing in action, unaccounted for, or a prisoner of war from World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, or any other action involving the presence of U.S. military forces in a foreign country.

It is important to note that the Department of Defense has extended an invitation to Members of Congress, who specifically requested access to POW/MIA files, including the sponsor of the amendments at issue, to visit the DIA facility in the Pentagon to review POW/MIA cases of interest. DIA analysts would be present to answer any questions posed by the members. (To date, one Senator has responded to this invitation and has spent four days reviewing files at the DIA facility.) The Members were advised they could be assisted by professional staff of the Armed Services, Intelligence or Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees who have the appropriate clearances and have staff responsibility for POW/MIA issues.

WORKING PAPER

WORKING PAPER

The Gaines and Brooks Reports

Representative Smith has previously drafted amendments to require the Secretary of Defense to provide access to any Member of Congress to the so-called "Gaines and Brooks Reports." These "reports" are internal reviews of the DIA Special Office for POW-MIA and constitute confidential advice to a former DIA Director from advisors specifically picked by him on the effectiveness of the program for which he felt a heightened responsibility.

Portions of these reports are classified because of their potential impact on our diplomatic relations with the governments of Vietnam and Laos.

These reports are in the nature of confidential Inspector General reports to the Director on the internal workings of his Agency. DIA is willing to discuss the effectiveness of its POW/MIA efforts, but hopefully without invading the confidential relationship that existed between a former Director and his hand-picked advisors.

WORKING PAPER

MEMORANDUM

6 November 1991

From: Joan Dempsey GDIP Staff
To: Mr. Knecht, C31

Subject: Gaines Report

1. You requested that I recount how I came to possess the Gaines report and when I located the document. Following is the sequence of events as best I can remember.

2. In my previous position as Special Assistant to the Executive Director, DIA, I worked POW/MIA issues with the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA. A draft amendment to H.R. 5009, the Intelligence Authorization Bill, was introduced in September 1990, requiring DIA to provide three reports to Congress. Those reports were the Tighe, Brooks, and Gaines reports. The Tighe report was available. The Gaines and Brooks reports could not be located in any office in DIA involved, currently or previously, in the POW/MIA issue.

3. I initiated a search for the Gaines and Brooks reports in September. I requested a thorough review of all former DIA directors' files and record files within the Executive Support Office in DIA, as well as historical files in the DIA library. I also queried personnel associated with this issue in DIA during the time the reports were compiled. The only reference to the Gaines report that was located in late September or early October was a paper copy of briefing viewgraphs provided to a former DIA director on the Gaines study effort. Also at that time, a page-and-a-half list of conclusions and recommendations written by RADM Brooks was located. It was internal staff memoranda, not a report. Ultimately, the amendment was changed to require that the Tighe report be made available to members of Congress and that the Secretary of Defense could withhold sources and methods.

4. I continued to try to locate the Gaines report. Late in 1990, a former director's executive secretary suggested I talk to a military officer, no longer assigned to DIA, who was aware of the Gaines report at the time the study was ongoing. That officer led me to a current DIA employee in the Office of Security and Counterintelligence who had a copy of the Gaines report. I do not remember the exact date but both the employee who had the report and I think it was in January 1991.

ADDENDUM (2.2.7) ~~TO~~ ~~THE~~ ~~STAFF~~

FACT SHEET

Colonel Millard A. "Mike" Peck was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIA) in June 1990 and left the office on March 28, 1991. Colonel Peck is a highly decorated veteran of the Vietnam War.

On February 12, 1991 Colonel Peck handed a letter to his superiors that contained allegations of a coverup in the POW-MIA activities of the U.S. Government and interference in the intelligence process of the Defense Intelligence Agency by the Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. Colonel Peck's letter closed with a request for DIA assistance "in being retired immediately from active military service." On March 28, 1991 - his last day of duty in the DIA POW/MIA office - he attached a letter of farewell to his staff on the door of his office along with a copy of his February 12 letter with the personal references to the Director, National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia blacked out.

Colonel Peck told the team looking into his charges that he disagrees with the current approach the U.S. Government is using to resolve the POW/MIA issue. Colonel Peck wants the U.S. Government to take unspecified action to "win the second Vietnam War." He believes the U.S. Government is rushing to normalize relations with Vietnam without first making Vietnam confess to holding prisoners of war after the end of the war. He does not say prisoners are still held in Vietnam, but wants to settle up for what he believes the government of Vietnam did in the past. He sees current U.S. actions for obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing service personnel, such as the establishment of a temporary POW/MIA Office in Hanoi, as playing into the hands of the Vietnamese government.

There have been seven previous investigations between 1982 and 1987 into allegations of a government conspiracy or coverup in handling of the POW/MIA issue. All concluded that

there was no merit in the allegations. The Department's current inquiry has not found any facts that support Colonel Peck's allegations of impropriety in the POW/MIA activities of the National League of Families, Defense Intelligence Agency or the U.S. Government.

There also has been consistent monitoring of Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency POW/MIA activities since 1975 by the House Select Committee on POW/MIAs, by the POW Task Force of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, and by the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.

Colonel Peck did identify some shortcomings in the management of the POW/MIA Office which require attention. For example, the members of the POW/MIA Interagency Group should use a formal process to task the DIA POW/MIA Office, and we need a procedure to establish the priority of competing requests for POW/MIA intelligence support. The management problems identified are not serious and the new chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action already has corrective management actions underway.

Colonel Peck is currently assigned to the Military District of Washington.

The U.S. Government remains totally committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel. We have made every conceivable effort to resolve the issue of whether the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia retained prisoners of war in captivity after the return of POWs in early 1973. Indeed, our focus is to resolve individual cases through joint investigations, surveys and excavations, while at the same time encouraging expanded unilateral efforts by the governments concerned.

Since September 1988, we have conducted 13 joint "iterations" in Vietnam consisting of one or more of these joint activities.

Since September 1987, Vietnam has repatriated 288 sets of remains. 123 of these remains have been identified.

In Laos, we have conducted 13 joint excavations. In April 1991, we began the first of several joint investigations of cases involving Americans who were known to have been captured alive.

The Department of Defense has about 150 people who work on this issue on a full-time basis, or nearly full-time basis. They include 31 personnel at the Defense Intelligence Agency's POW/MIA Office, 38 personnel at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Hawaii, 49 people at the U.S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, and others.

We still list 2,273 Americans as missing or otherwise unaccounted for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia.

The POW/MIA issue has the personal interest, concern and commitment of President Bush, Secretary Cheney and the entire Department of Defense. While the question of live prisoners remains at the forefront of our negotiation and intelligence efforts, all of us in the Department of Defense are committed to the return of any and all Americans who may still be held in captivity; the fullest possible accounting for the missing; and the repatriation of all recoverable remains. We will continue to apply all necessary resources to find the answers to these questions, as a matter of the highest national priority.

1034-1-1 (7. ~~25~~) TUBS NOV 5 74

14. Senator Grassley asked Mr. Ford for copies of the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratory reports (as well as DoD's) on the Carr photograph, the recent Stevens photograph and the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photograph. (pp. 356-458).

These items are attached at Tab A (1=Carr; 2=Stevens; 3=Robertson, Lundy and Stevens).

Analysis of the Carr

P.O.W./M.I.A. Images

Gary A. Mastin
Organisation 1421
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM 87185

1.0 Overview

Among the photographs supplied by the D. I. A. were two black and white prints of a Mr. Carr and one recent color print of a man in a polo shirt standing before a grillwork who has been identified by the Carr family as the same Mr. Carr. Gary Sydow of the POW/MIA group expressed an interest in Sandia trying to determine whether the recent color photo was indeed of Mr. Carr. One of the black and white prints is a facial close-up of Carr in his Special Forces uniform (Figure 1). Although slightly overexposed, this print shows clear detail of what appear to be acne scars on Carr's cheeks and chin. The presence of these scars prompted my associates and I to look for similar scars in the second black and white print, a picture from Carr's wedding (Figure 2). We then attempted to find the same scars in the color print suspected of being a recent photograph of Carr (Figure 3).

I cannot state conclusively whether the man in the color print is or is not the same individual in the Special Forces and wedding pictures, but there are some interesting correlations. This report documents those correlations.

2.0 Analysis Procedure

Facial regions in all three prints were digitized for exploitation by a digital computer and a digital image processor. This is performed by placing the prints on a light box, passing light through the prints, and imaging the transmitted and attenuated light with a black and white vidicon camera. The gray shade data captured by the camera is quantized to 256 levels and stored in the memory of a digital computer for exploitation. The spatial resolution of the digitized images is 512 x 512 picture elements (pixels). Computer algorithms and specialized hardware functions in the digital image processor are used to enhance contrast, zoom, smooth noise, and a number of other functions. No aspect of color has been exploited in my analysis since only one of the photographs is in color.

Prints are not the preferred media for digital image analysis. Transparencies are. When light is transmitted through a print, paper texture, writing and printing on the back side of the photograph, as well as the image itself, are captured. These artifacts reduce our ability to make judgements about the photographic image itself. Sometimes they may

C. Donald
Analysis of the Carr

August 12, 1991

interiere. This is especially true of writing such as handwritten numbers identifying the images and printing such as "THIS PAPER MANUFACTURED BY KODAK". We are always concerned that printing, writing, and paper texture can lead us to a false interpretation of the digitized data. Since prints were the only media provided, I proceeded with the analysis, paying close attention to any image features that could possibly be attributed to paper texture, printing, or writing. Although I cannot be certain that some of the facial features I am identifying in this report are not false, my best judgement is that they are real.

Because the Special Forces photograph provides the highest quality map of facial scars, I used it as my primary reference image. The wedding photograph is the secondary reference image. My first exercise was to identify common scars in both of these images. I digitized portions of the two black and white images around the mouth, chin, cheeks, and nose in order to gain higher spatial resolution digital images of the scars. Next, I stretched the contrast to make the scars more easily visible on a large color video monitor. Figures 4 and 5 are photographic copies of the images displayed on the monitor. Unfortunately, the copies do not show the features as well as the monitor. Finally, I identified three scar areas which I believe appear well in both images. These are outlined in boxes numbered 1, 2, and 5. Box 1 includes a single deep chin scar. Box 2 encloses two interesting features, a shallow depression closer to the mouth and a smaller rise to the right of the first feature. The shallow depression shows better in the wedding photograph. Box 5 encloses an intersecting double ring scar, one ring at the lower left of the box and one ring at the upper right.

I identified some distinguishing scars in the Special Forces image (Figure 4) and the wedding image (Figure 5) that may or may not be visible in both images. The scar in box 7 of the Special Forces image may appear in the wedding image, but this is purely a judgement call. What I have labeled as box 4 in the wedding picture may not exactly correspond to box 4 in the Special Forces image. Exact placement is difficult because of the slightly differing camera angles in the two images. The "blotch" on the chin in the wedding image (box 8) cannot be seen in the Special Forces image due to overexposure in the chin region of the Special Forces image. An interesting curve in the upper tip of the Special Forces image (box 6) is not visible in the wedding picture because of Carr's wedding image smile.

My next step was to find features in the suspected recent image of Carr. I will refer to this as the Suspect image. As in the case of the black and white images, I digitized a facial region of the Suspect image at high magnification. Because the face in the Suspect image occupies a smaller portion of the scene, the magnified and digitized face appears more noisy (grainy) than the Special Forces and wedding images. This "noisiness" makes all facial features less distinct, especially scars. I did discover several interesting correlations between images. First, box 5 encloses a double-ringed scars on the chin of the Suspect image that appears in roughly the same location as in the Special Forces and wedding images. Second, box 2 in the Suspect image shows two circular features in roughly the same location as in the Special Forces and wedding images. Third, note the similar upper lip curve in the Special Forces and Suspect images (box 6). Also note the correlation between the scars in box 7 of the Special Forces and Suspect images. Finally, box 8 in the

Special Forces image shows a chin "blotch" that is in the vicinity of the marking in box 8 of the wedding image.

Given the length of time between the Suspect and Special Forces/wedding images, I was concerned about the propriety of comparing acne scars for identification purposes. I consulted with Dr. Gerald B. (Chip) Demarest, head of the trauma unit of the University of New Mexico Hospital and a Desert Storm surgeon, about these kinds of scars. His comment was that deep acne scars such as those in the Special Forces image will remain for life. They may become shallower and possibly wider with age and weight gain and they may change color, but they will remain as characteristic facial features throughout life.

One final comment should be made about a scar that appears above Carr's right eye (viewer's left) in the Special Forces image (Figure 1). There appears to be a slight mismatch of Carr's right eyebrow, possibly due to a cut of some kind. This feature also appears in the wedding image (Figure 2). Now look at the color Suspect image (Figure 3). Does the suspect's right eyebrow show a similar anomaly? Dr. Demarest thinks so. I could not demonstrate anything conclusive digitally.

3.0 Conclusions

Although a positive identification of the individual in the Suspect image cannot be made based on my analysis, several interesting correlations between the Suspect image and known images of Carr can be made. Should more images surface that claim to be recent images of Carr, I would recommend that the facial features identified in this report be investigated. If at all possible, obtain original negatives. Prints are a poor medium for digital image analysis.

I must emphasize that any correlations are judgement calls on my part. Digital image processing has allowed me to visualize small details that were not obvious from the full-sized prints I received, but no quantitative analysis can realistically be performed to match these facial features to any degree of confidence. The matching was done by me and I am susceptible to human biases and errors in judgement.



Figure 2. Carr's wedding picture. This is a xerographic-process color copy.




Figure 4. Carr's Special Forces image after digitization of the desired facial region, contrast enhancement, and feature marking.




Figure 3. Suspected picture of Carr positively identified by Carr's family. This is a xerographic-process color copy.




Figure 5. Carr's wedding image after digitization of the desired facial region, contrast enhancement, and feature marking. Writing on the back of the digitized print shows through the digitized image.




Figure 6. Suspected image of Carr after digitization of the desired facial region, contrast enhancement and feature marking.

Analysis of the Purported Stevens P. O. W./M. I. A. Image

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1.0 Synopsis

This report accompanies a video tape showing the comparison of the service record photograph of Lieut. Larry J. Stevens (USN) and a recent photograph purported to show Stevens in southeast Asia. The quality of the purported Stevens image is not high enough to identify subtle facial features; therefore, a comparison of basic facial structure has been pursued. Four experiments were performed.

The first experiment was a computer comparison between the Service Record image and the Purported image. The Service Record image was uniformly scaled and positioned so that it geometrically registered with the Purported image. A digital blending or dissolving sequence was then created and recorded on video tape. This sequence makes it easier for a human observer to identify facial features such as cheeks, eyebrows, and nose structure that may be similar or different between the images. There is a good match between many features in this video sequence, but there is a noticeable difference in head width.

The second experiment was a computer comparison between the Service Record image and an image of a known individual (an employee of Sandia National Laboratories) with similar facial structure to the man in the Purported image. This experiment attempted to answer the question, "If the correlation between the Service Record and Purported images appears to be good, can the same correlation be made between the Service Record image and an image of another man whose face is similar to that of the man in the Purported image?" The same blending technique was used in this experiment. There are similarities in eye and nose structure between the men in these images.

The third experiment was another computer comparison, this time between the Test Subject image and the Purported image. These individuals are known to be different people, yet the blending shows similarities between the men.

Finally, a fourth experiment was performed. There was good correlation between facial features in the first experiment, but the width of the face in the Purported image is slightly wider than that in the Service Record image. Is this reasonable if the subject has gained weight over the years? To answer this question, images of the Test Subject from youth and from a recent image were compared. There was no measurable difference in

head width despite roughly 40 years of age-difference and a 100 lb. weight gain by the Test Subject.

There is not enough information in the Service Record and Purported images to make a conclusive identification. The two men look somewhat alike. There is some reason, however, to doubt that the images show the same individual. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that it is possible to photograph a Test Subject (having similar facial structures to those in the Purported image) in such a way that many features correlate. Experiment 4 showed that the Test Subject's head width, as measured ear-to-ear just below the eyes, did not change with age or weight gain. Why, then, is there a quantifiable difference in the same measure between Steven's Service Record image and that of the man in the Purported image? Readers should view the blending video tape sequences and make their own determination. Viewers should note that the Test Subject is called the "Imposter" in the video sequences.

I also have some serious reservations about the technique used by Prof. Charney of Colorado State University to "positively" identify the Purported image as that of Lieut. Stevens. These issues are briefly addressed at the end of this report.

2.0 Experimental Procedure

All experiments were performed in the Image Processing Facility at Sandia National Laboratories. In the first experiment, negatives supplied by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the purported image of Stevens, referred to in this report as the Purported image, and Stevens' service record image, referred to in this report as the Service Record image, were captured with a vidicon camera (using a 55 mm macro lens), digitized, and stored in computer memory. Only the facial regions of the images were digitized. This permits the highest spatial resolution possible in the image areas of interest. Next, the Service Record image was uniformly scaled so that the facial dimensions corresponded to those of the Purported image. Uniform scaling means that the x- and y-dimensions of the Service Record image were interpolated by the same factor. In this case, the x- and y-dimensions were interpolated so that the resulting image was 90% of the size of the digitized image. The scaling factor was determined so that the eye separation in both the Service Record and Purported images was identical. The Service Record image was then digitally translated within the computer memory space so that the eyes in both the Service Record and Purported images were superimposed. Some contrast stretching was performed to better match the contrast in the two images for frame-to-frame comparison. Finally, a digital dissolving or blending operation was performed as a comparison technique. Multiple comparison frames are generated in this technique which can be recorded as a movie loop. The sequence begins with the Service Record image displayed, then, in successive frames, the displayed image is composed of increasing contributions from the

Purported image and decreasing contributions from the Service Record image until, at last, only the Purported image is displayed. The algorithmic form of this process is

N = number of blending frames

$\Delta = 1/(N-1)$

For FRAME from 1 to N ,

$\lambda = (\text{FRAME} - 1) * \Delta$

$\text{IMAGEOUT} = (1 - \lambda) * \text{SERVICE_RECORD} + \lambda * \text{PURPORTED}$

End For

This process is reversed to blend the Purported image into the Service Record image.

This technique was chosen for two reasons. First, the quality of the Purported image is not high enough to identify subtle facial features such as scars, moles, etc. The poor quality is primarily due to film grain noise. The subject simply was not close enough to the camera to adequately sample his face. In the absence of high spatial resolution, all one can do is examine gross facial structure. The blending technique allows a comparison of gross facial structure. Second, Prof. Michael Carney, a forensic scientist at Colorado State University, has made a positive identification based on gross facial structure. Dr. Charney used binary (black or white) "edge" images created from high-pass frequency filtering of the Service Record and Purported images. While I understand the motivation for this, I also understand that this means an identification was made using a subset of the available gray-shade information. I was curious to see whether having all the spatial frequencies would aid in the identification. There are certainly striking similarities between facial structures in the Service Record and Purported images, but even with all the gray-shade data and the additional interpretive information one obtains from blending, I do not feel I can make a positive identification.

A second experiment was performed that was identical to the first, but the Purported image was replaced by an image of a known test subject. I wanted to know if a blend between the Service Record image and the image of a known imposter (having similar gross facial structure to the subject in the Purported image) would reveal the same similarities observed in the first experiment. A known individual

at Sandia National Laboratories,

posed in front of a TV camera connected to the image processor. His pose was chosen to copy the pose of the man in the Purported image. The digitized image was then uniformly scaled, translated, and rotated slightly so that his eyes matched the position of the man in the Purported image. A blending sequence was then performed between the Service Record image and the image of the known individual. The image of the known individual is called the "Imposter" in the video sequences.

This blending shows a correlation between the eye and nose structures of both Stevens and the Test Subject. There is, however, a difference in cheek structure below the eyes. The Test Subject's head is also wider than Stevens' head in the vicinity of the ears. This experiment shows me that the image of an imposter having a roughly similar facial

structure to that of the man in the Purported image can be blended with a known image of Stevens and match closely.

A more interesting experiment that I performed was a blending between the Imposter image and the Purported image. This was the third experiment. I believe that the blending between these two images shows as great, or greater, a similarity between faces as the blending between the Service Record and Purported images. My opinion after this experiment is that 1) if one of the images to be blended is blurred or noisy, thereby obscuring facial details, 2) if the men in the images are about the same age, and 3) if the faces in the images to be blended have *roughly* the same facial structure, then the blended images will appear to match. The imaging geometry of the faces also plays a significant role. I photographed the imposter in three slightly different geometries. One of these photographs matched the Purported image much better than the other two. The eye squint and smile of the imposter were also significant matching factors.

The experiments to this point have concentrated on what is the same in the images. What about those features that don't match? There seems to be some head width inconsistency between blended images in all of the experiments. By head width, I mean the distance between points where the ears intersect the skull just below the temples. A line drawn on the photograph between these points would cross the upper cheek bones. The pose of the head being photographed can certainly change the measured width. Slight neck rotations of the head relative to the camera can make the head appear wider. Fortunately, the Service Record and Purported poses are the same. Head rotation appears not to be an issue in this case. There is another consideration. Can this width increase with age and weight gain? The fourth and final experiment addresses this issue. An image of the Test Subject at age 14 was compared with an image of the Test Subject taken this week. I carefully posed the Test Subject so that his head position matched the position in his picture as a youth. In the case of the Test Subject, there is no measurable difference in head width. It is interesting that the Test Subject's head width has not changed despite a weight gain of over 100 lb. and fattening of the cheeks. In contrast, the head in the Purported image is about 14% wider than Stevens head in the Service Record image. (An adult head is about 6 in. wide, so 14% corresponds to about 1 in. of difference.) If this pattern of fixed head width holds for the general population, then it is very unlikely that the Service Record and Purported images show the same man.

3.0 Review of Prof. Charney's Photo Identification Procedure

Professor Charney has stated that the Service Record and Purported images show the same man. My understanding from Dr. Charney's report [1] is that his determination was made solely from the superposition of binary "edge" images created from high-pass filtering of the Service Record and Purported images. Figure 1 shows the color coded binary images that I understand Dr. Charney used to make his determination. If it is true that these binary images represent the only information used in Dr. Charney's decision, then I question the validity of his determination.

Researchers in human visual perception argue that humans, when viewing a natural scene, rapidly construct "... a primitive but rich description of the image that is to be used to determine the reflectance and illumination of the visible surfaces, and their orientation and distance to the viewer." [2] These researchers have shown that humans are extremely sensitive to rapid changes in intensity. The most rapid changes are termed "edges" and perceptual researchers focus on the human ability to recognize "edges" as a *first* step in analyzing scenes. As a result, people in the field of digital image processing often concentrate on finding "edges" in scenes as the first step in a computer analysis. One way to find "edges" in an image is to perform high-pass filtering. This is a technique commonly used in image processing as a *preanalysis* step.

One must understand, however, that "edges" in images are somewhat subjective. Different "edges" can be extracted from a common scene due to changes in lighting or the addition of noise. What I perceive as an edge on a face, regardless of lighting or noise, may be different from what a high-pass filter implemented on a computer designates as an "edge".

Furthermore, edge detection is usually used in image processing as a *data reduction* technique. A classic application is in machine vision where a robot, usually under highly controlled lighting conditions, must reduce the amount of picture information it sees to bare essentials in order for the computer to rapidly find objects in three-dimensional space. Because researchers believe that humans perceive "edges" as their first step in analyzing a scene, machine vision practitioners routinely find "edges", believing that "edges" are the optimal set of bare essentials necessary for locating objects.

The question I ask when assessing Dr. Charney's report is, "If it is difficult for observers to positively identify the Service Record and Purported images given all the information inherent in the gray-shade images, why should throwing away most of the information make the identification any easier?" Had Dr. Charney enhanced the high-frequency information of the image to make a better determination, I would not question his procedure. Had Dr. Charney eliminated a few frequencies that appeared to contribute to the "noisiness" of the image to make his determination, again I would not question his procedure. Throwing away information, however, is usually not a good idea. Let me illustrate my point with an example.

The superposition image in Figure 1, which comes from Dr. Charney's report, shows the Service Record "edge" image (red) superimposed on the Purported "edge" image (dark). Edges around the eyes, nose, and mouth overlap. Now look at Figure 2. Here I have superimposed the Test Subject "edge" image (yellow) over the Purported "edge" image (cyan). The "edges" from the Purported image are wider because of the noisy (fuzzy) nature of the Purported image. Note that the same is also true for the Purported "edge" image (dark) in Figure 1. The "edges" from the Test Subject image in Figure 2 overlap the "edges" from the Purported image. Am I to conclude, then, that the Test Subject and Purported images show the same man?

I believe that an expert at identifying human subjects can identify subtle structural features in photographs that a layman would miss. I believe that these features can be cru-

cial factors in identifying people. However, if an identification is made solely from the "edge" images, then I must dismiss the identification as being flawed.

4.0 Conclusions

I cannot say whether or not the Service Record and Purported images show the same man. The men in the two images do look somewhat alike. Sequence 1 on the video tape documents this. However, sequences 2 and 3 on the video tape show that an imposter can also be photographed to look somewhat like the Service Record and Purported images. The increased head width in the Purported image compared to the Service Record image is very troublesome to me, especially in view of the comparison between images of the Test Subject as a youth and as an adult. Age and weight gain did not increase the width. Finally, I am concerned about the technical foundation upon which Dr. Charney has made his identification.

5.0 References

1. M. Charney, Letter to Mr. Tracy E. Usry, Chief Investigator, U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D. C., Aug. 1, 1991.
2. D. Marr and E. Hildreth, "Theory of Edge Detection," *Proc. Royal Society of London*, Vol. B 207, 1980, pp. 187-217.




Figure 1. Dr. Charney's binary "edge" images created from high-pass frequency filtering [1]. He concludes that these are images of the same man because a number of edges overlap.




Figure 2. Superposition of binary "edge" images created from high-pass frequency filtering. The blue "edges" were made from the image purported to show Stevens in 1990. The yellow "edges" were made from the image of a test subject known not to be Stevens. Note the overlap around the eyes and nose.

Analysis of the Purported Robertson, Lundy, and Stevens

P. O. W./ M. I. A. Image

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1.0 Overview

One of the photographs the D. I. A. has asked Sandia National Laboratories to investigate is the widely circulated photograph of three men holding a banner which is purported to show Col. John L. Robertson (USAF), Maj. Albro L. Lundy, Jr. (USAF), and Lieut. Larry J. Stevens (USN). All three men are missing from the Vietnam war. These identifications have been made by family members. The D. I. A., however, has reason to believe that the photograph is a hoax. There are reports that this photograph is an alteration of a photograph taken at the end of World War II, or shortly after. The man on the left (see Figure 1) is believed by the D. I. A. to be holding the stocks of rifles. If this photograph is supposed to be a photograph of American servicemen being held captive in Vietnam, why would they be holding rifles?

I have examined regions of the photograph. Although the quality of this photograph is terrible, I concur that the man on the left is holding the stocks of several rifles. I also believe that the man on the right (see Figure 1) has his left hand cupped to support something. My belief is that he is holding the barrels of the rifles. Finally, I suspect that the second man, the one behind and to the immediate right of the banner, is holding the bottom of the banner with his left hand, has his shoulders parallel to the right-most man, and that his head position is the result of his holding the banner and leaning forward for the picture.

I, too, am suspicious that the photograph is a hoax. The only substantiating evidence I can give, however, is an outline of what I believe to be the front-most rifle and a justification for why the right-most man is posed as he is. I have no conclusions about the banner or the writing on the banner. This report outlines the details of my observations.

2.0 Analysis Procedure

The photographic print was rephotographed at Sandia National Laboratories and this negative was used to make an 8 x 10 inch transparency. The transparency was illuminated from behind, and the image was captured on a vidicon camera interfaced to a digital image processor and a digital computer. The captured image has a spatial resolution of 512 x 512 picture elements (pixels), each pixel having a dynamic range of 256 gray shades. Although the imaging system has the capability of capturing 256 gray shades, the photograph of three men has very little dynamic range. A histogram of the images shows the image to be almost binary, i.e. it has virtually two gray shades, opaque and transparent. This is a serious disadvantage for digital image analysis since analysis usually exploits dynamic range information to discern spatial structures of interest. I suspect that the original image supplied to the D. L. A. may have been a fax copy, not a true photograph. This could account for the poor dynamic range.

2.1 Man 1 and the rifle stocks

I began my investigations with a subregion extracted about the man on the left. I will refer to him as Man 1 since he is left-most. I digitized this subregion to the full spatial resolution of the system. In other words, I adjusted the position of the digitizing camera to fill the full 512 x 512 digitizing space with the subregion of Man 1. Next, I digitally altered the contrast of the digitized image in order to discern any structures at the chest level of Man 1. I wanted to see if I could trace the outline of the rifle stocks he appears to be holding. The light blue (cyan) outline in Figure 2 is my best judgement of an outline that is marginally visible in several contrast-stretched versions of the image. I discerned a faint round glint in the gun outline which I have questionably labeled as a rifle bolt. The green outline is a continuation of that outline, but one in which I have less confidence. I did, however, repeatedly discern a dark rectangular region in the enhanced image. Could this be an ammunition magazine? I am not sure. It could also be an artifact of continued reproduction of the original photograph. The red outline in Figure 2 shows the man's shoulder and arm profile. I was originally suspicious of a bright vertical line between the left edge of the banner and Man 1, but I later decided this shows the near intersection of the shoulder and the banner. I have also outlined what I believe to be the collar of Man 1. Could this man be wearing a camouflage shirt or jacket over a lighter shirt with an exposed collar? Finally, I was initially confused about the light areas just right of what I believe is the rifle stocks. I thought they showed Man 1's right hand. After some consideration, I believe the lower white area is the right hand and wrist, and that the upper white area is the left hand resting on top of the rifle stocks. This raised a serious question. If Man 1 has both hands near the rifle stocks, what is holding up the barrel ends?

2.2 Man 3 and his pose

This last question led me to consider the right subregion of the full photograph. The right-most man, whom I will call Man 3, seems to be posing with his left hand in a peculiar position. I conjectured that Man 3 is holding the barrel of the rifles whose stocks are being held by Man 1 (see Figure 3). Man 3 seems to have his hand cupped around the bot-

tom of the barrels. From the orientation of the rifle stocks held by Man 1 and by a comparison of relative head sizes, I assume that Man 3 is standing further away from the camera than Man 1. The next question I asked was, "Is Man 3 standing the expected distance away from Man 1 to actually be holding the barrel of the rifles?" I went to the library and found a copy of *Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the World* (1975) and located a popular World War II German rifle, the Mauser Kar 98 k. I chose this rifle because of its widespread use by the Germans in World War II and because of its bolt action. I could not locate a picture of this rifle with an attached magazine, if such an arrangement even exists. An associate helped me create a gray shaded transparency from the book page which I digitized and entered into the computer. I then digitally scaled the rifle image so that its stock height equaled the stock height of the front-most rifle held by Man 1 in Figure 3. Based on the depth of the front-most rifle stock, another associate and I calculated the angle that the rifle is making relative to the plane of the photograph. This was done because Man 3 is standing further back than Man 1, and, because of the angle of the rifles relative to the plane of the photograph, any rifle image mapped onto the photograph would have to incorporate length foreshortening due to the perspective. Our calculations showed the front-most rifle to be oriented at roughly 55 degrees from the plane of the photograph, meaning that the digitized rifle had to be compressed in length by about 40 percent. This experiment was performed and the rifle was overlaid on the photograph. The end of the barrel of the front-most rifle rested just beyond the hand of Man 3. I believe this verifies my conjecture that Man 3 is holding the barrels of the rifles. See Figure 4.

My associates and I have posed a question about the rifles that we cannot answer. Are the rifles being held right-side-up (barrel up and trigger down) or upside-down (barrel down and trigger up) as a hunter would hold his rifle? If my sketch is right (Figures 2 and 3), an ammunition magazine is attached to the front-most rifle, the bolt is visible, and the rifles are right-side-up. However, when I warped the Mauser Kar 98 k to overlay on the photograph, the rifle appeared to be too tall in the vicinity of the bolt and it partially obstructed the bottom of the banner. Perhaps no magazine exists and the rifles are being held upside-down. We can't say for sure.

2.3 Man 2 and the banner

Finally, I should say a few words about Man 2, the man just to the right of the banner. I was concerned about the apparent size of his head and its orientation. I fit ellipses to the faces of Man 2 and Man 3 and discovered that the head of Man 2 is almost exactly the same length as Man 3 who is standing in front. Still, I could find no evidence that the head of Man 2 had been cut and moved. I now suspect that Man 2 is in the proper place in the original photograph, that the person generating this hoax photograph did not move or add him. I say this because I believe Man 2 is standing with his shoulders parallel to Man 3, that he is standing almost shoulder to shoulder down-range from Man 3, and that Man 2 has his left hand holding the banner. I also suspect that Man 2 has his right arm raised to support the top left edge of the banner. I cannot find any evidence of Man 2's right hand. Why? Has it been removed as a result of alterations to the banner? I don't know. I suspect Man 2 just has a large head, and that due to his position behind Man 3 and his responsibil-

ity for holding the banner, he is stretching his head forward and at an uncomfortable angle for the picture.

2.4 More questions

One last set of questions. Is the background brush or is it light passing through camouflage netting? Could this be an altered version of a World War II victory photograph? Is Man 3 wearing a traditional Soviet uniform coat? Is Man 1 a paratrooper in camouflage? Are the rifles captured German weapons? Was the banner originally a captured Nazi flag or a flag of the victorious fighters that has been altered for this photograph?

3.0 Historical Literature Search

I am so convinced that this photograph is an alteration of a historical photograph that I have begun a limited literature search to find the original photograph. I have examined the following:

1. All issues of *Soviet Military Review* in the Sandia National Laboratories library from mid-1965 through 1989.
2. An assortment of books covering the Soviet liberation of the Baltic states and eastern Europe in the Sandia library and the University of New Mexico library. A list of possible sources was accessed by a Sandia librarian from her on-line Library of Congress database. This list is attached to the end of this report. I had little success in locating any of these volumes.
3. All issues of *Soviet Life* in the Sandia National Laboratories library from May 1989 to the present.

4.0 Conclusions

I cannot prove that this photograph is a hoax, but I believe there is substantial evidence that rifles are being held. It doesn't make sense that captive P. O. Ws would have their picture taken holding weapons. This, however is conjecture on my part. I have found no evidence that this photograph has been tampered with. I also have found no evidence that it is tamper-free. I recommend a continued historical literature search to locate the original image.




Figure 1. The purported image of Robertson, Lundy, and Stevens.




Figure 2. Man 1 and the rifle stocks (my interpretation of the scene). The light blue (cyan) outline is my best judgement of an outline that is marginally visible in several contrast-stretched versions of the image. The green line is a continuation of the cyan outline, but one in which I have less confidence.



Figure 3. The full scene with a continuation of the front-most rifle held by Man 1. Man 3 (right-most) may be holding the rifle barrels.




Figure 4. Test to see if Man 3 is the proper distance away from Man 1 to be holding the end of a rifle barrel. A Mauser Kar 98 k, digitally scaled and geometrically warped to the proper perspective, is superimposed for comparison.

ATTACHMENTS

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t 14/3/all

14/3/1

3764003 LCCN: 83012392 //r91

In one newspaper : a chronicle of unforgettable years / Ilya Ehrenburg and Konstantin Simonov ; translator, Anatol Kagan
UNIFORM TITLE: Krasnaia zvezda
Erenburg, Il'ia, 1891-1967
Simonov, Konstantin Mikhailovich, 1915-

New York : Sphinx Press, xxii, 503 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1985

ISBN: 0823686558

LC CALL NO.: D764 .E733 1985 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.53/47

14/3/2

3662731 LCCN: 88142766

Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, 1941-1945 ; sobytiia, liudi, dokumenty : kratkii istoricheskii spravocnik / [pod obshchei redaktsiei O.A. Rzhachevskogo ; sostavitel' E.K. Zhigunov ; kolektiv avtorov Andrianov V.I. ... et al.]
Rzhachevskii, Oleg Aleksandrovich; Zhigunov, E. K; Andrianov, V. I

Moskva : Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 463 p. : ill. (some col.) ; 27 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1990

ISBN: 5250004059

LC CALL NO.: D764 .V438 1990

14/3/3

3479916 LCCN: 90024512

Red storm on the Reich ; the Russians march on Germany, 1945 / Christopher Duffy
Duffy, Christopher, 1936-

London ; New York : Routledge,
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1991

ISBN: 0415035899

LC CALL NO.: D764 .D797 1991 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/4

3356936 LCCN: 84117784 //r90

Slia armia ; bovoi put' / S.M. Sarkis'ian
Sarkis'ian, S. M. (Semen Mkrtcheyevich)

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo, 283 p., [16] p. of plates : ill., maps,
ports. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1983

LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .S364 1983

14/3/5

3329064 LCCN: 84106136 //r90

Shlia s bol'shai-- / A.M. Chmel'ev
Chmel'ev, A. M. (Aleksandr Makarovich)

Kishinev : Kartia Moldovianaske, 171, [5] p. : port. ; 20 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1983

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LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .S336 1983

14/3/6

3231830 LCCN: 88206454

Skvor' ognennye vikhri ; bovoi put' 11-i gvardeiskoi armii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941-1945 / [avtorskii kolektiv, M.G. Grigorenko (rukovoditel') ... et al.]
Grigorenko, M. G

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo, 283 p., [16] p. of plates : ill., maps,
ports. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1987

LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .S493 1987

14/3/7

3215939 LCCN: 85197823 //r90

Osvobozhdenie gorodov : spravocnik po osvobozhdeniiu gorodov v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945 / pod obshchei redaktsiei S.P. Ivanova ; [avtorskii kolektiv, Dudarenko M.L. (rukovoditel') ... et al.]

Ivanov, S. P; Dudarenko, M. L
CORPORATE SOURCE: Institut voennoi istorii. Soviet Union. Ministerstvo obrony. Tsentral'nyi arkhiv.

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo, 597 p. ; 23 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1985

LC CALL NO.: D764 .08543 1985

14/3/8

3210024 LCCN: 90145320

Velikaia Otechestvennaia ; fotoal'bom posviashchen velikomu podvigu sovetskogo naroda, sovershennomu v krovoprolitnoi bor'be protiv nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov / [avtory teksta Chuikov V.I., Riabov V.S. ; khudozhnik Belozerskii O.I. ; avtory fotografii i kinokadrov M. Al'pert ... et al.]
Chuikov, V. I, 1900-; Riabov, Vasilii Sergeevich; Al'pert, Maks Vladimirovich

Izd. 4. Moskva : "Planeta", 389 p. : chiefly ill. (some col.) ; 28 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1987

LC CALL NO.: D764 .V415 1987

14/3/9

3201500 LCCN: 84117843

Vtoraia udarnaia v bitve za Leningrad ; vosponinaniia, dokumenty / [sostavitel' V.A. Kuznetsov ; obshchestvennaia redaktsionnaia kollegiia K.K. Krupitsa ... et al.]
Kuznetsov, V. A; Krupitsa, K. K

Leningrad : Lenizdat, 375 p., [16] p. of plates : ill. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1983

LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .V76 1983

14/3/10

3101566 LCCN: 87124929

August 16, 1991 8:07am Page 3

Desiatyi tankovyi Dneprovskii : boevoi put' 10-go tankovogo Dneprovskogo
ordena Suvorova korpusa / I.M. Kravchenko, V.V. Burkov ; pod redaktsei
I.A. Magonova
Kravchenko, I. M. (Ivan Mikhailovich)
Burkov, V. V.; Magonov, I. A

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo, 188 p., [16] p. of plates : ill. ; 21 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1986
LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .K73 1986

14/3/11
3089850 LCCN: 88209387

Tysiacha chetyresta vosemnadsat' dnei : rasskazy o bitvakh i garoiakh
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyny / A. Mitiaev
Mitiaev, A. (Anatolii)

Moskva : "Detakaia lit-ra", 589 p. : ill. (some col.) : 22 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1987
LC CALL NO.: D764 .M528 1987

14/3/12
3052526 LCCN: 80023634 //r903

The Soviet juggernaut / by Earl F. Zienke and the editors of Time-Life
Books
Zienke, Earl Frederick, 1922-
CORPORATE SOURCE: Time-Life Books.

Alexandria, Va. : Time-Life Books : Morristown, N.J. : School and
library distribution by Silver Burdett Co., 208 p. : ill. ; 29 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1980
ISBN: 0809433893; 0809433895 (lib. bdg.); 0809433877 (retail ed.)
LC CALL NO.: D764 .Z4928 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/13
3051329 LCCN: 77070036 //r89

War in the East : the Russo-German conflict, 1941-45 / by the staff of
Strategy & tactics magazine ; contributors, James P. Dunnigan ... [et
al.]
UNIFORM TITLE: Strategy & tactics
Dunnigan, James P

1st ed. New York : Simulations Publications, vi, 186 p. : ill. ;
25 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1977
ISBN: 0917852001
LC CALL NO.: D764 .W32 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/14
2896870 LCCN: 89125475

Armiia Radziacka v wojnie z hitlerowskimi Niemcami 1941-1945 / Fryderyk
Zbiniewicz
Zbiniewicz, Fryderyk

/d. 1. Warszawa : Wydawn. Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 310 p.,
[40] p. of plates : ill. ; 23 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1988

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ISBN: 8111074895
LC CALL NO.: D764 .Z36 1958

14/3/15

2011805 LCCN: 87141142

Tvortsy pobedy ; ot riadovogo do marshala / [sostaviteli, S.N. Kosterin
i N.N. Mikhailov]
Kosterin, S. N.; Mikhailov, N. N

Moskva : Sov. Rossiia, 319 p. : 21 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1987
LC CALL NO.: D764 .T97 1987

14/3/16

2805426 LCCN: 88039114

Soviet operational deception ; the red cloak / by Richard N. Armstrong
Armstrong, Richard N. (Richard Nolan), 1946-

Fort Leavenworth, Kan. : Combat Studies Institute, ix, 56 p. : ill.
; 23 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1988
LC CALL NO.: D764 .A77 1988 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/17

2577358 LCCN: 75382523 //r893

Von Busuluk bis Prag (Ins Deutsche ubertragen von Erwin Thiemann [u.a.]
UNIFORM TITLE: Z Busuluku do Prahy
Jvoboda, Ludvik, 1895-

Gekurzte Ausg.) (Berlin) Deutscher Militärverlag 342 p. with illus.
21 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1967
LC CALL NO.: D764.6.C5 5865
NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: GDB68-A1-136

14/3/18

2250724 LCCN: 86232914

SSSR y bor'be protiv fashistskoi agressii, 1933-1945 /-otvetstvennyi
redaktor A.L. Narochnitskii
Narochnitskii, Aleksei Leont'evich
CORPORATE SOURCE: Institut istorii SSSR (Akademia nauk SSSR)

2-e izd, perer. i dop. Moskva : "Nauka", 349 p. : 22 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1986
LC CALL NO.: D764 .S78 1986

14/3/19

2250028 LCCN: 86231283

Persirovanie rek, 1942-1945 gg. ; iz opyta 65-i armii / P.I. Batov
Batov, Pavel Ivanovich

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo, 158, [2] p. : ill. ; 21 cm.
PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1986
LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .B37 1986

14/3/20

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233345 LCCN: 86189194

Pobeda--10; materialite sa propachatahi ot spisanie "Voennoistoricheski sbornik", br. 2, 1985 g
 CORPORATE SOURCE: Tsentralen komitet na DMS. Voennoistoricheski sbornik.

Sofia : Dimitrovski komunisticheski suiz, TSentr. kom-t, 79 p. ; 20 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1985
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .P537 1985

14/3/21

2196927 LCCN: 86107411

Mesokrushimoe edinstvo / V.A. Zamlinakii
 Zamlyne'nyi, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych

Kiev : Gol. izd-vo izdatel'skogo ob'edineniia "Vyscha shkola", 205 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1984
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .Z335 1984

14/3/22

2117593 LCCN: 85202948

Pobeda--publitsistika, ocherki / [sostavlenie i podgotovka teksta A. Krivitskogo]
 Krivitskii, Aleksandr Iur'evich

Moskva : "Khudozh. lit-ra", 365 p. ; 27 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1984
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .P5385 1984

14/3/23

1828767 LCCN: 83177726

Kruty stupeni ; zapiski zhurnalista / Iurii Zhukov
 Zhukov, Iurii Aleksandrovich

Moskva : "Mysl'", 381 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1983
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .Z488 1983

14/3/24

1787331 LCCN: 83100993

Pervye kalpy / M.M. Afanas'ev
 Afanas'ev, M. M. (Nikolai Mikhailovich)

2-a izd., dop. Moskva : Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 172 p., [16] p. of plates : ill., ports. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1982
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .A4 1982

14/3/25

1695270 LCCN: 82177748

Der Krieg im Osten 1941-1945 ; historische Einfuhrung, Kommentare und Dokumente / Michael Bartsch, Hans-Frieder Schabesch, Rainer Schepplmann

UNIFORM TITLE: Unvergessene Krieg (Television program)

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1981
 ISBN: 3802521439
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .E38 1981 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/26

1666013 LCCN: 82158351 //r86

Cerol Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyny, 1941-1945 : rekomendatelnii bibliograficheskii ukazatel' / pod redaktsiei G.A. Kumanova ; [sostaviteli N.P. Baranova ... et al.]
 Kumanov, Georgii Aleksandrovich; Baranova, N. P
 CORPORATE SOURCE: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka RSFSR.

Moskva : "Kniga", 140 p. ; 20 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1981
 LC CALL NO.: Z6207.W8 G44 1981; D764 DEWEY CALL NO.: 016.94054/81/47

14/3/27

1576492 LCCN: 81454110 //r852

Tanky miri k Ostrave / [autori] Sergej Petras, Karel Richter
 Petras, Sergej
 Richter, Karel, joint author

1. vyd. Praha : MV, 271 p., [8] leaves of plates : ill. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1979
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .P46
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: Cz80

14/3/28

1550688 LCCN: 81177939

Der unvergessene Krieg : Hitler-Deutschland gegen die Sowjetunion 1941-1945 / Michael Eickhoff, Wilhelm Pagels, Willy Reschl
 Eickhoff, Michael, 1933-
 Pagels, Wilhelm, 1950-; Reschl, Willy, 1947-

Koln : Verlagsgesellschaft Schulfernsehen, 192 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1981
 ISBN: 3802521439 (kart.)
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .E38 1981 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: GFR81-A

14/3/29

1536193 LCCN: 81155569

51-ia gvardeiskaia mnogonatsional'nai / Khalil Mutallimov
 Mutallimov, Khalil

Baku : Azerbaizhanskoe gos. izd-vo, 292 p., [17] p. of plates : ill., ports. ; 21 cm.

PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1978
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .M88 1978

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14/3/30

19510 LCCN: 81144242
 Ot Stalingrada do Berlina / V.I. Chuikov
 Chuikov, V. I., (Vasilii Ivanovich), 1900-

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 670 p., [44] p. of
 plates : ill. (some col.) ; 21 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1980
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .C54 1980

14/3/31

1522328 LCCN: 81130874
 Rodniki muzhestva / I.S. Vybornykh
 Vybornykh, I. S., (Ivan Semenovich)

Moskva : Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 190 p., [19] p. of
 plates : ill., ports. ; 21 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1980
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .V87 1980

14/3/32

1492695 LCCN: 81040153
 Soviet generals recall World War II / edited by Igor Vitukhin
 UNIFORM TITLE: Sovetskie voenachal'niki rasskazyvalut o Vtoroi mirovoi
 voine
 Vitukhin, Igor

New York : Sphinx Press, xvi, 413 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1981
 ISBN: 0823686523
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .S615513 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21

14/3/33

1447694 LCCN: 80510783 //r852
 Rozhdeniia na zemliakh zaporozhskikh / A. I. Oleinikov : [lit. zapis'
 M. M. Gilelakh]
 Oleinikov, Andrei Ivanovich
 Gilelakh, Mikhail Mikhailovich

Izd. 2., dop. Kiev : Izd-vo polit. lit-ry Ukrainy, 177 p., [8]
 leaves of plates : ill. ; 20 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1980
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .O45 1980
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: USSR***

14/3/34

1428277 LCCN: 80490317 //r852
 Novomoskovskaia Krasnoznamennaia : Boevoi put' 195-1 Novomosk.
 Krasnoznam. strelkovoi divizii / V. S. Vylitok, S. F. Leskin
 Vylitok, Vasilii Stepanovich
 Leskin, Sergei Fomich, joint author

Moskva : Voenizdat, 200 p., [8] leaves of plates : ill. ; 20 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1979
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .V9
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: USSR79

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/3/35

1462791 LCCN: 79363785 //r852
 Lenino--Warszawa--Berlin : wojenne dzieje 1 Dywizji Piechoty im.
 Tadeusza Kosciuszki / Kazimierz Sobczak
 Sobczak, Kazimierz


Warszawa : Wydawn. Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 470 p., [34] leaves
 of plates : ill. ; 26 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1978
 LC CALL NO.: D764.6 .S68
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: P***

14/3/36

7368501 LCCN: 73168947 //r86
 The Great march of liberation [Translated from the Russian by David
 Fidler]
 UNIFORM TITLE: Velikii osvoboditel'nyi pokhod. English

Moscow, Progress Publishers 286 p. illus. 21 cm.
 PUBLICATION DATE(S): 1972
 LC CALL NO.: D764 .V4513 DEWEY CALL NO.: 940.54/21
 NATL. BIBLIOGRAPHY NO.: USSR***

BARON



5 2

The Baron 52 Project, Inc.
P.O. Box 41023
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33743

Incident Summary - EC-470 "Baron 52"

On January 27th, 1973, the U.S. Government signed The Paris Peace Accords, bringing a long sought "Peace with Honor", and ceasefire to Southeast Asia. His report deals with the 3 February, 1973 shoot-down of an EC-470 electronic intelligence aircraft operating eight days AFTER all military operations were to cease. The EC-470 essentially is a C-47 aircraft which has been altered by the emplacement of more than \$4 Million (in 1973 dollars) worth of sensitive electronic equipment so that it can be used for military reconnaissance work. Among it's functions is the ability to locate and eavesdrop on enemy military communications. Much of the electronic equipment involved is regarded as SECRET and crew-member operators had to possess TOP SECRET/CRY-TO Security Clearance with special access to compartmentalized information (SI). (There are DoD directives dictating that arrangements be made for the immediate destruction of the aircraft and equipment rather than risk compromise of same.)

4. The particular EC-470 with which we are concerned, Call Sign: "Baron 52", was based at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base (KTHFB), Thailand. It had a minimum basic crew of eight men - four commissioned officers primarily responsible for flying and navigating the aircraft, and four enlisted personnel responsible for the operation of the electronic equipment aboard. On February 5, 1973, while on a classified tactical mission to locate and track the movement of Vietnamese armor along a sector near the "Ho Chi Minh Trail", the EC-470, containing at least two of the flightcrew, was shot down over Buravane Province, Laos. Shortly after the shoot-down, another U.S. eavesdropper working in the area intercepted coded Vietnamese Command and Control Communications indicating that several members of the EC-470 crew had bailed out of the damaged plane, had been captured, and were to be transported to a specific commander awaiting the crew for transport to Hanoi, North Vietnam. This information was known to U.S. Officials immediately.

4. In another report, still highly classified, a "friendly" agent, whom the U.S. Government considers highly reliable, reported seeing four of the crew "clean shaven" and "in their flight suits", being led away from the crashsite area under guard.

4. Four days later, a helicopter was utilized to lower a search team to the crash site to ensure that all of the classified materials were destroyed. The wreckage was thoroughly inspected. As this was not a hostile site, the team was on the ground over forty minutes to complete their survey. The cargo compartment of the aircraft had melted, though structurally the aircraft remained primarily intact. This is not common in an uncontrolled landing situation (crash), indicating that at least one of the flight crew had stayed aboard to attempt a landing. Under the nose of the wreck, partial remains were discovered which are thought to be those of a co-pilot. Peering inside the wreck, towards the front, the search team is reported to have seen, but did not recover, at least one additional body still strapped into the seat normally occupied by the second co-pilot of the aircraft. In the rear where the other crew members had been stationed, there was no sign of anyone, and neither their nor their remains, parachutes, or survival equipment vests were seen in the wreckage. This confirmed the information that the men had exited the aircraft, avoided the crash, and been captured. Eventually the search party departed, taking with them one co-pilot's retrievable remains and some other fragments of material. The co-pilot was declared dead (KIA), and the other seven crew members were continued in their missing status (MIA). This was done even though the body of the second co-pilot was seen and confirmed dead in the plane. Up to the day this document was prepared, the family of this young man was still not notified

that his body was found at the site, and that he was in fact deceased. They... search and hope for answers that our military casualty offices have not for over sixteen years.

6. Investigation further indicates that on February 17, 1973, members of the EC-470 crew were seen and identified about 25 kilometers from the crash site, in good health and accompanied by their known captors. Once again, U.S. Officials were immediately made aware of this information.

6. Throughout this period, U.S. Department of Defense directives mandated that the families of men such as these be given the most complete information possible. However, this was not done. The families were told that the aircraft was not being tracked by radar... it was; they were told that there were no photos of the crash site... there are; they were told that the crashsite could not be investigated further because it was considered "hostile"... it was not. Of course, the country of Laos had areas in which combat was commonplace and enemy personnel were known to operate in. However, the mountainous region in which the wreckage came to rest was quiet prior to, during, and subsequent to the crash incident and search.

7. On February 22, 1973, seventeen days after the shoot down... while this information was still being withheld from the families, the Air Force declared ALL of the men from the aircraft dead; without the benefit of ANY new information. Coincidentally, the previous day, February 21, 1973, the United States Government participated in the signing of the accord to restore peace to Laos.

8. In response to their inquiries, the families were told that all of the crew perished in the crash. This even though absolutely no evidence exists to support any conclusion which excludes several members of the crew not being present in the aircraft to die from injuries obtained in the crash landing or subsequent fire.

9. About two months after the shoot-down, the captives were sighted again, still in apparent good health, with their captors about 65 kilometers from the crash site. Again this information was known immediately by U.S. Officials, but was withheld from the families of the men. Instead, these families were assured, again and again, that it was certain that all of the men of the EC-470 had died in a fiery crash. At the same time these statements were being told to the families in response to their questions, other organizations within the Defense Department were continuing to track the movement of these prisoners, and others, throughout the region. In fact, further investigation has shown that these men were transported throughout North Vietnam, to Hanoi and Son Tay, and then back to Sam Neua, Laos. Sometime during this movement the captives were turned over to Soviet representatives for transport to the Soviet Union and/or its satellite nations, on board 11-14 "Crane" transport aircraft.

10. During the summer of 1976, some details of this case were "leaked" to Jack Anderson, the syndicated newspaper columnist and Lyn Ferguson of the Atlanta Journal. They pursued the reports until the Defense Department released several highly "sanitized" documents that confirmed that indeed individuals were captured on the same date and in the same area as the EC-470 crash, but that "no identity or nationality was specified"... another outright lie, as no U.S. Aircraft were lost over Laos since the preceding December, and none since this incident. Still, the families of these men were not told what the details of the information were, they were merely told that the information was not enough to warrant a change of status review or any other reconsideration of the determination of death in this case.

11. The determination of death in this matter cannot be defended. It is

indisputable that all of the evidence shows that these men were alive when they were pronounced dead. There is not a shred of evidence that they are not alive today. Many other POWs survived for long periods in the hands of these same captors.

12. An important point to address at this point is that there have been literally thousands of first-hand live sighting reports of U.S. prisoners still held in both Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union. Additionally, U.S. intelligence agencies have amassed a huge collection of POW information up to the day this was prepared. Since this crew was made up of young, healthy men, and considering that they were some of the last flyers to be taken captive, one could reasonably expect them to be less scarred by the POW experience than those older and longer in captivity. Because of this "survivability multiplier", and the fact that these POWs are considered more valuable live than dead due to their technical skills, the surviving members of the Baron 52 crew should be among those most likely to be considered during any negotiations and subsequent repatriation.

13. About the preparation of this paper:

All information comes from seven volumes of official documents, reports, letters, and dozens of interviews with experts and principal participants in activities identical to those of Baron 52, its search and rescue, and other's who handled and/or were otherwise exposed to the extensive files maintained by our government on this case.

Due to regulations in place to prevent disclosure of certain information, great emphasis was placed on omitting information which would outline any sources, methods, or capabilities of our government's intelligence community.

All information presented which was obtained verbally was subjected to double source confirmation before it was included in this text.

14. This report was prepared on behalf of the entire crew of "Baron 52", by the Baron 52 Project. The Baron 52 Project is a non-profit, non-political research project dedicated solely to this incident. Research, conclusions, and recommendations on how to terminate the imprisonment of these Americans, are provided to U.S. and other national policy makers, Press organizations, International Relief organizations, and other informational consumers. For more information, write:

Mr. Patrick J. Cressman
Baron 52 Project
P.O. Box 41023
St Petersburg, FL 33743

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 - c. Circumstance Letter from Base Commander
 - d. Search Continuing message, HQ USAF
 - e. DD1300 - MIA
 - f. Crashsite found and visited message, HQ USAF
 - g. Remains of Co-Pilot Identified message, HQ USAF
 - h. Search Termination message, Base Commander
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 - j. Mortuary Affairs Introduction, HQ USAF
 - k. Circumstance Letter II from Base Commander
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 - m. DD1300 - KIA
 - n. Sympathy Letter, CSAF, Gen. John D. Ryan
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 - q. Circumstance Letter IV, from Base Commander
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 - b. Matejov, Joseph A.
 - c. Brandenburg, Dale.
 - d. Melton, Todd.
 - e. Bernhardt, Robert E.
- 12 AFHPC Letter to Cressman NOK
- 13 JCRC Letter of 3 Nov 81 to R.A. Cressman
- 14 Mr. Josh Levin's letter to Capt. Ray Vohden, undated
- 15 Ms. Maddens Draft Press Release of 24 July 78
- 16 Press Release forwarded to Cressman NOK 3 Aug 78
- 17 DoD Transcript of 3 Aug 78 "Good Morning America".
- 18 DIA Transmittal of information to AFHPC, re: intercepts.
- 19 Col. Matejov's letter to SAF of 29 March 79
- 20 SAF letter to Col. Matejov of 3 May 79

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Dear _____

On January 7th I read the headline
which hailed the "Peace with Honor"
Agreement, only to wake the next
morning to find my situation
the same as the day before. I
had spent the night in the hope that
the peace agreement would be signed
and the war would end. But the
peace agreement was not signed
and the war was not over. I
was still in the same situation
as before. I had to go to work
as though nothing had
changed in the situation.

Believing that I must have missed
some of the smaller parts of the inven-
tories, read it and found that
I had not overlooked anything
that was on the printed page.
It was then that I realized
that I and two others of my
unit were in violation of

an excitement which ~~was~~
~~was~~ to be an order from
 the Commander in Chief of the
 Armed Forces of the United States.

The ~~impact~~ impact of this
 obligation was quite intense
 for me. Not only do I feel that
 it is morally wrong to ~~participate~~
 in activities which may
 jeopardize a peace which took
 twelve years to reach but
 also because I feel I may
 be participating actively in
 an illegal military mission.

This thought brought back
 a memory of a certain military
 man who was in a similar
 situation and made the
 choice to dutifully carry out his
 orders even though there was
 a question of ~~these~~ legality

This man was ~~St. C.~~ ^{William} Colley.
 Not wanting to risk the possibility
 of being ~~responsible~~
 indirectly responsible for
 the possible results of the
 orders I am under I went
 to seek advice of the base
 legal officer.

When I was informed of the
 consequences for refusing to
 carry out the orders which I
 consider to be illegal as well
 as immoral.

These consequences instilled
 in me a fear which has caused
 me to abandon any thought
 of refusing to obey these illegal
 orders.

The truly sad part of this
 situation is that I wonder
 how many other ~~men~~ "St. Colley's"
 there have been because of

On March 20, 1967, I was in the United States and I received a letter from the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. telling me that my situation was the same as the one before - nothing had changed in Southeast Asia.

Feeling that I must have missed some of the small print of the agreement, I again read it and found that I had not overlooked anything that was on the printed page. It was then that I realized that I and the others of my unit were in violation of an agreement which I consider to be an order from the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The impact of this realization was quite intense for me. Not only do I feel that it is morally wrong to participate in activities which may jeopardize a peace which took twelve years to reach, but also because I feel I may be participating actively in an illegal military mission.

This thought brought back a memory of another military man who was in a similar situation and made the choice to dutifully carry out his orders even though there was a question of their legality. This man was Lt. William Calley.

Not wanting to risk the possibility of being indirectly responsible for the possible results of the orders I am under, I went to seek advice of the base legal office. There I was informed of the consequences for refusing to carry out the orders which I consider to be illegal as well as immoral. These consequences instilled in me a fear which has caused me to abandon any thoughts of refusing to obey these illegal orders.

The truly sad part of this situation is that I wonder how many other "Lt. Calleys" there have been because of the same fear that I feel now . . . that fear of being punished for doing what his mind and soul tells him is right.

I regret that I cannot give you any specific details of my unit's violations due to the classification of my work. However, in general terms, violations have been made against (the Peace Agreements) Chapter II, Article 2; Chapter II, Article 3, paragraph A; Chapter II, Article 4; Chapter VII, Article 20, paragraph A; Chapter VII, Article 20, paragraph B.

Perhaps the most disheartening fact is that ever since I entered school and later the military, I have been taught that because of American's firm beliefs in truth and justice we did not break our national promises. However, now I find myself involved in just such an act.

I gratefully appreciate any assistance you can render to help eliviate (sic) this situation for the American servicemen for whom the war has become more frightening. . for now he has yet another enemy to meet: his conscience.

Yours truly,

*Peter R. Cressman
Sgt. United States A.F.S.S.
Det 3 6994 Security Sqdn.
Ubon, RJAFB
A.P.O. San Fran 96304*

~~I am writing the bill with
the hope that they~~

I am writing this letter with
the hope of bringing to light
a situation which I
believe is being hidden from
the American people as well as
the rest of the world.

I am currently assigned to
 Detachment 3 of the 6888TH
 Central Postal Directory
 located in Germany.

Our unit has been involved
in acts which I believe to
be in flagrant violation
of the Fair Campaign Practices

Agreement. ~~Chapter 11, Article 11, Section 11~~
 I am not permitted to give any
 detailed information con-
 cerning this situation. However,
 I am sure that with ~~superior~~
 investigation ~~done~~ ~~these violations~~
 could become known to you.

I am assuming that a
 great majority of the people as well
 as you, I believe, are un-
 aware of these violations. If
 they were aware I cannot picture
 the American people supporting
 such acts. ~~to pass myself off~~
~~this is not a school. This is~~
~~a~~ throughout my schooling
 and military training these
 sort of violations were
~~seen as~~ always portrayed
 as acts of aggression.

the barbaric enemy. It
 truly bothers me to think that
 I as an American am involved
 in such practices which
 are being treated as standard
 operating procedures.

At this point the only thing
 keeping me from refusing to
 involve myself in these
 violations is the fear that
 it would jeopardize my
 soon coming discharge.

I would like to thank you
 at this time for whatever effect
 you may have on this matter.
 Perhaps ~~if~~ ~~if~~ all parties
 involved uphold the Paris
 Conference at Vietnam treaty,
 a truly lasting and honorable
 peace will be a reality.
 Yours truly

I am writing this letter with the hope of bringing to light a situation which I believe is being hidden from the American people, as well as the entire world.

I am currently assigned to Detachment 3 of the 6994th Security Squadron. Our unit has been involved in acts which I believe to be in flagrant violation of the Paris Conference on Vietnam Agreement. (Chapter II, Articles II, IV, and VII.)

I regret that I am not permitted to give any detailed information concerning this situation. However, I am sure that with superficial investigation alone, these violations could become known to you.

I am assuming that a great majority of the people, as well as your constituents, are unaware of these violations. If they were aware, I cannot picture the American people supporting such acts.

As for myself - throughout my schooling and military training, these sort of violations were always portrayed as acts of aggression by the "barbarous" enemy. It truly bothers me to think that I, as an American, am involved in such practices which are being touted as standard operating procedures.

At this point, the only thing keeping me from refusing to involve myself in these violations is the fear that it would jeopardize my soon coming discharge.

I would like to thank you at this time for whatever effort you may expend on this matter. Perhaps, if all parties involved upheld the Paris Conference on Vietnam Treaty, a truly lasting and honorable peace will be a reality.

Yours Truly,

Peter R. Cressman

Sgt. United States A.F.S.S.

Det.3, 6994 Security Sqdn.

Ubon RTAFB

APO San Fran 96304

EVENT:	Overdue EC-47	DATE/TIME OF EVENT:	04/1905E Feb 73
LOCATION:	Ubon RTAFB, Thailand	TIME REPORTED TO AFO	04/1945E Feb 73

PACAF CP (Sgt Keeler) reports as follows: EC-47, BARON 52, 56th Special Ops Wing, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand is overdue at Ubon AB. Aircraft was on a Ubon AB round robin frag mission - destination to follow in hard copy message. Aircraft took off at 4/1105E and last known contact was with LION GCI Site at 4/1330E. Fuel exhaustion time is 4/1905E. A ramp check was made with negative results. Also, a fast FAC recce flight was made with negative results. Last three of tail number are 636.

- 04/2040E, Sgt Gregg, NMCC, advised that the fast FAC reported conversation with BARON 52 at approximately 1325E. BARON 52 reported his position at that time as 15 nautical miles NW of Attapeu and receiving 37-mm ground fire. (RSO)
- 04/2100E, PACAF CP updates: EC-47, BARON 52, has been located. 45 nautical miles SE of Saravane, Laos. SAR has been initiated. Aircraft appears to be a combat loss. (RSO)

NOTIFICATION RECORD AND DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTIONS:

OFFICE/CY	PERSON	TIME	TIME	OFFICE	CY	PERSON	TIME	TIME
SAFOS	2	12200E		NMCC/AF	1	GRACIA	12040	2130
SAFUS	1			SAFLL	1			
SAFOI	1			AFIGDS	1			
AFCC	1			AFOSI	1			
AFCV	3	04		AFLCGX	1			
AFNO	2	04		AFLCGH	1			
AFNOX	1			AFDPXJC	1			
AFNOU	1			AFDC	1			
AFPR	1			DATA	1			
AFPLG	1			AFLC	1			
AFND	1	CM	V	CASUALTY	1			
AFDP	1			SAFOSA	1			
AFIC	1			AFINOB	1	Granger	2105	
AFICCE	1			AFDPXSD	1			
AFNOOCO	1			SAFMR	1			
AFNOCO	1	CM	1200E	SAFMRP	1			
AFNO	1	CM	"	CAF	1	Granger	2035	

X 32183

UNCLASSIFIED

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS

9:20 AM, Monday, Feb 5, 1973

WFO

TWO AIR FORCE OFFICERS

ARRIVED

WITH THIS OFFICE

MR. AND MRS. GEORGE R. CRESSMAN
1821 2ND AVE NORTH
ST PETERSBURG, FL 33704

IT IS WITH DEEP PERSONAL CONCERN THAT I OFFICIALLY INFORM YOU THAT YOUR SON SERGEANT PETER R. CRESSMAN IS MISSING IN ACTION IN LAOS. ON 4 FEBRUARY 1973 HE WAS THE AIRBORNE MORSE SYSTEMS OPERATOR ABOARD AN EC-47 AIRCRAFT ON AN OPERATIONAL MISSION OVER LAOS. THE AIRCRAFT HAS NOT RETURNED TO UBON AIR BASE THAILAND AND FUEL EXHAUSTION TIME HAS ELAPSED. EXTENSIVE SEARCH IS BEING CONDUCTED. PLEASE BE ASSURED NEW INFORMATION RECEIVED WILL BE FURNISHED YOU IMMEDIATELY. PENDING FURTHER INFORMATION HE WILL BE LISTED OFFICIALLY AS MISSING IN ACTION. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS YOU MAY CALL MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOLL FREE BY DIALING 1-800-531-5501. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE SYMPATHY DURING THIS PERIOD OF ANXIETY.

MAJOR GENERAL K.L. TALLMAN
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL, MILITARY PERSONNEL
HQ U.S. AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 3, 6994TH SECURITY SQUAD ON (USAFSS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96304

Mr. and Mrs.
1821 2nd Ave
St. Petersburg

Dear Mr. and

It is with deep
surrounding
Although the
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your anxiety

On 5 February
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aircraft. A
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Please be as
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The men who
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Sincerely

P.B. 74
F. A. HUMPHREY
Commander

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Ave North
St Petersburg, Florida 33704

7 Febru

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

It is with the deepest sympathy and regret that I write this let
inform you of the circumstances surrounding the missing in action
of your son, Peter. Although it is extremely difficult to discov
incident, I know that you would want to know as much as possible
ing the circumstances surrounding Peter's missing in action stat
will relate them to you as we understand them.

Peter took off from Ubun Royal Thai Air Force Base on a regular
uled reconnaissance mission at 11:05 P.M. on 4 February 1973, ex
to return to home base seven hours later. At approximately 1:25
5 February, your son's aircraft commander reported receiving gro
Shortly thereafter, all attempts failed to communicate with his
and the aircraft disappeared from radar coverage. Search and re
ations were implemented immediately. An Air Force AC-130 and two
F-4 fighters were immediately diverted to the area but were not a
establish visual or radio contact. Dedicated search and rescue
have been continuing since that time but have thus far been unsuc
I can assure you that every thing possible is being done to locat
son.

While each of us in the detachment feels a great sense of loss at
I know his absence will be felt more deeply by his loved ones. I
make sure you are notified of any change in Peter's status.

If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate
me.

Sincerely yours,

Bill Shea

WILLIAM J. SHEA, Capt, USAF
Commander

I have just completed a preliminary inventory of your son's belongings and mailed them for shipment. All that is required now is coordination with the transportation office and compliance with regulations governing the shipment of your son's belongings.

In my first correspondence with you I received incorrect information as to the spelling of your last name. Please accept my sincerest apology. If there is any assistance I can provide, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully Yours,

Edward Valerio

EDWARD VALERIO, 1Lt, USAF
1st SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON



SB032(1740)(1-027658065002)PD 03/06/73 1738

ICS IPMWANG WSH

202007098 BK GOVT PDB W WASHINGTON DC 03-06 NPT

PMS MR AND MRS GEORGE R CRESSMAN REPORT DLY DONT DLR BTWN 10PM & 6AM

~~21 12 1973 DLY CHARGES GUARANTEED~~

STPETERSBURG FLA

I REFER TO MY TELEGRAM OF 23 FEB 1973 CONCERNING YOUR SON THE OVERSEAS COMMANDER HAS ADVISED US THAT THE SITE OF THE CRASH IS STILL CONSIDERED HOSTILE. THEREFORE, NO FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO SEARCH AND RECOVER REMAINS WILL BE MADE AT THIS TIME. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED AS FURTHER INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE MY CONTINUED SYMPATHY IS EXTENDED TO YOU IN YOUR GREAT LOSS.

R L TRASK CHIEF MORTUARY BRANCH HQ USAF



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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20330

REPORT OF CASUALTY		REPORT NUMBER AND TYPE	DATE
1. SERVICE IDENTIFICATION (Name, Service Number, Grade or Rate, Component, Branch and Organization)		2. CASUALTY STATUS	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, RACE, RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE
CRESSMAN, Peter Richard, FRI48-46-5985, Sgt, Regular, USAF - Det 3, 695 PO San Francisco 96306		BATTLE	23 May 51 - Glen Ridge NJ - Caucasian - Roman Catholic
4. DATE AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CURRENT STATUS AND HOME OF RECORD AT TIME		5. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, PAY GRADE, LENGTH OF SERVICE FOR PAY, BASIC PAY, INCENTIVE PAY	6. DATE AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CURRENT STATUS AND HOME OF RECORD AT TIME
Oakland CA		168-46-5985	Yes *
7. ACTIVE - On Duty		8. REPORTING COMMAND AND DATE REPORT RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT	9. PRIOR SERVICE DATA
Mr George R Cressman 1821 2nd Ave N, St Petersburg FL 33704 Mrs Evelyn R Cressman		UBON AFLD THAILAND - 5 Feb 73	YES
10. SELECT THE SERVICE NUMBER, LOCAL BOARD, AND LOCATION (If unknown, enter date and place of first entry in U.S. Armed Forces)		11. PREVIOUS SERVICE DATA	12. DISTRIBUTION
DATE PCS SEA TOUR COMMENCED: 21 Jun 72 *Hostile Pay: Yes		YES	13. ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
FOOTNOTES: 1 Adult next of kin. 2 Beneficiary for gratuity pay in event there is no surviving wife or child - as designated on record of emergency data. 3 Beneficiary for unpaid pay and allowances - as designated on record of emergency data.		BOBBY D. BALLARD, Capt, USAF Ch, Casualty Rptg & Survivor Assistance B:	

DD FORM 1300
1 MAR 68

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346



9 Mar 1973

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

I am writing to you to provide a detailed summary of all the circumstances surrounding the death of your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman. While I do not have any new information, I would like to review the circumstances in more detail for you, and to explain more fully the reasons for the decision to declare your son killed in action.

On 4 February 1973, Peter was a crew member of an EC-47 aircraft on an operational mission over Laos. The aircraft departed Ubon Airfield at approximately 11:05 PM (local), 4 February 1973. At approximately 1:25 AM on 5 February, the aircraft reported observing ground fire, and at 1:30 AM reported operations normal. This was the last contact that was made with the aircraft. After several attempts to establish contact failed, search and rescue efforts were put into effect at 6:00 AM (first light) on 5 February. The search included a continuing visual and communications search in addition to numerous photographic reconnaissance flights.

On 7 February 1973 a crash site was discovered, which through photo interpretation was determined to be your son's aircraft. A helicopter then took a pararescue team to the site and hovered while the team was lowered to examine the wreckage. The aircraft was almost totally destroyed. The entire fuselage was badly burned, and equipment in the aft part of the fuselage was completely melted. The aircraft had impacted upside down and there were no skid marks. Both wing tips were broken off, and were located some distance from the aircraft. The helicopter and the team remained in the area until forced to depart due to running low on fuel. The remains of one crew member were recovered and later identified as those of the co-pilot; no other remains were recovered. Due to the fact that the aircraft crashed in an extremely hostile area, no other search and rescue teams have been scheduled to go into the area. Your son was originally carried as missing in action until a review could be made of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident. After a thorough review, it was determined that there were no survivors. Based on this, your son's status was changed to killed in action on 22 February 1973.

The severity of the crash, the total destruction of the aircraft, the intense fire, and many other factors were considered before we regretfully reached this decision. Also of importance was the fact that no emergency radio beepers were ever heard from any member of the crew, and no parachutes were seen.

When the current intense hostility in the area subsides, hopefully other teams will be sent in. Please be assured that you will be notified

immediately of any new findings. If I may be of further assistance, or if you feel that there is some point you would like to have explained in more detail, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely

P. A. Humphreys
P. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USAF

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346



Mr. & Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, FL 33704

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Cressman

17 APR 1973

Thank you for the appreciation you expressed in your letter of 18 March. I sent you a letter on 7 April providing you additional information regarding the decision to change your son's status. A similar letter was sent to the next of kin of each of the seven crew members whose status was changed.

As I mentioned in my previous letter to you, only one identifiable set of remains was found, that of the co-pilot, Lieutenant Bernhardt. Parts of three and possibly four additional bodies were found but none were identifiable due to the fire and state of decomposition. The search team did not recover any personal items identifiable with your son, or any of the other crewmen, excluding Lieutenant Bernhardt. As I related in my letters to you, the aircraft came to rest upside down and the fire within the wreckage was extremely intense, badly burning the fuselage and melting much of the equipment inside the aircraft.

The four men pararescue team that visited the site was on the ground for forty minutes at the crash site, computed from the lowering of the first man to the return of the fourth man to the helicopter. The duties of the team were threefold and in the following priority: pick up survivors, destroy classified equipment, and recover remains. The first two men lowered were constantly checking the perimeter of the crash site for unfriendly persons while the remaining two carried out their assigned duties. The fact that the airplane was upside down, the severe fire, and the limited time to investigate, precluded a more thorough search of the wreckage. We anticipate that further visits will be made to the crash site sometime in the future.

A Joint Casualty Resolution Center has been established at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base in Northeastern Thailand. The purpose of this center is to visit each crash site and investigate all aspects of each crash. Peter's crash site will probably be one of the first they will visit. However, this cannot be done until an agreement can be reached with the country involved (Laos) and hostilities cease. Hopefully, when these visits can take place, more information will become available. I assure you that any additional facts will be provided to you as they become known.

Again, I offer you my deepest sympathy, and I renew my offer to you to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely

P. A. Humphreys
P. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USAF
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING IPACAF
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96304



19 FEB 1973

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

It is with regret that I inform you that the search for your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman, has been terminated. I wish to express my personal sympathy and the concern of our entire wing.

The aerial and ground search has been conducted continuously since the time of the crash and has now been terminated. After locating the crash site, a helicopter was dispatched to the scene and a rescue team was lowered to examine the wreckage. The aircraft was almost totally destroyed. The team reported finding human remains that have been positively identified as belonging to another crew member. After careful consideration I feel that there is a possibility that one or more crew members could have parachuted to safety, therefore your son will continue to be carried in a missing status until a final determination can be made.

Please be assured that if any new information concerning your son's status is received, you will be notified immediately. A detailed report is being prepared at this time. You will be advised of its contents by the Casualty Division, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, upon completion of the report.

The adjustment to a loss such as yours cannot be made without great difficulty, but I earnestly hope that this expression of concern, which comes from every member of this wing, will in some small measure help to ease the anguish you feel. I will always consider it a privilege to provide any assistance I can for you.

Sincerely

F. A. Humphreys
F. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USA
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING IPACAF
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96304



7 APR 1973

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

Since my letter of 9 March 1973, I have personally discussed at great length the search and rescue effort associated with the loss of your son's aircraft. These discussions were held with the commander of the wing whose unit visited the crash site. I am more firmly convinced than ever, after our discussion, that the decision to change Peter's status was valid. I hope that the information which follows will allay any doubts or fears that the decision was premature or without adequate basis.

First of all, let me review the communication capability of the aircraft. Because of the distance from the nearest radar facility, the aircraft was not being tracked by radar. However, as indicated in my first letter to you the crew was making routine half hourly radio contact and also reporting unusual occurrences. They were also maintaining radio contact with another aircraft flying in the general area. The last radio contact was at 1:30 AM local, when they made routine contact. Members of the crew had ready and immediate access to various types of communications equipment located within the aircraft. Ultra High Frequency (UHF), Very High Frequency (VHF), and High Frequency (HF) radio equipment was in operating condition at the time of departure from Ubon Airfield and was in use during the flight. In addition, each member aboard the aircraft carried survival radios pre-set to operate on emergency frequency in the event of an unexpected situation. All that was required was that they be switched on. The intensive training of all flying personnel makes it improbable that at least one of the crew members would not have instinctively transmitted on one of the many pieces of communication equipment available, in case of an emergency, unless they were all immediately and completely incapacitated. Further, the aircraft communication equipment could operate off the aircraft batteries in an emergency regardless of the condition or operation of the engines.

Another consideration that had a bearing on this decision is the normal operating procedures followed during flights of this nature. The internal design of the aircraft, coupled with the bulky equipment on board, causes most crews to fly without wearing their survival equipment while in flight. Such equipment is cumbersome, uncomfortable when worn for extended periods of time, and, at times, interferes with their duties. The crews are trained to be able to put on the equipment and get ready to leave the aircraft in approximately two minutes. Further, Peter's flight was operating in the early morning hours at an altitude that would necessitate the exit door being closed and locked in view of the cold temperature. Therefore in case of an emergency it would also take time to unlock and open the door. These things can be done quickly if the airplane is flying straight and level, however, if it is in a spin or dive, movement within the aircraft is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Since no communication contact with the aircraft or any of the crew was made after 1:30 AM, it is a reasonable assumption that the cause of the mishap must have been of a catastrophic nature. It was probably a direct hit from anti-aircraft fire which immediately started a fire in the aircraft thus precluding the initiation of emergency procedures. Assuming this to be the case, the crew would not have had time to retrieve survival equipment, don it, and exit the aircraft safely. To further document the basis of this decision, the fact that the aircraft had approximately five hours of fuel on board at the time of the crash, must be considered. Since the crew had transmitted a report that ground fire was observed five minutes prior to the last contact, and the loss of the aircraft appears to be instantaneous, it can be logically assumed that the aircraft was hit by ground fire and erupted into intense fire as a result of the remaining fuel supply.

With burning with terrain problem.

The team which visited the crash site had to operate quickly since it was in an extremely hostile area and was subject to attack from ground fire at any time. The extended distance from a friendly base also reduced the allowable time at the crash site, due to the limited fuel supply available for the return trip. Evidence was examined as quickly as possible and team members were thoroughly debriefed and interrogated upon their return. The pararescue team did discover three and possibly four bodies or the remains thereof, (only one of which could be positively identified) but time did not permit a thorough search of the aircraft or the crash site for additional remains. Photographs of the site indicate that the aircraft, in all probability, initially impacted in one area and then continued its trajectory, finally landing in an inverted position. The wreckage was strewn from the impact point to the final resting area, which also prohibited the rescue team from conducting a more intensive investigation.

One of the points made in a letter I received from a next of kin was the treatment of the information concerning the crash by the news media. Premature release of information to the media concerning incidents of this nature could possibly endanger any existing survivors and those involved in their rescue or investigation of the crash site. Once the information does become public knowledge, the treatment of releasable information by the radio, TV and press is beyond our control. As in this case, such treatment can become misleading, causing undue anguish and grief to the next of kin. Admittedly, the mission of your son's aircraft was classified, which tends to spur interest in a "spy plane" incident. Another point made was that the lack of radio beeper contact could not be construed as evidence that there were no survivors, since to establish contact could be risky and unwarranted in such a hostile environment. There is a certain degree of validity to that argument but it is also subject to considerable doubt. Operation of the radio beeper is accomplished by merely activating a switch on the radio. It does not require the downed crewman to talk or make any other movement or noise. Since the beeper does not give away the crewman's location except to aircraft flying overhead, our crews are trained to establish beeper contact even in hostile environments. Although the lack of contact is not overwhelming evidence of death, it, taken into consideration with all other evidence, did have a bearing on the change of status.

In my desire to provide all available information, I want to add some other items of information. The aircraft commander was a seasoned veteran serving his second Southeast Asia tour. The mission was not a special flight - it was a routine flight, of a type flown day and night, without benefit of escort aircraft.

These flights are not escorted by fighter aircraft because of the difference in speed of the aircraft and also because the presence of fighters might attract undue attention. The next point concerns the search and rescue effort. This effort was started immediately after it became apparent the aircraft was in difficulty. Another aircraft flying in the area started listening for emergency radio signals, but none were ever heard. Since there was no contact and the exact crash site could not be precisely located, the search aircraft had to wait for daylight and hope for visual sighting.

Let me summarize by stating that we did employ a certain amount of conjecture in trying to visualize the events as they took place. However, we made logical assumptions based on all the available facts and information. You may be assured that every facet of each piece of information was considered prior to arriving at the difficult decision to change Peter's status to killed in action. Conclusive evidence of death is not required for a commander to arrive at such a decision. Existing evidence did warrant this decision, which is one of the most agonizing and difficult tasks a commander must face.

I am fully aware of the natural instinct to refuse acceptance of the death of a loved one without physical evidence. It is my sincerest hope that I have been successful in alleviating your doubts and, to some degree, in making the loss of your son a little easier to bear. As a final matter of information, the other crew members on the aircraft were Captain George R. Spitz, Aircraft Commander; First Lieutenant Robert E. Bernhardt, Co-Pilot; Second Lieutenant Severo J. Primm III, Co-Pilot; Captain Arthur R. Bollinger, Navigator; Sergeant Dale Brandenburg, Crew Member; Sergeant Joseph A. Matejov, Crew Member; and Staff Sergeant Todd M. Walton, Crew Member.

In the event you desire to communicate with their next of kin, please forward a request for names and addresses to the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Attn: DPMS, Randolph AFB, TX 78148. This is required to protect the rights and privacy of the involved families. I again extend to you my deepest sympathy, and ask that you contact me if there are any other questions left unanswered.

Sincerely

P. Q. H.
P. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USAF
Commander



Telegram

SQB026(1100)(1-007503054003)PD 02/23/73 1057

ICS IPMWANG VSH

ZCZC07008 BK USGOVT TDW ALEXANDRIA VIR 02-23 NPT

PMS MR AND MRS GEORGE R CRESSMAN, DLR, DONT PHONE CHECK DLY
CHGS ABOVE 150 (REPORT DELIVERY) DONT DLR BETWEEN 100M

AND 6AM 1821 2ND AVE NORTH STPETERSBURG FLO

IT WAS WITH DEEP REGRET THAT I LEARNED OF THE DEATH OF YOUR
SON. MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY IS EXTENDED TO YOU IN YOUR GREAT
LOSS. OVERSEA COMMANDER HAS ADVISED ME THAT REMAINS OF YOUR
SON HAVE NOT BEEN RECOVERED. I APPRCIATE ANXIETY YOU ARE
EXPERIENCING AND REGRET THAT MORE FAVORABLE INFORMATION
CANNOT BE FURNISHED YOU. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT I WILL
NOTIFY YOU IMMEDIATELY SHOULD HIS REMAINS BE RECOVERED
OR FURTHER INFORMATION BECOME AVAILABLE. IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS PLEASE CALL AREA CODE 202/325-9330 BETWEEN 8:00
AND 4:00 PM, MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY. PLEASE TALK WITH MR.

COURTNEY OR MRS. BALILES, MY SPECIAL ADVISERS ON MORTUARY
AFFAIRS.

R L TRASK CHIEF (MORTUARY BRANCH) HQ USAF

1973 FEB 23 AM 1. IC

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20330

REPORT OF CASUALTY		Correct Report Number - H-66	26 Feb 73
CRESSMAN, Peter Richard, FR148-46-5985, Sgt, Regular, USAF - Det 3, 6994 Scty Sq, APO San Francisco 96304			
Southern Laos 5 Feb 73 * Killed In Action (Airborne Morse Systems Operator)			
23 May 51 - Glen Ridge NJ - Caucasian - Roman Catholic			
28 Aug 69 - Wayne NJ			
168-46-5985: E-4		Yes **	☒ CREW ☐ NON-CREW
Active - On Duty			
Mr George R Cressman 1821 2nd Ave N, St Petersburg FL 33704 father(1,2,3) Mrs Evelyn R Cressman same mother			
REPORT FOR TO FOLLOW		REPORTING COMMAND AND DATE REPORT RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT	
1-18		NAJON PHANOM APRT THAILAND - 22 Feb 73	
Unknown - LB 2 - Hackensack NJ			
SG1:			
*This individual is held to have been missing in action from 5 Feb 73 to 22 Feb 73, the date of receipt of evidence in HQ USAF, that the above named person could not have survived. The provisions of Title 37, USC, Sections 551-558 are considered applicable. **Hostile Pay: Yes DATE PCS SEA TOUR COMMENCED: 21 Jun 72			
NOT: THIS FORM MAY BE USED TO FACILITATE THE CASHING OF BONDS, THE PAYMENT OF COMMERCIAL INSURANCE, OR IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY OTHER CLAIM IN WHICH PROOF OF DEATH IS REQUIRED.			
FOOTNOTES 1 Adult next of kin. 2 Beneficiary for gratuity pay in event there is no surviving wife or child - as designated on record of emergency data. 3 Beneficiary for unpaid pay and allowances - as designated on record of emergency data.			
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE		OFFICIAL	
BOBBY D. MALLARD, Capt, USAF		Ch. Casualty Rptg & Survivor Assistance Br	

DD FORM 1300

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1973


My dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman:

We of the Air Force share your sorrow in the death of Sergeant Peter R. Cressman.

Your son was held in high regard by his associates for his willingness to accept responsibilities, and the excellent manner in which he completed assignments. I hope you will find comfort from the memory of his faithful service for his country.

Please accept my deepest sympathy.

Sincerely,



JOHN D. RYAN, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 Second Avenue, North
Saint Petersburg, Florida

THIS MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AT

5:40 PM, TUESDAY, Feb 22, 1973

BY

MR. AIR FORCE OFFICER AND

FATHER HILDEEN

MR AND MRS GEORGE R. CRESSMAN
1821 - 2ND AVENUE NORTH
ST PETERSBURG, FL 33704

Very
much

REFERENCE MY PREVIOUS COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE MISSING STATUS OF YOUR SON, SGT PETER R. CRESSMAN. IT IS WITH DEEP REGRET THAT I OFFICIALLY INFORM YOU OF HIS DEATH. HE WAS KILLED IN ACTION IN LAOS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1973 AS THE RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED IN THE AIRCRAFT INCIDENT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO YOU. THE INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO HIS COMMANDER BY MEMBERS OF THE SEARCH TEAM CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THAT YOUR SON COULD NOT HAVE SURVIVED THE INCIDENT. YOUR SON'S COMMANDER WILL WRITE YOU A LETTER CONTAINING ALL THE KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING HIS DEATH. AS YET HIS REMAINS HAVE NOT BEEN RECOVERED. THE MORTUARY BRANCH, HQ USAF, WASHINGTON, D.C. WILL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU CONCERNING THIS MATTER. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS YOU MAY CONTACT MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TOLL FREE BY DIALING 1-800-531-5501. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE SYMPATHY.

MAJOR GENERAL K.L. TALLMAN
ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL, MILITARY PERSONNEL
HQ U.S. AIR FORCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 28, 1973

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman:

I have learned with great sadness of the death of your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman. All America shares your loss, and the deepest sympathies of our fellow citizens will forever honor your son's profound sacrifice.

Mrs. Nixon and I want you to know that you and your loved ones are in our thoughts and in our hearts. We pray that the eternal respect your son has so tragically earned will sustain and comfort you in the days ahead.

Sincerely,



Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 Second Avenue, North
Saint Petersburg, Florida 33713

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 8TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (PACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96300



24 FEB 1973

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

It is with deep regret that I write you concerning the death of your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman. His tragic loss on 5 February 1973 brought sorrow to all of us. Please accept my deepest sympathy.

A careful review of all available facts has been made and there is no reasonable doubt that there were no survivors. Due to the severity of the crash, the apparent total destruction of the aircraft, the intense fire, and the fact that no contact of any kind was established with any member of the crew, the decision was made to declare your son killed in action.

Peter's dedication and service to his country were in the highest tradition of the United States Air Force. I am proud to have been associated with him and I join the men of this wing in expressing our deepest sympathy for his loss. Please be assured that I am ready to assist you in any way I can during this time of sorrow.

Sincerely



F. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USAF
Commander



Telegram

SQB 100(1446)(1-020333044)PD 02/13/73 1445

ICS IPMSNTB SNT

2020 02006 XVGOVT MSC RANDOLPH AFB TEX 89 02-13 1252P CST

PMS MR AND MRS GEORGE R CRESSMAN DLY 1.50 DLR DO NOT PHONE

1821 2ND AVENUE NORTH

ST PETERSBURG FLO 33703

REFERENCE PREVIOUS COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE MISSING IN ACTION

STATUS OF YOUR SON, SERGEANT PETER R CRESSMAN.

THE HUMAN REMAINS FOUND IN THE AREA WHERE YOUR SONS AIRCRAFT
CRASHED HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS ABOARD TH
AT

AIRCRAFT THIS INDIVIDUALS STATUS HAS BEEN CHANGED TO KILLED IN
ACTION AND HIS FAMILY HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU
INFORMED OF ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT.
AGAIN, PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE SYMPATHY DURING THIS PERIOD OF
ANXIETY.

MAJOR GENERAL K. L. TALLMAN ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
PERSONNEL, MILITARY PERSONNEL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED E F T O

O P 110704Z FEB 73

FM 8CSGP UBON AFLD THAI

TO RUEFHQA/CSAF/LCSKC

AFMPC/RANDOLPH AFB TEX/DPMS

696DAHSO/KELLY AFB TEX/DPMS

CINCPACAF/HICKAM AFB HI/DPSP

USAFSS/SA: ANTONIO TEX/DPSP

USAFSSPAC/WHEELER AFB HI/DPSP

56CSGP/TKP APRT THAI/DPMS

13AF/CLARK AB PI/DPSP

7/13AF/UDORN AFLD THAI/CD

COMUSMACV/DP/JPRC

USA MORTUARY/SAIGON RVN/JCCRO8

AFAPC/DENVER COLO/MPEC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO DPMS

SUBJECT: CASUALTY REPORT, COMPLETE CONTINUED MISSING REPORT.

REF MY DPMS 050638Z FEB 73 AND 56CSGP DPMS 101119Z FEB 73.

A. CRESSMAN REPEAT CRESSMAN, PETER RICHARD.

B. SERGEANT.

PAGE 2 RUMORUA2430 UNCLAS E F T O

C. 148-46-5985 REPEAT 148-46-5985. REGULAR AIR FORCE.

G. EC-47 (BARON 52) LEFT UBON AFLD, THAILAND ON AN OPERATIONAL

OVER LAOS. DEPARTURE TIME WAS 1605 ZULU, 4 FEB 73. AIRCRAFT

LOST RADIO CONTACT AT 1830 ZULU. LAST RADAR CONTACT WAS 1840

ZULU. ESTIMATED FUEL EXHAUSTION TIME IS 0005 ZULU 5 FEB 73

AND ARE CONTINUING. REASONS FOR CONTINUING MISSING STATUS:

ALTHOUGH THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE HAS BEEN FOUND NOT ALL OF THE

BODIES WERE FOUND, AND NONE WERE IDENTIFIED THE COMMANDER

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED E F T O

FEELS THAT THERE IS A CHANCE THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE CREW-
MEMBERS COULD HAVE BAILED OUT AND LANDED SAFELY ON THE GROUND.
THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AFM 30-4, PARA
2-10B, THERE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF DEATH. AF FM 494
WILL BE SUBMITTED ON 13 FEB 73.

BT

(Note: Retyped by M. Kamauoha/HQ JCRC on 27 MAY 88. Original illegible
when copied.)

R 162136Z MAR 73
FM CINCPAC CP SMITH HI
INFO COMUSSAG/7AF (JCMC) NKP THAI
R -----Z MAR 73
FM USAF--PAC WHEELER AFB HAWAII
TO RUH---A/CINCPAC CAMP SMITH HI J2 J3
RU--A-A/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI IN DO
BT

SUBJ: EC-47 LOSS ON 5 FEB 73 (U)
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, SUBJ AS ABOVE, -----
INFO: QUOTE:
R072030Z MAR 73
FM USAF -B KELLY AFB TEX
TO -----/CSAF WASH DC INY
INFO -----/USAFSS-AG WHEELER AFB HAWAII
RU-----/69943CTYSQ NKP RTAFB THAI
RU-----/DET 3 69948CTYSQ UBON RTAFB THAI

SUBJ: EC-47 LOSS ON 5 FEB 73 (-)
1. THE EC-47 DOWNED FROM UNKNOWN CAUSE ON 5 FEB 73 RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF EIGHT CREWMEMBERS. ON 9 FEB 73 A TEAM CONSISTING OF 3 PJ'S AND ONE INDIVIDUAL FROM THE 6994TH SOTY SQ NKP WERE AIRLIFTED INTO LAOS TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH SITE. THREE BODIES WERE FOUND. ONLY ONE CO-PILOT WAS IDENTIFIED. A POSSIBLE 4TH BODY WAS OBSERVED, IN THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO VIEWED THE WRECKAGE. THE CABIN SECTION WAS APPARENTLY SUBJECTED TO INTENSE FIRE. AS THEY STATED ALL EQUIPMENT AND BODIES HAD COMPLETELY BURNED, ALTHOUGH REMAINS OF POSSIBLY THREE BODIES WERE SEEN. THERE WAS NO SIFTING OF DEBRIS TO DETERMINE IF EVIDENCE EXISTED TO CONFIRM STATUS OF THOSE PERSONNEL IN CARGO COMPARTMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT.
2. SINCE NO PRESENT EVIDENCE POSITIVELY CONFIRMS DEATH OF REMAINING 5 CREWMEMBERS, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO BAIL OUT DOES EXIST, ALTHOUGH NO BEEPERS OR OTHER TRANSMISSIONS WERE NOTED ON GUARD. TO SUPPORT THIS THEORY, THE FOLLOWING SECRET NOFORN (NEED TO KNOW) RELEASE TO THE COMMANDER, 8TFW ON 27 FEB 73 QUOTE: 1. ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE, THE ENEMY WAS MOVING FOUR PRISONERS ON TRUCKS NORTHWARD ALONG ROUTE 914 IN LAOS ON 5 FEB 73. THIS SOURCE REPORTED THEY MAY HAVE BEEN ENROUTE TO A STAGING AREA IN LAOS JUST WEST OF THE DMZ. 2. IT IS SPECULATED BY JQ USAFSS THAT THESE PRISONERS MAY HAVE BEEN CREWMEMBERS OF BARON 52, A 56SOW EC-47 AIRCRAFT WHICH CRASHED IN LAOS ON 5 FEB 73. THIS SPECULATION, ADMITTEDLY TENUOUS, IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT THESE PRISONERS WERE REPORTED TO BE IN AN AREA SOME SIXTY-FIVE NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE BARON 52 CRASH SITE. DEPENDING ON THE FLIGHT PATH OF BARON 52, AS WELL AS PREVAILING WINDS THAT DAY IT IS POSSIBLE SOME CREWMEMBERS COULD HAVE BAILED OUT NORTH OF THE CRASH SITE POSITION AND COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN CARRIED EVEN FURTHER NORTH DURING DESCENT. FURTHERMORE, SINCE THESE PRISONERS WERE REPORTEDLY BEING TRANSFERRED BY TRUCKS, IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN SOME SIXTY-FIVE NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE CRASH SITE THE SAME DAY THAT BARON 52 CRASHED. UNQUOTE. THE 8 TFW CO APPRECIATED THE INFORMATION ALTHOUGH HE CONSIDERED IT VERY TENUOUS. AS YOU CAN SEE, THERE IS CAUSE FOR SPECULATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF MISSING CREWMEMBERS.

3. PROVIDING TERMS OF THE LAOTIAN CEASE FIRE PERMIT ENTRY OF U.S. PERSONNEL INTO LAOS FOR CRASH SITE INVESTIGATION, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS PARTICULAR SITE BE AMONG THE FIRST TO BE INVESTIGATED. A SIFTING AND ANALYSIS OF DEBRIS IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT SHOULD PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO CONFIRM THE FATE OF REMAINING BARON 52 CREWMEMBERS. UNQUOTE
--S 31 DEC ----
BT
#4372

NNNN

(NOTE: This is a retype of original document which is barely readable as of this date, 9 July 1987. All hyphens (-) in the address and ending of message depict a number or letter which is unreadable. Original message was classified but has since been downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED by authority of YN1 Russell of GDS 79 on 28 OCT 81.)

SAFELI/MAJ POWELL/57361/Betty/Mar 23

CRESSMAN

Dear Mr. Widdall:

On behalf of the Director, Legislative Liaison, this is in reply to your inquiry of March 5 concerning Sergeant Peter A. Cressman who was reported killed in action. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman, contacted you in this regard.

Mr. and Mrs. Cressman were personally notified by an Air Force officer on February 5 that their son was reported missing in action in Laos. Search progress reports were provided to them on February 8 and 10. On February 13, they were informed that human remains found in the area where their son's aircraft crashed were identified as one of the crew members and his family had been notified of his death. Mr. and Mrs. Cressman were advised that they would be kept informed of any information received concerning the incident involving their son. An Air Force officer personally notified them on February 22 that Sergeant Cressman was declared killed in action on February 5 as the result of injuries sustained in the aircraft incident previously reported to them. The information made available to his commander by members of the search team conclusively established that their son could not have survived the incident. They were provided the telephone number of the Air Force Casualty Division in the event they had questions, but they have not contacted that office since they were notified of their son's death.

The overseas commander sent a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Cressman on March 9 providing them with all known facts surrounding the death of their son. A copy of that letter is attached for your information.

Please assure Mr. and Mrs. Cressman that if there had been any doubt that their son could have survived, they would not have been notified of his death. In the event there is any forthcoming information concerning his remains, they will be contacted by the appropriate Air Force official.

AFDP/MSC

We wish to extend our deepest sympathy to Mr. and Mrs. Cressman in the loss they have sustained and want to thank you for your interest.

Sincerely,

H. J. ANDERSEN, Colonel, USAF
Congressional Inquiry Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

Cy-Lt 9 Mar 73
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Attachment

Honorable William D. Widdall

House of Representatives

WASHINGTON 20310

MAR 23 1973



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Dear Mr. Midnall:

On behalf of the Director, Legislative Liaison, this is in reply to your inquiry of March 5 concerning Sergeant Peter R. Cressman who was reported killed in action. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman, contacted you in this regard.

Mr. and Mrs. Cressman were personally notified by an Air Force officer on February 5 that their son was reported missing in action in Laos. Search progress reports were provided to them on February 8 and 10. On February 13, they were informed that human remains found in the area where their son's aircraft crashed were identified as one of the crew members and his family had been notified of his death. Mr. and Mrs. Cressman were advised that they would be kept informed of any information received concerning the incident involving their son. An Air Force officer personally notified them on February 22 that Sergeant Cressman was declared killed in action on February 5 as the result of injuries sustained in the aircraft incident previously reported to them. The information made available to his commander by members of the search team conclusively established that their son could not have survived the incident. They were provided the telephone number of the Air Force Casualty Division in the event they had questions, but they have not contacted that office since they were notified of their son's death.

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We wish to extend our deepest sympathy to Mr. and Mrs. Cressman in the loss they have sustained and want to thank you for your interest.

Sincerely,

M. J. ANDERSEN, Colonel, USAF
Congressional Inquiry Division
Office of Legislative Liaison

WILLIAM B. WIDNALL
7th District, New Jersey

Room 2305
Reynolds Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
CONE 201: 234-4447
DISTRICT OFFICE ADDRESS:
31 PARKVIEW AVENUE
PARAMUS, NEW JERSEY 07652
COLFAR 9-1516

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET AND CONGRESS
JOINT ECONOMIC
JOINT OFFENSE PRODUCTION
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEES

WASHINGTON STAFF:
BEVERLY J. GRAY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

March 26, 1973

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman:

At the request of Mr. Craig Lakatis of the Oakland Observer newspaper in my district, I contacted our Air Force officials for information regarding the death of your son.

I am enclosing a copy of their reply I have received today, together with a copy of the letter sent to you in this matter by your son's Overseas Commander.

Hoping this information is satisfactory and may I extend to you my sincerest and most heartfelt sympathy in the loss of your beloved son.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
1821 2nd Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida, 33704
Enc.

WBW:mc

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 4TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (MACAF)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346



Mrs. Severo J. Prime III
1145 Kimbro Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70808

17 APR 1973

Dear Mrs. Prime

Once again, our letters have crossed in the mail. I received your 2 April letter on Monday, 9 April, after I had sent you my letter of 7 April. A similar letter to the one you received was sent to the next of kin of the other crew members whose remains could not be located or identified. My 7 April letter answered many of the questions you have asked, and in this letter I will cover the remaining questions you have posed.

The partial remains of First Lieutenant Robert E. Bernhardt, the other co-pilot on the crew, were the only ones recovered and positively identified. His skull and torso were recovered outside the aircraft with identification being made through dental records. Other partial remains were found at the crash site but were not parts which could be identified with an individual or recovered due to advanced decomposition. The remaining seven crew members were declared killed in action based on the circumstances cited in my last letter to you. They, as was your husband, were carried missing in action until that time. Interrogation of the pararescue team revealed that partial remains discovered in the aircraft were trapped into the seats normally occupied by the pilot and the two co-pilots. It is unrealistic to assume that these remains were those of any other members of the crew.

The duties of the pararescue team members were threefold and in the following priority: pick up survivors; destroy classified equipment; and recover remains. Time and related factors previously discussed with you prevented the team from bringing back the remains of those bodies discovered other than those of Lieutenant Bernhardt. The four man rescue team which visited the crash site spent approximately forty minutes on the ground calculated from lowering of the first team member to the reentry of the fourth member back into the helicopter. During this period of time two of the team were constantly checking the perimeter for hostile persons. The other two were conducting their duties. Other than the human remains, there were no identifiable personal objects discovered in the area. However, the lack of dog tags or other objects is not proof that one or more of the crew exited the aircraft safely. The fire in the EC-47 was of such intensity that the entire fuselage was badly burned and equipment aboard was melted beyond recognition. It is therefore illogical

to assume that objects that normally could be used for identification purposes would be recognizable, even to a trained pararescue team. The fact that the airplane was upside down also hampered the investigation. I again emphasize the fact that the time restriction imposed on the rescue and search effort severely limited the investigation.

As I stated to you in my letter of 13 February, I sincerely felt at that time that there was an outside possibility that one or more of the crew may have parachuted to safety. In the following week, the Wing Commander of the unit whose pararescue team visited the crash site and I evaluated the possibilities and facts associated with the loss of the aircraft and the decision was then made to change the status to killed in action for the remaining seven men who comprised the crew. This decision was not a contradiction of the original decision, but a change based on a thorough and thoughtful analysis of all available information.

I discussed the radio beepers at length in my most recent letter to you, but would like to add that crew members in most instances can activate the beepers while descending by parachute, after safely exiting the aircraft. They don't have to wait until they are on the ground and thus subject themselves to the possibility of immediate capture, without first alerting friendly forces of their approximate location. The other friendly aircraft flying in the area could easily have heard the beeper signals. The area where the aircraft was conducting the mission is mountainous and does contain dense jungle, as you stated. However, the fact that no parachutes were sighted does not negate all the other facts and evidence I have discussed with you.

A new development is currently underway in Thailand, which may shed more information on the loss of your husband. A Joint Casualty Resolution Center has been established at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base in Northeastern Thailand. The function of this Center will be to visit each crash site to investigate all aspects of the wreckage. The crash site of your husband's aircraft has been identified as one of the first to be visited. This cannot be accomplished until agreement is reached with the country involved (Laos) and hostilities cease. Contrary to widespread opinion, much of the territory surrounding the crash site remains extremely hostile. I assure you that any additional facts will be forwarded to you as they become known.

Your simile of attempting to put together a jigsaw puzzle is an excellent comparison. We fit together the pieces we have and fill in the rest from considered judgement based on operational experience and known operating factors developed over the years. A decision such as that in the case of your husband is made only after much soul searching examination of all available information.

Again, I truly offer you my deepest sympathy and ask that you contact me for any additional assistance. I want to assure you that it is my sincere desire to alleviate your concern.

Sincerely

P. A. Humphreys
P. A. HUMPHREYS, Colonel, USAF
Commander


CHAPTER FOUR - OPERATIONS

The first three months of 1973 were of increasing importance in the operations of the 361st TFW. Due to the withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam, the AADP role of the 361st TFW was a primary concern of higher headquarters.² With the removal of ground forces from SEA, the primary means of detecting enemy infiltration and ceasefire violations fall to the VC-47/361st TFW.


On 5 February 1973, the squadron suffered its first combat loss. A VC-47, flying out of the 361st with eight men aboard, was shot down in a friendly fire area 100 miles north. Radio contact was lost with no information on why or where the aircraft went down. On 7 February, 1973, Maj Norman Vane, 361st TFW assistant operations officer, accompanied the Jolly Green helicopter that participated in the SAR effort. The wreckage was found with no apparent survivors. The bodies of the copilot, 1st Robert E. Bernhardt, and the third pilot, 2nd Devoro J. Prim III, were found and identified in the charred remains of the aircraft. The other crew members were believed consumed in the fire that resulted from the crash. Listed as missing in action were the aircraft commander, Capt George A. Spitz, the navigator, Capt Arthur M. Bollinger, and the radio operators from the 664th Security Squadron, Sgt Dale Brandenburg, Sgt Peter H. Cressman, Sgt Joseph A. Matejov, and 361st TFW Lt. Bolton.



from History of the
361st Tac. Elec. Wing



*The Next of Kin of Lt Prim
Have never been told this





APEN AT BARON 52
 RESCUE PERSONNEL
 PHOTO SHOWS
 AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE
 RESCUER ON PENETRATOR
















NO 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100



Matejov, Joseph, A.



DALE BRANDENBURG



TODD MELTON



Bernhardt, Robert, E.

CRESSMAN, Peter R., SGT, 56146-0-5688, MIA
 DPMCE/Ma, Silverbush/371, 56146-0-5688, awcus/ca/25 Oct 75

DPMCE

30 OCT 1975

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
 6982 - 62nd Avenue, North
 Pinellas Park, Florida 33565

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

Reference is made to Mrs. Cressman's telephone conversation with a representative of this office on 9 September 1975 concerning your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman.

We have researched all possibilities in an attempt to locate a photo of your son's crash site and find that none exists.

If we may be of further assistance to you, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely

ED SILVERBUSH

ED SILVERBUSH, Major, USAF
 Chief, Missing Persons
 Casualty Matters
 Asst DCS/Personnel for Mil Pers

FILE IN MASTER
 PERSONNEL RECORDS

DATE 30 OCT 75
 OFFICE DPDILB
 LEO 30 OCT 75



JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER
 NAS BARBERS POINT HAWAII 96882

JCRC-CDD

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Request for Sergeant Peter R. Cressman, USAF, 148-46-5985

R.A. Cressman
 c/o National Forget-Me-Not Association For
 Prisoners of War and Missing In Action Inc.
 P.O. Box #41023
 St. Petersburg, FL 33743

1. The Joint Casualty Resolution Center has conducted a thorough search of its files for information pertaining to the subject individual. All documents resulting from that search are attached to this letter.

PHOTOS: 2 Facials 1 Aircraft

MAP: L701563402

Teletype Conversation

FM: MAC 36

PKT: Crash Site Info

Narrative

RPT: Intelligence Case File

FM: Personal Auth Card

RPT: APEX BEELINE

MSG: 56SOW NKP RTAFB THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAILAND

MSG: 8 CSG UBON AFLD THAI

MSG: 56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 8 CSG UBON AFLD THAI

MSG: 8 CSG UBON AFLD THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: OLCB6960 ABSQ KELLY AFB TX

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT EIGHT

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 56CSG NKP APRT THAI

MSG: 40ARRS RCC NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

RPT: SAR ACTIONS

RPT: SARDAB

RPT: SARDAB

RPT: SARDAB

MSG: 56TH SERVICES SQ NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

MSG: 56SOW NAKHON PHANOM RTAFB THAI

Undated

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2 DEC 72

041905EFEB73

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050634ZFEB73

050015ZFEB73

050635ZFEB73

050638ZFEB73

051205ZFEB73

051645ZFEB73

061205ZFEB73

071140ZFEB73

071201ZFEB73

071502ZFEB73

081140ZFEB73

091000ZFEB73

091014ZFEB73

091320ZFEB73

9 FEB 73

Undated

9 FEB 73

27 FEB 73

100300ZFEB73

100300ZFEB73

100300ZFEB73

Josh Levin
c/o Jack Anderson
1401 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036

Capt. Ray Vohden
c/o MIA/POW Affairs
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Capt. Vohden:

Persuant to my request of last week, I would like to obtain information on the crash of an Air Force EC-47 Q over Laos, the date of February 5, 1973.

It is known that such an aircraft was shot down with eight persons aboard. These men were: Lt. Robert Bernhardt, E-4 Dale Bradenberg, E-4 Joseph Matejov, E-4 Peter Cressman, Lt. Severo Primin, E-5 Todd Melton, Capt. Arthur Bollinger, and Capt. George Spitz. The body of Lt. Bernhardt was returned to the U.S. All men were declared dead.

It has come to my attention that as many as six men were known to be captured, or at the very least not definitely dead. This fact has not been released publicly up until now.

I would like to obtain a detailed account of the circumstances behind the move to declare these men dead, and information about the known status of these men at the time of the crash. Information concerning how U.S. data on these men was obtained (e.g. intercepts) would be appreciated as well.

Please do all you can to assist me in my research.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

Josh Levin
Josh Levin

ADDITIONAL/Rev. Maddon/00040/24 Oct 72

An Air Force EC-47 aircraft departed from
Ayutthaya, Thailand, on an operational mission over
Laos at approximately 11:05 PM (local time) on
February 4, 1973. It carried an eight man crew.
At approximately 1:25 AM on February 5th, the air-
craft reported observing ground fire and at 1:30 AM
reported communications normal. This was the last con-
tact made with the aircraft. No emergency signals
or automatic beacon signals were ever heard. After
several attempts to establish contact failed, search
and rescue efforts were begun at 6:00 AM (first
light) on February 5th.

On February 7, 1973, the crash site was dis-
covered. A pararescue team was lowered by hoist
from a hovering helicopter on 7 February to search
for survivors. The team reported that the aircraft
was almost totally destroyed. The fuselage was
punctured by what appeared to be an extremely intense
fire and everything in the fuselage was reduced to
ashes or melted. The aircraft had burned until

down and there were no child seats. Both wing tips had broken off and were located some distance from the aircraft. The team found no survivors, but found remains of about 40 crew members. The area was considered very hostile and the rescue team's time on the ground was limited by available fuel to the hovering helicopter. The team recovered the identifiable remains and left the crash site when the helicopter's remaining fuel supply necessitated departure.

The remains recovered were later identified as those of the first copilot.

The field commander's decision to declare the crew to be dead was made on February 22, 1973. His decision was based on the circumstances of the loss and the report on the condition of the aircraft made by the rescue team. Although the aircraft was equipped with Ultra High Frequency, Very High Frequency and High Frequency radio, no distress call was received. Each crew member carried a survival radio programmed to

operate on emergency frequency, but none were activated at the time of the crash. Most crew fired without wearing their survival equipment. In an emergency, it would have been necessary to don the equipment and open the exit door, actions which are made difficult if the plane has been hit and is not in level flight. When the aircraft was found, it was almost totally destroyed. The chances of survival were extremely remote.

Shortly after the loss of this aircraft, a ~~an~~ ^{that was not in} intelligence source reported that ~~that~~ ^{men who were} ~~four~~ ^{men} were transporting four captured ~~prisoners~~ ^{prisoners} about 55 kilometers from the crash site. ^{however,} No identifying or nationality was ~~given~~ ^{provided} ~~about~~ ^{about} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~prisoners~~ ^{prisoners} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~usually~~ ^{usually} ~~used~~ ^{used} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~determine~~ ^{determine} ~~whether~~ ^{whether} ~~or~~ ^{or} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~report~~ ^{report} pertained to crew members of the ED-47 aircraft. Loss on February 5, 1973. No further intelligence reports of any kind were received as to the location or disposition of the four ~~prisoners~~ ^{prisoners} mentioned in

the intelligence received. The names of the crew and members whose location was not recovered were included on lists provided to the Ministry in May 75, June 75 and April 75 and lists provided to the IAC (in June, October and November 1975).

CRESSMAN, Peter R., Sgt, FR148-46-5985
MPCCB/Mr. Rowlett/2816/4 Aug 78/lp

3 AUG 1978

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
6982 62nd Avenue, North
Pinellas Park, Florida 33565

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman

The attached statement was released by the Department of Defense as the result of a press inquiry concerning the loss of the aircraft on which your son, Sergeant Peter R. Cressman, was a crew member. I read this statement to Mrs. Cressman by telephone on 28 July 1978. Nothing contained in the press release changes the Air Force's position concerning the status of the crew members.

A map pinpointing the area of the crash site of the aircraft, as requested by your son, is being forwarded to you under separate cover.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please let us know.

Sincerely

Sign:

THEODORE E. BROM, JR., Major, USAF
Chief, Missing Persons
Casualty Matters

1 Atch -
Press Release

An Air Force EC-47 aircraft departed Ubon Airfield, Thailand, on an operational mission over Laos at approximately 11:05 PM (local time) on February 4, 1973. It carried an eight man crew. At approximately 1:25 AM on February 5th, the aircraft reported observing ground fire and at 1:30 AM reported operations normal. This was the last contact made with the aircraft. No emergency signals or automatic beeper signals were ever heard. After several attempts to establish contact failed, search and rescue efforts were begun at 6:00 AM (first light) on February 5th.

On February 7, 1973, the crash site was discovered. A pararescue team was lowered by hoist from a hovering helicopter on 9 February to search for survivors. The team reported that the aircraft was almost totally destroyed. The fuselage was gutted by what appeared to have been an extremely intense fire and everything in the fuselage was reduced to ashes or melted. The aircraft had impacted upside down and there were no skid marks. Both wing tips had broken off and were located some distance from the aircraft. The team found no survivors, but found remains of three to four crew members. The area was considered very hostile and the rescue team's time on the ground was limited by available fuel in the hovering helicopter. The team recovered the identifiable remains and left the crash site when the helicopter's remaining fuel supply necessitated departure.

The remains recovered were later identified as those of the first co-pilot.

The field commander's decision to declare the crew to be dead was made on February 22, 1973. His decision was based on the circumstances of the loss and the report on the condition of the aircraft made by the rescue team. Although the aircraft was equipped with Ultra High Frequency, Very High Frequency and High Frequency radio, no distress call was received. Each crew member carried a survival radio preset to operate on emergency frequency, but none were activated at the time of the crash. Most crews flew without wearing their survival equipment. In an emergency, it would have been necessary to don the equipment and open the exit door, actions which are made difficult if the plane has been hit and is not in level flight. When the aircraft

was found, it was almost totally destroyed. The chances of survival were extremely remote.

Shortly, after the loss of this aircraft, an intelligence source that may not be further identified reported that enemy forces were transporting four captured men who may have been American pilots about 65 kilometers from the crash site. However, no identity or nationality was specified. It is not possible to determine whether or not that report pertained to crew members of the EC-47 aircraft lost on February 5, 1973. No further intelligence reports of any kind were received as to the location or disposition of the four captured men mentioned in the intelligence report. The names of the seven crew members whose bodies were not recovered were included on lists provided to the Vietnamese in May 73, June 74 and April 75 and lists provided to the Lao in July 1973 and June, October and November 1974.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Good Morning America

WJLA-TV
ABC Network

August 3, 1978

7:00 AM

Washington, D.C.

Misinformation

JACK ANDERSON: The Paris agreement ending the Vietnam War was signed in January 1973. Two weeks later, on February 5th, 1973, a spy plane flew over Laos. It was brought down by ground fire. Well, 17 days later, the eight-man crew was declared dead by the Pentagon. Yet the remains of only one flier were found.

Now my staff has learned that at least half of the crew probably survived. Pentagon officials realized this within days after the crash, yet the Air Force never told the families of these men that their loved ones were probably alive.

An American para-rescue team found the wreckage, but only the remains of the first copilot, Lieutenant Robert Bernhardt, were identified. Afterwards, a surveillance report, which the Pentagon itself calls reliable, sighted four captured men about 65 kilometers from the crash site.

A Pentagon spokesman now agrees there's a good chance these four men were survivors of the crash. Yet the Pentagon deliberately gave the families misinformation.

My sources say this case is not at all unique. The full details of other Air Force crashes, they say, haven't always been made available to the families.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

14 MAR 1978

H-54,093/DB-4

TO: Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center
Randolph Air Force Base
ATTN: Gene Schultz
Texas 78142

SUBJECT: Forwarding of Documents, Re: EC-47 Aircraft Downed
5 February 1973

In response to your 8 March 1973 telephonic request, the enclosed documents are provided for your retention.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

- 4 Enclosures
1. DoD Information Report as of 5 Feb 73
 2. DoD Information Report as of 5 Feb 73
 3. DoD Information Report as of 17 Feb 73
 4. DoD Information Report as of 2 May 73

CHARLES F. TROWBRIDGE
Chief, PW/MIA Branch
Resources and
Installations Division
Directorate for
Intelligence Research

72

CAPTIVITY OF FOUR PILOTS

GROUP IS HOLDING FOUR PILOTS CAPTIVE AND THE GROUP IS REQUESTING
ORDERS CONCERNING WHAT TO DO WITH THEM

72

MOVEMENT OF PRISONERS.

GROUP

HAS FOUR PIRATES

THEY ARE GOING

THEY ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES MOVING

FROM "44" TO "93"
ALONG THE ROAD.

7 FEB 73

ALL OF THE UNITS ARE TO FIRE AT THE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DURING THE NEW SEASON. THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE SOUTH LAOTIAN CAMPAIGN HAVE SHOT DOWN ONE AIRCRAFT AND CAPTURED THE PILOT/PILOTS. IT REQUESTED THAT ALL OF THE UNITS GO OUT AND LOOK FOR PIECES OF THE AIRCRAFT. IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS TOO FAR AWAY TO PICK UP THE PIECES, REPORT SO THAT THEY CAN TAKE CARE OF IT. THIS IS TO BE DONE IMMEDIATELY, YOU ARE TO REPORT BACK ON THE 19TH. THIS IS ALL THE TIME THAT YOU HAVE TO REPORT. IT HAS TO BE REPORTED BY THE 19TH

DOWNED EC-47 CREW

1. HAVE REVIEWED ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FOUR FLIERS AND NO ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS OR AMPLIFYING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF THE FLIERS WERE REVEALED. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING IS A RECAP AND SOME OTHER OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THIS SUBJECT.

2. FOUR FLIERS, WHOSE NATIONALITY WAS NOT DISCLOSED, WERE LOCATED ON 5 FEB IN THE GENERAL AREA NORTH OF MOUNG HONG.

THE FLIERS WERE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM "44," A PROBABLE REFERENCE TO KILOMETER MARKER 44 ON ROUTE 914 (XD 495254 16-30N 106-25E) TO "93," A PROBABLE REFERENCE TO KILOMETER MARKER 93 ON ROUTE 1032 (XD 549505, 16-43N 106-27E), AND WERE APPARENTLY EN ROUTE TO WEST OF THE DMZ IN LAOS, TWO PERSONS WERE TO BE CONTACTED CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF THE POWS AND IF PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED, HIGH HQS WAS TO BE NOTIFIED TO SUPPLY "WAYS AND MEANS" (REFERENCES TO TRUCKS) TO MOVE THE FLIERS. SUFFICIENT WATER WAS TO BE GIVEN TO THE FLIERS.

THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSPORTING THE FLIERS AND ASKED TO SEE IF THESE PROBLEMS HAD BEEN RESOLVED SO MOVEMENT COULD CONTINUE. THE PERSON ALSO ASKED THAT HE BE NOTIFIED OF THEIR TIME OF DEPARTURE AS HE WAS WAITING FOR THEM.

ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL LOCATION GIVEN

IS SOME

65 KM FROM THE CRASH SITE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT LEAST PART OF THE CREW WERE ABLE TO BAIL OUT PRIOR TO THE CRASH AND THEREFORE COULD HAVE BEEN CLOSER TO THIS POINT THAN THE CRASH SITE WHEN THEY WERE CAPTURED. FURTHER, SINCE VEHICLE TRANSPORTATION WAS INDICATED, RAPID MOVEMENT IS REASONABLE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE 4 FLIERS WERE PART OF THE CREW OF THE EC-47.

HAVE REVIEWED ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FOUR
FLIPS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-10-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

1. The following information was obtained from the file of the
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ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL LOCATION GIVEN

10 KM FROM THE CRASH SITE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT LEAST PART OF THE
WAS WAS ABLE TO FALL OUT PRIOR TO THE CRASH AND THEREFORE

STEPHEN A. MATEJOV
8418 PENDROY STREET
EAST MEADOW, NEW YORK 11554

29 March 1979

Honorable John C Stetson
Secretary of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Mr. Secretary:

There are many forces within me which prompt me to write to you. Firstly, I am a concerned citizen and feel that a wrong has been committed which should be righted. I am also a Retired Army Officer, a Graduate of the United States Military Academy, and hence part of the Family of those who serve, like yourself, the interest of our country in a military fashion. But, primarily, this letter is being written as a parent, a father of ten children, of which one child is the subject of this appeal, as outlined below.

My son, Sergeant Joseph A. Matejko, was involved in an Air Force mission approximately six years ago, February 4th, 1973, in which the plane was shot down over Laos. At first the Air Force declared him Missing in Action. Shortly thereafter, on the 19th of February, the Air Force changed his status to Killed in Action. As recommended by the Air Force personnel who had contact with us during this trying time, a Memorial Service was held for him in the community and the Family then started to close ranks and adjust to this tragic happening. But, as it developed, we were not to be left alone.

Several months ago, the Air Force sent us a news release which indicated that there was considerable doubt that all of the crew had perished since sightings were made of flyers being escorted on a trail to captivity. Privately, I contacted known friends and associates to find out what they knew of this. It appears that in my son's unit, it was common knowledge to all, that the "pilots" of this mission were dead but that the other four, who had operated the electronic reconnaissance equipment in the rear of the craft, had not only survived the crash but had been captured. They, the men of the 1994th Security Squadron, knew of several sightings of the men being herded along dirt roads. They also knew of enemy radio intercepts in which the handling of these captives were of immediate interest. It was "barracks room" talk. And these men expressed surprise and consternation that those captured would be declared dead in so short a time!

As can be expected, this surfacing of new information upset my whole family. After several discussions with the Air Force Casualty personnel, my wife and I were invited to the Pentagon on the 10th of March 74, to personally review the available information surrounding this aircraft incident. There we were made privy to the "visual-sighting" and "radio-intercept" reports in question. I was as amazed and as puzzled as my son's comrades were. I posed the question to Lt. Colonel Bobby D Ballard who was supervising our visit to Washington: "why, in the face of all this information, did the Air Force decide to list the entire crew as Killed in Action?" Colonel Ballard replied that he had asked that same question by telephone of Colonel Humphreys, Commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-4's), my son's senior unit commander at that time. Colonel Ballard explained that he had researched this answer in response to an earlier but similar query given him by parents of other crew members, this same flight. To which Colonel Humphreys replied that he had listed them as Killed in Action simply because he did not have this intelligence information available to him!

Mr. Secretary, I submit to you respectfully, that such a state of affairs would appear to anyone schooled in the Military Arts as inconceivable! In accepting that proposition, however, since it was offered, I hereby petition the Secretary to reopen this case and reverse the ruling made on behalf of my son and declare him again "Missing in Action" as it rightfully belongs, based on the information currently made available. A thorough interrogation of all personnel involved, under oath, to include Colonel F.A. Humphreys, his intelligence staff & other key officials as well as Captain William J. Shea and his cohorts of Detachment 3, 8994th Security Squadron--that now seems to be in order. If, in fact, Colonel Humphreys did not know of these intelligence gleanings, then, who covered up and why?

In closing, Mr. Secretary, I wish to emphasize that at this point I am writing this as a father, who, with wife and children behind him, petition for a redress of a grievance. I have no axe to grind. I am not looking for anyone to be punished. If, in the pursuit of this gruesome predicament, your representative do find a malfeasance of office, I feel confident that the matter will be addressed properly. Rather, I am trying to assure myself and family, and, in a way, my son, that we have not abandoned him.

Please, Mr. Secretary, do not let this become another type of "watergate" affair which will continue to fester and haunt the Air Force until it is aired satisfactorily.

Trusting,

Stephen A. Matejov
Stephen A. Matejov
Lt. Colonel, Retired

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC 20330



AFM 10
AFM 10
MPC
RANDOLPH AFB TEXAS 78148

3 MAY 1979

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Matejov, USA (Retired)
2415 Pendroy Street
East Meadow, New York 11554

Dear Colonel Matejov

The Secretary of the Air Force has authorized me to act for him on missing in action issues. Therefore, your 29 March 1979 letter to him has been referred to me for a reply.

Colonel Matejov, having reviewed all the available evidence, I do not believe that an investigation is warranted or that the evidence justifies a change of status to missing in action. Considering the length of time since his loss, the fact that our repatriated prisoners had no information about him or any member of his crew, and the severe health problems any American in arduous circumstances would experience in Southeast Asia, I conclude that there is no substantive basis for a presumption that your son survived.

My staff has spoken with General Humphries and are satisfied that he did not know of the reports about four captives. However, he has since concluded that, if they were accurate, their relevance to the loss of your son would have been questionable in view of all the other available information as set out in his letters to you beginning on 13 February 1973. General Humphries made his decision based upon the available information, and I do not find his judgment to have been arbitrary or unreasonable. Therefore, I do not believe that sworn statements or an investigation are necessary. With respect to the release of the sighting reports to you, I can add nothing to the explanation provided in the letter of transmittal. There was no "cover-up" or intentional withholding of information.

Status changes do not result in an abandonment of our government's efforts to obtain an accounting. We have and will continue to seek a final disposition for all of our personnel lost in Southeast Asia. The actual status of our personnel MIA or KIA has not resulted in an absolute refusal by the North Vietnamese or its allies, to provide information

about members whose status has been changed to KIA. Confirmation of this is found in the fact that the remains of 48 Air Force personnel have been recovered since the general repatriation of PWs in March 1973, 27 of whom had previously been changed to killed in action. Consequently, I conclude that a change of status has not been a factor in the North Vietnamese or its allies decision to provide an accounting in individual cases such as your son's. Rather, they apparently provide information when they believe it will serve their interests. Whether we have changed a status to KIA appears not to be a factor in their decisions.

I deeply regret that you have suffered the loss of a son. Please accept my admiration and respect for the dignified manner in which you have presented your concerns. The Air Force appreciates the opportunity to review the case. Being convinced that the original decision was valid, I cannot honor your requests. I want to assure you that in the event any information concerning your son ever becomes known, we will advise you as expeditiously as possible regardless of his status.

Sincerely

LW
L. W. SVENDSEN, JR.
Major General, USAF
Asst DCS/Manpwr and Pers
for Mil Pers

POW'S AFTER HOSTILITIES

Mr. FOUNTAIN: You made reference to one case in which information was withheld. Are you in a position to tell us the circumstances in connection with that case?

Mr. SHIELDS: The one case of which I am aware in which there was not what we might describe as simply an oversight was a case in which three men may have been captured. This would have been after the termination of hostilities in South Vietnam. I believe that record has been made public now, has it not?

This was a communications intercept which indicated three men out of a reconnaissance aircraft may have been captured. In fact the communication intercept stated they were captured. The men though, were declared presumptively dead.

The circumstances of the loss were examined on the scene, and as I recall there was concern among officials within the Pentagon that the remains of those three men may not have been in the wreckage of the aircraft, so it raised strong presumptions in my mind that something may have happened to those men. They may have been captured. Nevertheless, they were declared presumptively dead.

I am not sure what the families were told. Families were not informed there had been a communication intercept which indicated they had been captured. This was in 1973.

Mr. GUYEN: Mr. Chairman I am going to give my time to Mr. Gilman because he has so much to ask and I had a chance to make a statement.

Letter of Mary Mateja to Mr. Lawrence Hargrett dated Sept. 17, 1988

Sept. 17, 1988

Dear Larry,

Please forgive me for not answering sooner, but last week I had a house full of visitors and we were never home. There's so much to see and do here. You asked for Joe's story, so I'm enclosing what Skyhook II did on Joe. Part of what they didn't have was my husband and my secret meeting with Dr. Roger Shields in N.Y. City. I didn't talk about this until two years ago. My husband had promised to never tell of this meeting when he made the arrangements. I kept quiet as long as he was alive. Not seeing enough action done to bring our men home, I feel I had to speak about it and I do.

Dr. Shields told us the four men on the ECA7 who manned the electronic equipment had bailed out and were among the known live captured Americans. Their names were on the list to be turned over to the Vietnamese of men we knew they had. It was Bill Clements, (Today the Governor of Texas) then acting Secretary of Defense, who ordered Roger Shields to cross out the four men's names and write over them "killed in action". Our men were killed on paper at the Paris Peace Talks. The reason given was to protect the 591 men coming home, because the ECA7 was flying eight days after the Peace Treaty was signed!

Dr. Shields said he told Bill Clements "You can't do that, you know these men are alive." Bill Clement's answer? "They are killed in action" Shields had to obey the order. Dr. Shields told us he had intended to see what he could do after the 591 men returned, but in all the excitement at Clark Air Force Base he "dropped the ball". My son, Pete Crossman, and the others were just written off. (Helton and Brandenburg)

I'm sure Evelyn Crossman can give you other information I might have left out.

I would appreciate it if you give Evelyn Crossman the Skyhook II material when you are finished with it. I had promised to give it to her in Wash. but with all the action going on I forgot. She's still waiting to see it. If you have any questions, feel free to call or write. I'll be here through Sept. I return to N.Y. early Oct. I hope I've sent you what you want.

I'm also enclosing a letter Joe wrote one week before his capture. Note his interest in the POWs - Little did he know he would soon become one. Thanks for your interest and help to all of us.

Sincerely,
(signed)

Mary Mateja

Excerpt from "Hearings before the Committee on Veteran's Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, second session. (1986) Vol.1, page 189.

Mr. NEVIN. Well, it was on apparently April 12, 1973, that the official policy, indeed the public policy, of the U.S. Government became that there is no reason to believe that any American missing remain alive in Indochina.

Senator DENTON. And Roger Shields—

Mr. NEVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Roger Shields went along with that and he is still a good man?

Mr. ASHWORTH. Sir, I think you hadn't been able to make it when I specifically brought up this instance.

Dr. Shields was ordered to say that, and when he objected, my understanding is Dr.—the voice over the telephone said to him. "They are dead. Do you understand, Dr. Shields, they are dead?"

And I have to tell you, in a telephone conversation that I had with Dr. Shields, he told me that at the time that this was stated, that this statement was made at the end of Homecoming, that there were enormous questions, enormous questions, about the POW's over there and that this was not a priority item after that point in time. Dr. Shields personally told me that.

Mr. William "Bill" Hendon's notes on his telephonic conversation with Dr. Roger Shields on 23 April 1963, starting at 1212 hrs. (EST):

TEXT:

(Dr. Roger) Shields answered (the) phone himself - no secretary - he said "Roger Shields". I said Roger, this is (Billy Hendon), etc.

I read him the statement attributed to him in pod S-9, and also (Brigadier General) Kingston's, and also Soth's February 13 (statement). He said he (Shields) hadn't really meant to say that (and he wasn't quoted correctly. He claimed Soth was referring to the 2 (POWs released) thru Hanoi - I (Hendon) told him no way - (and) cited 6 were captured by NVA (North Vietnamese Army) - rather by PL (Pathet Lao), but turned (them) over to NVA in 15 minutes. (I) read (the) Soth statement again and asked how we could make such a statement that they (the POWs) were all dead. He said "we negotiated them away". They were trying to get us to recognize them, deal with them, we said "no way".

There was one incident - I (Shields) can't remember the name of it...

(Hendon): Specimen 170...

(Shields): No, I remember that one - this was a C47 shot down in (February) - we had a radio intercept where they (the NVA) were talking about having the crew - some of the crew - as prisoners - 4 or 5 were killed - the rest were captured - we knew it and negotiated it away. I tried to tell Bill Clements and I almost lost my job. He said they were all dead. I told him we had no evidence of that (and) we couldn't say that. He said "you didn't hear me, you didn't hear what I said - they're all dead. Bill Clements was really a hard core guy on dealing with the communists.... I almost lost my job.

Shields said he had to go to a luncheon, was late, and then had to go to S.E. Asia, (and) would return (on the) 23rd of May. After assuring Shields I would call him in late May (he said he'd come to DC or to NY for meeting). I went over to tell V of my call and cite it as an example of what you can learn if you cut there moving, what you pick up, and I told him the whole conversation. He (V) was stunned. He couldn't believe it. He couldn't believe when I showed him their dead out names in the Homecoming book. He couldn't believe the guy (Shields) would say it over an unsecure line.

I (Hendon) called ----- to get DIA summary of (that) case. It included a (document) we gave to Laos statement

captured immediately. V thinks this gets them off the hook as it implies DIA incorporated Shield's story into the info given to the Lao. I tell him no, I recall a story of some guys being seen +/- 20 km away, this is what they mean.

V and ----- see Sol and I am right. V is almost a believer!! Only a few more thousand miles to go!!

Signed and dated.

Case #1983-0-01 thru 07

NARRATIVE

On 5 February 1973, an EC47 aircraft, tail number 43-58636, with eight personnel on board, disappeared while flying over Saravane Province, Laos. On 7 February 1973, the crash site of this aircraft was located in the vicinity of coordinates YC 143 291. Pararescuemen were lowered by jungle penetrator to investigate the burned wreckage. They reported that three of four charred remains were observed in the wreckage but were able to recover only one set which was later identified as one of the missing crew. Due to the possibility that some of the crewmembers may have parachuted to safety prior to the crash, aerial searches were conducted in the area and emergency radio channels monitored, but no trace of any other crewmember could be found. Subsequent information indicates that several of these crewmembers may have been captured.

Data-pertaining to these seven individuals are as follows:

Name: Spitz, George Ross
Rank: Captain, US Air Force
Date of Birth: 17 January 1943
Race: Caucasian
Height: 1.85 meters
Weight: 79.2 kilos
Hair: Brown
Eyes: Blue

Case #1983-0-01 thru 07

Name: Bollinger, Arthur Ray

Rank: Captain, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 13 June 1944

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.85 meters

Weight: 83.8 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Blue

Name: Melton, Todd Michael

Rank: SSGT, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 11 April 1949

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.85 meters

Weight: 90.6 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Blue

Name: Primm, Severo James III

Rank: 2nd Lt, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 3 November 1947

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.80 meters

Weight: 72.4 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Green

Case #1983-0-01 thru 07

Name: Cressman, Peter Richard

Rank: SGT, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 23 May 1951

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.77 meters

Weight: 77.0 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Blue

Name: Matejov, Joseph Andrew

Rank: SGT, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 2 February 1952

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.85 meters

Weight: 74.7 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Blue

Name: Brandenburg, Dale

Rank: SGT, US Air Force

Date of Birth: 11 November 1948

Race: Caucasian

Height: 1.77 meters

Weight: 65.6 kilos

Hair: Brown

Eyes: Brown

WORTH L. BLOOM

NOW COMES Jerry J. Mooney, and hereby swears and affirms the following:

I am presently 46 years of age, married and have two children. I am currently a citizen and resident of the State of Montana. I have served on active duty with the United States Air Force since 28 April, 1957. I retired on the 1st day of June, 1977. From approximately June, 1968 to December, 1974, I was assigned duties as a special research analyst and crypt analyst to include all formal reporting actions at duty locations which were Joint Sobe Processing Center (Okinawa) and the 6970th Support Group (Ft. George G. Meade, Md.) with duty to the National Security Agency (NSA).

A general description of my assigned duties was that I was a Superintendent and Section NCOIC for airborne cryptographic operations. I was also a special research analyst and fund programmer and evaluator for the B2 Group. I had responsibilities for developing, reviewing and approving plans pertaining to airborne and conventional resources (intelligence). I assisted in the planning, funding, and allocation of manpower and equipment resources in accordance with global and local requirements. I maintained a top secret security clearance during this entire period of time.

Specifically, on a day-to-day basis, I would receive, process, analyze, evaluate and formally report significant intelligence data in accordance with high level consumer requirements.

I have attended and graduated from the following formal training in the intelligence field: Apprentice Radio Traffic Analysis Specialist Course (AE 10020, March Air Force Base, California), Cryptanalytic Specialist Course (ALX 20130, Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas), NCO Academy, United States Air Force Security Service. I served in an intelligence career field throughout my twenty years of service with the U.S. Air Force.

During the Vietnam conflict I was assigned to the J.S.P.C. in Sobe Chinawa and later with the 6970th Support Group with duty assignment to the National Security Agency. Based upon my six years of experience in these assignments and based upon my intelligence background, I am presently convinced that there are living Americans who are prisoners of the Vietnam War being held in captivity in Southeast Asia.

I base this opinion on the following: in my job during these assignments I received intercepted North Vietnamese communications and messages directly relating to the command and control and military operations of North Vietnamese units operating in North Vietnam, northern South Vietnam and Laos. These communications were both directive and informative in nature and contained orders to "shoot down the enemy, shoot down the enemy and capture the pilot alive, and shoot down the enemy and execute the pilot." These were the exact operational orders which I collected.

Further, other communications were received discussing the handling, disposition and transportation of captured American personnel—both pilots and ground forces people. These messages revealed the delivery of captured Americans from Laos, South Vietnam through the Bankar and Hugia passes to Vinh, North Vietnam and probably on to Hanoi. They also revealed the execution of captured Americans and the pre-planned execution of impending captured Americans. In my role as a senior analyst and having access to both operational and collateral data from other military organizations and national agencies I was able to associate North Vietnamese references to U.S. official listings of missing U.S. personnel. I compiled a listing of over three hundred U.S. military personnel categorized as MIA/POW. At Homcoming One less than five percent of those on my list known to be alive were returned to the United States.

Further, as a basis for my opinion, North Vietnamese messages revealed a high interest in selecting priority targets to include F-111 aircraft.

airborne intelligence collectors, F-4 laser bomb equipped aircraft and electronic support aircraft. It was clear from the intelligence collected that the North Vietnamese were particularly interested in capturing the crew or pilots of these aircraft alive. They were considered very important prisoners.

In approximately February, 1973, while assigned with the 6970th Support Group assigned further to the National Security Agency at Ft. Meade, Maryland, my section received, analyzed, evaluated and formally reported the shoot-down of an EC-470 aircraft in Laos. Based upon the enemy messages which we collected there were at least five to seven survivors who were identified as Americans and transported to North Vietnam. This is an example of their interest in an intelligence collector aircraft. Since the aircraft was assigned to the 6994th Security Squadron (an intelligence collection unit) and its members were trained intelligence collectors, this confirms my earlier statement of high North Vietnamese interest in capturing these individuals alive. This information was formally reported to interested consumers with an add-on of "White House." I personally wrote the message that these men had been captured alive, that they were Americans and had been transported to North Vietnam. In secure phone conversations with the Defense Intelligence Agency we were in total agreement that these were the crew members of the downed EC-470. In this regard, the attached correspondence from Rear Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle dated 25 February, 1981, relates to this specific incident that I reported on. The representation that there was no identity or nationality of the reported prisoners is completely false. I have reviewed the DIA computer print-out dated 80/02/26 under the "incident date" of 730205 which is attached hereto as Exhibit Two. This is the same incident about which I am referring. The crewmembers listed are in "category one" according to the print out, which confirms my report that certain of these crewmembers were captured alive since I have now learned that "category one" means "confirmed knowledge" of the presence of these men by North Vietnam.

I have given this sworn affidavit under penalty of perjury and I confirm that all of the above is true and accurate to the best of my information and belief. I have given this information also to a United States Congressman as a concerned citizen of this country. I have made this affidavit knowing full well that it may be filed in the case of Smith, et.al. -vs- Reagan, et.al.


Subscribed and sworn this 3rd day of November, 1981.

NORTH CAROLINA

GIBBERLAND COUNTY

I, CHARLES G. BOLTWOOD, JR., a Notary Public for Cumberland County, State of North Carolina, do hereby certify, that on this date, JERRY J. MOOREY, personally appeared before me, and acknowledged the due execution of the foregoing instrument.

- This 3rd day of November, 1981.



My Commission Expires

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON DC 20301

U-5021/01-7

Mr. and Mrs. George R. Cressman
6892 62nd Avenue North
Pinellas Park, FL 33565

25 FEB 1981

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cressman:

This is in response to your letter of 1 September 1980 to Mr. and Mrs. George Brooks, which was subsequently forwarded to the Defense Intelligence Agency for comments.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has completed a review of your son's case, including the material that you provided. Based on that review, it is understandable why you would have concern and anxiety regarding some of the information and circumstances surrounding the loss of your son's aircraft.

However, based on our review, the information as stated by the Air Force in their press release of 21 July 1978, is correct, in that no identity or nationality of the reported prisoners was specified, and that there was no certainty that these people were American or that the information was connected to the crash of your son's aircraft. Additionally, the statement in the press release that no additional intelligence reports of any kind were received about these four prisoners, remains true to this date.

DIA will continue to make every effort to account for all Americans in Southeast Asia, including your son. I hope that someday we can put to rest all of your and other families' anxieties and doubts about the fate of your loved ones by obtaining a full accounting and the return of any Americans who may still be held captive there.

If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

JERRY O. TUTTLE
Rear Admiral, USN
Vice Deputy Director
for Intelligence and
External Affairs

Exhibit 1

EXHIBIT 3, P. 5 of 6

UNCLASSIFIED

LINE	DATE	TIME	FROM	TO	REMARKS	FILE
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81	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
82	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
83	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
84	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
85	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
86	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
87	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
88	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
89	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
90	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
91	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
92	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
93	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
94	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
95	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
96	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
97	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
98	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
99	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101
100	12/15/78	1400	101	102	RECEIVED 12/15/78	101

AFFIDAVIT

RE: SGT JOSEPH A. MATEJOV, ET AL.
THE MISSING IN ACTION AND
PRISONERS OF WAR RESULTING
FROM THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

STATE OF MONTANA)
COUNTY OF ROOSEVELT) ss.

My name is JERRY J. MOONEY. I CURRENTLY RESIDE AT 324 EDGAR STREET, WOLF POINT, MONTANA, 59201. I AM 49 YEARS OLD, MARRIED WITH TWO DAUGHTERS AND FOUR GRANDCHILDREN. BETWEEN 28TH OF APRIL, 1957 AND 1ST OF JUNE, 1977, I WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. I RETIRED AT THE RANK OF E8, SMSGT. DURING MY 20 YEAR MILITARY CAREER, I SERVED AS AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST AT VARIOUS OVERSEAS LOCATIONS IN EUROPE, AFRICA, THE NEAR EAST, THE FAR EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. FURTHER, I PERFORMED THREE STATESIDE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

I MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CONCERNING SGT JOSEPH A. MATEJOV, ET AL., THE MIA'S AND POW'S RESULTING FROM THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, OF MY OWN FREE WILL AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING IT IS EQUIVALENT TO SWORN TESTIMONY AND SUBJECT TO THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY:

DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, THERE WAS A POPULAR PROTEST SONG THAT CONTAINED THE LYRICS: "WHERE DID ALL THE YOUNG MEN GO, A LONG TIME PASSING?". FOR 16 LONG YEARS, SGT MATEJOV'S MOTHER, MARY MATEJOV, THE OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS, AND TOO FEW CONCERNED CITIZENS HAVE ASKED THAT SAME QUESTION OF OUR GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE MIA'S AND POW'S FROM THE VIETNAM WAR. OUR GOVERNMENT, IN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES/COMMISSIONS, A PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL COURT ACTIONS, AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, HAVE BORROWED FROM THAT PROTEST SONG THE OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION: "TO GRAVEYARDS EVERYWHERE". CONSEQUENTLY, DURING THE PAST 16 YEARS, OFFICIALLY THIS POSITION HAS BEEN A GOVERNMENT VULTURE CIRCLING THE BATTLEFIELDS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA PICKING BONES, ANY BONES, TO ACCOUNT FOR OUR MISSING. MEANWHILE, THE AMERICAN EAGLE AND ALL IT STANDS FOR IN TRUTH, JUSTICE AND DUE PROCESS, HAS BEEN CAGED FROM THIS ISSUE BY POLICY AND POLITICS.

THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE EC470 DID NOT GO TO A GRAVEYARD ANYWHERE. THEY WERE CAPTURED ALIVE AND IDENTIFIED IN A CATEGORY KNOWN AS "NANNA FROM LENIN, MD-ROSCOV BOUND!" THEY WERE IDENTIFIED AS POW'S. BUT POLICY AND POLITICS AT THAT TIME, ABANDONED THEM, FOR "VIETNAM," AS I NOW REALIZE, BECAME THE "WALK AWAY WAR".

PRESIDENT NIXON WALKED AWAY WITH HIS PEACE WITH HONOR!
HENRY KISSINGER WALKED AWAY WITH HIS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE!
THE HAWKS OF CONGRESS WALKED AWAY KNOWING THE RIGHT BATTLE HAD NOT BEEN FOUGHT AND NOW, COULD NOT BE WON!
THE DOVES OF CONGRESS WALKED AWAY FILLED WITH A GREAT SENSE OF "VICTORY" AT ANY COST.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WALKED AWAY FACING A HUGE TASK TO REBUILD IT'S CAPABILITIES AND LEAVING BEHIND A SMALL REAR GUARD TO CONTROL THE MESS AND PICK-UP THE BONES.

THE MEDIA WALKED AWAY FOR THOSE SENSATIONAL MILITARY BASHING HEADLINES WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE-NO MORE GOOD RATINGS!

THE STATE DEPARTMENT WALKED AWAY TO PERCEIVED GREATER TASKS; DETENTE, SALT AND ABM TREATIES.

THE MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WALKED AWAY RELIEVED THAT THE WHOLE BLOODY AFFAIR WAS FINALLY OVER.

AND I TOO, WALKED AWAY, KNOWING WE HAD LEFT SGT MATEJOV AND OTHERS, BEHIND. BUT I WAS CONFIDENT OUR POLITICAL AND POLICY LEADERSHIP WOULD BRING THE MEN HOME!

BUT TO THOSE WHO LIVED AND FOUGHT THIS GOVERNMENT DICTATED "NO WIN" WAR, IT WAS A DIFFERENT ROUTE TO FOLLOW.

FOR 55,000 PLUS, THEY WERE CARRIED AWAY IN COFFINS; THOUSANDS MORE ROLLED AWAY IN WHEELCHAIRS, CRIPPLED FOR LIFE!

COUNTLESS MORE WANDERED AWAY NOT KNOWING, OR UNDERSTANDING, WHAT HAD OCCURRED!

OTHERS STOMPED AWAY, DETERMINED TO FORGET, KNOWING THEY HAD BEEN BETRAYED!

SOME WERE LEFT BEHIND TO THEIR JUNGLED OR WATERY GRAVES; AND

AS A NATIONAL DISGRACE, MANY LIKE SGT MATEJOV, WERE LEFT BEHIND TO THE MERCY OF A NO-MERCY ENEMY AND THEIR INFORMATIONAL DETERMINED ALLIES.

SOME OF THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE EC470 INCIDENT WAS PROCESSED, EVALUATED AND REPORTED BY MY SECTION. FOUR OF THE CREW, THE "BEEPS" (BACKEND ELECTRONIC PEOPLE), SURVIVED THE INCIDENT AND WERE CAPTURED ALIVE. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DIA ANALYTIC COUNTERPARTS, THEY CONCURRED, STATING THAT BACKUP OPERATIONAL DATA SUPPORTED THE INTELLIGENCE. FOUR HAD SURVIVED AND WERE CAPTURED BY ENEMY FORCES. THIS WAS A SIMPLE, UNCOMPLICATED TRUTH ARRIVED AT BY THE EXPERIENCED EXPERTS OF THE TIME, BASED ON THEIR PROFESSIONAL REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, WITHOUT THE INTERFERENCE OF POLICY OR POLITICS.

SOMETIME LATER, INFORMATION APPEARED IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA INDICATING THE FOUR SURVIVORS OF THE EC470 HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO. THIS WAS POLITICALLY CONVENIENT TO OUR GOVERNMENT, FOR THE FOUR EC470 SURVIVORS COULD THEN JUST DISAPPEAR INTO THAT RECOGNIZED MIA/POW "BLACK HOLE" IN LAOS, AS DID SO MANY OTHERS. HOWEVER, DATA I PROCESSED AND

EVALUATED WAS NOT PATHET LAO, BUT NORTH VIETNAMESE! BECAUSE OF ENEMY FORCE DISPOSITIONS AND TACTICAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH LAOS, THE PATHET LAO HAD INVOLVEMENT IN THIS INCIDENT. BUT IT WAS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO EXERCISED THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE FOUR SURVIVORS OF THE EC47Q; MATEJOV, CRESSMAN, BRANDENBURG AND MELTON. THIS WAS CRITICAL AS IT ENABLED AN IMMEDIATE, DETAILED EVALUATION OF AVAILABLE DATA. IT CORRELATED KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY INTENTS AND CAPABILITIES RESULTING IN AN ACCURATE AND PROFESSIONAL ASSESSMENT. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION IT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

EC47Q SHOOTDOWN, 5 FEB 73

"THE EC47Q INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MISSION WAS, IN ALL PROBABILITY, FLAK TRAPPED, A DELIBERATE PRE-PLANNED ACTION, RATHER THAN A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY (~~SE-FFZ~~) ACTIVITY SHOWING AN ENEMY INTEREST AND PROBABLE INTENT AGAINST THE MISSION PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. THE PROBABLE UNIT INVOLVED IN THE STRIKE WAS THE (~~5TH~~) REGIMENT WHO HAD CONDUCTED A SIMILAR FLAK TRAP IN LAOS IN LATE MARCH 1972 AGAINST A C130 AIRCRAFT. INFORMATION INDICATES THE "DEEPS"; MATEJOV, CRESSMAN, BRANDENBURG AND MELTON, SURVIVED THE STRIKE AND WERE CAPTURED ALIVE. DATA FURTHER REVEALED THE CAPTIVES WERE IN THE CONTROL OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THEIR MOVEMENT WOULD BE EITHER TO HANOI OR THE SPECIAL POW CAMP NORTHWEST OF VINH AT (CN ---). IN THEIR MOVEMENT, PRELIMINARY INTERROGATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE (3RD) AND (4TH) DIVISIONS IN THE (---) AREA AND THE (---) DIVISION IN THE (---) AREA. IT WAS FURTHER ANTICIPATED, THAT DUE TO THEIR CURRENT SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE, AND PAST EXPERIENCE, THEY WOULD BE HANDLED AS "MANNA FROM LENIN", WERE MB (MOSCOW BOUND), AND WOULD EVENTUALLY BE PROCESSED THROUGH (SAM REGU) LAOS".

UPON COMPLETION OF THIS ASSESSMENT, IT WAS DISCUSSED WITH A COUNTERPART ANALYST AT DIA. DURING THAT CONVERSATION I MENTIONED, "WELL, THEY (THE SURVIVING EC47Q CREW MEMBERS) ARE GONE FOREVER. WE WILL NEVER GET THEM BACK". THE ANALYST I WAS TALKING TO REPLIED, "YOU BETCHA!"

THOSE TWO STATEMENTS (...THEY ARE GONE FOREVER...AND YOU BETCHA") REPRESENTED AN UNDERSTANDING BY EXPERTS I ASSOCIATED WITH, THAT CERTAIN PRISONERS HELD BY THE ENEMY, "MANNA FROM LENIN", WERE GONE FOREVER. THIS WAS BECAUSE OF THE TACTICAL, STRATEGIC, AND/OR SCIENTIFIC/ECONOMIC VALUE THEY REPRESENTED TO THE ENEMY AND THEIR ALLIES. THIS SHOULD SURPRISE NO ONE, LEAST OF ALL, OUR GOVERNMENT. IN THE ARMS RACE OF MILITARY POSTURES, CAPABILITIES, AND DISPOSITIONS, IT IS NOT OUR QUANTITY THAT ENABLES US TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF POWER WITH HOSTILE NATIONS, BUT OUR EXPERT QUALITY-HITECH. IT IS ALSO TRUE, THAT OUR ENEMIES, AS WELL AS FRIENDS AND ALLIES, HAVE RISKED ESPIONAGE, BLACKMAIL, SUBVERSION, ETC., TO OBTAIN SECRETS AND CAPABILITIES. IN THE VIETNAM WAR, MANY OF OUR MEN, TRAINED AND WITH HANDS-ON

EXPERIENCE IN THAT HI-TECH AREA OR WITH SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE CAME FLOATING DOWN IN PARACHUTES LIKE "MANNA FROM LENIN" INTO THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ENEMY AND IT'S ALLIES. SIMPLY PUT, THEY WERE FREEBIES, AND TO DENY THAT THE ENEMY AND IT'S ALLIES WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS "FREEBIE" SITUATION IS AN ANALYTICAL CRIME OF GROSS INCOMPETENCE.

THE SURVIVING FOUR CREW MEMBERS OF THE EC47Q SHOOTDOWN WERE CARRIED IN THREE UNOFFICIAL ANALYTICAL WORKING AID LISTS? THEY WERE

(A) THOSE MIA'S KNOWN TO BE CAPTURED ALIVE. A LIST OF OVER 400 NAMES OF MIA'S OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 305 WERE LISTED AS POW'S. ONLY ABOUT 5% WERE RETURNED AT HOMECOMING I. (ASSESS 16 SEP 1977)

(B) THE "WHO TO ASK LIST" ON MIA/POW'S. THIS LIST WAS DEVELOPED IN 1972/73 TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OUR HIGH LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS, IF REQUESTED. SIMPLY PUT, IT LISTED OVER 1,000 MIA/POW'S BY NAME AND WHO, WITHIN THE ENEMY'S MILITARY FORCE DISPOSITIONS, WOULD HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FATE. SPECIFICALLY, IT WOULD HAVE ENABLED OUR NEGOTIATORS TO ASK, WITH COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY, NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS: "WE KNOW THAT YOUR (1ST) DIVISION, (5TH) REGIMENT, (...) COMPANY? WAS INVOLVED AND HAS SPECIFIC DETAILS ON THIS MIA/POW (MATEJOV, CRESSMAN, ETC.), HOW ABOUT IT?" NO REQUEST FOR THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION WAS EVER MADE?

(C) THE WARM BODY COUNT SCENARIO FOR 72/73-A COLD SURGICAL LIST WHEREIN ANALYSIS WITHOUT, HEART OR HOPE, MADE KIA DECLARATIONS FOR CERTAIN MIA'S NOT RETURNED AT HOMECOMING I AND CONTINUED POW STATUS FOR OTHERS WITH CAUSE. IT WAS PROMPTED BY A PERCEIVED CHANGE IN POW POLICY BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN 1972, AND IN ANTICIPATION OF SUCCESS AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS AND WAS REQUIRED TO ENSURE OUR MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM SEA.

MY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS KNEW I MAINTAINED THESE LISTS. BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE SUMMER OF 1974, FOLLOWING A POSSIBLE POW SITUATION IN LAOS, THAT THEY WERE REQUESTED. MY SUPERIORS WERE INFORMED WHERE I HAD FILED THESE LISTS AND THEIR FUTURE HANDLING AND DISPOSITION IS UNKNOWN.

IF SOMEONE WOULD HAVE TOLD ME 16 YEARS AGO THAT IN 1985, THERE WOULD BE AN MIA/POW CONTROVERSY, I WOULD HAVE REPLIED "YOU'RE CRAZY". PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT FOLLOWING HOMECOMING I, "THAT ALL OUR BRAVE MEN WERE BACK HOME AGAIN", WAS ACCEPTED BY US ONLY AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT WITH LITTLE IMPACT ON POLICY. FOR AT THE SAME TIME, AND CONTINUING UNTIL AT LEAST 1976/77, THE HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY WAS TO "ISOLATE, LOCATE, IDENTIFY AND RECOVER AMERICAN POW'S PARTICULARLY IN LAOS". THIS REQUIREMENT WAS NOT ONE OF THOSE "EYES ONLY", BEHIND CLOSED DOORS POSITIONS,

BUT WAS TASKED THROUGHOUT THE RANKS AND AT ALL OPERATIONAL LEVELS WITH COMMITTED AND DEDICATED RESOURCES. BUT OPERATIONS, BY THEMSELVES CANNOT ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE, THAT IS, THE RETURN OF OUR POW'S. IT MUST BE SUPPORTED AND ACTED UPON BY POLICY AND POLITICS. AND THERE LAYS THE CAUSE AS TO WHY OUR POW'S HAVE NOT COME HOME, AND WHY IN 1929 WE CONTINUE TO HAVE AN MIA/POW ISSUE, ONE OF POLICY AND POLITICS WITH A TRIAD OF OFFICIAL POSITIONS.

1. FIRST THERE WAS THE BAMBOO CURTAIN. THEY ARE ALL DEAD. A SIMPLE WAY TO CLOSE THE DOOR ON AN EMBARRASSING AND POTENTIALLY COSTLY SITUATION IN REPARATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO THOSE WHO SERVED AND FOR THE WAR. NO NEED TO MAKE THE MIA/POW ISSUE THE LAST BATTLE, INTERNATIONALLY. IT WOULD BE TOO COSTLY.

2. SECOND, THE BRICK WALL. SIGHTING REPORTS, ALTHOUGH THE LEAST RELIABLE OF SPECIAL INFORMATION AND THE MOST DEBATABLE, HAD TO BE EXPLAINED AWAY. EASY ENOUGH WITH AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT SOME MAY STILL BE ALIVE BUT REMAIN BY CHOICE. SIMPLY PUT, TRAITORS. OF COURSE, NO MENTION IS MADE TO THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS OVER THE YEARS, THAT IS, DENYING THEIR EXISTENCE, COULD BE CONSIDERED COLLABORATION AND CONTRIBUTED TO SUCH DECISIONS BY SOME POW'S.

3. THIRD, THE STEEL SHIELD OF NATIONAL SECURITY, A POLICY TO PROTECT US ALL. SIMPLY ITS PREMISE IS, GOOD WILL BEGETS GOOD WILL - WE WILL NOT DEAL OR NEGOTIATE FOR HOSTAGES. THIS NATION WILL NOT BE BLACKMAILED. IF THOSE WHO HOLD OUR POW'S WISH TO "GIVE THEM BACK" WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED, WE WILL ACCEPT THEM. HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT CONSIDER ANY PAYMENT FOR SUCH AN ACTION EVEN THOUGH SUCH A PAYMENT MAY BE A LEGAL OR MORAL OBLIGATION AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS DURING THE WAR.

CONFRONTED WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING, PERHAPS MY STATEMENT IN 1973 FOLLOWING THE EC470 INCIDENT THAT THE SURVIVORS "WERE GONE FOREVER" NOW APPLIES TO ALL POW'S. THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE TO DATE SEEMS TO SUPPORT THAT 1973 CONCLUSION.

BETWEEN MY RETIREMENT IN 1977 UNTIL MID 1985, I GAVE LITTLE THOUGHT OR CONCERN TO THE MIA/POW ISSUE. THE HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS TO LOCATE AND BRING OUR MEN HOME WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED? FURTHER, LIVING IN AN ISOLATED AREA OF MONTANA, NO NATIONAL NEWS RELATING TO THIS ISSUE WAS AVAILABLE. THUS FOR 8 YEARS, I LIVED WITH CONFIDENCE AND FAITH THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY COMMITTED TOO, AND WOULD BRING THE MEN HOME. IN 1985, CABLE T.V. CAME TO WOLF POINT, MONTANA, AND WITH IT, EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS. IT WAS AT THAT TIME, I VIEWED A NEWS REPORT CONCERNING THE THOMAS HART INCIDENT AND HOW THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THAT ALL THE REMAINS HAD BEEN RECOVERED

FROM THE CRASH SITE EXCAVATION IN SOUTHERN LAOS. I KNEW THIS TO BE IN ERROR, FOR I RECALLED MY RECORDS LISTING SURVIVORS FROM THAT INCIDENT.

MY INTEREST RENEWED IN THE MIA/POW ISSUE, I DID SOME CHECKING AND FOUND, TO MY TOTAL SHOCK, THAT ALL HAD BEEN DECLARED DEAD AND THERE WAS STRONG GOVERNMENT INSISTENCE THAT NO POW'S REMAINED. INITIALLY I PLANNED TO CONTACT THE DIA, AN ORGANIZATION I HAD A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT FOR BECAUSE OF THE EXPERTISE IT HAD DEMONSTRATED TO ME IN OUR CONTINUOUS CONTACTS DURING THE WAR, AND CHALLENGE THIS CURRENT POLICY POSITION WITH A REVIEW OF MY HANDS-ON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE CONCERNING THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, I LATER DECIDED TO JOIN IN THE SMITH, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, LAWSUIT AS A LEGAL MEANS TO CONFRONT THE GOVERNMENT TO AVOID A CLOSED DOOR, CONTROLLED ATMOSPHERE AND GIVE THE ISSUE SOME PUBLIC EXPOSURE "JUST IN CASE" A COVERUP OR INCOMPETENT EMPLOYMENT OF POLICY AND POLITICS WAS INVOLVED.

IN LATE 1985, I SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE HIGHLIGHTING THE EC470 INCIDENT. PRIOR TO ITS PUBLIC RELEASE IN JANUARY 1986, I HAD OCCASION TO DISCUSS ITS CONTENTS WITH A REPORTER FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. DURING THE CONVERSATION, THE REPORTER ASKED ME WHAT REACTION I EXPECTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT ONCE THE AFFIDAVIT WAS MADE PUBLIC. I REPLIED THAT I ANTICIPATED THE DIA TO CALL ME IN AND WE WOULD DISCUSS MY CONCERNS AND GET THINGS SETTLED. HIS REPLY WAS "LAUGHTER" FOLLOWED BY THE SENTIMENT THAT DIA WOULD NEVER DO THAT FOR IT WOULD BE AN ADMISSION BY THEM THAT I WAS TELLING THE TRUTH!

IN LATE JANUARY, 1986, I TRAVELED TO WASHINGTON D.C. TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE SENATE VETERANS AFFAIR'S COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE MIA/POW ISSUE. PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON, I RECEIVED THREATS NOT TO GO. THE NIGHT PRIOR TO MY TESTIFYING, I RECEIVED THREATS TO "GET OUT OF WASHINGTON". THIS PROMPTED CAPITAL HILL POLICE PROTECTION DURING THE REMAINDER OF MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

THE MORNING OF THE DAY I WAS TO TESTIFY, I WAS CONFRONTED BY OFFICIALS OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND SECURITY OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. ESSENTIALLY I WAS TOLD I WAS BEING "BAD" AND FROM NOW ON LOT TO DISCUSS MY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ISSUE WITH ANYONE UNLESS I HAD THEIR PERMISSION FIRST. NOT ONCE DURING THE COURSE OF OUR BRIEF CONVERSATIONS DID THESE OFFICIALS MENTION OR SHOW WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE REAL ISSUE, THE MIA/POWS.

DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME, AT GOVERNMENT INSISTENCE, MY ORIGINAL AFFIDAVIT WAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE COURT, REWRITTEN AND RE-SUBMITTED FOR "SECURITY REASONS". MUCH OF THE DATA THAT WAS DELETED FROM THE ORIGINAL AFFIDAVIT WAS EXTRACTED FROM "UNCLASSIFIED" PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS GIVEN

TO ME BY AIR FORCE PERSONNEL CLERKS AT ANNUAL RECORDS' CHECKS. UNCLASSIFIED THEN, BUT NOW CLASSIFIED BECAUSE IT WAS BEING USED IN THE MIA/POW ISSUE???

IN JANUARY, 1987, THE BBC BROADCAST "WE CAN KEEP YOU FOREVER" WAS AIRED. FOLLOWING THAT BROADCAST, THE DOD RELEASED A PUBLIC STATEMENT REFERRING TO THOSE OF US WHO HAD APPEARED IN THAT BROADCAST AS "LESS THAN CREDIBLE".

HOWEVER, LATER ON, MID-SUMMER OF 1987, I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM A U.S. CONGRESSMAN STATING THAT DIA HAS REQUESTED HE ASK IF I WOULD MEET WITH THEM TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE. I RESPONDED IN A LETTER AGREEING TO A MEETING AND DETAILING EXACTLY THOSE ISSUES AND CASES I WISHED TO DISCUSS. TWO MONTHS LATER, THE LETTER I HAD SENT WAS RETURNED "UNOPENED" AND "UNREAD" (?). ON THE FACE OF THE ENVELOPE WAS A STAMP, U.S. GOVERNMENT MAILROOM-RETURN TO SENDER. EVIDENCE THAT THE LETTER HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE PROPER OFFICE AND PERSON WERE CROSSED OUT AND REPLACED WITH "NOT DEL" - NOT DELIVERED. AND ON THE FACE OF THE ENVELOPE WERE THE HANDWRITTEN LETTERS "NGB" - NOT GOVERNMENT BUSINESS! IS THAT THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POSITION FOR LIVE POW'S LIKE JOSEPH A. MATEJOV, PETER CRESSMAN, AND ALL THE OTHERS - NOT GOVERNMENT BUSINESS! IF IT IS, WHO MIGHT BE THE NEXT VICTIMS OF NGB, THE BLACK, THE INDIAN, THE ELDERLY, RETARDED OR HANDICAPPED! WE THE PEOPLE, ALL THE PEOPLE ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS. AT LEAST WE WERE THE LAST TIME I READ THE U.S. CONSTITUTION!

THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 31 YEARS HAVE BEEN BOTH FRIGHTENING AND DISGUSTING REGARDING THE MIA/POW ISSUE. I HAVE BEEN TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT ONLY TO BE IGNORED, INTIMIDATED, THREATENED AND DISCREDITED. I HAVE BEEN TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT HEARING MUCH CONCERN, BUT SEEING NO OFFICIAL ACTION IN LEADERSHIP, RESPONSIBILITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY. AND I HAVE BEEN TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, ONLY TO BE TOLD THAT THEY HAVE NO LEGAL JURISDICTION, FOR THE ISSUE IS AN EXCLUSIVE MATTER OF POLICY FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THE LATTER IS THE MOST DISTURBING TO ME. THE COURTS, THE SOUL OF OUR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ARE IGNORING THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IN FAVOR OF POLICY. BUT SUCH ACTION HAS PRECEDENCE IN HISTORY. THE JUDICIARY ALLOWED THE JEWS AND OTHERS TO BECOME A MATTER OF POLICY IN NAZI GERMANY AND THEY DIED BY THE MILLIONS. THE JUDICIARY ALLOWED THE JAPANESE AMERICANS TO BECOME A MATTER OF POLICY IN 1942 FOLLOWING PEARL HARBOR, AND TO INTERMENT CAMPS THEY WERE SENT. OF COURSE, WE LET THEIR FATHERS AND SONS FIGHT AND DIE FOR FREEDOM IN WWII, THE VERY FREEDOM THAT POLICY DENIED THEIR FAMILIES. AND NOW, ITS OUR POW'S AND MIA'S THAT ARE POLICY, NOT JUSTICE. WILL WE NEVER LEARN!

I DO NOT KNOW IF ANY LAWS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED IN THE ACTIONS TAKEN CONCERNING THE MIA'S AND POW'S. THAT IS FOR

LAWYERS TO ARGUE, JURIES TO DECIDE, JUDGES TO RULE AND HISTORIANS TO DEBATE. BUT, AT THE MINIMUM, AS A 20 YEAR PROFESSIONAL, AND CONCERNED, COMMITTED AMERICAN CITIZEN, I FIRMLY BELIEVE OUR GOVERNMENT IS GUILTY OF VIOLATING "THE COVENANT".

"THE COVENANT" WAS EXPLAINED AND INSTRUCTED TO ME BY A SUPERVISOR AT MY FIRST OVERSEAS' DUTY ASSIGNMENT. SIMPLY, THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE IS TO KEEP THE PEACE. WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS, FOR WHATEVER REASON, WE THE PEOPLE GIVE GOVERNMENT THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE TERRIBLE RESPONSIBILITY TO RISK OUR LIVES IN WARFARE. IN TURN, WE THE PEOPLE DEMAND FROM GOVERNMENT THEIR AWESOME ACCOUNTABILITY NOT TO WASTE US. DURING THE "NO WIN" POLICY AND POLITICS OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE MIA AND POW ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL ITS ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE COVENANT. THOSE WHO SERVED IN THAT WAR KNOW IT, AS DOES JOSEPH A. MATEJOV'S MOTHER, MARY MATEJOV.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

DATED HIS 26TH DAY OF MARCH, 1989.

James J. Moore
JAMES J. MOORE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 26TH DAY OF MARCH, 1989.

James J. Moore
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR THE STATE OF MONT.
RESIDING AT WOLF POINT, MONTANA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 11/10/90



STATE OF TEXAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
GOVERNOR

September 6, 1988

Mr. Lawrence Hagerty
Post Office Box 1289
Brandon, Florida, 34299

Dear Mr. Hagerty:

I have your August 22, 1988, letter in regard to a circumstance relating to Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords, and four servicemen who were shot down over Laos on February 5, 1973.

For your information, General Chappie James was the senior person in DoD responsible for the MIA and KIA lists during the time frame to which you refer, and no decisions were taken by me without full consultation with General James. Dr. Shields has given you grossly wrong information and no names were struck from either the MIA or KIA lists without full staffing and a personal sign-off by General James.

I have no recollection of Dr. Shields discussing this information with me and certainly I had no knowledge whatsoever that these men were alive. I categorically and emphatically refute any such statements by Dr. Shields.

I am not in any way interested in your "equal time." I am denying the information you now have and would suggest to you that without some proof of this "hearsay" information that you forget it.

Sincerely,

W.P. Clements, Jr.
William P. Clements, Jr.
Governor

December 15, 1988

Governor Bill Clements
Office of the Governor
Austin, TX 78701

Dear Governor Clements,

Thank you for your letter of September 6, 1988 in which you explained that any names removed from the list of known POWs in 1973 were removed at the direction of General James or his staff. Dr. Shields must have been mistaken when he said that you were the person who ordered several names of live POWs to be stricken from the list.

I do have one additional question, however, and that pertains to the order you gave to disregard all current intelligence regarding known POWs who did not return after "Operation Homecoming". Before I televise this story, I would like to have your point of view, for the information I have does not place you in a particularly patriotic light.

As I have the story, you ordered the "shelving" of the detailed list of known POWs. Furthermore, our source says that it was you who set in motion the restructuring of intelligence criteria to preclude any future "confirmed" sightings of the men we left in Southeast Asia at the end of the war. If this is not true I need to know, for I certainly do not want to imply that you bear major responsibility for the continued imprisonment of these men if it is not true.

Very truly yours,

Larry Hagerty

the Honorable William P. Clements, Jr.
Governor, State of Texas
Austin, Texas
78701

1 February, 1989

Dear Governor Clements,

1. I am writing to you in regards to a situation which I believe You may be helpful in clarifying. The situation to which I am refering is the Missing in Action (MIA)/ Prisoner of War (POW) question.
2. A local television show recently aired here in the Tampa Bay area which gave the details of my brother's crash incident. The February 5th 1973 shootdown of an EC-47Q over the country of Laos.
3. Details provided by the show included some rather distressing information concerning the "Striking" of my brother and his crewmates from the negotiating lists.
4. The details listed Dr. Roger Shields and yourself as the persons directly responsible for this indefensible action. In addition, the show quotes a confidential source from the U.S. Intelligence Community stating that Dr. Shields and yourself wrote a directive changing the criteria to be used by U.S. Intelligence Agencies in defining a confirmed POW report.
5. If the information shown was in fact true, please explain why my brother was abandoned. Was it in the name of Political Expediency? Were you directed to strike the names from the negotiations?
6. Sir, I am a life member of the Air Force-Sergeants Association, and have seen your name associated with outstanding community action projects with the Boy Scouts of America, AFSA, and others. You don't sound like the type person who would knowingly turn his back on a fellow serviceman. I hope that you will take a few moments to explain what happened, so that I can better understand why my brother was not even asked for by our government until the Gen. Vessey trips of 1987-88.
7. I have an appointment with a Mr. Lawrence Hagerty, producer of the show mentioned, on 13 February to discuss my brother's case and to see what else he knows about it. Please try to respond to this inquiry prior to that meeting so that I might have a better viewpoint from which to evaluate his information.
8. Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.

Respectfully

Mr. Patrick J. Cressman
6982 - 62nd Ave. No.
Pinellas Park, Fl.
34665

STATE OF TEXAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
GOVERNOR

March 1, 1989

Mr. Patrick J. Cressman
6982 62nd Avenue, North
Pinellas Park, Florida, 34665

Dear Mr. Cressman:

I have your letter of February 5, 1989, asking for clarification regarding my position relative to the MIA question and POWs in Vietnam. This of course is an old issue and has been grossly misrepresented through the years. I applaud your interest and I am certainly pleased to know that you are a life-member of the Air Force Sergeants Association. I am most sympathetic to your feelings considering the background of your brother having been lost in Vietnam.

You are correct in stating that I was in the Department of Defense from January 1973 to January 1977 so for four years I was involved one way or another in the POW situation.

During the period that I was in DoD I looked primarily to General Chappie James who had a long and distinguished record in the Air Force and was a pilot in Vietnam for several years. Also Dr. Shields played a role and made certain reports to the Congress and to me but I looked primarily to General James for my information and liaison with the POW groups.

In answer to your question, and for the record, I never struck any person's name from any list; that was not my function and I had no personal knowledge of any list per se. What you hear on television or from some unofficial sources could be anything but in this instance it is certainly not true that I had anything to do with any list.

I appreciate receiving your letter which of course gives me the opportunity to put the record straight. As a citizen I have been

interested in the POW situation in Vietnam since the middle of the 1960's and my interest continues. I am most pleased to note the return of remains from Vietnam during the past year where in Vietnam is now at least partially beginning to assist us in the recovery of the remains which is the first step in identification of the MIAs.

I appreciate your letter and I am sympathetic to your interest regarding your brother.

Sincerely,

W.P. Clements, Jr.
William P. Clements, Jr.
Governor

WPC,Jr.:jh

I've been a while answering your letter but I just wasn't to go. This all worked out right & I was somewhat apprehensive about writing you, not knowing whether you would get my letter, whether you wanted to talk with someone from [] outfit or whether it may have been too painful, oh, a hundred things. But I'm glad I did and happy you answered. I've been thinking this around for so long and have never really spoken to anyone about it in any great detail. But I'd like to do it now. I'd like to tell you how I felt about things and what happened that night in February of 1973 so far from home. I read Chapter 15 of "First Haves" and have some comments on it too. But first —

I don't know how [] felt about being there but by the time I got over there in August of 1971 I knew we weren't there to win a war. I just saw our job as protecting as many Americans as we could before the end came. What we were doing was classified but it's been 16 years since I got out and I doubt there will be any serious problems if I go into details now. [] I was an intercept operator listening for Morse code transmissions. I don't remember his AFSC (Air Force Specialty Code). We also after carried voice intercept operator, who knew Vietnamese and listened for voice radio calls. They were 203's. I was an analyst, a 202, and when an operator got a target up I would try to determine whether it was a

high or low priority. We flew in EC-47's, old converted cargo planes stuffed to the maximum with radio gear and direction-finding equipment.

We were the "back-enders" because we worked back in the cabin of the airplane. The "front-enders" were the pilot, co-pilot, and navigator, even though they now worked back with us. Of course, the "front-enders" were all officers while we "back-enders" were all enlisted men. We would fly missions that lasted from 5 to 7 hours. We would listen for radio transmissions and when one came up, try to locate him. This information would be passed along through various agencies and channels until, if it was an important target, fighter or bomber aircraft would try

to destroy it. In the last part of January or early February 1971 we were given a mission to try and locate a group of tanks that were moving from North Viet Nam through Laos and into Cambodia. Some General back in Hawaii requested or should say ordered, the missions. They were night missions which was unusual for us. Mostly we flew in daylight and it was a lot safer that way. We looked like a harmless cargo plane and so were not fired on much. But at night we were just a slow flying target. They didn't even give us escorts.

Tanks communicate by voice radio and so the missions were flown with two voice operators and two nose operators. Voice men didn't know how to operate the equipment that was tied into the navigational

equipment for DF purposes so the nose men flew too. US analysts were not needed on the missions because our job was totally dependent on nose signals. We had books that told us who some of the nose signals were and so could figure out who was important and who wasn't. Another of our jobs was to write up the mission reports when the mission recovered (ended).

So during these night missions we would sit in our communication trailers and take radio calls from the plane. If they were able to find a tank and DF him they would radio us and we would pass it on to (eventually) bombers that were standing by. We felt pretty left out and there was a feeling among us analysts that the others who flew the

missions thought we were sitting things out in safety while they were risking their lives. Chicken in other words, though it was not our choice to wait on the ground. The missions had been flown for 3 or 4 days and some had returned early because they were taking so much fire. It was just too dangerous. But the general just said, "keep at it".

A spokesman for us analysts went to the Squadron Commander to try and get us to fly on the missions too. Basically just to show the others we could. A few hours before "Boson 52" (Joss plane) was to take off the OK came through. The mission and its crew had already been assigned but the analyst on duty that night could go if he wanted. Some re-arranging would have to be done and

Someone would have to be "bumped" off the mission but it could be done. The next night we would be scheduled on the flights with the rest of the crew. Well, that night was my night to be on duty. I remember our representative who had gone to the CO coming in just after I went on duty and telling me. If it had come through the day before I would have been on the plane but as it was I "didn't want to make a fuss". And, frankly, I was scared. Though I would probably have died if I had gone, I have to live with that feeling of cowardice the rest of my life. At any rate I didn't go.

The crew showed up for their briefing at about 8 or 9 p.m. as I recall. Giving

The briefing was another job for the analyst so I gave it to the crew, watched them leave, and sat down to wait for the radio calls.

Take-off time was around 10 or 11 pm as I recall and the briefings were a few hours before that so maybe it was around 6 or 7 that I briefed them.

Once they go to the plane and had it powered up they would begin their pre-flight radio checks. The planes had a lot of radios. The pilots used radios "in the clear" that is, not scrambled. These were the radios they used to talk to the control tower and other aircraft. The "back-enders" used 3 "secure" radios. These were scrambled to avoid a bad guy hearing what we were saying. The only way

you could receive the signals is if you had a radio that could de-scramble the signal. Sort of like the pay TV channels HBO and Cinemax. You need a de-scrambler to get them.

The 3 radios were FM (or "Fox Mike" as we called it), UHF 1 and UHF 2. The FM was the main radio and most reliable but it had a limited range. If the mission were to DF a tank they would probably use the longer-ranged UHF radios.

As the plane sat on the run way it made its checks to make sure the radios were OK. They were. They called me with a check of their system, I acknowledged them, wished them luck, and later they took off.

The call name for our

Squadron was "Baron", the mission number was five two. Baron 52.

Tanks would be pretty easy to see throwing up a lot of dust during the day time so they only traveled at night. They knew we (the U.S.) would be looking for them so they didn't communicate very often and when they did it would only be for a short time, maybe less than a minute. We needed a minute or so of intercept to DF them so it was a hard job to locate them.

Udon Royal Thai Air Force Base was where we were stationed. We were a detachment (Det 3) of the Headquarters of the 6994th Security Squadron stationed north of us at Nakorn Phanom, Thailand, better known to us as NKP. NKP had a mission up too so each night there were 2 EC-47's out

looking for tanks.

The first hint I had of any trouble was at about midnight or so. A sergeant in our tele-comm shack came over to tell me that our airplane wanted me to call them. Most of our reports, etc. were sent via a teletype machine in our tele-comm shack. We also communicated with NKP, and other ground stations (Hawaii, Washington DC, etc.) over these machines. Apparently NKP's plane had been talking to ours and passed the message to their (NKP's) base and they teletyped it over to us. I don't know if that's real clear but anyway I got a message to call Baron 52. No explanation, just "give them a call." I knew they were out pretty far and it would not be easy.

to reach them but I gave it a try on each radio. I got no answer so I waited 15 minutes (standard procedure) and tried again without success.

Twenty minutes or so later the guy in the tele-comm shack came back and said NKP wanted to talk to me so I went to the shack. The guy at NKP wanted to know if I had been able to get in touch with our plane. When I said no he said he had been in touch with his plane and that both planes had been fired on by "accurate 59 mm guns, probably radar guided." NKP's plane had not been able to raise our plane after that. I knew something was a little messed up because it should have been either 27 mm or 52 mm. There was no 59 mm. Anyway, their plane was returning to

base and it would have the AMS (Airborne Mission Supervisor) or their plane get in touch with me when they landed and give me the straight story.

But that I should try hard to reach our plane. I immediately went back and made more radio calls, again without any luck. I went outside our compound and over to our maintenance building. They had a radio which transmitted in the clear. There were two maintenance men there playing cards. I asked to use their radio and made some calls to our plane. There was no response so I made a call to "any station" that is, any airplane that might hear me was to respond. Again, I got no answer.

Before I went back to our trailer and the secure radios, I told

the maintenance men who was going on and to keep trying to contact anyone. It was about 2 o'clock in the morning by now and the crew for the first morning mission showed up. The AMS for that mission was a higher ranking Sgt who had been in for a number of years, a "lifer" as we called the career men. He asked if I had notified the Capt (our CO) or the Squadron of "front loader." I said no and he said he would handle it. Meanwhile I was to issue a "CRITIC" report. This was the highest priority message only used for emergencies or very high priority messages. I did. A CRITIC requires hourly updates until the situation is resolved. I issued the next two follow-ups and my shift was over.

I stayed around until about 6 or 6:30 am in case the plane came back, thinking, hoping, that it was just some radio problems and they were on their way back without radios. They only had enough fuel to stay up until 6 a.m. or so and then I knew they were down. The crew from NKP got back around 3 a.m. or so but they couldn't shed any more light on the subject, just that our plane had been fired on a number of times and was trying to get away from the guns.

When I got back to our squadron compound at about noon there was no new information.

A couple of days later we were told a photo recon plane had photographed a crash site. We could look at the pictures

if we wanted which a friend of mine and I did. You couldn't tell much. Just a burned out place in the jungle. The

Search and Rescue people sent a helicopter out to the site the next day. The next day an squadron commander called a meeting of everyone to explain the findings.

The plane was ~~lying~~ ^{flaying} on its top. The wings, outboard of the engines, were found a quarter of a mile or so away from the crash, one wing north and one northeast, as I remember.

This might have indicated the plane was spinning and the wings broke off. Everything from just behind the cockpit to just in front of the tail was burned to ash. They recovered what they thought were two bodies from the cockpit area. One was later identified as the

Copilot. Everyone else was declared MIA until about two weeks or so later we were told all were declared KIA. They thought it had gone down too fast for anyone to get out and we only flew at about 10,000 feet which isn't very high.

That was the last I heard of Baron 52 until about 2 years ago. A Viet Vet I ran into had a copy of the names on "the Wall" and so I looked up Joe's name. To my surprise I saw him listed as MIA again. So I wrote to the National League of Families to get more information.

Baron 52 was not the only F-47 to be lost in the war. There were a couple of others shot down near the DMZ in the late 1960's. One had some casualties and the other didn't. I remember

reading the reports.

Robert Crisman said in First Heres that the plane carried "extremely classified intelligence equipment", which it did, and that it was "designed to explode on impact." This is just not true. There were no explosives on board our aircraft. As fact, the standard procedure was that if the aircraft survived a crash in test, the crew was to get out and away from it and call in an air strike to destroy the equipment. I don't know where he got that bit of information but it's just plain wrong. I flew 102 missions on board there and I would have known if there were explosives on board. There weren't.

I don't know if what he says about a helicopter crew being on site of the crash the same day it went down is

true or not but I seriously doubt it. Our squadron, because of the nature of our work, was privy to all kinds of classified information and I'm sure we would have known about a visit to the site. The USAF had documented all known crash sites in SEA so that if a pilot reported seeing one it could be checked to see if it was a new or old crash. It took time to verify Baron 52's crash site.

However, one thing he said did trigger a memory of mine. A few days after the plane was lost I saw a short message. It read that a "normally reliable source" in Laos (a friendly nation) had reported seeing 3 or 4 Americans, clean shaven, and in flight suits, being led through the jungle. Our plane was the only one

lost in that point so, if true, they would have been our people because if they had been down for a long time they would not be clean shaven and would not have been dressed in their flight suits. But nothing was ever followed up on the message to my knowledge and it was dismissed as a bad report.

There was a strange thing that happened in relation to the mission that I want to mention. It's not significant, just strange. The front enders usually flew as a team. Benson 52's team was young, about our age and real cut-ups. Just before the plane was to start its engines, in fact just as the pilot was climbing on board, he was overcome by a tremendous headache. So bad he had to stay behind. A relief pilot was called and

flew the mission. The other pilot was flown to the Philippines and was found to have a brain tumor that chose that moment to act up. He was operated on, recovered, and was back flying within a couple of months. Strange. The relief pilot was married to an Oriental or perhaps a Philippine and had a couple of kids.

When I said earlier that if I would have gone someone would have been bumped, it wouldn't have been me or any other of the operators. He was an AMS. You had to be good to be an AMS.

I don't know if anything Dave said has helped. I hope it doesn't hurt.

I can't understand why this country isn't doing more to find our buddies. And I think the way they've treated

I've been a month or more putting this down so I'd better get it in the mail now. I would like to keep in touch with you.

C. 1. p

A It was highly classified at the time; higher than the field commander had access to. Even in an unclassified form, it was not available until after the men had been declared dead.

2. Why didn't someone in the Air Force pass to casualty or the field even an unclassified version of the material?

A: The incident occurred just prior to the return of our prisoners of war. The intelligence community, at the time, was carrying an understandably heavy burden preparing for the repatriation of our PWs. Excess manpower needed for such things as declassification of documents was simply not available. It was hoped that if they had indeed been captured alive they would have been repatriated along with the rest of the prisoners. The fact that they were not repatriated led us to the regrettable conclusion that they were, in fact, not captured alive as this intelligence report would lead you to believe.

After the return of our PWs, the work load in our intelligence organizations continued at an extremely high level while the returned prisoners were debriefed and their debriefings were analyzed. Incidentally, no information was provided by these debriefings which would substantiate the capture of this crew. During that time, the intelligence report in question apparently fell by the wayside and no attempt was ever made to declassify it until recently. I would like to point out here, in conclusion, that we have never received any other information to support the claims made in this report. Conversely, everything we have, including investigations by a House Select Committee and a Presidential Commission, lead us to the conclusion that no one is left alive.

3. Why didn't the Air Force ever provide information to the NOVA?

A: As mentioned before, it is the belief of DOD and the Services that after the repatriation of PWs the communists no longer held any of our men alive. It was the general opinion, born from experience with hundreds of other MOK, that providing information we felt, and still feel, was misleading or worse - false, could have a detrimental effect on the MOK by giving them false hope for the return of a loved one who we were sure was not alive. On many occasions, foreign governments have stated that they no longer hold any American prisoners and have steadfastly refused to provide us with anything but remains or information about those who were killed in the conflict.

Letter from
to Mrs. J. J. J. J.
61

FILE REFNO 1983-01

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

20 FEB 1987

U-0246/VC-PW

TO: Department of the Air Force
Headquarters Air Force Military
Personnel Center
DPMC, ATTN: Major Jerry Cruik, USAF
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-6001

SUBJECT: Transmittal of DIA Analysis

1. On 5 February 1973, an EC-47Q electronic reconnaissance aircraft on an intelligence gathering mission over southern Laos crashed with the loss of all personnel on board.
2. Sanitized intelligence reports from February and May 1973, which were released to the families of crewmembers, and assertions made by a former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst have led some to the erroneous belief that at least four crewmembers survived and were captured.
3. In July 1986, Mr. Patrick J. Cressman, a relative of one of the crewmen, wrote to the President and several members of Congress, stating that his brother and three other crewmembers, known by the U.S. Government to have been alive and captured, were "abandoned."
4. The Defense Intelligence Agency has conducted an exhaustive analysis of all available intelligence and operational data surrounding the EC-47Q loss. This analysis has concluded:
 - a. There is no evidence that any crewmembers survived the crash.
 - b. There is no evidence that any crewmembers were captured by enemy forces.
 - c. The intelligence reports of 5 February, 17 February and 2 May 1973, contain no evidence that relates to crewmembers of the EC-47Q.
5. A copy of the DIA analysis is attached. This analysis will also be provided to the White House and in response to Congressional queries.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Enclosure a/s

[Signature]
KIMBALL H. GAINES
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in Action



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

20 FEB 1987

ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION ON THE LOSS OF EC-47Q BARON 52

LOSS INCIDENT

The EC-47Q, call sign Baron 52, and its eight crew members were lost over Laos on 5 February 1973. Four days later a search team inspected the wreckage and located the remains of four crew members. Two of the remains were in the pilot and co-pilot positions. The third was in the engineer's compartment, and the team was able to recover a portion of this body, which was identified as the other co-pilot. The fourth body was near the engineer's compartment. Normally in this type of aircraft there are two positions immediately behind the engineer's compartment. One of these two positions would have been occupied by SSgt Todd M. Melton and the other by either Sgt Joseph A. Matejov or SSgt Peter R. Cressman. Due to physical and time constraints and hostile forces in the area, the team was not able to lift the fuselage to search for additional remains.

The search team also found what appeared to be anti-aircraft artillery shrapnel holes in parts of the wreckage. They found no evidence that the crew were preparing to bail out when the plane crashed; and it did not appear that the aircraft attempted a controlled crash landing. The disposition of the wreckage and other features of the crash site (e.g., absence of skid marks) indicated the aircraft had plunged nearly vertically to earth, bounced once, landed upside down and burned.

Although operating outside the range of ground radar stations during most of its mission, Baron 52 had frequent radio contact with other aircraft in the area. For example, the commander made routine half hourly contacts with, and reported all unusual occurrences to, Moon Beam Airborne Command and Control Center, and also had radio contact with Spectre 20, an AC-130 gunship working in the same area. The electronics warfare crew members also used separate communications equipment to maintain contact with another EC-47, Baron 62, flying in the same general area. The last reported position of Baron 52 was about 8-10 minutes flying time from the crash site.

COMMANDER'S DETERMINATION

Following a review of facts associated with the crash, the Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, in coordination with the Commander, 56th Special Operations Wing, recommended that the status of the crew members be changed

to killed-in-action. The next-of-kin were informed of the status change and the facts supporting the decision in a series of letters dated between 24 February and 17 April 1973, which summarized the events of Baron 52's last mission and the evidence obtained by the search team. The commander added that in view of the capabilities of the radio communications equipment, Baron 52's frequent contacts with other aircraft, and the intensive training of the crew, in case of emergency at least one of the crew would have instinctively used the radios unless the aircraft crashed as a result of some catastrophic incident that immediately and completely incapacitated the crew members. Having reviewed the available facts, the field commanders reported that they believed "there was no reasonable doubt that all the members of the crew of Baron 52 were killed in the crash."

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Although the observations of the search team and other facts constituted what the field commander believed to be compelling evidence that none of the crew members survived, four sensitive intelligence reports, portions of which were declassified for release to the next-of-kin, led others to speculate that the four electronics specialists could have survived. Two of the documents were dated 5 February 1973, another 17 February 1973, and the fourth 2 May 1973. Through a longstanding misinterpretation of these sanitized documents an erroneous impression of survivors was preserved. Yet in fact, the four reports do not relate to the loss of the EC-47Q.

- The initial 5 February report originated in the area of Vinh, North Vietnam, over 240 miles by road north of the EC-47Q crashsite. In that report, which was issued as an unevaluated spot report as soon as the information was acquired, a North Vietnamese unit near Vinh is said to be holding four prisoners who are not further identified.
- The later 5 February report, based on and issued after a review of the information in the earlier 5 February report, provides no additional insights into the origin or identity of the prisoners.
- The 17 February document is a report by an enemy unit of the alleged downing of an aircraft in the area immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone which separated North and South Vietnam, and as such does not relate to the EC-47Q or its crew.
- The 2 May report is yet another analyst's interpretation of the 5 February reporting and is neither new information nor a new report. DIA's review of the evidence shows that the analyst who prepared the

2 May report made a number of arbitrary and erroneous assumptions and speculative assertions in an attempt to infer that the 5 February information originated from a location much closer to the EC-47Q crashsite and that some of the crew survived. The 2 May report therefore actually provides no more conclusive information than the original 5 February report did; however, the unwarranted personal speculation tends to draw attention away from this fact.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the four documents cited above were never conclusively correlated to crew members of Baron 52. The documents initially were entered into the files of the crew members only because the information was acquired shortly after Baron 52 became missing, and it was anticipated that future reporting might permit DIA analysts to make a definitive correlation to the Baron 52 incident. No such reporting was ever received. It is further emphasized that following the loss of Baron 52 none of its crew was ever seen alive, and there is no intelligence whatsoever which would indicate any of the crew survived the incident of loss.

654

- Reply to
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Washington, DC 20005-1501
(202) 374-2744
(202) 374-4478
 - ☐ 721 Federal Building
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Cris Moore, IA 50209-2110
(712) 324-4990
 - ☐ 206 Federal Building
101 1st Street S.E.
Crandall, IA 52001-1227
(319) 363-4432

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

October 10, 1990

Mr. John M.G. Brown
Box 30
Petalia, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

I wish to thank you for your generosity in contributing your research and many long hours of work to our POW/MIA investigation. The documents you provided pertaining to POWs of World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War will offer us an invaluable historical context for understanding this issue as we seek the truth and a resolution of the matter.

As you request, let me give you my assurance that I and my staff will not permit any copies to be made of these documents, nor will we permit access to them, without your express approval. We are grateful that you have donated this effort to our cause and I will do whatever I can to ensure that your request is honored.

Once again, thank you for your outstanding work and generosity. Please let me know if I can be of help in your future endeavors.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley
United States Senator

655

John M.G. Brown
Box 30
Petalia, CA 95558
(707) 629-3547

4 October, 1990


Senator Charles Grassley
Personal Attn. Mr. Lolesnik
U.S. Senate Hart Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Grassley,

I am submitting for the current investigation into the matter of U.S. prisoners of war who remained in hostile captivity 260 + numbered, now-declassified official documents uncovered by me in the National Archives. These documents confirm the existence of American POWs of the 1918-1920 American intervention in Russia, World War II, Korea and Vietnam in Soviet or Soviet-surrogate control. I have selected them from among some 10,000 other POW-related documents now in my possession.

These documents form the basis for my February 1990 VFW Magazine article, MISSING POWS OF THE COLD WAR, my May/June two-part New American article, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, LET OUR PEOPLE GO, and my September 15, 1990 Washington Post column, THE POW CONSPIRACY, all of which are enclosed. As an author, currently writing a fully documented history of U.S. POWs of the above listed conflicts, this primary-source documentary evidence is very valuable to me, and there is no one else in the United States whom I would have entrusted with it. I request that you do not permit any copies of the enclosed documents to get into the hands of other writers or reporters who might misinterpret them or quote them in the wrong context, or use them to coopt my own investigative research. I am trusting you and your staff to safeguard what represents years of work on my part, on behalf of the POWs. If you need further assistance please contact me.

Sincerely,



John M.G. Brown

he Washington Post

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1990

A:

The POW Conspiracy

At the close of his article "No MIA Conspiracy" (op-ed, Aug. 24), Stephen Rosenfeld wrote "my own sense of things is that the Americans who were taken prisoner in Vietnam have been honorably served by those charged with pursuing their fate. Does that make me part of the conspiracy?"

The answer is that nearly all of the "hundreds and perhaps thousands of officials" Rosenfeld referred to did play a part, usually minor, in ensuring that the full truth on American and Allied POWs held by the Soviets and their surrogates after World War II, Korea and Vietnam would not be revealed to the American public. The matter has been a national security concern since the development of the Soviet nuclear threat to the very existence of the United States. All the officials and officers who have taken part in suppressing the truth of Soviet-surrogate-held American POWs have faced a painful moral choice while doing their lavishly ordered duty.

Based on thousands of declassified official documents and supporting eyewitness accounts obtained during seven years of investigation and research, it is clear that thousands of American POWs have been secretly held by the Soviets and their surrogates since 1945. The numbers of Americans thus illegally withheld appear to have been approximately 20,000 in 1945, 4,000 to 5,000 (or more) after 1963 and perhaps as many as 1,000 after 1973. These Americans, and many thousands more Allied POWs, were withheld for ransom and blackmail, used as forced labor and for espionage purposes. In addition I can document the secret withholding of American POWs of the 1918-1920 intervention in Russia in Lukovka prison in Moscow and the Selovosty Island GPU forced-labor camps until at least the 1950-1955 period.

In answer to Rosenfeld's 5-nd question: All major-circulation U.S. publications I have contacted, with the exception of the VFW Magazine, have declined to publish documentable facts of the history of U.S. prisoners of war held by Communist nations. These publications have apparently decided to even investigate the matter seriously. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the editors of such publications have avoided publishing such historically significant material in the interest of some higher political purpose.

Rosenfeld accused people like me of "turning on our own government." It might be in order to state that my family helped found and protect the revolutionary government of the United States in 1776 that I in my turn served that government in front-line combat and that it was the intention of the Founding Fathers that our government be constantly held accountable to the people. That is the principle for which the tens of thousands of missing American POWs fought, and that is why people such as myself consider that we are merely doing our duty toward our fellow American servicemen by uncovering the truth about their fate.

—John M. G. Brown

JOHN M.G. BROWN
BOX 30
Petaluma, CA 95558
(707) 629-3547

4 October, 1990

Senator Charles Grassley
Personal Attn. Iris Kolesnik
130 Senate Hill Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Sincerely,

John M.G. Brown
John M.G. Brown

VETERAN VIEWS

Hidden POWs of the Cold War: One Man's View

By John M.G. Brown

A series of signals from the Soviet Union asking for U.S. assistance in repatriating some 300 Soviets missing in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a unique opportunity.

Reports from Soviet diplomatic sources appearing in the American press in 1989, indicating that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had discussed this matter with President George Bush, demonstrates possible linkage in accounting for Russian MIAs in Afghanistan and American POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War as well as previous wars.

A number of U.S. prisoners may have been transferred to the Soviet Union from Indochina, and documentary evidence exists of the transfer of large numbers of U.S. POWs of the Korean War to the Soviet Union. The U.S. demanded their return in May 1954, but the Soviet Union denied holding American POWs "under guard."

And the existence and disappearance of American and British POWs under Soviet control in 1945 has been documented by this writer through declassification of thousands of formerly secret U.S. cables and reports in the National Archives.

Although many Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests have been denied me for "national security" reasons, some records have been obtained through FOIA. Interviews with 1945 participants have clarified other aspects of this hidden aspect of the Cold War.

In 1945 the Soviet Army liberated over a million Western Allied POWs and displaced persons in Nazi camps in Poland, eastern Germany and Austria. According to the Yalta Agreements they were to be repatriated to their native lands.

While some were relatively well-treated by front-line Russian troops, documentary evidence details how over 500,000 of these prisoners were forcibly retained by Soviet authorities. Included were hundreds of thousands of French, Belgians, Dutch and ethnic Jews who had survived the Nazi concentration camps.

Among them were tens of thousands of American, British and Commonwealth POWs whose kidnapping became a high-level national security secret. American and British prisoners were also among the more than 4,500,000 German and Japanese POWs retained as forced labor by the Russians.

On May 23, 1945, two weeks after

the end of the war in Europe, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's chief POW negotiator with the Soviets, Maj. Gen. Ray Barker, stated in a secret report: "The SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held as hostages by the Russians..."

Recently declassified U.S. and British documents record details of a Soviet "blackmail" operation executed by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his cohorts Molotov, Beria, Gorkov and others.

Their object was to obtain Allied compliance in the coerced and forcible repatriations of more than 5,000,000 Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and other eastern Europeans. They also demanded U.S. diplomatic recognition of Communist regimes in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

An additional benefit to the Russians was to be the labor of thousands of technologically advanced (by Soviet standards) Allied prisoners. The actions of highly placed Soviet spies in the British and American governments severely compromised the Allies and greatly assisted the Soviets in this operation.

Repatriation of POWs was a secret topic of the 1945 founding United Nations Conference in San Francisco, the 1945 Hopkins-Stalin meetings and the Potsdam Conference. It appears that Field Marshal Alexander, Gen. George Patton and to a lesser extent others, including Gen. Eisenhower, resisted this chain of events prior to and following the unsuccessful September 1945 foreign ministers meetings.

Well after the war, Alexander cabled London: "Difficulty in tracing BR/US PWs in Russian zone." He reported that U.S. and British

POWs were being shipped east into Russia "in boxcars with German PWs."

Meanwhile, Patton's Third Army had located thousands more American and British prisoners being withheld after the war by the Soviets in Austria. According to once-top secret U.S. documents, decisions were first made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then by President Harry Truman that the potential losses of a 1945-46 war with Russia were not worth the possible recovery of some 20,000 American and 20,000 or more British and Commonwealth POWs.

Implementation of this policy was passed on to the responsible departments and agencies. Evidence has surfaced of the secret return of Allied prisoners for the forcibly repatriated Soviet citizens of whom Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Lord Bethell and Nikolai Tolstoy have written so eloquently.

Repatriations to Stalin's GULAG were marred by mass suicides. Stalin reneged on full reciprocity and most of the Allied POWs disappeared into secret, special camps. Stalin's failure to reciprocate in the repatriations of 1945-47 resulted in an official tendency to minimize the extent of Allied losses.

In classified U.S. and British documents, the total number of prisoners known to be in Soviet hands was scaled down to some 5,500 Americans and 8,500 British and Commonwealth troops. Continuing research indicates that these figures reflect a shifting of known prisoners into other categories. All told, some 78,000 Americans remain unaccounted for from WWII.

The acute need for intelligence inside Soviet territory to locate the large number of missing Allied prisoners for possible secret rescue or negotiations led to U.S.-Soviet air battles in Europe and U.S. naval threats to the Russians in Manchuria.

This crisis led to the first major American covert actions after WWII inside Soviet territory executed by

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Army G-2/SSU, the State Department's Office of Policy Coordination, and later the CIA.

Among other assets, they used existing German intelligence networks. The perceived need for extreme security in this matter helped create a chain of events leading to the present debate on the limits of secrecy in a free society.

The latest Soviet statement of concern for the return of their missing Afghan War prisoners should be viewed as a public diplomatic signal of their willingness to consider an exchange. This should not, however, be permitted to become a forced repatriation of those 40-80 former Soviet prisoners known to be living

in freedom in the U.S. and Canada. What would be in order, however, is the use of American influence to gain control of those Soviet POWs in Afghanistan and Pakistan who wish to return home.

Given the present glum mood and Gorbachev's statements on Stalin's crimes, it might finally be to the Soviet Union's advantage to reveal the truth about American POWs from WWII.

John M.G. Brown, a former combat infantryman with the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions in Vietnam, is a Life Member of Post 2886 in Seattle, Wash. and author of *Rice Paddy Grunt* (1986).



Though most American prisoners held by the Germans were liberated by U.S. troops (as shown here), possibly as many as 20,000 U.S. POWs were not repatriated from Soviet-controlled territories. U.S. Army



Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States Magazine • February 1990 • Vol. 77 No. 6

FEATURES

Operation Just Cause. In the biggest U.S. military operation since Vietnam, GIs invaded Panama and deposed dictator Gen. Manuel Noriega.

Congressional Veterans Committees. As part of a new "For Your Files" series, VFW Magazine will be publishing informational items you may want to clip and save.

Maintenance is the Key. Post Service is one of National Headquarters' best kept secrets. Part five of the spotlight series describes how this program assists Posters to function more effectively.

On the Far China Station by Richard K. Kolb. The U.S. East India (Asiatic) Squadron patrolled the vast Pacific rim of Asia in the 19th century. And its members fought some exciting but forgotten engagements.

Berlin: Cold War Outpost by Richard K. Kolb. Though much of Eastern Europe is undergoing dramatic political change, the mission of the U.S. Army's Berlin Brigade has not changed. Troops stationed there still serve as a symbol of America's commitment to Western Europe's freedom.

Berlin Crisis of 1961. In one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War, a new and untired U.S. President called Moscow's bluff along the Iron Curtain.

U.S. Special Operations Command: The 'Quiet Professionals' by Col. Tom Jones. America's elite special forces, most recently committed to action in Panama, are seldom publicly recognized for their vital defense role. This overview provides a glimpse at their mission and composition.

Central America: Top Priority by Senior Vice Commander-in-Chief James L. Kimery. In the heart of the Western Hemisphere Marxist-inspired political violence persists, as a VFW fact-finding trip recently found.

COLUMNS

COMMAND POST. Commander-in-Chief Wally Hogan answers a critical question: Is the Cold War Really Over?

WASHINGTON WIRE. Legislation. James N. Magill; Service. Frederico Jourbe, Jr.; Security. Kenneth A. Stedman.

VETERAN VIEWS. Hidden POWs of the Cold War: One Man's View by John M.G. Brown. When WWII ended, thousands of U.S. POWs were not repatriated from Soviet-controlled areas.

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TORONTO SUN, 27 MAY 1989

The Saturday/Sunday/May 27, 1989 11

Dreadful military secrets

WILLIAM STEVENSON



"It seems unbelievable," begins a feature in the U.S. Veterans News and Report. "Since the end of the Vietnam war, the Vietnam veterans have contended that Americans were left behind. Scoffed at and harassed, the veterans have been accused by government officials of using the myth of POWs to hold onto the war. But if the United States was willing to forsake more than 20,000 men while postulating the most powerful military force in history..."

Let me cut in here to say the authors of A Secret that Shames Humanity are no secretoids. One is a valued friend: John Brown, a combat infantryman in Vietnam; and Tom Ashworth, a former Marine helicopter pilot. They have been digging through bureaucratic secrecy and now come up with troubling questions:

"Where are the secret records concerning thousands of live Canadian, American and British fighting men who disappeared into the Soviet prison system at the end of World War II?"

"Were those U.S. officers who handled the coverup on abandoned Allied prisoners then promoted to high rank in policy-making and intelligence positions because of their dangerous knowledge and the need to ensure silence?"

"Did this become a pattern, ensuring that similarly involved officials in later wars would also rise rapidly and even become assigned to questionable covert operations of recent years?"

"Have the Soviets and other communist governments used the complicity inherent in this coverup to compromise or blackmail key U.S. officials, thus endangering U.S. security?"

To get such questions before the public, the authors have been obliged to publish some 1,000 words in The U.S. Veterans, having been opposed in their efforts to find someone bold enough to print their book. Their theme is said to be too potentially damaging to national interests. Their answer is that nothing can damage a nation more than the pretense of abandoning its own men on the battlefield.

The Soviet Union kidnapped and held in perpetual captivity tens of thousands of Canadian, American, British and Commonwealth POWs," says Brown. "It was done with the knowledge of the highest level decision-makers in the United States and Great Britain..."

"Allied prisoners were the principle component in forcing mass-repatriations of Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs and other Soviet citizens and in helping ensure British and American recognition of puppet Soviet governments in East Europe."

Brown and his co-author spent years burrowing through files labelled TOP SECRET long after there was any apparent need for secrecy. They began by looking for hard evidence of U.S. secret intelligence on American left behind in Vietnam and found themselves on a paper-chase back through history.

They retrieved confidential messages between Moscow, London and Washington following the Moscow Conference in February, 1945 when Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the last time. Brown believes "it was then that the West agreed to the forced repatriation of two million 'Soviet citizens' who were in Allied hands. The

price was the return by Stalin of some 20,000 Americans and some 20,000 British in Stalin's hands."

Stalin never paid the agreed price. Now the authors disclose cables between British Field Marshal Alexander and the supreme headquarters of Allied command in London (SHAEP) that show Alexander refusing orders to forcibly deliver up some 20,000 Czechs to the Russian NKVD (now the KGB).

In the end, Alexander complied in order to get the Russians to release British and American soldiers. The bloody operations resulted in some British troops throwing down their rifles and refusing to carry out orders to force the Czech families - wives and children as well as the soldiers - into the waiting Russian arms.

Alexander's cables in late spring 1945 reflect his growing realization that the terrible deed - Operation Keelhaul - served little purpose. For instance: "In Russian some difficulty experienced in tracing British POWs... unconfirmed reports in Russian/U.S. POWs being evacuated Odesa by rail in boxcars..." There were many top-secret messages like that.

Ten years later, British security files still bore traces of sensitivity in the form of a red tag: "This document is to be handled for official use only... The term Forcible Repatriation cannot be used for dissemination to the public..."

U.S. Gen. George C. Marshall was less willing to gloss things over. A month after victory in Europe, he called Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, the Allied supreme commander: "Concerned your report 5-26-45 that 20,000 U.S. prisoners still in Russian hands." But Marshall was thrown a distracting bone, and said to forget what had become "a national security matter."

Armed with paper clues that soon filled their basements, Brown and Ashworth concluded that the communist countries have always used prisoners as pawns, to be discarded when no longer playable. They depict world statements sucked into a game that, in Vietnam, gave the Hanoi government a strong bargaining hand before letting U.S. President Richard Nixon withdraw from that war.

They claim to have accumulated documentary evidence of the continued existence of thousands of American prisoners in enemy hands following the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Brown says, "Federal agents came to see me last month (April) and reminded me of the need for national security secrecy in these matters."

From that he concluded if U.S. publishers were being told the same yarn, he and Ashworth might as well print the bare details in the veterans' newsletter. "Then," he tells me, "maybe someone will let us publish the whole truth."

Dear Mr. Brown,

Bill Stevenson wanted you to have a copy of his column.

Regards,

William Stevenson, Author of:

A MAN CALLED INTREPID
ON MOUNTAIN AT ENTREE

THE
TORONTO
SUN

Over photography
Black and white Berlin
that photos courtesy
of German Information
Center. Inset photo:
night photographing
China

The POW Conspiracy

At the close of his article "The MIA Conspiracy" (Sept. 8, p. 34), Stephen Rosenfeld wrote "my own sense of things is that the Americans who were taken prisoner in Vietnam have been honorably served by those charged with pursuing their fate. Does that make me part of the conspiracy?"

The answer is that nearly all of the "hundreds and perhaps thousands of officials" Rosenfeld referred to did play a part, usually minor, in ensuring that the full truth on American and Allied POWs held by the Soviets and their surrogates after World War II, Korea and Vietnam would not be revealed to the American public. The matter has been a national security concern since the development of the Soviet nuclear threat to the very existence of the United States. All the officials and officers who have taken part in suppressing the truth of Soviet- or surrogate-held American POWs have faced a painful moral choice while doing their lawfully ordered duty.

Based on thousands of declassified official documents and supporting eyewitness accounts obtained during seven years of investigation and research, it is clear that thousands of American POWs have been secretly held by the Soviets and their surrogates since 1945. The numbers of Americans thus illegally withheld appear to have been approximately 20,000 in 1945, 4,000 to 5,000 (or more) after 1953 and perhaps as many as 1,000 after 1973. These Americans, and many thousands more Allied POWs, were withheld for reasons and methods, used as forced labor and for espionage purposes. In addition I can document the secret withholding of American POWs of the 1916-1920 intervention in Russia in Lubyanka prison in Moscow and the Solovetsky Islands GPU forced-labor camps until at least the 1930-1930 period.

In answer to Rosenfeld's final question: All major-circulation U.S. publications I have contacted, with the exception of the VFW Magazine, have declined to publish demonstrable facts of the history of U.S. prisoners of war held by Communist nations. These publications have apparently declined to even investigate the matter seriously. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the editors of such publications have avoided publishing such historically significant material in the interest of some higher political purpose.

Rosenfeld accused people like me of "lying on our own government." It might be wiser to state that my family helped fund and protect the revolutionary government of the United States in 1776 that I in my turn served that government in front-line combat and that it was the intention of the Founding Fathers that our government be constantly held accountable to the people. That is the principle for which the tens of thousands of missing American POWs fought, and that is why people such as myself consider that we are merely doing our duty toward our fellow American servicemen by uncovering the truth about their fate.

—John M. G. Brown

Book Accusing U.S. of P.O.W. Coverup Stirs a Dispute

By EDWIN McDOWELL

A book accusing the United States of secretly withholding the fate of American prisoners of war still being held in Southeast Asia has been published by a publisher who has been charged with a similar charge that Bantam Books turned down. Government officials pressure Bantam officials before they learned it was flawed and vulnerable to attack from Government officials named in the book.

The book is "The Boys Goodbye," by Paul Gilkin, the literary agent for

Yuan Stevenson and Monica Jensen. The book, published by Bantam Books last January, a Canadian publisher, says that the authors, who are still being held in Southeast Asia, have been charged with a similar charge that Bantam Books turned down. Government officials pressure Bantam officials before they learned it was flawed and vulnerable to attack from Government officials named in the book.

publishing industry executives say the controversy, which was first reported by the New York Times, has been stirred by the book. The book, which was published by Bantam Books last January, a Canadian publisher, says that the authors, who are still being held in Southeast Asia, have been charged with a similar charge that Bantam Books turned down. Government officials pressure Bantam officials before they learned it was flawed and vulnerable to attack from Government officials named in the book.

Authors, in turn, are critical of the book. "We are not critical of the book," said Martin Garbus, publisher of the book. "We are critical of the book."

Criticism by Authors
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the authors, said that in the summer of 1988 he had received a letter from a lawyer for Richard Armitage, an aide to the secretary of defense. The letter, he said, criticized the book. Mr. Stevenson had written for Canada's National Post about American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia. Mr. Gilkin said he had passed the letter to Mr. Jensen, who considered it. Mr. Jensen, who was then the publisher of the book, said he had passed the letter to Mr. Gilkin, who was then the publisher of the book. Mr. Gilkin said he had passed the letter to Mr. Jensen, who was then the publisher of the book.

"I took Their Suggestion"
Mr. Jensen, formerly a publisher for "30 Minutes," contends that Bantam booked for reasons to reject their letter. "We had worked on the book for two years with their encouragement," he said. "Then after the book was published, they rejected it."

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New York Times
(pg. C-21) 5-24-90

First of a two-part series

Mikhail Gorbachev, Let Our People Go

Holding American, Allied, and other prisoners as hostages — for ransom or blackmail or for intelligence purposes — has been a Soviet-communist policy since 1919. Hundreds of American civilians and U.S. military hostages of the intervention held prisoner by the victorious Bolsheviks, along with others arrested or detained later, were used by the Soviets in 1921 to obtain \$100 million worth of desperately needed food supplies under the authority of war relief director (later President) Herbert Hoover. In his memoirs Hoover listed as the first minimum condition for U.S. aid: "freedom of all American prisoners in Russia."

According to an October 21, 1920 Associated Press report, the total number of American citizens in Russia was estimated at 3000 (including some families of naturalized Americans). Certainly, at this time, hundreds of native-born American civilians and U.S. military prisoners were being held hostage by the Soviets. One of them, a Red Cross official and U.S. Army officer in WWI named Emmett Kilpatrick, captured with men of Wrangel's White Army, smuggled a letter out of a Chekha secret police prison: "... I am now held in prison as a hostage for one Jim Larkin [a communist agitator imprisoned in the U.S.] now serving a sentence of twenty years, and the same has been awarded me."

Western European war prisoners and civilians were also being held hostage by the Soviets at this time, in an effort to gain concessions from their home governments. The U.S. State Department sought to put the matter to rest with a public announcement on October 22, 1920, a day after the above quoted AP story: "Irish-American figures on the number of Americans in Russia are off by about 1000, according to



Soldiers in the American intervention forces were targeted for capture by Lenin

State Department records, which put the correct number at about 35."

Death Warrant

The State Department claimed that the others were Russian-Americans, and that "all the Americans in Russia remained there of their own free will when Ambassador Francis left that country July

* Russian Peter Nikolaevich Wrangel led a White Russian force of counter-revolutionaries, fighting against the regime established in Russia by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Following his appointment as commander in chief of the White Russian forces in April 1920, Wrangel established a provisional government in the Crimea and scored several victories against the Soviet troops. His defeat late in 1920 marked the end of the White Russian apparatus in the Soviet revolutionary government.

JOHN M.G. BROWN

with research assistance Thomas V. Ashworth

than War prisoners should be viewed as a public diplomatic signal of their willingness to consider an exchange. This opportunity should not be permitted to become a forced repatriation of those 40-50 former Soviet prisoners known to be living in freedom in the U.S. and Canada, or of those Vietnamese who have escaped a modern Stalinist regime.

Since Vietnam has evidenced some fear of dealing honestly with the United States on the fate of

known POWs in its control, perhaps the correct approach is to involve Vietnam's powerful ally (and originator of the problem), the Soviet Union. If the Vietnamese feel unable to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of the United States while still expecting U.S. diplomatic recognition, then the Soviet Union should assist its ally by providing a way out of the present dilemma.

America should already be using its influence to gain control of those Soviet POWs in Afghanistan and

Pakistan who wish to return home. The Soviet Union should announce that, as part of their campaign of "openness," they will allow American prisoners who have come under their control. In various ways to return home if they wish to. In matters truly involving the national security of the United States, certain returning prisoners could be sworn to secrecy.

Whose National Interest?

Recent developments in the POW matter in the United States and Canada indicate that American and Allied leaders may have discussed this subject with Soviet leaders prior to and during the recent Malta Summit. U.S. determination to continue a transparent secrecy in this matter, on the grounds of national security, raises the question of whose national interest such secrecy actually serves.

The Soviet domestic press has begun to publish portions of the truth for their own people. Also, during 1989 the USSR propaganda magazine *Soviet Life*, published by governmental agreement in the U.S., admitted some of Stalin's crimes: "... Stalinism implies mass terror, contempt for human life, the massacre of millions of innocent people on political grounds.... Stalinism means forced labor of millions of people.... Stalinism means fraud on the state level, fabrication of 'traitors against the homeland,' misrepresentation of collectivization, falsified history of the party, the state and the world."

The publication of such truths by the Soviet Union should challenge the United States government to open some of its own secret files. With the monumental changes apparently taking place in Eastern Europe, more of the history of the 1945 Soviet takeover in those areas is emerging. Once set in motion, such a tide of revelations is difficult to reverse. Given the present "glassnost" mood and Gorbachev's statements on Stalin's crimes, it might finally be to the Soviet Union's advantage to expose the full truth of this matter and restore the surviving prisoners to their homelands. ■

Colonel Shelton, POW

The Moving Wall has finally come to San Angelo, Texas. The Vietnam Veteran's Memorial (Moving) Wall preserves the names of the American soldiers who gave their lives for freedom or were left behind to languish in Southeast Asia. Among these missing men is Colonel Charles Ervin Shelton.

Col. Shelton, a reconnaissance pilot, was shot down in his RF-101 while on a secret mission over Laos — 25 years ago, on April 29, 1965, his 33rd birthday. Other pilots circling over Sam Neua Province saw him land safely. His wingman even waved to him. According to the U.S. Defense Department, a 105 pilot made radio contact with Shelton, who responded that he was in "good condition." Shelton sat on a hill for two hours, waiting to be rescued by helicopters that never came.

Intelligence personnel report that Shelton managed to evade capture until he was surrounded by two Pathet Lao platoons, three days after being shot down. Officially listed as a POW on May 24, 1965, Col. Shelton has one advantage over other POWs/MIA's: He is the only one still officially listed as a POW. The decision whether or not to keep his file open was debated in October 1980, at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. Previous hearings for other POWs had all ended with the same results: "presumed dead."

The last name on the list was that of Charles E. Shelton. The three

hearing officers reported that the classified documents they reviewed had no bearing on their 2-1 decision that Col. Shelton can reasonably be presumed dead. But, since Shelton's was the last name to be considered, the decision had to be approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. What with all the "red tape" involved, it wasn't until 1984 that Verne Orr (then Secretary of the Air Force) publicly stated that Shelton's POW status would not change until positive evidence could be obtained to justify it.

Throughout the years, Shelton's wife Marian has received several first-hand live sighting reports from reputable intelligence personnel. As recently as 1986, a former intelligence agent who still travels to Vietnam said that he was told by U.S. intelligence analysts that it had been reported that Shelton had been moved to Vietnam from Laos in April 1985, to a secluded island prison called Ho Thach Bai, located 40 miles northeast of Hanoi, off the Red River. These sightings are what have kept the Shelton family from giving up hope. "I'm very worried about the future and the honor of this country and believe that all of our men who fought for this country should be brought home with honor," says Mrs. Shelton. "For, as President Reagan once said, 'A country that forgets its fighting men is a country that in itself will be forgotten.'"

— JENNIFER M. NOTTER

In the above case, CHAMBER reported as missing in action an administrative determination had been placed on each of their records that they were killed in action on the date they were reported as missing. This action was taken in accordance with the office precedent based on the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army under date of April 12, 1935, 12,1935, CHAMBER, 28,649,999, Co.1, 369th Infantry that when the latest authentic report indicates soldier was in action and when sufficient time has elapsed so that report of his would have been received through various organizations, and there is no information found as to his status, the only reasonable presumption is that he is dead.

(in the
Lubyanka,
Moscow)
He
Also reports
"many"
American
POW's in
the Solovets
Islands.. /
G.P.U.
forced-labor
camps

2
J.B.

FOUNDATION OF: U.S. POW POLICY

Mr. Huckleberry:

Please see inclosed correspondence also slips attached thereto from Colonel Adams, and a list of names of the supposed American prisoners in Russian Prison. The whole number being apparently fifteen, about eleven being unnamed.

(only those
in the
Lubyanka
Prison, Moscow)

I have looked into this question and find that at least one case that has an important bearing on it, namely the case of William J. Martin, Company A, 539th Infantry, which regiment served in Archangel on North Russian Expedition. Under date of Feb. 3, 1919 a report from Archangel showed Martin missing in action. This was the last information received from Europe. Under date of March 14, 1921 we made a determination showing: "Was killed in action Jan. 19, 1919". This determination was no doubt predicated on the unexplained absence of the soldier for about two years.

I also find another case which may possibly be involved, it is that of Lindsay Retherford, up in my mind because of the mention of the Russian sailor of Alfred Lindsay. Lindsay Retherford was reported missing and a similar determination was made in his case.

I showed to Colonel Parrott the Martin case and he was very much impressed by the thought that Martin may possibly be alive.

He wished you to obtain from Miss Shahan a list of all determinations concerning men who served in North Russia or Siberia in the cases of men missing in action, prisoners of war, deserters, etc. With regard to Siberia, I understand that one officer and six enlisted men were taken prisoners in Siberia, but I understand that they were repatriated from capture by the forces operating against the Americans in Siberia. This in order to determine whether there could be any more cases like the Martin case.

R.J. L.

Chief Clerk

11-8-30.

To Mr. Drown:

Can you or Mr. Rose see any other line of approach in this case -

R.J.

3

J.B.

9 February 1945

SHAW, France

French POW's

Crockett

Priority

SECRET

Amb: ✓
Hqs: ✓
GAS: ✓
Sup: ✓
Air: ✓

Beach

SECRET

M-22635

To AIDENHOWER for BARKER from SPALDING signed D'ANE.

This is in reply to your 8-78110. French here estimate about 800,000 French POW have been taken by Soviet armies, among which are 10,000 women and children recovered from camp at Kattowice and 41,000 POW recovered in East Prussia. They believe large part of all French POW will be recovered on Eastern Front.

French here say they made request to UNIMIA for assistance in care and evacuation of POW from Russia. Compliance with this request was deferred. They then made request to American Red Cross for clothing, medicine and concentrated food but not for help in actual evacuation. They are now negotiating with Soviets.

THIS WAS REPLY TO 8-78110

SECRET

4
J.B.

Mr. Perkins

Mr. Korman

file
WJ

Mr. Perkins:

Mr. Ciechanowski, of the Polish Embassy here, called me this afternoon to say that they have just received word from their (Polish) Government that over 1,000 officers and enlisted men of the American Army escaped from German prison camps in the Posen district and are now scattered in various towns in Poland. The prison from which they escaped was in Szulin in the Posen area. Two American officers: Colonel Charles Kohn and Major Jerris Kiden called at the Foreign Office in Lublin and asked the Polish authorities to communicate the above information to the Ambassador. Mr. Ciechanowski's telephone is: D - 3 - 00 - 25.

February 12, 1945. pm

Original given to
Major Taylor, Feb. 12

WJ

FILED IN INFORMATION AREA

SHAFF SCS

5
R6135
Entry 1
Box 37

The following is a true copy of a note given to one of the officer I.O.'s and turned in at HQ.

February 14th, 45

c/o Commanding Officer

Sir,


There are now eight officers and twelve H.C.O. (H.C.O. of whom are mostly American and British Airman.

At the moment we are with the Russian Army in Nowy Sacz for over three weeks and no responsible parties have been notified of our presence and whereabouts. We have no freedom, and have been told that we are in a fortress.

Kindly send immediately an officer you'll listen our departure.

I remain Yours Truly,

a/ H. Brooks - T/C



William Fitcher
WILLIAM FITCHER,
Capt., J.C.,
Intelligence Officer.

Amato, Benedict V.
Anerell, Otto C.
Anagnos, Charley
Amoser, Florian
Anderson, Claudie
Anderson, Veretto H.
Anderson, James A.

1st Lt 01310202
Capt 0323402
Sgt 30017765
Sgt 36741731
Sgt 18040886
2nd Lt 01683481
Sgt 34173545

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SECTION 3.3. 255413
BY 6027/BC NARA, DATE 24 Oct 1992

File Copy

Chronological No. 44

Moscow, February 12, 1945.

Dear Mr. Dekanosov:

Since writing to you on February 10, 1945 with regard to the group of United States Army officers and non-commissioned officers which the American military authorities wish to send to the Soviet Union to establish contact with American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army, I have been informed that it is desired to have the group proceed direct from Tehran to Poltava.

Very sincerely yours,

George F. Kennan,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

His Excellency

V. G. Dekanosov,

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs,

Moscow.

A true copy of



OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AIR MAIL

UNRESTRICTED

No. 21006



AMERICAN EMBASSY

London, February 14, 1945.

Subject: Statement in House of Commons Concerning Release of British Commonwealth Prisoners of War by Soviet Forces.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 20914 of February 8, 1945, concerning questions in the House of Commons with respect to the release of British Commonwealth prisoners of war by Soviet forces, I have the honor to report that in reply to further questions from Sir Alfred Knox (Conservative) and Mr. A. Edwards (Labour) as to whether any British prisoners of war had been liberated, as to the number of British prisoners of war camps in the Eastern Area, and as to the steps taken to secure their well-being, Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, made the following reply on February 13, 1945:

"Twelve camps, whose numbers are given below, have either been overrun by the Soviet forces or are in their direct path. There were about 60,000 prisoners from the British Commonwealth in these camps. It is clear that the Germans intended to move the prisoners from these camps to Central Germany and considerable transfers have taken place. The men are apparently moved on foot by daily stages of between 12 and 18 miles. It is likely, however, that many have been overtaken by the Soviet forces. The arrangements made with the Soviet authorities were outlined in a reply given by my right hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Miss Ward) on 6th February, and my hon. Friend will no doubt have seen the text of the comprehensive agreement about the repatriation of prisoners of war now in German hands which is published in this morning's papers. Some scores of names of British ex-prisoners have so far been picked up from the Lublin radio. Next-of-kin are being informed."

711.4 AMERICAN POW in USSR - Kennan
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

8
J.B.

"Following are the camps:

Stalag IIB
Stalag IID
Stalag IIIB
Stalag IIIC
Stalag 344
Stalag VIIIB
Stalag VIIIC
Stalag XIX
Stalag IAB
Stalag Luft III
Stalag Luft IV
Stalag Luft VII

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Carlos J. Warner

Carlos J. Warner,
Second Secretary of Embassy.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

Secret 9
J.B.

EPM-852

This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone
other than a Government
Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Geneva

Dated February 16, 1945

Rec'd 12:17 a.m., 17th

Secretary of State

Washington.

US URGENT.

60, February 16, 5 p.m.

FOR AMERICAN RED CROSS FROM JAMES.

"751. Following information results conferred with
Marti. Stalag 20-A moving west. 20-B moving toward
Neubrandenburg. 400,000 Poles Stalag 2-C overrun
remainder moving west. Conditions present movement are
most difficult. Oflag 64 received 6 hours notice to
evacuate. 266 men unable march were moved by train
have arrived Stalag 3-A. Remainder marched west in
weather 30 below zero without having had time collect
reserve food or clothing supplies. Such supplies as
were taken froze solid and hence almost inedible as no
means heating them. There has been widespread dysentery
which with men suffering from foot injuries during march
has obliged abandon approximately 200 men on roadside
to shift for selves. 4600 AMPOWS from Stalag 3-B

arrived at

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
(LIAISON)
FEB 17 AM 9 30

arrived at 3-A after 10 days march having completely exhausted reserves. Men exhausted and poor condition physically. Now sleeping on straw under tents as no space available in barracks. After few days rest will proceed on foot to new camp in preparation for them 18 kilometers west of Luckenwalde. About half British aviators from Luft 3 now Staglag 3-A remainder moving on towards Marlag Milagnord. Americans from Luft 3 moving half to Staglag 7-A half to Nuremberg. All Norwegian prisoners have arrived Staglag 3-A also 950 Polish officers from Hungary latter in bad physical condition. Staglag 344 momentarily stopped at Konigsgratz until a decision as to final destination can be taken. Marti claims above described conditions movement of prisoners is actually better than provisions for civilian evacuation. Civil populations are fleeing with no provisions little clothing either on foot or such transport as they can find. Frankfurt Oder population being now evacuated in open coal cars. Following are estimated approximate percent total number prisoners each nationality now on move. British 39 Americans 53 Belgian 20 Poles 27 Yugoslavs 11 Greeks nil Norwegian 100 French 22 total all prisoners 24. Staglag 3-A being used as point of concentration for moving prisoners.

Now 100,000

100-443887-100

MAP
NEAREST TOWN SQUARE.

Newbernburg 11 2

A
 PLANKTON
 Luchenswalde
 B 2
 C 1

5	Fürstentum/Ober	C?
C	Anders	C?

D	Merrill-Stegiles	N 2
A	Hobbs	B-C 9

B	Monberg	B 2
C	Warriz	B 3

D	Torgau	N 2
D/2	Annaberg	N 2

	Y	C	
Hartmannsdorfer	113		
Oederz	112		

Ludwigshafen A-B 3
Villingen A 4

U	Amphibian / Reptiles	A 2
I	Birds	A 2
	Mammals	A 2

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6-10-77
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	Bremer Bridge	A-182
	Nilesburg	A-9

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130	Abstracts	141

Country	Year	Value
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WILLIAM A. WALLSBERG	WALLSBERG	C 4
WILLIAM C. WARD	WARD	C 4

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AND MERCHANT MARINE CAMPS

12
J.B.

23 February 1945
 M 22883
 To Russell from Crockett signed Deane M 22883.

Additional list of American officers known to have been liberated from Krieg G, Stubin, and now in Poland follows:

In Page, Captain Ellsworth Cundiff, Bartlesville, Oklahoma;

In Vespasia
 1st Lt Preston Rougez
 2nd Lt Edward Humphreys
 2nd Lt Thomas A. Labig
 1st Lt Tom R. McGee
 1st Lt Stockton
 2nd Lt Joe Sumstad
 1st Lt William A. Smular, Jr.
 1st Lt Sam M. Salmatov, and
 2nd Lt Donald Wernet.

In Volga in Hospital, Captain Joseph Varkin and Captain Richard Nosbeck, the latter suffering from stomach trouble.

Source of above information 3 officers who arrived in Moscow 22 February, and listed in M 22867, 22 February 1945. List of enlisted men who escaped from Stalag 3C follows:

Sgt Thomas Jensen;

CM-IN-24745

(24 Feb 45)

ACTION
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 INFO
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 PMG
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COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

19

13
J.B.

US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

M 22883

23 February 1945

Sgt Stringham;
 T Sgt Rich;
 S Sgt Messer,
 Sgt Case;
 Sgt Tom Hoag;
 Sgt Koch;
 Sgt Bell;
 Sgt George Crouch;
 Sgt Greer;
 M Sgt Thomas;
 S Sgt Hastings;
 Sgt Neal Blankenship, 12019214;
 Sgt Ferald Adams, 17175310;
 Cpl Frank Youngblood, 34058805; and
 Cpl Robert Rash, 36811386.

Above reported by Sgt George Lukashevits who arrived in Moscow, 22 February, after escaping from evacuation column of 500 men. His information indicated that entire 2000 men escaping 3C were liberated by Russians and are now making their way toward Warsaw. Sgt Herman Curley was fatally wounded when Soviets overran column and died while under Russian care at a little unidentified town near Kustrin. Attempt will be made to get details from Soviets.

MX22867 18 CM-IN-23397 (23 Feb 45)TAO

End

ACTION: TAO

INFO: OPD

0-1

0-2

C of S

CM-IN-24745

(24 Feb 45)

DTG 231726

18

REGRATED CONFIDENTIAL. PARAPHRASED
 VERSIONS REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED
 ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/9-1

COPY NO.

19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

15
J.S.

The following information comes from a conference with
Mr. Schinner, Ambassador's representative Berlin, at present in Geneva:-

(1) At the present time, there are approximately 100,000 P.O.s
marching along the region of the North German coast. Some few still remain
on the road between Lauenburg 17° 45' East, 54° 40' North and Stolp 17° 27' East,
54° 25' North. The great body is in the region between Schwanau 14° 15' East,
53° 55' North, Dresden to Jeklin, Dossin and Neukirchensberg. They will continue
west along roads in a region bordered roughly by the sea on the North and on
the South by Danzig 15° 10' East, 53° 45' North, Schwering 15° 25' East, 53°
40' North and will be settled in the region of Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen.

The present rations of these men are 3 - 4 potatoes per day, 1
quart of hot water and 200 grammes of bread when bread is available, which
frequently is not more than once in 3 or 4 days. About 50% of these men are
suffering from dysentery, apparently in a contagious form. They are selling
everything they have, watches, jewelry and even clothing to obtain food, but
the country has been so well worked over by civilian refugees and previous waves
of prisoners that there is practically nothing to be had.

The Interzone delegation in Berlin has succeeded in obtaining
two German army trucks of 22½ tone capacity, and has been using these to move
SP7 from Lübeck to men on the Northern line of march. During the first three
days, 22,000 food parcels were moved in this way. In addition, they were able
to move by train six car loads of SP7 to form a stock at Neukirchensberg, whence
they are being shuffled by truck to various points along the Northern line of
march. Subsidiary stocks have been established out of Neukirchensberg at
Jeklin, Dossin and Stolp.

(2) At present, 800 officers from this camp are at present at Alt
Lauen 12° 45' East, 53° 50' North, where they will rest for three days. Mr.
Schinner states that these officers, who were out of training at the
beginning of the march, are now probably in the worst condition of any of the
men involved in this movement. When food parcels were brought to them, many
of them were so weak that they were unable to carry off a 5 eleven pound parcel.

About 60,000 P.O.s are moving westward in a belt bounded
roughly on the north by Berlin and on the South by Dresden and Leipzig. The
Southern edge of this movement has already begun to reach the boundaries of

Wehrkreis II ..

14
J.S.

Wehrkreis II, and there is being moved by train to final destinations. These
men are in a relatively good condition.

For the use of men on the central line of march, the delegation
has succeeded in getting up a stock of eleven car loads of SP7 at Stolp III -
Ludowigsdorf, whence it is being moved, as possibilities allow, to the necessary
points.

(3) At present, 200 severely wounded American officers, presumably
wounded in Stalingrad III, were abandoned in this town and have now been
covered by the Russians.

Major Flörkeberg a/cdr. 390 severely wounded Allied
prisoners were transported from this camp in coal barges. They had no bedding,
no light, no heating but were provided with two blankets per man. They were
accompanied by one American doctor and 15 Allied Sanitary Personnel. During
the trip, they had practically no food and no medicine. After an eight day
trip in temperatures of 20° - 25° below zero, they arrived at Warden 12° 30'
East, 52° 25' North where they have now been hospitalised. The losses during
the trip amounted to 7 men dead, none Americans. At Warden, 200 SP7 have been
placed at their disposal by the delegation in Berlin.

Approximately 80,000 prisoners including 25,000 Americans are
now marching through the Sudetenland along a route marked roughly by the towns
of Kladsko, Litochin, Angermünde, Neukirch-Lütz, Ansbach, Treglow, Witten,
whence about half will continue by Kladsko and the other half by Kladsko
through Riga to a region bounded roughly by Riga, Ostrov and Riga. The
situation of these men is extremely grave. They have been repeatedly starved
and straggled along the route and although little is known as to their present
food supply, it is presumed to be extremely small. These men have been
marching through the Czechoslovak mountains under extremely severe weather
conditions, and are on the whole in very poor condition.

Along a great proportion of the Eastern war zone, whenever the
evacuation of a camp is announced, the Volksturm appears within a few hours
fully armed and with means of transportation to empty out the Red Cross
warehouses. This has been repeatedly done in various camps and the Volksturm
seems powerless to prevent it. The supplies are distributed to the local
civilian....

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J.S.

civilian population. On a number of occasions, Wehrmacht guards have been driven from warehouses at the point of a bayonet by the Volksturm.

The discipline of the American prisoners during this movement has been of the highest order and has received general praise from the Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht. Mr. Schirmer states that a good deal of responsibility for maintaining this order has fallen upon a general and a colonel whose names he could not recall but who are presumably General Vanaman and Colonel Spivey from Stalag Luft III. These officers and their staff are at the present time practically free, living at Junkenwalde in the German officers' quarters and eating at the German officers' mess. This has aroused some critical comment on the part of other Americans.

The following information results from a conference with Mr. Wyse Dumant, delegate of the International Committee in Berlin, at present in Geneva:-

During the period from February 6th to February 25th, Mr. Wyse Dumant was visiting camps in Wehrkreis VI, immediately behind the present line of battle. On the night of February 22nd, at 12.30, he was caught in a raid on Stalag VI-D. He states that this Stalag had been flown over a number of times in the days preceding the attack by reconnaissance planes, and presumably photographed. For the attack, a parachute flare was dropped, which clearly lighted the whole camp, after which the camp was severely bombed and totally destroyed with a loss of one French prisoner and 70 Russian prisoners dead, plus 200 wounded. During this attack, no bombs fell outside the camp area. Mr. Wyse Dumant lost all his papers and his clothing during the raid and was, therefore, unwilling to give specific data of other attacks on camps in Wehrkreis VI. Certain of this information is, however, in the hands of Mr. de Courtrix in Berlin and has been urgently asked for. Mr. Wyse Dumant states that during the past weeks, a considerable number of established and regularly recognized camps in this region have been repeatedly bombed and strafed, both by day and by night, by the Allied aviators.

He further states that the new headquarters of the International Committee at Uffing were also recently bombed without serious damage and without any direct hit being registered. Uffing is at the Northern end of a small....

11
J.S.

a small "L" shaped lake known as the "Stafelsee" North West of Murnau, approximately 30 kilometers South West of Munich. The headquarters is an old castellated brick building, square and with a single central tower. It stands by itself and is clearly visible on the top of a hill.

February 26th, 1945.

Arthur Robinson
Special Representative
American Red Cross.

Odessa PR Reports.

Routine

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Amb
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SECRET

0112152

To BISSELL from CROCKETT signed DEANE.

Contact team in Odessa reports arrivals of liberated U. S. PW there to date amount to 146 officers and 106 enlisted men. In addition, 157 British soldiers and 6 British officers have arrived. Names of Americans will follow when received. PW intelligence indicates that there are 28 sick at Hallestein and that liberated PW amount to about 700 from Offlag 64, Neuburg 1900 from Stalag 3C, Eastpr.; and 2000 from Stalag 2a, Hammerstein. Russian transit camp at Odessa is clean and treatment excellent. Food supplied is meagre but being supplemented by us. (S)

(see p. 108)

4.952

Poland: ^{+ 300 Wounded at Sagan.}
5,252 ^{+ many more from} IN SOVIET CONTROL

Stalags ~~XX~~ A+B, Stalag VIII c,
Stalag VIII B, Stalag 344.
Stalag Luft III, Stalag Luft IV.

THIS MESSAGE ORIGINATES G & S ACT. NO.

(END)

~~SECRET~~

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Timeahka

3577

03/22/32

03/21327

TOP SECRET - URGENT

TOP SECRET

TO DEANE FROM MARSHALL: TOPSIRC.

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin at once and also deliver a copy of it to Admiral Archer for transmission by him to Mr. Churchill.

Begin message: I have reliable information regarding the difficulties which are being encountered in collecting, supplying, and evacuating American ex-prisoners of war and American aircraft crews who are stranded east of the Russian lines. It is urgently requested that instructions be issued authorizing 10 American aircrafts with American crews to operate between Poltava and places in Poland where American ex-prisoner of war and stranded airmen may be located. This authority is requested for the purpose of providing supplementary clothing, medical and food supplies for all American soldiers, to evacuate stranded aircraft crews and liberated prisoners of war, and especially to transfer the injured and sick to the American hospital at Poltava. I regard this request to be of the greatest importance not only for humanitarian reasons but also by reason of the intense interest of the American public in the welfare of our ex-prisoners of war and stranded aircraft crews. Secondly on the general matter of prisoners of war in Germany I feel that we ought to do something quickly. The number of these prisoners of war, Russian, British and U. S., is very large. In view of your disapproval of the plan we submitted what do you suggest in place of it.

Q. 11632. See

MND 75c115

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ACMAR, Washington

Personal Message for the President

Barriman

White

URGENT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Personal and Top Secret for the PRESIDENT from BARRIMAN. TOPSEC

In light of Marshal Stalin's reply to your message regarding our liberated prisoners of war I feel you will be interested to have from me a brief review of the situation.

Our information received from our liberated prisoners indicates that there have been four or five thousand officers and enlisted men freed. The Russians today claim that there are only 2,100 of whom 1,350 have arrived at Odessa and the balance being en route by train.

Russian information is based on reports from concentration points within Poland where our prisoners have been collected. Meantime there appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering about Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don't like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor. In addition we have reports that there are a number of sick and wounded who are too ill to move. These Stalin does not mention in his cable. Only a small percentage of these reported sick or wounded have arrived at Odessa.

For the past ten days the Soviets have made the same statement to me that Stalin has made to you, namely, that all prisoners are in

TOP SECRET

Page #1

Actually more than
5,000,
of whom 2,858
were eventually
re-located through
Odessa by late-
April - early May '45

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

21
J.B.

TOP SECRET

Odessa or entrained thereto, whereas I have now positive proof that this was not repeat not true on February 26, the date on which the statement was first made. This supports my belief that Stalin's statement to you is inaccurate.

I am glad to say that the reports from our contact officers in Odessa indicate that the Russians have done a first rate job in providing quickly a reasonably adequate camp in Odessa and our prisoners are reasonably well provided with food, etc. Our officers there also are allowed to communicate with us daily. I have no present reason to complain about the situation in Odessa or about the speed with which our prisoners have been moved from Poland by train, considering the shortage of transportation.

I am outraged, however, that the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our prisoners are first collected, to evacuate our prisoners, particularly the sick, in our own airplanes, or to send our supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1,000 miles from point of liberation, where they are urgently needed.

Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled or have

TOP SECRET

Page #2

22
J.B.

been subsequently withdrawn. We succeeded after considerable delay in getting one contact team of an officer and a doctor to Lublin but they have not been permitted to move to other points and our infrequent communications with them have been largely through the friendly intervention of the Polish Embassy here.

Ten days ago the Soviet Foreign Office finally authorized General Deane to go to Poland to review the situation but no action has been taken so far. I pressed it again last night and hope to hear today. I have proposed that he go with a Russian officer and report jointly to the Soviet authorities and myself as to whether their information or ours is correct.

I am not so worried about our prisoners who are well. These, I believe, will gradually be assembled and shipped to Odessa. I am extremely concerned, however, over the sick and wounded. I hope to get an answer today about Deane's trip. If it is not satisfactory I will recommend that you cable Stalin again.

*Soviet
Approve
later
recovered*

TOP SECRET

23
J.B.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
LUBLIN, POLAND

MAR 12 1945

DEAR SIR:

A NUMBER OFS AMERICAN
OFFICERS (PWs) ARE IN
BROMBERG. WOULD LIKE
TRANSPORTATION AND
REPATRIATION. A WAIT
INSTRUCTIONS AT HOTEL
LENINGRAD. REQUEST
IMMEDIATE ANSWER.

R.W. Anderson
Capt 01256584

*Note: Seen and copy
made by U. S. M. L. Mission
Moscow Mar 13/45*

Major Richardson:
after you have finished with
attached, please return it.
do you know whether the officer
and mentioned in the letter from
Capt. Anderson have already been
taken care of
Maj. Richardson told me copy
of attached letter has been
sent by Maj. Mission
11-1-45

RECORDED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

24
J.B.

From General Deane:

10 March 1945

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Wilmoth,
American Prisoner of War Contact Team,
Lublin, Poland.

Dear Colonel Wilmoth:

There is no use of my going over the difficulties I have had in Moscow in attempting to help your situation. Needless to say, our efforts would fill a book, but the results are nil despite the fact that we not only have gone to the Ambassador level but to the Presidential level.

I was informed that your pass for Lublin is good until March 15th. However, I want you to remain there beyond that date and not leave unless they threaten to forcibly make you. I have been trying for two weeks to get authority for a trip to Poland to get first-hand information on the situation and I think I will eventually make it, but so far have only had day to day postponements. When I see you we can go over the situation more thoroughly.

The ten prisoner of war contact teams arrived at Poltava today and at least four officers and four non-commissioned officers will go to Odessa to relieve Hall. Thus far we have had no authority to establish contact teams in Poland and I am constantly told that your work is finished, which I know is not true. We shall keep working on the situation, however, as you know.

I am hopeful that the same plane that brings you this letter will bring you at least some supplies, and if I come I will have my plane filled with supplies.

We have had a few messages from you but they have been badly garbled and it was difficult for us to know your exact situation. I do know what a difficult time you have had and how frustrated you must have felt on many occasions. I know that you have felt, as I have, that there is much that could have been done, but that we have been frustrated on every attempt to accomplish it.

We did get one cable from you which you apparently filed commercially on the 8th. It arrived this morning, indicating that

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J.B.

you need certain supplies and stating that there are now ten Americans and twenty-eight British at the hospital. This seems to be an effective method of communication and I suggest that you try it frequently. I will also endeavor to use commercial communication to you. Until I can get planes and supplies to you, just sit tight and do the best you can.

I am deeply grateful for the work you, Kingsbury and Kiehl have done so far, and I am fully aware of the difficulties under which you are working.

Hoping to see you soon, I am

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DEANE,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Commanding General,
U.S. Military Mission.

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

217

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

26
J.B.

PH-1449

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via ARMY

Dated March 14, 1945

Rec'd 7:58 p.m.

DC/A

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

738, March 14, 3 p.m.

Telegram to Moscow
SICEB 3/16/45 B. (SWP)

I assume the Department has been informed by

the War Department of the great difficulties General
Deane and I have been having with the Soviet Govern-
ment in regard to the care and repatriation of our
liberated prisoners of war. In the beginning it
appeared that the Soviet authorities were going to
interpret our agreement substantially as we did,
namely that we be allowed to send our contact officers
to several points within Poland to which our prisoners
first find their way, to fly in emergency supplies
and to evacuate our wounded on the returning trips
of the planes, although in Soviet planes rather than
United States planes. We obtained authority for
one contact team of an officer and doctor to go to
Lublin with one plane load of supplies and they have
done extremely useful work there. No other teams or

supplies

708

By W.H.P. 5-1388

740.C.1114 EN/3-144E 740.001144E 3-1445
Confidential File

27
J.B.

-2- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via ARMY.

supplies have since been permitted and authority for
the Lublin team to remain has recently been withdrawn.

The Soviets have now contended that Odessa is the
only present "camps and points of concentration"

referred to in the agreement to which our contact
officers are to be permitted. The Soviets are, how-
ever, planning also to establish camps at Lwow,
Bronnitsa and Volkowisk which are just east of the
present Polish border and will be accessible to our
officers, but even these camps are a long way from
the original points of liberation.

Our prisoners have suffered serious hardships
from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et
cetera, in finding their way to concentration points
in Poland and on the long rail trip to Odessa because
we have been stopped from sending in our contact
teams and emergency supplies, a considerable number
of sick and wounded are still hospitalized in Olch.

I have been urging for the last two weeks that
General Deane be permitted to survey the situation
with a Red Army officer. This was first approved in
writing with the qualification that arrangements
must be made with the Polish authorities. An
officer of our military mission informally approached
the Polish

8875

S/H/48

28
J.R.

-3- #738, March 14, 3 p.m.; from Moscow via Army

the Polish Embassy here and was advised that no Polish authorization was necessary as it was entirely within the competence of the Red Army. We have been unable, however, to get authorization for Deane's trip.

It seems clear that the Soviets have changed their point of view during the last several weeks and are now rigidly determined that none of our officers shall be permitted in Poland.

I saw Molotov again today about the situation. He maintained that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its obligation under the agreement and both the Red Army authorities and the Polish Provisional Government objected to the presence of our officers in Poland. When I pressed him on what valid objection the Red Army could possibly have, he pointed out that we had no agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. In spite of my contention that this was a Soviet responsibility he kept reverting to the above fact. I then directly asked him if he was implying that we should make such an arrangement with the Poles and if so, whether the Red Army would remove its objections. He did not

answer

8875

S/H/48

29
J.R.

-4- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

answer this question directly but left me with the impression that he wished me to draw that deduction.

I am satisfied that the objection comes from Soviet Government and not the Provisional Polish Government as our military mission has been in informal contact with the Polish Embassy here who have been extremely cooperative as have all Polish authorities including the Polish Red Cross to our prisoners in Poland.

I feel that the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government by dealing with it in this connection as the Soviets are doing in other cases.

General Deane and I have not (repeat not) been able to find a way to force the Soviet authorities to live up to our interpretation of our agreement. We have used every argument to no avail. Unless some steps can be taken to bring direct pressure on the Soviets, our liberated prisoners will continue to suffer hardships, particularly the wounded and sick. I recommend that the Department consult with the War Department with a view of determining what

further

88-75 8/11/48
-5- #772, March 14, 1948, from Moscow via Army

further steps might be taken here or elsewhere to induce the Soviets to change their present un-cooperative attitude.

It is the opinion of General Deane and myself that no arguments will induce the Soviets to live up to our interpretation of the agreement except retaliatory measures which affect their interests unless another direct appeal from the President should prove effective. We therefore recommend that the first step be a second request from the President to Marshal Stalin along the line of the suggestion I have already made in my Army cable March 12, perhaps now amplified in light of developments since. In the meantime, however, we recommend further that the Department and War Department come to an agreement on what retaliatory measures we can immediately apply in the event an unfavorable answer is received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

Consideration might be given to such actions as, or combination thereof: (One) That General Eisenhower issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens

far removed

30
J.B.

88-75 8/11/48
-6- #772, March 14, 1948, from Moscow via Army.

far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa; (Two) That Lend-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government additional to our fourth protocol commitments for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort; (Three) That consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of the agreement according to any reasonable interpretation.

Lend
Lease
Cut - 9 1/2

I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Deane requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall.

W. PRUMAN

LMS

certainly up to the last few days and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American prisoners either at Soviet assembly points awaiting entrainment to Odesa or wandering about in small groups not in contact with Soviet authorities looking for American contact. I therefore understand your reluctance to permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you to inform me in this particular matter, so that I may be able to explain to you in detail my desires.

No. 179

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
TO THE PRESIDENT: MR. F. ROOSEVELT

I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland.
With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans who have been evacuated to Odesa, I must state that I have not contacted the Soviet authorities, and I am not in a position to verify the information. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odesa, there were only 17 sick U.S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 21. I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odesa. I am not sure of this.
I say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the instance the matter concerns the interests of the United States, front and of Soviet continuing no relation to the military, and odd offered looking after, want all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things. I am not at all certain of the commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to my extent.
I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet

700

camps—better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in U.S. camps, where some of them are still with German authorities, and some are subjected to unfair treatment and individual persecutions, including beating, as has been communicated to the U.S. Government on more than one occasion.

March 22, 1945

No. 780

Received on March 25, 1945

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN
FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The State Department has just been informed by Ambassador Gromyko concerning the composition of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference.¹ We have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko's character and capabilities and know that he would aptly represent the Soviet Union. I am sure that Mr. Gromyko will be able to help in the friendly and fruitful cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union at Yalta. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius, I know that the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing at San Francisco in the same spirit—the establishment of the eventual realization of the peace and the establishment of a secure and peaceful future.

The Conference, without Mr. Molotov's presence, will be deprived of a very great asset. It has pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to be present. It is a conference that will find it possible to hold the conference at least for the vital opening sessions. All speaking Powers and the majority of the other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In these circumstances I am afraid that Mr. Molotov's presence at the conference will be of considerable interest in the general objectives of this Conference on the part of the Soviet Government.

797

701

Following is text of personal message received by the Prime Minister from Stalin dated March 23rd.

English:

I have received your message.

So far as concerns British prisoners of war, you have no grounds for anxiety. They are living in better conditions than was the case with Soviet prisoners of war in English camps, when the latter in a number of cases suffered persecution and even blows. Moreover, there are no longer any English prisoners in our camps - they are on route for Odesa and voyage home.

Following is text of personal message received by the Secretary of State from Molotov dated March 23rd.

English:-

I have received your message of March 21st on the subject of prisoners of war.

I cannot agree with your assertion that this agreement has been unsatisfactorily carried out so far as the Soviet side is concerned. Moreover I cannot regard as justified the exaggerated claims which do not follow from the agreement. I can assure you that British prisoners of war are in good conditions. We will continue to take care of British prisoners of war in future.

711.4 POWS

Wash, Washington

POW Policy

Rgs ✓ GAB Air

RUC

CCC

4323

SECRET

WASH-90731

26 March 1945

260033Z

260113Z

SECRET
ROUTINE

EXCERPT signed MARSHALL to MILANS Moscow, has been repeated to AFEC Caserta, AMPSO Teheran, AMBEC Cairo, Rgs COMZ Paris.

Superseding WASH-54401 to Deane and Giles is revised policy

publicity liberated prisoners: Individual interviews authorized

provided personnel briefed beforehand against disclosure camp

intelligence activities, evasion and escape briefings equipment.

Censor all stories. Delete criticism Russian treatment, references

to Allied personnel fighting Eastern Front PFI publication individual

names permitted provided prior official radio notification to War

Department made.

Action: J. S.

36
J.S.57
J.S. //

By WILLIAM M. BLAIR

When a release was given
BOWEN, April 8—Prisoners
of American soldiers came home
"day after month of privation in
German prison camps. Battle-
scarred and some of them still
bearing marks of long confinement,
the largest contingent of
liberated prisoners to return from
Europe debarked this morning
from an Army troop transport.

Most of the former prisoners
were liberated by the Russians in
eastern Germany. Many escaped in
the narrow corridor the Russian
thrust across Poland into Ger-
many.

The soldiers told of terrible
hardships in Nazi prison camps,
of an almost starvation diet, of in-
adequate shelter in the cold of
winter and inadequate shelter.
They described the long trek
across Poland into Russian terri-
tory. An officer said:

"The Polish were especially in
the harrier and it was very hard
there and they opened their doors
gave us food from their meager
stores and helped us on our way."

The Russians, the soldier said,
were friendly only with their mili-
tary and didn't have a whole lot
of time for us."

Saved By Red Cross Food
Despite their ordeals, the fifteen
hundred men appeared in good
physical condition, which they at-
tributed mainly to Army care and
a "wonderful food" of recent
months while they waited in the
Mediterranean area to be brought
home.

The majority spent only five or
six months in prison camps. A
few suffered through almost a
year. Many of them said in effect:
"If it hadn't been for the Red
Cross packages, many of us
wouldn't be here."

The prisoners said they engaged in
a flourishing "black market"
trade with German guards to
obtain bread and other food. Four
for the most part was soup and a
bit of bread for five men every
two days. Meat was served once
a week, usually consisting of two
thin slices of Bologna. Red sugar
and jelly also was served once a
week. Oranges, they said,
were "distributed widely."

They tried to tell of how they
felt to be home. Loaded into
troop trucks, they were whisked to
Camp Meyer, Bannockburn, where
the first time of major importance
was a steak dinner and all the food
they could drink.

They will be issued new clothing
by the end of the week. The Army hopes
to have them back to their homes
within a week. They will start
working for their own benefit.

A unit of American volunteers
they now being used by the Rus-
sians. Sherman tanks, rifles and
even hand grenades.

Liberated from a camp near
Kuestrin, Germany, several men re-
called one of the first things they
saw when the Russians drove
toward them was a Sherman tank,
manned by a Russian woman.

Christian Book Airborne Men

The "Warrior and the Sea" for
the special Navy edition. The
general report for the "Warrior
Army" "Front-line fighting."
Many of the men reported:

"We were treated as rough and
had a lot of things to get to be
told. They also told of German
civilians helping our Air Force
men who had parachuted into
enemy territory.

Red Cross workers, USO volun-
teers and an Army band greeted
them as their ship docked. Inter-
tainment went on until almost mid-
night. On the train to Camp Stan-
dard, they closed their eyes to the
passing landscape.

Staff Sgt. Earl Evans, one of Mr.
and Mrs. Louis Evans, of 2506
Ryer Avenue, New York City came
back without a scratch but a
nightmare experience. A strapping
313 pounds when he was a semi-
hustler in the Golden Gate heavy-
weight boxing tournament in 1941,
he dropped about twenty-seven
pounds while a prisoner.

He served Poland into Russian terri-
tory. An officer said:
"The Polish were especially in
the harrier and it was very hard
there and they opened their doors
gave us food from their meager
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Liberated from a camp near
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toward them was a Sherman tank,
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Liberated from a camp near
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THE NEW YORK TIMES CAPTIVE STRAFING IN ERROR ADMITTED

Assistant Provost Marshal
Explains Mistakes to the
Prisoners' Relatives

WASHINGTON, April 8 (UN-
Manned) of migrating POW prisoners
in Germany have occasionally
been strafed in mistake by Amer-
ican planes. A War Department
 spokesman said today.

"It is hard to understand how
this happens, as my photo are
briefed about prisoners-of-war
movements," said Gen. B. M.
Byrne, assistant provost marshal,
headquarters of prisoner affairs.

He said the truth is that things
are changing so fast over there
that it is impossible to brief the
pilots accurately. The pilot's in-
structions are to disrupt transpor-
tation and search every German
vehicle they see on the roads."

General Byrne described three
great mistakes of prisoners of
war, served by their captors to
search westward because of the
Russian advance. Information ob-
tained from the prisoners of war
said that the Germans had a
policy of capturing POWs and
keeping them in the rear areas
to be used as labor.

These figures are to large, Gen-
eral Byrne said, that experts in
the Provost Marshal General's of-
fice find them hard to believe.

General Byrne said that about
100,000 prisoners of war, including
15,000 Americans, were being
moved from the rear areas to
the front lines of Germany. The
movement was being made in a
series of small groups, and that
a large number of these prisoners
were being moved in a line south
of Berlin.

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were being moved in a line south
of Berlin.

April
quote

3

April
3 groups of POWs

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ASB-1304

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone. (SECRET)

Caserta

Dated April 13, 1946

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TOP SECRET

1505, April 13, 6 p.m.

Following is summary of a communication being made
(re our immediately preceding telegram) to AGWAR request-
ing clarification of Soviet intentions as to implementation
of Yalta Agreement on prisoners of war,

(?) of Yalta Agreement directive separate staging
camp for Soviet nationals was established immediately
in Fifth Army area in Florence and base camp in Bari.
No guards were provided at each installation and Russians
were permitted and encouraged to set up their own camp
administration. Russians of all categories are accepted
at Florence camp, outfitted with clothing, PX supplies
and same facilities as for United States personnel. After
minimum processing they are flown to Bari to await shipment
to Russia. When Soviet military missions representatives
were taken to inspect both camps, they expressed pleasure
and said treatment was "too good".

On March 2

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2- #1505, April 13, 6 p.m.; from Caserta

On March 2 this HQ sought through AGC Hungary,
military mission Moscow, and Soviet authorities in Rome,
to attach United States POW contact personnel to our
mission in Hungary and to HQS on Russian front. No
authority has been received to date. Deane has since
reported that he feels certain Russians will not allow
United States personnel to enter Poland for political
reasons. (Details of Bucharest experience are included
see our 1352 of April 6, 11 a.m.).

Twenty-six hundred Americans have been evacuated
via Odessa to date but a shipment of 884 Americans who
arrived there April second are now held up there under
Russians at Bari.

In light of conflicting interpretations of Yalta
Agreement, McNarney has asked for War Department
instructions on policy to be followed until Soviet
intentions are made clear.

KIRK

LMS

NOTE: Garbled portion serviced

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

GENERAL ROBERTS

SECRET

DRAFT

42
J.B.Walden + 1966
by train
Kathleen
20/1/67

To HULL OFD for DEANE from OLSEN signed DEANE

This is a summary of

summarizing present POW picture based on War Department intelligence report
some of is rather old
 concerning PW camps in Germany dated 17 March, this data however includes

information which in some cases is not later than 30 December. Present

position of fronts and location of camps indicates possibility of our having

to handle in future about ⁸⁰⁰⁰ ~~4000~~ Americans from Camps 17D, Gneixendorf, and

SB, Wogucheld. In addition may have to handle approximately 8600 from

Far
more
than this

Camps 3A, 4D, 43, 4F, 4A and 4C located in area where fronts in closest

proximity south of Berlin now and about 8500 from Camps Luft V, Barth, and

7900

2A, New Brandenburg. All other camps expected to be liberated by our forces

and realize possibility that some of above listed camps may be evacuated west

if corridor is won and can be used for this purpose. In view of above

not
 believe we should/cancel shipment of supplies now enroute to

Odessa, 9000 units of which will be for American PW. 5000 units now available

in Odessa for Americans. Since capacity for Americans at Odessa is 1200, above

camps in northern area might be evacuated to collection point at Lvov thence

to Moscow

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

70 10471 1087

43
J.B.

(sgd) JCHL

JCHL

42-23 April 1945

My dear Hodges:

First let me thank you for your courteous reception and your kind invitation for luncheon. We not only enjoyed our all too short visit but left feeling that we had gained important information that would permit us to be of further help at this critical time.

We are strengthening Ad Sec's transportation resources with a large number of truck companies and, incidentally, some L-5's for rail reconnaissance.

Answering your inquiry as to how much force an Army Commander would need to gain the control of displaced Russians, I can only say that in my letter of 8 April 1945, SWSJepi: Liberated Prisoners of the Soviet Union, covers the matter in general and more particularly in Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9. I enclose a copy of your easy reference.

Talking with Judge McCloy today, he agreed that of course an Army Commander could use any force necessary to insure the success of his operations. He expressed the hope, which I share, that most of these people can be kept well forward and thus be enabled to reach their Fatherland over the shortest possible route.

With kindest wishes for your continued victories.

Yours ever,

JOHN C. H. LEE

(sgd) General
 Courtney H. Hodges
 Commanding General
 Communications Zone

Lieut. General Courtney H. Hodges
 Commanding, First U.S. Army
 APO 230, U. S. Army

Not copy - 100%
 Accredited-unofficial release
 Sec/Army by IAU/ 42 date 6 JAN 1945

RESTRICTED

17 0730

CONFIDENTIAL

No.

J.S. 77

TOP SECRET

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia Page 2
 No: M 24009 22 April 1945

feasible to move our POW's westward through a widening corridor instead of bringing them all the way around through Odessa.

The accuracy of the information we have on location of POW camps and numbers of prisoners is open to question. Best data available from the War Department report of 17 March 45 shows over 5,000 at Barth near the Baltic coast north of Berlin and 3,000 more at Neu Brandeburg. South of Berlin 2,900 at Luckenwalde, 2,500 at Muhlberg and 1,000 others at four other camps in this same area. Some of these may already have been overrun.

West of Vienna at Gneixendorf (near Krems) 4,000 were indicated, and 4,000 more at Wagscheid west of Linz. However, Archer says the International Red Cross believes that many of these prisoners have been shifted by the Germans and that the Russians will not liberate nearly so many as we at first anticipated. You may be able to get in Washington more up to date information.

End

ACTION: Gen Hull (Gen Deane)

INFO : C of S

CM-IN- 21185 (23 Apr 45) DTG 221605Z mlg

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Our ability to make representations to the
 messages. Our ability to make representations to the
 where necessary and to ensure that the terms of the
 depends upon the

45
J.S.

8 - Mr. Bohlen:

The attached was written at the
 Secretary's request and as he directed
 a copy has been sent to Mr. Louis Hyde.
 If you have any suggestions to make
 about it please communicate them to
 Mr. Hyde.

Hess

DECLASSIFIED
 140 187200
 UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/00

representatives for a cessation of hostilities should be...
 He stated he had a telegram from the Prime Minister concerning on this and
 handed the paper to Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden stated that we were afraid if we did not
 go in now we might not get in at all. Mr. Eden asked Mr. Eden if he would give
 him his comments on this tomorrow if possible. Mr. Eden agreed.

F. Sweden

Mr. Eden referred to the recent proposal of the Norwegian Government to the
 Swedish Government that the Swedes should now come into the war and help throw the
 Nazis out of Norway. The Secretary stated that this matter had been referred to our
 Joint Chiefs of Staff and that we were now waiting for their views. He said that
 Mr. Hickerson was handling this matter and that he hoped for an answer tomorrow. He
 suggested to Mr. Eden that it might speed the matter up if the British repre-
 sentatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should put in a paper immediately to our
 Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the matter could be considered by the Combined Chief.
 Mr. Eden said he thought we could do this.

G. Prisoners of War

Mr. Eden said that the Secretary had mentioned to him while they were with
 the President today that he wanted to talk to him about a "prisoners of war" matter.
 The Secretary said that what he had in mind was the difficulty we had were having
 with regard to members of the U. S. and U. K. Armed Forces who were prisoners
 behind the Russian front lines. He said that the treatment which our prisoners
 had obtained were quite unsatisfactory and that we had not been able to have con-
 tact teams sent into the area to care for and provide for our men. The Russians
 had promised to do something about this at Yalta but they had done nothing. He
 wanted to raise this matter with Mr. Molotov when he arrived.

April 12, 1945

TRUMAN → EDEN - STETTIN
 US/UK POW's / POLAND

Not in any published war
 or Truman, Eden, etc.

SECRET
 100-000000-1000
 100-000000-1000
 100-000000-1000

47

J.B.

MEMORANDUM

April 19, 1945.

Mr. Secretary

The following is a list of questions which Mr. Molotov
 may raise or which you might wish to raise depending
 upon the course which the discussions take:

1. Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on liberated areas in Rumania.
2. Implementation of the Crimea Agreement on liberated areas in Bulgaria.
3. Need for improvement of the American position on Allied Control Commissions in satellite states.
4. The failure of the Soviet Government to provide facilities for the entry of UNRRA and Red Cross personnel into Poland and the Balkans.
5. Failure of the Soviet Government to satisfy our requirements for full advance information concerning transfers to third countries of supplies furnished to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease or supplies of Soviet origin similar to Lend-Lease materials.
6. The implementation of the Crimea Agreement regarding the exchange of liberated prisoners of war and civilians.
7. The Krasnodar case.
8. The Soviet request for a six billion dollar loan.
9. Forthcoming meeting of the Reparations Commission in Moscow.

48
J.E.

4. The Failure of the Soviet Government to Provide Facilities for the Entry of UNRRA and Red Cross Personnel into Poland and the Balkans.

UNRRA has been attempting for several months to arrange for the entry of UNRRA personnel into Poland in connection with the carrying out of its functions there. Despite the fact that the Provisional authorities in Poland indicated their agreement, it has not been possible to obtain the necessary visas. Similar difficulties have been encountered by the Red Cross in getting its representatives into Poland. Late in February, however, two Red Cross representatives did finally get into Poland and one is still there. It has been impossible so far for them to carry out any effective work since the sixty tons of medical supplies sent from Moscow in February had not arrived in Lublin by April 16.

Mr. Molotov may take the position that this is a matter for the Polish Provisional Government. You may wish to point out that these areas are under Soviet military control and that UNRRA is an international organization in which the Soviet Union is a prominent member. We cannot believe that these difficulties could not be overcome if the Soviet Government desired to do so. You may also wish to stress the humanitarian aspects of this matter and to point out that our sole interest is to help the people in these areas who have suffered so much from the effects of the war.

49
J.E.

6. The Implementation of the Crimea Agreement Regarding the Exchange of Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians.

You are familiar with the fact that despite the intervention of the President the Soviet Government would not allow our contact teams to proceed to Poland to assist our liberated prisoners of war in accordance with the terms of the Crimea Agreement on this matter.

Mr. Molotov may raise the question of our refusal to return to Soviet control Soviet Nationalist prisoners in German uniform who claim the protection of the Geneva Convention as German prisoners of war.

You may wish to explain that we have been concerned that the Germans might retaliate on American prisoners of war in their hands if we did not comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on this matter. We have insisted with the Germans that prisoners of war captured in American uniform be treated as American prisoners of war regardless of their nationality. Moreover, German measures of retaliation might not be confined to this particular question. You might assure Mr. Molotov, however, that we have no intention of holding Soviet citizens after the collapse of Germany regardless of whether they desire to return to the Soviet Union or not.

Promise of Forced
repatriations

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

51
J.B.

DATE: April 29, 1945

SUBJECT: Matters to be discussed with Mr. Molotov
and Mr. Dunn.

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Mr. Hiss
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Dunn

← Alger Hiss

COPIES TO: S/Raynor
S/Hyde
A-D/Mr. Dunn
S/Bohlen

6. The Soviet Request for a Six Billion Dollar Loan.

You may wish to state that the Soviet memorandum on this subject is receiving the careful consideration of this Government, but compliance with the Soviet request would require prior legislation by Congress.

Depending on the general tenor of the conversations you may consider it advisable to point out to Mr. Molotov that in considering this matter the Congress will doubtless be influenced by the prospect for full collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability.

You might further desire to remind Mr. Molotov that Congress reflects public opinion and that public opinion in this country has been greatly concerned over developments in Eastern Europe since the Crimea Conference. You will doubtless wish to assure Molotov, however, that this Government sincerely desires this collaboration, and we are anxious to do all we can to assist the Soviet Union in reconstruction and in the further development of its prosperity.

Mr. Dunn, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Hiss met with the Secretary at the Secretary's apartment this morning.

The Secretary said that he wished to go over the matters which he should take up with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dunn.

Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Dunn and the Secretary then discussed the Polish situation at some length. Mr. Bohlen reported on the latest visit of Ambassador Harrison on this subject. (Mr. Bohlen had met Ambassador Harrison on the latter's arrival at the airport last night.)

The Secretary then brought up the subjects relating to the San Francisco Conference which remained unsettled. After a good deal of discussion it seemed to be generally agreed that provided it was clearly understood that there would be only one presiding officer at a time, we might be prepared to agree to there being a commission of four presidents of the Conference, one of the four to be designated chairman of the Conference, and the four to be presiding officer when present.

Mr. Dunn said that it was particularly important that no way appear to be agreeing to a collection of four which would have to agree unanimously on points of order and other rulings brought up at the Conference. He feared that this concept

NEW YORK
MAY 16 1945
MAY 16 1945
MAY 16 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SPECIAL WAR PROBLEMS

S/W DIVISION

APR 24 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

52
J.B.

APR 20 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

There has come to hand a third person note from your Department dated 11 April 1945, S/W, inclosing a copy of a note to you from the Soviet Ambassador, Washington, dated 26 March 1945. This note alleges that the American authorities failed to disclose to the Soviet Government the existence of three American camps in England holding 1000 former Soviet prisoners of war, and charges that such failure is a violation of our agreement with the Soviet Government concerning prisoners of war.

The same complaint was presented at Moscow about 27 March to the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, by the Moscow military authorities. In response to inquiries made by General Deane at that time, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force informed General Deane and the War Department by message dated 1 April that the existence of these camps has been known to the Russian authorities in the United Kingdom since their inception, and that these camps have been visited repeatedly by Soviet officers. The reason why these Soviet nationals were brought to England was in order that the ships which will repatriate them to Odessa may conform to movement schedules. SHAEF's message further states that the theater gives every facility to the Soviet representatives in the carrying out of their mission, and that Soviet participation in the internal management of their camps is granted to the maximum possible degree. The extent of such participation is in some cases, however, limited by a shortage of qualified Soviet officers.

For your further information it may be mentioned that the Commanding General, United Kingdom Base Section, in a message dated 30 March informed the War Department that General Ratov, in an interview with the American military authorities in London on 20 March, requested permission to interview Soviet citizens held in the United Kingdom by the United States, which request was immediately granted. On 30 March 1945 General Ratov and members of his staff began a tour of inspection of installations in which such personnel are held.

FILED

MAY 26 1945

53
J.B.

The Secretary of State

It will be seen from the foregoing that there has been no failure on the part of this Government to keep the accredited Soviet representatives duly informed, as required by the agreement in question.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War

740.0014 EM/4-2000

740.0014 EM/4-2000

By *Hand* LND 700050
NARA, D.C. *4/20/45*

54
J.B.

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

Telegram No. 3936
of April 20th, 1945

IMMEDIATE

CHANCERY (P.O.W.'s)
DISTRIBUTION

Chancery - Action
Secretary of State
T. File

Spares (3)

Red Box A

Red Box B

Red Box C

H.E.

H.B. Butler

J.H. Magowan

R. Makins

Sir G. Sansom

Sir G. Campbell

A.D. Marris

R. Opie

B. Cockram

G.O. McKenzie

F.W. McCombe

F. Healey

A. McD. Gordon

P.H. Core-Booth

J.W. Russell

J.S.M. (8)

Comm. Coleridge

Roger Stevens

Col. G.D. Loup (2)

G.R. Ranken

Major Berkeley

J. Underwood

*Relates to Makins
later requests to Stalin re
Red Cross
escape into Poland*

From: Acting Secretary of State

To: Lord Halifax - *(Soviet spy Donald Maclean
wrote for him)*

Desp: 6.36 pm April 20th, 1945

Recd: 2.56 pm April 20th, 1945

Addressed to Washington
telegram No. 3936 of April 20th
repeated to Moscow,

Your telegram No. 2639.

Following for Secretary of
State.

We are repeating to you
Moscow telegrams Nos. 1173, 1205 and
Foreign Office telegram to Moscow
No. 1922.

It is clear that Soviet
Government will not allow our contact
teams into Poland. The Russians deny
the existence of any British prisoners
of war in Poland but we have evidence
that there are prisoners of war
concentrated at Cracow and Gostochin
and in hospitals. This is a clear
breach of Yalta agreement and we ought
to maintain our position on this. At
the moment however, the important thing
is to get medical supplies and comforts
to our men in Poland. We have therefore
turned to the Red Cross channel (see
Foreign Office telegram No. 1922 to
Moscow) meanwhile reports from our
contact officers who have been at Lwow-
Volkovysk which are concentration
points designated by the Russians them-
selves and are east of Curzon line
disclosed serious breaching of the agree-
ment which merit strong protests. In
reply Foreign Office telegram No. 1958
has been sent.

55
J.B.

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

Telegram No. 3923

of April 20th, 1945

NND 700050
NARA, D.C. *5/17/45*

From: Acting Secretary of State

To: Lord Halifax

Desp: 8:25 p.m., April 20th, 1945

Recd: 5:48 p.m., April 20th, 1945

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H.E.

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J.W. Russell

J.S.M. (8)

Comm. Coleridge

Roger Stevens

Col. G.D. Loup (2)

G.R. Ranken

Major Berkeley

J. Underwood.

Following received from Moscow
telegram No. 1173 April 1945.

Begins.

Your telegram No. 1663.

Soviet authorities at Lwow
have refused to extend permits of our
officers beyond April 5th and have ordered
them to return to Moscow. Admiral Archer
has instructed our officers to stay where
they are but I understand that they have
been confined to their hotel. The reason
given by the Soviet authorities was that
the camp at Lwow had been cleared. They
promised new passes if more prisoners ar-
rived.

2. Owing to lack of communications
with Volkovysk we do not know whether the
same has happened there but it seems likely.

3. Before the receipt of your
telegram under reference I had written to
M. Molotov pressing strongly for our officers
to be allowed to remain until they have com-
pleted the duties which they were sent from
England to perform and pointing out to him
that the British public would never under-
stand withdrawal of our officers until all
our missing prisoners had been accounted for,
particularly because a great number must
have been liberated by recent operations of
the Red Army or would shortly be by operation
which were about to be undertaken.

4. While I agree that we should
now await reports from our officers at Lwow
and Volkovysk I doubt if these will in fact
provide much additional information. There
is I am sure great opposition to allowing
our people to have access to Poland and also
some inclination to blackmail us into dealing
with Warsaw authorities. But we also have
to make allowances for rooted Soviet objective

Operations Division, HODD

Policy Section, HODD

Major J. C. Street

I Top Secret

20 April 1945

COMMANDING GENERAL, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS ALLIED FORCES
HEADQUARTERS CASERTA ITALY

HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATION ZONE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS US ARMY
PARIS FRANCE

POLICY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF YALTA AGREEMENT CONCERNING LIBERATED BRITISH AND SOVIET NATIONALS IS SUBJECT TO PARTY EXPERIENCES SINCE NOVEMBER ONE NINE ZERO ONE CMA DEARER ME TWO THREE FOUR SIX FOUR OF TWO SEVEN MARCH CMA MEMORANDUM SIX FIVE ONE NINE FOUR TWO OF TWO NINE MARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS TO ADVISE OF ONE TWO APRIL FIVE AS THREE EIGHT THREE TO SIX DIAGONAL TWO NINE TWO AIRE DASH ONE
PAREN PAREN NOTES FROM MARSHALL FOR MEMORANDUM CMA INFORMATION EISENHOWER
PAREN PD POLICY IS THAT NO REPEAT NO RETALIATORY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BY US
FORCES AT THIS TIME FOR SOVIET REFUSAL TO MEET OUR OFFERS WITH REFUSAL TO
AMERICAN CONTACT TEAMS AND AID FOR AMERICAN PERSONNEL LIBERATED BY RUSSIAN
FORCES

J. E. HULL
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, GPD

AMOUNT 190 is CM-IN 11365 of 11 Feb 45
ME 23444 is CM-IN 28092 of 27 Mar 45
FI 11942 is CM-IN 11412 of 29 Mar 45

GPD
LCO
O-1
O-2
JCS
ASST (PND)

W. W. SLADEN, Jr.
Colonel, GSC
HON. E. LINDBERGH, Col, GSC, Chief, Policy Section

Note: Policy remained after VE DAY.

(15)

PARTMENT
OF
STATE

57
J.B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
NND 70000
NARA, Date 5/17/81

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

RS-710

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL) Rec'd 2:48 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1423, April 30, 9 p.m.

I am wiring immediately upon completion full

summary of interview with Col. General Golikov,
representative of Soviet of Peoples Commissars
for Repatriation Affairs, which was featured in
today's PRAVDA (To Paris for Murphy and Robor as
86 and to ANPOLAD Casorta as 75) Golikov makes
startling allegations regarding mistreatment of
Soviet citizens in British and American prisoner
of war camps and contrasts unfavorably treatment
accorded them with generous treatment allegedly
accorded American and British prisoners of war
liberated by Red Army. No allegation that all
liberated British and American prisoners have
been repatriated except for small groups and
complaints of delays in repatriation of liberated
Russian prisoners of war.

Suggest this telegram and summary of inter-
view which will follow be brought to attention of
Ambassador Harriman and General Doane.

EDA

KENNAN

740.00114 EW/4-3045

100-30114-1-3045

724

PREPARING OFF
WILL INDICATE WHEN
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge Department
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge in

Department of State
Washington

From San Francisco
U.N. Conference

URGENT

UNCLAS

SECRET

SAN FRANCISCO

11 MAY 2 1

Secret FOR THE SECRETARY

The following text of a press release in answer to the accusations made by General Golikov, President of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, that the American Government has not lived up to the Yalta agreement relative to the treatment of Allied prisoners of war has been approved by the President and is being submitted to the War Department for its final concurrence. We would appreciate your comments and suggestions.

(Code Room) The text of the press release is attached.)

DCR - OP-C Unit

Anal. *DP*

Rev. *DP*

EE:EDurbrow:LS

5/2/45

SECRET

740.00114 EW/4-3045

CJ/LE

Confidential File

SECRET

129042

SECRET
D. 129042

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
BRANCH OF RESEARCH

Intelligence Section

TO: Major L.B. DeLoach, I.C., C.I.O.
FROM: Captain G.O. Curtis, I.C., C.I.O., Brussels
DATE: 7 May 45

Subject: Release of Belgian prisoners by the Russians.

Source: Major Akbar, Service des Informations, Petit Sablon, Brussels.

1. Major Akbar member of the Belgian mission which has been attempting to get released for Soviet Russia for several months. They have cut down their numbers from 33 to 4 but are still unable to get the necessary permission to enter Soviet-controlled territory. They propose, if satisfaction is not given shortly, to go to Constantinople and from there demand of the Russians whether or not they are to be allowed to complete their mission.
2. Major Akbar saw some 40 Belgian prisoners in Paris and all 40 confirmed the harsh treatment meted out to them by the Russians in the front lines and lines of communication, and only when they reached Moscow did things improve. The men were force-marched, given practically no food, robbed of their possessions, made to wait on roads and the clearing of debris, like convicts. At one point a Russian Colonel who spoke French intervened in their favor, but as soon as he had gone the ill-treatment was resumed. One of the 40 told Major Akbar that he was a Communist before he saw the Russians, but he is one no longer.
3. Major Akbar asked Colonel Malinoff if he could explain the attitude of the Russians, which appears contrary to all Russian interests and ideology, and Col. Malinoff, in a typically Russian report, said that the two Belgian SS brigades on the Eastern Front had fought with such fury and distinction that they had left a very evil souvenir in the minds of the Russians. He also added that possibly, in view of the uniforms they were wearing, they were mistaken by the Russians for members of the Organisation Todt.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 750140
R. 11/11 NARA Date 12/4/89

G.O. CURTIS,
Captain

726

INCOMING MESSAGE

JEPP
TOO 101131B MAY

SHAEP FWD 117/10
TOR 101355B MAY
eol 101415B MAY

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG NINTH US ARMY
TO FOR ACTION : CG SHAEP FWD ATTN G-1 PMX INFO ROOM
FOR INFO : CG TWELFTH ARMY GP ATTN G-1 PMX
REF NO : EX-21203, 10 MAY 1945 CITE: GNMMA

Stalag II A located at NEUBRANDENBURG now under Russian control, contains 1100 Americans in the camp with 2600 Americans attached to Stalag II A located within radius of 50 km. of camp. 650 British attached to camp. 200 Americans hospitalized, 50 being seriously ill.

Present conditions of camp: No camp control, Russian officer in charge usually drunk, drunken Russian soldiers molesting American sick, Americans robbed by some Russian soldiers making it difficult to avoid trouble. Food supply not critical on 7 May, but running low.

ACTION : G-1
INFORMATION : AG RECORDS
805

PS IN 2699 10 May 45 1517B 0W/1f REF NO: EX-21203

36 576

CONFIDENTIAL

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO

5

727

61
J.B.

SECRET MAIL

Anglo-American POW's

M4 / G45

VIM

Carter

5766

S-07705

11 May 1945

111926Z

111815B

SECRET
PRIORITY

3 DAYS
AFTER VE
DAY

From SHAEP MAIL for action to MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW for DEANE,
for information to SHAEP FORWARD, from BARKER signed EISENHOWER

Information received from prisoner of war camps in rear of Russian lines indicates thousands of United States and British prisoners of war held in close confinement under unsatisfactory conditions. We could have evacuated them by air a week or ten days ago if the Russians would agree to cooperate by permitting us to land planes at nearby airfields, as specifically authorized by Article 4 of Yalta Agreement.

Unless this evacuation can be effected promptly, there may well ensue most undesirable consequences.

This is in reference to our number FWD-21010. Please express to Russians the urgency of this matter and ask that they direct their commanders on Western Front to permit the landing of United States and British planes at fields near camps for evacuation of our prisoners of war.

Action: G.S.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TO: JEFF
 FROM: JEFF
 SUBJECT: Repatriation of American POW's
 310938Z
 TOP SECRET

62
J.B.

To AGMAR for GENERAL MARSHALL information AFHQ McHARRY and
 SHAEP MAIN for GENERAL KIRCHNER from IRAM: TOPSEC.

12 MAY
 Odessa closed
 to evacuation of
 American PW's

Deputy Head of Soviet Repatriation Committee, Lt. General
 Golubev, informed me on 12 May that there would be no more
 Americans sent to Odessa except a few individual stragglers, and
 that henceforth all repatriation of American prisoners of war
 would be westward and overland.

In accordance with the above, I have initiated steps to abolish
 our contact team in Odessa and have also been requested by the
 Soviet
 Soviet authorities to do so. Foreign Office also informed our
 Embassy today that they would not approve visas of Red Cross
 personnel to Odessa because there would be no more prisoners of war
 evacuated through that port. In addition, Admiral Archer was
 informed by the Soviet Repatriation Committee on 27 May that instruc-
 tions would be issued to stop sending British officers, soldiers
 and citizens to Odessa. Also, that henceforth those Allied prisoners
 of war liberated in the southern region would be dispatched to Orsk (Asiric)
 to be handed over to the 8th Army.

From the above, it is apparent that it is the intention of the
 Soviet High Command to abandon the port of Odessa as a transit camp

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

63
J.B.

JEFF
 TOO 171740B MAY

SHAEP FWD 278/17
 TOR 172155B MAY
 IV, 172300B MAY

CONFIDENTIAL
 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : CG NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY (Simpson)
 TO FOR ACTION: CG SHAEP FORWARD ATTENTION G-1 PMX
 FOR INFO : CG VII CORPS ATTENTION G-1 PMX, CG TWELFTH
 ARMY GROUP ATTENTION G-1 PMX
 REF NO : XX-21617, 17 MAY 1945
 Delay V-B

Following VII Corps message quoted:

"Reports received that 1,000 United States and
 British ex-PWs formerly in MUELBURG and NOB RIESA 8715-E need
 medical supplies, additional medical attention and food. Many
 have left because of conditions. Reports indicate camp leader
 doing all in his power to enforce stay-put order. Russians
 alleged to have threatened to use force to prevent escape.
 Suggest immediate evacuation of both camp and hospital."

Liaison being carried on with Russians with view
 to allowing United States medical supplies and ambulances to
 enter camp.

Request that your Headquarters establish liaison
 with Russian SHAEP Representative with view to negotiating re-
 turn of these United States and British ex-PWs to Ninth Army
 area.

GNMMA.

36 550

ACTION : G-1
 INFORMATION : SGS G-2 AG RECORDS
 17 MAY 45 2335B AGD/1f REP NO: XX-21617
 PS IN 4738

CONFIDENTIAL

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

REF file NO. 3326/1

17 MAY 45

6 (12)

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

PRIORITY

64
J.B.

TO : CG VII CORPS
FOR INFO : CG TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
FROM : SHAEP FORWARD, SIGNED SCAEP
REF NO : FWD-21786

Eisenhower
CITE: SHGAP
TOO: 181330B

Ref Ninth Army cable EX-21617 of 17 May to for
action SHAEP FWD with info copy to you.

Ensure a copy of above referred cable is de-
livered to General R. W. BARKER or Brigadier R. E. S. VENABLES
now meeting with Russians at LEIPZIG.

Further inform General BARKER or Brigadier
VENABLES that STRAUB's conversations with EX-FW who have found
their way to the rear from NOE BATESA verify facts as reported.

EX-21617 is FS IN 4738, 17/5/45, G-1

ORIGINATOR:

G-1

AUTHENTICATION: E. F. STRAUB
Colonel, GSC

INFORMATION:

G-2

AG RECORDS

FS OUT 4648

18 May 1945

1427B

DWR/rob

Ref No: FWD-21786
TOO: 181330B

39

37

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

...transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased.
(Messages Marked O.T.F. need not be paraphrased).

(To London)

W. 715.

65
J.B.

To : Troopers Info Freedom - 30 Mission -
From : BMM Roumania. BMM Hungary.

SECRET.

RAC 1336/4640 10 May. 1400B.hrs.

Your 93691 P.W.5 of 15th May has not entirely
agreed with BMM Hungary's BMM/329 of 17th May. Hope
authority is given (and?) Russians here informed earliest
of fact of route being closed down. At present they insist
on all P.W's going to ODESSA.

(Freedom pass to 30 Mission).

PMK
Admiral
Colonel
Embassy
U.S. Mission.

May 17, 1990

Mr. John M.G. Brown
Box 30
Petrolia, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

I received your letter and the articles you enclosed, and have read them with great interest in light of my own experience when I was liberated by Russian forces in late April, 1945. For many years after the war I thought about the circumstances of my own exfiltration from Stalag IV B in eastern Germany. I tried, unsuccessfully, to communicate my concerns to American Officers when I reached Frankfurt's repatriation Center and again when I was flown to LeHarve, France. My concerns for other prisoners left behind at IV B were treated with initial scepticism, then annoyance at my persistence, and finally with reassurance that the matter "would be investigated."

When I finally came back to the States, recovery from wounds that I had received at the time of my capture, the malnutrition and amoebic dysentery I developed, and the sheer exhilaration of surviving and being home took precedence and life soon resumed some semblance of normalcy.

Your articles, and the enormity of the possible number of prisoners that suffered a quite different fate have served to bring that traumatic period back in memory, tho' possibly dimmed by the passage of the years.

At any rate, the following are my recollections to the best of my ability.

When we were liberated by a Russian tank battalion, a group of us enthusiastically sought out a Russian officer to try to find out what was happening, and when we could expect to be repatriated back to American control. This officer spoke no english, but did have a smattering of German and since my mother had spoken German/Yiddish and my father had come from Russia and had taught me some of that language, I became sort of an unofficial translator for some of the men in my section. This is exactly what I was told by a Major Vasilli Vershenko.

The Russians were first concerned about the repatriation of the Russian prisoners held in a separate compound at IVB, and the Major indicated that they had to be interviewed individually since they felt that there were many "cowards, traitors and deserters among them and they had to be dealt with expeditiously". Then he told me that the Russians and

66
J.B.

From a survivor
of Stalag IV-B
Muhlberg -
who escaped from
Russians

67
J.B.

the Americans had agreed to a pact wherein the Russians would receive "credits" for each American POW returned. This, he explained was a complex logistical matter, best handled by sending us to Odessa for treatment and repatriation. The callousness of his response and the officious tone in which this information was given, gave me real pause and I tried to explain to others that I was suspicious of their methods and motivations. Most of the men, however, felt that the Russians were our allies and that we were going to be well treated and returned home shortly. That night, my bunkmate, Cpl. William Smith of the 9th Division shared our mutual concerns and decided to take off on our own. The next evening, we "liberated" two Russian bicycles, got thru a gap in the wire where a Russian tank was parked and took off toward the west where we believed the American army would be. Our subsequent journey back thru Russian held territory, our capture by a band of fanatical "Hitler Youth" and subsequent escape, is a two week adventure that is an unbelievable story that must wait for another time to relate. As I said earlier, I tried to tell American Intelligence officers about the Majors comments, but was told that we were probably told that version in order to preserve order in the camp.

I'm happy that you have and are pursuing the matter of missing POW's, and would appreciate hearing more about your efforts.

I'm truly sorry that I can't shed more light on the subject, but as you know, generally a G.I.'s view of war is limited to what he directly sees, feels and experiences.

Sincerely,
[Redacted Signature]

734

INCOMING MESSAGE

68
J.B.

JN55

TOO 130745Z MAY

SHARP FWD 120/13
TOR 131124Z MAY
eol 131225Z MAY~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~PRIORITY~~

FROM : MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW FROM DEANE
TO : SHARP FWD TO EISENHOWER
REF NO : M-24293, 13 MAY 1945

Norwegian General Officer, who has been a prisoner of war at LEUCHENWALD, South of BERLIN, has arrived in MOSCOW.

He states that conditions in LEUCHENWALD under Russian control are extremely bad. Camp Commandant is a major who is usually intoxicated and treatment of British and American prisoners is not good. He states that recently a great many British and American prisoners were flown out in American transports against the Russian's wishes and that the Russians have vented their resentment on the remainder.

The Norwegian does not want his name used for fear of the effect it might have on Russian treatment of other Norwegian prisoners; however, if you have any supporting data that you can furnish, I would appreciate your sending it to me so that I can put pressure on the Russian Repatriation Committee.

In any event, when GOLDBEV meets your representatives in LEIPZIG, we should be prepared to confront him with all factual data possible concerning mistreatment of our prisoners by the Russians.

PS IN 3492 48 1295

CONFIDENTIAL

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO. 7

735

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

REF NO: M-24293

13 May 1945

SHARP FWD 120/13

ACTION: 0-1
INFORMATION: 0-2
0-3
0-4
0-5
MR MURPHY
MR STEELE
SUSPENSE
**
AG RECORDS

38 1296

PS IN 3492

13 May 1945

1355B DWR/rob Ref No: M-2425

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGETO
J.S.

383.6-1

Alexander (SACRED)

ATTN

NO 101 1111

FROM

TO FOR ADJUTANT GENERAL

FOR INFO

REMARK

1. Russian PWs at GMAZ. Colonel ALAN... in Russian and I am appealing to... in ITALY or working with... themselves at... restriction to RUSSIA.

2. No objection to this broadcast... has been handed to... returning from... in POLAND... Russians.

3. Do not agree that we want the... application subject to their agreeing to... in English, Polish and Russian appealing to... to give themselves up to Russians with... treatment and repatriation to USA/UK. This... to be submitted to... by Americans and British... respectively.

38 1297

FS IN 3555

RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 37

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

71
J.S.

To :

Troopers

Info SHARP Forward, PWX Exchange. -
30 Mission.

From :

Freedom.

Signed Alexander cite FREED.

S. F. R. R. T.

PX 76978

16 May. 10588 hrs.

1. Exchange of liberated PWs between 8th Army and Russians agreed. Your 93448 P45 of 14th May refers.

2. Understand exchange began 14th May at GMAZ from 2,000 fit 250 sick Russians immediately available from WOLFFMARK. Movement of others dependent on local commanders abilities to loan transport. Area of operational roads congested.

3. Large numbers surrendered personnel supposedly of Russian origin ex German COSSACK Div were in VOLKMARK area on 18th May.

4. Rumoured that 800 to 1,000 British PW are inside Russian lines near GMAZ. If and when freed will evacuate by air from KLIGER-FURT.

PWX
Admiral
Colonel
Embassy
U.S. Mission.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: *MAN 44-657*
By: *MAN 44-657*

COMING MESSAGE

72
7.8.

JETS
TOO 191045B MAY

SHAEP FWD 142/19
TOR 191506B MAY
RW 191613B MAY

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM : SHAEP MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR

FOR INFO : ETOUSA, MTOUSA, SHAEP FWD

REF NO : 8-88613, 19 May 1945, CITE: SHRAP

Reference WZ-82478.

Estimate number of German personnel now held by United States is subject.

Best information available at moment follows:

A. In prisoner of war status outside GERMANY 880,000. This does not include 142,000 evacuated to US and 39,000 evacuated to MTOUSA November, but does include 34,000 in UK. Inside GERMANY or AUSTRIA 2,000,000.

B. As disarmed German troops, either within or outside GERMANY or AUSTRIA 1,000,000. Above figures are subject to considerable uncertainty.

Reports have been requested of Army Groups and data will be transmitted to you as soon as available.

New Subject: Number of US prisoners of war recovered from German custody now in US or British hands 80,000. This figure includes 27,000 already evacuated to US.

Numbers of US prisoners estimated in Russian custody 25,000.

FS IN 5235

36 539

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORTH...

GERMAN REASSURE ALLIES ON PRISONERS

WASHINGTON, May 19.—The Allies are in the process of receiving the first of the German prisoners of war. The first group, consisting of 1,000 men, was received by the British in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area.

The latest American prisoners received the morning on April 21 from the German Government. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area.

On that date it had been estimated that the Germans had received 1,000 prisoners of war. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area.

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SHAEP ASKS RUSSIANS ABOUT FREED PW'S

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TO 'INVADES' ZONE TO FREE PRISONERS

Enters Koonigstein Fortress in Russian Line—Rescued 100 Americans

WITH THE UNITED STATES NORTH ARMY, May 19.—From Koonigstein Fortress, Germany, the first group of German prisoners of war was received. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area. The German prisoners are being received in the Rhine area.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JEZE

TOO 222022B MAY

SHAEP FWD 76/23
TOR 230630B MAY
1k; 230754B MAY

may 11 12 SHEN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date

SECRET

PRIORITY

89 DEC 1949

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER

TO FOR ACTION : TROOPERS PW2

FOR INFO : SHAEP FWD, SHAEP MAIN

REF NO : FX-80335, 22 MAY 45 CITE: PROAB

1. WOLFSBERG and SPITAL Camps now clear of British Commonwealth, US PW. AFHQ occupied AUSTRIA completely covered by detachment of Repatriation Unit. Evident that no British Commonwealth, US PW remaining except for few stragglers who may be unwilling to declare themselves. Total of 2861 evacuated by air to ITALY as of 21 May. All in good condition. 65 Br Commonwealth sick have been evacuated to ITALY by air. 45 of these due to fly UK ETD 23 May.

2. Agreement reached with Major SKVORTZOFF (DEVOCBOSOFF?) Repatriation Staff TOLBUKHIN's Hq and General GRAZKIN 57 Army GRAZ for handover to them of all Soviet(?) ex PW(s) in British Zone. 2847 transferred 17/18 May.

3. Permission obtained from local Soviet Commander for Repatriation Detachment to enter Russian Zone but difficulty experienced in tracing Br/US PW. Approx 300 have exfiltrated into KLAGENFURT. Unconfirmed reports suggest Br/US PW still being evacuated ODESSA by rail in box cars with German PW. Many instances of theft of clothing and personal effects.

4. Yugoslav occupied AUSTRIA believed clear of PW. Local representatives in the main friendly.

5. Approx 12000 French PW now uncovered presenting accommodation problem. 3900(3970?) being shipped to MARSEILLES end May.

FS IN 6049 239

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INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR

TOO 211849Z MAY

SHAEP 241/21
TOR 212210B MAY
1j; 212336B MAY

SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM : AGWAR (FROM MARSHALL)

TO : SHAEP MAIN FOR EISENHOWER

REF NO : W-95496, 21 MAY, 1945.

Concerned over report your S-88613 that 25,000 US prisoners still in Russian hands.

Request complete details and when transfer to US control expected.

S-88613 is SMC OUT 1986B, 21/5/45, G-1

ACTION : G-1

INFORMATION : S03

G-2

G-3

G-4

G-5

SUSPENSE

AO RECORDS

Interim reply sent to AGWAR 22 May, stating full report will follow.

SMC IN 6839 22 May 45 0055B SL/1p REF NO: W-85496

15 0023

SECRET

FILE NO. 3816/10

COPY NO.

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FF File NQ 383.6/11

PROPERTY (or PERSONAL EFFECTS)

The repatriates may carry personal property, clothing, blankets, provisions - no bulky items. (Personal effects include watches).

DOCUMENTATION

To be carried out according to mutual arrangements between local Commanders on each side.

REPATRIATES - IN ROUTE

To be supplied with rations until time of delivery at ultimate transfer points.

First priority of movement will be given to sick and wounded who are fit to travel. There are certain provisions as to disinfection, all of which are more or less normal.

The Commanders will take immediate steps to put the plan into effect and will complete repatriation at the earliest possible time.

The plan was approved as at 1300 hours 22nd May, and went into effect today, 23rd May.

It is conclusive and final, and is now in operation. As a matter of fact, we began putting it into effect on the afternoon of 21st May, when we moved 2,300 British and Americans across.

There are no points especially disadvantageous to us, and everything the SHALT Staff wanted, they obtained, except we were not able to initiate them and there a standing liaison committee on both sides. This was forbidden by MOSCOW direct.

General **BANKER** is now preparing a full report.

This copy only if it is BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/----- date **29 DEC 1949**

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
TO RESTRICTED
BY 60322
DATE 3 SEP 945

SEP 1945

R-37 238

23rd May 1945.

23 MAY 1945

Gen. Eisenhower

Please note,
N. 130

23 May

(307)

76
J.B.

90,000
U.S. PW
& MIA;
Returned
July '41
E.T.M.

76,000 Known PW
MARCH 4:
25,000 AS returned.
PW
51,000 Known PW return

25,000+
MIAs
Recovered
as PW's

20,000
Known PW
and live
MIA's lost
in Soviet Zc
11,000 Known
Lawrence

23 MAY
1945

KEY.

Genem
SIBER
C:Z.
6-2

23 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons.

TO: The Chief of Staff
Supreme Headquarters, AEF

79
J.B.

1. In accordance with your oral instructions of 13 May 1945, a party of SHAEF officers and enlisted men proceeded by air transport to Halle, Saalkreis, Germany, on 16 May, 1945, for the purpose of conferring with representatives of the Russian High Command on the matter of repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons. This party was accompanied from Versailles by the Russian Major Generals DRAGUN and RATOV and their secretaries.

A Russian party arrived from Moscow via Berlin about 1530 hours, same date. This party was headed by Lieutenant General GOLUBEV. When the Russian Mission was finally assembled it numbered some forty officers and forty to fifty enlisted men. Among the Russian officers were one Lieutenant General and six Major Generals.

The Russian party arrived in requisitioned German vehicles of all makes, an American-type armored car, fully equipped, and a radio truck, which latter was in operation during most of the time. All Russian male personnel were heavily armed with pistols, sub-machine guns and rifles. The first conference was held in a former Luftwaffe officers club at the Luftwaffe school, at about 1800 hours, 16 May, the date of arrival. The respective Missions were headed by General GOLUBEV and the undersigned. After opening statements by those officers, I proposed the immediate initiation of steps looking toward prompt release and return to Allied control of all British and American prisoners of war then in Russian custody, using air and motor transport. This proposal was firmly resisted by General GOLUBEV, who cited all manner of local administrative difficulties which precluded the operation. He stated that serviceable air fields did not exist, which was known by myself to be not the case and I so informed him. The Russian position was very clear that neither now, nor at any time in the future, would they permit Allied airplanes to be used for the movement into or out of their territory of prisoners

- 1 -

37 230

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of war or displaced persons, except "Distinguished persons, sick and wounded". From the discussions on this first point, which lasted some two hours, the SHAEF representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held as hostages by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release. This is...

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79
J.B.

other Allied/Russian matters. The Russian Mission could not agree to this, apparently in response to instructions from Moscow.

5. Final agreement on a plan was reached at 0415 hours, 22 May. Signatures were affixed thereto at 1800 hours, same date. Copy of the Agreed Plan is attached hereto (Appendix "A").

6. Although the Plan indicates that its provisions are to become effective twenty-four hours after signature, it actually began to operate on the afternoon of the 20th, with the transfer of some 2,200 US/British prisoners from the camp at Luckenwalde.

There is every indication that the Russians intend to make a big show of rapid repatriation of our men, although I am of the opinion that we may find a reluctance to return them all, for an appreciable time to come, since those men constitute a valuable bargaining point. It will be necessary for us, therefore, to arrange for constant liaison and visits of inspection to "uncover" our men.

7. On the afternoon of 22 May, two groups of SHAEF officers, by arrangement with General GOLUBEV, went on a tour of camps in the Russian area where US/British prisoners of war are thought to be located. They will investigate conditions and gather data thereon. This is the first instance of either American or British officers being permitted to visit such camps in the forward Russian area.

R. W. BARKER
Major General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-1

37 33

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SHAEP

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

TO: HAGWAR
 FROM: SHAEP MAIN, SIGNED EISENHOWER CIN SHQAP

REF NO: 8-89142 TOO: 231945B

(1) Reference your W-85496, May 21, our S-88987, May 22 and TWA conversation General LOVETT, 22 May.

(2) Plan with Russians for mutual repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons was agreed and signed at noon 22 May. Under this agreement:

a. All USSR PW and citizens liberated by Allied Forces and all Allied PW and citizens liberated by Red Army are to be delivered through Army lines to Army Commands on each side.

b. Recovered Allied prisoners of war will be received at 5 points - WISMAR, WUSTMARK, LUDWIGSLUST, MAGDEBERG and LEIPZIG. 2 additional transfer points will be arranged in GERMANY and in AUSTRIA.

c. Capacity each point from 2,000 to 5,000 daily. Figures do not imply for man exchange.

d. Documentation to be responsibility of receiving and not dispatching authority.

e. First priority in movement to be accorded to those sick and wounded fit for travel.

Although the plan actually went into operation today, we were able to make it effective on the evening of 20 May with respect to 2200 British and American PWs at LUCKENWALDE. The fact has been established that the Russians are now prepared to make prompt delivery and it is expected that considerable numbers will be delivered to us on the 23rd.

SMC OUT 2523

- 1 -

15 0019

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 J-8
 XVM 8018222
 XVM 8002222
 22/5/45

INCOMING MESSAGE

REF NO: S-89142 23 MAY 1945 (CONTINUED)

(3) In order to give the War Department prompt data concerning all U.S. EX-PWs recovered from Russian control under the above plan, we are prepared to make nominal rolls at each of the 5 transfer points and will forward them to the War Department by most expeditious means and prior to accurate and complete check in Casualty Branch this Theater.

(4) Observation shows that due to the loose administrative system in Red Army we cannot expect to get any worthwhile information on men in their custody for some time. We now for first time have officers in their forward areas inspecting PW Camps and hope for some information from them. Also hope now to make regular visits of this nature, until evacuation is complete.

(5) The following remarks apply to all U.S. EX-PWs held in GERMANY:

1st - Many of these men became PWs in NORTH AFRICA and MEDITERRANEAN; hence there is no previous record of them in Casualty Division this Theater.

2nd - The only detailed information we have on German holdings of PWs is that furnished from time to time by Casualty Branch, AG War Department.

3rd - In order to expedite receipt of names by War Department, lists of recovered EX-PWs are now being prepared at Reception Camps and sent direct to War Department prior to final check and processing in Theater Casualty Division.

For these 3 reasons we believe that Casualty Branch War Department is the best source of information as to status of individual PWs prior to their recovery.

W-85496 in SMC IN 6839, 22/5/45, G-18

ORIGINATOR: G-1 AUTHENTICATION: H.P. KESSINGER, COLONEL
 INFORMATION: G-2 G-3 G-4
 G-5 COM 2 AG RECORDS SUMMARY

23 MAY 1945 2123B

SL/re REF NO: S-89142 TOO: 231945B

F2
J.B.

SHAEP
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : CG, 12TH ARMY GROUP
FOR INFO : CG SEVENTH CORPS
FROM : SHAEP MAIN, SIGNED SCAEP
REF NO : S-89125

CITE SHGAP
TOO: 231930B

5836-1

It is desired to obtain nominal rolls of recovered U.S. Prisoners of War at the earliest possible time. To this end it is desired that you utilize excess PWK personnel and any other personnel necessary to document these Ex-Prisoners of War at the points the Russians deliver them to our control. Rolls will be prepared giving the following information:
A. Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial; B. Serial Number;
C. Rank; D. Former Organization; E. Date returned to U.S. Control;
F. Whether or not Hospitalized.

These rolls will be delivered by the most expeditious means possible to General LOVETT, Theater Adjutant General, PARIS, using, if necessary, officer couriers and air transportation. The greatest care will be exercised in preparing these rolls, using either typewriter or printing plainly as it is intended to telephoto the original rolls to War Department. It is of the greatest importance that every U.S. Prisoner of War transferred from Russian custody be so documented, as well as any other recovered U.S. personnel.

New subject: It is also desired that every recovered U.S. Prisoner of War be given an opportunity to send a 15 word cable to his next of kin. These cables may be written on any type paper available giving full address of the next of kin, text and full signature of sender. Cables written by recovered Prisoners of War may be delivered to the Theater Adjutant General at the same time nominal rolls are brought back. Cables will be sent free of charge.

39 101
SHC OUT 2507

- 1 -

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J.B.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO : S-89125 23 MAY 1945 (CONTINUED)

New subject: In addition, it is desired that a Senior U.S. Officer or Non-commissioned officer from each Prisoner of War Camp in the Russian Zone be interviewed, obtaining the following information: A. Date Camp was taken over by the Russians from the Germans; B. Location of Camp; C. Attitude of Russians toward U.S. Prisoners of War; D. Was motor transportation permitted to visit Camps; E. If so, were Prisoners of War permitted to return to our lines in that transport; F. Was U.S. transport appearing at Camp turned back by the Russians and not permitted to make contact with the Camp; G. What liberties were U.S. Prisoners of War given after Russians took control of Camp; H. Any other pertinent information bearing on this situation.

It would be desirable if the individual interviewed could be the Camp Leader or Senior U.S. Officer in the various Camps. These reports of interviews will be forwarded by most expeditious means to G-1 SHAEP Forward.

It is requested that every effort be made to accomplish and expedite both the nominal rolls and the interviews with Camp Leaders.

ORIGINATOR : G-1 AUTHENTICATION: ROBERT L. MAY, MAJOR
INFORMATION : SCS
COM Z
AG RECORDS

39 102

SHC OUT 2507 23 MAY '45 1948B SL/ra REF NO: S-89125
TOO: 231930B

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

750

SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : TWELFTH ARMY GROUP: SEVENTH CORPS.
FROM : SHAEF MAIN SIGNED SOAEF CITE: SROAP
REF NO : S-89273 T00: 251315B

Reference our S-89125, 23 May, calling for nominal rolls of recovered U.S. Prisoners of War.

None have been received by this Theater Adjutant General up to now. It is understood from an officer just returned from the LEIPZIG area that several thousand have been turned over by the Russians in last few days. It is imperative that we receive these nominal rolls without delay.

Please send TWX report to Theater Adjutant General giving the number of ex-prisoners of War returned to our custody since the agreement reached with Russians at HALLE. Also the time we may expect the nominal rolls. This information is needed to make an urgent report to War Department.

S-89125 is SMC OUT 2507, 23/5/45, G-1.

ORIGINATOR : G-1 AUTHENTICATION: ROBERT L. MAY,
MAJOR.

INFORMATION : SCS
COW 2
NO RECORDS

89 1003

SMC-OUT 2667

25 May 1945 1313B EBR/al REF NO: S-89273
T00: 251315B

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751

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

DAOR
T00 271500B May

SHAEF FWD 258/27
TOR 271920B May
VNS 272035B

RESTRICTED
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : RIFOR REAR
TO : SHAEF FWD G-1 PWX
REF NO. : AG-3700 27 May 1945

Russians at LUENIGSLUST have not yet received instructions that documentation responsibility is for receiving and not despatching authority.

In case this holds up PWX exchanges, urgently request the instruction be got to Russians at LUENIGSLUST earliest.

ACTION: G-1
INFORMATION: AG RECORDS

IN 7003 27 May 1945 2040B HFK/rob Ref No: AG.3700

39 127

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

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5

23 MAY, 1945 meeting between PATTON's 3rd Army Chief of Staff, General GAY, and Soviet General Derevenko, confirming that Soviets were holding American & BRITISH POWs in Austria at Melk.

General GAY: I say yes. Is that satisfactory with you?

General Reinhart: If I should have to use truck transportation, that would be a stiff haul. The trip to Erlauf is 107 miles round trip. Erlauf is some 10 or 12 miles this side of Melk.

General GAY: I think it is all right.

General Reinhart: Does the General have any further objection to having it at Amstetten?

General Derevenko: I am ready to start the work. To change this location, it would require time to organize another place. I am of the opinion that it would be much better if it is in the vicinity of Melk.

General GAY: We would have to be able to use the railroad in this connection.

General Derevenko: I am waiting to get a definite statement concerning the railroad, and until that time, we will have heavy traffic. Of course, it would be much easier not to begin this work with traffic on the roads. Too, because your organizations have done quite a good job in the vicinity of Amstetten and other places, too many bridges are out. It is not so easy to restore them. Restoration work is being done all the time.

Colonel Vissering: When we get the railway in running order, if we put up two coaching stops, perhaps you could arrange to find two sets in your area, so one day your trains could run our way, and the next day our trains could run your way.

General Derevenko: I will consider this question and give you an answer as soon as possible through General Reinhart.

General GAY: We assume also that we will have authority to use boats to take prisoners down or bring them back.

General Reinhart: Is Melk on the river?

General GAY: Yes.

General Reinhart: On the question of trucks, I believe there should be some agreement that the Russians and Americans will run an equal number of convoys of approximately the same size, and that all convoys should be used both ways.

Colonel Leitch: Yes, if we send a train load of Russians over to Melk, that same train should be loaded up with Western Europeans and returned to us. It should be the same both ways in order that truck and train transportation can be used to its fullest capacity.

General GAY: I think that will normally be true.

General Derevenko: I think the same way on this question as you do. General Reinhart is concerned about the amount of both sides.

their transportation is only to collect through Melk, and that we will do all the hauling of prisoners.

General GAY: When people are there ready to go, they will use their transportation.

General Derevenko: I can state that this can be worked out in the most perfect manner.

General Reinhart: Then we will do all the hauling.

General GAY: Other than that which he desires to do.

General Reinhart: I think this railway runs down to Steyr. It runs in Russian territory from Enns down to Steyr. This is going to be a double-barrel proposition for me. I will be getting lots of these people back to forward further west and I am going to need some help on the transportation.

General GAY: We will haul prisoners of war first, and displaced persons second. Are you in shape to get the prisoners started tomorrow?

General Reinhart: I could send prisoners of war right now, but the question is: Has he a control party to clear them? We don't want to be getting a bunch of German agents. On that question of the control party also comes up the point of documents. They will need somebody familiar with the documents.

General GAY: You can bring British and Americans over without screening them.

General Reinhart: No, sir. I think we should identify them before we bring them.

Colonel Leitch: The divisions are busy now getting PWs screened.

General GAY: Do you have British and American prisoners of war on hand at Melk now?

General Derevenko: The British and American prisoners of war are not in the vicinity of Melk. They are farther down the Danube, in the vicinity of Vienna, but they will be brought up immediately, and will be screened.

General GAY: How do you feel about our putting people down at Melk to screen these people?

General Derevenko: We must work it so you could have your representatives at this point.

General GAY: We feel that we can get our people down to Melk so they can start work tomorrow night.

General Reinhart: We must also have a medical check because of disease etc.

General Derevenko: At 1600 today, Moscow time, they are waiting for information on one point at Enns and the other in the vicinity of Steyr.

General GAY: We won't be able to start running there until tomorrow evening.

10 0012

NVA 38 1242

Dropers Info: 30 Mission - AGO British Delegation Hungary
AGC Roumania.

From: A.F.H.Q. Signed ALEXANDER CITY FIELD.

~~SECRET~~

FX 82606 26 May. 1859 H.Hrs.

DECLASSIFIED
NND750115
Authority
SI
SUN, 1984

1. Agreement with Russians at GRAZ only applies to handing over of Soviet citizens in British zone Austria. NO repeat NO reciprocal guarantee in respect of British P.Ws obtained apart from half hearted promise which so far has NOT been honoured. Evacuation to GUESSE still continuing from this area.

2. Premature to plan an overland exchange on a local contact basis till Moscow issue directive to GRAZ commander.

3. Considered essential Moscow be asked to announce their agreement to local overland exchange, as there are 15,597 U.S.A. account, 8,462 British account awaiting repatriation in this theatre.

FX
U.S. Mission
Embassy
Canadian Legation
Australian Legation
New Zealand Legation
Admiral
Colonel

*Try to
find out if the British
have taken action on
this - if so - what?
J.S.*

29 May - Call for action
will have to wait
until from Staff before taking action. The commander
has much info and believe SHAFER will and action
required. Try to

Evacuation of POW's

30 May 1949

Ref: CAS 100

JMS

Timockto

6110

~~TOP SECRET~~

30/8200Z

30/2046Z

TOP SECRET
URGENT

To MCNARNEY and TRANK - ACTION -, DISSEMINATE information from
MAINHALL. Reported to all addressees. TOPSEC.

Information received from British indicates that 15,597
United States and 8,462 British POW's now in Marshal Tolbukhin's
hands. Understood further that Soviet Commander proposes to
continue the evacuation of these POW's to Odesa rather than
repatriate them over land as had been proposed by Soviet Government
and accepted by United States and British. Request fullest
information urgently.

Action: J.S.

DECLASSIFIED
NND750115
Authority
SI
SUN, 1984

Harry Hopkins - Stalin, Meetings in Moscow

TOP SECRET

90

J.B.

PARAPHRASE OF NAVY CABLE MAY 30, 1945

FROM HOPKINS, TOPSECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY:

On two occasions Stalin has emphasized the importance of planning at once for the organization of the Peace Conference in so far as it relates to Europe. Apparently he is thinking about a formal conference and he emphasized that the Allies were not properly prepared at Versailles and that we should not make that mistake again. At your forthcoming meeting he will bring this up.

We reminded Stalin some days ago that he had made a speech in which he said that he did not favor the dismemberment of Germany. This appeared to be contrary to the position he took both at Tehran and Yalta. His explanation of this action on his part was that his recommendation had been turned down at Yalta and more specifically that Eden and Strang on behalf of the British had stated that dismemberment was to be accomplished only as a last resort and that Vissart, who was present at the Conference at which this discussion took place in London, interposed no objection, hence Stalin states that it was his understanding that both Great Britain and the United States were opposed to dismemberment. I undertook to tell him that this was not the case; that while you had made no final decision in regard to this, the United States considered this an open question and that you would surely want to thrash it out at your next meeting. I told him that he must not assume that the United States is opposed to dismemberment because he may learn from you that just the opposite was the case. He then said that dismemberment was a matter which the three Allies must settle among themselves and that he would keep an open mind in regard to it.

He went into some detail regarding the definition of the German General Staff and stated that it would be desirable if the members of that Staff could be detained for ten to fifteen years and if a legal way could be found to prosecute and convict the General Staff as a war criminal organization that would be all the better. The Soviets have captured certain members of the General Staff whom they consider to be war criminals and whom they propose should be prosecuted as such under any circumstances. Stalin stated that the Soviets permitted no prisoners of war to go to work on farms or in factories. As to exactly what he was doing with prisoners of war he was somewhat hazy but he indicated that he was bringing many of them back to White Russia and the Ukraine to work in mines and on reconstruction. He said

91
J.B.

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

May 30, 1945

For:

Potsdam

that he did not know just how many prisoners of war they had but he thought they had about 2,800,000 of which 1,700,000 were German and the balance Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians, etc. He stated that the officers were not repeat not being required to work. You can be sure that at your next meeting Stalin will have some pretty specific proposals to make about prisoners of war, and more particularly, I believe, about war criminals. He did not, as we anticipated, express any criticism of our handling of war prisoners. Stalin outlined in some detail his administrative procedure in local German communities, but I shall delay a report on that until I return home. He said he believed we should do everything to encourage them to get to work on their farms in order to provide food for themselves, and indicated that we should cooperate in getting their light consumer goods industries going. He indicated that Germany should be permitted these heavy industries required for the rehabilitation of their transportation systems, electric power, water, sewage, etc.

Although he promised that he was going to appoint Zhukov as his member of the Control Council for Germany, it has not yet been done. We shall at tonight's meeting again urge him to announce at once Zhukov's appointment.

MLN:aj

RPH

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NND 867200
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92
J.S.

(During the Hopkins - Stalin Meetings)

No. 1009

31 MAY 1945

12. General N. V. Slavin,
Assistant Chief of Staff of Red Army,
People's Commissariat for Defense,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear General Blarbas:

I have had a cable from General Marshall in which he states he has received information which indicates that 12,527 United States liberated prisoners of war are now under control of Marshal Tolbukhin. He says further that his information is that Marshal Tolbukhin proposes to continue the evacuation of these prisoners of war through Odesa, rather than repatriate them westward and onward, as was proposed by the Soviet Government and accepted by the United States and British authorities in the agreement at Kalle. He has asked me to obtain information on this subject and reply to him urgently.

I have been informed by General Colburn that no more American prisoners of war would be repatriated through the port of Odesa and that all would be repatriated westward and overland. However, there seems to be some difficulty in accomplishing this. Field Marshal Alexander has also cabled to me stating that the repatriation of prisoners of war in Marshal Tolbinich's area continues to be through Odesa.

We have been requested by the Soviet authorities to abandon
our program of our contact team activities in Moscow and I have
already taken steps to accomplish this. It seems apparent to me
that it is the intention of the Soviet High Command to evacuate
our prisoners of war westward, but perhaps these instructions have
not yet reached Marshal Tukhachev.

I would appreciate your letting me know the attitude of the Soviet Government in this matter with the least possible delay in order that I may reply to General Marshall. I am making a similar request to Lt. General Coluber.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DRANK
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding General
U. S. Army

~~TOP SECRET~~

3-0

759

93
J.B.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE

TO : US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FOR DRAFT
FROM : SHAFT MAIN SIGNED SCALE (Eisenh
REF NO : U-89942 CITE SEGE TOO:311430E

Latest available displaced persons and prisoners of war figures show almost 1,600,000 Western Europeans (French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgais) either repatriated from or at present held in SHARP area. Soviet delegates at LEIPZIG conference stated only 300,000 Western Europeans in their area. Continued working party on European food supplies, composed of representatives from UNRRA, SHARP, USSR, UK and USA, including Soviet delegate KHUSCHENKO, estimated approximately 3,000,000 displaced Western Europeans in enemy-held territory at beginning 1945. This discrepancy of over 1,000,000 Western Europeans is causing the Dutch and French Governments considerable anxiety. Can Soviets help to clarify situation by giving nationality breakdown of all Western European displaced persons and prisoners of war now held by them and gathered in GERMANY, POLAND, USSR, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, ROMANIA, AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE FURNISHED TO duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by IAC/ _____ date _____
20 DEC 1949

ORIGINATOR : G-5 AUTHENTICATION: L. A. TRUMPFY
Lt MAC

INFORMATION : G-1
SOS
27 101 AG RECORDS

SAC (NY) 3342 31 May 45 1555B 8L/mn REF NO: 9-8962

CONFIDENTIAL

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1535

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

JEBR

SHAEP FWD 9/31

TOO 302000B MAY

TOR 310010B MAY

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SECRET
ROUTINE

FROM : SHAEP MISSION FRANCE SIGNED LEWIS

TO FOR ACTION : SHAEP FORWARD G-5 DP BRANCH

FOR INFO : SHAEP MAIN

REF NO : MF-14427, 30 MAY 1945

Accordance your telephone request, cable from Fifteenth Army French Detachment to General CHERRIERE MMFA Hotel CONTINENTAL PARIS of 25 May is paraphrased for your information.

Report of Lt D HAVERNAS according to confirmed reports. Russians still do not release thousands of French ex-PWs and civilians, forcing them to work. Many transferred westwards to unknown destination. Please inform High authority. 700 ex-PW's are evacuated daily from this area to UDINE. Civilians held under difficult food and accommodation conditions. Mission CHERRIERE local staff still badly needed.

Please dispatch instructions concerning VICHY Consul NOEL HENRY and staff who claim to have been approved by French Government. Signal Captain SAVARY (SACARY?).

ACTION : 0-5

INFORMATION : SGS
0-1
SUSPENSE
AO RECORDS

PS IN 7747 31 May 1945 0225B JOB/fch Ref No: MF-14427

36 523

SECRET

SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORTH

SGS-SHAEP FILE NO. 302000B MAY 1945




30 May

SECRET

June 1, 1945.

No. 449.

Subject: Overland Exchange of Ex-Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Liberated by the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army.



The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir,

With reference to my telegram Nos. 8625 and 2936 of May 15 and 24, 1945, respectively, I have the honor to transmit a copy of the plan agreed by representatives of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Supreme Command, Red Army, at Halle, Germany, May 22, 1945, for the most expeditious overland delivery of Allied and Soviet ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons liberated by the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army. The two delegations were headed by Lieutenant General A. D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, and Major General R. W. Barker, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, SHAEP.

As reported in my telegram No. 2236 of May 24, 4 p.m., the plan, in its final form, was only agreed after six days of conversations. Allied desiderata which were unacceptable to the Red Army delegation included permission to fly transport aircraft into Soviet-occupied territory and the establishment of a standing working committee or commission to be set up at some convenient location near the demarcation line, such as Leipzig or Halle, charged with handling day-to-day details of the exchange. Although General Golubev would not agree to the incorporation of a paragraph providing first priority delivery of U.S. and U.K. ex-prisoners of war, he gave his most solemn personal assurance that all U.S. and U.K. ex-prisoners of war would, in fact, be given preferential treatment. A request for second priority for Western European ex-political detainees, in accordance with the desires of the Western European governments that such persons be repatriated before their respective ex-prisoners of war and other displaced persons, was summarily refused. The assertion that (all) political prisoners held in German concentration camps overrun by the Red Army had been released and that there were, accordingly, no more political prisoners in Soviet-occupied territory. With respect to this category of displaced persons, not even verbal assurances were to be had.

The Red Army delegation, for its part, had arrived in Halle with a set document which contained numerous provisions unacceptable to SHAEP. In form, the document

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SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
PMI Branch, G-1 Division (FWD)

96
J.B.

GAP 585,6 x 970 (Allied)

First May, 1945

SUBJECT: Dominion and Services Liaison Officers.
Attachment for duty with PMI.

TO: The Director of Prisoners of War,
The War Office,
Cannon Street House,
Cannon Street, LONDON, W.I.

1. It is considered that the time has now arrived when certain Dominion and Services Liaison Officers may be withdrawn from this Theatre in the immediate future.

2. Prisoners of War not yet evacuated and in RUSSIAN hands will be dealt with through exchange points already agreed upon. From these points they will be evacuated with the minimum delay either through Staging Camps or direct to the U.K. depending upon availability of aircraft and upon weather conditions.

3. In these circumstances it will only be necessary to have minimum Dominion and Services representation at exchange points and Staging Camps.

4. It is suggested that a member of the Staff, "Miaja", though the training of them will be a long process, it is intended that this shall be the case for a further representation in the future, and when the relevant date of this category is available from your Casualty Branch. In any event it is desirable to retain Dominion and Services Officers for this purpose, it is suggested that they may be made available from the personnel remaining on the Continent at exchange points and Staging Camps.

5. (a). It is urgently necessary to curtail the number of personnel in this Theatre and particularly on this Headquarters and it will be appreciated if you will obtain the concurrence of the Dominions and Services that personnel when this Headquarters considers can be dispensed with shall be returned to the U.K.

(b). It is proposed to release personnel attached to this Headquarters in the first instance, followed by release of those surplus to Army Group requirements.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1:

R.B.S. YERABLES,
Brigadier,
DMIX.

5571

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FILE 34/12
ANN/03

98
J.B.

The primary
cover-up story
leaked to
the media

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 1945

25,000 Missing U. S. Soldiers Turn Up Alive

Men, Found in Nazi Prison
Camps, on Way Home;
89,776 Prisoners Found

By Carl Levin

By Wire to the Herald Tribune
Copyright, 1945, New York Tribune Inc.SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
Allied Expeditionary Force, Paris,

June 4. — Twenty-five thousand

American soldiers who had been

listed as missing in 1943 have

turned up as prisoners of war and

now are on their way back to the

United States, it was disclosed

here today by the Recovery

Allied Military Personnel Division

at the Office of the European

Theater of Operations Forces

Marshal.

Lieutenant Colonel W. P.

Schweitzer, of Elizabeth, N. J.,

chief of the R. A. M. P. Division,

said there was little likelihood

any others would be found, except

stragglers who may yet come in

from Russian-occupied Germany.

It also is believed, he said, that

the 89,776 American prisoners of

war recovered from camps in Ger-

many constitute the entire Ameri-

can prisoner group which was in

Nazi hands during the final stages

(Continued on page 6, column 4)

(Continued from page one)

of the war. Of this number, which

includes those previously listed

missing in action, all but about

20,000 are either already in the

United States or on an en route.

The 25,000 have been processed

and are waiting at Lucky Star,

the R. A. M. P. camp near La

Havre, for ships home.

Schweitzer, a New York paper

manufacturer in civilian life, said

most of the recovered prisoners

will suffer no permanent health

defects as a result of their experi-

ences. Surprisingly, he said, those

who had been captives for the

shortest periods were found to be

in the worst condition.

This was particularly true of the

men captured in the Ardennes

battle last December. Stay of

them, Schweitzer said, had no real

and almost no food for weeks as

the Nazis tried to keep them from

falling into Allied hands as the

end neared. A slice of bread a day

and a little soup, if it was avail-

able, was a common ration for

Ardennes captives during their

forced marches to the Nazi rear.

The weakest of these, as well as

a considerable number of other

wounded or ill prisoners who

needed hospitalization and could

not go through the established re-

patriation procedure, are not in-

cluded in the R. A. M. P. figure.

76,000 PWs
Known
by name
March, 1945

90,000 PWs
25,000 MIA
65,000 Not
Known
PWs known
by name
recovered

11,000 U.S.P.
known by name
not recovered

10,000 or more
five MIA's not
recovered

20,000 U.S.
remaining in
Soviet Con:

78,000 MIA
remain MIA
largely U.S.
Army - E.T.C

Same reporter who helped to
discredit and destroy General Patton
in the Fall of 1945, labeling him a
"pro-Nazi."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 1945

10,000 Ex-Captives Coming by Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For

WASHINGTON, May 31.—The German prisoners of war whom the Red Cross expects to reach this shore by week-end, increasing to 10,000 by Sunday night, are the last of the 10,000 who have been taken back to the United States.

During today that the War Department believes that "nearly all" of the American soldiers taken prisoner in Europe are accounted for, Under-Secretary John P. Patterson said.

While noting that it is not yet possible that many of those who were still being carried as missing in action, Patterson said that the Red Cross has been working to get the names of the missing prisoners of war.

Arrangements have been made with Soviet authorities for the return of American prisoners of war from Germany, the Red Cross expects to reach this shore by week-end, increasing to 10,00 by Sunday night, are the last of the 10,00 who have been taken back to the United States.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JUNE 2, 1945

99% of U. S. Captives in Reich Survived, Red Cross Reports

Over 99 per cent of American prisoners of war taken in Europe during the last two years of the war are still alive, the Red Cross reports today.

The American Red Cross had announced in Washington, it expected that 99 per cent of the American prisoners of war taken in Europe are still alive, the Red Cross reports today.

Red Cross authorities also gave further information on statements that Adolf Hitler issued orders in March of 1945 that the German Army should not allow any American prisoners of war to be taken into captivity.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE
U. S. MILITARY MISSION
HONOLULU

M24524

Date: 18 June 1945 Distribution: Amb: Number:
To: ACHAR, Washington: Esi: Approved: JWS
CAG: AIR:

Subject: Evacuation of POW's Cryptographer:
Originator: Deane Typist: McCr. JWS
Precedence: PRIORITY
Security: TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 01/1002

To ACHAR for GENERAL MARSHALL from DEANE: TOPSECRET

M24524

In further reply to MARK-90429 of 30 May, General Golikov, Head of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, assured me last night that they would make every effort to locate individual Americans who might be stranded in Soviet-occupied territory and when located, they would be evacuated by any route that I requested. I informed him that I would like to have them evacuated westward, in accordance with the agreements made at Yalta. I do not believe there are very many such individuals, although I do know of a few and have already furnished the information to the Soviet Repatriation Commission.

Concerning those liberated prisoners of war in Marshal Tolbukhin's area, estimated in excess of 15,000, Golikov assured me that they would be evacuated westward in accordance with the Yalta agreement. He confirmed my previous belief that Odessa was to be abandoned as a transient camp for the repatriation of American prisoners of war.

RECEIVED
NND/50115
AIR, etc.

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

165 AIR 1303-C/100
7.5

MEMORANDUM

TO:

The air life of repatriated Allied personnel began on 3 April when aircraft of the LX Troop Carrier Command returned from Germany with 968 American and British ex-Prisoners of War.

From then on the movement of repatriates by air increased, to reach a peak load of 36,204 on 11 May.

Figures on repatriates flown out of Germany up to midnight 31 May are shown below. Repatriates who were overcounted as casualties are not included.

	AMERICANS	BRITISH	FRENCH	OTHERS	TOTAL
In U.S./W.G.	65,068	102,868	126,148	2,995	298,513
In R.A.F. W.G.	1,119	38,909	8,782	7,088	55,901
In R.A.F. W.G.	2	0	70	10	72
TOTAL	66,189	141,777	135,020	10,103	354,489

* Includes 10,613 Belgians.

Additional figures on the flying of repatriates are given in succeeding pages.

W. D. MATHERSON
Colonel, A.C.
CDS-3/CHC

W. D. MATHERSON
Group Captain, R.A.F.
CDS-3/CHC

6 June, 1945.

101 0103/5461 (P.W.G.)


J.S.

Memorandum for
S.H.A.E.F. (P.W.)
P.W. G-1 Div.

Subject: Dominion and Services Liaison Officers
attached for duty to S.H.A.E.F. PWX.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum GAP 383.6x370 (Allied) of 31st. May 1945 regarding the suggested withdrawal from S.H.A.E.F. of Dominion and Services Liaison Officers.

2. This suggestion is being discussed with Authorities concerned and we will notify you as soon as a decision has been reached.



0309

for Director of Prisoners-of-War.

ISA Army 1 Casualty Army
16 June
2 R.A.F. Army
2 R.A.F. Army
2 NZ MIL

RESTRICTED

Very
Imp.

By *W. H. H. H.*
12 NOV 1945
Date

11 June 1945

102
J.R.

Repatriation of British, US, and Other United Nations
Prisoners of War as of 7 June 1945

(Key:
See P.
76)

1. Figures of British and US recovered Prisoners of War shown in this memorandum represent personnel handled by PWK Organisation. The same is true to a large extent of the numbers of Dutch and Belgians. Russians reported delivered to the Russians have been handled through both DP and PW channels.

It is believed that there are more British and US PWs to be recovered and the War Office/War Department are endeavoring to ascertain the number and if possible the location of such personnel. As regards the number of US PWs the figure is somewhat complicated by the large number of missing in action personnel recovered as PW but never reported as such due to lack of time between their capture and recovery.

From the SHAEF area, practically 90% of BR/US recovered personnel were evacuated by air, the majority of the British being flown to the UK. Of the remaining 10% evacuated by land/sea a large number were medical evacuees. A large proportion of French, Dutch, and Belgians and some Polish recovered PWs have been evacuated by air as well as a number of Russians flown to the vicinity of the Russian lines for handing over to the Russians. Air evacuations is still continuing for allied personnel.

2. Under the provisions of the Crispan Agreement, negotiations were completed 22 May 1945, between the Soviet High Command and SHAEF for delivery of liberated former Prisoners of War and citizens to the respective forces for repatriation. Certain points along the Soviet-SHAEF line in Germany and Austria were agreed as assembly points to which Soviet and Allied subjects would be collected for delivery to Soviet or Allied forces as the case might be.

3. BRITISH: The total number of British and Dominion Prisoners of War repatriated is less than the total expected which is 175,000. Information has

18 0005 Already reduced Security From 199. One non-transmittable known - Put

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Rev. 5/8
MHD TWA/SG
NARA Date 5/1/2001

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMEMBASSY, MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
DATED: June 11, 1945
NUMBER: 2013

SWP to
Byron
Van Buren
Byrd
Byrd
Byrd
JUN 16 1945 *Edison*

(Reference is made to telegram no. 2064, June 7, 7 p.m. to the Department,) (sent to London as no. 265, repeated to Stockholm as no. 29, and repeated to the Department as no. 2013.) Although it has no evidence to support reports of severe treatment to Soviet citizens who have been repatriated to Allied occupied areas, the Embassy feels that it would be unwise to disregard these reports. Military authorities and the Soviet Government have never attempted to hide their scornful attitude toward Russian troops taken prisoners of war. The Russian Government has never signed the Geneva Convention and during the war it refused all attempts of enemy governments to come to an agreement regarding the treatment of POWs. Such an agreement would have improved the welfare of those Soviet POWs held by the Germans.

Many of the Soviet prisoners and civilians removed to Germany accepted service in German labor and military formations and were consequently liberated in German uniforms. The Russian attitude towards these individuals is very severe and they will probably be accused of having committed an act against the State which is one of the most serious crimes in the Soviet.

Although

-2-

Although repatriation has been under way for several months the Embassy knows of only one case in which a repatriated prisoner returned to his family and home and was reinstated in his prewar pursuits. This individual suffering from tuberculosis, was released after having been held for 4 months under guard in Moscow.

It has been learned that repatriates are met by Soviet guards at the port of entry and are marched without ceremony to unknown destinations. Trainloads of repatriates have been going to Moscow enroute east. No contact may be had with the prisoners while the train remains in the Moscow railyards. Little information is available but it is understood that each repatriate is subjected by the police to an intense screening. Unless the repatriate can present extenuating circumstances he will probably be accused of desertion. If the prisoner is found in German uniform he will no doubt be accused of activity against the State. Those who have been accused of anti-State activity or deliberate desertion are probably being shot. However, some repatriates may be allowed to return home such as those who possess good war records, or refused to fight with the Germans, or were captured, when wounded or under similar circumstances. However, the largest portion of repatriates are without doubt placed in forced labor battalions and under police supervision are working on construction projects in Central Asia, Siberia and the far north of the Urals.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12858 Sec. 2.2
NND 760050
NAN
DATE 5/17/75 BY 82

-3-

105
J.R.

The Soviet citizens who have not yet been repatriated have few illusions regarding the treatment awaiting them on their return since they know well the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards surrendering and anti-State activity. Therefore it is not surprising that many of them show little enthusiasm at the prospect of return to the Soviet and are doing everything possible to avoid it.

The reports of execution taking place at Murmansk may be the result of this state of mind. The Embassy is verifying these reports and all developments will be transmitted to the Department.

HARRISON

Harrison

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12858 Sec. 2.2
NND 760050
NAN
DATE 5/17/75 BY 82

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12858 Sec. 2.2
NND 760050
NAN
DATE 5/17/75 BY 82

CONF BY *106* NARA DATA *J.B.*
 HOUSE OF COMMONS
 12 June 1945
 London. Cols. 1463-1454.

BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR

30. Mr. Graham White asked the Secretary of State for War if he can make any further statement with regard to the incidence of tuberculosis among returned prisoners of war, including the numbers in military and civilian hospitals, respectively.

Sir J. Grigg: Three-quarters of the prisoners who have returned have been examined by Mass Miniature Radiography and the rest will be examined when they return from leave. 294 have so far been found to be suffering from tuberculosis. This is about three in every 1,000. 158 have been admitted to civil sanatoria and 136 are in military and E.M.S. hospitals awaiting admission.

31. Mr. Graham White asked the Secretary of State for War if he has any information later than that of 29th May as to the number of British prisoners of war still unaccounted for.

32. Captain Gamman asked the Secretary of State for War if all British Commonwealth prisoners of war liberated by the Russian armies have yet returned to this country, and, if not, how many are still unaccounted for.

Sir J. Grigg: Since the beginning of this year close on 166,000 British Commonwealth prisoners have reached this country or their country of origin overseas. This is nearly 3,500 more than the figure I gave on 5th June in reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wycombe (Sir A. Knox). There are still some prisoners in parts of central and southern Europe, prisoners of the Soviet Union, but figures are not available. Arrangements are being made for their transfer westwards to areas in British and American occupation.

Captain Gamman: Have representations been made to the Soviet Government to supply lists of the names of these prisoners-of-war, in view of the fact that the war has been over for more than a month?

Sir J. Grigg: There certainly have been representations. I do not think it is a very hopeful line of country to ask them to supply lists. The representations have been in the main, if not entirely, pressure to send the prisoners back to our lines.

Sir Joseph Hall: How many are there still unaccounted for in the official records?

Sir J. Grigg: I do not think my hon. Friend can have read the answer that I gave last week. I referred to that and suggested that it is impossible to give exact figures.

106
J.B.

199,500 Brit/Comm POWs
 known, March, 1945
 (Number secretly reduced to
 176,000 in May)
 leaving 8,000 + missing
 in Soviet Zone. Actually
 20,000 to 30,000.

REPRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SHAEF FORWARD
 STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

107
J.B.
 331/7/77

INCOMING MESSAGE

T00 131825B JUNE

SHAEF FWD 530/15
 TOR 152200B JUNE
 roo 152257B JUNE

RESTRICTED
 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM : PRISTERN AUDLEY LONDON
 TO : SHAEF FWD PWX
 REF NO : T.126 (P.V.5) 13 JUNE 1945


Handwritten:
 7 cables DPW
 9/14/45
 BL

1. Reference telephone conversation GEPF-VER-ABLES regarding Dominions Liaison Officers attached SHAEF (PWX).

Nov. find that Dominions have officers right forward in GERMANY, AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA etc. The officers now at SHAEF Hq act as connecting link with those in Forward Areas. For political reasons Dominions are unwilling to hold the ~~unofficial~~ ~~and~~ missing.

2. Accordingly request you allow 1 officer from each Dominion and INDIA to move into GERMANY with your Hq and to remain there to act as link between Dominions forward officers and Dominions Governments. Am assured that all redundant Dominion Liaison Officers have been or are being recalled.

ACTION : 0-1
 INFORMATION : AG RECORDS



PS IN 4809 15 Jun 45 2332B HFX/1f REF NO: T.126 (PW 5)

8 0307

RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THE MESSAGE

Sent from London Outpost (USGR)
with letter dated JUN 18 1945

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X/1331

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X/1331

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J.B.

Distribution:

- 1 - USGR Division/PC
- 1 - Files
- 2 - CID & L
- 1 - SI, Reports Chief
- 1 - X-2

Information Date: 17 June 1945
Report Date: 18 June 1945
Dissemination Date: 19 June 1945

Evaluations: See text
Sources: RMA
Sub-sources: See text

This is a report on an informal interview with Lt. Col. William F. Penell O-313894, AC (present address Delta Base Station, APO 772 which is an air corps processing center on the Riviera). Col. Penell recently returned from Russia where he was stationed at both Poltava and Odessa, since early this year, mainly as a contact man with the Russians on problems connected with repatriation of American prisoners of war freed by the Russians. Toward the end of his stay he apparently became persona non grata with the Russians for he was suddenly ordered to leave by the American command and to take the first boat out of Odessa, regardless of where it was going. Since returning from Russia he has been interviewed by intelligence officers at DIAEF and has had extended conversations with General Epper and others there. He maintained a daily log of what happened during his stay in the USSR and turned it over to Col. Strong of PWX (U-1) DIAEF at Frankfurt-on-Main. He does not speak Russian. His personal attitude generally was that war against Russia would be a world catastrophe. He felt that to prevent it two things were needed: strong American forces in Europe capable of giving a good account of themselves, and friendly but firm diplomacy to stand up for American rights and to negotiate the settlement of outstanding differences.

Col. Penell's main points concerning his story in the USSR may be summarized as follows:

1. Treatment of American PWs. American PWs freed by the Red Army were in the main treated very shabbily and came to hate the Russians. Many of them were robbed of watches, rings, and other personal possessions which they had managed to retain even after extended periods of captivity under the Germans. Their food at Odessa was very poor, consisting mainly of soup with cucumbers in it and sour black bread. The Russians generally tended to throw obstacles in the way of repatriation, frequently calling off prisoners at the last minute and insisting always upon clearance from Moscow for every prisoner released. American PWs at Odessa were guarded by Russian soldiers carrying loaded rifles with fixed bayonets, and Russian security was more stringent there than German security had been in the various ghettos and Oflag. A number of American officers who went to Poland at various times to coordinate the hunt for 14th Army PWs were ordered out very quickly at Russian insistence.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 750140

By: RLR NARA Date: 7/2/87

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SENT TO USSR

United States

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J.B.

2. Russian attitude toward US. Among lower echelon officers with whom the Colonel came into contact, he noted a number of times a strong feeling of hostility toward the United States and Great Britain. In general the Russians are extremely cocky, convinced that they alone won the war, and confident in their own powers. On 8 May when Americans and Britons at Odessa heard the V-E proclamation over the BBC, the English and American boats sounded their fog horns and generally indicated their relief at the end of the war in Europe. Commanding officers of all such units were called to the Odessa Port Commander's office and reprimanded sharply for such peculiary behavior, and told flatly that the war could not be over, regardless of what BBC said, since Stalin had not made any such announcement. The Colonel did meet many Russians who were extremely pleasant and anxious to get on with the Americans, but he got the impression that the attitude of hostility and cockiness was the "official" line and reflected the position of higher-ups. He claims to have talked with American officers who contacted the Russians in Germany and to have been told that at regimental and division headquarters they were treated royally, but at corps, army and higher headquarters they got very cold receptions.

3. American-Russian military cooperation. The Colonel claims that even during the operations of the Poltava bases for American aircraft a good deal of hostility was evident. When American aircraft were grounded by the Russians last March, a number of Americans tried to destroy their Radar equipment, according to instructions, and were threatened with machine-gunning by the Russians. At Odessa a number of American officers were called in by Russian intelligence officers and grilled very minutely on a very wide range of questions, from the organization of the American Army and the situation in the sectors they were in when they were captured to the personal political beliefs of the officers concerned. The Colonel worked with a Russian major in Odessa who told him flatly that regardless of his (the American's) rank or his orders from his own headquarters, he would do as the Russians ordered because he was in the Soviet Union and was in their power.

4. Internal sentiment among Russians. From his limited contacts with civilian Russians in the Ukraine, the Colonel felt that there was a good deal of hostility toward the Soviet state, and one Russian even told him that the USSR was simply a prison camp for 200 million people. There were many rumors always floating about Poltava about anti-Russian sabotage committed in the Ukraine and in White Russia by nationalists opposed to the Soviet regime, and the Colonel personally felt that the purpose of setting these two republics separate seats at San Francisco was to mollify the strong nationalist feelings in those areas.

5. Russian treatment of their own returned PWs. Col. Penell saw many repatriated Russian PWs march off the docks at Odessa and these were invariably under armed guard. The report on their fate which he gave credence to was that these repatriates were compelled to work at forced labor for a period equal to their captivity under the Germans. Some of the Russian

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J.S.~~TOP SECRET~~
Combined Chiefs of Staff

Top Secret

19 June 1945
Col. C. R. Peak
W. D. Bkt. 77500

Priority

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS CASERTA ITALY.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES MAIN BUNKER
FRANKFURT GERMANY.

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION WASHINGTON D C.

PARA ONE PD WITH REGARD TO MAP NINE SEVEN FIVE CMA THE ACTION ALREADY
TAKEN BY YOU PAREN TOPRED BOOK MESSAGE TO ALEXANDER FOR ACTION CMA TO
THAT FRANKFURT FOR KISSEHOWER AND TO AMSSO PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF
STAFF FOR INFORMATION PD THIS MESSAGE IS PAN FIVE SEVEN SIX TO
ALEXANDER FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF PAREN WITH RESPECT TO THE
TRANSFER OF COSSACKS OVERLAND TO SOVIET MILITARY AUTHORITIES CMA AS
REPORTED IN YOUR ZERO DASH FIVE SIX FIVE NINE OF TWENTY SIX MAY NINETEEN
HUNDRED FORTY FIVE CMA IS APPROVED PD PARA TWO PD IT IS NOT YET
POSSIBLE TO GIVE YOU ANY DECISION AT THIS TIME CONCERNING FINAL DISPOSAL
OF THE CROATIAN AND GERMAN CROAT TROOPS PD THIS MATTER IS PRESENTLY
UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE U S PD 8 PD AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS PD FOR
THE TIME BEING CMA HOWEVER CMA YOU WILL CONTINUE TO RETAIN SUCH
PERSONNEL IN YOUR CUSTODY AND TO HANDLE THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMO FOR RECORD:

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J.S.

1. COS 576 is a report by the SACD which considers a message from
SAGRED (MAP 975) on final disposal of Cosmacks, Catalaks and German
Croat Troops in his custody.

2. Prior to cessation of hostilities instructions were issued that
disident Yugoslav troops, in Italy upon surrender should be disarmed and place
in refugee camps or returned to Yugoslavia. Arrangements have been considered
for transfer of Cosmacks direct to Soviets.

3. In COS 576 it is concluded that action taken by SAGRED on dispo-
sition of Cosmacks should be rectified and that concerning Yugoslav troops
further transfer of Croats should be withheld in view of action taken on a
governmental level. With respect to Catalaks, SAGRED should be informed
to handle in accordance with existing instructions. Recommendation is made
that the above conclusions should be brought to the attention of SAGRED,
and that the Department of State and British Embassy be so advised.

4. COS 576/1 indicates that the foregoing instructions have been
approved and message dispatched to SAGRED as PAN 576. Department of State
and British Embassy notified by memo 19 Jun 45.

L. E. M.

BRITISH & POLISH FILE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958 Sec 3.3
NND 760050
By *KV* NARA Date *5/2/88*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE LEGAL ADVISER

June 22, 1945.

To: Mr. Herriek (SWP)
Mr. Durbrow (EK)

From: Mr. Flournoy (Le)

Subject: Proposed Transfer to Soviet Authorities in
Germany of Soviet Nationals now Held in
this Country as Prisoners of War, Who Were
Wearing German Uniforms When Captured

As I told Mr. Herriek this morning, it does not appear to me that the Department is justified in invoking Article 75 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 to justify the proposed action in this case. I understand from Mr. Herriek's statement to me that Assistant Secretary of War McCloy suggested mentioning the treaty provision in question, but, for the reasons hereinafter stated, it appears to me that it would be improper to invoke it. While the War Department is no doubt primarily responsible for the proposed action in this case, this Department has a certain responsibility in the matter, especially with regard to the proposed invoking of the treaty.

I gather from the attached correspondence and statements made to me by Mr. Herriek this morning that the cases to which the attached draft note to the Soviet Embassy and telegram to our Embassy at Paris relate differ from most of the cases in which Soviet nationals who were captured in German uniforms have heretofore been sent to Germany for transfer to Russia.

It is my understanding that most of the earlier cases related to Soviet nationals who wished to be repatriated. Apparently in those cases the Soviet Embassy appeared as protector of the rights of the persons in question, or at least pretended to do so.

In a note of February 1, 1945 the Department observed that it had previously taken the position that the uniform, rather than the nationality of prisoners of war governed with regard to exchanges, that wearers of the American uniform were entitled to "the full protection of the Geneva Convention", and that this Government had

*informed

EO 12958 Sec 3.3
NND 760050
By *KV* NARA Date *5/2/88*
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J.B.

It might be contended that at least some of the persons in question deserve to be executed for serving in the armed forces of Germany against the Soviet Union, but it would seem that such a contention could be justified only upon the ground that the service of these persons in the German armed forces was voluntary. However, even if it could be proved that they were all serving voluntarily in the German armed forces when they were captured, it is not believed that the repatriation provisions of the Geneva Convention have any application to them, since their real destination was to be not Germany but Russia. Therefore, if the proposed note and telegram are to be sent, it is recommended that the references therein to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention be eliminated.

It is believed that, if there is legal justification for sending the persons in question to Russia, it must be found in the laws of war, for the proper administration of which the War Department, rather than the Department of State, is responsible.

740.0011 E.W./6-1145

Le-RW Flournoy: FGS

FORM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Authority 440 75000By BS NARA Date 2/16/68

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F.B.

No. 1100

20 June 1945

Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev,
Assistant Government Authorized
Administrator for Repatriation,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear General Golubev:

We have been requested by General Eisenhower to make an urgent appeal to you for an estimate of the number of displaced Western Europeans who are now in Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe.

Thus far, about 1,800,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 French remain in German areas occupied by British-American forces. This makes a total of 1,900,000 French accounted for, exclusive of those who still remain in Soviet-controlled territory. French authorities insist that the total number of prisoners of war and displaced persons amount to 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted individuals, there would still remain a great discrepancy.

1,000,000
FRENCH
MISSING IN
SOVIET ZONE

About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated. Less than 25,000 Dutch still remain in Germany under control of British-American forces. However, the Dutch authorities estimate that there were originally 340,000 Dutch nationals deported, thus leaving a great discrepancy.

The Belgian authorities also reported a discrepancy but it is comparatively smaller than those of the French and the Dutch.

Specifically, General Eisenhower would like to know:

- (1) Your estimate of the number of French, Dutch and Belgian ex-prisoners of war or displaced persons still remaining in Soviet-controlled territory.
- (2) How many of these persons are accessible for transfer across the Allied lands?
- (3) How many of these persons are inaccessible, that is Western Europeans now in the Soviet Union, Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia or the Balkan countries?

Authority 440 75000By BS NARA Date 2/16/68

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F.B.

Apparently this matter is causing the governments concerned great anxiety not only for humanitarian reasons but also because of the necessity of planning their economy to take care of the repatriated persons when they are finally brought home. We realize you cannot give us extremely accurate figures, but your best estimates would be entirely satisfactory. We would be grateful if you would let us have this information at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. DEANE
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding General,
U. S. Military Mission

J. A. H. CAMPBELL
Lieutenant General,
British Military
Mission

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

STAFF MESSAGE CONTINUED
INCOMING MESSAGE

Imported

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J.E.

JMSS

SHAEP MAIN 138/25

TMO 250830Z JUNE

TOR 251200B JUNE

to be used to duty
to edited unofficial researchers Order
der/Army by TAG/ date

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28 DEC 1949

ROUTINE

FROM : US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FROM GAMMELL AND DEANE
TO : SHAEP MAIN FOR EISENHOWER
REF NO : M-24784 25 JUNE 1945 CITE: SHOE

Upon receipt of S-91662 dated 19 June, we presented the queries contained therein to GOLUBEV and have received the following reply:

"In answer to your letter of 20 June:

1. I do not have the exact data on the moving around of persons from Western EUROPE and therefore cannot say much about them.

2. I know that there have been freed by the Red Army:

French: About 250,000 of which 202,456 persons have already been sent home and about 50,000 who are getting ready to be sent home.

Danes: 201 persons freed, 121 of whom have been sent home and the rest are in the process of being handed over.

Belgians: 27,980 persons freed of which 25,920 have been sent home, the remainder in the process of

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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J.E.

SECRET

REF NO: M-24784

SHAEP MAIN 138/25

of being turned over.

3. Still up to the present time we have been unable to get the exact information on the number of Soviet citizens located in the territory of the Allied Governments and in territory under the control of the Allied Armies. The data which is given to us is extremely inconsistent and, of course, does not correspond to those facts which we have.

"On 22 May Major General BARKER at the time of the negotiations at HALLE told us that in the jurisdiction of the Allied Command there are up to 1 and 1/2 million Soviet citizens. Of this number, on 22 June, we had accepted 989,543 persons including those who crossed through the lines of the troops on their own.

"On 13 June Representatives of SHAEP informed our Representative in FRANCE that in addition to those Soviet citizens handed over to us, they figured on handing over more than 1,000,000 more Soviet citizens.

"This indicates that there is still no exactly calculated data on Soviet citizens in the hands of the Allied Command, and that many hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens in addition to the 1,000,000 being figured on for handing over, evidently are continuing to work on the fields of the German farmers and live in the cities of the Allied Governments and in territory under the control of the Allied Command. We have full reason to affirm this. It was definitely not accidental that on 20 May in the English newspaper "SUNDAY TIMES" information was published that in the zones of the British and American Command alone there are about 3,000,000 Russians, together with many Poles and Latvians.

"In giving you the exact data on persons liberated by the Red Army in Western EUROPE and already handed over to go home, I wish to express my conviction that you will help in every way possible not only to get exact data on the number of Soviet citizens under the jurisdiction of the Allied Command,

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Maj. GEN.

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JUL 1945

JUL 1945

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PRIORITY

To DEANE MOSCOW, HQ 21st ARMY GROUP, CO 12th ARMY GROUP, CO 6th ARMY GROUP also SHAEF signed SHAEF from SHAEF MAIN From: Eisenhower

The following communication has been received from Gen.

Command Adj Deputy A.C. of B, G-2, KIVUNA.

"Possibility that several hundred American prisoners of war liberated from Staling Lft 1, North, are now confined by the Russian Army in the Rostock area pending identification as Americans is reported by an American who recently returned from such confinement.

S/Lt Anthony Shary was one of 1000 air force officers and non-commissioned officers who left Staling Lft 1 immediately prior to assumption of control in North by the Red Army in order to obtain summer air transport from Wismar. The group of ten in which Sgt. Shary travelled was arrested by Russian soldiers and held in jails in Bad Döberan, then Rostock. Ten other Americans were seen under similar circumstances in Rostock.

Russian authorities demanded identification papers, which no prisoner possessed, and refused to consider dog tags proof of the Americans' status. The Americans were well fed and well treated but Shary complains there was no disposition to speed identification and evacuation. After 25 days he escaped from jail and made his way to British forces.

From his own observations and conversations with other former prisoners he believes several hundred Americans may be held in like circumstances in the Wismar-Bad Döberan-Rostock Area."

2. Will you please expedite any action that can be taken by you regarding the above and also possibility that some of the

JUL 1945

Maj. GEN.

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PRIORITY

3. For EISEN, 12th, 6th Army Groups. It is entirely possible that your contacts with Russians may enable you to discover similar cases as above. Immediate representation should be made by you to Russians with a view to recovery of any British/AM who may at present be held under similar circumstances by the Russians.

Page 2
of 5-9293

STANDARD MESSAGE ARCHIVE

INCOMING MESSAGE

JHSS

396/18

TO: 121017B JULY

TOR 121017B JULY

SECRET**PRIORITY**

FROM : US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FROM DEANE
TO : SHAEF MAIN (FOR SCAEF FOR SHGAP)
REF NO : M-24981, 12 July 1945

GOLDBEV today informed me that he is still conducting an investigation concerning the possibility of American prisoners of war being in the WISMAR-BAD DOBERAN-ROSTOCK area. As suggested in your 5-92930 (373)

He has promised to let me know the results of the investigation and I will inform you.

3-92930 is SHC OUT 6270, 25/6/45, G-1 563.6/11

ACTION : G-1

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

333/1/88 IMPORTANT

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J.B.

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

(29 JUNE 1945)

TO : AGWAR FOR WARCOS
 FROM : SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED TEDDER CITE SHOAP
 REF NO : S-94080 T00: 291500B

Ref: WX-23028 of 27 June. SHAEF's reply to General GOLUBEV was received by DEAN on 23 June and immediately delivered to GOLUBEV. Essence of reply was as follows:

"1. Called his attention that we now have 153 Soviet Liaison Officers working under the direction of Major General DRAGON who is charged with the responsibility of assisting us in the problem of repatriation.

"2. That each Army Group has an organization to handle repatriation matters, and in these organizations we have woven Soviet Liaison Officers who are doing valuable work. The process of repatriation is working smoothly and, as initial difficulties are overcome, the work will proceed with even greater dispatch.

"3. That we see no real necessity for the introduction of a new organization, which we feel is not necessary and which would mean a duplication of effort.

"4. That we had instructed the Army Groups to call for additional Soviet Liaison Officers if needed."

New subject:-

General BARKER also sent DEAN unofficial letter containing following background material:

"While at HALLE General GOLUBEV read the proposal to me. I advised him that I would have to discuss the matter with the SHAEF Staff and 21 Army Group. Knowing that the U S and BRITISH PW would soon be out of the Russian Zone and that we could not reasonably ask for a British and U S Mission to go in their zone, I asked General GOLUBEV if he was willing to grant similar privi-

SMC OUT-7393

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121 J.B.

(1AP)

REF NO : S-94080 T00: 291500B (Continued)

ages to the French who would have many citizens in the Russian Zone. His reply was non-committal stating he would have to refer it to his Government.

"Before The HALLE Conference we had made numerous attempts to visit PW Camps in the Russian Zone and always met a firm refusal. After the HALLE Conference General GOLUBEV asked to visit Camps where Russians were being kept. We agreed and asked him for permission to visit Camps in the Russian Zone. He agreed to allow 1 of our Officers to visit 5 Camps. One of my representatives started on the trip accompanied by a Russian Major who stated he had the necessary orders. After visiting the first and nearest Camp the Russian Officer produced orders signed by General GOLUBEV restricting our Officers visit to the one Camp. This is the only instance of Soviet authorities permitting U S or British Officers to visit Camps in their area, which is in sharp contrast to the liberal policy pursued us.

"With reference to the proposal of sending General VERSHININ and his 162 Officers, we have no intention whatever of granting it."

WX-23028 is SMC IN 8425, 27/6/45, 0-1.

ORIGINATOR : G-1 AUTHENTICATION: R.E.S. VENABLES, BRIGADIER
 INFORMATION : SOS
 G-4
 G-3
 MR MURPHY
 MR KIRKPATRICK
 G-5
 G-6
 AO RECORDS

SMC OUT 7393 29 JUNE '45 1709B EBB/ra REF NO: S-94080 T00: 291500B

- 2 -

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 4842-2-200

By 13 HARA UIC 2460

21 July 1945

No. 04997

Major General John R. Deane,
Chief, American Military Mission
in Moscow

Dear General Deane:

In answer to your letter of 13 July, I can state the following:

1. During the entire time of repatriation, the following numbers of foreigners were handed over to the Allied Command:

Americans	22,010
English	20,463
French	223,111
Belgian	31,530
Dutch	23,558
Luxembourg	1,246
Norwegian	1,011

2. Inasmuch as a check has not yet been finished, I am unable to tell you the precise number of Western Europeans who have remained in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany after Allied Anglo-American troops withdrew.

However, we know exactly that in this zone after the withdrawal of troops there were more than 100,000 foreigners of which more than 70,000 were Poles, 80 Americans and 13 English.

3. We do not have precise information concerning the number of Soviet citizens who have been returned to us by Anglo-American troops and left by them in the zones of occupation. Therefore, we would be very appreciative if you could tell us.

Respectfully,

/s/ Colonel
Lt. General

Translated by Major Hall
vtn

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THE SOVIET UNION

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J.B.

ink. Political Adviser,
at

August 9, 1945—7 p. m.
h commitments taken
oviet Union all Soviet
they has been adopted
et citizens who were
Soviet frontiers.
13 Soviet citizens cap-
tioned to ascertain
Baltic States or other
Gians who have lived
k of the present war).
or be turned over to

they were "stateless"
e clearly Soviet citi-
zens and the Soviet
was within the mean-
of war and displaced

up referred to in your
ascertain whether in

BRNKS

ny (Murphy) to the

ist 27, 1945—7 p. m.
gust 27—4:50 p. m.)
ion at United States
oup Control Council
is taken as German
n of Soviet Socialist
epatriation there has
violence such as the
at a church service
considerable number
nity are also taking

open Affairs

Please ~~confirm~~ understanding of our policy. Did we at Yalta
assume the specific obligation to return these Russians by force if
necessary? In the protocol which I have seen informally I find no
reference to this subject but understand the Chiefs of Staff made an
agreement on this subject.
Gray has suggested that where force is necessary we might wish
to permit Russian troops to enter our zone for the purpose of removing
these individuals. G-5 estimates there are from twenty to thirty
thousand of them.

McKerley

740 82314/8-2745. Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for
Germany (Murphy), at Berlin

WASHINGTON August 29, 1945—5 p. m.

263. From Matthews. Reurtel 353, August 27, 7 p. m. Full text
agreement signed Yalta being forwarded by airmail. Briefly agree-
ment provides all Soviet citizens liberated by US forces be separated
from enemy POW's and maintained separately until handed over
to Soviet authorities. Military authorities each contracting party
required without delay to inform competent authorities other party
regarding citizens found by them and at same time to take necessary
measures to implement all provisions of agreement.

While agreement makes no mention of Soviet citizens captured in
German uniforms nor of the use of force, Soviets have consistently
claimed it covers all their citizens and Department has interpreted it
as covering POW's of Soviet nationality prior to 1939 and in concurren-
ce with War Department ordered return to Europe and turned
over to Soviet authorities a number of POW's brought to this country
and later ascertained after thorough screening to be Soviet citizens.
Incidents involving resistance requiring use of force by our military
authorities occurred in connection with this group.

For your confidential information, Department has been anxious
in handling these cases to avoid giving Soviet authorities any pretext
for delaying return of American POW's of Japanese now in Soviet
occupied zone, particularly in Manchuria. (Matthews.)

BRNKS

* Captain Gray, Counselor of Mission, Office of United States Political Ad-
viser for Germany Affairs
* Civil Affairs Division

Report of OSS Lt. Col. James F. Donovan 0338695 FA / Mukden, Manchuria 22 Sept. 1945

Mukden, Manchuria
22 Sept. 1945

SECRET

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J.B.

It is an understandable reaction, of course. They wonder why their American Allies are spying on them in territory occupied by the Red Army in fulfillment of an agreement to help the U.S. fight against them. (None of these ideas were ever openly stated, but oblique remarks carried the above impressions?).

h. Two incidents at Dairen did not help to relieve the slight tension. On one day between the 2nd and 8th of September American Naval carrier aircraft made a "show of force" over the harbor of Dairen according to Commodore C.C. Wood, who witnessed it. This excited the Russian authorities in Dairen a great deal and they asked Commodore Wood what it was all about. As he had not been given any advance information from the Navy he was just as puzzled as the Russians and could offer only a weak explanation. In the afternoon of the 12th of Sept. (after the ex-POWs had sailed) Admiral Settle was informed by radio that another "show of force" would be made that afternoon, this time by cruisers and destroyers of the Seventh Fleet. This worried Admiral Settle considerably and he sent a strong protest to his headquarters. He was very puzzled by this show of force which was duly made outside the harbor about 1500 hours 13 Sept.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

17 September 1945

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 202 and 203
CIA LTR 5-24-73
SMT:ML: MARK Date 2-27-73

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, obtained by OSS representatives in Mukden and transmitted by the OSS representative in Chungking, is dated 13 September:

Americans are very unpopular with the Soviets in Mukden, probably because the Soviets do not wish Americans to observe their actions. The Soviets are to leave on 1 November. In the meantime they are carrying out a program of scientific looting. Every piece of machinery is being removed and all stocks of merchandise in stores and warehouses are being taken away. Mukden presumably will be an empty city when they leave.

The Soviets are indiscriminately Killing Chinese and Japanese. Three OSS men have been held up by Red Army soldiers armed with sub-machine guns, and their watches, wallets, and pistols have been taken from them. Four American officers have been removed from Mukden's good hotel and have been placed in a second-rate Japanese hotel.

William J. Donovan
Director

128 J.E.		WASHINGTON, D. C.	
COUNTRY	China	ORIGINAL RPT	AJ-33520
SUBJECT	Chinese Economic Information	DATE OF INFO	27 February 1946
		DATE OF RPT	21 February 1946
		DISTRIBUTED	1 March 1946
CHARACTER	Threaten	CONFIRMATION	
ORIGIN	China	SUPPLEMENT	
NO. IN FILE	2 - Colorado	NO. OF PAGES	1
HOW ACQUIRED	Office	ATTACHMENTS	
EVALUATION	3-2		

1. Correspondents returning from Mukden report that nearly 200,000 Japanese soldiers from the Japanese Army were transferred by the Russians to China, Siberia. Apparently, the soldiers were used as laborers to install remodeled Manchurian machinery in new plants at China. Of the 5000 factories in Mukden, no more than 100 are operational. The rest were run down by the Russians and then blown up either by them or by the Communist 8 Army, giving the impression that the damage was caused by bombing.
2. Many correspondents feel that the Americans have the responsibility of evacuating the Japanese wherever Russia's only claim, if any, is the evacuation of machinery.
3. The Soviet commander of Mukden claims that all Mukden factories are war booty and that the Russians are entitled by the Yalta Agreement to all such booty.
4. The Japanese in Manchuria are eager to be evacuated by the Americans; which discounts Russian statements to the effect that they will get out of Manchuria when the Americans get out of China.

DECLASSIFIED
 BY NND 750440
 BY RLK NARA Date 9/20/84

SECRET
 MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Enclosure: CM-IN-10228 (21 Oct 45),
 Copy No. 85.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the State-War-NavY Coordinating Committee consider the enclosed message from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean and furnish them with the basis for a reply.

War-NavY Coordinating Committee has been requested to furnish a reply for the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)
 A. J. McFARLAND,
 Brigadier General, USA,
 Secretary.

Copy to:
 Admin Aide to CNO
 OPD WDGS

SECRET

Pages 1 - 5, Incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DISPOSAL OF CHETNIKS AND GERMAN CROAT TROOPS IN AUSTRIA

Reference: C.O.S. 876 Series

Report by the Joint Logistics Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider a message from the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (Appendix "C", page 5) requesting information as to whether any further decision had been taken concerning the final disposal of Chetniks and German Croat troops, about whom original instructions were issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, in PAN 576, 20 June 1945 (page 3 of C.O.S. 876).

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In C.O.S. 876 Series, the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force that pending further consideration by the United States and British Governments, Chetniks and German Croat troops taken into custody would be retained in custody and handled in accordance with existing instructions of the Department of State and British Foreign Office to their respective representatives in Italy.

3. A representative of the Department of State (Mr. E. T. Bailey, Assistant Chief of the Special War Problems Division) states that there has been no change in the present position of the Government of the United States regarding the disposal of

FROM: PSS-CIC (RUS) U.S.S.R.
P.O.W. and Internee Camp near
TAMBOV.
E. of Moscow

Date: April - May 1945.

SIU/WD/GR	181
S. 1226101	181
Copy 14/1	181
Recvd. DEC 20 1945	J.B.

1. Informant, a Pole forced to serve in the German Army, was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1944. He was kept for a time in the Transit Camp in KAUNAS, then in MINSK until he was deported across SIBERIA to the SEVINSKAYA camp near VLADIVOSTOK. At the end of 1945 - APRIL, he escaped and tried to get to Europe. He was, however, arrested by the NKVD after he had got beyond MOSCOW, and placed in the P.O.W. and Internee Camp in TAMBOV, which was occupied by Germans, French, Americans, British, Dutch, Belgians, and even a few citizens of LUXEMBOURG, also Estonians, Letts, Rumanians and Yugoslavs. The prisoners numbered, in informant's estimation, well over 20,000; they were both military and civilian, most likely over-run by the Russians during the offensive.

2. All prisoners were forced to work, and the food they were given was very bad and monotonous. They were housed not in huts but in dug-outs.

3. The monotonous food caused some strange disease which made the legs and arms swell; the swellings spread and the swollen places developed sores and wounds. After a time men afflicted with this disease died. Informant was told that more than 25,000 Italians, more than 2,500 French and approximately 10,000 Rumanian and Hungarian prisoners had died in this manner. There were also many casualties among Poles and the other nationalities.

4. Prisoners in this camp included men of very high culture and learning and great experts in many fields of science. Informant observed that German engineers were employed on a special task - the drawing up of blue-prints for a four-engined aircraft, which would carry about 500 men and achieve a speed - it was alleged - of 1,000 kilometres per hour. The Russians were extremely interested in these blue-prints and men working on the invention were granted all possible facilities both in work and the conditions of life in the camp. Informant was also told that a group of technicians and engineers of all nationalities was busy working out plans for new types of tanks and other technical machines and installations, but he was unable to learn any details about them.

5. When informant left the camp there were still numerous Frenchmen due to be repatriated in the next batch; there were also some Belgians and Dutch, and others, including some Englishmen and several Scots Americans, the presence of whom in this camp is probably unknown to the British and the U.S.A. authorities. When he was leaving, these Englishmen and Americans asked him urgently (as did the French officers and men) to notify the Allied authorities of their plight. Informant succeeded in reaching France with a convoy of Allied nationals.

The Militant and UPRAR

performed assessing various aspects of the plans and agreements, although probably no major final decisions were made in Yugoslavia, were given on September 1981.

Country	1982 J.R.
Belgium	2,200,000
France	1,900,000
Germany	1,800,000
Italy	1,700,000
Japan	1,600,000
United Kingdom	1,500,000
Sweden	1,400,000
Spain	1,300,000
Canada	1,200,000
USA	1,100,000
South Korea	1,000,000
India	900,000
China	800,000
USSR	700,000
Japan	600,000
France	500,000
Germany	400,000
Italy	300,000
Spain	200,000
Sweden	100,000
Belgium	50,000
Canada	20,000
USA	10,000
South Korea	5,000
India	2,000
China	1,000
USSR	500
Japan	200
France	100
Germany	50
Italy	20
Spain	10
Sweden	5
Belgium	2
Canada	1
USA	0.5
South Korea	0.2
India	0.1
China	0.05
USSR	0.02
Japan	0.01
France	0.005
Germany	0.002
Italy	0.001
Spain	0.0005
Sweden	0.0002
Belgium	0.0001
Canada	0.00005
USA	0.00002
South Korea	0.00001
India	0.000005
China	0.000002
USSR	0.000001
Japan	0.0000005
France	0.0000002
Germany	0.0000001
Italy	0.00000005
Spain	0.00000002
Sweden	0.00000001
Belgium	0.000000005
Canada	0.000000002
USA	0.000000001
South Korea	0.0000000005
India	0.0000000002
China	0.0000000001
USSR	0.00000000005
Japan	0.00000000002
France	0.00000000001
Germany	0.000000000005
Italy	0.000000000002
Spain	0.000000000001
Sweden	0.0000000000005
Belgium	0.0000000000002
Canada	0.0000000000001
USA	0.00000000000005
South Korea	0.00000000000002
India	0.00000000000001
China	0.000000000000005
USSR	0.000000000000002
Japan	0.000000000000001
France	0.0000000000000005
Germany	0.0000000000000002
Italy	0.0000000000000001
Spain	0.00000000000000005
Sweden	0.00000000000000002
Belgium	0.00000000000000001
Canada	0.000000000000000005
USA	0.000000000000000002
South Korea	0.000000000000000001
India	0.0000000000000000005
China	0.0000000000000000002
USSR	0.0000000000000000001
Japan	0.00000000000000000005
France	0.00000000000000000002
Germany	0.00000000000000000001
Italy	0.000000000000000000005
Spain	0.000000000000000000002
Sweden	0.000000000000000000001
Belgium	0.0000000000000000000005
Canada	0.0000000000000000000002
USA	0.0000000000000000000001
South Korea	0.00000000000000000000005
India	0.00000000000000000000002
China	0.00000000000000000000001
USSR	0.000000000000000000000005
Japan	0.000000000000000000000002
France	0.000000000000000000000001
Germany	0.0000000000000000000000005
Italy	0.0000000000000000000000002
Spain	0.0000000000000000000000001
Sweden	0.00000000000000000000000005
Belgium	0.00000000000000000000000002
Canada	0.00000000000000000000000001
USA	0.000000000000000000000000005
South Korea	0.000000000000000000000000002
India	0.000000000000000000000000001
China	0.0000000000000000000000000005
USSR	0.0000000000000000000000000002
Japan	0.0000000000000000000000000001
France	0.00000000000000000000000000005

At the same time, Danish and Norwegian Jewish birth numbers were also reduced. In the case of the Danes, this was because of a large number of emigrants fleeing Copenhagen, including a few hundred (out of thousands) who fled the Russians and the Flemings. Both Jews and Greeks, apart from the Jews, probably numbered no more than a few thousand. Soviet nationals, for whom no official estimates were given, probably equalled several million persons.

[illegible][illegible]

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The Military and UMRRA

iosis surveys of all centre residents. Penicillin was used to reduce the allegedly high incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis. Supplies of standard medicines and surgical equipment were made available in ample quantities, backed by large military reserves; and the American Red Cross released large stocks of unused 'standard medicine kits' originally earmarked for prisoners of war. Forty-seven thousand of these kits were distributed in Western Germany, and 7,400 in Austria.

Because of the concern felt by UNRRA medical personnel over the general reduction in rations during 1946, UNRRA made substantial distributions of cod-liver oil and allotted 900,000 tablets, containing standard doses of vitamins C and D, to all children and adolescents under twenty years of age, to all pregnant and nursing women, and to all persons suffering from vitamin deficiency. Simultaneously, UNRRA "weight-bearing" testing was instituted in the British and United States Zones. The results of the testing indicated that the average man lost 10 to 20 pounds more than the German population, so that men for the most part were to some extent allowed to

Dental care, too, was provided for displaced persons by UNRRA, although a continuing shortage was reported of toothbrushes and acrylic resin needed to make dentures. By July 1946 there were 76 dental centres in the British Zone, with 1130 dentists, 54 dental assistants, and 35 technicians, practically all recruited from the displaced persons; 16 German dentists, and 5 UNRRA dentists. During June comparable personnel in the United States Zone attended to about 40,000 patients. Dental services in the French Zone were considered inadequate, being described as 'rudimentary in personnel and equipment';

TRACING OF MISSING PRISONERS

BRUSSELS, 1946 European tracing bureaus prepared what was probably the largest list of missing prisoners of war, and lost their lives as a result of the war, and in addition contained detailed personal descriptions.

International Red Cross committees, working from 1939 to 1945, collected 100 per cent for the missing prisoners of war, and were unable to locate 100,000. The British Red Cross committee, which had been working since 1945, published in their own and they maintained a central list with a view to tracing the missing.

A central data bank was established at a hospital in Lisbon near where in the British Zone, and during July last people were contacted.

%

8

NOMINATION OF CHARLES F. BULLOCK

RECEIVED: 1997-01-27

[illegible]

LINCOLN UNIVERSITY

Senator Fairbanks. And I can't understand, unless it was because of the President's illness, why this agreement began this way: "The leaders of the three great powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain—have arrived at the following agreement."

Then they signed individually, not as the governments at all. They then signed on page 21, *ad hoc* only.

The next agreement on page 23, *ad hoc* only.

Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilian internees by force upon the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, and the American continent.

IT SEEMS OWE.

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hereby wishing to make arrangements—

and on earth

Then I would like to insert article 1.
(Article 1 above referred to is as follows:)

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under the United States command and all United States citizens after their liberation, returning from the Soviet command of war and will be maintained separately in separate from compounds of concentration until they have been placed across the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, upon between these authorities.

"For the Government of U

Now how do you account for the fact that one document—and the agreements are signed on the same day—carried the “(government and the other names of individuals?”

SILVER DOCUMENT

Mr. BOWMAN. Well, sir, I think the answer is that this document you have read last was a draft that came from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The document concerning the

57

Palillos = skewers

overrun by the respective armies was an operating agreement which was to be carried out by the two military sides, you see. Therefore it was done in that way.

FORCIBLE NEPATALATION

[illegible]

INTERVIEW 1948 AGREEMENT

Mr. Donnan. That agreement was one that was received from SHAEF headquarters. Yes; but it was made at Yalta.

Senator Fawcett. Yes; it was indeed made at Yalta.

Mr. Donnan. Yes; it was indeed made at Yalta.

Senator Fawcett. This agreement was signed on February 1945, and made public on March 8, 1946.

[illegible]

AMERICAN FIDUCIARIES

[illegible]

agreements were

Senator Frazarson. I do mean that they are at Yalta and the President didn't see them!

Mr. DONLIZ. I don't know whether the President saw this or

136 J.R.
Important

THE SECRETARY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington, D. C.

25 February, 1946

Memorandum for the Director
Office of the Chief of Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with your oral request, supplemented by recent conversation with Major Gundersen of this office, inclosed herewith is chart showing Missing in Action (including captured) U.S. Army personnel for the period 7 December 1941 through 31 December 1945. This will provide you with the best recent figures available in published form, for purposes of comparing German and Japanese losses.

It will be noted that the items "Prisoners of War (Current Status)" and "Missing in Action (Current Status)" are still large. The reason of course is that as of 31 December 1945 these categories reflected latest definite reports available for statistical compilation, and the situation to date has not materially changed. You will appreciate that for statistical purposes these categories cannot be moved to other categories until detailed disposition records have been processed. In many cases, final disposition must await a legal determination of death under Pt. 490 which may take up to next September, even though investigation to date leaves little logical doubt that a given man is permanently lost. There is the further factor that the processing of individual records for final statistical purposes is necessarily much slower than a numerical count of unprocessed cases in theaters, creating a time lag. As further data is available in final form, this office will be glad to make it available to you.

The foregoing data was classified "Restricted", but has been approved for release to you.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)
J. L. Sullivan Jr.
Major General
Chief, Strength Accounting
and Statistics Office, GCS

1 Incl
Chart, "Missing in Action
U.S. Army Personnel"

MISSING IN ACTION U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL
German and Japanese Theaters
7 December 1941 through 31 December 1945

Dead of Other Branches	Dead of Other Branches	Returned to U.S. Control	P.O.W. (Current Status)	Total	Other Missing in Action			Total Missing
					Declared Dead	Rep't Dead From MIA	Rep't Not Dead From MIA	
German Theaters	210	640	90,977	91,617	11,753	38	2,977	132,929
Japanese Theaters	48	8,436	16,941	25,425	1,712	1,202	2,253	40,133
Totals(a) 258	9,084	107,898	5,000	122,740	13,465	1,240	23,185	173,342

(a) Grand totals do not include Africa Middle East Theater, Pacific and Not Chargeable to any Command, Caribbean
and Defense Command and USAFMC.

(b) Since all prisoners of war (POW) have been returned to military control, the status of the
above indicated personnel is now being investigated by the War Department.

Source: "Battle Casualties of the Army" 1 January, 1946.
Strength Accounting & Statistics Office - 25 February 1946

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J.S.

*Capt. Pance -
I think Col. Rolland
suggested he do some
work on this*

CAPTURED OR INTERVIEWED UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL

7 December 1941 - 31 October 1945

A. GERMAN THEATERS

	Total Prisoners Taken	Prisoners Died While in Captivity	Prisoners Not Yet Returned to Military Control	Prisoners Returned to Military Control
European Theater	77,528	624	6,125	70,779
Medit. Theater	20,351	128	470	19,753
Sub Total:	97,879	752	6,595	90,532

B. JAPANESE THEATERS

China, Burma, India	679	269	33	377
USAF Pacific	22,518	6,665	1,179	14,674
U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces	251	7	9	235
Alaskan Dept.	12		2	10

Sub Total: 23,460 6,941 1,223 15,296

C. OTHERS

	1,725	6	100	1,619
--	-------	---	-----	-------

GRAND TOTAL: 123,064 7,699 7,918 (4) 107,447

(a) Since practically all living known prisoners of war have been returned to military control, the status of the above personnel is now being audited by the War Department.

Statistics Branch, G.S.
7 January 1946

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J.S.

there were more persons in this category than had been supposed at an earlier date.

When the policy relating to forcible repatriation had become clarified in December 1945, it was specified that Soviet citizens who had been residents of the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939 and who had been captured in German uniform would be repatriated without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary. By the spring of 1946, when repatriations of the displaced persons were resumed, the problem of forcible repatriation had reduced itself, for the most part, to the disposal of those who had been captured in German uniform. It was natural that the most tenacious resistance to repatriation arose within this group, as well as among those accused by the Soviet authorities of having rendered aid and comfort to the enemy, as these persons had the worst to fear in the way of retribution. In January 1946 a definition of 'German uniform' was requested for purposes of repatriation. The definition was made to include membership in all regular military formations, certain paramilitary organizations auxiliary to the Nazi Party, and voluntary units like the Goetzack and Ukrainian legions. On 24 February 1946, a group of 1,590 Soviet citizens who had been captured in German uniform were delivered from Prisoner-of-War Enclosure Number 431 at Plattling to the Soviet authorities at Schonberg. In spite of the elaborate precautions taken during this transfer, five of the men succeeded in committing suicide and a number of others attempted to do so. After this transfer, a total of 1,630 remained in Theater Headquarters issued instructions to deliver 794 of these to the Soviet authorities, but to hold the remainder, designated as 'political, without citizenship rights, pending further instructions.

The final disposal of the last of the Soviet citizens captured in German uniform was reported by the Third United States Army as follows:

Operation TAFER was completed on 13 May 1946. This operation was the forced repatriation of two hundred and twenty-two (222) Soviet war criminals from Prisoner-of-War Enclosure Number 431, Plattling. During the week 4-11 May, all Soviet prisoners of war in Plattling who were found not repatriable were discharged. Seven hundred and ninety-one (791) Soviet citizens who were to be held for further screening were moved from Prisoner-of-War Enclosure Number 431, Plattling, to Prisoner-of-War Enclosure Number 118, Burgau, Germany. On 13 May 1946, the 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, shipped the remaining to Russia. There was one fatality and two injuries among the prisoners of war. There were no casualties among American personnel.

*John,
the original
these people were
labeled for America*

575

*The last transfers were
actually completed in May 1947.*

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, 255004

NARA, Date 11/18/89

IMMEDIATE PROBLEM:

1. Retain, after 31 March 1946, a limited number of German prisoners of war who are directly or indirectly involved in production of Army and Navy Intelligence.

2. Categories in question are as follows:

- Prisoners of war being interrogated for information
- Prisoners of war voluntarily preparing intelligence or historical reports
- Prisoners of war translating documents essential to intelligence or scientific and technical research.
- The bare minimum of German prisoners of war essential to service of above personnel which cannot be achieved by other personnel. (This will be the touchy problem, and we must justify these accurately.)

3. Agencies interested: Navy, AEF, AAF, GDS, CR

4. G-2 will request using a circular to nominate and justify retention. G-2 will recommend approval of L/C of C and Secretary of War. G-1 has already informally concurred.

5. G-2 will simultaneously recommend:

- Retention of additional prisoners of war justified as essential to intelligence projects, but not now being so utilized (including War Crime C.)
- Shipments of additional prisoners of war to the U. S. who can be exploited and returned by 15 June 1946.
- Repatriation by 15 June 1946 of all prisoners of war retained after 31 March. Justification of retention of any prisoners of war after 15 June 1946, and only on cases that cannot be exploited under any other project to be presented to the Secretary of War by 15 May 1946.

6. As a result, for the present, no prisoners of war, whose exploitation cannot be completed by 15 June 1946, will be brought to the U. S., but will be frozen in present location in Germany.

SECONDARY PROBLEM: Exploitation of German personnel after 15 June 1946.

1. In order not to prejudice the projected long-range version of OVERCAST project KIS will not, at this time, recommend exploitation under OVERCAST of personnel not qualified for that program.

Detail: Div/Int/2232
Lt Col. Hagedorn
Revised: Lt Col. Smith/2245/14

141 J.B.

18 JUN 1946

REF 243.6

RECEIVED
19 JUN 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PROPOSED MARSHAL GENERAL:

SUBJECT: Special Handling of German Prisoners of War Formerly Held by the Military Intelligence Division

1. Attached as Tab A is a roster of German prisoners of war transferred to Fort Meade, Maryland, on 6 June 1946. One of these prisoners of war, Paul Hoffmann, 200-1220, can be separated from this group for repatriation with any other prisoners of war being returned to Germany. In accordance with informal arrangements made with your office and Fort Meade by representatives of the GFI branch of this Division, it is requested that prisoner of war Robert Schumann, 200-1285, be substituted for prisoner of war Hoffmann in this special group and that a separate order be issued for this particular group of forty-seven (47) prisoners of war in order to insure that they remain together throughout transport to Frankfurt, Germany.

2. Temporary duty orders are being issued on 1st Lieutenant George H. Hildner, Jr., G-170370, and Sergeant John S. Dean, 21432916, as G-2 escorts for these forty-seven (47) prisoners of war.

3. In a separate memorandum to the A. C. of S., G-2, Headquarters, USFET (a copy of which will be furnished your office) complete instructions as to the disposition of these forty-seven (47) prisoners of war after their arrival at Frankfurt, Germany, is being forwarded.

4. Fourteen (14) of this group of prisoners of war could, under normal circumstances, be repatriated to some other than the U. S. Some in Germany, and six (6) of this group of prisoners constitute a specific security threat if close surveillance is not maintained by the A. C. of S., G-2, USFET, after their arrival in Germany. Furthermore, all of these prisoners of war, because of their retention on various service duties at a classified intelligence installation, will constitute, for approximately ninety (90) days after their departure, a security threat if not kept under a limited surveillance at Frankfurt. It is therefore requested that as great a degree of segregation as possible, both while en route to the Port of Embarkation and on the transport by which they will be shipped to Europe, be afforded this whole group of forty-seven (47) prisoners of war. It is to facilitate this segregation and

NW215

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SECRET

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24/11/46

SECRET

142 J.B.

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE PRISONERS OF WAR

- Group 1: (See Memorandum for the Provost Marshal General, File MID 885.6, subject: "Special Handling of German Prisoners of War, etc., dated 18 June 1944.)
- Group 2: (Seven prisoners, escorted by Captain Adam J. Henschman, O-594527, GAO, and Sgt. L. J. Mahoney, 58753234, already under orders to proceed on Shipment No. 1300.)
- Group 3: Three prisoners and two ID escorts by air.
 Escorts: Captain Herman L. Halls, O-120233, Inf. and
 S/Sgt. Eric O. Bussell, 81404823
 Presentations: All five will travel in civilian clothes, by most direct route.
 Prisoners: Herbert ABER, GPO 5714
 Heinz KILGER, GPO 840080
 Mathias HAI, GPO 11570
- Group 4: Two prisoners, one German civilian, one Navy escort.
 Escorts: Lt. William Buschbeck, 145801, USN
 Presentations: All four will travel in civilian clothes, by most direct route.
 Prisoners: Georg HANSEN, GPO 1001423
 Heinz SCHLICK, GPO 1305
 Herbert von Bismarck
- Group 5: One German Admiral and one Navy escort.
 Escorts: Commander Robert V. Parker, 184800, USN
 Presentations: Both will travel in civilian clothes, by most direct route.
 Prisoner: Rear Admiral Otto Schultz
- Group 6: Eight prisoners and two ID escorts by water.
 Escorts: Captain Adolph A. Wolff, O-348028, ASG, and
 S/Sgt. Earl L. Rapp, 58753245
 Presentations: Travel by water to Bremerhaven, with maximum segregation on route. Escort officer will have complete key (Secret Instructions and Confidential Letter of authority to assist him at ports and on European continent. Captain Wolff is in overall command of Group 7 as well as Group 6. Both Groups may travel on same ship if segregated in separate cabins.
 Prisoners: Heinrich GUNDEL, GPO 1200
 Heinz R. GUNDEL, GPO 1419
 Konrad GUNDEL, GPO 1306

SECRET**TRANSLATION**

143 J.B.

COPIE**NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY****FRENCH REPUBLIC**

Paris, August 1944

Excellency,

I have brought to the attention of the Minister for ex-Prisoners of War the testimony of Mr. Joseph Bogenschutz, 35 Grand'Rue, at Mulhouse, (Haut Rhin), who was repatriated on last July 7 from Russia, from Camp 189-6 at Linskaya, which is 75 Kilometers from Novosibirsk, and who states that about 20 Alsatians and Luxemburgers were still in this Camp at the time of his departure.

Bogenschutz states that he wrote at least three cards a month through the Red Cross (Red Crescent) since September 1944 and that none of these cards ever arrived. He states that the Camp Commander is a German and that instead of repatriating Alsatians, he selects Germans for repatriation.

Bogenschutz, in addition thereto, alleges that there remain American, British, Belgian, Polish, Rumanian, Luxembourg, etc., nationals in the Camp.

I am bringing this matter to your attention more particularly because of the latter information.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(signed) HENRI MECK
 Deputy of
 the Bas-Rhin

DECLASSIFIED
 HQ. MECK, Dec. 73
 REID YODICO
 By SP4, NARA, Date 1/17/87

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES




144 J.B.

NO. 6100

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy,
Warsaw, Poland, July 15, 1946

SUBJECT: Transmitting List of American War Prisoners who were Registered by the Polish Red Cross.

RECEIVED
11:56
HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.
JUL 16 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



I have the honor to inform the Department that the Polish Red Cross at Warsaw, Poland has provided the Embassy with the names of 230 persons who were registered with the Polish Red Cross at Warsaw, Poland between February 1, 1945 and May 1, 1945 as American War prisoners. While the Polish Red Cross has stated that for several reasons beyond its control, some of the data set forth in the list may not be entirely accurate, the list as it was received from the Polish Red Cross is transmitted herewith in original and photograph.

It is suggested that the Department may wish to refer copies of the enclosed list to the office of the Provost Marshal General, War Department, for such action as that office may deem appropriate in the efforts it is exerting to ascertain the whereabouts and welfare of former American prisoners of war.

The Embassy has sent an appropriate note of appreciation to the Polish Red Cross for its action in sending the Embassy the list of names under discussion.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Edward J. Doran
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: CH N.

List of American war prisoners (Original and photograph).

740.00114A EW/7-1846

CS/JEC

740.001

SEP 10 1946

145
J.B.

Policy

In reply refer to
SPD 740.00114A E.W./9-546

My dear Mr. Freeman:

Representative Gerald W. Landis has requested the Department of State to endeavor to assist you in obtaining information regarding your son, Sergeant Forrest E. Freeman, who has been reported missing with his crew since December 1944, pursuant to the inquiry contained in your letter to him of September 2.

The War Department has informed this Department that its overseas commanders were recently queried as to the probability of personnel now carried in a missing status being located alive, and that the answers from all commanders reveal that no information had been brought to light by intensive investigations which would indicate the possibility that any will be found alive with the exception of those missing less than sixty days or those who may be deliberately absconding themselves from military control. However, if you will furnish exact information regarding your son the Department of State will be glad to undertake the desired inquiry through official channels. Such information should consist of his full name, Army serial number and mailing address, date and place of birth, the names of the members of his crew, particularly that of the plane commander, etc.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

Edward D. Malachukin
Assistant Chief
Special Projects Division

Mr. W. L. Freeman,

Ellettsville,

Indiana.

SPD:Miller:LD

9/12/46

146
J.B.~~SECRET~~In reply refer to
FCID 740.00114A/9-1146

740.00114A EW/9-1146

October 8, 1946

SECRET

To: Mr. Russell A. McViggen,
Liaison Branch, GAO, Rm 2009,
Temp B Bldg., 2nd & Q St., S. W.,
War Department, Washington D. C.

From: J. D. Neal, Chief, Division of Foreign
Activity Correlation.

Subject: U. S. Prisoner of War Camp Records.

There is enclosed for the information of the American Graves Registration Service, a copy of Secret despatch No. 1701 of September 11, 1946 from the American Embassy at London, England. The enclosure mentioned in the despatch was furnished to the Office of the Provost Marshall General of the Army by the Department on October 3, 1946 and presumably may be obtained from that office if it is believed to be of interest. Particular attention is invited to paragraph three of the despatch which indicates that the above-mentioned enclosure contains eye-witness reports of the shooting of at least one American prisoner.

Enclosures:

Copy of No. 1701, Sept 11, 1946
from London.

FCID 740.00114A

~~SECRET~~

740.00114A EW/9-1146

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 30, 1946

147
J.B.

SUBJECT: Sergeant Forrest E. Freeman

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Muncester, War Department and Mrs. Glover.

COPIES TO:

Mrs. Muncester at the War Department said on October 29 that Forrest E. Freeman was reported missing in action in December 1944, that he was on a B-17, Flying Fortress Bomber, which left its base in Italy on an operational bombing mission to Eleonhammer Oil Refinery, Germany. She further furnished information substantially the same as that contained in the attached letter of December 3, 1946 addressed to Mrs. Freeman by the War Department adding that the plane was seen to drop below and behind the formation about 125 miles from the Russian line. Mrs. Muncester read the following from a report prepared for transmission to Mrs. Luce who expressed an interest in Forrest E. Freeman:

Member of
Congress:
Cham Booth
Luce

The question of permission for United States military teams to enter Russian territory is one which has been discussed between United States and Soviet military authorities and has been presented by our diplomatic representatives in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Soviet authorities. The Russians have adopted a position that they are themselves making any necessary searches and will furnish

reports

State Dept
PolicyCS
FILE

DECLASSIFIED
AND
RECORDED
by K02, 11/11/00

148
5-8(STATE DEPARTMENT
POLICY STATEMENT)**Policy**

- 2 -

reports to us of their findings. At present Soviet-occupied Germany is being searched by three investigating teams which are making special investigations only. Negotiations for entry of Graves Registration units into Soviet-occupied Germany, Austria and Poland have so far been unsuccessful and it can not be predicted when these areas can be covered. All Americans who were liberated by the Russians have been returned to our forces and our military attache at Moscow, in cooperation with the Russian Government, has in all cases taken action to insure that all Americans discovered in Russian territory are returned promptly to our control.

SFD:EGlover:agw

The Wisconsin State Journal

MADISON, SUNDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1946

Iron Curtain Shrouds Lee's Fate

Parents Believe Russians Hold Him With 20,000 Other Yanks

Thousands of Americans who were captured by the Russians in May, 1945, are being held in the Soviet Union, according to a report from the State Department. The report says that the Russians are holding about 20,000 Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945. The report also says that the Russians are holding about 10,000 other Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945.

Iron Curtain Shrouds Fate of Lee

(Continued From Page One)
A group of Americans in America, who were captured by the Russians in May, 1945, are being held in the Soviet Union, according to a report from the State Department. The report says that the Russians are holding about 20,000 Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945. The report also says that the Russians are holding about 10,000 other Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945.

...the right to search for missing Americans in the Soviet Union. The report says that the Russians are holding about 20,000 Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945. The report also says that the Russians are holding about 10,000 other Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945.

...the right to search for missing Americans in the Soviet Union. The report says that the Russians are holding about 20,000 Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945. The report also says that the Russians are holding about 10,000 other Americans, including the missing pilot, Lt. Col. Robert G. Lee, who was shot down in the Korean Peninsula in May, 1945.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Projects
SPECIAL DIVISION

(Bedell Smith)

December 10, 1946

EE: Mr. Thompson

Reference the underlying file. So far as concerns paragraph 3 I agree that if the paragraph can be misinterpreted in the sense suggested by Miss James, an outsider could without effort arrive at the same impression. I am prepared therefore to make this change as suggested.

So far as concerns the second change suggested by Miss James I find that acceptance of this would leave the letter meaningless so far as concerns the group of persons we are discussing in that paragraph. It would make an entirely erroneous impression in the minds of the persons receiving the letter.

When Ambassador Smith was here he stated that the attitude of the Soviet Government in regard to the American deportees from the Balkans was entirely unsatisfactory but that we would not be in a position to protest until they flatly refused to release a person proven to be an American citizen and proven to be in the Soviet Union. That has not occurred and that is the important point in my opinion to stress to the public. The fact that we are presenting these cases to the Soviet Union is not in my opinion any reason why we should make a Pollyanna-ish presentation of the matter to the public.

I could understand a suggestion that we should add into the fourth paragraph of the draft letter a statement that we are currently presenting cases of this type to the Soviet Government and that they are under investigation by that Government, but to eliminate the sense of the statement on the grounds that we are presenting the cases does not appear to me to be logical.

I would

LYNN PAUL, Groceries

CRANDON, WISCONSIN

Jan. 19, 1947

(Robert) → former Under Secretary of War
Richard C. Patterson,
Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Letter to Miss Paul

Dear Sir:

I have read with interest the item in the Chicago Tribune of Jan. 9, "Envoy 'ledges help if it's proved B-24s hold any Americans".

My son was a gunner on a B-24 which flew from lower Italy to Vienna Austria during the last months of the war. On Feb. 19, 1945 they bombed Vienna and were hit over the target, killing one member of the crew. But they flew back over Yugoslavia and radioed their intention to bail out. Last radio coordinates were 43deg. 35min. north by 15 deg 0 min. east. 2:40 PM. The entire crew is still missing and presumed dead by our government.

Since Yugoslavia is Russian dominated, we understand free travel is forbidden and we have heard and still fear that American flyers are being held in that country.

If our searching teams are allowed in Yugoslavia it seems to us, that some evidence of the plane or the crew should have been found by now.

Any information you can give us will be appreciated.

Thanking you, I am,
Yours truly,

Miss Lynn Paul.

740.00114A EW/1-1947

740.00114A EW/1-1947

CS/N

FW 740.00114A EW/1-1947

ID - 100
Mr. Swales/5063/103

SECRET

152
J.B.

2 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, COLLECTIVE BRANCH, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SUBJECT: German Prisoners of War in U.S.S.R.
(Reference: CD No. 575.2)

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Research Project No. 5616 "German Prisoners of War in the U.S.S.R." which was forwarded by memorandum, subject as above, dated 17 March 1947.

2. It is requested that the following addendum be added to paragraph 2 of reference project:

In official communiques from June 1941 through 14 May 1945, published in the New York Times, the Soviets claim a minimum of 1,400,000 German prisoners of war, of which number at least 1,250,000 were rounded up after 8 May 1945. These figures do not include satellite prisoners. During the war many of the communiques did not give figures for captured, stating merely that many prisoners were taken. Considering this fact and the confusion during the rounding-up process after VE Day, the total figure given above may have been understated by as much as one million men.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

R. F. SWIS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief, Intelligence Group

SECRET

Hand carried
by Mr. Talt
SECOND SECTION COPY 3/24/47

FD

Frankfort, April 9, 1947

153
J.B.

Any record of Charles or
Carl Hilton and of William
or Bill Brown?

on Charles HILTON and William BROWN,
icans, supposedly held in Prisoner of
camp in Russia.

SPD:EKeller

of the United States Political Adviser
Frankfort has the honor to quote for
information and necessary action a
ust received from this Headquarters con-
cerning two Americans supposed to be held in a Prisoner
of War camp in Russia:

"The following report received in this
Division is transmitted herewith for your infor-
mation.

"An escaped German prisoner of war, while at
Camp 365 in SEVASTOPOL, Russia, made the acquaint-
ance of Subjects, two American prisoners at the
camp. He met them in July 1945 and saw them occa-
sionally from that time until his escape in October
1946. They had given him their names and vital
statistics and had asked him to report them to the
Americans if ever he had the chance. Subjects
claimed to have been studying at a university in
Germany and to have been taken into custody by the
Russians and placed in the SEVASTOPOL Camp. Available
information on Subjects is as follows:

"HILTON, Charles or Carl, born 16 October 1916
in the neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.

"BROWN, William or Bill, born 5 March 1919 in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin."


In triplicate to the Department.
Copy to CE - Mr. Riddleberger

File No. 711.4.
LRLentz:md

740.00114A EW/4-947

CC/A

SECRET



FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION:

1/4 Robert E. Chard
ROBERT E. CHARD
Colonel, GSC
Executive

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, 27 JAN 64
NARA, Date 11/14/84
155
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
INTRA-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
(FOR USE IN THE ONLY)

CLASSIFICATION
(BY AWT)

SECRET
J.R.

FILE NO. MID 918

SUBJECT Investigative Jurisdiction

TO: Executive, ID

FROM Ch/Security Group DATE 20 May 47 COMMENT NO. 1
NAME & TEL. Col. Rorney/mf/72595

1. Fifth Army Intelligence Report No. 2715, 7 October 1946, related to information obtained from a former officer who escaped from a German prison camp in Poland and who spent some time in Poland prior to his return to the U. S. Contained in the report was a reference to two possibly American born Soviet intelligence officers. Copy of this report was furnished to the FBI. In course of inquiries made by the FBI that agency determined that similar inquiries apparently were being pursued by the Fifth Army. The FBI has complained to ID regarding this apparent violation of the Delimitations Agreement by the Fifth Army.

2. The attached letter to the Fifth Army calls this matter to their attention. Recommend signature and dispatch.

1 Incl
Ltr to Fifth Army

L. R. RORNEY
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Security Group

TO: Security Group

FROM: Executive

22 May 1947

Ltr 21 May 1947 to CG, 5th Army was signed (jcm) and sent to



TO: Executive, ID

FROM Ch/Security Group DATE 5 June 47 COMMENT NO. 3
Col Rorney/mf/72595

1. 1st Ind. from Fifth Army, in reply to ID letter of 21 May 1947, indicates that the action taken was correct and in accord with the Delimitations Agreement. The attached 2d Ind. to Fifth Army acknowledges reply to ID letter and states opinion of this Division is that action taken was correct. Recommend signature and dispatch.

1 Incl
2d Ind to Fifth Army

L. R. RORNEY
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Security Group

TO: Security Group

FROM: Executive

10 June 1947

2nd Ind dated 9 June 1947 to 5th Army was signed (mas) and dispatched.



SECRET

SECRET

EX-100/2/1/1/1/1

21 May 47

156
3.8.

END 918

SUBJECT: Investigation Aviation

TO: Commanding General
Fifth Army
Chicago, Illinois
ATTENTION: A.C. of S., G-2

1. The following is furnished for information only.

2. Fifth Army Intelligence Report No. 2715, dated 7 October 1944, related to information obtained from a former officer who escaped from a Soviet prison camp in Poland and who spent some time in Poland prior to his return to the United States. Disclosed in the report was a reference to the possibility that some Soviet Intelligence officers, who were in the Soviet Union, had been in contact with the Fifth Army. It was interesting to the extent of trying to identify the two individuals in question.

3. In the course of the inquiries made by the FBI, that agency determined that similar inquiries apparently were being pursued by the Fifth Army. In making a contact in this matter at the Fort Monmouth Company the FBI learned that one Major Franklin G. Morgan, Headquarters, Fifth Army, had been to Detroit during October, 1944, investigating this matter. The FBI has concluded to the Intelligence Division regarding this apparent violation of the Detention Agreement by the Fifth Army.

SECRET

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

- 1 -

157
J.R.

Many of these citizens left the United States after World War I, some travelling on American passports and some on foreign passports issued to their alien parents. Some of these persons did not hold themselves out to be American citizens while residing abroad before and during World War II nor did they maintain ties with the United States during that time. The governments of the countries in which they reside contend that they are not citizens of the United States but rather citizens of the countries in which they have lived and worked for many years and where they raised their families. This Government, of course, does not recognize this contention and continues to assert the American citizenship of such persons when such citizenship has been established in accordance with our law.

The figure in line 2 concerns so-called national American citizens excluding official personnel. However any effort to distinguish between dual nationals and persons who are citizens only must be tentative in view of the singular later revelation of nationality laws exercised by Communist governments. Many of those the list in line 2 have not communicated with our missions for several years and it has not been possible to determine their present circumstances or whereabouts. Some of those have possibly renounced their citizenship, some may have died and several would probably prefer to remain where they are. Those who have communicated with our missions and expressed a desire to return to the United States have been assisted by our missions, to the best of their ability, in their efforts to obtain exit visas for return to this country.

The figure in line 3 is probably fairly accurate, but some American citizens may have departed these countries without informing our missions of their movements.

The figure in line 4 concerns only those American citizens who have informed our missions that they are unable to depart because of the failure of the Communist government to grant them exit documentation. There are probably many others in this category of whom our missions have no knowledge.

Line 5 concerns those Americans who when last heard from were in labor camps, prisons or concentration camps throughout the orbit. Specific information concerning those in this category is contained in the secret annex to this memorandum.

Line 6 concerns individuals about whom we have no positive knowledge at this time, save under circumstances which would indicate that they are presently incarcerated. Specific information concerning persons in this category is also contained in the secret annex to this memorandum.

Only two citizen government employees have defected. They are Charles McFar, Administrative Assistant in the Agency to Review and Defect


defected

1947

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1177

NEWSPAPER, APRIL 7, 1947



These wartime pamphlets urging opposition to Hitler were put out by the German officers' Band--still a factor in the mystery of what happened to 2,000,000 missing Germans captured by the Soviets

the story on the Volga city: The Führer... the marshal. "I will let you in on the secret. As soon as Stalingrad is captured, Turkey and Japan will attack the Soviets."

Where Are the POW's?

After four or five years in Russia and after exposure to Russian women, most of the German prisoners we took won't want to go back. They'll marry and settle down. Certainly we've got more Germans than 2,000,000, but we need them more than Germany does. Now the French say the Germans emigrate. We say: They went out to Russia in 1911-14. Let them stay emigrated."

A Soviet officer in Berlin last week gave this hard-boiled description of Russian prisoner-of-war policy. This week Secretary Marshall planned a busy and detailed challenge to the Soviet on the whole question of German prisoners. He was armed with a fresh intelligence report that estimated that the Russians had captured about 4,000,000 Germans. Minister Molotov had previously stated that 1,000,000 had been returned and 2,000,000 remained in Russia. That was about 2,000,000 unaccounted for. What were they and what were they doing? And did they possibly represent either a tool or a club for the Russians to wield in Germany?

Quick or Dead? A good many of the 2,000,000 may be dead. Russian communiques did not include a separate category for wounded prisoners. Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, were counted as prisoners even if they had little chance of survival. The lack of hospital facilities, transportation bottlenecks, and the Russian notorious scorn for the "Fascist leeches" all would make things tough for a wounded prisoner. As late as July 1946 a trainload of healthy Wehrmacht officers, en route from

Oranienburg concentration camp to the Caucasus, arrived with 11 per cent of 111,000 occupants dead and 60 per cent seriously ill.

Many of the missing 2,000,000 may have been deliberately misclassified as civilian workers instead of POW's. Germans in Russian camps were reported to have been offered the choice of staying in confinement or winning freedom and better rations by signing a contract to work as civilians for the reconstruction of Russia, the German labor to which the Russians believe they are entitled under the Yalta restoration pact.

In screening POW's the Russians rate them according to health, stamina, and skill, rather than rank. "Able and technically skilled" prisoners go into Category I; "able" into Category II. The lame, the halt, and the blind become Category III and IV, marked for early discharge. Of all the prisoners returned from Russia to the American zone, 20 per cent require immediate medical treatment. And meanwhile, the Soviets continue shipping prisoners out of Germany. In ten days of February 1948, the rail way can move railroad from German concentration camps (now being used as POW screening centers) to Russia.

Combined Staff: Russia's cavalier treatment of Wehrmacht prisoners is a serious political liability inside Germany. But by the same token, their return at a psychological moment could be an immense asset in a big-power struggle for influence in the Reich.

Their utility as instruments of future Russo-German collaboration could be greatly increased by the fact that channels for such collaboration already exist. They were created during the war, when expatriate German Communists and high-ranking Wehrmacht officers were formed into the Free Germany Committee. Under Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus and Gen. Walter von Seydlitz,

who were captured at Stalingrad, Committee propagandized German soldiers to surrender en masse to the Germans. A subsidiary of the committee is the Band Deutscher Offiziere (Union German Officers), a transmission belt for the pro-Russian indoctrination of German officers.

Now Paulus and Seydlitz live together in a college near Moscow. Both are reported receiving no military training. A bright young Soviet Army officer, 3,000 other German officers, members of the Band, are in prisoner camps. They include about 60 generals among them the commander of the Feldherrnhalle division (four of whose officers will go on trial in Munich next week as leaders of a Nazi underground). Crick Luftwaffe officers, one of the former jet-pilot test pilots for Luft are reported training Soviet pilots. German, at Russian, teach air and tactics to the Poles. Together with students, these former German officers may constitute a German-Russian force capable of quick expansion.

About 100 Band officers have returned to Germany, ostensibly as demobilized civilians, but some actually wearing German uniforms. Paul Markgraf, a former friend of Paulus and Seydlitz, now chief of police in Berlin, and others in the administration of the Soviet zone. Even the gemstone soldier (prize when redeployed from a POW camp) Russia, can be useful. American intelligence officers say that hundreds of them returned to the western zones, act as forerunners for the Russians.

REICH: The Unions Vote Red

The mills of democracy grind slow and sometimes they also grind strange. Last October, for example, Berlin the Russian-sponsored Social

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Germany 159
J.S.

WDGSP/C3 17689

23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL S. J. CHAMBERLIN:

With reference to your forthcoming trip to the European Theater it is requested that information be obtained for this Division on the following items:

Statue of arrangements made, being made or to be made and difficulties encountered therein relative to search and recovery of American dead in Russian occupied or Russian dominated territory.

Smith
Mr. LUTHE *offsc*
Lieutenant General, GSC
Director of Service, Supply
and Procurement

*I left him into the hands of the Russians
and to be seen*

Dir. P. H. H. H.
Feb 54 61 21

20800
INCL. 1

UNCLASSIFIED REF ID: A612356
 NARA, Date: 11/11/2011

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
 Office of the Director of Intelligence
 APO 771, c/o PX, ST, ST

33 July 1946

SUBJECT: US Personnel Alleged Held by Soviets

TO: Director of Intelligence
 General Staff, U. S. Army
 Washington 25, D. C.

The enclosed CIC report is forwarded for possible use in tracing missing US personnel.

C P BIXEL
 Colonel G2C
 Dir of Intel

1 Encl:
 NOI dtd 15 June 1946

Telephone: VIENNA 2-47743

175 CS910 383.7 255A

13 June 48

RECEIVED 10 AUG 1946

NAME	RANK	SER. NO.
HERRARD, Paul R.	1 Lt.	O 726 565
JOHANNSON, Eric L.	Boon	Z 137 504
KERCHNER, Richard C.	Pfc	6 947 136
LAMB, Frederick A.	S/Sgt	34 275 916
LANSER, Richard C.	Ch. Off.	BL. No. 105 458
LORD, Cyril H.	2 Lt.	O 704 739
LURACK, Joseph G.	F/O	T - 61 544
NEIGHBOURS, Fleet B.	Ch. Steward	Z 112 406
NIS, Walter	S/Sgt	37 307 545
OBINSON, Roy A.	Slt	611 06 37
ROLAND, Donald R.	Lt (16)	175 115
STINSON, Donald C.	Sgt	36 412 844

BURIAL LOCATION

U.S. Cemetery, North Sembrat,
 USSR, Plot A, Row 1, Grave 4.
 Small Island, N.E. of
 Molokov, USSR.
 U.S. Cemetery, North Sembrat,
 USSR, Plot A, Row 1, Grave 3
 Cape Lopatka, Kamchatka,
 USSR.
 Second Christian Cemetery,
 Odessa, USSR.
 *** Gorge Lopatka-Kamchatka,
 USSR.
 U.S. Cemetery, North Sembrat,
 USSR, Plot A, Row 1, Grave 1
 Archangel, USSR.
 Haplogard, P O W Camp No 6,
 Grave 3.
 City Cemetery, Muransk, in
 lot for Foreigners. USSR.
 British Port, Komsomolskoye
 Cemetery, Archangel, USSR.
 U.S. Cemetery, North Sembrat,
 USSR, Plot A, Row 1, Grave 3

AT THE NATIONAL ARCH

14 MAR 1948

110 03911 383.7 255A

162 J.R.

15 June 1948

SUBJECT: USFR - American Army Personnel in Confinement

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

The following information was obtained from a former forced laborer who claimed to have been confined in an unregistered lager with Subject personnel. Informant claimed to have been released through an error committed by the commandant of the Moscow hospital where she was transferred because of infantile paralysis.

Approximately 60 km from Moscow, in the direction of Kalina, there is an unregistered labor camp. The confines, 150 men and 50 women, work in coal mines in the vicinity of the camp. Among those confined are 3 American Air Force soldiers who were captured by the German Wehrmacht, Czechoslovakia, during April 1945. The men are:

Charlie, 21 years, 170 cm, blond, blue eyes, has paralyzed right shoulder.

Joe, 25 years, 165 cm, dark blond, dark eyes, has stomach wound and is confined in lager infirmary.

Albert, 27 years, 170 cm, black hair, brown eyes, has stiff left hip and burn scar on left side of face, is from Texas.

The lager confines will never be repatriated and are not permitted to write letters.

SOURCE: CIC Report

Evaluation: F - 3

Reliability cannot be judged
Possibly true

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, SEC 1.6

By VSW NARA, Date 7/24/78

163
3.8.

3/9/284

Army Intel

Proj. Decimil file

HVG-194P

From 381 USSR

TO 385.2 USSR

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation MID 383.4 U.S.S.R. - 31 Dec 46

Date 10 Sept 46

From SSU

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/SSU

Authority

7/24/78

Date

WITHDRAWAL
NOT REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
10
2
5
R.W.

164
32
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 1.3

NARA, Date 7/26/78

13
(These Security withdrawal
Notices follow the
Presidents of American
Powell's, in the Archives)

Army Intel
Pres. Declass file
1946-1948
From 381 USSR
TO 385.2 USSR

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation MID 383.4 U.S.S.R. - 31 Dec 46

Date 9 Oct 46

From CIG

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/CIG

Authority

7/26/78
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ID

2p

⑤

R.N.

U.S. Government paying for American remains
from 1946-1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



In reply refer to
DS

April 18, 1960

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to a letter dated April 3, 1950 from the Department of the Army (Army reference QMGMB 293 (Russia) and previous correspondence concerning the exhumation and delivery to American authorities at Berlin of the remains of sixteen American World War II dead presently buried in the Soviet Union. The letter of April 3 states that the Quartermaster General, the Department of the Army representative on matters concerning repatriation of World War II dead, agrees to make available to the State Department through the medium of advanced transfer of funds, \$34,000 to be utilized for paying the Soviet authorities for the expenses of exhuming and delivering these remains, the fund computations being based on the Soviet expense estimate of 204,000 rubles.

The suggestion that a working fund be established is agreeable to the Department of State. The Department understands that this money is to be expended by it to reimburse the Soviet authorities for expenses amounting to 204,000 rubles which they have stated will be incurred by them in exhuming the remains of the sixteen American World War II dead now interred in Soviet territory and delivering the remains to Berlin to be transferred to American authorities.

In accordance with the request contained in the letter of April 3, there is enclosed completed Standard Form 1080 in triplicate, together with six copies of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

John E. Peurifoy
Deputy Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Standard Form 1080.
2. Six extra copies of present letter.

The Honorable

Frank C. Pace, Jr.,
Secretary of the Army.

OSa 293 Russian (4-18-50)
CSUSA 293 (18 Apr 50)

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

166

J.B.

QUEST 205 Speed

Chief, Division of Protective Services
Department of State
Room 206, 515-22nd St., N. W.
Washington, D. C.

ATTENTION: Mrs. Alice B. Carroll

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to letter this Office, dated 3 April 1960, concerning advance transfer of funds in amount of \$25,000 for reimbursing Soviets for exhuming the remains of sixteen (16) American World War II Dead, file as above; phone call on 13 July, Mrs. Carroll to Colonel Hinson and classified telegram #107 forwarded to this Office on 13 July 1960.

The Quartermaster General agrees to make available to the State Department through the medium of advance transfer of funds, \$17,000 additional to be utilized by the American Embassy for reimbursing the Soviet authorities for expenses of exhuming the remains of sixteen (16) American World War II Dead. It is understood that this amount together with the \$34,000 previously made available will completely reimburse the Russians to the extent of 204,000 rubles, dollar conversion rate of four (4) rubles to the dollar and that the additional funds are required because of a decrease in exchange rate.

It is requested that, if the above indicated action is agreeable to the State Department, concurrence be indicated by written advice, and transmittal of a completed Standard Form 1080 supported by six (6) copies of State Department agreement to this Office, requesting the advance transfer of funds and indicating the purpose of transfer.

Sincerely yours,

J. G. WHICHEM
Major, INO
Memorial Division

CONCURRENCE:

Fiscal Division

CONCURRENCE:

Mission Office

20 July 1960

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

167

Moore, Blanche L.
From

Nov. 10, 1949

740.00114 a 21
/11-1049

Regarding a demand for the immediate release of 400
American Veterans that are being held by the Russians.

RM

cmc/BI

New York Life
Insurance Co.
Harrisburg, Pa.
From

Jan. 23, 1948

740.00114 PW
/1-2348

Regarding Bealittle filers interned by the Soviet
Union.

SPD

msf/m

State Department
Special Projects
Division
From Bailey

Feb. 6, 1948
Memo.740.00114 PW
/1-2348

Memorandum of conversation between Colonel Hinson,
from War Department and Captain George, and Mr.
Bailey, regarding Bealittle filers interned by the
Soviet Union.

msf/m


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

These are
missing from the file
msf

NARA, Date 12/13/80

169 3.0 By VSW

PS 84 Foreign Service Posts of the U.S.
 Policy 1950-52 Political Advisor for Japan Samuel R. Bonds, 1950-52
 Box 7 321-4-122-3



FROM: TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DEPT OF STATE WASH DC.....ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING MESSAGE

DS /WS/ATD/keb

DATE: 12 Dec 1950
NO: 1177

Following is text of statement on survey re unrepatriated Japanese released to press Dec 11 by Public Information Division FONOFF:

"The number of Japanese nationals in the areas under the control of the Soviet Forces at the time of surrender was about 2,726,000, of which about 2,357,000 have been repatriated and the remainder, approximately 370,000 in number, have not been returned. Although among those still unrepatriated there are believed to be many without family or home in Japan, there are 316,339 of whom the names are known or some definite information has been received as of 31 August 1950 after intensive examination and careful checking of reports submitted by the families of unrepatriated internees, prisoner of war correspondence and data furnished by repatriates and various available rosters. This figure will increase as investigations beginning with the overall survey made in conjunction with the national census of October 1 proceed."

SIBALD

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. E. BUSH
 Brigadier General, AGD
 Adjutant General

W. J. SIBALD
 Chief, Diplomatic Section

Info Copies:

1/R: This is informational message on
 subject of current interest to
 Department of State.

CINC
 C/S
 G-2
 PIO
 AG

ATK 26-5776

UNCLASSIFIED

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECURITY: SECRET

PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

TO: Department of State

611.6224/11-1450

FROM: USPOLAD, Heidelberg

November 14, 1950

REF:

SUBJECT: American Citizen Allegedly Held in USSR

There is quoted below the text of a letter, dated September 7, 1950 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Tokyo, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA, Washington, regarding an American citizen allegedly held in a prisoner-of-war camp in Karaganda:

"1. Interrogation of two Japanese repatriates from the USSR reveal the possibility that an American man was being held in Soviet forced labor camps as of 1948.

"2. One of the informants, who was repatriated 21 January 1950, reports having seen and talked with an American, name unknown, at the 99-13 PW camp in Karaganda between May and June 1948. The American was described as 25-26 years of age, 5'6" tall, weight 110 pounds, blonde hair, blue eyes, lean face. The repatriate "heard" that the American was an "ex-GI" who was captured in Europe near a large river (possibly the Elbe) after being lost from his unit during the last war. He was reportedly tried at Moscow and Karaganda by a military court on charges of espionage and received a 10-year sentence. According to the informant, the American spoke Russian fairly well and his German language ability was good.

2
Americans

"3. The second informant, repatriated 22 April 1950, reports that an American prisoner arrived at Karabas convict camp southwest of Karaganda about 22 August 1948. The American was quartered in the same room with the interrogator for three days. The informant states that the American was reportedly captured somewhere in Germany and sentenced to 25 years in prison on charges of espionage. He was described as 25 years of age, height 5'7", weight 160 pounds, medium build, large mouth, long face, reddish-brown hair, blue eyes, fluent in German and Russian. He was reportedly "treated by other prison inmates, who blamed the United States for their predicament. Informant states that the American was transferred to special quarters in the same camp in late August 1948.

"4. Attention is invited to similarities in the two reports at the present time;

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 871026

By: [signature] NARA Date: [signature]

AJHogden:eor

ACTION COPY - DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this document (action copy) to the [signature] file with an endorsement of action taken.

170 J.B.

SECRET

2 Heidelberg No. 100

however, other repatriates from the same areas will be contacted as soon as possible on this special target. It is recommended that the European Command be queried on this subject and/or any pertinent data be forwarded for the information of this Command".

The above quoted letter was made available by Intelligence Division, European Command. That office recently made available a report, dated October 13, 1950 from 7707 European Command Intelligence Center, giving information from a European source, regarding an American allegedly held in a prison at Karanganda:

"1. The following information was extracted verbatim from MIS field report 7827/24 dated 13 February 1950, Fuessen Team Case No. 210, Classified Document Register BS-0695; PW source 256051; G-2 Hq US Con Log No. 1715, dated 24 February 1950. Date of information is March 1947 to November 1949. The MIS field report did not give any evaluation.

"2. Source states that he knows of one American who is interned in one of the camps in KARANGANDA (49°52'N - 73°10'E), KAZAKH SSR. Source bases his statement on the following: One day in October 1949, after he had returned from work, one of his fellow PWs in the barrack told him of an incident he had witnessed that day. On his way to work with his group, he was passing the vicinity of the airstrip when he saw Soviet militia and MVD soldiers start beating a man who had been walking in the area. The man cried out that he would not stand for that sort of treatment and that he was an American citizen. They then beat him and mistreated him all the more and called him a spy. A car of the MVD police arrived upon the scene, and the man was dragged into it and presumably taken to MVD headquarters. Source never saw the man again, nor did any of his comrades, but they heard that he had joined the other persons who were interned in the area."

"3. The MIS field report did not contain any indication that the information obtained from the source had been reported separately by MIS 7827/24."

"4. The MIS field report is now being processed for publication by 7707 ECIC."

R.L. + J.P.
Robert F. Corrigan,
Foreign Service Officer

Policy

171
J.B.

JAN 24 1950

In reply refer
to 22.

Dear Mrs. Moore:

Reference is made to your letter of November 10, 1949 in which you referred to a number of American soldiers who are purportedly being held as prisoners in the "Iron Curtain" countries. It is presumed that the soldiers to whom you refer were allegedly taken prisoner during the second world war.

The terms of the agreement reached by the United States with the Soviet Government on February 11, 1945 at Yalta provided for the mutual repatriation of all American citizens liberated by the Soviet Armed Forces and of all Soviet citizens liberated by the American Armed Forces. On November 26, 1946 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the American Embassy in Moscow that, "according to information received by the Ministry from the appropriate Soviet authorities there are no American citizens in prisoner-of-war camps in the Soviet Union."

The Adjutant General Department of the Department of the Army, the organization concerned with Army personnel, has informed the Department of State that, according to its records, all of the American prisoners who were freed from prison camps and all of the American flyers who were forced to land in the Soviet Union have been recovered by the American military authorities. It was likewise asserted that no evidence exists as to the detention of American prisoners of war in the other "Iron Curtain" countries.

The

Mrs. Blanche L. Moore

115 Michigan Avenue,

Shelby, Michigan.

LCR-61-100

51

172

J.B.

(Pentagon and CIA
had it)

- 2 -

The Department of State has no information to indicate that the above statements are not correct. In the event that you have an inquiry regarding some individual who has not returned from the war, it is suggested that you communicate with the Adjutant General, Department of the Army. You may be assured that such a case would receive every possible consideration.

Sincerely yours,

FR
Frederick Reinhardt
Deputy Director
Office of Eastern European Affairs

FORM 8-58
7-58

, INDICATE

Collect

Charge Department

Change to

Livesightings - 1950's
OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AMEMBASSY

CANBERRA

27

DEPT has proposed to UK, FR and AUSTRAL (thru EMB here) that they join US in submitting to next GA question of failure USSR to repatriate or otherwise acct for POWs and civilian internees detained in SOV territory. Since possibility SOV cooperation in implementing any GA RES on this matter is slight, principal purpose in bringing such problem forward wld be to inform world opinion and exert moral pressure. However, every effort wld be made assure that presentation this case wld be factual and restrained.

Case wld be presented under ARTs 10 and 11 of Charter as situation continuance of which impairs friendly relations between USSR and western-powers. (On this basis we do not believe ART 107 wld present any legal difficulty). Case wld consist factual record SOV failure either repatriate or acct for vast number GER, JAP and other POWs as well as civilians deported to USSR, despite repeated Allied appeals and in clear violation of Moscow Agreement APR 1947, Potsdam Proclamation 1945, SCAP-USSR Agreement 1946 and recognised standards international conduct.

FR have indicated opposition to presentation case and DEPT now considering possibility proceeding without them if UK and AUSTRAL agree.

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173

J.B.

1 P.M.

CONTROL

4874

AUG 16 1950

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CIR

April 30

P.H.

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SECURED
OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET FILE

S/H

174 J.B.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Charge to

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

-2-

agree. UK reaction not yet obtained. AUSTRAL EMB
awaiting reactions govt.]

Since supplementary list of items for agenda closes AUG 20,
necessary reach decision on submission item soonest.

Forgoing for your info if consulted by POWOFF. If consulted,
you shld refrain from persuasion since in view FR attitude it by
no means certain we will decide proceed.

Acheson
GRI
ACHESON

ACHESON

INTRODUCTION
DESIRABLE
(OFFICES ONLY)

EUR. INT. SECURITY
8/16/50

S/S-CR

AUG 16 1230 A.M.

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 61735-
CO NO.

175
J.B.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 9 Apr. 1951

SUBJECT

NO. OF PAGES 1

2. POW Camps, Liaison and Training

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.
same as aboveDATE OF
INFO.

Early April 1951, except as stated

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					GRADING OF CONTENT				
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1.

2.

3.

Officers captured in North Korea by the Chinese Communists are now interned
in a former army prison in Liaison. Detained men are confined in concentration
camps in Pungwon (125-57, 12-13). The daily routine includes physical
exercise, political training in Chinese and Russian, and analysis of the
Korean war by Communist political directors. A specially printed paper is
distributed daily. Personnel assigned to manage the camps have been greatly
increased. Most of them are volunteers who were students in foreign language
departments of the various Chinese universities.

Comment: SO-61736 reported 12 POW camps in Liaison and
Pungwon.

Document No. 2
No Change to Main ☐
☐ Deleted
Class. Changed To TS ☐
Auth. ☐ TC-2
CC-M A.A.A. 501 P. 1

BY CABLE
APPROVED FOR

176

J.B.

REPRODUCED COPY

ANTHONY OF DOCUMENT HOME CROSS FILE		CROSS FILE BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
		2 May 1951	
SUBJECT		DATE	
Treatment of Political Prisoners in Soviet Penal Institutions			
SUMMARY INFORMATION			
This document concerns life in the Moscow prisons of LEFORTOVSKAYA, GULICHANSKI, and BOUTOVSKAYA. The subject of this document is mentioned in the following way: WALLINBERG: The Soviet authorities have no examples in holding as prisoners for years old diplomats, functionaries, officers, without any trial or judgment. Their purpose in this is to obtain as far as possible information, revelations, and denunciations. They also want to have a certain number of hostages on hand for eventual exchange of prisoners. Thus the Soviet authorities arrested, after their entry into Budapest, at the end of World War II, the Constable of the Swedish Legation, WALLINBERG, who was entrusted with the protection of the interests of several nations and owing to this fact was an object of many things. He had never acted against the Russians, but in their eyes he constituted an excellent source of information. He is still in some prison in Moscow, unless he is already dead. . . . THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
REPRODUCED COPY		APPROVED FOR	
CROSS-REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
		15 MAY 1952	

FORM 56-34

DE PAGE

 FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

S.B. 177

ACTION

is assigned to

August 13, 1951

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Department of State

FROM: INCONSISTENT, CONFIDENT

RE: None

SUBJECT: RELEASE AND RELOCATION: Jimmy RODEFELDER and John BOAKER

Information has been indirectly furnished to the Consulate General by a returned German prisoner of war in Russia concerning a request of two American citizen prisoners of war in Russia that their whereabouts be made known to their relatives in the United States.

The two American citizens are Jimmy Rodelfelder (or Rodhefelder), from Cincinnati, Ohio (or New Orleans), 38 years old, physician and officer in the United States Air Force and John Boaker (or Frager), Cincinnati, about 35 years old, painter, and soldier in the United States Air Force. They were taken prisoner some time in 1944. They are reportedly in Stalingrad in the International Brigade (Camp 7362/3).

The informer's address is known to the Consulate General should any further information be desired.

9/18/51 neither PD nor
 DC/R can find any
 record of these persons.

Transmitted by form to Army
 for info. to file

9/19/51
 J

(Send Lots)

HFNelson/r10

44

UNCLASSIFIED

611.61241/8-1551

CS/R

611.61241 8-1551

174
J.B.

CLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 63759

CD NO.

INTEROFFICE 11
DATE DISTR. 6 May 1951

NO. OF PAGES 11

NO. OF ENCLS.
EXCLUDED REPORTSUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY China/Korea

SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in Canton

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO.

11 April-20 April 1951

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT						
COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE	USUALLY UNRELIABLE	POSSIBLY UNRELIABLE	NOT USUALLY UNRELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	B	C	D	E	F. X	1	2	3	4	5	6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

At 6:00 p.m. on 11 April twenty-five American prisoners of war from Korea arrived in Canton by rail from Hankow. On 20 April they were being held in three foreign-style houses at the end of Tung Sun (Tung Sun) Road, with 50 armed police and some plain-clothes men to guard the area. These guards had two machineguns.

Source: [REDACTED] Don Long, [REDACTED] carried a story on 27 April saying that two groups of American prisoners of war were sent by rail from Hankow to Canton on 15 and 20 April. One of these groups was reported as more than twenty men and the other more than thirty, and all are lodged on Tung Sun Road, Chungshan. Source is being queried as to whether his report is a confirmation of the newspaper item.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 63781

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 24 May 51

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.
EXCLUDED REPORTSUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT Situation in Fuhien

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO.

January 1951

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE	USUALLY UNRELIABLE	POSSIBLY UNRELIABLE	NOT USUALLY UNRELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	B	C	D	E	F. X	1	2	3	4	5	6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The former Japanese shrine in Fuhien has been converted into an American "train camp." On one occasion the American prisoners of war were seen being delivered there by jeep. After the outbreak of war in Korea, Fuhien became overcrowded with wounded men who have crowded all local hospitals and available civilian houses. The local population has been advised by the government to leave. Fuhien has become a rendezvous of service men. Young men and students there are still enthusiastic about joining the army.

180
J.B.CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORTREPORT NO. SO 45064*
CD NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 29 May 1951

SUBJECT 1. Arrival of American Prisoners of War in Canton
2. Transfer of American Prisoners of War from Canton to Kwailin

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(SEE REPORT)

DATE OF INFO.

23 April, 2 May 1951

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

- On 23 April forty-five American prisoners of war arrived in Canton at 6:00 p.m. on two special cars of the Canton-Hankow Railroad. They were under guard of the garrison regiment of the Central and South China Military Area and were taken to private houses on Tung Sun Road, Tungshan, Canton, near the Kuangtung-Suangsi Baptist Hospital.
- On 30 April Chinese Communist authorities in Peking ordered that American prisoners of war, being detained at Tung Sun Road, East Canton, be taken to Kwailin. At 3:00 a.m. on 2 May two trains, accompanied by four armed cars, were conveying prisoners to the Tientsin Station.

Comment. SO-45715 states that 25 American prisoners of war were brought to Canton on 11 April. Newspaper stories in Hong Kong carried similar stories at about the same time. Though dates and numbers of prisoners vary, they all report the same place of detention.

Document No.

CLASSIFICATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORTREPORT NO. SO 46710
CD NO.181
J.B.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 27 June 1951

SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in South China

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO.

As stated

NO. OF ENCLS.
(SEE REPORT)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

- In early April American prisoners of war from Hanoi began arriving in Hankow, where they were turned over to the Chinese Communist Central and South China Military Command. By 15 April approximately 500 had arrived in Hankow, and on 18 April some of these prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hankow under heavy guard.
- In mid-April 60 prisoners of war, most of whom were Americans and the rest British, arrived in Canton via the Canton-Hankow railway. In early May they were being detained in a foreign-style compound at the corner of Tungsha Road, East, and Shichichow (SE 1/4) in Tungshan, Canton. There were barbed wire barricades around the compound, and a Public Security division mounted a heavy guard around the area. No one was allowed to enter without permission from high Communist authorities. The prisoners were treated fairly well, and were given good food and blankets.
- In mid-June 52 American prisoners of war from Hanoi were incarcerated in the Baptist church on Tungsha Road, Canton. These prisoners were sent to Canton because the Chinese Communist authorities hoped to obtain military and medical supplies from the United States Government in return for their release. They planned to demand U. S. \$100,000 worth of supplies for each prisoner released. The British and Indian Governments were to be used as intermediaries.

- Comment. According to another informant, there was no indication, as of 24 May, that American prisoners of war were being sent to Canton. There were no barbed wire barricades at the end of Tungsha Road, East, Canton.



BY CABLE

14 MAY 1951

192
J.B.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO 66760-00

- 2 -

2. Comment. Casual informants have stated that as of 20 April 25 American prisoners of war who had arrived in Canton were being held in three foreign style houses at the end of Tungsan Road, East. See SO-63715 and SO-65066. SO-65066 reports that some of these prisoners were transferred to Beulin on 2 May.
3. Comment. According to some Chinese sources in Hong Kong, the presence of United States or United Nations troops in Canton as of mid-June cannot be confirmed. The original report appeared in the Hong Kong newspaper Wing Tse Jih Pao (like the Hong Kong Pinger Standard, a publication of 10 June 1950) in late April. The reporter probably based his information on the statement of a traveller from Canton, who stated he had seen prisoners in Tungsan. The Wing Tse Jih Pao would print any news embarrassing to the United States.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SC (582)

CD NO.

DATE DIST. 12 AUG 51

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
LISTED BELOWSUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Korea/China

SUBJECT Communist Treatment of United Nations
PrisonersPLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO.

October 1950 - February 1951

GRADINGS OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADINGS OF CONTENT				
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	SOMETIMES RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	SOMETIMES TRUE	NOT TRUE	NOT TRUE
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J

(Except as noted)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

- One Republic of Korea soldier who was captured by the Communists on 29 October 1950 was sent to a war prison camp at Pyukong (125-26, 10-36) in North Pyong-ang. This camp in early November had about 1,000 American war prisoners, of whom about 700 were negroes, approximately 1,500 ROK prisoners, and about 350 ROK civilian employees of the United Nations forces. These men were classified by nationality and housed in barracks which accommodated about 70 men each. All prisoners were questioned and searched every three days but were otherwise left to themselves. Each man received a daily ration of 700 grams of millet, barley, or corn, in theory, but actually they received mostly corn and salt in about half the assigned quantities. Additional food could be obtained by bartering watches, uniforms, boots, and cigarettes. No blankets or bedding of any kind were supplied, but straw was available.
- ROK prisoners were released after a period of several months (the soldier reporting their facts was released on 30 December) and given the choice of joining the North Korean army, settling down as civilians in North Korea, or returning to their homes. Most of those released were first-year soldiers or civilians. They were issued certificates of release which could be presented on their way back home in order to obtain food from local residents. Villagers stated that food given to released soldiers was deducted from their ration in kind.
- The Chinese and North Korean Communist troops referred to the war prisoners as "liberated soldiers."
- Seven Americans were captured in Seoul on 6 January 1951 and were turned over to the Seoul head-quarters of the North Korean army. According to an officer of the North Korean State Security Bureau, they were scheduled to be sent to Pyongyang as soon as orders from general headquarters there arrived for their transfer. On 10 February, they were still in Seoul and were seen pulling handcarts from the West Gate toward the East Gate, under the supervision of three North Korean soldiers. All the Americans appeared undernourished and weak from hard labor.

194
J.E.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

50-65823

-4-

0-6

During the Communist offensive against Seoul in early January, the Chinese Communist forces in the Yangju (27-42, 37-47) area captured about a hundred men and officers of the ROK army. The Chinese did not kill any of these prisoners but questioned each man separately. After this interrogation they released all the soldiers but kept officers, master sergeants, city residents, and high school graduates, who, it was rumored, would be sent to Manchuria for Communist indoctrination. The released soldiers were issued travel certificates permitting them to return home.

A staff member of the State Security Bureau in Seoul on 12 February stated that all American prisoners of war were sent to camps in Midden, Tongshan, and Antung Provinces of Manchuria, where they were put to hard labor in mines and factories.

50-714 865

CLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 80 49071

CD NO. INTELLIGENCE

DATE DISTR. 21 Aug. 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT US Prisoners of War in Communist China

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO.

Date: 21 Aug. 1951

REFERENCE COPY

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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

STATUS OF PRISONERS				REASON FOR PRESENT STATUS OF PRISONERS											
RECEIVED	RELEASED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED	REMOVED

SOURCE

- On 2 August 1951, US prisoners of war from Korea, who had been held in the Republic of China, were taken to the Republic of China by train for Peking via North Korea. A platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers.
- In late July 1951, prisoners in the central part of the Republic of China, captured in the Yangtze River area of China, were heavily guarded by several rings of Communist armed guards.
- US prisoners of war were taken to the Republic of China in 1951. In 1951, US prisoners of war were taken to the Republic of China in 1951.

APPROVED FOR

CLASSIFICATION

REPORT NO. SO 70338
CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 22 Aug. 1951

SUBJECT Use of United Nations P.O.'s by Communists for Propaganda Purposes

NO. OF PAGES: 1

PLACE
ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO. 5 May 1952

DO NOT CIRCULATE

NO. OF ENCL.

**SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 1**

[illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1. The Chinese Commandate have been using numbers of UN prisoners of war captured in Korea for propaganda tours throughout China. The tours are to demonstrate to the Chinese people Communist political achievements and the success of the "volunteer" forces, as well as to encourage youths to join the army and aid in fund raising.
2. The arrival of the above prisoners in the South China area was coordinated with the Delegation for Comfort of Troops in Korea by Kiangtze Youth and the Delegation of Aid to Korea Volunteers.
3. In Canton some 40 UN prisoners participated in street demonstrations. Most were former residents of South China or Hong Kong and among the group were British and American officers and enlisted men selected for their knowledge of Cantonese dialect. Although detained in a local concentration camp, they have been allowed to write to friends and relatives in order to capitalize on their propaganda value. Demonstrations have also been planned.

Document No. 2
No. Change in Class. ☒
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Class. Changed To: TT S S
Auth: NY 72-2
Date: 21 AUG 1978

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CLASSIFICATION					
GROUP	X	GROUP	X	GROUP	GROUP
GROUP	X	GROUP	X	GROUP	GROUP

CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 70512
CO NO.

COUNTRY Ch.12

DATE DISTR. 26 August 1951

SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in Thailand

- NO. OF PAGES: 2

**PLACE
ACQUIRED**

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCL.
(SEE PAGE)

DATE OF INFO 25 JUL 1971

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**SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.**

RANKING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY RANKING OF CONTENT						
EXCELLENTLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	POORLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	DOES NOT EXIST	EXCELLENT SOURCE	POORLY TRUE	POORLY TRUE	USUAL	POORLY FAKE	DOES NOT EXIST	
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	6	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Document No. 3
 No Change in Class. ☐
☒ Reassigned
 Class. Changed To: TS : (C)
 Auth. By: [Signature]
 Date: 5-2-78 E: SK

1. Seventy-eight American prisoners of war are in a camp at No. 33, near 4000 Tientsin Road, Shanghai. They have an freedom of movement and are not free to talk. They meet alone meetings daily to study communist doctrine. Camp officers are representatives of the East China Bureau and the East China Military Area, and four English-speaking doctors. Guards are from a training regiment of the Shanghai Municipal Public Safety Office. Names of the camp officers are named Chieh-ch'iao-fu-shih (張 紹 勳 尉 長), Tzu-shih-yeh-shih (趙 世 益 上 尉), and Pan-shu-shih (潘 樹 石).
2. The following names of ten prisoners are from a scrap of paper pinned up in the POU camp. [REDACTED] These from which they came, dates assigned, and comments are from the camp list.
- a. Hui-ang (惠 安); acting president of the executive committee; company commander, 1st Company, 9 Regiment, 2 Division; progressive in thought.
 - b. Lai-ai-shih (來 艾 士); member of the executive committee; Independent 3 Regiment, 2 Division; still burdened by old thoughts.
 - c. Ma-shu-t'ao (馬 樹 桃); member of the executive committee; platoon commander, 3 Company, 1 Battalion, 38 Regiment, 2 Division; extremely honest.
 - d. Ch'ui-ai-p'ing (崔 艾 平); member of the executive committee; radio operator, Independent 3 Regiment, 2 Division; possesses ideals but unable to achieve freedom to practice.
 - e. Li-shih (李 石); member of the executive committee; company commander, 3 Division; progressive in thought, has made progress in learning.
 - f. Pui-li-p'u (裴 利 普); member of the organization; 1st class private.

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- 2 -

SO 70512*

1. Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division; stableman.

g. Pien-fu-eh (彭富) : member of the organization; junior grade private, 38 Regiment, 2 Division; slow progress in learning.

h. Yen-ou (延偶) : member of the organization; middle grade private, 38 Regiment, 2 Division; honest, good.

i. Ho-ou (何偶) : member of the organization; E company, 25 Division; stableman.

j. Ho-t'o (何托) : record incomplete.

1. [REDACTED] Comment. No. XI, Lane 1136 was the address of Japanese Military Special Services Headquarters in 1941.

2. [REDACTED] Comment. Presumably at the camp committee.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 71322*

CD NO.

189
J.S.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 6 Sept. 1951

SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in Shanghai and Canton

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCL.
(ATTACHED)DATE OF
INFO.

July-August 1941, of source.

DO NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

RANKS OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L

As noted, THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. DO NOT CIRCULATE.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. Name of more American prisoners of war at the camp on Tuyen Road, Shanghai¹ are the following:

Pa-hsing (裴興) : Major, advisor to 30 Regiment, 9 Division.

I'e-lin-ou (柯林斯) : Air Liaison officer, Chinese division (sic).

Pai-h'o (裴克) : Captain, 29 Regiment.

Shih-lai-to (世萊特) : Major.

To-eh-ti (托尔蒂) : Air Force Lieutenant.

The date of this information is 14 August 1941.

2. As of mid-July about 60 American prisoners of war were being held in the former villa of CH'EN Chi-t'ang at Fien Kuoan Village in Canton. They were given two meals daily of the same food Chinese Communist soldiers receive and were being given daily political and ideological training. Their guards were drawn from the garrison regiment of 15 Army Group Communist Headquarters.

3. The Chinese Communist 4 Field Army under the command of LIN Piao has selected a group of United Nations prisoners of war to be sent to Dandong or Canton and sent them to Canton. About 120 such prisoners have arrived in Canton, including 15 Americans, 8 British, and 100 South Koreans. More than 40 were in the first group of arrivals, and the remainder came later in another group. The American and British prisoners are housed in the former UNIS office in Shansen, Canton. They are restricted to the building, but are receiving

CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

Document No. 009

Is Change in Class. ☐

Is Reclassified ☐

Class. Char. 11 73 8

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By: [Signature]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 2 -

good treatment. The South Koreans are not treated as well as the British and Americans. No official or unofficial information concerning the prisoners has been disclosed by the Chinese Communist authorities, but it is believed that they are to be used for propaganda purposes.

1. Current. See 80-70812 for the supplementary report on American prisoners of war at 35, Lane 1134, Teyuan Road, Shanghai.

2. Current. 80-70838, from a similar source, reported the use of Chinese-speaking United Nations' prisoners of war for street demonstrations in Canton. The commenter that it is unlikely that United Nations' prisoners could be used for propaganda purposes without reports of such activity appearing in the Chinese press. Commenter stated that commenter reported there were no US prisoners in Canton as of mid-July. However, commenter who received this information from a source with contacts in Canton, has reported that 80 American prisoners of war extrained from Japan for Taiwan on 8 May 1951. The prisoners seen in Japan were reported to be in good spirits and tidily dressed.

CLASSIFIED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 60 72900

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 20 Sept. 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS.
LISTED BELOWSUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in Communist China

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO. 11d-September 1951

REFERENCE COPY

DO NOT CIRCULATE

RATING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY RATING OF CONTENT				
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CONFIDENTIAL BY OFFICE SOURCE	POSSIBLY TRUE	POSSIBLY FALSE	DOUBTFUL	CANNOT BE JUDGED
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

- As of mid-September, there were 71 American prisoners of war confined in a two-story building at Lo Chia Shan (洛家山) in Tach'ang (113-17, 30-32).
- The Americans were being provided the same type of diet that is provided by the Chinese Communist Government for middle-grade civil servants, and had freedom of movement within the building. They worked outdoors for several hours each day, and the remainder of their time was devoted to political instruction.
- A former Chinese student in America, named CH'EN Hsi-Chang (陳希昌), was in charge of the prisoners. A Soviet major named Li-tau-lo-tung (李陶洛通), was also assigned to work with the American prisoners.

Document No. 3
No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Declassified
Date (Month-Year) 73 8 8
By: 8-AUG-873

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CLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 72788*
CO NO.

COUNTRY

SUBJECT Formation of Joint Command for
Thirteen Communist Nations

DATE DISTR. 27 Sept. 1951

NO. OF PAGES 3

PLACE
ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO. 17-25 August 1951

REFERENCE COPY
DO NOT CIRCULATE

NO OF ENCLS.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. .

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT						
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFLICTS BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	B	C	D	E	F	1	2	3	4	5	6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

CLASSIFICATION

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECURITY EDUCATION**

REPORT NO. SO 74-69

CO NO.

COUNTRY Cb1b4

SUBJECT United Nations Primary of War in Canton

DATE DISTR. 23 Oct. 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

**PLACE
ACCOMMODATION**

DATE OF INFO. 3 October 1957

DO NOT CIRCULATE

NO. OF ENCLS.
ATTACHED

**SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.**

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	POORLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	NOT GRADABLE (OTHER REASONS)	PROBABLY TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	PROBABLY FALSE	DOUBTFUL
A	B	C	D	E	F	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

On 3 October, about 170 United Nations prisoners of war arrived in Canton by train from Hankow. They were taken to the former American consulate building on Shamen. Two squads of Public Security guards were posted around the building, and no pedestrian was permitted to approach closer than 50 meters.

Document No. 10
 Approved for Release by CIA ☐
☐ Declassified
 Date: 78 10 16
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24 AUG 1978 BY: 24
 CLASSIFICATION

STATE	DATE	BY	REASON

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Document No. 11
 No Change in Class. ☐
☐ Reclassified
 Class. Changed To: TS 1 (S)
 Auth.: HR 70-2
 Date: 15 AUG 1971 BY: 29

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CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. SO 71807
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.

COUNTRY China
SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War in Communist China
PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]
DATE OF INFO. 13 September - early October 1951
DATE DISTR. 25 Oct 51
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCL. 1
DO NOT CIRCULATE
SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADE OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADES OF CONTENT									
COMPLETENESS	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	COMPLETENESS	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [REDACTED]

- On 13 September CHD 218-14 (胡加德), a staff member of the Central and South China Military Area headquarters, after inspecting a camp for American and British prisoners of war at S2 Pa Ning (潘宁) Road, Shaoen, Canton, issued an order prohibiting prisoners from speaking to people outside the compound.
- Names of some of the prisoners in this camp from the United States Eighth Army, the British Gloucester Regiment, and the British Argyll Battalion are as follows:

- United States Eighth Army:
 - Hai-chin-fa (海金发) (Hickelf), 1st Lieutenant.
 - Li-ho-ark (李克阿), warrant officer.
 - W-shi (王世) (Wootch), 1st warrant officer.
 - Lo-son (罗斯) (Thoss), 1st enlisted.
 - Lo-son (罗斯), enlisted.
 - Ren-ah-tan (荣安坦) (Ranta), 1st enlisted.
 - Ren-lai-to-shih (荣来德士) (Rright), 1st enlisted.
 - Lo-son (罗斯) (Thoss), 1st enlisted.
 - Chia-hao-shih (蔡豪士) (Harris), 1st enlisted.
 - Lo-son (罗斯) (Thoss), 1st enlisted.
 - Li-son (李森) (Lay), 1st enlisted.
 - Lo-son (罗斯) (Thoss), 1st enlisted.

Document No. [REDACTED]
No Change in Class. ☒
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Class. Changed To: TS 3 8
11.1 NR 70-2
11.2 NR 70-2
By: [REDACTED]

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CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. SO 71337
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.

COUNTRY China
SUBJECT American Prisoners of War in Communist China
DATE DISTR. 1 Oct. 1951
NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]
DATE OF INFO. 1 August 1951
DO NOT CIRCULATE
NO. OF ENCL. 1
SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADE OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADES OF CONTENT									
COMPLETENESS	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	COMPLETENESS	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY	RELIABILITY
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [REDACTED]

On 1 August, the Communists in Liaison (108-14, 11-15) held a meeting in celebration of their Army Day. During the meeting, 5 American prisoners of war, captured in Korea, were escorted by Communist soldiers to the rear area. Two of them addressed the gathering.

Document No. [REDACTED]
No Change in Class. ☐
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11.1 NR 70-2
11.2 NR 70-2
By: [REDACTED]

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[illegible]

11. A soldier of the 354 Regiment observed about 120 American prisoners of war walking through Kumsu on the night of 25 March. It was said they were being sent from the Sonch'ui-Kangdokum area to Jangju.

[REDACTED]

198
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CD NO.

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS
LISTED BELOW

**SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.**

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out?

SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information on [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] American Prisoners of War

PLACE
REQUIRED

DATE OF: June 1948 - Late April 1951
 FBI

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
NOT APTLY FITTING	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAMILY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	COMPLETELY OF OTHER SOURCES	POSSIBLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	POSSIBLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

***Insert as noted**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

SOURCE

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INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 4378

CD NO.

199
J.S.

COUNTRY China/Korea

SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War in
Northern Shensi

DATE DISTR. 6 February 1952

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE OF
INFO. Late December 1951.NO. OF ENCL.
NONESUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

BY CABLE

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	GRADING OF INFO RECEIVED	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	USUALLY FALSE	COMPLETELY FALSE	GRADING OF INFO FOUNDED	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Approximately 27 December, the Chinese Communists moved 300 United States prisoners of war and 22 prisoners of other nationalities into a concentration camp near Hsiang (113-14, 40-06). The prisoners were under the instruction of Europeans.

Comment: Information in previous reports from the above source appears doubtful or probably false. It is possible that the above report is a fabrication.

Document No. 15
 Is Change in File ☐
☐ Deleted
 Date Changed To: 10 60
 Auth: 10 60
 Date: 10 60
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CLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. OO-2-55

CD NO.

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT Use of UN Prisoners of War in Anti-US
Propaganda Parade

DATE DISTR. 14 Feb 52

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE
ACQUIREDDATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Jan 52NO. OF ENCL.
NONESUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 52

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN					SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	GRADING OF INFO RECEIVED	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	USUALLY FALSE	COMPLETELY FALSE	GRADING OF INFO FOUNDED	COMPLETELY TRUE	USUALLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

About the first week of January 1952, the Communists are parading UN captives (prisoners of war) in Paochow, Yunnan Province, for propaganda purposes.

had actually seen such captives -- and they are UN soldiers. Communist banners pointed the UN soldiers to the spectators, saying "these are the people we've been fighting -- and have conquered." (See SO 7915) reporting arrival of UN POWs from Shensi to a destination unknown.

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INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 859A0

CD NO.

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE DISTR.

NO. OF PAGES

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE				COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAMILY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

- In November 1951 about 50 American prisoners of war were brought under guard from Shanghai to Hangchow, and were then taken to Moehiafou (Moehiafou) and placed in the detention center there. On 10 February 1952, 15 of them were taken elsewhere, leaving only 35.
- The Chinese Communist Party Committee for West China and the Political Department of the 3 Field Army each sent a cadre to the Moehiafou Detention Center to serve as the highest responsible officers there. In addition, the Propaganda and Organization Departments of the Chongqing Party Committee each sent five cadres to be responsible for the management and education of the prisoners.
- LIT Ping-to (李平托), Propaganda Department Director, and YANG Sen-i (杨森一), Organization Department Director, both of the Chongqing Party Committee, and KU Te-tsun (顾德尊), Propaganda Department Director of the Hangchow Party Committee, visited this detention center in December 1951 and in January 1952.
- This detention center is guarded by a company of the 7 Army Group.
 - Comment. The exact location of Moehiafou is unknown, but it is probably near Hangchow.
 - Comment. KU Te-tsun may be the same as the man by that name who has been listed as the Propaganda Department Director of the Chongqing Provincial Government.
 - Comment. At these times the living conditions of the prisoners were fair.

CLASSIFICATION

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CLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 87479*

CD NO.

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE ACQUIRED

China

American Prisoners of War in Chongqing

Early April 1952

[REDACTED]

DO NOT CIRCULATE

DATE DISTR. 2 May 1952

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. 1

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE				COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAMILY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

In early April 1952, there were 35 American prisoners of war at the Moehiafou Camp. The following is a partial list of the Americans:

- Su-ai-shih (Smith), Private, 2nd Bn., 23 Regt., 2nd Div.; disabled.
- Chih-shan-shih-yu-lo, Private, 2nd Div.
- Ma-liab-ara (Morris), O Co., 20th Regt., 2nd Div.
- Ma-p'o-sh'i, Private, A Co., 32nd Regt., 7th Div.
- Ma-ara, 1st Co., 25th Div.
- Ma-sh'i, A Co., 32nd Regt., 7th Div.; sick.
- Ma-liang-shiang, Private, Ma-ara-4's (Fleet) Regt.
- Shih-ti-in, Private, 23rd Regt., 2nd Div.; disabled by the loss of one foot.
- Ma-ara, or Ma-liang-shiang, Private, 7th Regt., 1st Div.
- Ma-li-shi-in, Private, A Co., 32nd Regt., 7th Div.; sick.

Comment. [REDACTED] all disabled and sick prisoners were

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(REF ID: A77111)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. SO 91634

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea/China

DATE DISTR. 17 July 1952

SUBJECT Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China

NO. OF PAGES 3

DATE OF INFO. January - May 1952

NO. OF ENCL. 1

PLACE ACQUIRED

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE					COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT				
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAMILY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	COMPLETED BY OTHER SOURCE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J

* Except as noted

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

- In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chon Pu Kwan Li Ch'u) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in Pyongyang, under Colonel So-mun-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1146/1133), as intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LII Hui (2651/6701) and HAN II (0589/2400) were deputy chairmen of the office.
- The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps," detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungghim. Peace camps were also at K'aiyuan Kwan (126-05, 42-36) and Poonch'i (123-13, 41-80).
- Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on

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- Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.

- Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK army officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being indoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

Kangdong Camp

- In May the largest North Korean prisoner of war camp, detaining twelve hundred prisoners, was near F'al King (1132/1345) mountain, six miles southeast of the Kangdong (126-05, 39-09) (NU-437) railroad station.¹ The compound, divided with barbed wire and mud embankments into four partitions for Americans, English, and Turkish prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities, held 840 Americans, 100 English, 60 Turkish, and 200 hundred French, Dutch, and Canadian troops. Most of the United States prisoners were members of the 1 Cavalry Division and the 24 Infantry Division. General William Dean was moved from Berlin and hidden in this camp in 1951.

- The Kangdong camp, organized into study, management, sanitation, and fitness sections, compelled the prisoners to study for three hours, to labor for four hours, and to discuss political problems for two hours.

- On 1 May nine thousand (nin) ROK army prisoners and fifty United Nations prisoners were in caves at the Kangdong camp, extending from approximately NU-42363 to NU-44368 in a valley at A'al-ai, Kiangdong-syn (126-05, 39-09) (NU-437).² Of the ROK army prisoners 10 percent were officers, 50 percent non-commissioned officers, and 40 percent privates. Of the United Nations prisoners 10 percent were Negroes. The prisoners, who received 600 grams of cereal and salt each day, were not required to work and spent only two hours each day out of the caves. An average of two prisoners were dying daily from malnutrition and eruptive typhus. The majority of prisoners at this camp were extremely anti-Communist in thinking. Three North Korean army guards, armed with PPK's and rifles, were at the entrance of each cave.

Camp Number 106, Miria

- On 1 May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp Number 106 at approximately TD-47221A, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Miria railroad station (125-51, 39-01) (TD-4722). Prisoners held here, having been processed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.

- Each prisoner received 50 won monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 45 grams of soy bean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Miria airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, machine, and PPK's, was at the camp.

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11. On 5 May 200 ROK army prisoners and 110 prisoners from other United Nations armies including 80 Negroes, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp at the site of the former Suan mine (286-23, 38-47) (N2-1396), ten kilometers north of Suan (286-27, 38-40) (N2-7186). Lieutenant Colonel KIM Kye-soon (6955/1114/1360) commanded the camp. Although other United Nations prisoners were not required to work, the ROK army prisoners constructed shelters and trenches throughout the entire day. The prisoners received only rice balls for food. Several of the other United Nations prisoners had obtained wheat paste from villagers in exchange for watches and other personal possessions. The villagers were prohibited from entering the camp area. No sanitary facilities were offered to the prisoners. Approximately fifteen prisoners, including both ROK and United Nations personnel, were too ill to stand.

Sarikon

12. In late April approximately eight hundred United Nations prisoners were in a series of underground shelters at approximately IC-1667 in a valley between two hills four kilometers northeast of the Sarikon railroad station (285-46, 38-30) (N2-1064). On each side of the valley at the base of the two hills were 27 shelters. One shelter in every five accommodated the camp guards. Right hundred Chinese Communist soldiers, armed with PMA's and rifles, guarded the area. Dummy guards were also used at night. The majority of the guards were billeted in a nearby village of fifteen homes. The guard billets were easily visible from the air. Each prisoner received pork soup and 600 grams of cereal three times daily and a package of cigarettes each day. The prisoners were required to work for one hour and attend indoctrination meetings for two hours daily.

Mukden

13. On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Kaiao Han Kuan Chieh, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Kaiao Han Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

1. Comment. In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Langkang.

2. Comment. This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraph 6-7 above.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO

PLACE ACQUIRED

BY CABLE

SOURCE

In late May 1953, approximately 1,500 United Nations prisoners of war were confined in a camp at Langkang (2639/1444/2321), Manchuria. The majority of these prisoners of war were American Marine officers and men who were sent to this camp after recovering from wounds.

Comment. A POW camp also tentatively accepted in Manchuria was dropped from available listings in January 1953 because of a lack of recent reports concerning it. Available information fails to indicate the positive presence of any POW camps in China outside of Manchuria.

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Papers Of Harry S. Truman
Psychological Strategy
Board Box 32

U.S. Pow Policy
(changed)

207
J.B.

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
1-21-76

100-85-42 (A) (S)

P. Tab
NLT (P) 3064

D-2-111 D-10-10-66

1 - Mr. Gordon Gray Later National
Security Advisor to President Eisenhower

Distribution of Prisoners of War

UNCL

28 December 1951

1. You will recall that in October we developed and sent to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Joint Staff a staff study on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war.

2. There can be no doubt that the forcible repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea would have serious effects upon U.S. psychological warfare operations for many years to come.

3. Our treatment of Soviet and satellite captives has an unfortunate history, as you will recall. As a result of an agreement at Yalta, the United States in the years immediately after World War II assisted the Soviet Union in the repatriation of various categories of Soviet bloc persons—chiefly prisoners of war, escaped, and displaced persons. The result of our cooperation was that more than four million Soviet citizens were returned to the Soviet Union and that thousands were executed or punished in other ways without regard to the conditions which caused their displacement from Soviet-controlled territory.

4. In addition, persons escaping from the Soviet area after World War II were forcibly returned to Soviet control as a matter of U.S. policy up until well into 1948. This treatment of Soviet captives became well known to the populations within the Soviet area and, as has been well documented, became the cause of widespread despair. It practically stopped the flow of defections, and it would make it very difficult to wage effective psychological warfare against the Red Army in event of war.

5. Our policy was subsequently changed so that persons entering the Allied zone of Germany and Austria are no longer forcibly returned. The treatment we have given defectors has, however, not been sufficiently good or well publicized to erase the former picture.

6. This is the background within which the question of forcible repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war must be considered. Repatriation of our Korean victims would distinguish us from Communist forces in any future conflict. It would therefore in the long run cost us more American lives than the lives of the prisoners of war problem.

7. The latest JCS directive to General MacArthur on the subject indicates that we are making an effort to exchange prisoners on a voluntary basis. (We are not giving publicity to this fact, probably because we are not yet ready to

Papers Of Harry S. Truman
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PART of a series of 20+ documents
involving NSC/CIA/STATE/DEFENSE

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UNCL

make the final decision). The instructions to General MacArthur require that should he be compelled to examine the desirability of forcible repatriation, he must refer the matter for decision to Washington.

10. I have learned by hearsay that the President is informed on this question and is inclined to oppose forcible repatriation.

11. Recognizing that there are factors to consider in making a decision on this question other than the psychological, I believe nevertheless that the great importance of the psychological factor should be emphasized at the time when a decision is about to be reached. I recommend that you discuss this problem with the Board members and consider also discussing it with the President.

Copy of this memo sent to J. Phillips,
State Dept. on 1/16/52 per Col. Davis.
ce

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TELETYPE INFORMATION REPORT

211
J.B.

TO: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JOA, SECDEF, SEC
NEW ORL, OFF, CDR

CLASSIFICATION	DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
TDCS -3,302,641	12 JANUARY 1957
ORIGIN	REMARKS
POSSIBLE RELEASE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BY CHINESE GOVERNMENT.	
8 JANUARY 1957	
3	
THE 10 AMERICANS NOW IMPRISONED IN CHINA MIGHT BE RELEASED SHORTLY. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS NOW EXAMINING THE CASE INDIVIDUALLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PRISONERS HAVE BEHAVED PROPERLY. THOSE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WELL BEHAVED MIGHT BE RELEASED. INFORMANT ESTIMATED THE CHANCES OF THEIR RELEASE AS 50 TO 20 IN FAVOR OF RELEASE.	
DISSEMINATION: NONE.	
END OF MESSAGE	
CLASSIFICATION	DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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J.B.

CLASSIFICATION	DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
212	12 JAN 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:	
SUBJECT: American Prisoners at Weizhuo Camp, USSR	
1. On 17 May 1957, [redacted] research analyst, at the direction of the Chief, [redacted], requested that certain information concerning an American Cox (Lan), reported held in a prison camp in Weizhuo, USSR, be brought to the attention of appropriate officials in the Department of Army by [redacted] (Current Intelligence).	
2. [redacted] reported that he attended a West Point Preparatory School and entered West Point Military Academy in 1946 with Richard Alvin Cox, Mansfield, Ohio. Cox mysteriously disappeared from West Point on 14 January 1950. He is still missing and there is no trace of his present whereabouts.	
3. According to [redacted] the American prisoner in Weizhuo Camp described in Air Intelligence Information Report 24-256-54 (AF No. 1070277) MSG 2400, 701st Air EXERCISE 7050th Air EXERCISE (SAFE), 18 December 1956, would accurately fit the description of Richard Alvin Cox as he knew him.	
4. At the suggestion of Lt. Colonel H. F. Mearns, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, this information was brought to the attention of the West Point Liaison Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Lt. Colonel A. C. Hambley, Jr., Room 3C 400, Pentagon, Code 131, Extension 70723. Lt. Colonel Hambley was permitted by the writer to make a verbatim extract of that information concerning Cox which appears in Paragraph 7.b., Page 10 of report cited above.	
5. Lt. Colonel Hambley advised that he would personally bring this report to the attention of the Commandant, U. S. Military Academy on his next trip to West Point in about ten days.	
6. Lt. Colonel Hambley expressed his appreciation for this information and extended his compliments to [redacted] for his alertness in bringing it to the attention of the Department of the Army.	
Approved for Release Date 12 JAN 1957	

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
TEXAS

SAATHOBY INVOUCH

By *WJ/KS*

5-B88

213

ACTION
is assigned to

J.B.

LH

United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Member
Washington, D. C.

*Received by
Phone 12/15/53
December 15, 1953*

12/15/53

*draft 11/6/53
file LH*

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV
PCB

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing a communication which I have received from one of my constituents. I will appreciate your giving serious consideration to this problem, based on its merits.

Please let me have as prompt a reply as possible, returning the enclosure, in order that I can inform the writer.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson

215486

Office of the Secretary
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

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PM 1 35

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV
PCB

611.61241/12-2153

611.61241/12-2153

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Chiss.
Sheet No. 1

214
J.B.

Memoranda

By *WJ/KS* *5-B88*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FR/NA - Mr. Drew

DATE, January 4, 1953

FROM - Mr. Walter J. S. Sessel, Jr.

SUBJECT: Article in December 18, 1953 issue of U.S. News and World Report re Americans held by Communists.

The attached letter dated December 21, 1953 from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson is referred to NA for handling since the enclosure apparently refers to an article concerning missing Korean War GI's and not to American soldiers in Soviet custody, as the writer alleges. The writer is apparently referring to the article on page 27 of the December 18th issue of U.S. News and World Report entitled "Where are 944 Missing GI's?". NA has been unable to find an article referring to six or eight hundred American soldiers in Soviet custody.

It is suggested that the following be included in the letter which NA drafts in reply to Senator Johnson:

The Department of State has no information to the effect that there are approximately six or eight hundred American soldiers in the custody of the Soviet Government. A few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning prisoners-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

Senator Johnson's letter has been acknowledged by telephone. Please return to the library the attached copy of U.S. News and World Report.

WJ/KS
FOR: EX: WH: James: 12/14/54

With regard to question as to whether there are any of these persons or any other U.S. citizens in the custody of Soviet

By *W.H.P.S.**5-1388*215
J.S.In reply refer to
SRV 611.61241/12-2153*Refugee - Unsub
sentence marked on
memo.*

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GI's" on page 27 of this publication. I believe that the following account of the efforts being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody will be of interest to your constituent.

On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoner of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on the list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated. The Communists at the same time asked for an accounting of 98,742 prisoners they alleged had not been accounted for by the United Nations Command.

General

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

216
J.S.By *W.H.P.S.**5-1388*In reply refer to
SRV 611.61241/12-2153*Refugee - Unsub*

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GI's" on page 27 of this publication. It was believed that efforts were being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody, and we are interested in having the following information about this matter.

On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoner of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on the list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated. The Communists at the same time asked for an accounting of 98,742 prisoners they alleged had not been accounted for by the United Nations Command.

add page 3

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

General

By *W.H.P.S.**S-1380*217
J.B.

- 2 -

General Clark, in a letter of September 24 to the Communist side, stated that he considered their reply wholly unacceptable, and pointed out that by signing the armistice agreement, the Communists had undertaken a solemn obligation to repatriate directly or to hand over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission all of the captured persons held by them at the time the armistice was signed. He pointed out that this obligation was binding upon them and applied to all United Nations Command persons regardless of where captured or held in custody. I am enclosing a copy of General Clark's letter of September 24 which you may wish to send to your constituent.

On November 21, the United Nations Command provided the Communist side with a revision of its original list of unaccounted for Allied personnel which it had presented to the Communists on September 9. The revised list contained a total of 3,400 names, and the figure for United States prisoners of war unaccounted for was increased by eight to a total of 652.

On November 21, the United Nations Command protested in the Military Armistice Commission to the Communists that they had still failed to give a satisfactory reply concerning the list of unaccounted for United Nations Command personnel, and pointed out that additional evidence provided by three Korean prisoners of war who recently defected to the United Nations side corroborated the United Nations Command statements that the Communists were withholding prisoners of war. The United Nations Command demanded that the Communists hand over to the custody of the Custodian Forces of India all those prisoners that your side still retains.

Ambassador Arthur Dean has also referred to this problem in the course of his negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom.

Your constituent may be assured that it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody, and the United Nations Command will make every effort to accomplish this objective.

With

By *W.H.P.S.**S-1580*218
J.B.

- 3 -

With regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 19 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning prisoners-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

Mr. Bath's letter is returned, as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

Statement

1. Copy of General Clark's letter of September 24 to Communist Commanders.
2. From Mr. Bath (returned).

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

By *W.H.P.*

F-1388

"Coverup"

2/19

J.R.

in reply refer to
RV 611.61241/12-2153

Retype

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GI's" on page 27 of this publication. It was to be assured that efforts are being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody, and we are by interested in having the following information about this matter.

I am enclosing copies of a statement recounting the efforts being made to secure the return of American prisoners of war who might still be in Communist custody which I believe will be of assistance to you in replying to your constituents. As the statement points out, it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and we will do everything possible to accomplish this objective.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on this list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated. The Communists at the same time asked for an accounting of 98,742 prisoners they alleged had not been accounted for by the United Nations Command.

General

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate.

add page 3

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

By *W.H.P.*

F-1388

220

J.S.

reply refer to
V 611.61241/12-1853

January 20 1964

611.61241

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GI's" on page 27 of this publication.

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With regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Bevers, two Americans.

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

reported

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611.61241/12-2153
CJC

By WJH

221

J.B.

- 2 -

reported by returning prisoners-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

Mr. Bath's letter is returned, as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Statement.
2. From Mr. Bath (returned).

5/5 - CR
JAN 20 1954 P.M.
f.w.

1/25/34
P:SEV:LHorrigan:DM:mr

X H 1/25/34

222

J.B.

re reply refer to
SEV 611.61241/2-1754

My dear Senator Saltonstall:

Secretary Dulles has asked me to reply to your communication of February 13, acknowledged by telephone on February 23, enclosing a letter from Mrs. Ruth King of Windsor, Massachusetts. Mrs. King writes concerning an article in "U.S. News and World Report" regarding American civilians and military personnel who may be in Communist custody.

The Department does not overlook any reports that American citizens abroad are in difficulties of any kind. In each case it makes a careful investigation into the circumstances in order to determine what action can and should be taken. We share your constituent's concern for those Americans who may be imprisoned in Communist countries, and for those individuals with legitimate claims to American citizenship who, while not actually imprisoned, are not permitted to leave the countries in which they presently reside.

It should be pointed out however, that most of the possible American citizens in Eastern Europe are dual nationals whose claims to American citizenship are in many cases not recognized by the governments of the countries in which they are now residing.

For the most part these persons are (a) naturalized Americans who returned to the country of their birth, (b) children born in the USSR or other Iron Curtain countries of naturalized American parents, who derive a claim to American citizenship from the fact that they are the children of American citizens who may be able to make a claim.

Mrs. King's letter is being requested.
Sincerely yours,

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:
From Mrs. King (returned).
Release, February 10, 1954.

By *W.H.P.**5-1388*215
J.S.In reply refer to
SKV 611.61241/12-2153*Restype - already
sent this morning on
memo.*

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On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoners of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on the list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated. The Communists at the same time asked for an accounting of 95,742 prisoners they alleged had not been accounted for by the United Nations Command.

General

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

216
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SKV 611.61241/12-2153*Restype*

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of U.S. News and World Report. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GI's" on page 27 of this publication. It can be assumed that efforts are being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody and we are interested in having the following information about this matter.

On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoners of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

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General

add page 3
The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

By VH/RJSS-1380217
J.B.

- 2 -

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Ambassador Arthur Dean has also referred to this problem in the course of his negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom.

Your constituent may be assured that it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody, and the United Nations Command will make every effort to accomplish this objective.

With

By VH/RJSS-1580218
J.B.

- 3 -

With regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning prisoners-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

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For the Secretary of State:

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

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2. From Mr. Bath (returned).

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By *W/R*

F-1388

"Coverup"

219

J.R.

in reply refer to
RV 611.61241/12-2153

Retype

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General

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By *W/R*

F-1388

220

J.B.

reply refer to
V 611.61241/12-1853

January 20 1964

111.61241

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The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
United States Senate.

reported

611.61241/12-2153

611.61241/12-2153
CJC

By 1/17/54

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J.B.

- 2 -

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Mr. Bath's letter is returned, as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

- ✓ 1. Statement.
- ✓ 2. From Mr. Bath (returned).

S/S - CR
JAN 20 1954 P.M.
f.w.

P:SEV:LHorrigan:DM:mr

2 H 1/15/54

222

J.B.

re reply refer to
SEV 611.61241/2-1754

EXCELLENCE
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1954

My dear Senator Saltonstall:

Secretary Tuller has asked me to reply to your communication of February 13, acknowledged by telephone on February 23, enclosing a letter from Mrs. Ruth King of Windsor, Massachusetts. Mrs. King writes concerning an article in "U.S. News and World Report" regarding American Citizens and Military Personnel who may be in Communist Custody.

The Department does not overlook any reports that American citizens abroad are in difficulties of any kind. In each case it makes a careful investigation into the circumstances in order to determine what action can and should be taken. We share your constituent's concern for those Americans who may be imprisoned in Communist countries, and for those individuals with legitimate claims to American citizenship who, while not actually imprisoned, are not permitted to leave the countries in which they presently reside.

It should be pointed out however, that most of the possible American citizens in Eastern Europe are dual nationals whose claims to American citizenship are in many cases not recognized by the governments of the countries in which they are now residing.

For the most part these persons are (a) naturalized Americans who returned to the country of their birth, (b) children born in the USSR or other Iron Curtain countries of naturalized American parents, who derive a claim to American citizenship from the fact that they are the children of Americans who may be eligible for naturalization.

Mrs. King's letter is requested.

Sincerely yours,

Thurston B. Norton
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:
From Mrs. King (returned).
Release, February 10, 1954.

FROM : ALCONGON, Hong Kong

1716

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, & SUBSIDIARIES

March 23, 1964

REF

Rev Page	1
Date	10-10-78
By	J. A. T.
For	CIA 7
Unit	L-2

SUBJECT: American POWs reported en route to Siberia

Actually a
2 list - Russian
According to H. Col.
written by D. L. Simpson
Re: Bush original
SI report.
f.o. section
from
of No
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(Val)

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred Russian prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Mandchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consul General agreed with his evaluation of the information as probably true and the source as of unknown reliability. The full text of the Initial Air Liaison Office report follows:

First report dated March 16, 1954, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington. C2.

"This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli (Lupin), 49°50'-11.09"N Manchuria road map; AMSL 201. First Edition, on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observes POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source observed three POWs who were under guard who were conversing in English. Poles were wearing insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force. Uncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Germans among POWs captured and also stated that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available Hong Kong, for questioning for the next four days."

Upon receipt of this information, USAF, Washington, requested elaboration of the following points:

1. Description of uniforms or clothing worn by POWs including ornaments.
2. Physical condition of POWs.

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Go to page

DECLASSIFIED BY: 6032
DATE: 12-16-2009

By Bm/Lov 1151, Page 11

Page 2 of 12
 Date No. 1216
 File No. H022

P. _____
E. _____
D. _____
F. _____

3. Nationality of guards.
4. Specific dates of observations.
5. Destination in Siberia.
6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian clothes accompanying movement of POWs.
7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned.

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below.

*FROM: USAINFO SON LACKY. CITE C 4. REUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven questions.

- (1) POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy insulation at weather considered early spring. Source identified from pictures service jacket, field, M94, etc belongings except canteen.
- (2) Condition appeared good, no wounded all ambulatory.
- (3) Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate unloading platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian trainmen wore dark blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train uniform, but he knows the trainmen are military and wearing regular train uniforms.
- (4) Interrogation with aid of more fluent interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside city of Manchouli about three months later with POW train headed towards station where he observed POW transfer. Source was impressed with second observation because of large number of Negroes among POWs. Source states that he was told by a very close Russian friend whose job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouli that the subsequent POW shipments passed through Manchouli. Source says these shipments were reported to be made occurred when United Nations forces in Korea were on the offensive.
- (5) Unknown.
- (6) Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who married Chinese.

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225
J.B.

DECLASSIFIED FOR EMBASSY ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, BY 2401

By Boyle/Jan NARA, Date 1/1/2000Page 3 of 1716
Dep No. 1716
From Hong Kong680000
(1 to 1000000)Page 3 of 1716
End No. 1716
Dup No. 1716
From Hong Kong

(7) Three POWs observed in station restaurant appeared to be 30 to 35. Source identified Air Force non-commissioned officer sleeve insignia of Staff Sergeant rank, stated that several inches above insignia there was a propeller but says that all three did not have propeller. Three POWs accompanied by Chinese guard. POWs appeared thin but in good health and spirits, were being given what source described as good food. POWs were talking in English but did not converse with guard. Further information as to number of POWs observed source states that first observation filled a given passenger car train and second observation about the same. Source continues to emphasize the number of Negro troops, which evidently impressed him because he had seen so few Negroes before. Source further states that his Russian railroad worker friend was attempting to obtain a visa to Canada and that he could furnish more information, the railroad workers name is Leon Strelnikov whose mothers sister lives in Canada and is applying for a visa for Strelnikov (phonetic). Comment Reporting Officer: Source is very careful not to exaggerate information and is positive of identification of American POWs. In view of information contained in Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 dated 5 February 54, Reporting Officer gives above information rating of F-2. Source departing Hong Kong today by ship. Future address on file this office."

700-
1200
American

In this connection the Department's attention is called to Charity Interrogation Report No. 619, forwarded to the Department under cover of a letter dated March 1, 1954, to Mr. A. Saban, Chief, Section 6 of this report states, "On another occasion source saw several coaches full of Europeans who were also taken to USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him."

Julian P. Harrington
American Consul Generalcc: Taipei
Moscow
London
Paris226
J.B.

DECLASSIFIED FOR EMBASSY ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, BY 2401

By Boyle/Jan NARA, Date 1/1/2000

No. 947

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to request the Ministry's assistance in the following matter.

The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States Government desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time.

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1954SOVIET DENIES HAVING
U.S. KOREA PRISONERS

MOSCOW, Thursday, May 11.—The Soviet Government in a note sent to the United States Embassy yesterday denied that American prisoners had been transported to the Soviet Union from Korea.

The Soviet Government's statement was the first published notice that the United States had sent a note to Moscow on this subject. The number of prisoners reported and where they were sent remained.

The acknowledgment was published in Soviet newspapers today, and the United States made the charge in a note delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on May 8.

The Soviet reply said: "The statements in the note of the United States Government, that American war prisoners, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any basis and are clearly refuted, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union."

The Moscow radio heard in London broadcast this acknowledgment. The Associated Press said.

At the State Department in Washington, a spokesman said the United States Embassy in Moscow gave the Soviet Foreign Office a note May 1, but the spokesman said he did not know when the prisoners were or how many there were. He said it was not the note also had been sent to the Soviet Embassy a week ago.

American Embassy,

Moscow, April 5, 1954.

ED Shaughnessy
DHN:ny:inf

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

THE NEW YORK TIMES
JAN. 3, 1954

227
J.R.

THE OTHER PRISONERS

While world attention has been focused on the Korean war prisoners comparatively little has been said about many other prisoners from many nations who languish in Communist jails or are being worked to death in Communist slave labor camps. Their plight has been brought into the news again by the appearance of the two Americans, Roger Cox and Leland Taylor, who have just been freed by the Soviets and of Arnold M. Klien, the American business man released from a Shanghai prison suffering from partial paralysis and beriberi.

All three confirm that the Soviet bloc and the Chinese Communists are holding in their jails and slave camps many foreigners, including soldiers and civilians, women and children. Cox and Taylor, who were freed because they had been identified, by returning Austrian prisoners, have identified at least four more Americans and reported on six others. But, according to State Department figures, the total number of Americans held by the Soviets and their European satellites exceeds 1,000 in addition to several times that number who are reported claimants to American citizenship, and the Chinese Communists are known to hold about 100 Americans. The latter figure may be increased by these unidentified prisoners of the Korean war reportedly deported to China.

Many of these Americans, like many West Europeans, were residents in the Iron Curtain countries caught by the Communist tide; others were deported from German concentration camps; some, like Cox, were simply kidnapped. How many have since died is uncertain, but the known death toll among German and Japanese war prisoners tells its own grim tale. It would be some comfort to think that their imprisonment was the work of Berlin and that the latter's liquidation might bring them freedom in keeping with Premier Malenkov's New Year's wishes to the American and all Western people. But with the Communist regimen nothing can be taken for granted, and it is the duty of the American Government to use all available means, through diplomatic channels and the United Nations, to press for their liberation.

FREED FLIER SAYS PEIPING IS HOLDING MORE U. S. AIRMEN

Canadian Now in Hong Kong
Brings News of Americans
Other Than 11 Jailed

DETAILS NOT DISCLOSED

Data on Prisoners' Identity
Sent to Washington After
Aide Sees Informant

BY HENRY R. LIEBERMAN

WING COMMANDER SHINE, an official of the Chinese Air Force, said today that three Americans were known to have been in the camp with the two Americans, Roger Cox and Leland Taylor, who were freed by the Soviets. Wing Commander Shine said that the three Americans would be released along with the Canadian, now in Hong Kong, who brought the news of the Americans' release. The three Americans were known to have been in the camp with the two Americans, Cox and Taylor, who were freed by the Soviets. Wing Commander Shine said that the three Americans would be released along with the Canadian, now in Hong Kong, who brought the news of the Americans' release.



CANADIAN FLIER REACHES HONG KONG: Squadron Leader A. R. MacKinnon, right, is met by the brother-in-law, R. C. F. Wing Commander, Donald Shaw, at Loew's Station yesterday after his release from Communist China. He was shot down near the Yalu river while flying as an reconnaissance officer with the United States Air Force during the Korean War.

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J.R.

OVER

(Continued on Page 1, Column 1)

1. PROBLEM

To evaluate the conduct of American prisoners of war in Korea, ascertain the reasons therefor, and determine what corrective measures are necessary to eliminate misconduct.

2. FACTS BEHIND THE PROBLEM

a. During U. S. operations in Korea in 1950-53, at least 5,685 U. S. military personnel (of whom 5,115 were Army) were taken prisoner by the enemy. Of these, over 1,000 died in captivity and 4,115 were repatriated subsequent to the armistice agreement. Twenty-one U. S. soldiers refused repatriation and remained with the communists. (Annex B, Interim Report of U. S. Battle Casualties, 31 December 1953).

b. Estimates of the number of Americans who were captured and died in enemy prisoner of war camps have been considerably higher than official casualty figures, which show about 6,000 Americans as "missing in action". A Senate subcommittee investigating many war crimes concluded that more than 5,000 American prisoners of war died because of communist treatment. (Annex K, "Korean War Atrocities", Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 11 January 1954).

c. American prisoners of war experienced harsh treatment during captivity, and were subjected to vigorous interrogation and indoctrination by the enemy. (Annex C, Intelligence Considerations, and Annex D, Medical Considerations).

d. Individual reactions of American prisoners of war to communist indoctrination and interrogation ranged from determined resistance to active collaboration with the enemy. (Annex G, Intelligence Considerations).

e. Misbehavior before the enemy, misconduct as a prisoner, and aiding the enemy are specific offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (Annex E, Legal Considerations and Precedents).

f. U. S. Army policies and standards governing the conduct of troops subject to capture and conduct during captivity are expressed in its publications. The Uniform Code of Military Justice prescribes the minimum standard of conduct in such situations. (Annex F, Policies and Standards Governing Conduct of Troops).

g. U. S. Army training programs include instruction in evasion and escape, resisting interrogation and indoctrination, and survival. (Annex G, Training Considerations).

SECRET

TAB A

Series A

INTERIM REPORT OF U.S. BATTLE CASUALTIES
As of 31 December 1953

(Source: Progress Reports and Statistics, OSD 25 Jan 54)

	Total Dept. of Defense	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1. TOTAL CASUALTIES (Sum of items 3, 4 and 5) (Note 1)	112,118	110,081	2,080	28,110	1,847
2. TOTAL DEATHS (Sum of items 3, 4a and 5a)	30,606	25,208	295	4,137	866
3. Killed in action - Total	22,986	18,852	297	3,294	543
4. Wounded in action - Total	105,807	101,644	1,927	24,188	378
a. Died of Wounds	2,680	1,911	22	537	11
b. Other (current wounded, returned to duty, evacuated to U.S., etc.)	103,227	71,733	1,576	23,651	367
5. Missing in action - Total	13,325	11,385	186	628	226
a. Died of Wounds	5,140	4,645	31	24	3
b. Returned to Military control	5,111	4,638	35	194	264
c. Current captured (Note 2)	101	93	0	7	1
d. Current missing	2,953	2,409	74	121	349

Note 1: These figures reflect findings of presumptive death and other determination changes in status, and revisions processed through 31 Dec 53. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

Note 2: Status of Item 5c.

	Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Gross captured	5,625	5,115	21	225	224
Killed	1,106	1,079	0	24	3
Returned	4,418	3,973	31	154	220
Current captured	101	93	0	7	1

ANNEX B

2-1877 281

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

REPORT NO. CS-311/04439-71

(C.I.A.
Report
#)

DATE DISTR 10 JUNE 1971

COUNTRY / NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 1965-JUNE 1967

SUBJECT PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING SITE FOR CAPTURED U.S.

PILOTS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE AND PRESENCE OF SOVIET
AND COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL AT THE SITE

• ACQ

SOURCE

VIETNAM - SAIGON - 780 - APRIL 1973

1. A PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING POINT FOR U.S. PILOTS SHOT DOWN OVER VINH PHU PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM /NVN/, WAS LOCATED AT THE LAM THAO SUPERPHOSPHATE PLANT /VJ381389/ NEAR THACH SON VILLAGE, LAM THAO DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. TWO U.S. PILOTS WERE TAKEN TO THE DEBRIEFING POINT ON ONE OCCASION IN 1965; EIGHT, IN 1966; AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER, IN 1967. THE PRISONERS WERE ESCORTED TO THE SITE BY PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES /APSF/, AND STUDENTS FROM A NEARBY SCHOOL SERVED AS PERIMETER GUARDS. EACH TIME PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT TO THE SITE THEY RODE IN AN OPEN CAR OF CHINESE ORIGIN RESEMBLING AN AMERICAN JEEP. SOME OF THE ESCORT GUARDS RODE IN A LEAD CAR AND OTHERS RODE IN TWO CARS FOLLOWING THE PRISONERS. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE PLANT, THE GUARDS LINED UP, FORMING A CORRIDOR THROUGH WHICH THE PILOTS ENTERED THE BUILDING. AT THIS POINT A SOVIET, A CHINESE, AND A VIETNAMESE GREETED THE PILOTS AND LED THEM INTO THE BUILDING. THE PILOTS USUALLY REMAINED IN THE BUILDING FOR SEVERAL HOURS. WHEN THEY EMERGED THEY HAD CHANGED FROM UNIFORMS INTO CIVILIAN CLOTHING.

SAID

██████████ HAD TOLD HIM THE FOREIGNERS WERE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE. SOVIET PERSONNEL HAD BEEN STATIONED AT THE PLANT SINCE ITS CONSTRUCTION IN 1963, BUT IN 1965 THE NUMBER OF SOVIETS WAS REDUCED TO THREE OR FOUR, AND IT REMAINED AT THAT LEVEL AS OF JUNE 1967. ABOUT 20 COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL ARRIVED AT THE PLANT IN 1966 AND THERE WERE STILL ABOUT 20 THERE AS OF JUNE 1967 AS FAR AS ██████████ KNEW, THE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL GOOT ALONG WELL.

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CS-011/04430-71

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J.R.

2. AFTER SHAKING HANDS WITH THE SOVIET AND CHINESE, THE PRISONERS WERE LED TO A DIFFERENT VEHICLE FROM THE ONE WHICH BROUGHT THEM TO THE S.T.E. THEY WERE ESCORTED FROM THE PLANT BY A DIFFERENT SET OF GUARDS WHO WORE YELLOW AND WHITE UNIFORMS AND WERE ARMED WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS. [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW THE DESTINATION OF THE PRISONERS.

3. ABOUT 30 STUDENTS FROM THE LAN THAO SECOND-LEVEL SCHOOL WERE SELECTED BY THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT, DAO KHAC T R U N G, FOR GUARD DUTY AT THE SUPERPHOSPHATE PLANT. EACH STUDENT WAS CAREFULLY SCREENED AND THEN TRAINED IN THE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING U.S. PRISONERS. A PAMPHLET ENTITLED "POLICY ON TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS" /CHINH SACH DOI XU TU BINH MY/ WAS USED AS A TRAINING DOCUMENT, AND STUDENTS WERE GIVEN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RECEPTION OF THE PRISONERS AT THE DEBRIEFING SITE. ONE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STUDENT GUARDS WAS TO DISARM ANY VILLAGERS WITH WEAPONS BEFORE ALLOWING THEM CLOSE TO THE AMERICANS. AS LONG AS NO PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE AMERICANS, THE VILLAGERS WERE PERMITTED TO APPROACH THE PILOTS AND MAKE ANY REMARK SUITABLE TO THE OCCASION.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE NAVFORV
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM

235 J.R.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

386

ACTION

January 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZIEZINSKI

FROM:

MICHEL OKSENBERG

SUBJECT:

Renewed League of MIA Families Request for Appointment

Once again, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia seeks to meet you (Tab B).

They have nothing new to say, and I am capable of summarizing any developments for you. So I recommend turning down the request, and I will call Ann Griffiths separately to say you have instructed me to see her.

However, a letter from you is important to indicate that you take recent refugee reports of sighting of live Americans "seriously." This is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game, and you should not be the whistle blower. The idea is to say that the President is determined to pursue any lead concerning possible live MIAs.

Do not offer an opinion as to whether those leads are realistic. Apparently you revealed skepticism to Congressman Gilman, and my recommended letter to the League walks you back from that.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Ann Griffiths.

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J.B.

From Vice President
George Bush
to Anthony Duke
(My father-in-law)
J.B.B. Oct 2, 1986

Dear Tony,

I was glad to get
your letter. I am an
admirer of Ross Perot
and I'm glad your son-in-
law is helping Ross.

(Same
day
A.D. Duke
&
J.B.B.
Brown
not with
William
Cassidy
at CIA HQ
Langley -

The President & I, on
the assumption that our
men are alive, want every
avenue checked out.

Thanks so much for
that good letter.
Sincerely, George Bush

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J.B.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

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Telephone (609) 734-8000 Telex 12973-443-17 Fax 609-934-3399

IMPORTANT

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

December 13, 1988

Dear Mr. Brown:

I have your further letter, of December 3, concerning your study of questions connected with the American prisoners of war who fell into Russian hands in the final months of the Second World War. I have also received the many copies of documents that accompanied your letter, as well as the volume of reminiscences of your Vietnam service, the gift of which

It would seem to me that the sort of documentation you have sent to me should permit you to form a pretty fair picture of the course of these

Mr. John M. G. Brown

-2-

December 13, 1988

exchanges with the Russians on the part of both the British and ourselves, and of the results obtained.

I can only give you one memory that may be of interest to you. I thought it, at the time, highly probable that General Golitsky, while wearing a regular military uniform, was actually a high official of the then M.K.V.D. and not of the regular Russian military authorities. I believe I made my view plain to General Deane, but that he felt that he had no choice but to deal with the man assigned for this purpose, and had no formal grounds for questioning his status. I could understand his position, but I resented this sort of obfuscation and saw it as an attempt to prevent contact between our Military Mission and the regular Russian military establishment.

Very sincerely,

George Kenman
George Kenman

John M. G. Brown
Box 30
Petrolia, CA 95558
707/629/3547

31 May, 1990

MS. Mary Bartlett
Public Affairs
Hoover Institution Bldg. 170
Stanford, CA 94305
Fax: 415/725/3326

Reference: June 4 1990
Visit of President Mikhail Gorbachev

Dear Ms. Bartlett,

I am sending, as per my conversation yesterday with Dolores Apodaca Alfond of Washington State, a letter and attachments for Mr. Gorbachev relating to my research and publishing of recently declassified documents concerning US prisoners of war in Soviet control in 1945 and thereafter.

I trust that you will hand them to President Gorbachev's personal assistant and I wish to thank you in advance for the valuable service you perform for the surviving prisoners and for the United States by doing so.

I am sending one set of documents by fax and a larger packet by Federal Express on 31 May, 1990, telephoning your office when they are on the way.

Please accept my sincere best regards,

John M. G. Brown

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J.B.

John M.G. Brown
Box 30
Petrolia, California, 95558

*Delivered @ Soviet Consulate in
San Francisco w/ Gorbachev press*

May 31, 1990

The Honorable Mikhail Gorbachev
President and General Secretary
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

President Gorbachev,

I wish to send my best wishes to the people of the Soviet Union and to you for your extraordinary leadership. The long history of Russia has been enhanced by your efforts for glasnost.

I am one of the American researchers who have uncovered formerly-secret official documentation in the U.S. National Archives and through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), of American and Western Allied prisoners-of-war remaining under the control of Soviet authorities after the 1918-1920 American intervention in Russia, the Second World War in 1945 and the Korean War in 1953. In addition I have uncovered witnesses among former US Intelligence officers who have admitted that US POWs missing after the 1973 American withdrawal from Vietnam, had been listed as "Moscow Bound". The total missing since 1945 is recorded as many thousands of Americans. I have published these findings and I include copies of my HIDDEN POWs OF THE COLD WAR, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) Magazine, February 1990 and other articles.

My appeal to you is that the Soviet state now release all surviving American prisoners in the USSR who wish to return home- and use its influence to gain freedom for those held by communist governments in Asia. The existence of these prisoners of three wars has long been secretly-classified by the US Government from the American people, apparently in the national security interest of avoiding a possible military confrontation with the USSR. Thus, it appears to be most difficult for the United States Government to be the first to publicly demand the repatriation of living prisoners. The Soviet Union could create a completely new relationship with the United States by finally addressing this last major secret of the Cold War and of Josef Stalin's regime, which is now emerging here. I am sure that my country would reciprocate in searching for missing Soviets in Afghanistan and Pakistan or in other areas of Soviet interest.

I will offer to do the most I can do, which is to meet with Soviet investigators or officials in the United States to assist them in understanding the American version of these events and to record for my book the Soviet version of events. I know you understand that I am only doing my duty for my fellow American servicemen.

With sincere respect

John M. G. Brown

Attached: HIDDEN POWs OF THE COLD WAR, VFW February 1990,
Letters of General William Vestmoreland, (A.U.S. Ret'd),
and George Kennan, former US-Ambassador to Russia.

FEBRUARY 1990


VFW

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

As Wall Crumbles Berlin Brigade Stands Firm

To: President Mikhail Gorbachev.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

M. Brown



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J.S.

Veterans of Foreign War of the United States Magazine - February 1990 - Vol. 77 No. 6

VETERAN VIEWS

Hidden POWs of the Cold War: One Man's View

By John M.G. Brown

A series of signals from the Soviet Union asking for U.S. assistance in repatriating some 300 Soviet soldiers missing in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a unique opportunity.

Reports from Soviet diplomatic sources appearing in the American press in 1989, indicating that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had discussed this matter with President George Bush, demonstrates possible linkage in accounting for Russian MIAs in Afghanistan and American POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War as well as previous wars.

A number of U.S. prisoners may have been transferred to the Soviet Union from Indochina and documentary evidence existed for the transfer of large numbers of U.S. POWs of the Korean War to the Soviet Union. The U.S. demanded their return in May 1954, but the Soviet Union denied holding American POWs "under guard."

And the existence and disappearance of American and British POWs under Soviet control in 1945 has been documented by this writer through declassification of thousands of formerly secret U.S. cables and reports in the National Archives.

Although many Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests have been denied me for "national security" reasons, some records have been obtained through FOIA. Interviews with 1945 participants have clarified other aspects of this hidden aspect of the Cold War.

In 1946 the Soviet Army liberated over a million Western Allied POWs and displaced persons in Nazi camps in Poland, eastern Germany and Austria. According to the Yalta Agreements they were to be repatriated to their native lands.

While some were relatively well-treated by front-line Russian troops, documentary evidence details how over 100,000 of these prisoners were forcibly retained by Soviet authorities. Included were hundreds of thousands of French, Belgians, Dutch and ethnic Jews who had survived the Nazi concentration camps.

Among them were tens of thousands of American, British and Commonwealth POWs whose kidnapping became a high-level national security secret. American and British prisoners were also among the more than 4,500,000 German and Japanese POWs retained as forced labor by the Russians.

On May 23, 1945, two weeks after

the end of the war in Europe, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's chief POW negotiator with the Soviets, Maj. Gen. Ray Barker, stated in a secret report: "The SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held as hostages by the Russians..."

Recently declassified U.S. and British documents record details of a Soviet "blackmail" operation executed by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his cohorts Molotov, Beria, Gorkov and others.

Their object was to obtain Allied compliance in the coerced and forcible repatriations of more than 5,000,000 Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs, Poles, Italians and other eastern Europeans. They also demanded U.S. diplomatic recognition of Communist regimes in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

An additional benefit to the Russians was to be the labor of thousands of technologically advanced (by Soviet standards) Allied prisoners. The actions of highly placed Soviet spies in the British and American governments severely compromised the Allies and greatly assisted the Soviets in this operation.

Repatriation of POWs was a secret topic of the 1945 founding United Nations Conference in San Francisco, the 1945 Hopkins-Stalin meetings and the Potsdam Conference. It appears that Field Marshal Alexander, Gen. George Patton and to a lesser extent others including Gen. Eisenhower, resisted this chain of events prior to and following the unsuccessful September 1945 foreign ministers' meetings.

Well after the war, Alexander cabled London: "Difficulty in tracing BR/US PWs in Russian zone." He reported that U.S. and British

Though most American prisoners held by the Germans were liberated by U.S. troops (as shown here), possibly as many as 20,000 U.S. POWs were not repatriated from Soviet-controlled territories. U.S. Army



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J.S.

POWs were being shipped east into Russia "in boxcars with German PWs."

Meanwhile, Patton's Third Army had located thousands more American and British prisoners being withheld after the war by the Soviets in Austria. According to once-top secret U.S. documents, decisions were first made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then by President Harry Truman that the potential losses of a 1945-46 war with Russia were not worth the possible recovery of some 20,000 American and 20,000 or more British and Commonwealth POWs.

Implementation of this policy was passed on to the responsible departments and agencies. Evidence has surfaced of the secret return of Allied prisoners for the forcibly repatriated Soviet citizens of whom Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Lord Bethell and Nikolai Tolstoy have written so eloquently.

Repatriations to Stalin's GULAG were marred by mass suicides. Stalin reneged on full reciprocity and most of the Allied POWs disappeared into secret, special camps. Stalin's failure to reciprocate in the repatriations of 1945-47 resulted in an official tendency to minimize the extent of Allied losses.

In classified U.S. and British documents, the total number of prisoners known to be in Soviet hands was scaled down to some 5,500 Americans and 8,500 British and Commonwealth troops. Continuing research indicates that these figures reflect a shifting of known prisoners into other categories. All told, some 78,000 Americans remain unaccounted for from WWII.

The acute need for intelligence inside Soviet territory to locate the large number of missing Allied prisoners for possible secret rescues or negotiations led to U.S. Soviet air battles in Europe and U.S. naval threats to the Russians in Manchuria.

This crisis led to the first major American covert actions after WWII inside Soviet territory executed by

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Army G-2/SSU, the State Department's Office of Policy Coordination, and later the CIA.

Among other assets, they used existing German intelligence networks. The perceived need for extreme security in this matter helped create a chain of events leading to the present debate on the limits of secrecy in a free society.

The latest Soviet statement of concern for the return of their missing Afghan War prisoners should be viewed as a public diplomatic signal of their willingness to consider an exchange. This should not, however, be permitted to become a forced repatriation of those 40-50 former Soviet prisoners known to be living

in freedom in the U.S. and Canada.

What would be in order, however, is the use of American influence to gain control of those Soviet POWs in Afghanistan and Pakistan who wish to return home.

Given the present glasnost mood and Gorbachev's statements on Stalin's crimes, it might finally be to the Soviet Union's advantage to reveal the truth about American POWs from WWII.

John M. G. Brown, a former combat infantryman with the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions in Vietnam, is a Life Member of Post 2886 in Seattle, Wash. and author of Rice Paddy Grunt (1986).

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J.S.

William Childs Westmoreland
General, United States Army, Retired
Box 1050
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

March 26, 1990

Dear John:

Thank you for sending me the copy of the beautifully written letter to General Colin Powell.

Indeed you are on to something and I trust it can be brought to a head.

Please keep me informed.

Sincerely,

William Childs Westmoreland
H. C. WESTMORELAND

John M. G. Brown
Box 30
Patrolia, Ca. 95558

William Childs Westmoreland
General, United States Army, Retired
Box 1088
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

October 5, 1989

Dear Steve:

This is an acknowledgement of your letter of August 18 which was forwarded to my vacation address and delayed by Hugo.

John Brown is a sincere man and has spent hundreds of hours on the MIA problem. My gut feeling is that his allegations are documented.

As you appreciate public attitudes toward the Vietnam War MIA problem are far different from those following World War II.

Sincerely,

W. Childs Westmoreland
W. C. WESTMORELAND

Steve Johnston
Eastside - Today
11061 NE 2nd St.
Suite 105
Bellevue, Washington 98004

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J.B.

Soviets urgently seek names of MIAs

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J.B.

Government thinks 100 to 200 alive in Afghanistan

By Colla Pickover
AP Wire Service

KABUL, Afghanistan — Nothing pains Soviet officials here quite as much as attempts to draw parallels between their nation's bitter experience in Afghanistan and the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

By no odd point, at least, they compare their loss to that of the Americans.

Think what an emotional issue the question of MIAs is for Americans, said a high-ranking Soviet diplomat in a recent interview. "Do you think our missing soldiers are any less to us? You can say there is no higher priority for us than accounting for these men."

According to Moscow's official tally, more than 10,000 troops died in combat against Afghanistan's insurgents since the Soviet intervention in 1979. At least another 37,000 were wounded before the Soviet military withdrawal was completed Feb. 15. An additional 313 are listed as missing in action.

"There is reason to believe that at least 100, and perhaps as many as 200, are alive and being held captive," said an official of the International Committee for the Red Cross. "The Russians are extremely keen on finding them."

Asped to U.S. — Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has personally raised the MIA issue with President Bush, saying they the United States will use its influence with the rebels to locate the prisoners, according to a spokesman of the Soviet Embassy here.

The CIA is the major foreign source of the mujahideen movement, according to the guerrillas with

arms. "We've applied many times for help from the American government," said a Soviet Embassy official. "This is something you Americans could do easily and for which the Soviet people would feel the deepest gratitude."

The missing Soviet troops are believed to be held in rebel camps inside Afghanistan, as well as in camps in Pakistan and Iran.

"We are sure there are Soviet POWs inside Pakistan, but when

ever we learn of one's existence, they disappear," said the embassy official. "It is extremely frustrating."

No access since 1984.

The Moslem guerrillas — mujahideen — operate freely from bases in the area of Peshawar, Pakistan. They also control vast areas of the Afghan countryside.

Red Cross officials support Moscow's claim that Soviet POWs are being held in Pakistan but said

the organization has had no direct access to them since 1984.

In that year, the Red Cross negotiated the release of 11 Soviet POWs with the Pakistan government, an agreement that kept the Soviets in Switzerland for two years before repatriation.

"Since then, there has been nothing," said a Red Cross official. "It's been a complete blackout."

Tragedy impossible

Twenty Soviet prisoners held in

a Pakistan warehouse were massacred in 1985, according to one reliable account.

The Soviets are desperate to learn even their names, said an international relief official. "But all we know is roughly when the incident occurred and how it occurred."

Apparently, the mujahideen simply gunned these prisoners down in retaliation for some Soviet military atrocity inside Afghanistan.

Relief officials like the Soviets, accuse the United States of not doing more to secure information on the POWs.


They concede, however, there is probably little Washington could do to win their release.

The mujahideen are quite

sure they held something very valuable, one such official said. "Still, perhaps the Americans could learn their names and pass the information along, at the very least, to help ease the minds of these men's families."

The Soviet Union insists it holds no mujahideen prisoners. But it is believed that the Afghan government, once which Moscow wielded enormous influence, holds upwards of 12,000 rebel captives.

The Soviets could probably convince Kabul to give up these prisoners in exchange for the POWs, but there is nothing so far to suggest the mujahideen are willing to bargain, said a relief official.



WILLIAM STEVENSON



They retrieved confidential messages between Moscow, London and Washington following the Yalta Conference in February, 1945 when Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the last time. Brown believes "it was then that the the West agreed to the forced repatriation of two million 'Soviet citizens' who were in Allied hands. The

From this he concluded if U.S. publishers were being told the same yarn, he and Ashworth might as well print the bare details in the veterans' newsletter. "Then," he tells me, "maybe someone will let us publish the whole truth."

Regards,

The Russians lost in a quagmire, unable to win the war, and they were left with a million dead and wounded, their best brigades, their fighting men, many of the missing may be in the United States and Canada, the Soviets claim, but these men need not fear punishment. "Think what we emotional issue the question of MIA's is for Americans... Do you think our missing soldiers mean any less to us? A Soviet diplomat asked in a recent Russian Globe article.

Searching for lost men can be as costly as the original war. For the last 30 years, the U.S. has spent \$1 billion on the subject. Still the number is unknown accurate. For aught we know, the missing may be in the Soviet Union. President Mikhail Gorbachev approaches President Bush for assistance in this own MIA dilemma. U.S. Veteran brings you this special documented report of a well-known Soviet agenda which abducted and enslaved

The American National Archives have now been searched by 170 researchers, including the authors, originally involved in the project. The results of the search are being collated in a document listing the fate of American prisoners left behind in the USSR. Many records are still scarce classified after 44 years, however, and some documents have come posthumously to light, have been obtained, nevertheless.

The research, coupled with information obtained from the blacklisting operation at the end of the war, including tens of thousands of American, British and other Western Allied POWs as well as the Soviet, Chinese, Japanese, German, Italian, and Polish prisoners of war, has been made available to the public. The project was headed by the late Professor Desmond O'Malley, who was succeeded by Professor David G. Allen, Anthony Eden, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Clement Churchill, Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Clement A. Allen, Anthony Eden, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry Stimson.

U.S. and British POWs as hostages.

In Poland and the Soviet Union, the Germans forced hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs and civilians to retreat to the rear. Many of them were left behind and taken by the enemy. In the Soviet Union, they were sent to the Red Army in January and early February, 1945, prior to the Yalta Agreement on repatriation of prisoners, the American Embassy in Moscow began receiving reports of U.S. prisoners in Soviet hands through U.S. intelligence. Sen. Charles McNary, D-Ind., told the Senate that Gen. George Kennerly, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had learned that Gen. John Deane, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, had already begun consulting with demands for information from the Russians.

From the mounting evidence that many Americans had been held incommunicado by the Soviets, who hadn't revealed the fact, Kennan, as chargé d'affaires, demanded contact with the prisoners and subsequently suggested a statement to the

Another forecast of trouble occurred when the Embassy received a note dated February 14, 1945, signed by F.H. Brooks, which read, "Here in 'Nowy Sącz' are eight officers and twelve NCO's (non-commissioned officers) all of whom are mostly Americans and British airmen. At the moment we are with the Russian Army in Nowy Sącz for over three weeks and no responsible parties have been notified of our presence and whereabouts. We have no freedom and have been told we are internees."



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY NEWSLETTER

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DECEMBER 1988

Professor George Schwab
Editor
For the visit of President Mikhail Gorbachev
PROFESSOR ELIE WIESE

(a member of the Executive Committee of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy)

For your exemplary contributions to the cause of

HUMANITARIANISM AND PEACE

the National Committee on American Foreign Policy congratulates you

for having been awarded the

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

Guiding Principles of American Foreign Policy

 Remarks by Ambassador
Vernon A. Walters
 Before the National Committee on
 American Foreign Policy
 New York City
 October 15, 1988

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador [Kellogg]. I am delighted to be here. This is an extraordinarily prestigious group, and I feel very honored that you have asked me to speak to you. I see in the audience many old friends and a number of colleagues from the United Nations here, and I will try to be as brief as possible because my experience has been that the speaker speaks about what interests him and the questions are what forces him to speak about what the audience wants to hear. I will, therefore, briefly run across the field of American foreign policy.

First, my instructions from the President as far as the United Nations is concerned are to reform it and not to kill it. I think that's very important. If the United Nations did not exist, it would have to be invented. It has a number of shortcomings, but it also is unique and offers an opportunity to so many nations to keep contact with others. The smaller nations have relatively few diplomatic posts, and yet at the United Nations they can be in

(continued on page 7)

United States Policy Toward South Africa: Why Did It Fail?

 by
 Rhoda Plotkin

American foreign policy in southern Africa has failed to achieve its objectives. Originally hailed by its proponents as a realistic approach to the problems of political reform and peaceful change in South Africa and the region, the Reagan policy of constructive engagement now shares the unhappy fate of its failed predecessors. In terms of

(continued on page 8)

The POW/MIA Question: National Honor and Foreign Policy

 A Letter to the National Committee
 on American Foreign Policy
 by
John M. G. Brown

National honor and national interests are not mutually exclusive. To the extent that national honor is undermined by actions that threaten the morale of citizen-soldiers, their families, friends, and others it becomes a matter of security and therefore also a foreign policy concern. What I am

(continued on page 12)

The POW/MIA Question: (cont'd from pg. 1)

alluding to is, of course, the POW/MIA tragedy in Southeast Asia.

As is well known, Washington's decision to quit Vietnam was accompanied by an endeavor to forget the immediate past that led to the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In this attempt Washington violated the tradition of the citizen-soldier who, in return for performing honorably the profession of soldiering, with all that that implies, especially the willingness to die and the expectation of being honored by the nation instead of being abandoned. By continuing to transgress the tradition by not resolving the POW/MIA tragedy honorably, the United States is continuing to turn its back on the people who defend the country

and is thus continuing to court disaster. To prevent this from happening it is vital to recognize the tragedy, to recognize once and for all that for millions of Americans the war is not yet over, and to act accordingly.

Before suggesting a course of action, I shall briefly review several salient facts: (1) Of more than 500 Americans held prisoners by the Pathet Lao in Laos, not one has returned; (2) of hundreds captured or missing in South Vietnam, many have never been freed; (3) beyond those returned from North Vietnam in Operation Homecoming in 1973, many others are known to have been captured. (Of those returned, none was missing an arm or a leg or was disfigured by burns, ejections from flaming aircraft notwithstanding.) The presence of POWs

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Newsletter

DECEMBER 1988

In Vietnam has been corroborated by, among others, hundreds of live sightings on the part of U.S. prisoners, refugees, camp inmates, former South Vietnamese soldiers and officers, by Robert Garwood, the last U.S. prisoner to leave Vietnam in 1979, by highly suggestive satellite evidence and communications interceptions, and finally, the evidence submitted by the highly decorated U.S. officers Mark Smith, Robert Howard, and Melvin McIntire, orders to destroy incriminating evidence or risk destruction of career and character notwithstanding.

Because the present administration and past administrations have done next to nothing to resolve the problem, a wounded veteran of the Vietnam War, a member of the National Advisory Board of Skyhawk II Project—Account for POW/MIA's, and the chairman of the POW/MIA Committee of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, urge the President to appoint immediately a capable, prominent citizen to negotiate a successful resolution of the tragedy. That citizen must be helped by a competent office staff and by the vast intelligence capabilities at the disposal of the country.

The negotiator must be instructed to (1) reopen the bona fide offer made by Vietnam to "sell" an unspecified number of U.S. POWs, something President Reagan rejected in 1981 (see the editorial in *The Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 1988); (2) discuss the issue with Communist China; (3) discuss the tragedy with the Soviet Union. Evidence seems to indicate that the Soviet Union may be holding some of our Vietnam prisoners who were transferred because of their specialized electronic warfare training.

In short, what is being suggested here is nothing that is out of line. There are ample precedents. For example, from the depth of a far more severe defeat Chancellor Konrad Adenauer obtained the release of German army prisoners from Soviet labor camps. Now the last of the Bay of Pigs prisoners are being released.

What is unacceptable is a do-nothing policy or one that aims at a token release of only two or three Americans who may well be branded as former deserters or collaborators.

CUMULATIVE INDEX (1988)

of the

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 Brown, John M. G., "The POW/MIA Question:
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 the National Committee on American Foreign

 For the Record: "Failure at Reykjavik: A Bless-
 ing in Disguise," December 1988, vol. 9, no. 6

For the Record: "On State Terrorism," Decem-

National Archives



Washington, DC 20408

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J.B.251
J.B.

30 JUN 1989

Mr. John M. G. Brown
37577 Mattole Road
Petaluma, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 29, 1989, for access to various records in Record Group 331, 332, and 342 relating to American prisoners of war and displaced persons.

AFHQ microfilm reel 139-B has been declassified and may be examined in our research room. If you wish to order a microfilm reproduction, please follow the instructions on the back (pink copy) of the enclosed MATF Form 72. The remaining AFHQ microfilm reels cited in your letter, specifically 108-F, 457-B, 144-Special, 97-F, 557-F, 535-F, 486-B, and 180-F remain security classified. Similarly, the records you have cited as box 3 of Entry 220-A (Records of the G-2 Section, 15th Army Group) and boxes 12 through 15 of Entry 53-A (Records of the G-3 Section relating to special operations) in Record Group 331 also remain security classified. Since we must submit these records to the Declassification Division for review, we are unable to complete the processing of your request within the ten days provided for by the Freedom of Information Act. The amended act (5 U.S.C. 552 (a)(6) (B)), provides that an agency may be allowed additional time to complete its review of the requested records if that agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request.

In Record Group 342 we were unable to locate an eighth box of interrogation reports of repatriated Japanese POW's from the Soviet Union. We examined the box which follows immediately after the seven boxes of interrogation reports but the material contained therein is not relevant to your request. This, therefore, is not a denial of that portion of your request, as the requested records do not exist.

From Record Group 332, Records of the European Theater of Operations--U.S. Forces, European Theater, you requested debriefings of German Prisoners of War, presumably filed under the decimal 383.6. This portion of your request fails to meet certain tests of the FOIA. The House Committee on Government Operations (House Report No. 95-793) indicated that in making a request that "although you are not required under the FOIA to specify a document by name or title, your request must be reasonably describe the information sought." Additionally, the report of the House Government

ETO - MISFET

RG 332/335

A6-DEC 383.6 12992 German POW debriefings

National Archives and Records Administration

Senator Charles Grassley
Personal Attn: Chris Kolesnik
135 Senate Hart Bldg.
Wash., DC 20510

12th Sept, 1989

Dear Chris,

I hope you are well. I am enclosing a list of PW related microfilm and documents which have been refused to me by the National Archives on the grounds that they are still classified, although nearly all of them are 44 years old. If, as certain USG officials have stated, we are wrong in our conclusions concerning US PWs remaining in Soviet hands in 1945, why then are we refused access to the appropriate records? On some of the requests I have waited nearly a year, (since November, 1988). This has obviously had the effect of government-imposed censorship, and has infringed on our constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, which I personally served in front-line combat to uphold. I am quite concerned that I (and my colleague, Ashworth) get full access to these documents as we do not feel that anyone else is well-grounded enough, in the thousands of other documents in our possession, to interpret them correctly. Their significance might be entirely misunderstood without all the concurrent cables and reports. (I am also attaching copies of some of the original correspondence by me and Archives personnel.)

1) Record Group (RG) 331 decimal 389.6 serials 1743, Austria OSS Reports, July, 1945, microfilm on reel R-459-F. I have been informed over 3 months ago by Richard Boylan, Asst Chief/Military Reference Branch, National Archives, that this was "referred to another government agency for further review." We do not want weeded portions of it but the entire report including cover piece and end which would clarify how many pages were in the original. Many OSS documents have been released to researchers such as Bradley Smith, author of The Shadow Warriors, but we have been denied access to practically all OSS documents, apparently because the subject of our research is US prisoners of war.

2) RG 331, serial 170 FAN Reports from AGWAR, Vol. 19, Sept 44- Feb. 1947, Microfilm on film reel R-15-N. I have heard nothing on this request in 10 months.

3) RG 331, serial # 20, PWB Correspondence, May 44-July, 1945 Film reel R-112-G. (10 months wait on this, also.)

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J.B.

4) RG 331, serial # 17, (original ref. # 57 in finding aid) Intelligence Summaries, various, Vol. 2 June 45- Feb. 46 on film reel R-111-G. (10 months wait on this also.)

5) RG 331 serial # 431 SACMED (Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean) Field HQ, POW, June 45 to Sept. 1945, serial # 433, POW April 45 to June 45, and serial # 434 American POW April, 1945 to August, 1945 - all on microfilm reel R-108-E. (Original FOIA 29 May, 1989. I was told in writing on June 30th, 1989 that this was "still security classified".)

6) RG 331, Microfilm 574, 576, 577, 578, POW & DP (displaced persons) film reel R-457-B. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

7) RG 331, 383.6, serial # 3574, AFHQ, POW Jan-Sept 47, and serial # 3575 (383.7) Displaced Persons, Feb. to August 47, film R-144 special. ("still classified", 30 June, 89)

8) from catalog of the Combined British American records of the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, WW II, Vol. 11 : p. 1198, serial 73, PWB sub-committee, Aug 44 to June 45, film R-97-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989.)

9) p. 1433, serial # 61 Project # 6, EYES ONLY, Aug 43 to July 47, and serial # 65 Project #10, POW, May 47 to Feb 48, both on film reel # R-557-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

10) p. 1433, serial 182 & 183, AFHQ G-5 Section, 1945-46, film R-535-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

11) p. 1467, serial 131 Displaced Persons and Repatriations, vol. 111 re: 45 to Aug 45, film reel R-486-B. F.I.I. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

12) p. 2058, serial 1 PW Reports and Ground Checks, film reel R-180-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

13) RG 331, E-220-A, AFHQ G-2 (1945 General Staff Intelligence), box 3, one copy each of all documents including covers and distribution lists.

(This item has been identified by Jo Ann Williamson, Chief of the Military Reference Branch, as "records of the G-2 Division 15th Army Group, and also: "remains security classified", on 30 June, 1989.)

14) RG 331, E-53 A, AFHQ G-3 Special Operations, 1945, boxes 12 through 15, one copy each all documents. ("remain security classified", 30 June, 1989)

15) RG 342, Interrogation Reports of Japanese PWs repatriated from Soviet penal labor camps. An 8th box which

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J.B.

contains several hundred pages of intelligence debriefings of Japanese prisoners who saw American POWs in the Soviet prison camps. The existence of this box was admitted to John M. G. Brown, Thomas V. Ashworth and James Sanders, all in person at Suitland, Maryland, on November 21st, 1989, by Richard Boylan, Assistant Chief, Military Reference Branch, who further stated that it was under CIA control. Its existence has also been disclosed to John M. G. Brown by a former high-level CIA officer.

16) RG 332, Records of the European Theater and USFET, 383.6, repatriated German POW debriefings, involving sightings of or imprisonment with US POWs in the Soviet prison system by Germans repatriated from Russia up through the Adenauer era. These are also known as the WRINGER REPORTS, and we have a few of them. For the the Director of the Military Reference Branch, Ms Williamson, to say that my request "fails to meet certain tests of the FOIA", through failing to "reasonably describe the information sought", is ridiculous. There are over a thousand boxes of Wringer Reports, containing approximately one million two hundred thousand pages of documents. The Chief, Williamson, and Assistant Chief, Boylan know very well what this is, and have also been denying access to our research-colleague, James Sanders. (We have little doubt that what is there on the Americans is rapidly disappearing.) The Archivists have admitted to us of being under heavy pressure from Pentagon officers. We are not seeking all of them, but only the ability to study them and make copies of certain livesightings of Americans to add to what we have for our forthcoming book on the subject. Our object is accuracy.

Chris, I hope Senator Grassley and you can get these records released to us. We have already made it clear that we have no political axe to grind, and that the history of this tragic matter, through 44 years and three wars, is far bigger than any single President, except perhaps the one who could break the great riddle of resolving it. The more we have immersed ourselves in understanding it the more we see the terrible dilemma it has presented to our successive Presidents, leading directly to present-day hostage situations.

The majority of the American people however, know or suspect the truth, thereby making every government denial of the truth into a further erosion of the government's public credibility. In Europe, the WW II aspect of this matter is more generally known, as the French, Belgians and Dutch lost over half a million prisoners into Stalin's Gulag.

I look forward to hearing from you soon, and hearing of success. Please give give my highest regards to Andy, should you see him. Best Regards,

John M. G. Brown

National Archives



Washington, DC 20409

12 MAY 1990

Mr. John M.G. Brown
Box 30
Petaluma, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of April 1, 1990, received by us on April 10, 1990 (our reference NN90-273).

We have submitted your request for the declassification of specific rolls of Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) microfilm to our declassification unit for review.

Some of the items you requested have been declassified. AFHQ Records 26-2
microfilm R-720-A, Record Group 331, and seven boxes of
interrogation reports of Japanese POWs repatriated from Soviet
penal labor camps, Record Group 342, are available for use in our
research room. enclosed is a copy of the accession description
of the seven boxes in Record Group 342. 15
Ample

The Wringer Reports are debriefings of individuals of various
nationalities repatriated from the Soviet Union roughly between
1946-56. These "reports" appear in bits and pieces scattered
through-out the records of various military agencies. The
largest collection of these reports are on 1,682 rolls of
classified microfilm, among the records of Record Group 311. We
do not have sufficient staff or time to declassify this body of
records in its entirety and provide for the demands of other
researchers. If there is a specific report or a number of
specific reports that can be identified we would be pleased to
have them reviewed for release. We do not consider this a denial
of your FOIA because your request is too general. get
rec'd
from Mr.
Gioro

In Record Group 335, there are two boxes of records under the
decimal 383.6, among the Security Classified General
Correspondence of the Secretary of the Army, 1953-56. These
records were recently declassified and are available in our
research room.

In Record Group 319, we have recently accessioned 16 boxes of
classified records containing POW information. These records are
presently being reviewed for declassification under a FOIA
request. (Ample)

Record Group 330, records of the Munitions Board, Vice Chairman
for Production and Requirements, Office of Petroleum Progress,
contains "Wringer" Project Reports for 1950-51. These reports
are housed in 10 classified boxes bearing titles that do not
reflect the presence of POW information (i.e. Geological,
Production and Natural Resources; Storage, Refineries, and
Publications). If you know of any specific documents among these
records that you would like reviewed, we would be glad to comply.

We hope we have been of assistance to you. If you have any
further questions please let us know.

Sincerely,

JOHN P. BUTLER
Chief
Suitland Reference Branch (NNRR)
Textual Reference Division

Enclosure

RG

920



P. O. BOX 1055 • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46206-1055 • (317) 635-6411
OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER/EDITOR IN CHIEF

June 4, 1990
7 - 97 - 7

Mr. John M. G. Brown
P. O. Box 30
Petroliia, California 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

Please excuse the delay in responding to your letter, but we took the liberty of forwarding it to our National Security Division for their comments and suggestions. We do appreciate your sharing your article "An American Sacrifice For Peace." It was well-written and informative, and you appear to have done a great deal of investigation into the U.S. government's handling of the fates of American POWs and MIAs.

I'm sorry to tell you that the material does not meet our current editorial needs. THE AMERICAN LEGION MAGAZINE has ongoing updates on the POW-MIA issue, and such reports are generated and researched by the Legion's National Security Division staff, or our own magazine staff.

Again, thanks for thinking of the magazine and sharing your article with us. —

Sincerely yours,

DANIEL S. WHEELER
Editor in Chief

cc: Miles Epling, National Commander

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J.S.

921

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J.S.

The
American
Legion

* NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS * P. O. BOX 1055 * INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46206 *
(317) 635-6411 *



OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COMMANDER

(Have many similar
from major publications)

June 5, 1990
17

Mr. John M. G. Brown
P. O. Box 30
Petroliia, California 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

Upon my return from Europe, I learned that the Editor-in-Chief of The American Legion Magazine had informed you that your article, "An American Sacrifice for Peace," would not be printed in our magazine.

Mr. Wheeler advises me that he consulted with our National Security Foreign Relations staff before making his decision.

I appreciate the material that both you and Carl Rice have been sending me in support of your article. However, as National Commander, I do not interfere with the editorial policies of The American Legion Magazine.

Even though your article will not be printed, please know that The American Legion will continue its efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue in accord with our mandates on this vital issue.

Sincerely

MILES S. EPLING
National Commander

cc: Carl Rice

JOHN M.G. BROWN
Box 30
Petrolia, CA 95558

7 August, 1990

Ms. Jo Ann Williamson
Chief
Military Reference Branch
Textual Reference Division
National Archives
Wash., DC 20408

Dear Ms Williamson,

I have your letter dated 18 July, 1990, evidently relating to my further FOIA requests to the Department of Defense and Department of State, apparently forwarded to the National Archives, concerning my search for documents reporting American prisoners of war in Soviet-surrogate captivity.

Once again you have seen fit to state that I have not "reasonably described" various documents I seek, and you have suggested I come to Washington to do research. I have worked in Sulland and Washington, and together with my research-colleague Thomas V. Ashworth, have declassified several thousand pages of documents relating to American POWs in Soviet/surrogate control. In this letter I intend to make it abundantly clear, for the record, why I have recently been trying to get my requests approved by mail. In my FOIA requests by mail I have repeatedly been denied access to documents and microfilm specifically identified by record group and decimal number, pertaining to American POWs in Soviet/surrogate control, either because they "remain security classified" or because they are not "reasonably described." At the same time the Pentagon has stated publicly that "no WW II/POW-related documents remain classified."

In 1988 and 1989 after traveling across the country several times to do research in the National Archives, I repeatedly faced deliberate obstruction by Archives personnel in attempting to research specifically identified official POW-related records, to wit:

1. When requesting certain specifically identified files, boxes, documents and microfilm containing information on American prisoners who disappeared in Soviet controlled areas I was made to wait all day long in some cases, and then deliberately brought the wrong material.

2. When I asked for the correct boxes or files I was told the Archives personnel (whose names I noted) were "too busy" or to "come back the next day". When I explained that I had come from California and that my time and resources were limited, I was told: "that's your problem."

3. I was repeatedly told by Archivist Richard Boylan and several others that many records I was requesting relating to WW II American POWs in the Soviet zone were "security classified." Sometimes these statements were made perfunctorily, and at other times the Archivist would state this after "checking."

4. When I attempted to do research in the pertinent OSS documents relating to the Soviet-occupied zones (under of Archivist John Taylor), I was repeatedly told they were all "security classified."

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J.B.

even though many of the files I wished to study have been opened to other researchers and noted in published work. I was also told that the 1945 Russian division (or section) of the OSS "did not exist."

5. Several times I requested boxes, files or microfilm listed in official finding aids by record group and decimal number and was told "they can't be found", or "they don't exist." When I would attempt to point out the contradiction, I would be told, "don't bother me with that again."

6. I eventually had a private conversation with an Archivist whom I had come to know years before in researching my first book, who revealed to me details of the handling of POW researchers by the Archives and the extreme pressure put on Archives personnel by Pentagon officers and officials to be uncooperative on anything to do with serious researchers on the subject of American prisoners of war.

7. You have also stated to me several times in writing that you do not consider your responses to my several previous and adequately-described requests for access to German POW debriefings (Wringer Reports), and various other U.S. POW records, a "denial under Freedom of Information Act." When I was working in the Archives I was repeatedly denied access to the boxes containing these documents, or was told "they couldn't be found", or, "they didn't exist."

The Department of Defense and the Department of State have written to me that all the documents I seek covering the period from 1945-1954 are in the custody of the National Archives. It is clear to me as a researcher and author that, taken together, all of the above actions by the National Archives constitutes complicity in a deliberate attempt to suppress documentary evidence of American POWs remaining in Soviet/surrogate control from 1945 onwards. For your information I have published newly uncovered facts on American POWs of three wars remaining in communist control which have reached millions of American veterans and their families. It is possible that at any time I may get the opportunity to do so again. I am also in the middle of writing a fully documented book on this subject and I intend to record the actions and names of the various officials who have obstructed investigations into the fate of thousands of American prisoners of war who remained in Soviet, North Korean, Chinese, Cuban, Vietnamese, Laotian and other hostile captivity over the past 45 years.

I sincerely hope therefore, that you will take my several previous FOIA requests and my above concerns seriously, and understand that my recent efforts to obtain the documents I seek by mail is based on past unsatisfactory experiences in the Archives. Rather than continually stating to me all the things you are not required to do, perhaps you might instead assign some individual to copy the documents and microfilm I have long ago requested and offered to pay for. I have no assurance whatsoever, should I travel to Washington to do further research, that the same behaviour would not reoccur.

Sincerely,

cc: Senator Charles Grassley Congressman Robert K. Dornan

National Archives



Washington, DC 20408

SEP 26 1990

Mr. John M. G. Brown
Bpx 30
Petaluma, CA 95558

Dear Mr. Brown:

This is in response to your letter of August 7, 1990, to Ms. Jo Ann Williamson of the Military Reference Branch, relating to your various requests for records pertaining to Americans held as prisoners of war.

In order to have records declassified under the Freedom of Information Act, you must reasonably describe the records that you wish to have declassified. A reasonable description would include the name of the federal organization that created or maintained the records, for example the War Department General Staff, the name of an office within the organization, for example the Operations Division, a specific series of records created by that office, for example the Operations Division central decimal file, a specific date or at least year, and an appropriate file designation provided by an index or filing manual. Requests for records pertaining to a general subject, such as Americans held as prisoners of war, are not sufficiently detailed for us to locate the records and begin a declassification action.

We are unable to address the seven specific points you raise in your letter, because in each instance you do not identify the records to which you were denied access. If you could be more precise about these instances, we would be pleased to investigate the matter. If you would provide a list or description of the OSS documents which you were told were security classified with a letter requesting access under the Freedom of Information Act, we would be pleased to process the request for you. Could you also provide the citation for the published work that has already made use of these documents?

OSS, Bradley Smith

If you could provide in a Freedom of Information Act request specific citations for record groups, series, descriptions, the box numbers, files or microfilm to which you were denied access, we will, if the citations accurately describe a collection of records in our custody, immediately begin a declassification review of the records.

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J.B.257
J.B.

Neither of the two archivists you mention in your letter remembers having conversations with you as described in your letter. If there are problems in communicating with the staff, we will do all we can to improve our communications with you. There is no pressure put upon the staff of the National Archives by officials of the Department of Defense, or by any other Federal Government agency, to be uncooperative with researchers dealing with the prisoner-of-war issue.

The National Archives, as an institution, is committed to assisting researchers in using the records in its custody, and one of our institutional goals is to declassify and make records available to all researchers. The National Archives is not attempting to suppress records pertaining to Americans held as prisoners of war.

We sympathize with your attempt to do research on a difficult topic, and we will do what we can to assist you. But your requests for assistance have to specifically identify the records in which you are interested.

The "Wringer Report" records that we located in the Records of Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Air Staff), Record Group 341, and Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Record Group 330, were declassified, and we can make them available in the research room in the Washington National Records Center Building in Suitland, Maryland.

We are still processing your Freedom of Information Act requests for the microfilmed records of Allied Force Headquarters, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331, and for sixteen boxes in accessions 64A-2224 and 66A-3219, Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319. We will inform you when the declassification review is complete.

Sincerely,

Michael Kuntz
TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON
Assistant Archivist
for the National Archives

John M. G. Brown
Box 30
Petaluma, CA 95558

April 1, 1990

Jo Ann Williamson
(or successor) Chief
Military Reference Branch
Textual Reference Division
National Archives
Wash., DC 20408

Dear Ms Williamson,

Under authority of U.S.C. 5, Section 552(b) I am requesting all known information relating to the following:
Pentagon officials recently stated that all World War II POW-related documents have been declassified. Accordingly I am requesting microfilm or paper copies of the following records (one each) to be sent to the above address, upon my payment of whatever charges are incurred.

- 1) Record Group (RG) 331 decimal 389.6 serials 1743, Austria OSS Reports, July, 1945, microfilm on reel R-459-F.
- 2) RG 331, serial 170 PAN Reports from AGWAR, Vol. 19, Sept 44- Feb. 1947, Microfilm on film reel R-15-H.
- 3) RG 331, serial # 20, PWB Correspondence, May 44-July, 1945 Film reel R-112-G.
- 4) RG 331, serial # 17, (original ref. # 57 in finding aid) Intelligence Summaries, various, Vol. 2 June 45- Feb. 46 on film reel R-111-G.
- 5) RG 331 serial # 431 SACHED (Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean) Field HQ, POW, June 45 to Sept. 1945, serial # 433, POW April 45 to June 45, and serial # 434 American POW April, 1945 to August, 1945 - all on microfilm reel R-108-B. (Original FOIA 29 May, 1989. I was told in writing on June 30th, 1989 that this was "still security classified".)
- 6) RG 331, Microfilm 574, 576, 577, 578, POW & DP (displaced persons) Film reel R-457-B. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)
- 7) RG 331, 383.6, serial # 3574, AFHQ, POW Jan-Sept 47, and serial # 3575 (383.7) Displaced Persons, Feb. to August 47, Film R-144 serial. ("still classified", 30 June, 89)
- 8) From catalog of the Combined British American records of the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, WW II, Vol. II : p.

198, serial 73, PWB sub-committee, Aug 44 to June 45, film R-97-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989.)

9) p. 1433, serial # 61 Project # 6, EYES ONLY, Aug 43 to July 47, and serial # 65 Project #10, POW, May 47 to Feb 48, both on film reel R-557-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

10) p. 1433, serial 182 & 183, AFHQ G-5 Section, 1945-46, film R-535-F. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

11) p. 1467, serial 131 Displaced Persons and Repatriations, Vol. 111 Feb. 45 to Aug 45, film reel R-486-B. P.I.I. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989)

12) p. 2058, serial 1 PW Reports and Ground Checks, film reel R-180-E. ("still classified", 30 June, 1989) + 2 May 90

13) RG 331, E-220-A, AFHQ G-2 (1945 General Staff Intelligence), box 3, one copy each of all documents including covers and distribution lists. ("remains security classified", on 30 June, 1989.)

14) RG 331, E-53 A, AFHQ G-2 Special Operations, 1945, boxes 12 through 15, one copy each all documents. ("remain security classified", 30 June, 1989)

15) RG 342, Interrogation Reports of Japanese PWs repatriated from Soviet penal labor camps. At least one box which contains several hundred pages of intelligence debriefings of Japanese prisoners who saw American POWs in the Soviet prison camps. The existence of this box was admitted to John M. G. Brown, Thomas V. Ashworth and James Sanders, all in person at Suitland, Maryland, on November 21st, 1989, by Richard Boylan, Assistant Chief, Military Reference Branch, who further stated that it was under CIA control. Its existence has also been confirmed to me by a former high-level CIA officer.

16) RG 332/335, AG-DEC 383.6, 12892 German PW (POW) debriefings Records of the European Theater and USFET, 383.6, repatriated German POW debriefings, involving sightings of or imprisonment with US POWs in the Soviet prison system by Germans repatriated from Russia up through the Adenauer era. These are also known as the WRINGER REPORTS. There are reported to be over a thousand boxes of Wringer Reports, containing approximately one million two hundred thousand pages of documents.

Thank you for your attention,

John M. G. Brown

The POW Conspiracy

At the close of his article "No MIA Conspiracy" (op-ed, Aug. 24), Stephen Rosenfeld wrote "my own sense of things is that the Americans who were taken prisoner in Vietnam have been honorably served by those charged with pursuing their fate. Does that make me part of the conspiracy?"

The answer is that nearly all of the "hundreds and perhaps thousands of officials" Rosenfeld referred to did play a part, usually minor, in ensuring that the full truth on American and Allied POWs held by the Soviets and their surrogates after World War II, Korea and Vietnam would not be revealed to the American public. The matter has been a national security concern since the development of the Soviet nuclear threat to the very existence of the United States. All the officials and officers who have taken part in suppressing the truth of Soviet-surrogate-held American POWs have faced a painful moral choice while doing their lavishly ordered duty.

Based on thousands of declassified official documents and supporting eyewitness accounts obtained during seven years of investigation and research, it is clear that thousands of American POWs have been secretly held by the Soviets and their surrogates since 1945. The numbers of Americans thus illegally withheld appear to have been approximately 30,000 in 1945, 4,000 to 5,000 (or more) after 1953 and perhaps as many as 1,000 after 1973. These Americans, and many thousands more Allied POWs, were withheld for ransom and blackmail, used as forced labor and for espionage purposes. In addition I can document the secret withholding of American POWs at the 1918-1920 intervention in Russia in Lubyanka prison in Moscow and the Solovkiy Islands GULAG forced-labor camps until at least the 1980-1930 period.

In answer to Rosenfeld's final question: All major-circulation U.S. publications I have contacted, with the exception of the VFW Magazine, have declined to publish documentable facts of the history of U.S. prisoners of war held by Communist nations. These publications have apparently declined to even investigate the matter seriously. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the editors of such publications have avoided publishing such historically significant material in the interest of some higher political purpose.

Rosenfeld accused people like me of "turning on our own government." It might be in order to state that my family helped found and protect the revolutionary government of the United States in 1776 that I in my turn served that government in first-line combat and that it was the intention of the Founding Fathers that our government be constantly held accountable to the people. That is the principle for which the tens of thousands of missing American POWs fought, and that is why people such as myself consider that we are merely doing our duty toward our fellow American servicemen by uncovering the truth about their fate.

—John M. G. Brown

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Were Some POWs Left Behind?

THE FOURTH of July is the right day to consider whether all those who contributed in their time to maintaining the independence and freedom that the holiday marks have received their due. We refer specifically to the American fighting men, captured or missing in the country's wars, who either may have been left behind alive and in enemy hands or may not have been fully accounted for. For decades the official government position has been that there is no credible evidence that American prisoners of war from the two world wars, Korea and Vietnam are still detained. Yet the expanding public record of inquiry into the situation of these thousands of men suggests that it is too soon to put their fate out of mind. While it seems true that there is no credible positive evidence that any are still alive, there still remains a jarring measure of arbitrariness about the basis on which the Pentagon has officially pronounced them dead or has otherwise accounted for them. The matter cannot yet be put finally to rest.

It is a deadly serious thing to suggest that the country may not have used every resource at its command to pursue American prisoners and reported prisoners diligently. But two sorts of evidence have inclined us to edge from skepticism to agnosticism on this issue. The first includes historical documentation such as that presented in an article on the opposite page today. The plot of it is that for various political and bureaucratic reasons, the missing of prisoners has not always been the top American priority.

The second sort of evidence includes the discrepancies in the accounting of POWs, MIAs and KIA-BNRs (killed in action-body not recovered) among combatants in the Vietnam War. In a typical instance, a Vietnamese refugee's sighting of a 1967 shootdown was matched up with the

shootdown of a surviving Navy pilot who was then repatriated in 1973. But that pilot subsequently contradicted the specific details of the refugee's report. Where, then, is the other pilot whose shootdown correlates much more closely with the refugee's account? This example comes from a sober new report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Republican staff—a Jesse Helms operation that poses questions that will not go away.

Partly in response to such goading, the Bush administration has gotten Vietnam to let it open an office in Hanoi to investigate reports of live sightings. The administration has also asked the Soviet Union for any help it can give in accounting for missing servicemen from the world wars, Korea, Vietnam and Cold War shooting incidents. These are useful steps, but are they enough? Some 16 senators are now calling for formation of a select committee to assess the government's efforts to track down POWs and MIAs. There have been previous probes, but not of the kind to bolster public confidence. The recent charges of an official coverup by the colonel formerly in charge of the Pentagon's MIA office, for example, were brushed off by an "internal management inquiry." The Helms report makes the further suggestion that Vietnam's offer to open its territory to American search should prompt the Pentagon to reciprocate and open its "territory"—its POW-MIA files.

One does not have to believe that the U.S. government has engaged in a devious and misguided conspiracy in order to admit the possibility that things might have been done differently at many points along the way. International relocation now provides new opportunities abroad for search and review. The Pentagon has its own profound obligation to respond.

THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1991 A15

THE WASHINGTON POST

John M.G. Brown

A 70-Year-Old Hostage Crisis

Some American POWs were reported in declassified live sightings as alive in forced-labor camps and "unrequited" years. Soviet citizenship and Russian names were reportedly assigned to American, British and French survivors in secret Soviet camps. Some 78,000 Americans remain missing from World War II. Additional U.S. prisoners captured during Cold War intelligence missions or kidnapped in Europe were also released and reported alive in gulf camps. Information on several of these cases was specifically sought in the U.S. diplomatic note of last April.

During the Korean War, the North Koreans and Chinese demanded repatriation of tens of thousands of U.S. and national who refused to return to Communist control. Upward to repeat the errors of 1945-46, the Truman administration adopted a new policy of voluntary repatriation. The Commission revealed by secretly withholding the names of U.S. and U.N. POW-MIA's.

In August 1983, Gen. James Van Fleet, retired commander of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea, said: "A large percentage of the 6,000

American soldiers listed as missing in action in Korea are still alive." According to declassified CIA and other sources, an estimated 2,000 or more U.S. POW-MIA's were reported transferred to the Soviet Union from secret Soviet-run camps in China. In May 1964 the United States demanded their return to the new, pro-Chinese government, which denied holding "American" prisoners. "Secret" Soviet government. Sightings of Korean War POWs in the Soviet Union, China and North Korea have persisted into recent years. Presumptive findings of death and the recovery of remains (which were assigned to the names of the missing) gradually reduced the already minimal number of U.S. prisoners acknowledged by U.S. authorities to be in Communist control from just under 1,000 in 1964 to 380.

Permanent reports from Indochinese refugees and from Marine Pvt. Robert Garwood, the last acknowledged U.S. POW to leave Vietnam (in 1979), indicated that perhaps 1,000 or more American prisoners from among the more than 2,500 U.S. missing and presumed dead in Vietnam and Laos remained in captivity following the 1973 return of 591 POWs. The Vietnamese demanded both U.S. diplomatic recognition and \$3 billion to \$4 billion in postwar aid—as secretly promised by President Nixon but rejected by Congress—for the release of prisoners they publicly denied holding. U.S. diplomatic efforts have thus far produced largely fragmentary human electrical remains from Southeast Asia, later assigned to the names of missing Americans.

Through their intercepted, decoded orders, the North Vietnamese were known by a U.S. Air Force and National Security Agency analyst, whose name must be withheld, to have assembled pre-selected U.S. prisoners from North and South Vietnam at a camp near Vinh, where they were interrogated by Soviet intelligence officers. These Americans were categorized within NSA as "MIP" or Moscow Board. A declassified CIA cable confirms that U.S. POWs in North Vietnam were interrogated by Soviet and Chinese personnel and dressed in civilian clothing for transport to unknown destinations. From Vinh, the prisoners were shipped to another camp near the Pacific Sea headquarters of Sam Heng, Laos, where Soviet operatives determined which Americans had tactical or intelligence value, and those POWs, according to the NSA analyst, were transported to the Soviet Union. Those deemed uncooperative but also unworkable, such as Navy Capt. Larry Van Ameringen, were sent to other, certain death at forced labor on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The NSA analyst has offered testimony and sworn affidavits to Congress on the fact that only 5 percent of the hundreds of U.S. POWs he tracked through intercepts were recovered by the Communists. Approximately 300 or more POWs were reported transferred by air and sea to high-tech development areas in the Soviet Union.

On the Soviet side, there are a few recent positive glimmers. An American who wanted to repatriate two Soviet POWs from Afghanistan in 1989 reportedly delivered hundreds of declassified U.S. POW-related documents (dated 1918-80) from the National Archives to researchers in Moscow and to three members of the Supreme Soviet, in the Moscow News of April 20, authorities in the Shantien town of Indochina invited relatives of American, French and Japanese "warrior" POWs who died in Soviet concentration camps to visit their late's protected graves.

Michael Gorchakov's hopes of recovering missing U.S. aid could well be made to depend on how helpful the Soviet Union is about living American POW-MIA's who disappeared in Indochina and about allowing recognition of any survivors of earlier wars who were given Soviet citizenship.

The issue of Cold War tensions should encourage President Bush to address the American people on the history of the POW-MIA issue. A presidential decision to declassify long-classified documentary information could begin to heal a deep national wound.

The writer, a novelist infrequently in Vietnam, is author of the forthcoming book on American prisoners, "Missing Remains."

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J.S.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

5720
Ser. 09B30P/00513547
30 Jul 90

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command (Code 06)

Subj: FOIA REQUEST OF JOHN M. G. BROWN

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5720.42D

Encl: (1) OASD(PA) memo, #90-FOI-1285/M of 26 Jul 90, w/attns

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter partially under your cognizance. Please respond directly to the requester concerning any information you may hold regarding the repatriation of Navy POWs once known to have been in Soviet control within 10 working days as prescribed by reference (a).

S.R. Aitken
G. R. AITKEN
By direction

Cy to (w/out encls):
Mr. John M. G. Brown
Box 30
Petrolia, CA 93556

No Response as of 26 Sept. 1990
Oct. 9, 1990 Have similar ones
from Defense / State / D.H.A., etc.

It is heartening that the United States has now formally asked Moscow for information on American prisoners who came under Soviet control during World War II, the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam. The request should help bring to broad attention a problem that has festered since World War I. It is fairly introduced in a new report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican staff, which examines American prisoners of war and Americans missing at action in Soviet and Soviet-occupied control going back more than 70 years.

According to declassified U.S. cables and other documents in the National Archives and to eyewitness accounts, in 1919, Lenin's new Bolshevik regime used hundreds of secretly held American, British and French POW-MIA's (members of a force sent to suppress the regime) as hostages in a demand for U.S. diplomatic recognition. Many of the 70 U.S. MIAs and 57 "prisoners" died continued to be withheld after an exchange of Americans aid for prisoners in 1921. In 1930, approximately 40 to 50 U.S. military POWs were reported by an eyewitness, Latvian-American escapee Alexander Gerasim, to be alive and in the Lubyanka prison and Solovki Islands forced-labor camps. After the United States recognized the Soviet regime in 1933, some political detainees were returned and assigned to the names of missing men. The hundreds of missing Allied prisoners of 1919, and many others, disappeared. In 1945, declassified records of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Force, indicate, the Red Army overran an estimated 1.5 million Allied POWs and displaced persons held by the Germans. Contrary to the Yalta Agreements, American officers were refused access to nearly all Soviet-controlled POW camps in Europe. According to recently declassified U.S. documents, approximately 500,000 of these prisoners subsequently disappeared. The documents indicate that about 20,000 U.S. POWs and MIAs were held in "sanctuary" after VE Day by Stalin to ensure Allied repatriation of millions of Soviet citizens and to obtain U.S. and Allied aid and diplomatic recognition of Soviet support regimes in East Europe. Declassified U.S. documents reveal that in March and April 1948, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations decided against the use of force to recover American POWs in order to ensure Soviet participation in the Japanese war and the postwar United Nations.

Still-living U.S. POWs were in Martin Singel, who escaped from Soviet-controlled Soling IV-8 Maderby and reported many Americans left behind, were extracted to Russia and told the matter was being "investigated." Of 90,000 U.S. POWs officially reported returned to Europe by June 1946, 25,000 had been MIAs and known to be prisoners. Documents reveal that administrative "presumptive findings of death" reduced the official number of "currently held" known U.S. POWs from 12,800 or more in June 1946 to 5,414 by the following January. Tens of thousands more U.S. MIAs were also presumed dead.

ADDENDUM (P 111) FEBRUARY NOV 15

25. Senator Kerry asked Mr. Sheetz for the number of unaccounted for Americans (POW/MIA) at the time of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords? After Operation Homecoming?

The database listing unaccounted-for Americans has always been a dynamic one. As the services added names during the war, persons were also being accounted for, for instance by escaping captivity, through early release from captivity, and as U.S. forces recovered and identified remains. It was only after Homecoming that individuals whom the services declared KIA/BNR were added to this list. After Homecoming the services also added additional theater losses (some distant from Southeast Asia) and several individuals who had originally been declared AWOL but whose status was changed to MIA. During the period between Homecoming and the fall of Saigon and of Cambodia, additional Americans became missing, while others were accounted for by remains recovery. It is no longer possible to reconstruct exactly what names and numbers the database included on any one day, therefore the following breakdown is based on information currently contained in the DIA data base.

1. Unaccounted for at signing of Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. forces and subsequently identified. 3,128 (Tab A)

2. Missing between 27 January 1973 and 2 April 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. forces and subsequently identified. 12 (Tab B)

3. POWs returned during Operation Homecoming, 12 February 1973-1 April 1973. 591 (Tab C)

4. Unaccounted for at completion of Homecoming, 2 April 1973. 2547 (Tab D)

5. Missing between 30 March 1973 and 15 May 1975, and body not recovered by U.S. forces and subsequently identified. 36 (Tab E)

6. Americans accounted for post-Homecoming, as of 11 December 1991. 316 (Tab F)

7. Unaccounted-for Americans, as of 11 December 1991. 2,267 (Tab G)

TAB A: Unaccounted for at signing of Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973. Page 1

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
DOWNEY, JOHN T	--	V	521129	730312	CH
DUFFY, CHARLES J	--	V	610113		LA
BANKOWSKI, ALFONS ALOYZE	E5	F	610323		LA
GARSDIE, FREDERICK THOMAS	E5	F	610323	910711	LA
MAGEE, RALPH WAYNE	O2	F	610323	910711	LA
MATTESON, GLENN (NMN)	O1	F	610323	910711	LA
SAMPSON, LESLIE VERNE	E5	F	610323	910711	LA
WEITKAMP, EDGAR WILKEN	W1	A	610323		LA
WESTON, OSCAR BRANCH JR	O2	F	610323		LA
BIBER, GERALD MACK	E5	A	610422		LA
BISCHOFF, JOHN MALCOLM	E7	A	610422		LA
MOON, WALTER HUGH	O4	A	610422		LA
GERBER, DANIEL A	--	V	620530		VS
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON	--	V	620530		VS
VIETTI, ELEANOR A	--	V	620530		VS
BLEWETT, ALAN L	--	V	620714		LA
PARKS, RAYMOND F	E6	A	620714		LA
SIMPSON, ROBERT LEWIS	O3	F	620828		VS
ANDERSON, THOMAS EDWARD	E4	M	621006		VS
CRUZ, RAPHAEL (NMN)	E5	F	630902		VS
MCKINNEY, NEIL BERNARD	O2	F	630902		VS
PURCELL, HOWARD PHILIP	O3	F	630902		VS
CHENEY, JOSEPH C	--	V	630905		LA
DEBRUIN, EUGENE H	--	V	630905		LA
HERRICK, CHARLES	--	V	630905		LA
DENTON, MANUEL REYES	E4	N	631008		VS
RITCHEY, LUTHER EDMOND JR	E3	M	631008		VS
WADSWORTH, DEAN AMICK	O3	F	631008		VS
VERSACE, HUMBERTO ROQUE	O3	A	631029		VS
CODY, HOWARD RUDOLPH	O3	F	631124		VS
RORABACK, KENNETH H	E8	A	631124		VS
GORTON, THOMAS FREDERICK	O3	F	631206		VS
HILL, RICHARD DALE	E3	F	631206		VS
ANGELL, MARSHALL JOSEPH	E5	A	631212		VS
HICKMAN, VINCENT JOSEPH	O3	F	640114		VS
MITCHELL, CARL BERG	O4	F	640114		VS
METOYER, BRYFORD GLENN	O2	A	640118		VS
STRALEY, JOHN LEROY	E3	A	640118		VS
THOMPSON, FLOYD JAMES	O3	A	640326	730316	VS
WHITESIDES, RICHARD LEBROU	O3	F	640326		VS
GREER, ROBERT LEE	E2	M	640607	901120	VS
SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T	E2	M	640607	901120	VS
LEDBETTER, THOMAS ISAAC	O3	A	640619		VS
TALLEY, JAMES LANE	E4	A	640619		VS
ALVAREZ, EVERETT	O2	N	640805	730212	VN
SATHER, RICHARD CHRISTIAN	O2	N	640805	850814	VN
CUTRER, FRED CLAY JR	O3	F	640806		VS
KASTER, LEONARD LEE	O2	F	640806		VS
GRAINGER, JOSEPH W	--	V	640808		VS
WALKER, KENNETH EARL	O3	F	641002		VS
WOODS, LAWRENCE (NMN)	E6	A	641024		CB
DAWSON, DANIEL GEORGE	O2	A	641106		VS
BLOOM, DARL RUSSELL	O3	M	641113		VS

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NIPPER, DAVID	E3	M	641121		VS
SANSONE, DOMINICK (NMN)	E7	A	641210	840717	VS
VADEN, WOODROW WILSON	04	F	641210		VS
TADIOS, LEONARD MASAYON	E5	A	641211		VS
PARKS, JOE	E7	A	641222		VS
BENNETT, HAROLD GEORGE	E4	A	641229		VS
COOK, DONALD GILBERT	03	M	641231		VS
DODGE, EDWARD RAY	E7	A	641231		VS
MCDONALD, KURT CASEY	03	F	641231		VS
HERTZ, GUSTAV	--	V	650202		VS
DICKSON, EDWARD ANDREW	03	N	650207		VN
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	650209		VS
SHUMAKER, ROBERT HARPER	04	N	650211	730212	VN
FRANKS, DWIGHT GLENN	E7	N	650224		VS
LOCKHART, HAYDEN JAMES	03	F	650302	730212	VN
SMITH, RICHARD D	03	F	650311		VS
CLYDESDALE, CHARLES FREDRI	02	N	650315		VS
HUME, KENNETH EDWARD	04	N	650329		VN
MCKINLEY, GERALD WAYNE	02	N	650331		VN
MORGAN, HERSCHEL SCOTT	03	F	650403	730212	VN
SMITH, GEORGE CRAIG	02	F	650403		VN
VOHDE, RAYMOND ARTHUR	04	N	650403	730212	VN
DRAEGER, WALTER FRANK JR	03	F	650404		VN
HARRIS, CARLYLE SMITH	03	F	650404	730212	VN
MAGNUSSEN, JAMES A JR	03	F	650404		VN
BAKER, ARTHUR DALE	03	F	650407		LA
LEWIS, JAMES W	03	F	650407		LA
ROARK, WILLIAM MARSHALL	03	N	650407	770318	VN
FEAGAN, RONALD JAMES	01	N	650409		CH
MURPHY, TERENCE MEREDITH	02	N	650409		CH
SWANSON, WILLIAM EDWARD	02	N	650411		LA
WOODWORTH, SAMUEL ALEXANDE	03	F	650417		VN
WHEELER, JAMES ATLEE	03	F	650418		VS
BUTLER, PHILLIP NEAL	03	N	650420	730212	VN
SHEA, JAMES PATRICK	02	N	650420		VN
STORZ, RONALD EDWARD	03	F	650428	740306	VN
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN	03	F	650429		LA
STUBBERFIELD, ROBERT A	03	F	650506	881215	VN
LAHAYE, JAMES DAVID	05	N	650508		VN
KARDELL, DAVID ALLEN	03	N	650509	890731	VN
WISTRAND, ROBERT C	03	F	650509		LA
HROLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	03	F	650518		LA
TAVARES, JOHN R	--	V	650518		VS
DONOVAN, LEROY MELVIN	E7	A	650519		VS
HARPER, RICHARD K	W3	A	650519		VS
BRACE, ERNEST C	--	V	650521	730328	LA
WALKER, ORLEN J	03	A	650523		VS
LYNN, DOYLE WILMER	05	N	650527		VN
PEEL, ROBERT D	03	F	650531	730212	VN
CROSBY, FREDERICK PETER	04	N	650601		VN
AMSPACHER, WILLIAM HARRY J	E4	N	650602	880713	VN
CHRISTIAN, DAVID MARION	02	N	650602	860410	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
MCKAMEY, JOHN BRYAN	03	N	650602	730212	VN
MCHICAN, M D	02	N	650602	880713	VN
PLANTS, THOMAS LEE	E5	N	650602	910306	VN
ROMANO, GERALD MICHAEL	02	N	650602	880713	VN
DALE, CHARLES ALVA	02	A	650609		VS
DEMMON, DAVID STANLEY	E5	A	650609		VS
COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR	E6	A	650610		VS
CURLEE, ROBERT LEE JR	E6	A	650610		VS
DOUGHTIE, CARL LOUIS	02	N	650610		VN
HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS	E5	A	650610		VS
HALL, WALTER LOUIS	02	A	650610		VS
JOHNSON, BRUCE G	03	A	650610		VS
OWENS, FRED MONROE	E7	A	650610		VS
SAEGAERT, DONALD RUSSELL	W1	A	650610		VS
HOLLAND, LAWRENCE THOMAS	04	F	650612		VS
GUARINO, LAWRENCE NICHOLAS	04	F	650614	730212	VN
SCHUMANN, JOHN ROBERT	04	A	650616		VS
ARMOND, ROBERT LAURENCE	03	F	650618		VS
GEHRIG, JAMES M JR	04	F	650618		VS
LOWRY, TYRRELL GORDON	03	F	650618		VS
MARSHALL, JAMES ALFRED	02	F	650618		VS
NEVILLE, WILLIAM EDWARD	E6	F	650618		VS
ROBERTS, HAROLD J JR	E7	F	650618		VS
WATSON, FRANK PETER	03	F	650618		VS
KARI, PAUL ANTHONY	03	F	650620	730212	VN
VAN CAMPEN, THOMAS CHARLES	E3	A	650624		VS
MONGILARDI, PETER NMN JR	05	N	650625		VN
JACKSON, CARL EDWIN	03	F	650627		VS
ROTH, BILLIE LEROY	E5	F	650627		VS
LINDSEY, MARVIN NELSON	04	F	650629		VN
EISENBRAUN, WILLIAM F	03	A	650705		VS
WILLIAMSON, DON IRA	03	F	650707	890123	VN
BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG	E6	M	650708		VS
DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS	E7	M	650708		VS
GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH	E8	A	650713		VS
TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	650713		VS
AVORE, MALCOLM ARTHUR	03	N	650718		VS
DENTON, JEREMIAH ANDREW	05	N	650718	730212	VN
TSCHUDY, WILLIAM MICHAEL	02	N	650718	730212	VN
FOBAIR, ROSCOE HENRY	03	F	650724		VN
KEIRN, RICHARD PAUL	03	F	650724	730212	VN
BERG, KYLE DAG	03	F	650727	730212	VN
KOSKO, WALTER	03	F	650727		VN
PURCELL, ROBERT BALDWIN	03	F	650727	730212	VN
BROWN, EDWARD DEAN JR	02	N	650729		VS
WEATHERBY, JACK WILTON	03	F	650729	780823	VN
DAUGHTREY, ROBERT MORLAN	03	F	650802	730212	VN
HAIL, WILLIAM W	04	F	650802		VS
BOWER, JOSEPH EDWARD	04	F	650803		VN
GRAY, HAROLD EDWIN JR	04	N	650807		VN
MAILLES, LAWRENCE SCOTT	02	N	650810		VS
BROWN, DONALD HUBERT JR	02	N	650812	850814	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RI	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
GOLLAHON, GENE RAYMOND	03	N	650813		VN
MELLOR, FREDRIC M	03	F	650813		VN
THOMAS, HARRY EUGENE	05	N	650813		VN
BRUNHAVER, RICHARD MARVIN	02	N	650824	730212	VN
DOREHUS, ROBERT HARTSCH	04	N	650824	730212	VN
FRANKE, FRED AUGUSTUS	05	N	650824	730212	VN
DAVIS, EDWARD ANTHONY	02	N	650826	730212	VN
SCHIERMAN, WESLEY DUANE	03	F	650828	730212	VN
BYRNE, RONALD EDWARD JR	04	F	650829	730212	VN
MCWHORTER, HENRY STERLING	03	N	650829	860410	VN
TAYLOR, EDD DAVID	03	N	650829		VN
COLLINS, JAMES QUINCY	03	F	650902	730212	VN
BRANCH, JAMES ALVIN	03	F	650904		VN
JEWELL, EUGENE M	02	F	650904		VN
LAGRAND, WILLIAM JOHN	W2	A	650905		VS
MARSHALL, RICHARD CARLTON	03	F	650905		VS
SHAW, EDWARD BRENDAN	02	N	650905		VS
GOODWIN, CHARLES B	02	N	650908		VN
RUDDOLPH, ROBERT DAVID	02	N	650908	881215	VN
STOCKDALE, JAMES BOND	05	N	650909	730212	VN
RIVERS, WENDELL BURKE	05	N	650910	730212	VN
GREEN, GERALD (NMN)	02	N	650912		VN
MOSSMAN, JOE RUSSELL	02	N	650913		VN
TAYLOR, NEIL BROOKS	02	N	650914		VS
MERRITT, RAYMOND JAMES	04	F	650916	730212	VN
RISHER, ROBINSON	05	F	650916	730212	VN
KLEMDA, DEAN ALBERT	02	F	650917		VN
BARBER, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	N	650918		VN
VOGT, LEONARD FREDERICK JR	05	N	650918		VN
BLACK, ARTHUR NEIL	E2	F	650920	730212	VN
CURTIS, THOMAS JERRY	03	F	650920	730212	VN
FORBY, WILLIS ELLIS	03	F	650920	730212	VN
HAWKINS, EDGAR L	03	F	650920		VN
MARTIN, DUANE WHITNEY	02	F	650920		VN
ROBINSON, WILLIAM ANDREW	E5	F	650920	730212	VN
SMITH, PHILIP E	03	F	650920	730315	CH
OSBORN, GEOFFREY HOLMES	02	N	650924		VS
HALL, GEORGE ROBERT	03	F	650927	730212	VN
GARWOOD, ROBERT RUSSELL	E2	M	650928	790321	VS
CHESNUTT, CHAMBLESS M	03	F	650930	850320	VN
CHWAN, MICHAEL D	02	F	650930	850320	VN
KILLIAN, MELVIN J	06	F	650930	850320	VN
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J	02	F	651001		VN
OFFUTT, GARY PHELPS	02	F	651001		VS
SCHARF, CHARLES J	03	F	651001		VN
BARRETT, THOMAS JOSEPH	02	F	651005	730212	VN
HIVNER, JAMES OTIS	03	F	651005	730212	VN
POGREBA, DEAN ANDREW	05	F	651005		VN
SEEBER, BRUCE G	03	F	651005	730212	VN
SCHULER, ROBERT HARRY JR	03	F	651015		VN
SIMA, THOMAS WILLIAM	03	F	651015	730212	VN
REIT, JAMES FRANKLIN	04	N	651016	730212	VN

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HUTTON, JAMES LEO	04	N	651016	730212	VN
GAITHER, RALPH ELLIS	02	N	651017	730212	VN
HALYBURTON, PORTER ALEX	02	N	651017	730212	VN
KNUTSON, RODNEY ALLEN	02	N	651017	730212	VN
MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS	03	N	651017		VN
OLMSTEAD, STANLEY E	04	N	651017		VN
WHEAT, DAVID ROBERT	02	N	651017	730212	VN
BRUDNO, EDWARD ALAN	02	F	651018	730212	VN
COLLINS, THOMAS EDWARD III	03	F	651018	730212	VN
PYLES, HARLEY B	04	F	651018		VS
SISSON, WINFIELD WADE	03	M	651018		VS
THORNE, LARRY ALAN	03	A	651018		VS
WORCHESTER, JOHN B	02	N	651019		VN
CHERRY, FRED VANN	04	F	651022	730212	VN
MAHN, ROBERT LEE	03	F	651022		VS
MCEWEN, JAMES ARTHUR	02	F	651022		VS
WEGER, JOHN (NMN) JR	02	F	651022		VS
MOORE, DENNIS ANTHONY	03	N	651027	730212	VN
ADAMS, SAMUEL	E5	F	651031		VS
DUSING, CHARLES GALE	E5	F	651031		VS
MOORE, THOMAS	E6	F	651031		VS
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD	04	N	651031	871125	VN
BOWLES, DWIGHT POLLARD	03	F	651103		VN
CHAPMAN, HARLAN PAGE	03	M	651105	730212	VN
MCCLEARY, GEORGE CARLTON	05	F	651105	880713	VN
BOLSTAD, RICHARD EUGENE	03	F	651106	730212	VN
CORMIER, ARTHUR	E5	F	651106	730212	VN
LILLY, WARREN E	03	F	651106	730212	VN
MCKNIGHT, GEORGE GRIGSBY	03	F	651106	730212	VN
SINGLETON, JERRY ALLEN	02	F	651106	730212	VN
JENKINS, HARRY TARLETON	05	N	651113	730212	VN
MCCLELLAN, PAUL TRUMAN JR	03	F	651114		VS
GREEN, DONALD GEORGE	03	F	651116		VN
BOWLING, ROY HOWARD	04	N	651117	770318	VN
HIEMER, JERRY ALLEN	E4	A	651117		VS
TAYLOR, JESSE JUNIOR	04	N	651117	751221	VN
TOMS, DENNIS LEROY	E2	N	651121		VS
DOUGLAS, THOMAS EVAN	E4	M	651122		VS
MILLER, RICHARD ARTHUR	03	M	651122		VS
PIRKER, VICTOR J	E4	M	651122		VS
VISCONTI, FRANCIS	03	M	651122		VS
WINKLER, JOHN ANTHONY	E2	N	651122		VS
REYNOLDS, JON ANZUENA	03	F	651128	730212	VN
RUTLEDGE, HOWARD ELMER	05	N	651128	730212	VN
RICHARDSON, STEPHEN GOULD	02	N	651130		VS
MCCORMICK, JOHN VERN	02	N	651201	880406	VN
REITHMAN, THOMAS E	03	F	651201		VN
AUSTIN, CARL BENJAMIN	05	N	651202		VN
LOGAN, JACOB DRUMMOND	02	N	651202		VN
ROBERTS, GERALD RAY	04	N	651202		VN
JOHNSON, STANLEY GARWOOD	02	M	651203		VS
NIBBIE, MORRIS FREDERICK	F3	A	651205		VS

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EISENBERGER, GEORGE JOE BU	E5	A	651205		VS
HYDE, JIMMY DON	E4	H	651205		VS
UPNER, EDWARD CHARLES	E6	A	651205		VS
DUNN, JOHN HOWARD	04	M	651207	730212	VN
FREDERICK, JOHN WILLIAM	W4	M	651207	740313	VN
CORLE, JOHN THOMAS	E4	M	651208		VS
CLARK, JERRY PROSPER	W1	A	651215		VS
WICKHAM, DAVID WALLACE II	03	N	651216		VS
JEFFREY, ROBERT DUNCAN	03	F	651220	730212	VN
JOHNSON, GUY D	04	H	651220	770318	VN
MIMS, GEORGE I JR	02	F	651220		VN
NORDAHL, LEE E	02	N	651220		VN
PITCHFORD, JOHN JOSEPH	03	F	651220	730212	VN
TRIER, ROBERT D	03	F	651220	821014	VN
WAX, DAVID J	02	F	651220		VS
ALCORN, WENDELL REED	02	N	651222	730212	VN
CARTWRIGHT, BILLIE JACK	05	N	651222		VN
DAIGLE, GLENN HENRI	02	N	651222	730212	VN
GOLD, EDWARD FRANK	03	N	651222		VN
LUKENBACH, MAX DUANE	04	N	651222		VN
PRUDHOMME, JOHN DOUGLAS	03	N	651222		VN
SHANKEL, WILLIAM LEONARD	02	N	651223	730212	VN
CHRISTIANO, JOSEPH	04	F	651224		LA
COLWELL, WILLIAM KEVIN	E6	F	651224		LA
EILERS, DENNIS LEE	03	F	651224		LA
HASSENGER, ARDEN K	E5	F	651224		LA
JEFFORDS, DERRELL B	05	F	651224		LA
THORNTON, LARRY C	E7	F	651224		LA
BAILON, RUBEN	--	V	651225		VS
GRELLA, DONALD CARROLL	E5	A	651228		VS
PHELPS, JESSE DONALD	W2	A	651228		VS
RICE, THOMAS JR (NMN)	E4	A	651228		VS
STANCIL, KENNETH LEON	W3	A	651228		VS
HILL, ARTHUR SINCLAIR JR	03	N	651229		LA
RAWSTHORNE, EDGAR ARTHUR	05	N	651229		LA
KIRKSEY, ROBERT LOUIS	E3	A	660101		VS
MAC LAUGHLIN, DONALD C JR	02	N	660102		VS
CALLAHAN, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660107		VS
GREENLEY, JON ALFRED	02	F	660107		VS
SCHIMBERG, JAMES PHILIP	E4	A	660109		VS
WILLIAMS, THADDEUS EDWARD	02	A	660109		VS
GODFREY, JOHNNY HOWARD	03	F	660111		VS
HOLLINGSWORTH, HAL T	01	H	660116		VS
NETH, FRED ALBERT	04	N	660116		VS
SCHOONOVER, CHARLES DAVID	04	N	660116		VS
WOOD, DON C	03	F	660116		LA
RAMSEY, DOUGLAS	--	V	660117	730212	VS
EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR.	02	M	660121		VS
FORMAN, WILLIAM S	03	N	660122		VN
FRENYEA, EDWARD HENRY	E3	N	660122		VN
GRISSETT, EDWIN R JR	E4	M	660122	890123	VS
GENNETT, DORET D	F2	H	660122		VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
TEMPLIN, ERWIN BERNARD JR	02	N	660122		VN
BOOZE, DELMAR GEORGE	01	M	660124		VS
HELBEL, LAWRENCE NEAL	01	M	660124		VS
PITT, ALBERT	03	M	660124		VS
SPRICK, DOYLE ROBERT	03	M	660124		VS
GRUBB, WILMER H	03	F	660126	740313	VN
MCPHERSON, FRED LAMAR	04	F	660128		VS
BADOLATI, FRANK NEIL	E6	A	660129		VS
HODGSON, CECIL J	E7	A	660129		VS
TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE	E6	A	660129		VS
HAMILTON, EUGENE D	03	F	660131		VN
ALM, RICHARD ANDREW	04	M	660201		VN
COATES, DONALD LEROY	E6	M	660201		VN
HUMPHREY, GALEN FRANCIS	E7	M	660201		VN
LOHEED, HUBERT B	05	N	660201		VN
LUKER, RUSSELL BURT	E6	M	660201		VN
PREVOST, ALBERT MICHAEL	02	M	660201		VN
VLACHAKOS, PETER GEORGE	E6	M	660201		VN
BROWN, WILBUR RONALD	03	F	660203		VS
CARTER, JAMES LOUIS	04	F	660203		VS
COFFEE, GERALD LEONARD	03	N	660203	730212	VN
HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR	02	N	660203	881103	VN
PARSLEY, EDWARD MILTON	E4	F	660203		VS
WALLER, THERMAN H	E4	F	660203		VS
ASMUSSEN, GLENN EDWARD	E6	N	660205		VS
MCCONNAUGHAY, DAN DAILY	E4	N	660205		VS
SPARENBERG, BERNARD J	E7	N	660205		VS
CRAYTON, RENDER	04	N	660207	730212	VN
HOPPS, GARY DOUGLAS	03	N	660210		VN
HUNTER, RUSSELL-PALMER JR	03	F	660210		LA
KIEFEL, ERNST PHILIP JR	03	F	660210		LA
HILLS, JOHN RUSSELL	04	F	660214		LA
MAUTERER, OSCAR	04	F	660215		LA
MURRAY, JOSEPH VAUGHN	02	N	660218		VN
RUFFIN, JAMES THOMAS	02	N	660218	830603	VN
SCHROEFFEL, THOMAS ANTHONY	02	N	660218		VN
SPENCER, LARRY HOWARD	02	N	660218	730212	VN
HETRICK, RAYMOND HARRY	03	F	660224		LA
CAUSEY, JOHN BERNARD	03	F	660225		VN
NEWTON, DONALD S	E5	A	660226		VS
WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES	E3	A	660226		VS
CHRISTENSEN, WILLIAM MURRE	02	N	660301		VN
FRAWLEY, WILLIAM D	03	N	660301		VN
WOLOSZYK, DONALD J	02	N	660301		VN
WORST, KARL EDWARD	03	F	660302		LA
ANDREWS, STUART MERRILL	04	F	660304		VS
CONLON, JOHN FRANCIS III	02	F	660304		VS
HESSON, ROBERT CHARLES	05	N	660305		VN
PAGE, GORDON L	04	F	660307		VN
SMITH, HAROLD VICTOR	03	F	660307		VN
WRIGHT, JERDY ALBERT JR	04	F	660307	890621	VN
FRITHS, WILLIAM MARTIN	01	F	660309		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE	E5	F	660309	VS	
PETERSON, DELBERT R	02	F	660309	VS	
TAYLOR, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	660310	VS	
XAVIER, AUGUSTO MARIA	02	M	660310	VS	
DAVIS, GENE EDMOND	E5	F	660313	VS	
DUVALL, DEAN ARNOLD	E4	F	660313	VS	
HENNINGER, HOWARD W	03	F	660313	VS	
MORGAN, EDWIN E	E6	F	660313	VS	
OLSON, GERALD E	03	F	660313	VS	
PARKER, UDON (NMN)	E4	A	660313	VS	
PASEKOFF, ROBERT E	03	F	660313	VS	
PAULEY, MARSHALL I	E5	F	660313	VS	
HILTON, ROBERT LARIE	E4	F	660314	VN	
KLUTE, KARL EDWIN	03	F	660314	VS	
PLETMAN, JAMES EDWARD	E4	F	660314	881215	VN
HOLMES, DAVID HUGH	03	F	660315	LA	
MCELROY, GLENN DAVID	05	A	660315	LA	
NASH, JOHN MICHAEL	03	A	660315	LA	
SCOTT, MARTIN R	03	F	660315	VN	
STEWART, PETER J	05	F	660315	VN	
UNDERWOOD, PAUL G	05	F	660316	VN	
BALDOCK, FREDERICK CHARLES	02	N	660317	730212	VN
DAVIS, BRENT EDEN	02	M	660318	VN	
MCPHERSON, EVERETT ALVIN	02	M	660318	VN	
BEACH, ARTHUR JAMES	03	M	660320	VS	
MULLIGAN, JAMES ALFRED	05	N	660320	730212	VN
RATZLAFF, RICHARD RAYMOND	03	N	660320	730212	VN
BURER, ARTHUR WILLIAM	03	F	660321	730212	VN
COMPTON, FRANK RAY	03	N	660321	VN	
TIDERMAN, JOHN MARK	04	N	660321	VN	
CLARK, DONALD E JR	03	F	660323	770930	VN
DAWSON, CLYDE DUANE	04	F	660323	770930	VN
HEWITT, SAMUEL EUGENE	E2	M	660323	VS	
TAPP, JOHN BETHEL	04	N	660323	VS	
BUSH, ROBERT EDWARD	03	F	660324	881215	VN
SHERMAN, JOHN BROOKS	02	M	660325	VS	
SMITH, BRADLEY EDEL	02	N	660325	730212	VN
GRAYSON, WILLIAM RONALD	05	N	660401	VN	
KRECH, MELVIN THOMAS	E6	N	660401	VS	
DOUGHTY, DANIEL JAMES	03	F	660402	730212	VN
LAWS, RICHARD LEE	03	N	660403	VN	
BROWN, JAMES WILLIAM	E1	M	660405	VS	
COOK, DENNIS PHILIP	03	N	660406	VS	
GATES, JAMES W	03	A	660406	LA	
LAFAYETTE, JOHN W	03	A	660406	LA	
BARNETT, ROBERT RUSSELL	03	F	660407	LA	
WALKER, THOMAS TAYLOR	03	F	660407	LA	
CONWAY, JAMES BENNETT	03	A	660412	VS	
GLASSON, WILLIAM ALBERT JR	04	N	660412	CH	
HARRIS, REUBEN BEAUMONT	E2	N	660412	CH	
JORDAN, LARRY M	02	N	660412	CH	
PUGH, KENNETH W	F2	N	660412	751216	CH

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
MAPE, JOHN CLEMENT	05	N	660413		VN
ZERBE, MICHAEL R	02	N	660415		VS
CHESLEY, LARRY JAMES	02	F	660416	730212	VN
JOHNSON, SAMUEL ROBERT	04	F	660416	730212	VN
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE	02	N	660417		VN
ADAMS, LEE AARON	02	F	660419		VN
BROWN, JOSEPH ORVILLE	03	F	660419		LA
ROBBINS, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660419		LA
ABBOTT, JOHN	05	N	660420	740313	VN
AUSTIN, ELLIS ERNEST	04	N	660421		VN
KELLER, JACK ELMER	04	N	660421		VN
BOYD, CHARLES GRAHAM	03	F	660422	730212	VN
BRUNSTROM, ALAN LESLIE	04	F	660422	730212	VN
NICKERSON, WILLIAM BREWSTER	02	N	660422		VN
WEIMORTS, ROBERT FRANKLIN	04	N	660422		VN
DYCKOWSKI, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	F	660423		VN
GOSS, BERNARD J	04	F	660423	780823	VN
COOPER, WILLIAM EARL	05	F	660424		VN
DRISCOLL, JERRY DONALD	02	F	660424	730212	VN
ANDERSON, WARREN LEROY	03	F	660426		VN
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR	E4	A	660426	890427	VS
TUCKER, JAMES HALE	02	F	660426		VN
BOSTON, LEO SIDNEY	03	F	660429		VN
BROWN, THOMAS EDWARD	02	N	660429		VN
BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR	02	F	660429		VN
EGAN, WILLIAM PATRICK	04	N	660429		LA
MULLEN, WILLIAM FRANCIS	03	M	660429		LA
RUNYAN, ALBERT EDWARD	04	F	660429	730212	VN
WOOD, WALTER SUTTON	04	N	660502		VN
MALONE, JIMMY H	E2	A	660504		VS
DAMES, JOHN JAMES	E7	A	660505		VS
HEILIG, JOHN	03	N	660505	730212	VN
THOMAS, KENNETH D JR	02	F	660505	850814	VN
LAMAR, JAMES LASLEY	05	F	660506	730212	VN
RAY, JAMES EDWIN	02	F	660508	730212	VN
DEXTER, BENNIE LEE	E3	F	660509		VS
BAILEY, JOHN EDWARD	03	F	660510		VN
FENELEY, FRANCIS JAMES	03	F	660511		VN
VILLEPONTAUX, JAMES H JR	02	M	660511		VS
KING, DONALD L	03	F	660514		VN
RALSTON, FRANK DELZELL III	03	F	660514		VN
BALCOM, RALPH CAROL	03	F	660515		VN
JENSEN, GEORGE W	04	F	660515		LA
MADISON, WILLIAM L	E5	F	660515		LA
MCKENNEY, KENNETH DEVEY	E3	F	660515		LA
PRESTON, JAMES A	E5	F	660515		LA
REILLY, LAVERN G	04	F	660515		LA
TAPP, MARSHALL L	03	F	660515		LA
THOMPSON, GEORGE W	02	F	660515		LA
WILLIAMS, JAMES E	E4	F	660515		LA
DEERE, DONALD THORPE	E4	A	660517		VS
GUILLET, ANDRE R	E3	F	660518		LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
HARLEY, LEE D	03	F	660518		LA
MOORE, WILLIAM JOHN	E4	F	660518		VS
WALL, JERRY MACK	E4	F	660518		VS
BUCKLEY, LOUIS JR	E5	A	660521		VS
THACKERSON, WALTER ANTHONY	E3	A	660521		VS
GLANDON, GARY ALVEN	02	F	660526		VS
GRIFFEY, TERENCE HASTINGS	02	F	660526		VS
HATCHER, DAVID BURNETT	03	F	660530	730212	VN
ALBERTON, BOBBY JOE	E5	F	660531		VN
CASE, THOMAS FRANKLIN	04	F	660531	860410	VN
EDMONDSON, WILLIAM ROTHROC	02	F	660531		VN
HARNORTH, ELROY E	E3	F	660531	860410	VN
HERROLD, NED R	02	F	660531		VN
MCDONALD, EMMETT RAYMOND	03	F	660531		VN
RAGLAND, DAYTON WILLIAM	05	F	660531		VN
SHINGLEDECKER, ARMON D	02	F	660531		VN
STEEN, MARTIN W	03	F	660531		VN
STICKNEY, PHILLIP J	E3	F	660531		VN
ZOOK, HAROLD J	02	F	660531	860410	VN
BORLING, JOHN LORIN	02	F	660601	730212	VN
MYERS, ARMAND JESSE	03	F	660601	730212	VN
ROSATO, JOSEPH FRANK	03	F	660602		VS
KRYSZAK, THEODORE E	03	F	660603		LA
MARTIN, RUSSELL D	02	F	660603		LA
MULLINS, HAROLD E	E6	F	660603		LA
ROSE, LUTHER L	E6	F	660603		LA
SMITH, HARDING EUGENE SR	05	F	660603		LA
WARREN, ERVIN	E5	F	660603		LA
SANDNER, ROBERT LOUIS	03	F	660607		CB
BUSH, ROBERT IRA	03	F	660609		VN
SHORACK, THEODORE JAMES JR	04	F	660609		VN
HARRIS, GREGORY J	E4	M	660612		VS
BURKART, CHARLES WILLIA JR	03	F	660613		LA
GIERAK, GEORGE GREGORY JR	02	N	660613		VN
GLANVILLE, JOHN TURNER JR	04	N	660613		VN
KERR, EVERETT O	03	F	660613		LA
LAMBTON, BENNIE RICHARD	E7	N	660613		VN
LURIE, ALAN PIERCE	03	F	660613	730212	VN
PYLE, DARREL EDWIN	02	F	660613	730212	VN
KOPPFMAN, THEODORE FRANK	04	N	660615	730212	VN
ADAMS, OLEY NEAL	E5	F	660617		VS
CAIRNS, ROBERT ALEXANDER	E5	F	660617		VS
COBBS, RALPH BURTON	04	N	660617		VS
COLLETTE, CURTIS DAVID	E5	N	660617		VS
DEMPSY, JACK ISHUM	E5	N	660617		VS
FRENG, STANLEY JON	E5	N	660617		VS
GALANTI, PAUL EDWARD	03	N	660617	730212	VN
GRAVITTE, CONNIE MACK	03	F	660617		VS
HESS, GENE KARL	E5	F	660617		VS
ROMIG, EDWARD LEON	02	N	660617		VS
SAVOY, M J	E2	N	660617		VS
STEFANWARTH, DONALD F	02	N	660617		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
WASHBURN, LARRY EUGENE	E3	F	660617		VS
MCDONOUGH, JOHN RICHARD	03	N	660620		VN
TUNNELL, JOHN WALLACE	04	N	660620		VN
BLACK, COLE	04	N	660621	730212	VN
EASTMAN, LEONARD CORBETT	03	N	660621	730212	VN
SULLIVAN, JOHN B III	02	F	660621	900913	VN
SMITH, WARREN PARKER JR	03	F	660622		LA
BELKNAP, HARRY JOHN	01	N	660623		VN
HYMAN, LAWRENCE FREDERICK	02	N	660623		VN
ELLIS, WILLIAM JR	E3	A	660624		VS
MARIK, CHARLES WELDON	02	N	660625		VN
SMITH, GENE ALBERT	04	N	660627	881215	VN
CAVALLI, ANTHONY FRANK	02	F	660628		LA
DUDLEY, CHARLES GLENDON	03	F	660628		LA
WOLFE, THOMAS HUBERT	03	F	660628		LA
JONES, MURPHY NEAL	03	F	660629	730212	VN
CAMPBELL, BURTON WAYNE	02	F	660701	730212	VN
PETERS, CHARLES HENRY	05	N	660701	880713	VN
WILLIAMS, ROBERT CYRIL	04	F	660701		VN
GAGE, ROBERT HUGH	E4	M	660703		VS
PHILLIPS, DAVID JOSEPH JR	03	F	660703		VS
RENO, RALPH JOSEPH	E8	A	660703		VS
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT JR	04	F	660706		VN
MORGAN, CHARLES E	03	F	660706	890731	VN
YOUNG, JAMES FAULDS	04	F	660706	730212	VN
PHARRIS, WILLIAM VALRIE	E3	A	660707		VS
TOMES, JACK HARVEY	03	F	660707	730212	VN
BROWNING, RALPH THOMAS	02	F	660708	730212	VN
LONGANECKER, RONALD LEE	E3	M	660708		VS
SHATTUCK, LEWIS WILEY	03	F	660711	730212	VN
WILKINS, GEORGE HENRY	04	N	660711		VN
KIPINA, MARSHALL F	E4	A	660714		LA
HOPP, ROBERT G	03	A	660714		LA
CONNELL, JAMES JOSEPH	03	N	660715	740306	VN
DENNISON, TERRY ARDEN	03	N	660719	740306	VN
DIAMOND, STEPHEN W	02	F	660719	770318	VN
WINTERS, DARRYL GORDON	E3	F	660719		VS
BARBAY, LAWRENCE	03	F	660720	730304	VN
DILLON, DAVID ANDREW	E4	A	660720		VS
HUBBARD, EDWARD LEE	02	F	660720	730304	VN
LEWIS, MERRILL R JR	03	F	660720	890621	VN
MCDANIEL, NORMAN ALEXANDER	03	F	660720	730212	VN
MEANS, WILLIAM HARLEY	03	F	660720	730212	VN
NELSON, WILLIAM H	06	F	660720	770930	VN
NOBERT, CRAIG R	02	F	660720		VN
PERKINS, GLENDON WILLIAM	03	F	660720	730212	VN
TIFFIN, RAINFORD	03	F	660721		VN
WELLS, ROBERT JAMES	E3	A	660722		VS
NEWSOM, BENJAMIN B	04	F	660723	740306	VN
PEMBERTON, GENE T	04	F	660723	740306	VN
SMITH, WILLIAM WARD	03	F	660723		VS
MCDANIEL, GEORGE DAVID	01	N	660728	730304	VN

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BOSSIO, GALILEO, FRED	04	F	660729		VN
CAMERON, VIRGIL KING	02	N	660729		VN
CHIARELLO, VINCENT AUGUSTO	02	F	660729	880302	VN
CONKLIN, BERNARD	03	F	660729	880302	VN
DI TOMMASO, ROBERT JOSEPH	02	F	660729		VN
HALL, JAMES S	E5	F	660729	880302	VN
HOSKINSON, ROBERT E	03	F	660729		VN
LAW, DELMER LEE	E7	A	660729		VS
MAMIYA, JOHN M	E6	A	660729	880302	VN
SMITH, HERBERT E	E6	F	660729	880302	VN
BURROUGHS, WILLIAM DAVID	04	F	660731	730304	VN
FINNEY, ARTHUR THOMAS	05	F	660801	850814	VN
KWORTNIK, JOHN C	03	F	660801	850814	VN
NORTH, KENNETH WALTER	03	F	660801	730304	VN
BURNS, JOHN ROBERT	03	F	660804		LA
BRAZELTON, MICHAEL LEE	02	F	660807	730304	VN
FRYER, CHARLES WIGGER	03	N	660807		VN
GIDEON, WILLARD SELLECK	04	N	660807	730304	VN
MORAN, RICHARD ALLAN	04	N	660807		VS
PYLE, THOMAS SHAW	03	F	660807	730304	VN
SANDVICK, ROBERT JAMES	03	F	660807	730304	VN
WENDELL, JOHN HENRY	03	F	660807	730304	VN
FLOM, FREDRIC R	02	F	660808	730304	VN
GOLBERG, LAWRENCE H	03	F	660808	770930	VN
KASLER, JAMES HELMS	04	F	660808	730304	VN
KOMMENDANT, AADO	02	F	660808		VS
WALLING, CHARLES MILTON	03	F	660808		VS
WYNNE, PATRICK E	02	F	660808	770318	VN
ALLINSON, DAVID JAY	03	F	660812		VN
NEUENS, MARTIN JAMES	02	F	660812	730304	VN
WRYE, BLAIR C	04	F	660812	900913	VN
BRODAR, JOHN WARREN	03	F	660814	730304	VN
EATON, CURTIS ABBOT	04	F	660814		VN
FRANKLIN, CHARLES E	03	F	660814	880713	VN
BRAND, JOSEPH W	05	F	660817	770930	VS
KEMP, FREDDIE (NMN)	E2	A	660817		VS
SINGER, DONALD M	04	F	660817	770930	VN
RYKOSKEY, EDWARD JAY	E3	M	660818		VS
MILIKIN, RICHARD M III	02	F	660820		VN
JOHNSON, JAMES REED	E3	A	660821		VS
BULLARD, WILLIAM HARRY	02	N	660825		VS
COKER, GEORGE THOMAS	02	N	660827	730304	VN
FELLOWES, JOHN HEAPHY	04	N	660827	730304	VN
BABULA, ROBERT LEO	E2	M	660828		VS
BODENSCHATZ, JOHN EUGEN JR	E2	M	660828		VS
BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR	E2	M	660828		VS
CARTER, DENNIS RAY	E2	M	660828		VS
WELLS, NORMAN LOUROSS	03	F	660829	730304	VN
HOFF, SAMMIE DON	02	F	660830	881215	VN
ROBINSON, KENNETH D	03	F	660830	881215	VN
NICHOLS, HUBERT C JR	04	F	660901		VN
SCHMIDT, NORMAN	05	F	660901	740306	VN

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TRUJILLO, JOSEPH F	E3	M	660903		VS
BLISS, RONALD GLENN	02	F	660904	730304	VN
MCNISH, THOMAS MITCHELL	02	F	660904	730304	VN
NASMYTH, JOHN HERBERT	02	F	660904	730218	VN
SALZARULO, RAYMOND PAUL JR	02	F	660904	900913	VN
ABBOTT, WILFRED KESSE	03	F	660905	730304	VN
BUNDY, NORMAN LEE	02	N	660906		VN
BLEVINS, JOHN CHARLES	03	F	660909	730304	VN
FISCHER, JOHN RICHARD	03	M	660909		VS
PETERSON, DOUGLAS BRIAN	03	F	660910	730304	VN
TALLEY, BERNARD LEO	02	F	660910	730304	VN
TATUM, LAWRENCE B	04	F	660910		VN
SPRAGUE, STANLEY GEORGE	04	F	660912	900913	VN
WAGGONER, ROBERT FROST	03	F	660912	730304	VN
COAKLEY, WILLIAM FRANCIS	04	N	660913	881215	VN
STODDARD, CLARENCE W JR	05	N	660914		VN
BUCHANAN, HUBERT ELLIOT	02	F	660916	730304	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN L	04	F	660916		VN
LEETON, DAREL D	03	F	660917		VN
BROWN, FRANK MONROE JR	03	N	660919		VS
HENRY, DAVID ALAN	02	N	660919		VS
PARSONS, DON BROWN JR	02	N	660919		VN
PILKINGTON, THOMAS HOLT	02	N	660919		VN
WALTHAM, DONALD G	03	F	660919	730304	VN
BLOOM, RICHARD MCAULIFFE	02	M	660920		VS
AMMON, GLENDON LEE	03	F	660921	780823	VN
BAUDER, JAMES REGINALD	04	N	660921		VN
MILLS, JAMES B	02	N	660921		VN
KNOCHEL, CHARLES ALLEN	03	N	660922		VN
WHITTLE, JUNIOR LEE	E4	A	660924		VS
BOSSMAN, PETER ROBERT	E4	N	660925		VS
BURGESS, RICHARD GORDON	E4	M	660925	730305	VS
CUSHMAN, CLIFTON EMMET	03	F	660925		VN
DUCAT, PHILLIP ALLEN	03	M	660925		VS
REITER, DEAN WESLEY	02	M	660925		VS
TICE, PAUL DOUGLAS	E3	M	660925		VS
BALLARD, ARTHUR T JR	03	F	660926	730304	VN
MOSBURG, HENRY LEE	03	A	660926		VS
PHILLIPS, MARVIN FOSTER	E4	A	660926		VS
SPILMAN, DYKE AUGUSTUS	02	F	660927		VN
STINE, JOSEPH M	04	F	660927		VN
BRASHER, JIMMY MAC	02	A	660928		VN
PITTMAN, ROBERT EDWARD	E4	A	660928		VN
TAYLOR, DANNY GENE	E6	A	660928		VS
NIX, COMAN GLENN	03	F	661001	730304	VN
ECHAVARRIA, RAYMOND L	E8	A	661003		LA
JONES, JAMES E	E7	A	661003		LA
WILLIAMS, EDDIE L	E7	A	661003		LA
BURNS, JOHN DOUGLAS	04	N	661004	730304	VN
ANDREWS, WILLIAM RICHARD	03	F	661005	900913	VN
BEENE, JAMES ALVIN	02	N	661005		VN
MAKOWSKI, LOUIS FRANK	04	F	661006	730304	VN

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GILCHRIST, ROBERT M	02	F	661007		VN
KNIGHT, LARRY D	03	F	661007		VS
PABST, EUGENE M	02	F	661007		VN
TREECE, JAMES ALLEN	03	F	661007		VS
FELDBAUS, JOHN ANTHONY	03	N	661008		VN
TANNER, CHARLES NELS	04	N	661009	730304	VN
TERRY, ROSS RANDLE	03	N	661009	730304	VN
CONFER, MICHAEL STEELE	02	N	661010		VN
ELKINS, FRANK CALLIHAN	03	N	661012	890621	VN
WOODS, ROBERT DEANE	03	N	661012	730304	VN
BORDEN, MURRAY LYMAN	02	F	661013		VN
MEADOWS, EUGENE THOMAS	02	F	661013		VN
THOMAS, DARWIN JOEL	01	N	661014		VN
ADAMS, STEVEN HAROLD	E3	F	661018		VN
ANGSTADT, RALPH HAROLD	04	F	661018		VN
CLARK, LAWRENCE	E5	F	661018		VN
HILL, ROBERT L	E6	F	661018		VN
LONG, JOHN HENRY SOTHORON	02	F	661018		VN
RACKLEY, INZAR WILLIAM JR	04	F	661018		VN
SHONECK, JOHN R	E5	F	661018		VN
BURKE, MICHAEL JOHN	E3	M	661019		VS
LEWANDOWSKI, LEONARD J JR	E2	M	661019		VS
MISHUK, RICHARD E	E2	M	661019		VS
EDWARDS, HARRY S JR	02	N	661020		VN
PURRINGTON, FREDERICK RAYM	02	N	661020	730218	VN
WAGENER, DAVID RAYMOND	03	F	661020		LA
EARLL, DAVID JOHN	03	F	661021		VN
HARRIS, HAROLD LEE	E3	A	661022		VS
KLEHERT, WILLIAM B	02	N	661022	770318	VN
KOLSTAD, THOMAS C	04	N	661022	770318	VN
MCBRIDE, EARL PAUL	04	N	661022		VN
GREEN, ROBERT BAILEY	E5	F	661025		LA
LEVAN, ALVIN LEE	E3	N	661025		VS
MORRISON, GLENN R JR	03	F	661026		VS
JOHNSON, DALE ALONZO	04	F	661027		VN
CARPENTER, ALLEN RUSSELL	03	N	661101	730304	VN
WEAVER, GEORGE ROBERT JR	E5	N	661101		VS
KLINE, ROBERT E	04	F	661102		VN
BRINCKMANN, ROBERT EDWIN	04	F	661104	890731	VN
CONNOLLY, VINCENT J	03	F	661104	840717	VN
HUNT, WILLIAM B	E6	A	661104		VS
SCUNGIO, VINCENT ANTHONY	03	F	661104		VN
CARTER, WILLIAM THOMAS	02	N	661110		VN
MCATEER, THOMAS JOSEPH	03	N	661110		VS
O'BRIEN, JOHN LAWRENCE	03	F	661110		LA
RIRDAN, JOHN MICHAEL	E4	N	661110		VS
SCHODERER, ERIC JOHN	E4	N	661110		VS
BISS, ROBERT IRVING	03	F	661111	730304	VN
BUTT, RICHARD LEIGH	02	F	661111	860410	VN
MEARNS, ARTHUR S	04	F	661111	770930	VN
MONLUX, HAROLD DELOSS	02	F	661111	730304	VN
RIMSDORF, HERBERT BENJAMIN	02	F	661111	730218	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
SWINDLE, ORSON GEORGE III	03	M	661111	730304	VN
FROSIO, ROBERT CLARENCE	05	H	661112		VS
JONES, JAMES GRADEY	02	N	661112		VS
KEIPER, JOHN CHARLES	E4	M	661115		VS
RAVENNA, HARRY M III	03	A	661115		VS
TIMMONS, BRUCE ALLEN	E4	N	661115		VS
PIITTMANN, ALAN D	E3	F	661116		LA
ARNOLD, WILLIAM TAMM	02	N	661118		VN
JOHNSTONE, JAMES MONTGOMER	03	A	661119		VS
WHITED, JAMES LAFAYETTE	04	A	661119		LA
CRECCA, JOSEPH	02	F	661122	730218	VN
WILSON, GORDON SCOTT	02	F	661122	860410	VN
GARDNER, GLENN VIRGIL	E2	A	661125		VS
NICHOLSON, DANIEL LEE	--	V	661125		VS
HOEFFS, JOHN HARVEY	E4	A	661128		VS
BERGER, JAMES ROBERT	03	F	661202	730218	VN
BOTT, RUSSELL PETER	E6	A	661202		LA
BURNS, DONALD RAY	04	F	661202	730304	VN
CORDIER, KENNETH WILLIAM	03	F	661202	730304	VN
DUCAT, BRUCE CHALMERS	02	F	661202	770318	VN
DYER, IRBY III (NMN)	E5	A	661202		LA
FLESHER, HUBERT KELLY	04	F	661202	730218	VN
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	F	661202	880302	VN
LANE, MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER	02	F	661202	730218	VN
MCRAE, DAVID EDWARD	02	N	661202		VN
MOORBERG, MONTE LARUE	03	F	661202	850814	VN
NYSTROM, BRUCE AUGUST	05	N	661202		VN
REHMANN, DAVID GEORGE	02	N	661202	730212	VN
STARK, WILLIE E	E7	A	661202		LA
STUTZ, LEROY WILLIAM	02	F	661202	730304	LA
SULANDER, DANIEL ARTHUR	01	N	661202		VN
WORRELL, PAUL L	01	N	661202	850814	VN
BEGLEY, BURRIS NELSON	04	F	661205		VS
WARREN, ARTHUR L	03	F	661205	860917	VN
CARLSON, JOHN WERNER	03	F	661207		VS
ASIRE, DONALD HENRY	05	F	661208	890621	VN
HYDE, MICHAEL LEWIS	03	F	661208	900913	VN
ALFRED, GERALD OAK JR	02	F	661211		VN
WATERS, SAMUEL E	03	F	661213	770318	VN
BRIGHAM, ALBERT	E3	M	661214		VS
HOLMAN, GERALD ALLAN	02	N	661214		VN
KOENIG, EDWIN LEE	04	N	661214		VS
MOWREY, RICHARD LYNN	02	N	661214		VN
NEWELL, MICHAEL THOMAS	03	N	661214		VS
WILSON, CLAUDE DAVID JR	03	N	661214	881215	VN
LUCAS, LARRY FRANCIS	03	A	661220		LA
LUM, DAVID ANTHONY	02	F	661220		VS
GLENN, DANNY ELLOY	02	H	661221	730304	VN
KERNS, ARTHUR WILLIAM	E2	A	661223		VS
REEVES, JOHN HOWARD	E3	M	661223		VS
BULLOCK, LARRY ALAN	E3	A	670101		VS
BUFFINGS, GEORGE B	02	F	670102	8009	LA

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STRATTON, RICHARD ALLEN	04	N	670105	730304	VN
MULLEN, RICHARD DEAN	04	N	670106	730304	VN
GAULEY, JAMES PAUL	03	F	670110		LA
STOVES, MERRITT III (NMN)	E3	A	670110		VS
KEMP, CLAYTON C JR	E4	N	670112		VN
REINECKE, WAYNE C	E4	N	670112		VN
CROWIN, MICHAEL PAUL	02	N	670113	730304	VN
CAMP, FRANKLIN HARLEE JR	E5	N	670114		VS
KERR, MICHAEL SCOTT	02	F	670116	730304	VN
MASTIN, RONALD LAMBERT	02	F	670116	730304	VN
STOREY, THOMAS GORDON	03	F	670116	730304	VN
WELCH, ROBERT J	03	F	670117		LA
COSDELL, WILLIAM KEITH	02	F	670117		LA
KROGMAN, ALVA RAY	02	F	670117		VN
WOZNIAK, FREDERICK J	04	F	670117		VN
WRIGHT, GARY G	02	N	670118		VS
MOSEN, MARLOW ERLING	04	N	670119		VS
ASHBY, DONALD ROBERTS SR	05	N	670119	730304	VN
BRADY, ALLEN COLBY	04	N	670119		VS
EHRLICH, DENNIS MICHAEL	03	F	670119	730304	VN
JAYROE, JULIUS SKINNER	02	F	670119	730212	VN
KRAMER, GALAND DWIGHT	04	N	670119	850814	VN
YARBROUGH, WILLIAM P JR	03	F	670121	730304	VN
BAUGH, WILLIAM JOSEPH	05	F	670121		VN
CONLEY, EUGENE OGDEN	02	N	670121		VN
HOGAN, JERRY F	02	F	670121	730304	VN
SPOON, DONALD RAY	03	F	670123	730304	VN
BRIDGER, BARRY BURTON	02	F	670123	730304	VN
GRAY, DAVID FLETCHER	E3	A	670124		VS
SIMPSON, MAX COLEMAN	E2	A	670125		VS
WALLACE, ARNOLD BRIAN	03	F	670126		VS
MORGAN, THOMAS R	E3	A	670128		VS
THORNTON, WILLIAM DEMPSEY	04	F	670129	830603	VN
BIEDIGER, LARRY WILLIAM	02	F	670129		VN
SILVA, CLAUDE ARNOLD	03	F	670131		LA
BARDEEN, HOWARD LEROY	03	F	670131		LA
KUBLEY, ROY ROBERT	E4	F	670131		LA
MIYAZAKI, RONALD KAZUO	03	F	670131		LA
MULHAUSER, HARVEY	04	F	670131		LA
WALKER, LLOYD FRANCIS	E3	N	670203		VS
JOHNSON, AUGUST DAVID	04	F	670204	730304	VN
BOWAR, JACK WILLIAMSON	03	N	670204		VN
COLLAMORE, ALLAN PHILIP JR	02	F	670204	730218	VN
DAVIES, JOHN OWEN	03	F	670204	770930	VN
DOB, HERB	03	F	670204	730304	VN
FER, JOHN	03	F	670204		VN
POOR, RUSSELL ARDEN	03	N	670204		VN
THOMPSON, DONALD E	04	F	670204	890621	VN
WILBURN, WOODROW HOOVER	E5	F	670206		VN
HALL, DONALD J	03	F	670206		VN
HEISKELL, LUCIUS L	03	F	670206		VN
KIBBEY, RICHARD ABBOT	03	F	670206		VN

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WOO, PATRICK HARDY	04	F	670206		VN
CARLSON, PAUL VICTOR	02	N	670212		VS
SULLIVAN, MARTIN JOSEPH	04	N	670212		VS
WEISSMUELLER, COURTNEY E	03	F	670212		LA
MARVIN, ROBERT CLARENCE	03	N	670214		VN
SOOTER, DAVID WILLIAM	W1	A	670217	730305	VS
DUART, DAVID HENRY	03	F	670218	730304	VN
JENSEN, JAY ROBERT	03	F	670218	730218	VN
GOODMAN, RUSSELL CLEMENSEN	04	F	670220		VN
THORNTON, GARY LYNN	01	N	670220	730304	VN
BORJA, DOHINGO R S	E7	A	670221		LA
WRIGHT, ARTHUR	E4	A	670221		VS
HART, JOSEPH LESLIE	05	F	670225		LA
ALMAN, HAROLD JOSEPH	04	M	670227		VS
HUIE, LITCHFIELD PATTERSON	03	N	670227		VS
LETCHWORTH, EDWARD NORMAN	02	N	670227		VS
SAUSE, BERNARD JACOB JR	E3	N	670227		VS
ZEMPEL, RONALD LEE	E3	N	670227		VS
MOORE, JAMES R	E4	M	670228		VS
RICHARDSON, FLOYD W	04	F	670303	881215	VN
ROBY, CHARLES D	05	F	670303	881215	VN
CARLOCK, RALPH LAURENCE	04	F	670304		LA
CARPENTER, HOWARD B	E5	A	670306		LA
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR	E4	A	670306		VS
MILLER, ROBERT LESTER	03	N	670307		VN
CRAIN, CARROLL OWEN JR	04	N	670308		VN
GALVIN, RONALD E	E2	N	670308		VN
PAWLISH, GEORGE F	02	N	670308		VN
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER	05	N	670309	881103	VN
EVERSON, DAVID	04	F	670310	730304	VN
LUNA, JOSE DAVID	03	F	670310	730304	VN
GREENE, CHARLES E	03	F	670311	730304	VN
HITESHEW, JAMES EDWARD	04	F	670311	730304	VN
KARINS, JOSEPH J JR	03	F	670311	880406	VN
MOORE, ERNEST MILVIN	05	N	670311	730304	VN
ADRIAN, JOSEPH DANIEL	03	F	670312		VS
CLARK, JOHN WALTER	03	F	670312	730218	VN
GOODRICH, EDWIN R JR	03	F	670312	850814	VN
HARRIS, PAUL WINIFORD	E2	M	670313		VS
TERWILLINGER, VIRGIL BYRON	E3	M	670313		VS
FREDERICK, PETER J	05	F	670315		VN
SMITH, DEAN (NMN) JR	02	N	670315		VN
GOEDEN, GENE WILLIAM	02	N	670317		VN
MORRILL, DAVID WHITTIER	04	M	670318		VS
PARKER, MAXIM CHARLES	01	M	670318		VS
AUSTIN, JOSEPH CLAIR	05	F	670319		VN
CHARVET, PAUL CLAUDE	03	N	670321		VN
ELLISON, JOHN C	04	N	670324		VN
HALLBERG, ROGER C	E6	A	670324		VS
PLOWMAN, JAMES EDWIN	02	N	670324		VN
STEWART, JACK T	03	A	670324		VS
HISE, JAMES HAMILTON	02	N	670325		VS

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CROW, FREDERICK AUSTIN	05	F	670326	730304	VN
FOWLER, HENRY POPE	02	F	670326	730218	VN
PALENSCAR, ALEXANDER J 3D	03	N	670327		VN
GOVAN, ROBERT A	04	F	670401		LA
JOUREMAIS, GEORGE HENRY	03	F	670401		VS
STANLEY, ROBERT W	02	F	670401		VS
WILLIAMS, DAVID R	04	F	670401		LA
DRAHESI, JOHN ARTHUR	03	F	670402	730304	VN
MARTIN, DAVID EARL	01	N	670404		VN
SZEYLLER, EDWARD PHILIP	03	N	670404		VN
PARKER, THOMAS AQUINAS	E6	N	670405		VS
SCHWORE, RONALD PAUL	E4	A	670409		VS
O'GRADY, JOHN FRANCIS	04	F	670410		VN
CLAY, WILLIAM CLIFTON III	03	M	670412		VS
CARLTON, JAMES EDMUND JR	03	M	670417		VN
MCGARVEY, JAMES MAURICE	04	M	670417		VN
HAMILTON, JOHN S	04	F	670419		VN
MADISON, THOMAS MARK	04	F	670419	730304	VN
STERLING, THOMAS JAMES	04	F	670419	730304	VN
HAMILTON, ROGER D	E3	M	670421		VS
HASENBACH, PAUL ALFRED	E3	A	670421		VS
MANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO	E4	A	670421		VS
NIDOS, DANIEL R	E3	A	670421		VS
WINTERS, DAVID M	E3	A	670421		VS
AUSTIN, CHARLES DAVID	02	F	670424		VN
CHRISTIAN, MICHAEL DURHAM	02	N	670424	730304	VN
KNAPP, HERMAN L	04	F	670424		VN
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON	04	N	670424	871125	VN
WILLIAMS, LEWIS IRVING	-02	N	670424	730304	VN
STACKHOUSE, CHARLES DAVID	03	N	670425	730304	VN
WESKAMP, ROBERT L	02	F	670425	740306	VN
DUDASH, JOHN FRANCIS	04	F	670426	830603	VN
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN	04	N	670426		VN
MEYER, ALTON BENNO	03	F	670426	730304	VN
MEYER, WILLIAM M	03	F	670426	850814	VN
RIATE, ALFONSO RAY	E4	M	670426	730316	VS
BENTON, JAMES AUSTIN	E3	M	670427		VS
CASTRO, REINALDO ANTONIO	E5	M	670427		VS
DALLAS, RICHARD HOWARD	E3	M	670427		VS
DYER, BLENN COLBY	E3	M	670427		VS
OSBORNE, SAMUEL WILLIAM JR	E2	M	670427		VS
PENNINGTON, RONALD KEITH	E3	M	670427		VS
CARAS, FRANKLIN ANGEL	03	F	670428	871125	VN
POLLIN, GEORGE J	02	F	670429	900913	VN
SIGLER, GARY RICHARD	02	F	670429	730304	VN
STEPHENSEN, MARK L	04	F	670429	880406	VN
TORKELSON, LOREN H	02	F	670429	730304	VN
ABBOTT, JOSEPH S JR	03	F	670430	730218	VN
ABBOTT, ROBERT ARCHIE	02	F	670430	730304	VN
JOHNSON, HAROLD E	03	F	670430	730304	VN
MCPHEE, RANDY NEAL	E2	M	670430		VS
THORNESS, LEO KEITH	04	F	670430	730304	VN

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BAILEY, JOHN HOWARD	E5	M	670501		VS
CORFIELD, STAN LEROY	E5	M	670501		VS
GAUGHAN, ROGER CONRAD	E4	M	670501		VS
GUAJARDO, HILARIO H	E2	M	670501		VS
SMITH, CARL ARTHUR	E3	M	670501		VS
SOULIER, DUWAYNE	E2	M	670501		VS
MOORE, RALPH EDWARD	E3	A	670503		VS
GRAHAM, JAMES SCOTT	02	N	670504	850814	VN
ROGERS, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	670504		LA
HUGHES, JAMES LINDBERG	05	F	670505	730304	VN
LARSON, GORDON ALBERT	05	F	670505	730304	VN
SHIVELY, JAMES RICHARD	02	F	670505	730218	VN
WIDEMAN, ROBERT EARL	02	N	670506	730304	VN
MCCUISTION, MICHAEL K	03	F	670508	730304	VN
STEIMER, THOMAS JACK	02	N	670508		VS
TODD, ROBERT JACY	E1	M	670509		VS
AHLMAYER, HEINZ JR	01	M	670510		VS
MILLER, MALCOLM THOMAS	E4	N	670510		VN
NETHERLAND, ROGER M	05	N	670510		VN
SHARP, SAMUEL ARTHUR JR	E3	M	670510		VS
TYCZ, JAMES NEIL	E5	M	670510		VS
ASHLOCK, CARLOS	E4	M	670512		VS
GADDIS, NORMAN CARL	06	F	670512	730304	VN
GRENZEBACH, EARL W	04	F	670512		VN
JEFFERSON, JAMES MILTON	02	F	670512		VN
PITMAN, PETER POTTER	03	F	670512		VN
STEWART, ROBERT ALLAN	04	F	670512		VN
ROLLINS, DAVID JOHN	03	N	670514	730304	VN
SOUTHWICK, CHARLES EVERETT	04	N	670514	730304	VN
HEILIGER, DONALD LESTER	03	F	670515	730218	VN
HILL, CHARLES DALE	E2	N	670515		VN
POLLARD, BEN M	03	F	670515	730304	VN
DODGE, RONALD WAYNE	03	N	670517	810708	VN
LEWIS, CHARLIE GRAY	E7	A	670517		VS
CAMERON, KENNETH ROBBINS	05	N	670518	740306	VN
DELONG, JOE LYNN	E3	A	670518		VS
HAUGHTON, ROBERT JOHN	03	N	670518	730304	VN
ANDERSON, GARETH LAVERNE	02	N	670519	730304	VN
GRIFFIN, JAMES LLOYD	04	N	670519	740313	VN
HELLBACH, HAROLD JAMES	03	M	670519		VS
KNIGHT, ROY A JR	04	F	670519		LA
MCDANIEL, EUGENE BAKER	04	N	670519	730304	VN
METZGER, WILLIAM JOHN	02	N	670519		VN
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY	03	N	670519		VN
PLUMB, JOSEPH CHARLES	02	N	670519	730218	VN
RICH, RICHARD	05	N	670519		VN
RUSSELL, KAY	04	H	670519	730304	VN
STARK, WILLIAM ROBERT	04	N	670519	730304	VN
WALTERS, JACK	03	N	670519	740313	VN
KEEFE, DOUGLAS ONEIL	E2	M	670520		VS
MADDOX, NOTLEY G	04	F	670520		VN
MILLIGAN, JOSEPH EDWARD	02	F	670520	730218	VN

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SMITH, HOMER LEROY	04	N	670520	740313	VN
VANLOAN, JACK LEE	04	F	670520	730304	VN
SIMPSON, WALTER STEPHEN	E5	A	670521		VS
WROBLESKI, WALTER F	W1	A	670521		VS
BACKUS, KENNETH FRANK	02	F	670522		VN
HOLMES, LESTER E	05	F	670522		VN
PERRINE, ELTON L	03	F	670522		VN
VOGEL, RICHARD DALE	04	F	670522	730304	VN
HOMUTH, RICHARD WENDAL	03	N	670523		VN
PETTIS, THOMAS EDWIN	02	N	670523		VN
SCHMITTOW, EUREKA LAVERN	E5	N	670523		VN
SOUCY, RONALD PHILIP SR	E5	N	670523		VN
GRAVES, RICHARD CAMPBELL	01	N	670525		VN
MECLEARY, READ BLAINE	02	N	670526	730304	VN
BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON	03	F	670527	890427	VN
GARNER, JOHN HENRY	E4	N	670529		VS
MEHL, JAMES PATRICK	05	N	670530	730304	VN
CHAUNCEY, ARVIN RAY	04	N	670531	730304	VN
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E	E3	A	670531		VS
JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW	E5	A	670531		VS
MCGAR, BRIAN KENT	E3	A	670531		VS
CARRIER, DANIEL LEWIS	02	F	670602	890731	VN
ROCKETT, ALTON C JR	03	F	670602		VN
SMITH, DEWEY LEE	04	F	670602	730304	VN
WOOD, REX STEWART	04	N	670602		VN
BODDEN, TIMOTHY ROY	E5	M	670603		LA
CIUS, FRANK E	E3	M	670603	730305	LA
DEXTER, RONALD JAMES	E8	A	670603		LA
GARDNER, JOHN G	02	M	670603		LA
HANSON, STEPHEN PAUL	03	M	670603		LA
KEARNS, JOSEPH T JR	03	F	670603		VN
LANEY, BILLY R	E7	A	670603		LA
SPRINGSTON, THEODORE JR	04	F	670603		VN
ROBINSON, LEWIS MERRITT	05	F	670604		LA
HAINES, COLLINS HENRY	04	N	670605	730304	VN
IBANEZ, DI REYES	E5	M	670605		VS
OWENS, JOY L	04	F	670607		VN
SALE, HAROLD R JR	02	F	670607		VN
APODACA, VICTOR JOE JR	03	F	670608		VN
BUSCH, JON THOMAS	02	F	670608	880713	VN
MYERS, DAVID GEPHART	02	M	670608		VS
HALL, THOMAS RENWICK	02	N	670610	730304	VN
PLATT, ROBERT L JR	E3	A	670610		VS
SHERMAN, PETER W	05	N	670610	910116	VN
BEECHER, QUENTIN RIPPETOE	W2	A	670611		VS
BOHLSCHIED, CURTIS RICHARD	03	M	670611		VS
CHOMEL, CHARLES DENNIS	E2	M	670611		VS
CHRISTIE, DENNIS RAY	E3	M	670611		VS
CLINTON, DEAN EDDIE	W1	A	670611		VS
FOLEY, JOHN JOSEPH III	E3	M	670611		VS
GONZALEZ, JOSE JESUS	E3	M	670611		VS
HANRATTY, THOMAS MICHAEL	E2	M	670611		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
HAVRANEK, MICHAEL WILLIAM	E3	M	670611		VS
KLEMM, DONALD M	04	F	670611		VN
KOOI, JAMES WILLARD	E3	M	670611		VS
MOSHIER, JIM EDWIN	E4	M	670611		VS
NELSON, JAMES R	E5	A	670611		VS
OLDHAM, JOHN SANDERS	04	M	670611		VS
PEARSON, ROBERT HARVEY	02	F	670611	880713	VN
RIGGS, THOMAS F	W2	A	670611		VN
STOCKMAN, HERVEY STUDDIE	05	F	670611	730304	VN
UHLMAHSIEK, RALPH E	E4	A	670611		VS
WEBB, RONALD JOHN	03	F	670611	730304	VN
WIDENER, JAMES EDWARD	E2	M	670611		VS
MCANUS, KEVIN JOSEPH	02	F	670614	730218	VN
MECHENBIER, EDWARD JOHN	02	F	670614	730218	VN
SWANSON, JOHN W JR	03	F	670615		VN
GUILLORY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E7	A	670618		VS
LEMONS, WILLIAM E	02	A	670618		VS
MCKITTRICK, JAMES C	03	A	670618		LA
SPINLER, DARRELL JOHN	03	F	670621		VS
PIRIE, JAMES GLENN	04	N	670622	730218	VN
SHERMAN, ROBERT C	E4	M	670624	850320	VS
BAILEY, JAMES WILLIAM	02	N	670628	730218	VN
LAWRENCE, WILLIAM PORTER	05	N	670628	730304	VN
HARDY, WILLIAM H	03	A	670629	730212	VS
ALLEN, MERLIN RAYE	E3	M	670630		VS
COLE, LEGRANDE OGDEN JR	03	N	670630	881103	VN
HOUSE, JOHN ALEXANDER II	03	M	670630		VS
HOWARD, LUTHER HARRIS	E4	A	670630		VS
JUDD, MICHAEL BARRY	E4	N	670630		VS
KILLEN, JOHN DEWEY III	E3	M	670630		VS
MCGRATH, JOHN MICHAEL	03	N	670630	730304	VN
RUNNELS, GLYN LINAL JR	E4	M	670630		VS
KASCH, FREDERICK MORRISON	02	N	670702	881103	VN
RAYFORD, KING DAVID JR	E3	A	670702	730316	VS
WILSON, WAYNE V	E5	M	670702		VS
SEYMOUR, LEO E	E5	A	670703		LA
CRAIG, PHILLIP CHARLES	03	N	670704	861126	VN
DODGE, WARD K	04	F	670705	740313	VN
FREDERICK, WILLIAM V	03	F	670705	890731	VN
WADDELL, DEWEY WAYNE	04	F	670705	730304	VN
HUGHES, KENNETH RAYMOND	04	F	670706	730304	VN
POLLACK, MELVIN	02	F	670706	730304	VN
AVOLESE, PAUL ANDREW	04	F	670707		VS
BITTENBENDER, DAVID FRITZ	03	F	670707		VS
BLANKENSHIP, CHARLES HERMA	03	F	670707		VS
CRUM, WILLIAM JOSEPH	08	F	670707		VS
JONES, GEORGE EMERSON	02	F	670707		VS
MCLAUGHLIN, OLEN BURKE	E7	F	670707		VS
TRITT, JAMES FRANCIS	E5	N	670707		VN
LEE, CHARLES RICHARD	03	N	670709	830603	VN
MARTIN, EDWARD HOLMES	04	N	670709	730304	VN
ALMONTARY17 (AMIF) (NMN)	F7	A	670712		LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
DOVE, JACK PARIS SR	03	F	670712		VN
FRANK, MARTIN S	E5	A	670712	730305	VS
HENRY, NATHAN BARNEY	E4	A	670712	730305	VS
MCURRAY, CORDINE	E5	A	670712	730305	VS
NEWELL, STANLEY ARTHUR	E4	A	670712	730305	VS
PERRICONE, RICHARD ROBERT	E4	A	670712	730305	VS
SCHIELE, JAMES F	E4	A	670712		VS
SQUIRE, BOYD E	04	F	670712		VN
SULLIVAN, ROBERT JOSEPH	E7	A	670712		LA
VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE	E4	A	670712		VS
FULLER, ROBERT BYRON	05	N	670714	730304	VN
CASSELL, ROBIN BERN	02	N	670715		VN
COPELAND, HC	04	F	670717	730314	VN
HARTMAN, RICHARD DANNER	04	N	670718	740306	VN
FRYE, DONALD PATRICK	01	N	670719	821014	VN
JACKSON, WILLIAM BRAXTON	E5	N	670719	821014	VN
MCGRANE, DONALD PAUL	E6	N	670719	821014	VN
PETERSON, DENNIS WILLIAM	03	N	670719		VN
FLORA, CARROLL E	E6	A	670721	730305	VS
DAVIS, DONALD VANCE	04	N	670725		VN
JARVIS, JEREMY H	02	F	670725		VN
LUNSFORD, HERBERT L	04	F	670725		VN
BRAZIK, RICHARD	02	F	670726		VN
CLAFIN, RICHARD AMES	03	F	670726		VN
BARE, WILLIAM ORLAN	02	F	670727		VN
CORBITT, GILLAND WALES	04	F	670727		VN
HARDIE, CHARLES DAVID	E5	N	670727		VN
PATTERSON, BRUCE MERLE	01	N	670727		VN
BENNEFELD, STEVEN HENRY	E3	M	670729		VS
JOHNSON, RICHARD HERMAN	E3	M	670729		VS
BISCAILUZ, ROBERT LYNN	E3	M	670730		VS
BYARS, EARNEST RAY	E3	M	670730		VS
FREDERICK, DAVID ADDISON	03	M	670730		VS
WATERMAN, CRAIG HOUSTON	02	M	670730		VS
ALLEN, THOMAS RAY	03	F	670731		VN
PACKARD, RONALD L	02	F	670731		VN
ZUHOSKI, CHARLES PETER	02	N	670731	730314	VN
PREWITT, WILLIAM ROLAND	E3	M	670801		VS
WINSTON, CHARLES C III	03	F	670801	770930	VN
CUNNINGHAM, CAREY ALLEN	03	F	670802		VN
HYNDS, WALLACE G JR	06	F	670802		VN
GOPP, THOMAS ALAN	E4	M	670803		VS
MCGRATH, JAMES PATRICK	E3	N	670803		VS
MAHAN, JOHN BENEDICT III	E3	M	670803		VS
NEWCOMB, WALLACE GRANT	03	F	670803	730314	VN
WOLPE, JACK	E4	M	670803		VS
BISZ, RALPH CAMPION	02	N	670804		VN
KEMMERER, DONALD R	03	F	670806		VN
PAGE, ALBERT L JR	03	F	670806		VN
CHAMBERS, CARL DENNIS	02	F	670807	730314	VN
WILSON, GLENN HUBERT	03	F	670807	730314	VN
CHEDDY, ALLEN GLENN	01	F	670809		VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
LENGYEL, LAUREN ROBERT	03	F	670809	730314	VN
MYERS, GLENN LEO	02	F	670809	730314	VN
BERUBE, KENNETH ALLEN	02	M	670811		VS
ATTERBERRY, EDWIN LEE	03	F	670812	740313	VN
MORRIS, THOMAS ELMER	03	F	670812	730314	VN
PARROTT, THOMAS VANCE	03	F	670812	730314	VN
GOODERMOTE, WAYNE KEITH	02	N	670813	730314	VN
HYATT, LEO GREGORY	04	N	670813	730314	VN
DION, LAURENT NORBERT	05	N	670817		VN
HOM, CHARLES DAVID	02	N	670817		VN
BUCKLEY, JIMMY LEE	04	N	670821	751216	CH
BUDD, LEONARD R JR	E3	M	670821	730305	VS
EBY, ROBERT GINO	--	V	670821		VS
FLYNN, ROBERT J	03	N	670821	730315	CH
HARDMAN, WILLIAM MORGAN	04	N	670821	730314	VN
MORRILL, MERWIN LAMPHREY	03	F	670821	830603	VN
POWELL, LYNN KESLER	02	N	670821	830603	VN
PROFULET, LEO TWYMAN	05	F	670821	730314	VN
SCOTT, DAIR V	02	N	670821		VN
TREMBLEY, J FORREST GEORGE	02	N	670821		VN
KERR, JOHN CREIGHTON GILLE	04	F	670822		LA
MORGAN, BURKE HENDERSON	03	F	670822		LA
BAKER, ELMO CLINNARD	04	F	670823	730314	VN
CARRIGAN, LARRY EDWARD	03	F	670823	730314	VN
GERNDT, GERALD LEE	02	F	670823	730314	VN
LANE, CHARLES JR	03	F	670823		VN
MIDNIGHT, FRANCIS B	02	F	670823		VN
NESS, PATRICK LAWRENCE	01	N	670823	860410	VN
SAWHILL, ROBERT RALSTON	04	F	670823	730314	VN
SITEK, THOMAS WALTER	04	N	670823		VN
SITTNER, RONALD NICHOLIS	03	F	670823		VN
TYLER, CHARLES ROBERT	04	F	670823	730314	VN
ALLARD, RICHARD MICHAEL	E4	A	670824		VS
GOFF, KENNETH B	02	A	670824		VS
HESS, JAY CRIDDLE	03	F	670824	730314	VS
HOLTZMAN, RONALD LEE	E4	A	670824		VS
SCHELL, RICHARD J	03	A	670824		VS
BOIS, CLAIRE RONALD ALAN	E5	N	670825		VN
JACOBS, EDWARD JAMES JR	05	N	670825		VN
ZAVOCKY, JAMES JOHN	02	N	670825		VN
DAY, GEORGE EVERETTE	04	F	670826	730314	VN
FULLER, WILLIAM O	03	F	670826		VN
KILCULLEN, THOMAS M	02	F	670826		VN
BACIK, VLADIMIR HENRY	04	M	670827		VN
BOGGS, PASCHAL GLENN	03	M	670827		VN
DEGNAN, JERRY L	--	V	670828		VS
WALLACE, CHARLES FRANKLIN	04	M	670828		VN
NEWBURN, LARRY STEPHEN	E3	A	670829		VS
ALLARD, MICHAEL JOHN	03	N	670830		VN
CAREY, DAVID JAY	02	N	670831	730314	VN
PERRY, RICHARD CLARK	04	N	670831	861226	VN
STACORD, MICHAEL ALLEN	04	N	670831	730314	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IOATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
JOHNSON, ROBERT DENNISON	04	N	670901		VS
OTT, EDWARD LOUIS III	E6	N	670901		VS
BENNETT, WILLIAM GEORGE	04	F	670902		VN
MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR	03	F	670903		VN
DOWNING, DONALD WILLIAM	03	F	670905		VN
HANSON, THOMAS PATTERSON	02	F	670905		VN
LAPORTE, MICHAEL LOUIS	E2	N	670905		VS
MILLER, CARL D	04	F	670905		VN
PRATHER, MARTIN WILLIAM	E3	M	670905		VS
RAYMOND, PAUL D	02	F	670905		VN
ANSPACH, ROBERT ALLEN	E8	A	670911		VS
PETERSEN, GAYLORD D	03	F	670911	780823	VN
HAWTHORNE, RICHARD W	04	M	670912		VS
KANE, RICHARD R	03	M	670912		VS
REID, HAROLD E	E3	M	670913		VS
BAGLEY, BOBBY RAY	04	F	670916	730314	VN
GRUBB, PETER ARTHUR	02	F	670917		VN
NELLANS, WILLIAM L	03	F	670917		VN
STAVAST, JOHN EDWARD	04	F	670917	730314	VN
VENANZI, GERALD SANTO	02	F	670917	730314	VN
PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO	E3	M	670921		VS
VESCELIUS, MILTON JAMES	04	N	670921	850814	VN
GEIST, STEPHEN J	E4	A	670926		VS
HUDDLESTON, LYNN R	02	A	670926		VS
NOE, HAROLD JOHN	02	M	670926		VS
GRAHAM, GILBERT JAMES	E3	N	670928		VS
MUSETTI, JOSEPH TONY JR	E5	N	670928		VS
OTT, PATRICK LEWIS	02	M	671002		VS
BARNETT, ROBERT WARREN	04	F	671003	730314	VN
KING, RONALD RUHYAN	04	F	671003		VN
LILLUND, WILLIAM ALLAN	03	F	671004		VN
MCDANIEL, MORRIS C JR	04	F	671004		VN
SCHOEFFEL, PETER VANRUYTER	04	N	671004	730314	VN
ZOOK, DAVID HARTZLER JR	04	F	671004		VS
TRAUTMAN, KONRAD WIGAND	03	F	671005	730314	VN
ARMSTRONG, FRANK ALTON III	04	F	671006		LA
APPLEBY, IVAN DALE	04	F	671007		VN
AUSTIN, WILLIAM REMNICK	03	F	671007	730314	VN
FULLAM, WAYNE E	04	F	671007	870924	VN
HODGES, DAVID LAWTON	03	N	671007		VN
GUERRA, RAUL ANTONIO	E3	N	671008		VS
PINEAU, ROLAND ROBERT	E7	N	671008		VS
ROGGOW, NORMAN LEE	02	N	671008		VS
WOLFE, DONALD FINDLING	02	N	671008		VS
ZISSU, ANDREW GILBERT	02	N	671008		VS
CLEMENTS, JAMES ARLEN	04	F	671009	730314	VN
DERRICKSON, THOMAS G II	03	F	671012		VN
HARDY, JOHN K JR	02	F	671012		VN
MILLER, EDISON WAINRIGHT	05	M	671013	730212	VN
WARNER, JAMES HOIE	02	M	671013	730314	VN
VAUGHAN, ROBERT REDDINGTON	04	N	671014		VN
ADRIANS, RICHARD NUANE	03	F	671016		LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IOATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	03	F	671016		VS
ANDREWS, ANTHONY CHARLES	07	F	671017	730314	VN
CADWELL, ANTHONY BLAKE	E2	A	671017		VS
FITZGERALD, PAUL L JR	E5	A	671017		VS
FORTNER, FREDERICK J	02	N	671017	831103	VN
HARGROVE, OLIN JR	E3	A	671017		VS
ODELL, DONALD EUGENE	04	F	671017	730314	VN
SULLIVAN, DWIGHT EVERETT	04	F	671017	730314	VN
BARR, JOHN FREDERICK	04	N	671018		VN
OGDEN, HOWARD JR	E3	M	671018		VS
HEMME, CLARENCE JOSEPH	03	F	671021		VS
DOOLEY, JAMES EDWARD	02	N	671022		VN
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP	02	N	671024		VN
GILLESPIE, CHARLES R	05	N	671024	730314	VN
LEWIS, EARL GARDNER	02	N	671024	730314	VN
HORINEK, RAMON ANTON	04	F	671025	730314	VN
KROMMENHOEK, JEFFREY M	03	N	671025		VN
SMITH, RICHARD EUGENE	04	F	671025	730314	VN
DANIELS, VERLYNE WAYNE	05	N	671026	730314	VN
MCCAIN, JOHN SIDNEY	04	N	671026	730314	VN
RICE, CHARLES DONALD	02	N	671026	730314	VN
CONNER, LORENZA (NMI)	02	F	671027		VN
FLYNN, JOHN PETER	06	F	671027	730314	VN
STIRM, ROBERT LEWIS	04	F	671027	730314	VN
TEMPERLEY, RUSSELL EDWARD	03	F	671027	730314	VN
KIRK, THOMAS HENRY	05	F	671028	730314	VN
FANNING, HUGH M	03	M	671031	840717	VN
KOTT, STEPHEN J	03	M	671031	840717	VN
KNAPP, FREDRIC WOODROW	02	N	671102		VN
MORROW, RICHARD D	04	N	671102	780823	VN
WRIGHT, JAMES J	02	N	671102	780823	VN
EGGER, JOHN CULBERTSON JR	04	F	671103		VN
GRAUERT, HANS HERBERT	02	N	671103		VS
KRUST, PETER HERMAN	04	N	671103		VS
COBEILL, EARL GLENN	03	F	671105	740306	VN
DUTTON, RICHARD ALLEN	04	F	671105	730314	VN
HAGERMAN, ROBERT W	04	F	671106	851204	VN
DEIHL, WILLIAM C	03	F	671107	740306	VN
ELLIS, LEON FRANCIS	03	F	671107	730314	VN
FISHER, KENNETH	03	F	671107	730314	VN
ADAMS, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	671108		VS
BRENNEMAN, RICHARD CHARLES	02	F	671108	730314	VN
EVERT, LAWRENCE G	03	F	671108		VN
HINES, VAUGHN MAURICE	E3	A	671108		VS
ARMSTRONG, JOHN WILLIAM	05	F	671109		LA
BAXTER, BRUCE RAYMOND	E8	A	671109		LA
BROWER, RALPH WAYNE	03	F	671109		LA
CLAY, EUGENE LUNSFORD	E5	F	671109		LA
KUSICK, JOSEPH GEORGE	E5	A	671109		LA
MAYSEY, LARRY WAYNE	E4	F	671109		LA
REHN, GARY LEE	E4	M	671109		VS
STAN, JAMES D	02	F	671109	740313	LA

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COOK, KELLY FRANCIS	05	F	671110		VN
CREW, JAMES ALAN	02	F	671110		VN
HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J JR	02	F	671110	881103	VN
MORGAN, JAMES S	04	F	671110		VN
MARTINEZ-MERCADO, EDWIN JU	E3	A	671111		VS
SHAW, GARY FRANCIS	E3	A	671111		VS
STATON, ROBERT MILTON JR	E4	A	671111		VS
STUCKEY, JOHN STEINER JR	E2	A	671111		VS
CAYCE, JOHN DAVID	E3	N	671112		VN
ROARK, JAMES DAVID	E5	N	671112		VN
KMETYK, JONATHAN PETER	E3	M	671114		VS
SCHULZ, PAUL HENRY	04	N	671116	730314	VN
SULLIVAN, TIMOTHY BERNARD	02	N	671116	730314	VN
CAPPELLI, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	671117	881215	VN
EMRICH, ROGER G	03	N	671117		VN
KEY, WILSON DENVER	03	N	671117	730314	VN
MCGRATH, WILLIAM DARREL	05	N	671117	851204	VN
BURDETT, EDWARD BURKE	06	F	671118	740306	VN
DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR	04	F	671118	871125	VN
HAUER, LESLIE J	04	F	671118	900911	VN
LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W	03	F	671118	871125	VN
CLOWER, CLAUDE DOUGLAS	04	N	671119	730314	VN
CROKDALE, JACK LEE II	E4	A	671119		VS
DE HERRERA, BENJAMIN DAVID	E3	A	671119		VS
ESTES, WALTER O	02	N	671119	770930	VN
FORD, DAVID EDWARD	03	F	671119	730314	VN
IANDOLI, DONALD (NMN)	E5	A	671119		VS
KLINCK, HARRISON HOYT	03	F	671119	850814	VN
LIGON, VERNON PEYTON	05	F	671119	730314	VN
STIER, THEODORE GERHARD	02	N	671119	730314	VN
TEAGUE, JAMES ERLAN	02	N	671119	770930	VN
VISSOTZKY, RAYMOND WALTON	04	F	671119	730314	VN
BUTLER, WILLIAM WALLACE	03	F	671120	730314	VN
MARTIN, JOHN M	03	F	671120		VN
REYNOLDS, DAVID RICHARD	E3	A	671121		VS
FOLEY, BRENDAN PATRICK	04	F	671124		LA
MAYERCIK, RONALD M	02	F	671124		LA
ABRAMS, LEWIS HERBERT	05	M	671125		VN
HOLDEMAN, ROBERT EUGENE	02	M	671125		VN
MIDGETT, DEWEY ALLEN	E2	A	671125		VS
SEARFUS, WILLIAM HENRY	05	N	671125		VN
BRENNAN, HERBERT OWEN	06	F	671126		VN
CONDIT, DOUGLAS CRAIG	02	F	671126		VN
JONES, LOUIS F	04	F	671129		LA
MILLNER, MICHAEL	E6	A	671129		VS
KUSHNER, FLOYD HAROLD	03	A	671130	730316	VS
CROSBY, RICHARD ALEXANDER	E4	A	671202		VS
LEEPER, WALLACE WILSON	W2	A	671202		VS
MOREIDA, MANUEL J	E4	A	671202		VS
STRANGE, FLOYD W	W1	A	671202		VS
COLLINS, ARNOLD	E4	M	671204		VS
DIKCEY, DONALD M	04	F	671205		LA

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PASTVA, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	M	671206		VS
GRZYB, ROBERT H	--	V	671210		VS
BENNETT, ROBERT ELWOOD III	02	F	671213		VS
SEHORN, JAMES ELDON	03	F	671214	730314	VN
HILL, HOWARD JOHN	02	F	671216	730314	VN
BOYER, TERRY LEE	02	F	671217	730314	VN
ELLIS, JEFFREY THOMAS	03	F	671217	730314	VN
FLEENOR, KENNETH RAYMOND	04	F	671217	730314	VN
CRANER, ROBERT ROGER	04	F	671220	730314	VN
GRUTERS, GUY DENNIS	03	F	671220	730314	VN
SCURLOCK, LEE D	E6	A	671221		LA
COOK, WILMER PAUL	04	N	671222	881215	VN
FORS, GARY HENRY	03	M	671222		LA
HICKERSON, JAMES MARTIN	04	N	671222	730314	VN
POWERS, VERNIE HOMER	E3	A	671224		VS
BURNS, FREDERICK JOHN	E3	M	671225		VS
KOONCE, TERRY T	03	F	671225		VS
INNES, ROGER B	02	N	671227		VN
LEE, LEONARD MURRAY	04	N	671227		VN
MARTIN, SAMMY ARTHUR	02	F	671227		VN
CLAPPER, GEAN PRESTON	E5	F	671229		VN
CLAXTON, CHARLES PETER	04	F	671229		VN
CRUZ, CARLOS RAFAEL	03	F	671229		LA
DARCY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E5	F	671229		VN
ECKLEY, WAYNE ALVIN	E5	F	671229		VN
FISHER, DONALD E	05	F	671229		VN
FOSTER, PAUL L	E5	F	671229		LA
MCCRARY, JACK	E6	F	671229		VN
OSBORNE, EDWIN HELMS JR	03	F	671229		VN
PARKER, FRANK C III	03	F	671229		LA
POTTER, WILLIAM JOSEPH JR	03	F	671229		LA
VAN BUREN, GERALD GORDON	03	F	671229		VN
WENAS, GORDON J	03	F	671229		VN
WILLIAMS, JAMES R	E4	F	671229		VN
SWORDS, SMITH III	04	F	671230		LA
WORTHAM, MURRAY L	02	F	671230		LA
BELCHER, GLENN ARTHUR	02	F	671231		LA
PEACE, JOHN DARLINGTON III	04	N	671231		VN
PERISHO, GORDON SAMUEL	03	N	671231		VN
DENNISON, JAMES RICHARD	04	N	680101		VN
HANLEY, TERRENCE HIGGINS	02	N	680101		VN
HERRIN, HENRY HOWARD JR	01	N	680101		VN
BEAN, JAMES ELLIS	06	F	680103	730314	VN
ELLIS, BILLY J	E4	A	680103		VS
ESTES, EDWARD DALE	04	N	680103	730314	VN
LANCASTER, KENNETH R	E4	A	680103		VS
MINNICH, RICHARD WILLIS JR	02	N	680104	851204	VN
ANTON, FRANCIS GENE	W2	A	680105	730316	VS
BIGGS, ERNEST FRANK JR	E5	A	680105		LA
FANTLE, SAMUEL	03	F	680105	770930	VN
FOULKS, RALPH EUGENE JR	02	N	680105		VN
GAITHER, WEN THOMPSON	F6	A	680105		LA

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HAMILTON, DENNIS C	W1	A	680105		LA
HARTNEY, JAMES C	04	F	680105	890621	VN
JONES, WILLIAM E	03	F	680105	850814	VN
LEWIS, ROBERT	E4	A	680105	730305	VS
PFFISTER, JAMES F JR	E3	A	680105	730305	VS
SCHULTZ, SHELDON D	W1	A	680105		LA
SCHWEITZER, ROBERT JAMES	05	N	680105	730314	VN
WILLIAMSON, JAMES D	E4	A	680105		LA
STONE, JAMES MARVIN	02	A	680107		VS
TRUJILLO, ROBERT S	E3	A	680107		VS
BIFOLCHI, CHARLES LAWRENCE	02	F	680108		VS
CANNON, FRANCES EUGENE	E2	A	680108	850814	VS
FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM	E3	M	680108		VS
HARKER, DAVID NORTHRUP	E3	A	680108	730305	VS
SMITH, HALLIE W	03	F	680108		VS
WILLIAMS, RICHARD F	E8	A	680108	850814	VS
DALY, JAMES ALEXANDER JR	E3	A	680109	730316	VS
GREEN, NORMAN M	05	F	680109		LA
IRSCH, WAYNE C	02	F	680109		VS
NEWTON, WARREN E	E4	A	680109		VS
PHIPPS, JAMES L	W1	A	680109		VS
RAMOS, RAINIER S	W1	A	680109		VS
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND	E3	A	680109		VS
SYKES, DERRI	E3	A	680109		VS
HALL, KEITH NORMAN	03	F	680110	730314	VN
HOPPER, EARL PEARSON JR	02	F	680110		LA
ANDERSON, DENIS LEON	02	N	680111		LA
BUCK, ARTHUR CHARLES	02	N	680111		LA
MANCINI, RICHARD MICHAEL	E5	N	680111		LA
OLSON, DELBERT AUSTIN	05	N	680111		LA
ROBERTS, MICHAEL LAND	E5	N	680111		LA
SLOW, GALE ROBERT	E4	N	680111		LA
STEVENS, PHILLIP PAUL	02	N	680111		LA
THORESEN, DONALD NELLIS	E5	N	680111		LA
WIDON, KENNETH HARRY	E5	N	680111		LA
COHRON, JAMES DERWIN	E6	A	680112		LA
PORT, WILLIAM D	E3	A	680112	850814	VS
HORNE, STANLEY HENRY	04	F	680114	900409	VN
LEBERT, RONALD MERL	02	F	680114	730314	VN
SUMPTER, THOMAS WRENNE	04	F	680114	730314	VN
TERRELL, IRBY DAVID	04	F	680114	730314	VN
WALKER, HUBERT C	03	F	680114	730314	VN
SKARMAN, ORVAL HARRY	E5	M	680115		VS
BIGGS, EARL ROGER	E7	A	680116	890427	VS
COOLEY, ORVILLE DALE	03	N	680116		VN
GEE, PAUL S	02	M	680116		VS
MOE, THOMAS NELSON	02	F	680116	730314	VN
MORELAND, WILLIAM D	03	M	680116		VS
REEDY, WILLIAM HENRY JR	E4	N	680116		VN
THOMPSON, WILLIAM JOSEPH	04	N	680116		VN
WILKE, ROBERT F	05	F	680117		VN
ROFES, WARREN WILLIAM	02	N	680118		VN

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HINCKLEY, ROBERT BRUCE	03	F	680118	730314	VN
JONES, ROBERT CAMPBELL	02	F	680118	730314	VN
ROEHRICH, RONALD L	02	N	680118		VN
SIMONET, KENNETH ADRIAN	04	F	680118	730314	VN
SMITH, WAYNE OGDEN	02	F	680118	730314	VN
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D	E3	A	680119		VS
MURRAY, PATRICK PETER	03	M	680119	860410	VN
WALLACE, HOBART M JR	04	M	680119		VN
HOLLEY, TILDEN S	03	F	680120		VN
KETTERER, JAMES ALAN	02	F	680120		VN
COALSTON, ECHOL W JR	E5	A	680121		VS
ELLIOTT, JERRY W	E2	A	680121		VS
HILL, BILLY D	E6	A	680121		VS
KIMSEY, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W2	A	680121		VN
RAMSAY, CHARLES J	03	M	680121		VN
RAMSDEN, GERALD LEE	04	N	680123		VN
DUNN, MICHAEL E	03	N	680126		VN
EDSMOE, NORMAN EDWARD	04	N	680126		VN
CORDOVA, ROBERT JAMES	E2	N	680127		VN
BENGE, MICHAEL	---	V	680128	730305	VS
MILLS, JAMES DALE	03	M	680129		VS
WHITE, CHARLES E	E7	A	680129		CB
COCHED, RICHARD NEWELL	---	V	680131		VS
KJOME, MICHAEL H	---	V	680131	730212	VS
LACEY, RICHARD J	E5	A	680131		VS
YOUNG, JOHN ARTHUR	E4	A	680131	730316	VS
ADKINS, CLODEN	---	V	680201	730305	VS
BLOOD, HENRY F	---	V	680201		VS
DAVES, GARY LAWRENCE	---	V	680201	730327	VS
GOSTAS, THEODORE W	03	A	680201	730316	VS
HENDERSON, ALEXANDER	---	V	680201	730316	VS
HANHARD, PHILLIP W	---	V	680201	730316	VS
MEYER, LEWIS E	---	V	680201	730327	VS
OLSEN, BETTY ANN	---	V	680201		VS
OLSEN, ROBERT F	---	V	680201	730327	VS
PAGE, RUSSELL J	---	V	680201	730316	VS
RAHDER, DONALD J	E6	A	680201	730327	VS
RUSHTON, THOMAS	---	V	680201	730316	VS
SPAULDING, RICHARD	---	V	680201	730305	VS
STARK, LAWRENCE J	---	V	680201	730316	VS
WEAVER, EUGENE	---	V	680201	730327	VS
WILLIS, CHARLES E	E4	A	680202		VS
ADKINS, CHARLES LEROY	03	A	680202		VS
BURNHAM, DONALD DAWSON	E5	A	680202		VS
PATTON, KENNETH J	E7	A	680202		VS
PRINGLE, JOE HAROLD	E5	A	680202		VS
PUGGI, JOSEPH D	E7	A	680203	730305	VS
ANDERSON, JOHN THOMAS	E4	M	680203	730305	VS
DEERING, JOHN ARTHUR	02	M	680203	730305	VS
DIBERNARDO, JAMES VINCENT	E5	A	680203	730305	VS
ETTMUELLER, HARRY L	E7	A	680203	730305	VS
OWEN, DONAT JOSEPH	---	A	680203	730305	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
JOHNS, VERNON Z	E3	A	680203	890427	VS
WIGGINS, WALLACE L	02	F	680203	780824	VN
WILSON, MARION EARL	E3	A	680203		VS
BROOKENS, NORMAN J	--	V	680204	730212	VS
OCONNOR, MICHAEL FRANCIS	W2	A	680204	730305	VS
UTECHT, RICHARD W	--	V	680204	730212	VS
EDGAR, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	680205		LA
GOODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY	W1	M	680205		VS
LASITER, CARL WILLIAM	03	F	680205	730314	VN
POTTER, WILLIAM TOD	02	F	680205		LA
ROLLINS, JAMES U	--	V	680205	730212	VS
BURNETT, DONALD FREDERICK	E8	N	680206		VS
CHAPA, ARMANDO JR	E4	N	680206		VS
FARRIS, WILLIAM F	E4	N	680206		VS
GALLAGHER, DONALD L	E7	N	680206		VS
HUSS, ROY ARTHUR	02	N	680206		VS
JONES, THOMAS PAUL	03	N	680206		VS
MCKAY, HOMER E	E5	N	680206		VS
NEWMAN, JAMES C JR	E6	N	680206		VS
THOMPSON, MELVIN CARL	E6	N	680206		VS
TRAVIS, LYNN MICHAEL	02	N	680206		VS
BRANDE, HARVEY G	E7	A	680207	730316	VS
HANNA, KENNETH	E7	A	680207		VS
HOLT, JAMES W	E7	A	680207		VS
LINDEWALD, CHARLES W	E7	A	680207		VS
MCMURRY, WILLIAM G	E4	A	680207	730316	VS
MORELAND, JAMES L	E4	A	680207		VS
PHILLIPS, DANIEL R	E5	A	680207		VS
THOMPSON, DENNIS L	E6	A	680207	730305	VS
CHENOWETH, ROBERT PRESTON	E5	A	680208	730316	VS
GEORGE, JAMES E JR	E4	A	680208		VS
HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE	E4	M	680208		VS
LAPHAM, ROBERT GRANTHAM	04	F	680208		VS
LENKER, MICHAEL ROBERT	E4	A	680208	730316	VS
PURCELL, BENJAMIN H	05	A	680208	730327	VS
ROSE, JOSEPH	W2	A	680208	730305	VS
ZAWTOCKI, JOSEPH S JR	E5	M	680208	850814	VS
ZIEGLER, ROY ESPER II	W1	A	680208	730305	VS
BROWN, HARRY WILLIS	E5	A	680212		VS
GROTH, WADE L	E4	A	680212		VS
GUNN, ALAN W	W2	A	680212		VS
ROE, JERRY L	02	N	680212		VS
DUNN, JOSEPH PATRICK	02	N	680214		CH
ELLIOT, ROBERT MALCOLM	03	F	680214		VN
MCMAHAN, ROBERT CHARLES	02	N	680214	900913	VN
WRITER, LAWRENCE DANIEL	03	F	680215	730314	VN
ASHBY, CLAYBORN WILLIS JR	E5	N	680217		LA
COONS, CHESTER LEROY	E4	N	680217		LA
DAWSON, FRANK ARTHUR	E3	N	680217		LA
DONATO, PAUL NICHOLAS	E6	N	680217		LA
HAYDEN, GLENN MILLER	05	N	680217		LA
KRAVITZ, JAMES STEPHEN	02	N	680217		LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
MARTIN, JAMES EDWARD	E3	N	680217		LA
THURMAN, CURTIS FRANK	03	N	680217		LA
WONN, JAMES CHARLES	01	N	680217		LA
DYE, MELVIN C	E5	A	680219		LA
GLOVER, DOUGLAS J	E6	A	680219		LA
GRIFFITH, ROBERT S	E5	A	680219		LA
LAUREANO, LOPEZ ISMAEL	E4	A	680220		VS
DONALD, MYRON LEE	02	F	680223	730314	VN
GUTTERSON, LAIRD	04	F	680223	730314	VN
HUBLER, GEORGE LAWRENCE	03	M	680223		VS
FRIESE, LAWRENCE VICTOR	03	M	680224	730314	VN
MARVEL, JERRY WENDELL	04	M	680224	730314	VN
RIDGEWAY, RONALD LEWIS	E3	M	680225	730316	VS
HARTZHEIM, JOHN FRANCIS	E5	N	680227		LA
MILIUS, PAUL L	05	N	680227		LA
PALMER, GILBERT S JR	04	F	680227		LA
WRIGHT, THOMAS T	03	F	680227		LA
COONS, HENRY ALBERT	04	N	680228		VN
HUNT, ROBERT W	E4	A	680228		VS
STEGMAN, THOMAS	03	N	680228		VN
FITTON, CROSLLEY J	04	F	680229	751221	VN
HARRIS, CLEVELAND SCOTT	03	F	680229	850320	VN
LANNON, RICHARD CLIVE	02	N	680301		VN
SCHUEURICH, THOMAS EDWIN	04	N	680301		VN
WELSHMAN, JOHN T	02	F	680303		VS
ANSELMO, WILLIAM FRANK	E5	F	680306		VS
COLOMBO, GARY LEWIS	E4	M	680306		VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT (NMN)	05	A	680306		VS
MITCHELL, GILBERT L	03	N	680306		VN
NELSON, RICHARD C	03	N	680306	840717	VN
RIOS, NOEL LUIS	E5	F	680306		VS
SEWARD, WILLIAM HENRY	04	M	680306		VS
BLANTON, CLARENCE FINLEY	05	F	680311		LA
BOND, RONALD DALE	04	F	680311		VS
CALFEE, JAMES HENRY	E7	F	680311		LA
CALLOWAY, PORTER EARL	E5	A	680311		VS
DAVIS, JAMES WOODROW	E5	F	680311		VS
DAVIS, THOMAS JAMES	E5	A	680311	730316	VS
GISH, HENRY GERALD	E5	F	680311		LA
HALL, WILLIS ROZELLE	E6	F	680311		LA
HOLLAND, MELVIN ARNOLD	E6	F	680311		LA
KIRK, HERBERT ARTHUR	E5	F	680311		LA
MCILLIAN, ISIAH	E4	A	680311	730316	VN
OLDS, ERNEST ARTHUR	04	F	680311		VS
PRICE, DAVID STANLEY	E4	F	680311		LA
RODRIGUEZ, ALBERT E	02	F	680311	881215	VN
SHANNON, PATRICK LEE	E6	F	680311		LA
SPRINGSTEADAH, DONALD K	E6	F	680311		LA
WORLEY, DON FRANKLIN	E5	F	680311		LA
GRIFFITH, JOHN GARY	03	N	680312		VN
KOLLMANN, GLENN EDWARD	05	N	680312		VS
ONISKE, EDWARD FRANCIS	F2	M	680312		VS

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BYRNE, JOSEPH HENRY	04	F	680313		LA
COLLINS, GUY FLETCHER	05	F	680313		LA
EVANS, CLEVELAND JR	E5	M	680313		VS
HEITMAN, STEVEN W	E5	A	680313		VS
WATSON, JIMMY L	W2	A	680313		VS
WESTBROOK, DONALD E	04	F	680313		LA
HAMM, JAMES E	02	F	680314		VS
ERICKSON, DAVID W	E2	M	680316		VS
KRAUSMAN, EDWARD L	E2	M	680316		VS
BARBER, THOMAS DAVID	E3	N	680317		VN
BENSON, LEE DAVID	02	N	680317		VN
COLLAZO, RAPHAEL LORENZO	E3	A	680317		VS
DOSS, DALE WALTER	04	N	680317	730314	VN
HENSLEY, THOMAS TRUETT	03	F	680317		LA
HUBBS, DONALD RICHARD	05	N	680317		VN
NIGHTINGALE, RANDALL JOHN	E5	N	680317		VN
ROSS, JLYNN JR	E3	A	680317		VS
SHUMAN, EDWIN ARTHUR	04	N	680317	730314	VN
DUNN, JOHN GALBREATH	03	A	680318	730212	VS
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL	E3	A	680318		VS
SWITZER, JERROLD ALLEN	E2	M	680318		VS
WILLIAMS, HOWARD K	03	F	680318		VN
BLAIR, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	680319	880406	VS
ROMERO, VICTOR	E4	F	680319		VS
FELLOWS, ALLEN E	04	F	680320		LA
SAYRE, LESLIE BERKLEY	02	A	680320		VS
HESFORD, PETER D	02	F	680321		LA
STOWERS, AUBREY E JR	02	F	680321		VS
GUY, THEODORE WILSON	05	F	680322	730316	VS
LYON, DONAVAN L	04	F	680322		LA
FRANKS, IAN JACK	E4	A	680323		VS
HATTORI, MASAKI (NMN)	04	A	680323		VS
ALLGOOD, FRANKIE EUGENE	05	M	680326		VS
EVANCHO, RICHARD	E3	M	680326		VS
GREEN, LARRY EDWARD	E4	M	680326		VS
KERR, ERNEST CLANEY JR	E3	M	680326		VS
LOWAK, RICHARD EUGENE	E4	A	680326		VS
MONTREY, GLENN WILLIAM	E4	M	680326		VS
BADLEY, JAMES LINDSAY	02	F	680327		VN
CALHOUN, JOHNNY C	E4	A	680327		VN
WHITTEKER, RICHARD LEE	03	F	680327		VN
ARCHER, BRUCE RAYMOND	03	M	680328	730316	VS
BOYER, ALAN LEE	E5	A	680328		LA
BROWN, GEORGE RONALD	E8	A	680328		LA
GRAHAM, DENNIS L	03	F	680328		VN
GROSSE, CHRISTOPHER A JR	E5	A	680328		VS
HUSTON, CHARLES G	E5	A	680328		VS
MACCANN, HENRY ELMER	04	F	680328		VN
MONTAGUE, PAUL JOSEPH	03	M	680328	730316	VS
WALLACE, MICHAEL WALTER	04	N	680328	881216	LA
CICHON, WALTER ALAN	E4	A	680330		VS
MILLEAVEY, QUINTEN EMILE	E4	A	680403		VS

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REXRoad, RONALD R	03	F	680403		VN
THOMAS, JAMES CALVIN	E3	M	680403		VS
TRIVELPIECE, STEVE MAURICE	E3	A	680404		VS
MATOCRA, DONALD JOHN	01	M	680405		VS
PEPPER, ANTHONY JOHN	E2	M	680406		VS
TRIMBLE, JAMES MITCHELL	E4	M	680406		VS
MCURRAY, FRED HOWELL JR	02	A	680407		VS
LAWSON, KARL WADE	E4	A	680409		VS
CARVER, HARRY FRANKLIN	E6	A	680410		VS
PADGETT, SAMUEL JOSEPH	E7	A	580410		VS
WHITTEMORE, FREDERICK HERB	05	N	680411		VN
STISCHER, WALTER MORRIS	04	F	680413	730328	LA
RODRIGUEZ, FERDINAND A	E2	A	680414	730212	VS
METZ, JAMES HARDIN	04	F	680415	770318	VN
HELD, JOHN WAYNE	03	F	680417		VS
BLODGETT, DOUGLAS RANDOLPH	E4	A	680419		VS
DENNIS, WILLIAM ROY	E4	A	680419		VS
GONZALEZ, JESUS ARMANDO	E5	A	680419		VS
HOUSH, ANTHONY F	E6	A	680419		VS
LORD, ARTHUR J	03	A	680419		VS
HILLARD, CHARLES WORTH	W3	A	680419		VS
SHAFER, PHILIP R	E4	A	680419		VS
WALLACE, MICHAEL J	E5	A	680419		VS
WERDEHOFF, MICHAEL R	E6	A	680419		VS
WILBURN, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	680419		VS
CESTARE, JOSEPH ANGELO	02	M	680420		VS
WALKER, WILLIAM JOHN	04	M	680420		VS
ZUTTERMAN, JOSEPH A JR	E5	M	680420		VS
CREAMER, JAMES EDWARD JR	E5	A	680421		VS
JAMERSON, LARRY C	E4	A	680421		VS
JOHNSON, FRANKIE B JR	E5	A	680421		VS
LINK, ROBERT C	W2	A	680421		VS
MACKEDANZ, LYLE E	E6	A	680421		VS
OLSEN, FLOYD WARREN	03	A	680421		VS
SPINDLER, JOHN GATES	01	M	680421		VS
CHOMYK, WILLIAM (NMN)	03	F	680422		VS
COOLEY, DAVID LEO	04	N	680422		VN
PALMGREN, EDWIN D	05	F	680422		VN
RIGGINS, ROBERT PAUL	04	F	680422		VS
HELLE, ROBERT R	E3	M	680424	730316	VS
KAVANAUGH, ABEL L	E4	M	680424	730316	VS
PARKER, WOODROW WILSON II	02	F	680424		VN
SPARKS, JOHN G	E3	A	680424	730316	VS
VINSON, BOBBY G	05	F	680424		VN
CROSSMAN, GREGORY JOHN	02	F	680425		VN
GUILLORY, HUBIA JUDE	E3	A	680425		VS
KELLEY, DANIEL MARTIN	E4	A	680425		VS
MITCHELL, ALBERT C	04	F	680425		VN
SCOTT, DAVID LEE	E4	A	680425		VS
MCDANIEL, JOHN LEWIS	04	F	680426		VS
STOW, LILBURN RAY	04	F	680426		VS
TOMM, LARRY RICHARD	E4	F	680426		VS

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BORS, JOSEPH CHESTER	04	F	680428		VS
COOK, WILLIAM RICHARD	05	F	680428		VS
FINLAY, JOHN STEWART	05	F	680428	730314	VN
SAVEDRA, ROBERT	04	H	680428		VN
GUILLERMIN, LOUIS F	03	F	680430		LA
PIETSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	680430		LA
STAEHLI, BRUCE WAYNE	E3	M	680430		VS
GERVAIS, DONALD PETER	E5	A	680501		VS
MARTIN, RICHARD D	E4	A	680501		VS
WHITHIRE, WARREN T JR	W1	A	680501		VS
ENGLANDER, LAWRENCE J	E5	A	680502		VS
AVERY, ROBERT DOUGLAS	02	M	680503		VN
CHANEY, ARTHUR FLETCHER	W1	A	680503		VS
CLARK, STEPHEN WILLIAM	03	M	680503		VS
CLEM, THOMAS DEAN	02	M	680503		VN
MCKAIN, BOBBY LYN	W2	A	680503		VS
TERRY, ORAL R	E3	A	680503		VS
KING, PAUL CHESTER JR	E3	A	680504		LA
KUSTIGAN, MICHAEL J	E7	N	680505		VN
MITCHELL, HARRY E	E8	N	680505		VN
NORRINGTON, GILES RODERICK	03	N	680505	730314	VN
TANGEMAN, RICHARD GEORGE	03	N	680505	730314	VN
ALDRICH, LAWRENCE LEE	E4	A	680506		VS
BAIRD, BILL ALLEN	E4	A	680506	730305	VS
BRANCH, MICHAEL PATRICK	E4	A	680506	730316	VS
CONDREY, GEORGE THOMAS III	W1	A	680508		VS
DAYTON, JAMES LESLIE	W1	A	680508		VS
JENNE, ROBERT EARL	E4	A	680508		VS
JURECKO, DANIEL EDWARD	E4	A	680508		VS
LEOPOLD, STEPHEN RYDER	03	A	680509	730305	VS
VAN ARTSDALEN, CLIFFORD DA	E4	A	680509		VS
BLACKMAN, THOMAS JOSEPH	E2	M	680510		VS
COOK, JOSEPH FRANCIS	E3	M	680510		VS
CZERWONKA, PAUL STEVEN	E2	M	680510		VS
FLEMING, HORACE H III	02	M	680510		VS
FRITSCH, THOMAS WILLIAM	E3	M	680510		VS
HEMPEL, BARRY LEE	E2	M	680510		VS
HEYNE, RAYMOND THOMAS	E3	M	680510		VS
KING, GERALD EUGENE	E4	M	680510		VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT CHARLES	E2	M	680510		VS
MCGONIGLE, WILLIAM DEE	E2	M	680510		VS
MILLER, GLENN EDWIN	E5	A	680510		VS
MITCHELL, DONALD WAYNE	E3	M	680510		VS
PERRY, THOMAS HEPBURN	E4	A	680510		VS
SARGENT, JAMES RAY	E3	M	680510		VS
JIMENEZ, JUAN MACIAS	E4	A	680511		VS
BUCHER, BERNARD LUDWIG	04	F	680512		VS
COEN, HARRY BOB	E3	A	680512		VS
CRAVEN, ANDREW JOHNSON	E3	A	680512		VS
HEPLER, FRANK MONROE	E5	F	680512		VS
LONG, GEORGE WENDELL	E3	F	680512		VS
LONG, GEORGE WENDELL	F4	A	680512	730316	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
MCELROY, JOHN LEE	04	F	680512		VS
MOORE, MAURICE HENRY	E4	A	680512		VS
MORELAND, STEPHEN CRAIG	02	F	680512		VS
ORR, WARREN ROBERT JR	03	A	680512		VS
RANSBOTTOM, FREDERICK J	01	A	680512		VS
SANDS, RICHARD EUGENE	E3	A	680512		VS
SIMPSON, JOSEPH L	E5	A	680512		VS
SKIVINGTON, WILLIAM E JR	E3	A	680512		VS
STULLER, JOHN CHARLES	E6	A	680512		VS
WIDOLSON, IMLAY SCOTT	E4	A	680512		VS
WIDNER, DANNY L	E3	A	680512		VS
WILLIAMS, ROY C	E3	A	680512		VS
COTA, ERNEST KENO	E5	N	680514		VS
KARGER, BARRY EDWIN	02	N	680514		VN
CROSSON, GERALD JOSEPH JR	02	F	680516		VN
RICKEL, DAVID J	03	F	680516		VN
YOUNG, CHARLES L	E3	A	680517		VS
GIST, TOMMY E	03	F	680518		VN
JAMES, CHARLIE NEGUS	05	N	680518	730314	VN
MONROE, VINCENT DUNCAN	04	N	680518	780823	VN
PADILLA, DAVID ESEQUIEL	E3	M	680518		VS
UYEYAMA, TERRY JUN	03	F	680518	730314	VN
DAVIES, JOSEPH EDWIN	03	F	680519		VN
MCCUBBIN, GLENN DEWAYNE	02	F	680519		VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN HARTLEY	E7	A	680520		LA
LEMCKE, DAVID EARL	E4	A	680521		VS
ADAM, JOHN QUINCY	E3	F	680522		LA
CHAMBERS, JERRY LEE	04	F	680522		LA
CREWS, JOHN HUNTER III	02	F	680522		VN
GLOVER, CALVIN C	E5	F	680522		LA
KNEBEL, THOMAS E	E3	F	680522		LA
MASON, WILLIAM HENDER	05	F	680522		LA
MCPHAIL, WILLIAM THOMAS	03	F	680522		LA
MILLER, EDWIN FRAHK	02	N	680522	730314	VN
MITCHELL, THOMAS B	03	F	680522		LA
PATE, GARY	E4	F	680522		LA
RASH, MELVIN D	E3	F	680522		LA
STPIERRE, DEAN PAUL	03	F	680522		VN
COCHRAN, ISOM CARTER JR	E3	A	680523		VS
LANE, GLEN O	E7	A	680523		LA
OWEN, ROBERT D	E6	A	680523		LA
SCHUMP, RAYMOND CECIL	04	A	680523	730212	VS
RUCKER, EMETT JR	05	F	680524		VS
SHANKS, JAMES LEE	04	F	680524		VS
HILL, JOSEPH ARNOLD	E3	M	680528		VS
INGVALSON, ROGER DEAN	04	F	680528	730314	VN
SMITH, LEWIS PHILIP II	02	F	680530		LA
BERESIK, EUGENE PAUL	04	F	680531		VN
GATEWOOD, CHARLES HUE	E3	M	680531		VS
LEONARD, EDWARD W	03	F	680531	730328	LA
BRICE, ERIC PARKER	03	N	680604		VN
MCMAHON, TRIMAN J	E3	M	680605		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
HARPER, RALPH LEWIS	E3	M	630606		VS
LAPLANT, KURT ELTON	E3	M	680605		VS
PALACIOS, LUIS FERNANDO	E3	M	680606		VS
SANCHEZ, JOSE RAMON	E2	M	680606		VS
SPENCER, DEAN CALVIN III	E4	A	680607		VS
HOLDEN, ELMER LARRY	E5	F	680609		VS
LOCKER, JAMES D	E4	F	680609		VS
RITTICHER, JACK COLUMBUS	O3	P	680609		VS
SCHMIDT, WALTER R JR	O2	M	680609		VS
YEEND, RICHARD CAROLINUS J	O3	F	680609		VS
FORD, RANDOLPH WRIGHT	O4	N	680611	850814	VN
CARTER, JAMES DEVRIN	W1	A	680613		VS
BOWMAN, FRANK (NMN)	E5	N	680616		VN
CHANDLER, ANTHONY GORDON	E5	N	680616		VS
RUPINSKY, BERNARD FRANCIS	O2	N	680616		VN
WILBER, WALTER EUGENE	O5	N	680616	730212	VN
BOOTH, JAMES ERVIN	O2	F	680623		VN
CASEY, DONALD FRANCIS	O5	F	680623		VN
CARPENTER, NICHOLAS MALLOR	O3	N	680624	900913	VN
MOBLEY, JOSEPH SCOTT	O2	N	680624	730314	VN
CORNELIUS, JOHNNIE CLAYTON	O2	F	680626		VN
WOODS, ROBERT FRANCIS	O4	F	680626		VN
GIAMMERINO, VINCENT F	E3	A	680627		VS
JOHNS, PAUL F	O4	F	680628		LA
OWEN, TIMOTHY S	E3	A	680629		VS
TIPPING, HENRY ALBERT	O4	F	680702		VS
BURKS, MICHAEL THOMAS	O2	F	680705	730314	VN
CRUMPLER, CARL BOYETTE	O5	F	680705	730314	VN
DEWBERRY, JERRY DON	E4	M	680705		VS
LAWRENCE, BRUCE E	O2	F	680705		VN
SILVER, EDWARD D	O4	F	680705		VN
MAHONEY, THOMAS PATRICK 3D	E3	M	680706		VS
BIRD, LEONARD ADRIAN	O2	M	680713		VS
HURST, JOHN CLARK	O3	M	680713		VS
JAMES, GOBEL DALE	O4	F	680715	730314	VN
MARTIN, LARRY E	O3	F	680715	890731	VN
NECO-QUINONES, FELIX V	E3	A	680716	730212	VN
CROSS, ARIEL LINDLEY	O2	M	680717		VS
PARRA, LIONEL	O3	M	680717		VS
SEABLOW, EARL FRANCIS	E3	A	680718		VS
FLANAGAN, SHERMAN E JR	O5	F	680721		VS
WILLING, EDWARD ARLO	E3	M	680721		VS
GOSEN, LAWRENCE DEAN	O4	N	680723		VS
BUSH, JOHN ROBERT	O2	F	680724		VN
GREILING, DAVID SCOTT	O4	N	680724		VN
HACKETT, HARLEY B III	O3	F	680724		VN
BROWN, PAUL GORDON	O2	M	680725	730314	VN
FANT, ROBERT ST CLAIR	O3	N	680725	730314	VN
PARISH, CHARLES C	O3	N	680725		VN
FULLERTON, FRANK EUGENE	O4	N	680727		VN
PATTON, WARD KARL	E6	N	680727		VS
ALVIERO, JERRY EDWARD	E6	A	680729		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
BEYER, THOMAS JOHN	O3	F	680730		VS
BROHS, EDWARD JAMES JR	O2	N	680801		VN
FOWLER, DONALD R	E4	A	680801		VS
HASTINGS, STEVEN M	E5	A	680801		VS
ROSS, JOSEPH S	O2	F	680801		VN
RUSSELL, PETER J	O2	A	680801		VS
THOMPSON, WILLIAM J	O4	F	680801		VN
WINN, DAVID WILLIAM	O6	F	680809	730314	VN
WOLFEIL, WAYNE B	O4	F	680809		LA
HICKS, TERRIN D	O3	F	680815		VN
SHANAHAN, JOSEPH FRANCIS	O3	F	680815	730314	VN
ELBERT, FRED	E3	M	680816	730316	VS
GRANIELA, JOSE ANTONIO JR	E3	A	680816		VS
MCELHANNON, MICHAEL OWENS	O4	F	680816		VN
OVERLOCK, JOHN F	O4	F	680816		VN
HOFFSON, ARTHUR THOMAS	O2	F	680817	730314	VN
MAYHEW, WILLIAM JOHN	O3	N	680817	730314	VN
POWELL, WILLIAM E	O2	F	680817	851204	VN
COLLINS, THEOTIS	E3	M	680819		VS
HOFFMAN, TERRY ALAN	E4	M	680819		VS
LINDBLOOM, CHARLES DAVID	E6	N	680820		VS
ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO	E3	A	680822		VS
BERGEVIN, CHARLES LEE	O2	F	680823		VN
FERGUSON, WALTER JR	E6	A	680823		VS
SETTERQUIST, FRANCIS L	O2	F	680823		VN
HEEP, WILLIAM ARTHUR	O3	N	680824		VN
LADEVIG, MELVIN E	O2	F	680824		VN
READ, CHARLES HAROLD W JR	O4	F	680824		VS
JOHNSON, BOBBY LOUIS	E4	A	680825	730212	VN
PICK, DONALD WILLIAM	O4	F	680827		VS
MILLER, ROBERT CHARLES	O4	F	680828		LA
PHILLIPS, ELBERT AUSTIN	E6	F	680828		LA
ASHALL, ALAN FREDERICK	O2	N	680829		VN
DUNCAN, ROBERT RAY	O2	N	680829		VN
BARTOCCI, JOHN EUGENE	O4	N	680831		VS
KINKADE, WILLIAM L	O2	F	680901		VN
FRAZIER, PAUL REID	E5	A	680903		VS
POSEY, GEORGE RAY	E3	N	680905		VS
COSKEY, KENNETH LEON	O5	N	680906	730314	VN
DEICHELHANN, SAMUEL MACKAL	O3	F	680906		VS
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE	E6	A	680908		VS
VAN DYKE, RICHARD HAVEN	O2	F	680911	810708	VN
MAXWELL, SAMUEL C	O4	F	680912	890621	VN
SHARK, EARL E	E5	A	680912		VS
DAVIS, EDGAR FELTON	O3	F	680917		LA
WOODS, BRIAN DUNSTAN	O4	N	680918	730212	VN
CAPLING, ELWYN R	O4	F	680919	770318	VN
HOLT, ROBERT ALAN	O3	M	680919		VN
LAVOO, JOHN ALLEN	O3	M	680919		VN
KUHLMANN, CHARLES F	O4	F	680922		LA
CALLAHAN, DAVID FRANCIS JR	O4	N	680923		VN
MCARDINE, DAVID WADSWORTH	O4	N	680923	730212	VN

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BREINER, STEPHEN EUGENE	E2	M	680924		VS
DRABIC, PETER E	E3	A	680924	730316	VS
MCCONNELL, JERRY (NMI)	E2	A	680924		VS
OLSON, BARRY ALLEN	E3	A	680926		VS
SMITH, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W1	A	680927		VS
DIXON, DAVID LLOYD	E4	N	680928		VS
HALPIN, DAVID PAUL	E3	N	680928		VS
NEWBERRY, WAYNE ELLSWORTH	O3	F	680929		LA
FIESZEL, CLIFFORD W	O3	F	680930		VN
SMITH, HOWARD HORTON	O4	F	680930		VN
SPINELLI, DOMENICK ANTHONY	O3	N	680930		VN
VANRENSELAAR, LARRY JACK	O2	N	680930	890731	VN
ERWIN, DONALD EDWARD	O5	N	681002	890731	VN
SMITH, ROGER LEE	E4	A	681003		VS
LAWRENCE, GREGORY PAUL	E4	F	681005		LA
STRIDE, JAMES DANIEL JR	E6	A	681005		LA
WESTER, ALBERT DWAYNE	O4	F	681005		LA
HANDRAHAN, EUGENE ALLEN	E4	A	681010		VS
HERREID, ROBERT D	E5	A	681010		VS
HUNT, JAMES D	O3	N	681013		VN
MASTERSON, MICHAEL JOHN	O3	F	681013		LA
ORELL, QUINLAN ROBERTS	O5	N	681013		VN
MASON, JAMES PHILIP	E5	A	681017		VS
BRIDGES, JERRY GLEN	E5	A	681020		VS
DEITSCH, CHARLES EDWARD	W3	A	681020		VS
KNIGHT, HENRY C	W1	A	681020		VS
MELDAHL, CHARLES H	E5	A	681020		VS
STANTON, RONALD	E4	A	681020		VS
FINLEY, DICKIE W	E3	A	681021		VS
KNABB, KENNETH KEITH JR	O3	N	681021		VN
TYLER, GEORGE E	O4	F	681024		VN
THOMPSON, BENJAMIN ARTHUR	E6	A	681025		VS
EDMUNDS, ROBERT CLIFTON JR	O2	F	681027	880605	VN
CONNOR, CHARLES RICHARD	O3	M	681028		VS
RICKER, WILLIAM ERNEST	O3	N	681028		VS
STONEBRAKER, KENNETH ARNOLD	O3	F	681028		VN
STROVEN, WILLIAM HARRY	O3	F	681028		VN
BEZOLD, STEVEN NEIL	O2	A	681029		VN
HARRISON, DONALD L	O3	A	681029		VN
HUNTER, JAMES D	E3	A	681029		VS
SWANSON, ROGER W	E3	A	681031		VS
KENNEY, HARRY JOHN	E4	N	681101		VS
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD	--	V	681105		VS
TURNER, FREDERICK RAY	E3	M	681106		VS
ERSKINE, JACK D	--	V	681113		VS
BIRCHIM, JAMES DOUGLAS	O2	A	681115		VS
COPLEY, WILLIAM MICHAEL	E4	A	681116		LA
KARST, CARL F	O4	F	681116		VS
WIECHERT, ROBERT CHARLES	O4	F	681116		VS
DERBY, PAUL DAVID	O3	M	681117		VS
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY GENE	O3	F	681123		VN
DIAMOND, MARK TOWAN	O3	F	681123	730314	VN

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FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE	O2	F	681125		VN
MORRISON, JOSEPH C	O4	F	681125		VN
STAMM, ERNEST ALBERT	O5	N	681125	740313	VN
THUM, RICHARD COBB	O2	N	681125	770930	VN
HARTNESS, GREGG	O3	F	681126		LA
STUIFBERGEN, GENE PAUL	E5	F	681127		CB
BADER, ARTHUR EDWARD JR	E5	A	681130	890326	LA
FITTS, RICHARD A	E5	A	681130	890326	LA
LABOHN, GARRY RUSSEL	E4	A	681130	890326	LA
MEIN, MICHAEL HOWARD	E4	A	681130	890326	LA
SCHOLZ, KLAUS D	E6	A	681130	890326	LA
STACKS, RAYMOND C	O2	A	681130	890326	LA
TOOMEY, SAMUEL K III	O4	A	681130	890326	LA
BERRY, JOHN ALVIN	W1	A	681205		VS
EVANS, BILLY KENNEDY JR	E5	A	681205		VS
MORALES, FRANK ADRIAN	--	V	681206		VS
PIRNUCCIELLO, JOSEPH S JR	O3	F	681208		LA
REX, ROBERT A	O2	F	681208		LA
FORD, EDWARD (NMN)	E5	A	681209		VN
MINOR, CARROL WILLIAM	E3	N	681209		VS
SHINEK, SAMUEL DALE	E4	A	681209		VS
GALBRAITH, RUSSELL D	O3	F	681211		LA
ALBRIGHT, JOHN SCOTT II	O2	F	681213		LA
CLARKE, FRED LEE	E6	F	681213		LA
DAILEY, DOUGLAS VINCENT	E5	F	681213		LA
DONAHUE, MORGAN JEFFERSON	O2	F	681213		LA
DUGAN, THOMAS WAYNE	O4	F	681213		LA
FANNING, JOSEPH PETER	O2	F	681213		LA
MCGOULDRIK, FRANCIS J JR	O4	F	681213		LA
WALKER, SAMUEL F JR	E5	F	681213		LA
BARRAS, GREGORY INMAN	O4	F	681218		LA
RAYNE, NORMAN	E5	A	681219		LA
BOUCHARD, MICHAEL LORA	O3	N	681220		LA
KENT, ROBERT D	O3	M	681220		LA
MORIN, RICHARD G	O2	M	681220		LA
ALLEE, RICHARD KENNETH	O3	F	681221		LA
BROWNLEE, CHARLES RICHARD	O4	F	681224		LA
KING, CHARLES D	E4	F	681225		LA
MEHRER, GUSTAV ALOIS	E2	A	681225	730316	VS
SCHERDIN, ROBERT F	E3	A	681229		CB
MCCANTS, LELAND S III	O2	A	681230		VS
CLACK, CECIL JAMES	E3	A	690101		VS
LAME, MITCHELL S	O3	F	690104		VS
NEELD, BOBBY G	O4	F	690104		VS
WELSH, LARRY DON	E5	A	690107		VS
BYRD, HUGH MCNEIL JR	O3	A	690109		VS
O'BRIEN, KEVIN	O2	A	690109		VS
SPROTT, ARTHUR ROY JR	O4	F	690110		VS
EATON, NORMAN DALE	O5	F	690113		LA
GETCHELL, PAUL E	O3	F	690113		LA
GUGGENBERGER, GARY JOHN	E4	A	690114	730212	VS
FICKLER, EDWIN JAMES	O3	M	690117		VS

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KUHLMAN, ROBERT J JR	02	M	690117		VS
SMITH, VICTOR A	02	F	690117		LA
COADY, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	F	690118		LA
ROSS, DOUGLAS ALAN	E5	A	690122		VS
SINGLETON, DANIEL E	02	F	690126		LA
UTLEY, RUSSEL K	04	F	690126		LA
CONGER, JOHN EDWARD JR	E3	A	690127		VS
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM EDWARD	04	F	690129		LA
HOLTON, ROBERT E	03	F	690129		LA
LUNA, DONALD A	03	F	690201		LA
SWIGART, PAUL EUGENE JR	02	N	690205		VS
BRIGGS, RONALD DANIEL	02	A	690206		VS
CHRISTIANSEN, EUGENE F	E3	A	690206		VS
O'HARA, ROBERT CHARLES	E5	A	690206		VS
PADGETT, DAVID E	02	A	690206		VS
PARKER, DAVID WAYNE	E4	A	690206		VS
PARSONS, DONALD E	05	A	690206		VS
STANLEY, CHARLES I	W1	A	690206		VS
DELEIDI, RICHARD AUGUSTINE	03	M	690207		VS
CLARK, THOMAS EDWARD	03	F	690208		LA
FRITZ, JOHN J	--	V	690208	730212	VS
KALIL, TANOS E	--	V	690208		VS
MACPHAIL, DON A	E3	A	690208	730316	VS
NEWINGHAM, JAMES A	--	V	690208	730212	VS
WILKINS, CALVIN WAYNE	E3	M	690208		VS
MEYERS, ROGER ALLEN	04	N	690209		VN
KROSKE, HAROLD W JR	02	A	690211		CB
ZUKOWSKI, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	690211		LA
CLARK, STANLEY SCOTT	05	F	690214		LA
STEVENS, LARRY JAMES	02	N	690214		LA
NIEDECKEN, WILLIAM CLINTON	02	N	690215		LA
WALSH, RICHARD A III	05	F	690215		LA
MOORE, JERRY L	E3	A	690216		VS
WOGAN, WILLIAM M	E4	A	690216		VS
BRUCHER, JOHN MARTIN	03	F	690218		VN
CHAPMAN, ROONEY MAX	04	N	690218		VN
JEROME, STANLEY MILTON	E6	N	690218		VN
SCHIMMELS, EDDIE RAY	E6	N	690218		VN
NEISLAR, DAVID PHILLIP	02	N	690220		VN
MACKO, CHARLES	04	F	690222		LA
PAXTON, DONALD E	05	F	690222		LA
PEARSON, WAYNE E	03	F	690222		LA
LONG, STEPHEN G	02	F	690228	730328	LA
CAMPBELL, CLYDE WILLIAM	03	F	690301		LA
KELLER, WENDELL R	04	F	690301		LA
LOVEGREN, DAVID EUGENE	E4	A	690301		VS
MERONEY, VIRGIL K III	02	F	690301		VS
BOGIAGES, CHRISTOS C JR	04	F	690302		LA
EVANS, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E5	A	690302		CB
MAY, MICHAEL FREDERICK	E4	A	690302		CB
SMITH, WILLIAM M	E3	A	690303		VS
COLEMAN, JIMMY LFF	F3	A	690306		VS

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MCDONNELL, JOHN TERENCE	03	A	690306		VS
REX, ROBERT F	03	F	690309		LA
WALTERS, TIM LEROY	E6	A	690309		LA
LUNA, CARTER PURVIS	05	F	690310		LA
ROBINSON, FLOYD HENRY	E5	A	690312		VS
BARNES, CHARLES RONALD	03	A	690316		VS
BATT, MICHAEL LERO	E4	A	690316		VS
BOBE, RAYMOND EDWARD	E3	A	690316		VS
FOSTER, MARVIN L	04	A	690316		VS
SMITH, DAVID R	03	A	690316		VS
ARMITSTEAD, STEVEN RAY	02	M	690317		LA
DINAH, DAVID THOMAS III	02	F	690317		LA
FINNEY, CHARLES E	03	M	690317		LA
MURPHY, BARRY DANIEL	E5	A	690318		CB
DAVIS, RICARDO GONZALES	E7	A	690320		LA
DAVIS, ROBERT CHARLES	03	F	690323		LA
WIDDIS, JAMES W JR	03	F	690323		LA
ARROYO-BAEZ, GERASIMO	E6	A	690324	850320	VS
BOMERS, RICHARD LEE	03	A	690324		VS
HERRERA, FREDERICK D	E3	A	690325		VS
HICKS, PRENTICE W	E3	A	690325		VS
ROBERTS, RICHARD D	E3	A	690325		VS
CZERNIEC, RAYMOND GEORGE	E5	A	690327		VS
KERNS, GAIL M	E5	A	690327	730305	VS
BELCHER, ROBERT ARTHUR	04	F	690328		VS
MILLER, MICHAEL ANDREW	02	F	690328		VS
HESS, FREDERICK WILLIAM JR	02	F	690329		LA
LATIMER, CLARENCE ALBERT	E4	A	690330		VS
CARPENTER, RAMEY LEO	03	N	690331		LA
WHITE, DANFORTH ELLITHORNE	05	N	690331		LA
POWERS, LOWELL S	W1	A	690402		VS
ECKLUND, ARTHUR G	02	A	690403		VS
JEFFERSON, PERRY HENRY	03	F	690403		VS
DE SOTO, ERNEST LEO	04	F	690412		VS
HALL, FREDRICK M	02	F	690412		VS
LAMP, ARNOLD WILLIAM JR	03	F	690412		VS
PIERSON, WILLIAM C III	W2	A	690413		VS
KOHYU, WILLIAM MICHAEL	W1	A	690416		VS
DAHILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD	E4	A	690417		VS
NEWTON, CHARLES V	E6	A	690417		VS
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F	E5	A	690417		VS
WILLETT, ROBERT VINCENT JR	02	F	690417		LA
ELLIS, RANDALL S	E4	A	690418		VS
SCOTT, VINCENT CALVIN JR	02	F	690422		VS
VAN CLEAVE, WALTER SHELBY	05	F	690422		LA
SHRIVER, JERRY M	E7	A	690424		CB
EAST, JAMES BOYD JR	04	F	690426		LA
REARDON, RICHARD JOHN	02	N	690428		VS
MASCARI, PHILLIP LOUIS	02	F	690502		LA
BILLIPP, NORMAN KARL	03	M	690506		VS
HAGAN, JOHN ROBERT	02	M	690506		VS
ROACH, WILLIAM JAMES	04	F	690508		LA

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MUNDT, HENRY G II	02	F	690508		LA
WALTERS, WILLIAM (NMN)	E3	A	690510		VS
DAUGHERTY, LEONARD EDWARD	E4	A	690511	730327	VS
HORTO, THOMAS TERUD	E4	A	690511	730327	VS
JACQUEZ, JUAN L	E4	A	690511	730327	VS
RYAN, WILLIAM C JR	02	M	690511		VS
BESSOR, BRUCE CARLETON	02	A	690513		LA
BROOKS, JOHN HENRY RALPH	E4	A	690513		VS
MASUDA, ROBERT S	E4	A	690513		VS
MUNOZ, DAVID LOUIE	E3	A	690513		VS
SCOTT, MIKE JOHN	E7	A	690513		LA
STEWART, VIRGIL GRANT	02	F	690517		LA
CUDLIKE, CHARLES JOSEPH	E4	A	690518		VS
BENTON, GREGORY REA JR	E2	M	690523		VS
RAMIREZ, ARMANDO (NMN)	E5	A	690523		CB
HANSKE, CHARLES JEROME	03	F	690524		VS
MONTEZ, ANASTACIO (NMN)	E7	A	690524		VS
WEITZ, MONEK	E1	M	690525		VS
WILLIAMS, LEROY CHRISTOPHE	E2	M	690525		VS
STORY, JAMES CLELLON	E2	A	690613		VS
WARD, NEAL C	02	F	690613		LA
GRACE, JAMES W	03	F	690614		LA
KAHLER, HAROLD	04	F	690614		LA
SPARKS, DONALD L	E3	A	690617		VS
TELLIER, DENNIS A	E3	M	690619	730327	VS
ROBERSON, JOHN WILL	E3	A	690622		VS
CONDIT, WILLIAM HOWARD JR	04	F	690623		VS
REED, TERRY MICHAEL	02	F	690623		VS
SAGE, LELAND CHARLES COOKE	02	N	690623		LA
JABLONSKI, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	A	690627		VS
FRANSEN, ALBERT M JR	E4	N	690702		VS
FALLON, PATRICK M	06	F	690704		LA
ANDRE, HOWARD VINCENT JR	04	F	690708		LA
SIZEMORE, JAMES ELMO	04	F	690708		LA
BANNON, PAUL WEDLAKE	04	F	690712		LA
PIKE, PETER X	02	F	690712		LA
BUTLER, DEWEY RENEE	E3	A	690714		VS
POLSTER, HARMON	02	F	690715		VS
WALKER, MICHAEL S	03	F	690715		LA
DAWSON, JAMES VERNON	03	F	690716		VS
SMILEY, STANLEY KUTZ	03	N	690720		LA
BRENNING, RICHARD DAVID	03	N	690726		VN
BURNS, MICHAEL PAUL	E4	A	690731		LA
NEAL, DENNIS PAUL	03	A	690731		LA
BURD, DOUGLAS GLENN	02	F	690801		VS
CALLIES, TOMMY LEON	03	F	690801		VS
TALKEN, GEORGE FRANCIS	04	N	690802		VN
BECK, EDWARD EUGENE JR	E2	M	690809		VS
DOTSON, JEFFERSON SCOTT	02	F	690809		LA
GOURLEY, LAURENT LEE	03	F	690809		LA
JANOUSEK, RONALD JAMES	02	M	690809		VS
VANCE, RUDOLF EDWARD	F4	M	690809		VS

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MICKELSEN, WILLIAM EMIL JR	03	N	690810		VN
HANSEN, LESTER ALAN	W2	A	690813		VS
DAVIS, DANIEL RICHARD	02	F	690818		LA
BOHLIG, JAMES RICHARD	02	M	690819		VS
FLANIGAN, JOHN NORLEE	03	M	690819		VN
MORRISSEY, RICHARD THOMAS	03	M	690819		VS
SMITH, ROBERT NORMAN	05	M	690819		VN
GRAF, ALBERT STEPHEN	02	M	690829		VS
ZIMMER, JERRY ALLEN	03	M	690829		VS
ESCOBEDO, JULIAN JR	E3	M	690901		VS
HELMIG, ROGER DANNY	03	F	690911		LA
STEARNS, ROGER HORACE	03	F	690911	900522	LA
TRAMPSKI, DONALD JOSEPH	E2	A	690916		VS
CLINE, CURTIS ROY	E2	A	690918		VS
CECIL, ALAN BRUCE	E5	A	690921		LA
JACKSON, JAMES W JR	E3	M	690921		VS
HUNTLEY, JOHN NORMAN	E3	A	690927		LA
CURRAN, PATRICK ROBERT	02	M	690929		LA
LONO, LUTHER A	04	M	690929		LA
BECK, TERRY LEE	E4	N	691002		VN
BELL, RICHARD WILLIAM	E4	N	691002		VN
BOWMAN, MICHAEL LEE	E4	N	691002		VN
DAYAO, ROLANDO CUEVA	E6	N	691002		VN
DEAN, DONALD CHESTER	E5	N	691002		VN
DILGER, HERBERT HUGH	03	N	691002		VN
ELLERD, CARL J	E5	N	691002		VN
FOWLER, JAMES JEWEL	E2	N	691002		VN
FOWLER, ROY G	E4	N	691002		VN
GAN, LEONARDO M	E7	N	691002		VN
GORE, PAUL EDWIN	E6	N	691002		VN
GORSUCH, WILLIAM D	E4	N	691002		VN
HILL, RAYFORD J	E4	N	691002		VN
KOHLER, DELVIN LEE	E4	N	691002		VN
KOSLOSKY, HOWARD M	E3	N	691002		VN
LEONARD, ROBERT B	E5	N	691002		VN
LIVINGSTON, RICHARD ALLEN	03	N	691002		VN
MONTGOMERY, RONALD WAYNE	E5	N	691002		VN
MOORE, WILLIAM R	E5	N	691002		VN
MOSER, PAUL KIERSTEAD	E4	N	691002		VN
PRENTICE, KENNETH M	E5	N	691002		VN
SALAZAR, FIDEL G	E5	N	691002		VN
TERRELL, KEAVIN LEE	E4	N	691002		VN
TYE, MICHAEL JAMES	E4	N	691002		VN
VIAZO, REYNALDO ROCILLO	E3	N	691002		VN
CUNNINGHAM, KENNETH LEROY	E2	A	691003		VS
GRAFFE, PAUL L	02	A	691003		VS
BOWER, IRVIN LESTER JR	E3	M	691006		VS
ALTIZER, ALBERT HAROLD	E3	A	691008		VS
WATKINS, ROBERT JAMES JR	W2	A	691008		VS
DRIVER, DALLAS ALAN	E4	A	691009		VS
GARBETT, JIMMY RAY	E4	A	691009		VS
MUNDF, RAYMOND GREGORY	E4	A	691009		VS

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SUYDAM, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	691009		VS
TURNER, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	691009		VS
MAXWELL, CALVIN WALTER	03	A	691010		VS
WEISNER, FRANKLIN LEE	02	A	691010		VS
BOOTH, LAWRENCE RANDOLPH	03	A	691016		LA
RATTIN, DENNIS M	E4	A	691016		LA
STUBBS, WILLIAM WENTWORTH	E5	A	691020		LA
COOK, GLENN RICHARD	02	F	691021		VS
ESPENSHIED, JOHN L	04	F	691021	890123	VS
BYNUM, NEIL STANLEY	02	F	691026		LA
WARREN, GRAY D	03	F	691026		LA
HERRICK, JAMES W JR	02	F	691027		LA
GAUTHIER, DENNIS L	E3	A	691031		VS
PARTINGTON, ROGER DALE	03	M	691101		VS
CARROLL, PATRICK HENRY	02	F	691102		LA
CHIRICHIGNO, LUIS GENARDO	03	A	691102	730327	VS
NOWICKI, JAMES ERNEST	W1	A	691102	730327	VS
WHITFORD, LAWRENCE W JR	05	F	691102		LA
BROWN, WILLIAM THEODORE	E6	A	691103		LA
NORTON, MICHAEL ROBERT	E2	A	691103		VS
SHUE, DONALD MONROE	E4	A	691103		LA
WALD, GUNTHER HERBERT	E5	A	691103		LA
ALFORD, TERRY LANIER	W1	A	691104		VS
CAVENDER, JIM RAY	W1	A	691104		VS
HANLEY, LARRY JAMES	03	F	691104		LA
KLIMO, JAMES ROBERT	E4	A	691104		VS
WARE, JOHN ALAN	E4	A	691104		VS
ECHANIS, JOSEPH YGNACIO	03	F	691105		LA
LEFEVER, DOUGLAS PAUL	03	F	691105		LA
BODAHL, JON KEITH	03	F	691112		LA
DENNANY, JAMES EUGENE	04	F	691112		LA
HELMICH, GERALD ROBERT	04	F	691112		LA
SMITH, HARRY W	03	F	691112		LA
TUCCI, ROBERT L	03	F	691112		LA
RAY, RONALD E	E6	A	691113		LA
SUBER, RANDOLPH BOTHWELL	E5	A	691113		LA
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE	04	N	691115		VS
WHITE, ROBERT THOMAS	03	A	691115	730401	VS
BALDRIDGE, JOHN ROBERT JR	02	F	691120		LA
RENELT, WALTER A	05	F	691120		LA
BEDINGER, HENRY JAMES	02	N	691122	730328	LA
COLLINS, RICHARD FRANK	04	N	691122		LA
DEUTER, RICHARD CARL	02	N	691122		LA
QUINN, MICHAEL EDWARD	03	N	691122		LA
JONES, GRAYLAND (NMN)	E3	A	691123		VS
BALAMOTI, MICHAEL DIMITRI	04	F	691124		LA
BROWN, EARL CARLYLE	03	F	691124		LA
COMER, HOWARD BRISBANE JR	W2	A	691124		VS
DEWISPELAERE, REXFORD JOHN	E4	F	691124		LA
FELLENZ, CHARLES R	E3	F	691124		LA
GANLEY, RICHARD O	03	F	691124		LA
GREWELI, LARRY I	E5	F	691124		LA

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MATTHES, PETER R	02	F	691124		LA
WHITE, JAMES B	03	F	691124		LA
WRIGHT, DONALD L	E5	F	691124		LA
ROGERS, BILLY LEE	E3	N	691201		VN
DUNLAP, WILLIAM C	W2	A	691202	890123	VS
SANDERLIN, WILLIAM D	E5	A	691202	890123	VS
SHANLEY, MICHAEL HENRY JR	E5	A	691202	890123	VS
VANDEN EYKEL, MARTIN D II	W2	A	691202	890123	VS
CLARK, JOHN CALVIN II	03	F	691205		LA
DANIELSON, BENJAMIN FRANKL	03	F	691205		LA
HARROLD, PATRICK K	02	F	691205		LA
BUCKLEY, VICTOR PATRICK	03	N	691216		VN
LONG, CARL EDWIN	03	M	691220		VS
BURRIS, DONALD DEANE JR	W2	A	691222		LA
KENNEDY, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	691222		CB
TROMBRIDGE, DUSTIN COWLES	02	N	691226		VS
FEATHERSTON, FIELDING W 3D	03	F	691230		LA
FERGUSON, DOUGLAS D	02	F	691230		LA
BROOKS, NICHOLAS GEORGE	03	N	700102	820203	LA
FRYAR, BRUCE C	03	N	700102		LA
LINDSTROM, RONNIE G	02	F	700102		LA
WEST, JOHN THOMAS	03	F	700102		LA
WALTON, WILBERT	E2	A	700103		VS
BURNES, ROBERT WAYNE	02	M	700105		LA
ROBINSON, LARRY WARREN	04	M	700105		LA
HOFF, MICHAEL G	04	N	700107		VS
OCHAB, ROBERT (NMN)	03	F	700107		LA
ALLEN, WAYNE CLOUSE	E5	A	700110	89012	VS
CROSBY, HERBERT CHARLES	03	A	700110		VS
GRAZIOSI, FRANCIS GEORGE	E4	A	700110		VS
HOMES, GEORGE ANDREWS	W3	A	700110		VS
CHORLINS, RICHARD DAVID	02	F	700111		LA
TUBBS, GLENN E	E5	A	700113		VS
ANZALDUA, JOSE JESUS JR	E4	M	700123	730327	VS
ANDERSON, GREGORY LEE	E4	F	700128		VN
BELL, HOLLY GENE	04	F	700128	881215	VN
LEESER, LEONARD CHARLES	03	F	700128		VN
MALLON, RICHARD J	03	F	700128	881215	VN
PANEK, ROBERT J SR	03	F	700128	881215	VN
PRUETT, WILLIAM DAVID	E8	F	700128		VN
SHINN, WILLIAM CHARLES	E5	F	700128		VN
SUTTON, WILLIAM CARL	E7	F	700128		VN
HEFEL, DANIEL	E4	A	700205	730327	VS
KOBASHIGAWA, TOM Y	E5	A	700205	730327	VS
LYON, JAMES MICHAEL	03	A	700205		VS
PARSELS, JOHN WILLIAM	03	A	700205	730327	VS
STEPHENSON, RICHARD CHARLE	02	N	700205		VN
KIEFFER, WILLIAM L JR	05	F	700211		LA
BRADSHAW, ROBERT SAMUEL 3D	02	M	700212		VS
BREEDING, MICHAEL HUGH	02	M	700212		VS
DAFFRON, THOMAS CARL	03	F	700218		LA
GILLEN, THOMAS ELDON	04	F	700218		LA

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MORLEY, CHARLES FRANK	02	F	700218		LA
MOORE, SCOTT FERRIS JR	E4	N	700220		VS
SABOG, MATEO	E8	A	700225		VS
BOYLE, WILLIAM (NMN)	E7	A	700228		LA
MCVEY, LAVOY DON	03	M	700302		VS
SKIBBE, DAVID WILLIAM	01	M	700302		VS
PARKER, JOHN JACKSON	03	N	700304		VN
ROSENBAUGH, ROBERT PAGE	03	F	700305		VS
GATES, ALBERT HENRY JR	03	M	700307		VS
COTTEN, LARRY WILLIAM	02	F	700309		LA
PARCELS, REX LEWIS JR	02	N	700309		VN
ROBINSON, EDWARD (NMN)	E6	A	700309		VS
SCHOEPFNER, LEONARD JOHN	03	N	700309		VN
TERLA, LOTHAR GUSTAV T	03	F	700309		LA
SCULL, GARY BERNARD	01	A	700312		VS
AYERS, DARRELL EUGENE	E6	M	700319		VS
PUGH, DENNIS GERARD	02	F	700319		LA
BUTLER, JAMES EDWARD	W1	A	700320		VS
COZART, ROBERT GORDON JR	03	A	700320	890427	VS
GONZALES, DAVID	E5	M	700321		LA
HUDGENS, EDWARD MONROE	04	F	700321		LA
UNDERWOOD, THOMAS WAYNE	E6	M	700321		LA
BECERRA, RUDY MORALES	E4	A	700324		CB
BORONSKI, JOHN ARTHUR	E6	A	700324		CB
GAUDE, BERMAN JR	E4	A	700324		CB
HARNED, GARY ALAN	E5	A	700324		CB
HOSKEN, JOHN CHARLES	W1	A	700324		CB
ODONNELL, MICHAEL DAVIS	03	A	700324		CB
POOL, JERRY LYNN	02	A	700324		CB
ALLEN, HENRY LEWIS	02	F	700326		LA
ELZINGA, RICHARD G	03	F	700326		LA
DUFFY, JOHN EVERETT	02	F	700404		VS
YOUNG, JEFFREY JEROME	E3	A	700404		VS
CROPPER, CURTIS HENRY	03	M	700405		VN
BRASSFIELD, ANDREW THOMAS	E6	A	700406		LA
FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE	--	V	700406		CB
KLINGHER, MICHAEL LEE	03	F	700406		LA
STONE, DANA	--	V	700406		CB
BUSHNELL, BRIAN LEE	E3	N	700409		VN
HORCHAR, ANDREW ANTHONY J	E3	N	700409		VN
KNIGHT, LARRY COLEMAN	03	N	700409		VN
PFANNKUCH, CHARLES BROOKS	02	N	700409		VN
NELSON, JAN HOUSTON	02	M	700411		VS
TABB, ROBERT ERNEST	E6	A	700412	730327	VS
BIVENS, HERNDON ARRINGTON	E4	A	700415		VS
MILLER, ROGER ALAN	W1	A	700415	730305	VS
AYERS, RICHARD LEE	04	F	700416		LA
RAUSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	700416		LA
WHEELER, EUGENE LACY	04	M	700421		VS
ADACHI, THOMAS YUJI	E5	F	700422		LA
BROOKS, WILLIAM LESLIE	04	F	700422		LA
DAVIS, CHARLIE BROWN JR	05	F	700422		LA

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FISHER, DONALD G	04	F	700422		LA
GOLZ, JOHN BRYAN	02	N	700422		LA
HARRIS, STEPHEN W	E5	F	700422		LA
HENSLEY, RONNIE L	E5	F	700422		LA
IRELAND, ROBERT NEWELL	E7	F	700422		LA
LINT, DONALD M	E2	F	700422		LA
ROWLEY, CHARLES S	05	F	700422		LA
TOWLE, JOHN C	02	F	700422		LA
EADS, DENNIS KEITH	W1	A	700423		VS
GOMEZ, ROBERT A	02	F	700423		LA
LITTLE, DANNY LEONARD	E6	A	700423		VS
LUCKI, ALBIN E	03	F	700423		LA
MURPHY, LARON D	03	A	700423		VS
CROSS, JAMES EMORY	03	F	700424		LA
REESE, GOMER DAVID III	03	F	700424		LA
ELLIOTT, ARTICE W	04	A	700426	730327	VS
HILL, JOHN RICHARD	03	A	700427		VS
SNIDER, HUGHIE FRANKLIN	E4	A	700428		VS
BISHOP, EDWARD JAMES JR	E3	A	700429		VS
CROWSON, FREDERICK H	E4	A	700502	730212	CB
GRIFFIN, RODNEY L	E4	A	700502		CB
HASLWOSKI, DANIEL F	W1	A	700502	730212	CB
PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT	E4	A	700502		CB
RICHARDSON, DALE W	03	A	700502		CB
YARNADO, MICHAEL B	W1	A	700502	890427	CB
YOUNG, ROBERT M	03	A	700502		CB
CHURCHILL, CARL RUSSELL	03	F	700503		LA
CONAWAY, LAWRENCE YERGES	05	F	700503		LA
HERNANDEZ, FRANK SANCHEZ	E5	A	700506		VS
KIER, LARRY GENE	E3	A	700506		VS
TERAN, REFUGIO THOMAS	E3	A	700506		VS
WORTHINGTON, RICHARD CHARL	W2	A	700506		VS
HAIGHT, STEPHEN HAROLD	E4	A	700509		VS
PREISS, ROBERT FRANCIS JR	E6	A	700512		LA
HUBERTH, ERIC J	02	F	700513		CB
TRENT, ALAN ROBERT	03	F	700513		CB
CONNER, EDWIN RAY	E8	N	700516		VS
SKEEH, RICHARD ROBERT	05	N	700516		VS
WESTWOOD, NORMAN PHILIP JR	03	N	700517		VN
ALBERT, KEITH ALEXANDER	E4	A	700521	730212	VS
SPRINGMAN, RICHARD	E4	A	700525	730212	CB
LEE, GLENN HUNG NIN	02	F	700527		CB
DUKE, CHARLES R	--	V	700530		VS
MARK, KIT T	--	V	700530		VS
HAMGEN, WELLES	--	V	700531		CB
HUGGINS, BOBBY GENE	04	F	700604		VS
WILSON, HARRY TRUMAN	E5	M	700604		LA
ALLOWAY, CLYDE DOUGLAS	E5	F	700607		VS
WILBRECHT, KURT MICHAEL	02	M	700607		VS
ELLIOTT, ANDREW JOHN	W2	A	700609		VS
HILBRICH, BARRY W	03	A	700609		VS
RYNDR, JOHN L	02	F	700609		VS

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PIERCE, WALTER MELVIN (MI	E3	A	700610		CB
COCHRANE, DEVERTON C	E6	A	700617		CB
LAKER, CARL JOHN	E4	A	700617		CB
DRAKE, CARL WILSON	O4	F	700618		CB
GREEN, JAMES ARVIL	E3	A	700618		CB
MCLAMB, HARRY LAWRENCE	O4	F	700618		CB
EARLE, JOHN STILES	O3	N	700622		VS
GUMBERT, ROBERT WILLIAM JR	E3	A	700622		VS
PEDERSON, JOE PALMER	E7	A	700623		VS
PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL	E2	A	700623		VS
ROZO, JAMES MILAN	E4	A	700623		VS
ALDERN, DONALD DEANE	O5	N	700629		LA
BELL, MARVIN EARL	E5	F	700630		LA
BURGESS, JOHN LAWRENCE	E5	A	700630		VS
DEAN, MICHAEL FRANK	E5	F	700630		LA
GOEGLEIN, JOHN WINFRED	O4	F	700630		LA
HILL, GORDON C	O2	F	700630		LA
JENKINS, PAUL LAVERNE	E7	F	700630		LA
SADLER, MITCHELL O JR	O3	F	700630		LA
SANDERS, WILLIAM STEPHEN	O3	F	700630		LA
SCHANEBERG, LEROY CLYDE	O3	F	700630		LA
HARBER, STEPHEN J	E4	A	700702		VS
BOOKOUT, CHARLES FRANKLIN	E7	A	700704		LA
BEALS, CHARLES ELBERT	E4	A	700707		VS
HOWARD, LEWIS JR.	E4	A	700707		VS
SCHULTZ, RONALD JAMES	E3	A	700721		VS
BLOODWORTH, DONALD BRUCE	O2	F	700724		LA
REED, JAMES WILLIAM	O3	F	700724		LA
GREGORY, PAUL ANTHONY	O3	N	700725		VN
BROWN, DONALD ALAN	O3	F	700730		LA
CHAVEZ, GARY ANTHONY	O3	F	700730		LA
CROWLEY, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	700810		VS
BROWN, JAMES AUSTON	E4	A	700812		VS
BECKER, JAMES CHRISTOF	O2	A	700815		LA
SCHMIDT, PETER ALDEN	E4	A	700815		LA
WELLONS, PHILLIP ROGERSON	O4	F	700817		VS
HAUER, ROBERT D	O2	F	700905		VS
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBER	O2	M	700911		VS
MILLER, WYATT JR (NMN)	E2	A	700913		VS
KEESE, BOBBY JOE	--	V	700918	730314	VN
DAVIDSON, DAVID ARTHUR	E6	A	701005		LA
GASSMAN, FRED ALLEN	E5	A	701005		LA
OTT, WILLIAM A	O3	F	701008		LA
SHAY, DONALD EMERSON JR	O3	F	701008		LA
CHESTNUT, JOSEPH LYONS	O4	F	701013		VS
MARTIN, JOHN BERNARD II	O3	N	701016		LA
STRAIT, DOUGLAS F	E4	A	701018		VS
WILSON, PETER JOE	E6	A	701019		VS
HEIDEMAN, THOMAS EDWARD	E7	F	701024		LA
DAY, DENNIS IRVIN	E4	A	701103		VS
DORITY, RICHARD CLAIR	E4	A	701103		VS
GTNN. DAVID LANDRELL	E3	A	701103		VS

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MANGUS, ARLIE ROBERT	E4	A	701103		VS
MARTIN, JERRY DEAN	E3	A	701103		VS
NORRIS, CALVIN ANDREW	E5	A	701103		VS
PANTALL, JAMES ROBERT	E3	A	701103		VS
SHEMAKE, JOHN DANIEL SR	E6	A	701103		VS
WOODS, DAVID WALTER	E4	A	701103		VS
CORONA, JOEL (NMN)	E3	A	701108		VS
BANCROFT, WILLIAM W JR	O2	F	701113		VN
WRIGHT, DAVID IRVIN	O4	F	701113		VN
KLUGG, JOSEPH RUSSELL	O3	N	701114		VN
MCINTOSH, IAN (NMI)	W1	A	701124		VS
SMITH, RONALD EUGENE	E7	A	701128		CB
STRINGER, JOHN CURTIS II	O2	A	701130		VS
GREEN, GEORGE CURTIS JR	E5	A	701204		LA
TAYLOR, WALTER JOSEPH JR	E3	A	701206		VS
DUCKETT, THOMAS ALLEN	O2	F	701212		LA
SKINNER, OWEN G	O4	F	701212		LA
DEUSO, CARROLL JOSEPH	E9	N	701215		VN
MCCOY, MERIL OLEN JR	O3	N	701215		VN
OWEN, CLYDE C	E4	N	701215		VN
PIERSANTI, ANTHONY J JR	O2	N	701215		VS
BOOTH, GARY PRESTON	E4	A	701223		VS
MCANDREWS, MICHAEL WILLIAM	W1	A	701223		VS
WISEMAN, BAIN WENDELL JR	W1	A	701223		VS
LUNDY, ALBRO LYNN JR	O4	F	701224		LA
BUNKER, PARK GEORGE	O3	F	701230		LA
AYRES, JAMES HENRY	O4	F	701013		LA
HOLGUIN, LUIS GALLEGOS	W1	A	701013		VS
MAGEE, PATRICK JOSEPH	E6	A	701013		VS
OKERLUND, THOMAS RICHARD	W1	A	701013		VS
ONELIA, DENNIS WILLIAM	W1	A	701013		VS
PALEN, CARL ANTHONY	E5	A	701013		VS
PARSONS, MICHAEL D	O2	A	701013		VS
RHODES, FERRIS ANSEL JR	O3	A	701013		VS
STRATTON, CHARLES W	O3	F	701013		LA
CRAMER, DONALD MARTIN	W2	A	701015		VN
MILLER, CARLETON PIERCE JR	O2	N	701016		VS
CURRY, KEITH ROYAL WILSON	O5	N	701018		VN
HARMWOOD, JAMES ARTHUR	E5	A	701015		VS
KINSMAN, GERALD FRANCIS	O2	A	701015		VS
MIRNER, ROBERT HENRY	O4	F	701017		VS
CARTER, GERALD LYNN	O2	N	701026		VN
LINEBERGER, HAROLD B	O4	F	701029		CB
MIXTER, DAVID IVES	E5	A	701029		LA
CARTWRIGHT, PATRICK G	E4	N	701031		VS
GOTNER, ROBERT A	O4	F	701032	730328	LA
STANDERWICK, ROBERT L	O5	F	701031		LA
PAUL, JAMES LEE	W1	A	701025		VS
STEWART, PAUL CLARK	W2	A	701028		LA
PIETRZAK, JOSEPH RAY	E5	A	7010210		VS
ROBERTSON, MARK JOHN	W1	A	7010210		VS
MCIFNO, ARTHUR EDWARD	W1	A	7010212		VS

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WILKINSON, CLYDE DAVID	03	A	710212		VS
CREAR, WILLIS CALVIN	E4	A	710215		LA
CRONE, DONALD EVERETT	E4	A	710215		LA
FIVELSON, BARRY FRANK	W1	A	710215		LA
LEONARD, MARVIN MAURICE	W2	A	710215		LA
POWERS, JOHN LYNN	E4	A	710215		LA
TAYLOR, JAMES HARRY	01	A	710215		LA
HOSKINS, CHARLES L	02	F	710216		LA
PATTILLO, RALPH NATHAN	04	F	710216		LA
BERG, GEORGE PHILLIP	W1	A	710218		LA
CRANDALL, GREGORY STEPHEN	W1	A	710218		LA
DEMSEY, WALTER EDWARD JR	E4	A	710218		LA
ENGEL, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	A	710218	910411	LA
JOHNSON, GARY LEE	E4	A	710218		LA
LEWELLEN, WALTER EDWARD	E4	A	710218	910411	LA
LLOYD, ALLEN RICHARD	E5	A	710218		LA
WATSON, RONALD LEONARD	03	A	710218		LA
WOODS, GERALD ERNEST	W1	A	710218		LA
HULL, JAMES LARRY	02	F	710219		LA
ACALOTTO, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	A	710220		LA
JOHNSON, RANDOLPH L	E5	A	710220		LA
MAY, DAVID M	02	A	710220		LA
REID, JOHN ERIC	W1	A	710220		LA
HARRISON, LARRY GENE	E6	A	710226		CB
SWANSON, JON EDWARD	03	A	710226		CB
BABCOCK, RONALD LESTER	03	A	710227		LA
LEWIS, LARRY GENE	02	N	710227		VS
MOONEY, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	710227		LA
BLACK, PAUL VERNON	W1	A	710301		CB
ZUBKE, DELAND DWIGHT	E5	A	710301		VS
DUBBELD, ORIE JOHN JR	02	A	710303		VS
DURCAN, JAMES EDWARD	E7	A	710303		VS
ALGAARD, HAROLD LOWELL	W1	A	710304		VN
ALLWINE, DAVID FRANKLIN	E5	A	710304	730327	VS
HENTZ, RICHARD JAY	E5	A	710304		VN
MARKER, MICHAEL WAYNE	03	A	710304		VN
OSBORNE, RODNEY DEE	E5	A	710304		VN
STRAWN, JOHN THOMAS	E6	A	710304		VN
HATLEY, JOEL CLINTON	E4	A	710305	900110	LA
KING, MICHAEL ELI	E4	A	710305	900110	LA
MOREIRA, RALPH ANGELO JR	W1	A	710305	900110	LA
NELSON, DAVID LINDFORD	03	A	710305	900110	LA
HUMMEL, JOHN F	W1	A	710306		LA
MILLINER, WILLIAM PATRICK	W1	A	710306		LA
ARD, RANDOLPH JEFFERSON	W1	A	710307		LA
BURNETT, SHELDON JOHN	05	A	710307		LA
ANKSHUS, RICHARD CAMERON	02	A	710308	730327	VS
GRANTHAM, ROBERT EUGENE	E4	A	710308		VS
HALE, JOHN DOUGLAS	02	A	710308		VS
PRATHER, PHILLIP DEAN	W1	A	710308	730327	VS
SMOOT, CURTIS R	E5	A	710310		CB
JEFFS, CLIVE G	02	F	710312		VS

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CREED, BARTON SHELDON	03	N	710313		LA
SEXTON, DAVID MASON	E5	A	710315		VS
SCRIVENER, STEPHEN RUSSELL	02	F	710316		LA
SEELEY, DOUGLAS MILTON	03	F	710316		LA
BAUMAN, RICHARD LEE	W2	A	710317		CB
DIX, CRAIG MITCHELL	E4	A	710317		CB
HARRIS, BOBBY GLENN	E4	A	710317		CB
HESTAND, JAMES HARDY	W1	A	710317	730212	CB
LILLY, LAWRENCE EUGENE	02	A	710317		CB
BOFFMAN, ALAN BRENT	02	A	710318	900113	LA
BRANDT, KEITH ALLAN	03	A	710318	900113	LA
CRISTMAN, FREDERICK LEWIS	W1	A	710319		LA
GARCIA, RICARDO MARTINEZ	E5	A	710319		LA
SPARKS, JOHN M	W1	A	710319		LA
BARKER, JACK LAMAR	04	A	710320		LA
CHUBB, JOHN JACOBSEN	E3	A	710320		LA
DILLENDER, WILLIAM EDWARD	E4	A	710320		LA
DUGAN, JOHN FRANCIS	03	A	710320		LA
CLEVE, REGINALD DAVID	W1	A	710322		LA
HALL, WALTER RAY	E4	A	710322		LA
KNUTSEN, DONALD PAUL	E4	A	710322		LA
MORIARTY, PETER GIBNEY	03	F	710322		LA
TRAVER, JOHN GROVE III	W1	A	710322		LA
BECKWITH, HARRY MEDFOR III	E5	A	710324		VS
BUTCHER, JACK M	02	F	710324	730328	LA
MCDONELL, R D (NFM/NMN)	E6	A	710325		VS
PUENTES, MANUEL RAMERIZ	E3	A	710325		VS
ROSSANO, RICHARD JOSEPH	E3	A	710325		VS
SALLEY, JAMES JR	E7	A	710331		VS
TERRILL, PHILIP B	E4	A	710331		VS
SMITH, JOSEPH STANLEY	01	F	710404		CB
LILLY, CARROLL B	03	F	710409		LA
BUERK, WILLIAM CARL	03	F	710411		VS
CHAMPION, JAMES ALBERT	E3	A	710424		VS
MALO, ISAACK F	E3	A	710424	730327	VS
LEMON, JEFFREY C	03	F	710425		LA
SIGAFOOS, WALTER HARRI III	02	F	710425		LA
KRUPA, FREDERICK	06	A	710427		VS
BINGHAM, KLAUS JURGEN	E6	A	710510		VS
LUTTRELL, JAMES M	E6	A	710510		VS
WALTON, LEWIS C	E6	A	710510		VS
CROOK, ELLIOTT	E4	A	710516		VS
FARLOW, CRAIG L	W1	A	710516		VS
JACOBSEN, TIMOTHY J	E4	A	710516		VS
NOLAN, JOSEPH PAUL JR	02	A	710516		VS
PEARCE, DALE ALLEN	W1	A	710517		VS
SOYLAND, DAVID PECOR	W1	A	710517		VS
ENTRICAN, DANNY D	02	A	710518		VS
KNUCKEY, THOMAS WILLIAM	02	A	710527		CB
TAYLOR, PHILLIP CHARLES	E5	A	710527		CB
CHAVIRA, STEPHEN (NMN)	E4	A	710528		VS
IRWINHART, PAUL DEAN	03	A	710528		VS

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BRUNSON, JACK WALTER	W2	A	710531	LA	
MUSIL, CLINTON ALLAN SR	03	A	710531	LA	
MAGERS, PAUL GERALD	02	A	710601	VS	
WANN, DONALD LYNN	W2	A	710601	VS	
CAVAIANI, JON R	E5	A	710605	730327	VS
JONES, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	710605	VS	
WILSON, RICHARD JR (NMN)	E3	A	710614	VS	
BIDWELL, BARRY ALAN	E5	N	710618	VN	
DEBLASIO, RAYMOND VINCE JR	02	N	710618	VN	
PAINTER, JOHN ROBERT JR	03	N	710618	VN	
METZLER, CHARLES D	05	N	710621	VN	
STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXAND	E5	A	710622	VS	
BRIDGES, PHILIP WAYNE	E4	A	710630	VS	
CARR, DONALD GENE	03	A	710706	LA	
THOMAS, DANIEL W	02	F	710706	LA	
TAYLOR, TED JAMES	03	A	710715	VS	
ASTON, JAY STEVEN	W1	A	710718	VS	
ANTUNANO, GREGORY ALFRED	E5	A	710724	CB	
DALTON, RANDALL DAVID	E4	A	710724	CB	
WALDHAUS, RICHARD G	--	V	710804	730212	VS
BERG, BRUCE ALLAN	E5	A	710807	VS	
BATES, PAUL JENNINGS JR	03	A	710810	VS	
DOLAN, THOMAS ALBERT	E5	A	710810	VS	
KENNEDY, JOHN W	02	F	710816	VS	
KUYKENDALL, WILLIE CLYDE	E3	A	710818	VS	
WEAKS, MELVIN LEE	E3	A	710818	VS	
VENNIK, ROBERT NICHOLAS	E6	A	710826	VS	
CORNWELL, LEROY JASON III	03	F	710910	LA	
IVAN, ANDREW JR	03	F	710910	LA	
BOND, RONALD LESLIE	02	F	710930	LA	
DONOVAN, MICHAEL LEO	03	F	710930	LA	
GARRETT, MAURICE EDWIN JR	03	A	711022	VS	
EVELAND, MICKEY EUGENE	E4	A	711026	VS	
FINGER, SANFORD IRA	E6	A	711026	VS	
GREEN, THOMAS FREDERICK	E2	A	711026	VS	
LAUTZENHEISER, MICHAEL (NM)	E5	A	711026	VS	
NICKOL, ROBERT ALLEN	E5	A	711026	VS	
TRUDEAU, ALBERT RAYMOND	W1	A	711026	VS	
OAKLEY, LINUS LABIN	E4	F	711029	VS	
DECAIRE, JACK LEONARD	E6	A	711103	VS	
ALTUS, ROBERT WAYNE	03	F	711123	LA	
PHELPS, WILLIAM	02	F	711123	LA	
THOMAS, JAMES R	E6	F	711125	VS	
BEUTEL, ROBERT DONALD	02	F	711126	VS	
STEADMAN, JAMES E	03	F	711126	LA	
MCINTIRE, SCOTT WINSTON	05	F	711210	LA	
BOYANOWSKI, JOHN GORDON	05	A	711214	VS	
BREHMER, DWIGHT AMOS	E4	A	711214	VS	
CALDWELL, FLOYD DEAN	E6	A	711214	VS	
HOLLINGER, GREGG NEYMAN	03	A	711214	VS	
PERKINS, CECIL CARRINGTON	03	A	711214	VS	
DEBBY, RITA LEE	W2	A	711214	VS	

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HILDEBRAND, LELAND	04	F	711218	730328	VN
WELLS, KENNETH	02	F	711218	730328	VN
FORAME, PETER CHARLES	02	A	711219		CB
JOHNSON, KENNETH	04	F	711219	730314	VN
POYNOR, DANIEL ROBERTS	02	F	711219		LA
SKILES, THOMAS WILLIAM	W1	A	711219		CB
THOMAS, LEO TARLTON JR	03	F	711219		LA
VAUGHN, SAMUEL R	02	F	711219	730328	VN
FINN, WILLIAM ROBERT	02	F	711224		LA
TUCKER, TIMOTHY H	02	F	711224		LA
GUENTHER, LYNN	03	F	711226	730212	VN
KOONS, DALE F	02	F	711226	880406	VN
STOLZ, LAWRENCE G	03	F	711226	880406	VN
BITTER, GEORGE L	--	V	711227		LA
TOWNLEY, ROY F	--	V	711227		LA
WEISSENBACK, EDWARD J	--	V	711227		LA
HOFFMAN, DAVID WESLEY	04	N	711230	730328	VN
HOLMES, FREDERICK LEE	04	N	711230		VN
DUGGAN, WILLIAM YOUNG	04	F	711231		LA
SUTTER, FREDERICK JOHN	03	F	711231		LA
BERDAHL, DAVID DONALD	E3	A	720120		VS
EDWARDS, HARRY JEROME	E4	A	720120		VS
COOPER, DANIEL DEAN	03	N	720204		VN
GALATI, RALPH W	02	F	720216	730328	VN
LEE, ALBERT EUGENE	E6	N	720216		VS
SCHWERTFEGER, WILLIAM R	03	F	720216	730328	VN
CUTTER, JAMES D	03	F	720217	730328	VN
FRASER, KENNETH J	03	F	720217	730328	VN
HAWLEY, EDWIN A JR	03	F	720217	730212	VN
IRWIN, ROBERT HARRY	04	F	720217	890731	VN
MORGAN, WILLIAM J	04	A	720225		VS
HOWELL, CARTER A	02	F	720307		LA
RUSCH, STEPHEN A	02	F	720307		LA
HARDY, ARTHUR HANS	02	F	720314	830920	LA
JACKSON, JAMES TERRY	03	F	720323		LA
PIKE, DENNIS STANLEY	03	N	720323		LA
WHITT, JAMES EDWARD	04	F	720323		LA
CROW, RAYMOND JACK JR	E3	F	720327		CB
DREHER, RICHARD E	03	F	720327		CB
MANOR, JAMES (NMN)	E4	F	720327		CB
PANNABECKER, DAVID ERIC	03	F	720327		CB
WAGNER, RAYMOND ANTHONY	E3	F	720327		CB
WONG, EDWARD PUCK KOW JR	E4	A	720327		VS
BRÄUNER, HENRY PAUL	04	F	720329		LA
CANIFORD, JAMES KENNETH	E5	F	720329		LA
CASTILLO, RICHARD	03	F	720329	860301	LA
HALPIN, RICHARD C	03	F	720329	860301	LA
MILLER, CURTIS D	03	F	720329		LA
PAULSON, MERLYN L	E5	F	720329	860301	LA
PEARCE, EDWIN JACK	E5	F	720329	860301	LA
RAMSOWER, IRVING B II	04	F	720329	860301	LA
STIMMONS, ROBERT F	E3	F	720329	860301	LA

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SMITH, EDWARD D JR	E5	F	720329	860301	LA
STEPHENSON, HOWARD D	O4	F	720329		LA
TODD, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E3	F	720329	860301	LA
WANZEL, CHARLES J III	O2	F	720329	860301	LA
YOUNG, BARCLAY B	O3	F	720329		LA
CROSBY, BRUCE ALLEN JR	E4	A	720330		VS
FINCH, MELVIN W	O3	A	720330	850814	VS
WESTCOTT, GARY PATRICK	E5	A	720330		VS
WORTH, JAMES F	E4	M	720401		VS
ASTORGA, JOSE MANUEL	E4	A	720402	730305	VS
BOLTE, WAYNE LOUIS	O4	F	720402		VS
FRINK, JOHN W	W1	A	720402		VS
GATWOOD, ROBIN F JR	O2	F	720402		VS
GIANNANGELI, ANTHONY ROBER	O5	F	720402		VS
KULLAND, BYRON K	O2	A	720402		VS
LEVIS, CHARLES ALLEN	O5	F	720402		VS
PASCHALL, RONALD PAGE	E5	A	720402		VS
SEREX, HENRY MUIR	O4	F	720402		VS
CHRISTENSEN, ALLEN DUANE	E5	A	720403		VS
HENDERSON, WILLIAM J	O2	F	720403	730327	VS
MUREN, THOMAS R	E2	M	720403		VN
ONEILL, DOUGLAS LEE	W2	A	720403		VS
WILLIAMS, EDWARD W	W1	A	720403		VS
ZICH, LARRY ALFRED	W2	A	720403		VS
SPENGLER, HENRY MERSHOW 3D	O3	A	720405	890427	VS
WINDELER, CHARLES CARL JR	W2	A	720405	890427	VS
ALLEY, JAMES HAROLD	E4	F	720406		VS
AVERY, ALLEN JONES	E6	F	720406		VS
CALL, JOHN HENRY III	O2	F	720406		VS
CHAPMAN, PETER HAYDEN II	O3	F	720406		VS
DUNLOP, THOMAS EARL	O5	N	720406		VN
PEARSON, WILLIAM ROY	E4	F	720406		VS
PRATER, ROY DEWITT	E6	F	720406		VS
CARLSON, ALBERT E	O4	A	720407	730212	VS
LULL, HOWARD B JR	E7	A	720407		VS
POTTS, LARRY FLETCHER	O2	M	720407		VS
SCHOTT, RICHARD S	O5	A	720407		VS
SMITH, MARK A	O3	A	720407	730212	VS
WALKER, BRUCE C	O2	F	720407		VS
WALLINGFORD, KENNETH	E8	A	720407	730212	VS
RAY, JOHNNIE L	O3	A	720408	730212	VS
WANAT, GEORGE K JR	O3	A	720408	730212	VS
KETCHIE, SCOTT DOUGLAS	O2	M	720409		LA
CHRISTENSEN, JOHN MICHAEL	O2	M	720413		VN
LEET, DAVID LEVERETT	O3	M	720413		VN
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G	O3	N	720414		VN
MCKINNEY, CLEMIE	O3	N	720414	850814	VS
DESPIEGLER, GALE A	O4	F	720415	730328	VN
TRIMBLE, LARRY ALLEN	O2	F	720415	890621	VN
JONES, ORVIN C JR	O3	F	720416		VN
MATEJA, ALAN PAUL	O3	F	720416		VN
AMOS THOMAS HIRSH	O3	F	720420		VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
BURNHAM, MASON IRWIN	O3	F	720420		VS
CARTER, GEORGE WILLIAMS	O4	A	720424		VS
ELLEN, WADE LYNN	W1	A	720424		VS
HUNSICKER, JAMES EDWARD	O2	A	720424		VS
JONES, JOHNNY MACK	O2	A	720424		VS
YOMAN, KENNETH JOSEPH	O3	A	720424	880406	VS
ZOLLICOFFER, FRANKLIN	E4	A	720424		VS
BROWNLEE, ROBERT WALLACE	O5	A	720425		VS
AMESBURY, HARRY ARLO JR	O4	F	720426		VS
COOKE, CALVIN C JR	E5	F	720426		VS
DUNN, RICHARD EDWARD	E6	F	720426		VS
HOSKINS, DONALD RUSSELL	E6	F	720426		VS
REYNOLDS, TERRY L	--	V	720426		CB
RUSSELL, RICHARD LEE	O2	F	720426		VS
MOLINARE, ALBERT R	O3	M	720427	730328	VN
SOUDER, JAMES BURTON	O4	N	720427	730328	VN
SEAGRAVES, MELVIN D	E3	N	720430		VN
AYRES, TIMOTHY ROBERT	O3	F	720503	730328	VN
MCDONALD, JOSEPH WILLIAM	O2	M	720503		VN
SIENICKI, THEODORE S	O2	F	720503	730328	VN
WILLIAMS, DAVID BERYL	O3	M	720503	890621	VN
WILES, MARVIN BENJAMIN C	O3	N	720506		VN
CONSOLVO, JOHN WADSWORTH JR	O3	M	720507		VS
KERNAN, JOSEPH EUGENE	O2	N	720507	730328	VN
POLFER, CLARENCE	O5	N	720507	730328	VN
LEAVER, JOHN MURRAY JR	O5	N	720508		VN
TAYLOR, EDMUND BATTELLE JR	O6	N	720508		VN
REEDER, WILLIAM S	O3	A	720509	730327	VS
BLACKBURN, HARRY LEE JR	O5	N	720510	860410	VN
HARRIS, JEFFREY L	O3	F	720510		VN
LOOGE, ROBERT A	O4	F	720510	770930	VN
RUDLOFF, STEPHEN A	O3	N	720510	730328	VN
WILKINSON, DENNIS E	O3	F	720510	780823	VN
BLASSIE, MICHAEL JOSEPH	O2	F	720511		VS
KITTINGER, JOSEPH W JR	O5	F	720511	730328	VN
PADGETT, JAMES P	O4	F	720511	730328	VN
REICH, WILLIAM J	O2	F	720511	730328	VN
STROBRIDGE, RODNEY L	O3	A	720511		VS
TALLEY, WILLIAM H	O4	F	720511	730328	VN
WILLIAMS, ROBERT J	O3	A	720511		VS
BOGARD, LONNIE PAT	O3	F	720512		LA
OSTERMAYER, WILLIAM HENRY	O2	F	720512		LA
BEDNAREK, JONATHAN BRUCE	O2	F	720518	881215	VN
RATZEL, WESLEY D	O2	F	720518	881215	VN
HOYT, DAVID P	O3	F	720519	730327	VS
NICHOLS, AUBREY ALLEN	O3	N	720519	730328	VN
THOMAS, WILLIAM E	W2	M	720519	730327	VS
WILLIAMS, JAMES W	O3	F	720520	730328	VN
BARNETT, CHARLES EDWARD	O5	N	720523	881103	VN
BEAN, WILLIAM RAYMOND JR	O3	F	720523	730328	VN
BYRNS, WILLIAM G	O3	F	720523	730328	VN
REFFER, CARROLL ROBERT	O3	N	720524	730328	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
HENN, JOHN ROBERT JR	W2	A	720524	VS	
STRONG, HENRY HOOKER JR	05	N	720525	VN	
LATENDRESSE, THOMAS B	03	N	720527	730328	VN
MORROW, LARRY K	E4	A	720529	VS	
KRANER, DAVID S	E3	N	720605	VN	
PAYNE, KYLIS THEROD	E2	N	720605	VN	
FOWLER, JAMES ALAN	04	F	720606	VN	
SEWELL, JOHN W	03	F	720606	VN	
MURPHY, JOHN S. JR	03	F	720608	730327	VS
ANGUS, WILLIAM KERR	03	M	720611	730328	VN
BIBBS, WAYNE (NMN)	E3	A	720611	VS	
HACKETT, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	720611	VS	
HOLM, ARNOLD EDWARD JR	03	A	720611	VS	
MCQUADE, JAMES RUSSELL	02	A	720611	VS	
WILSON, ROGER E	03	M	720611	880713	VN
YEAKLEY, ROBIN RAY	E4	A	720611	VS	
WILEY, RICHARD DENNIS	E4	A	720612	VS	
FULTON, RICHARD J	02	F	720613	730328	VN
HANSON, GREGG O	02	F	720613	730328	VN
DAVIS, FRANCIS JOHN	04	N	720614	VN	
AYRES, GERALD FRANCIS	04	F	720618	VS	
COLE, RICHARD MILTON JR	E6	F	720618	VS	
DANIELSON, MARK GILES	03	F	720618	VS	
GILBERT, PAUL F	02	F	720618	VS	
HARRISON, ROBERT HEERMAN	04	F	720618	VS	
HUNT, LEON ANDREW	E7	F	720618	VS	
KILPATRICK, LARRY R	03	N	720618	VN	
KLINKE, DONALD HERMAN	E5	F	720618	VS	
LEHRKE, STANLEY L	E4	F	720618	VS	
MERCER, JACOB E	E7	F	720618	VS	
NEWMAN, LARRY J	E5	F	720618	VS	
NYHOF, RICHARD E	E5	F	720618	VS	
WILSON, ROBERT ALLAN	03	F	720618	VS	
CALLAGHAN, PETER A	02	F	720621	730328	VN
ROSE, GEORGE A	03	F	720621	730328	VN
BEEKMAN, WILLIAM DAVID	03	F	720624	730328	VN
GRANT, DAVID B	03	F	720624	730328	VN
JACKSON, CHARLES A	02	F	720624	730212	VN
MCCARTY, JAMES L	02	F	720624	VN	
SHUMWAY, GEOFFREY RAYMOND	03	N	720625	VN	
BAKER, DAVID EARLE	03	F	720627	730212	CB
CERAK, JOHN P	03	F	720627	730328	VN
DINGEE, DAVID B	03	F	720627	730328	VN
FRANCIS, RICHARD L	03	F	720627	730328	VN
HANTON, THOMAS J	03	F	720627	730328	VN
MCDON, RICHARD H	02	F	720627	730328	VN
SULLIVAN, FARRELL JUNIOR	05	F	720627	830603	VN
CHEWEY, KEVIN J	03	F	720701	730328	VN
ROBINSON, PAUL K	04	F	720701	730328	VN
CUTHBERT, STEPHEN HOWARD	03	F	720703	900913	VN
MARSHALL, MARION A	03	F	720703	730329	VN
FLANDER, WILLIAM J JR	04	F	720705	730329	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
LOGAN, DONALD K	02	F	720705	730329	VN
SEEK, BRIAN J	02	F	720705	730329	VN
SPENCER, WILLIAM A	03	F	720705	730329	VN
KROBOTH, ALAN J	02	M	720707	730327	VS
ROBERTSON, LEONARD	03	M	720707		VS
GREEN, FRANK CLIFFORD JR	05	N	720710		VN
CRODY, KENNETH LLOYD	E4	M	720711		VS
HENDRIX, JERRY WAYNE	E6	M	720711		VS
LESSENE, HENRY D	04	N	720711	730329	VN
MASTERSON, FREDERICK J	03	N	720711	730329	VN
RANDALL, ROBERT I	03	N	720711	730329	VN
HUARD, JAMES L	02	F	720712		VN
ODONNELL, SAMUEL JR	03	F	720712		VN
SHIMKIN, ALEX	---	V	720712		VS
BROWN, WAYNE GORDON II	03	F	720717		VS
HAAS, LEON FREDERICK	03	N	720717		VN
PAIGE, GORDON CURTIS	04	N	720722	730329	VN
SHANK, GARY LESLIE	02	N	720723	840717	VN
KULA, JAMES D	03	F	720729	730329	VN
MATSUI, MELVIN K	03	F	720729	730329	VN
BRECKNER, WILLIAM J JR	05	F	720730	730329	VN
PRICE, LARRY D	02	F	720730	730329	VN
PENN, MICHAEL GENE JR	02	N	720806	730329	VN
SANSONE, JAMES J	E3	N	720810		VN
THOMPSON, DAVID MATHEW	03	N	720812		VN
GAUNTT, WILLIAM A	03	F	720813	730327	VS
TOWNSEND, FRANCIS WAYNE	02	F	720813		VN
PENDER, ORLAND JAMES JR	03	N	720817		VN
PITZEN, JOHN RUSSELL	05	N	720817		VN
RAEBEL, DALE V	04	N	720817	730329	VN
BEHMFELDT, ROGER ERNEST-	03	F	720819	870924	VN
SHINGAKI, TAMOTSU	04	F	720819	730329	VN
LESTER, RODERICK B	02	N	720820		VN
MOSSMAN, HARRY SEEBER	03	N	720820		VN
CROCKETT, WILLIAM JAMES	02	F	720822		VS
TIGNER, LEE MORROW	04	F	720822		VS
DOYLE, MICHAEL WILLIAM	04	N	720825	850814	VN
ENSCH, JOHN C	03	N	720825	730329	VN
CORDOVA, SAM GARY	02	M	720826	881215	LA
EVERETT, DAVID A	02	N	720827	730329	VN
TRIEBEL, THEODORE W	04	N	720827	730329	VN
GREENWOOD, ROBERT R JR	04	F	720902		LA
HEROLD, RICHARD WALTER	03	F	720902		LA
WOOD, WILLIAM C JR	03	F	720902		LA
LERSETH, ROGER G	03	N	720906	730212	VN
LINDLAND, DONALD FREDERICK	04	N	720906	830603	VN
GERSTEL, DONALD ARTHUR	04	N	720908		VN
MUSSELMAN, STEPHEN O	02	N	720910	810708	VN
HEEREN, JEROME D	03	F	720911	730329	VN
RATZLAFF, BRIAN M	03	F	720911	730329	VN
MCNURRAY, FREDERICK C	03	F	720912	730329	VN
ZIRFRIHLER, RICHARD U	03	F	720912	730329	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
BUELL, KENNETH RICHARD	04	N	720917		VN
DONNELLY, VERNE GEORGE	05	N	720917	900911	VN
GOETSCH, THOMAS AUGUST	E2	N	720917		VN
TUROSE, MICHAEL STEPHEN	02	F	720917		VN
ZORN, THOMAS ONEAL JR	03	F	720917		VN
CARROLL, ROGER WILLIAM JR	04	F	720921		LA
COOK, DWIGHT WILLIAM	02	F	720921		LA
BORAH, DANIEL VERNOR JR	03	N	720924		VS
CHAN, PETER	E2	N	720925		VS
WALSH, JAMES P	03	M	720926	730212	VS
BOSILJEVAC, MICHAEL JOSEPH	03	F	720929	870924	VN
BRETT, ROBERT ARTHUR JR	02	F	720929		VN
COLTMAN, WILLIAM CLARE	04	F	720929		VN
ONEIL, JAMES W	05	F	720929	730329	VN
ALPERS, JOHN HARDESTY JR	03	F	721005	730329	VN
BATES, RICHARD LYMAN	02	F	721005	730329	VN
LATHAM, JAMES D	03	F	721005	730329	VN
LEWIS, KEITH H	03	F	721005	730329	VN
ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE	05	F	721006		VN
BAKER, VETO HUAPILI	E5	A	721006	751177	VS
BOLTZE, BRUCE EDWARD	W2	M	721006		VS
LATELLA, GEORGE F.	02	F	721006	730329	VN
MCCORMICK, CARL OTTIS	05	F	721006		VS
CLEARY, PETER MCARTHUR	03	F	721010		VN
LEONOR, LEONARDO C	03	F	721010		VN
BRUNSON, CECIL H	02	F	721012	730329	VN
PEACOCK, JOHN ROBERT II	03	M	721012		VN
PRICE, WILLIAM MARSHALL	02	M	721012		VN
YOUNG, MYRON A	03	F	721012	730329	VN
GRAHAM, ALAN U	02	F	721017	770930	VN
HOCKRIDGE, JAMES ALAN	03	F	721017	770930	VN
BIXEL, MICHAEL SARGENT	02	N	721024		VN
MATTIX, SAM	--	V	721027	730328	LA
HALL, JAMES WAYNE	04	N	721028		VN
SULLIVAN, JAMES EDWARD	04	N	721029	850814	VN
TOLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD	06	N	721106	881103	VN
BROWN, ROBERT MACK	04	F	721107		VN
CARROLL, JOHN LEONARD	04	F	721107		LA
MORRISSEY, ROBERT D	04	F	721107		LA
WRIGHT, FREDERICK WILLISTO	04	N	721110	900913	VN
BREUER, DONALD CHARLES	03	M	721120		LA
CAFFARELLI, CHARLES JOSEPH	03	F	721121		VS
STAFFORD, RONALD DEAN	03	F	721121		VS
EARNEST, CHARLES M	05	N	721128		VN
HARVEY, JACK ROCKWOOD	02	F	721128		VS
JONES, BOBBY M	03	F	721128		VS
SHINE, ANTHONY C	03	F	721202		VN
ACOSTA, HECTOR MICHAEL	02	F	721209	730329	VN
WILLIAMS, BILLIE J	04	F	721209	900913	VN
CERTAIN, ROBERT G	03	F	721218	730329	VN
FERGUSON, WALTER L	E7	F	721218	780823	VN
WHANKIN, RICHARD F	04	F	721218	730329	VN

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MCELVAH, JAMES RICHARD	04	F	721218		VN
RISSE, DONALD L	05	F	721218	780823	VN
SIMPSON, RICHARD T	03	F	721218	730329	VN
THOMAS, ROBERT J	02	F	721218	780823	VN
WARD, RONALD J	05	F	721218		VN
ALEXANDER, FERNANDO	04	F	721219	730329	VN
BARROWS, HENRY CHARLES	03	F	721219	730329	VN
BROWN, CHARLES A JR	03	F	721219	730329	VN
COOPER, RICHARD WALLER JR	03	F	721219		VN
POOLE, CHARLIE S	E6	F	721219		VN
WILSON, HAL K	03	F	721219	730329	VN
ARCURI, WILLIAM YOUL	02	F	721220	730212	VN
GELONECK, TERRY M	03	F	721220	730212	VN
GRANGER, PAUL L	02	F	721220	730329	VN
KLOMANN, THOMAS J	03	F	721220	730212	VN
LEWIS, IRWIN S	03	F	721220		VN
MADDEN, ROY JR	E5	F	721220	730212	VN
MARTINI, MICHAEL R	02	F	721220	730329	VN
MCLAUGHLIN, ARTHUR V JR	E7	F	721220		VN
PAUL, CRAIG A	03	F	721220	770930	VN
PERRY, RANDOLPH ALLEN JR	04	F	721220		VN
SPENCER, WARREN R	03	F	721220	770930	VN
STUART, JOHN F	04	F	721220		VN
WIELAND, CARL T	03	N	721220	730329	VN
BEBUS, CHARLES JAMES	E3	F	721221	881215	VN
BEENS, LYNN RICHARD	03	F	721221	730329	VN
CRADDOCK, RANDALL JAMES	03	F	721221	881215	VN
DARR, CHARLES EDWARD	02	F	721221	881215	VN
DICKENS, DELMA ERNEST	02	F	721221	850221	LA
ELLIOTT, ROBERT THOMAS	E6	F	721221	850221	LA
FENTER, CHARLES FREDERICK	E3	F	721221	850221	LA
FULLER, JAMES R	E6	F	721221	850221	LA
GOULD, FRANK ALTON	04	F	721221		LA
GRAUSTEIN, ROBERT S	04	N	721221	851204	VN
HART, THOMAS TRAMMELL III	03	F	721221	850221	LA
HEGGEN, KEITH R	05	F	721221	740313	VN
HIGDON, KENNETH H	03	N	721221	730212	VN
JOHNSON, EDWARD HARVEY	04	F	721221	881215	VN
KIRBY, BOBBY ALEXANDER	04	F	721221	881215	VN
KROBOTH, STANLEY NEA	03	F	721221	850221	LA
LAGERWALL, HARRY R	03	F	721221	850221	LA
LILES, ROBERT L JR	03	F	721221	850221	LA
LOCKHART, GEORGE B	03	F	721221	881215	VN
LOLLAR, JAMES L	E5	F	721221	730329	VN
LYNN, ROBERT R	03	F	721221	881215	VN
MACDONALD, GEORGE DUNCAN	01	F	721221	850221	LA
MEDER, PAUL OSWALD	04	F	721221	850221	LA
NAGAHIRO, JAMES Y	05	F	721221	730329	VN
NAKAGAWA, GORDON R	05	N	721221	730329	VN
PERRY, RONALD D	03	F	721221	751221	VN
READ, ROLLIE K	E3	F	721221	850221	LA
WANE, BARTON SCOTT	04	N	721221	851204	VN

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WALSH, FRANCIS A JR	04	F	721221	850221	LA
WALTERS, DONOVAN K	03	F	721221	881215	VN
WINNINGHAM, JOHN Q	E6	F	721221	850221	LA
ALLEY, GERALD WILLIAM	05	F	721222	881215	VN
BENNETT, THOMAS WARING JR	03	F	721222		VN
BERNASCONI, LOUIS HENRY	05	F	721222	730329	VN
CAMEROYA, PETER P	03	F	721222	730329	VN
CONLEE, WILLIAM W	05	F	721222	730329	VN
COPACK, JOSEPH BERNARD JR	02	F	721222	881215	VN
DRUMMOND, DAVID I.	03	F	721222	730329	VN
GIROUX, PETER J	03	F	721222	730212	VN
LEBLANC, LOUIS E JR	E7	F	721222	730329	VN
MAYALL, WILLIAM T	02	F	721222	730329	VN
MORGAN, GARY L	E5	F	721222	730329	VN
SPONEYBERGER, ROBERT D	03	F	721222	730329	VN
WILSON, WILLIAM W	02	F	721222	730329	VN
YUILL, JOHN H	05	F	721222	730329	VN
CLARK, PHILLIP SPRATT JR	03	N	721224	881103	VN
JACKSON, PAUL VERNON III	03	F	721224		LA
RIESS, CHARLES F	03	F	721224	730328	LA
RICKMAN, DWIGHT G	02	M	721225		VS
COOK, JAMES R	E6	F	721226	730212	VN
HUDSON, ROBERT M	02	F	721226	730329	VN
LABEAU, MICHAEL H	03	F	721226	730329	VN
MORRIS, ROBERT J JR	03	F	721226	770930	VN
VAVROCH, DUANE P	02	F	721226	730329	VN
WIMBROW, NUTTER J	03	F	721226	770930	VN
ANDERSON, JOHN WESLEY	03	F	721227	730212	VN
CHIPMAN, RALPH JIM	03	M	721227		VN
FORRESTER, RONALD W	02	M	721227		VN
JEFCOAT, CARL H	04	F	721227	730329	VN
TRIMBLE, JACK R	02	F	721227	730329	VN
WARD, BRIAN H	02	F	721227	730329	VN
AGNEW, ALFRED HOWARD	04	N	721228	730329	VN
CONDON, JAMES C	04	F	721228	730329	VN
CUSHMAN, SAMUEL B	03	F	721228	730329	VN
FRYER, BEN L	02	F	721228	770930	VN
GOUGH, JAMES W	E7	F	721228	730329	VN
HAIFLEY, MICHAEL F	03	N	721228	850814	VN
JOHNSON, ALLEN L	04	F	721228	851204	VN
LEWIS, FRANK D	03	F	721228	730329	VN
SCAIFE, KENNETH D	E2	N	730103		VS
JOHNSTON, STEVEN BRYCE	03	F	730104		LA
LINDAHL, JOHN CARL	03	N	730106		VN
BUSH, ELBERT WAYNE	E6	A	730108		VS
DEANE, WILLIAM LAWRENCE	04	A	730108		VS
KNUTSON, RICHARD ARTHUR	W1	A	730108		VS
LAUTERIO, MANUEL ALONZO	E5	A	730108		VS
STINSON, WILLIAM SHERRILL	E5	A	730108		VS
WILSON, MICKEY ALLEN	W1	A	730108		VS
CLARK, ROBERT ALAN	02	N	730110		VN
MCNORMICK, MITCHELL T	03	N	730110		VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	REL_DATE	CTRY_ORIG
CHRISTOPHERSEN, KEITH ALLE	02	N	730121		VN
PARKER, CHARLES LESLIE JR	04	N	730121		VN
WIEHR, RICHARD DANIEL	E5	N	730121		VN
HALL, HARLEY HUBERT	05	N	730127		VS
KIENTZLER, PHILLIP A	04	N	730127	730327	VS
MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	03	F	730127		VS
PETERSON, MARK ALLEN	02	F	730127		VS

Number of Records Output: 3128

TAB B: Missing between 27 January 1973 and 2 April 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. forces and subsequently identified.

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DUENSING, JAMES ALLYN	03	N	730130	VN
HAVILAND, ROY ELBERT	02	N	730130	VN
STRINGHAM, WILLIAM S	E4	N	730203	VS
BOLLINGER, ARTHUR RAY	03	F	730205	LA
BRANDENBURG, DALE	E4	F	730205	LA
CRESSMAN, PETER RICHARD	E4	F	730205	LA
MATEJOV, JOSEPH A	E4	F	730205	LA
MELTON, TODD H	E5	F	730205	LA
PRIMM, SEVERO J III	01	F	730205	LA
SPITZ, GEORGE R	03	F	730205	LA
ACKLEY, JAMES H	--	V	730307	LA
DRIVER, CLARENCE N	--	V	730307	LA

Number of Records Output: 12

TAB C: POWs returned during Operation Homecoming, 12 February 1973-1 April 1973

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DOWNEY, JOHN T	--	V	521129	CH
THOMPSON, FLOYD JAMES	03	A	640326	VS
ALVAREZ, EVERETT	02	N	640805	VN
SHUMAKER, ROBERT HARPER	04	N	650211	VN
LOCKHART, HAYDEN JAMES	03	F	650302	VN
MORGAN, HERSCHEL SCOTT	03	F	650403	VN
VOHDEN, RAYMOND ARTHUR	04	N	650403	VN
HARRIS, CARLYLE SMITH	03	F	650404	VN
BUTLER, PHILLIP NEAL	03	N	650420	VN
BRACE, ERNEST C	--	V	650521	LA
PEEL, ROBERT D	03	F	650531	VN
MCKAMEY, JOHN BRYAN	03	N	650602	VN
GUARINO, LAWRENCE NICHOLAS	04	F	650614	VN
KARI, PAUL ANTHONY	03	F	650620	VN
DENTON, JEREMIAH ANDREW	05	N	650718	VN
TSCHUDY, WILLIAM MICHAEL	02	N	650718	VN
KEIRN, RICHARD PAUL	03	F	650724	VN
BERG, KILE DAG	03	F	650727	VN
PURCELL, ROBERT BALDWIN	03	F	650727	VN
DAUGHTREY, ROBERT NORLAN	03	F	650802	VN
BRUNHAVER, RICHARD HARVIN	02	N	650824	VN
DOREMUS, ROBERT HARTSCH	04	N	650824	VN
FRANKE, FRED AUGUSTUS	05	N	650824	VN
DAVIS, EDWARD ANTHONY	02	N	650826	VN
SCHIERMAN, WESLEY DUANE	03	F	650828	VN
BYRNE, RONALD EDWARD JR	04	F	650829	VN
COLLINS, JAMES QUINCY	03	F	650902	VN
STOCKDALE, JAMES BOND	05	N	650909	VN
RIVERS, WENDELL BURKE	05	N	650910	VN
MERRITT, RAYMOND JAMES	04	F	650916	VN
RISNER, ROBINSON	05	F	650916	VN
BLACK, ARTHUR NEIL	E2	F	650920	VN
CURTIS, THOMAS JERRY	03	F	650920	VN
FORBY, WILLIS ELLIS	03	F	650920	VN
ROBINSON, WILLIAM ANDREW	E5	F	650920	VN
SMITH, PHILIP E	03	F	650920	CH
HALL, GEORGE ROBERT	03	F	650927	VN
BARRETT, THOMAS JOSEPH	02	F	651005	VN
HIVNER, JAMES OTIS	03	F	651005	VN
SEEBER, BRUCE G	03	F	651005	VN
SIMA, THOMAS WILLIAM	03	F	651015	VN
BELL, JAMES FRANKLIN	04	N	651016	VN
HUTTON, JAMES LEO	04	N	651016	VN
GAITHER, RALPH ELLIS	02	N	651017	VN
HALYBURTON, PORTER ALEX	02	N	651017	VN
KNUTSON, RODNEY ALLEN	02	N	651017	VN
WHEAT, DAVID ROBERT	02	N	651017	VN
BRUDNO, EDWARD ALAN	02	F	651018	VN
COLLINS, THOMAS EDWARD III	03	F	651018	VN
CHERRY, FRED VANN	04	F	651022	VN
MOORE, DENNIS ANTHONY	03	N	651027	VN
CHAPMAN, HARLAN PAGE	03	M	651105	VN
BOLSTAD, RICHARD EUGENE	03	F	651106	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_R#	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
CORMIER, ARTHUR	E5	F	651106	VN
LILLY, WARREN E	03	F	651106	VN
MCKNIGHT, GEORGE GRISBY	03	F	651106	VN
SINGLETON, JERRY ALLEN	02	F	651106	VN
JENKINS, HARRY TARLETON	05	N	651113	VN
REYNOLDS, JON ANZUENA	03	F	651128	VN
RUTLEDGE, HOWARD ELMER	05	N	651129	VN
DUNN, JOHN HOWARD	04	M	651207	VN
JEFFREY, ROBERT DUNCAN	03	F	651220	VN
PITCHFORD, JOHN JOSEPH	03	F	651220	VN
ALCORN, WENDELL REED	02	N	651222	VN
DAIGLE, GLENN HENRI	02	N	651222	VN
SHANKEL, WILLIAM LEONARD	02	N	651223	VN
RAMSEY, DOUGLAS	--	V	660117	VS
COFFEE, GERALD LEONARD	03	N	660203	VN
CRAYTON, RENDER	04	N	660207	VN
SPENCER, LARRY HOWARD	02	N	660218	VN
BALDOCK, FREDERICK CHARLES	02	N	660317	VN
MULLIGAN, JAMES ALFRED	05	N	660320	VN
RATZLAFF, RICHARD RAYMOND	03	N	660320	VN
BURER, ARTHUR WILLIAM	03	F	660321	VN
SMITH, BRADLEY EDEL	02	N	660325	VN
DOUGHTY, DANIEL JAMES	03	F	660402	VH
CHESLEY, LARRY JAMES	02	F	660416	VN
JOHNSON, SAMUEL ROBERT	04	F	660416	VN
BOYD, CHARLES GRAHAM	03	F	660422	VN
BRUNSTROM, ALAN LESLIE	04	F	660422	VN
DRISCOLL, JERRY DONALD	02	F	660424	VN
RUNYAN, ALBERT EDWARD	04	F	660429	VN
HEILIG, JOHN	03	N	660505	VN
LAMAR, JAMES LASLEY	05	F	660506	VN
RAY, JAMES EDWIN	02	F	660508	VN
HATCHER, DAVID BURNETT	03	F	660530	VN
BORLING, JOHN LORIN	02	F	660601	VN
MYERS, ARMAND JESSE	03	F	660601	VN
LURIE, ALAN PIERCE	03	F	660613	VN
PLYLE, DARREL EDWIN	02	F	660613	VN
KOPFMAN, THEODORE FRANK	04	N	660615	VN
GALANTI, PAUL EDWARD	03	N	660617	VN
BLACK, COLE	04	N	660621	VN
EASTMAN, LEONARD CORBETT	03	N	660621	VN
JONES, MURPHY NEAL	03	F	660629	VN
CAMPBELL, BURTON WAYNE	02	F	660701	VN
YOUNG, JAMES FAULDS	04	F	660706	VN
TOMES, JACK HARVEY	03	F	660707	VN
BROWNING, RALPH THOMAS	02	F	660708	VN
SHATTUCK, LEWIS WILEY	03	F	660711	VN
BARBAY, LAWRENCE	03	F	660720	VN
HUBBARD, EDWARD LEE	02	F	660720	VN
MCDANIEL, NORMAN ALEXANDER	03	F	660720	VN
MEANS, WILLIAM HARLEY	03	F	660720	VN
PERKINS, GLENDON WILLIAM	03	F	660720	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_R#	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MCSWAIN, GEORGE PALMER	01	N	660728	VN
BURROUGHS, WILLIAM DAVID	04	F	660731	VN
NORTH, KENNETH WALTER	02	F	660801	VN
BRAZELTON, MICHAEL LEE	02	F	660807	VN
GIDEON, WILLARD SELLECK	04	F	660807	VN
PLYLE, THOMAS SHAW	03	F	660807	VN
SANDVICK, ROBERT JAMES	03	F	660807	VN
WENDELL, JOHN HENRY	03	F	660807	VN
FLON, FREDRIC R	02	F	660808	VN
KASLER, JAMES HELMS	04	F	660808	VN
NEUENS, MARTIN JAMES	02	F	660812	VN
BRODAK, JOHN WARREN	03	F	660814	VN
COKER, GEORGE THOMAS	02	N	660827	VN
FELLOWES, JOHN HEAPHY	04	N	660827	VN
WELLS, NORMAN LOUROSS	03	F	660829	VN
BLISS, RONALD GLENN	02	F	660904	VN
MCNISH, THOMAS MITCHELL	02	F	660904	VN
NASHYTH, JOHN HERBERT	03	F	660904	VN
ABBOTT, WILFRED KESSE	03	F	660905	VN
BLEVINS, JOHN CHARLES	03	F	660909	VN
PETERSON, DOUGLAS BRIAN	03	F	660910	VN
TALLEY, BERNARD LEO	02	F	660910	VN
WAGGONER, ROBERT FROST	03	F	660912	VN
BUCHANAN, HUBERT ELLIOT	02	F	660916	VN
WALTMAN, DONALD G	03	F	660919	VN
BURGESS, RICHARD GORDON	E4	M	660925	VS
BALLARD, ARTHUR T JR	03	F	660926	VN
NIX, COWAN GLENN	03	F	661001	VN
BURNS, JOHN DOUGLAS	04	N	661004	VN
MAKOWSKI, LOUIS FRANK	04	F	661006	VN
TANNER, CHARLES NELS	04	N	661009	VN
TERRY, ROSS RANDLE	03	N	661009	VN
WOODS, ROBERT DEANE	03	N	661012	VN
PURRINGTON, FREDERICK RAYM	02	N	661020	VN
CARPENTER, ALLEN RUSSELL	03	N	661101	VN
BISS, ROBERT IRVING	03	F	661111	VN
MONLUX, HAROLD DELOSS	02	F	661111	VN
RINGSDOORF, HERBERT BENJAM	02	F	661111	VN
SWINDLE, ORSON GEORGE III	03	M	661111	VN
CRECCA, JOSEPH	02	F	661122	VN
BERGER, JAMES ROBERT	03	F	661202	VN
BURNS, DONALD RAY	04	F	661202	VN
CORDIER, KENNETH WILLIAM	03	F	661202	VN
FLESHER, HUBERT KELLY	04	F	661202	VN
LANE, MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER	02	F	661202	VN
REHMANN, DAVID GEORGE	02	N	661202	VN
STUTZ, LEROY WILLIAM	02	F	661202	VN
GLENN, DANNY ELLOY	02	N	661221	VN
STRATTON, RICHARD ALLEN	04	N	670105	VN
MULLEN, RICHARD DEAN	04	N	670106	VN
CRONIN, MICHAEL PAUL	02	N	670113	VN
KERR, MICHAEL SCOTT	02	F	670116	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MASTIN, RONALD LAMBERT	02	F	670116	VN
STOREY, THOMAS GORDON	03	F	670116	VN
BRADY, ALLEN COLBY	05	N	670119	VN
JAYROE, JULIUS SKINNER	03	F	670119	VN
KRAMER, GALAND DWIGHT	02	F	670119	VN
BAUGH, WILLIAM JOSEPH	03	F	670121	VN
SPOON, DONALD RAY	02	F	670121	VN
BRIDGER, BARRY BURTON	03	F	670123	VN
GRAY, DAVID FLETCHER	02	F	670123	VN
BOMAR, JACK WILLIAMSON	04	F	670204	VN
DAVIES, JOHN OWEN	02	F	670204	VN
FER, JOHN	03	F	670204	VN
SOOTER, DAVID WILLIAM	W1	A	670217	VS
DUART, DAVID HENRY	03	F	670218	VN
JENSEN, JAY ROBERT	03	F	670218	VN
THORNTON, GARY LYNN	01	N	670220	VN
EVERSON, DAVID	04	F	670310	VN
LUNA, JOSE DAVID	03	F	670310	VN
GREENE, CHARLES E	03	F	670311	VN
HITESHEW, JAMES EDWARD	04	F	670311	VN
MOORE, ERNEST MILVIN	05	N	670311	VN
CLARK, JOHN WALTER	03	F	670312	VN
CROW, FREDERICK AUSTIN	05	F	670326	VN
FOWLER, HENRY POPE	02	F	670326	VN
DRAMESI, JOHN ARTHUR	03	F	670402	VN
MADISON, THOMAS MARK	04	F	670419	VN
STERLING, THOMAS JAMES	04	F	670419	VN
CHRISTIAN, MICHAEL DURHAM	02	N	670424	VN
WILLIAMS, LEWIS IRVING	02	N	670424	VN
STACKHOUSE, CHARLES DAVID	03	N	670425	VN
MEYER, ALTON BENNO	03	F	670426	VN
RIATE, ALFONSO RAY	E4	M	670426	VS
SIGLER, GARY RICHARD	02	F	670429	VN
TORKELSON, LOREN H	02	F	670429	VN
ABBOTT, JOSEPH S JR	03	F	670430	VN
ABBOTT, ROBERT ARCHIE	02	F	670430	VN
JOHNSON, HAROLD E	03	F	670430	VN
THORSNESS, LEO KEITH	04	F	670430	VN
HUGHES, JAMES LINDBERG	05	F	670505	VN
LARSON, GORDON ALBERT	05	F	670505	VN
SHIVELY, JAMES RICHARD	02	F	670505	VN
WIDEMAN, ROBERT EARL	02	N	670506	VN
MCCUITION, MICHAEL K	03	F	670508	VN
GADDIS, NORMAN CARL	06	F	670512	VN
ROLLINS, DAVID JOHN	03	N	670514	VN
SOUTHWICK, CHARLES EVERETT	04	N	670514	VN
HEILIGER, DONALD LESTER	03	F	670515	VN
POLLARD, BEN M	03	F	670515	VN
NAUGHTON, ROBERT JOHN	03	H	670518	VN
ANDERSON, GARETH LAVERNE	02	N	670519	VN
MCDANIEL, EUGENE BAKER	04	N	670519	VN
METZGER, WILLIAM JOHN	02	N	670519	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
PLUMB, JOSEPH CHARLES	02	N	670519	VN
RUSSELL, KAY	04	N	670519	VN
STARK, WILLIAM ROBERT	04	N	670519	VN
MILLIGAN, JOSEPH EDWARD	02	F	670520	VN
VANLOAN, JACK LEE	04	F	670520	VN
VOGEL, RICHARD DALE	04	F	670522	VN
MCCLEARY, READ BLAINE	02	N	670526	VN
MEHL, JAMES PATRICK	05	N	670530	VN
CHAUNCEY, ARVIN RAY	04	N	670531	VN
SMITH, DEWEY LEE	04	F	670602	VN
CIUS, FRANK E	E3	M	670603	LA
HAINES, COLLINS HENRY	04	N	670605	VN
HALL, THOMAS RENWICK	02	N	670610	VN
STOCKMAN, HERVEY STUDDIE	05	F	670611	VN
WEBB, RONALD JOHN	03	F	670611	VN
MCMAHUS, KEVIN JOSEPH	02	F	670614	VN
MCCHEMBIER, EDWARD JOHN	02	F	670614	VN
PIRIE, JAMES GLENN	04	N	670622	VN
BAILEY, JAMES WILLIAM	02	N	670628	VN
LAWRENCE, WILLIAM PORTER	05	N	670628	VN
HARDY, WILLIAM H	03	A	670629	VS
MCGRATH, JOHN MICHAEL	03	N	670630	VN
RAYFORD, KING DAVID JR	E3	A	670702	VS
WADDELL, DEWEY WAYNE	04	F	670705	VN
HUGHES, KENNETH RAYMOND	04	F	670706	VN
POLLACK, MELVIN	02	F	670706	VN
MARTIN, EDWARD HOLMES	04	N	670709	VN
FRANK, MARTIN S	E5	A	670712	VS
HENRY, NATHAN BARNEY	E4	A	670712	VS
MCMURRAY, CORDINE	E5	A	670712	VS
NEWELL, STANLEY ARTHUR	E4	A	670712	VS
PERRICONE, RICHARD ROBERT	E4	A	670712	VS
FULLER, ROBERT BYRON	05	N	670714	VN
COPELAND, HC	04	F	670717	VN
FLORA, CARROLL E	E6	A	670721	VS
ZUHOSKI, CHARLES PETER	02	N	670731	VN
NEWCOMB, WALLACE GRANT	03	F	670803	VN
CHAMBERS, CARL DENNIS	02	F	670807	VN
WILSON, GLENN HUBERT	03	F	670807	VN
LENGYEL, LAUREN ROBERT	03	F	670809	VN
MYERS, GLENN LEO	02	F	670809	VN
NORRIS, THOMAS ELMER	03	F	670812	VN
PARROTT, THOMAS VANCE	03	F	670812	VN
GOODERMOTE, WAYNE KEITH	02	N	670813	VN
HYATT, LEO GREGORY	04	N	670813	VN
BUDD, LEONARD R JR	E3	M	670821	VS
FLYNN, ROBERT J	03	N	670821	CH
HARDMAN, WILLIAM MORGAN	04	N	670821	VN
PROFULET, LEO TWYMAN	05	N	670821	VN
BAKER, ELMO CLINNARD	04	F	670823	VN
CARRIGAN, LARRY EDWARD	03	F	670823	VN
GERNOT, GERALD LEE	02	F	670823	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
SAWHILL, ROBERT RALSTON	04	F	670823	VN
TYLER, CHARLES ROBERT	04	F	670823	VN
HESS, JAY CRIDDLE	03	F	670824	VN
DAY, GEORGE EVERETTE	04	F	670826	VN
CAREY, DAVID JAY	02	N	670831	VN
STAFFORD, HUGH ALLEN	04	N	670831	VN
BAGLEY, BOBBY RAY	04	F	670916	VN
STAVAST, JOHN EDWARD	04	F	670917	VN
VENANZI, GERALD SANTO	02	F	670917	VN
BARNETT, ROBERT WARREN	04	F	671003	VN
SCHOEFFEL, PETER VANRUYTER	04	N	671004	VN
TRAUTMAN, KONRAD WIGAND	03	F	671005	VN
AUSTIN, WILLIAM RENWICK	03	F	671007	VN
CLEMENTS, JAMES ARLEN	04	F	671009	VN
MILLER, EDISON WAINRIGHT	05	M	671013	VN
WARNER, JAMES HOIE	02	M	671013	VN
ANDREWS, ANTHONY CHARLES	03	F	671017	VN
ODELL, DONALD EUGENE	04	F	671017	VN
SULLIVAN, DWIGHT EVERETT	04	F	671017	VN
GILLESPIE, CHARLES R	05	N	671024	VN
LEWIS, EARL GARDNER	02	N	671024	VN
HORINEK, RAMON ANTON	04	F	671025	VN
SMITH, RICHARD EUGENE	04	F	671025	VN
DANIELS, VERLYNE WAYNE	05	N	671026	VN
MCCAIN, JOHN SIDNEY	04	N	671026	VN
RICE, CHARLES DONALD	02	N	671026	VN
FLYNN, JOHN PETER	06	F	671027	VN
STIRM, ROBERT LEWIS	04	F	671027	VN
TEMPERLEY, RUSSELL EDWARD	03	F	671027	VN
KIRK, THOMAS HENRY	05	F	671028	VN
DUTTON, RICHARD ALLEN	04	F	671105	VN
ELLIS, LEON FRANCIS	03	F	671107	VN
FISHER, KENNETH	03	F	671107	VN
BRENNEMAN, RICHARD CHARLES	02	F	671108	VN
SCHULZ, PAUL HENRY	04	N	671116	VN
SULLIVAN, TIMOTHY BERNARD	02	N	671116	VN
KEY, WILSON DENVER	03	N	671117	VN
CLOWER, CLAUDE DOUGLAS	04	N	671119	VN
FORD, DAVID EDWARD	03	F	671119	VN
LIGON, VERNON PEYTON	05	F	671119	VN
STIER, THEODORE GERHARD	02	N	671119	VN
VISSOTZKY, RAYMOND WALTON	04	F	671119	VN
BUTLER, WILLIAM WALLACE	03	F	671120	VN
KUSHNER, FLOYD HAROLD	03	A	671130	VS
SEHORN, JAMES ELDON	03	F	671214	VN
HILL, HOWARD JOHN	02	F	671216	VN
BOYER, TERRY LEE	02	F	671217	VN
ELLIS, JEFFREY THOMAS	03	F	671217	VN
FLEENOR, KENNETH RAYMOND	04	F	671217	VN
CRAWER, ROBERT ROGER	04	F	671220	VN
GRUTERS, GUY DENNIS	03	F	671220	VN
HICKERSON, JAMES MARTIN	04	N	671222	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BEAN, JAMES ELLIS	06	F	680103	VN
ESTES, EDWARD DALE	04	N	680103	VN
ANTON, FRANCIS GENE	W2	A	680105	VS
LEWIS, ROBERT	E4	A	680105	VS
PFISTER, JAMES F JR	E3	A	680105	VS
SCHWEITZER, ROBERT JAMES	05	N	680105	VN
HARKER, DAVID NORTHRUP	E3	A	680108	VS
DALY, JAMES ALEXANDER JR	E3	A	680109	VS
HALL, KEITH NORMAN	03	F	680110	VN
LEBERT, RONALD MERL	02	F	680114	VN
SUMPTER, THOMAS WRENNE	04	F	680114	VN
TERRELL, IRBY DAVID	04	F	680114	VN
WALKER, HUBERT C	03	F	680114	VN
MOE, THOMAS NELSON	02	F	680116	VN
HINCKLEY, ROBERT BRUCE	03	F	680118	VN
JONES, ROBERT CAMPBELL	02	F	680118	VN
SIMONET, KENNETH ADRIAN	04	F	680118	VN
SMITH, WAYNE OGDEN	02	F	680118	VN
BENGE, MICHAEL	--	V	680128	VS
KJOME, MICHAEL H	--	V	680131	VS
YOUNG, JOHN ARTHUR	E4	A	680131	VS
ADKINS, CLODEN	--	V	680201	VS
DAVES, GARY LAWRENCE	--	V	680201	VS
GOSTAS, THEODORE W	03	A	680201	VS
HENDERSON, ALEXANDER	--	V	680201	VS
MANHARD, PHILLIP W	--	V	680201	VS
MEYER, LEWIS E	--	V	680201	VS
OLSEN, ROBERT F	--	V	680201	VS
PAGE, RUSSELL J	--	V	680201	VS
RANDER, DONALD J	E6	A	680201	VS
RUSHTON, THOMAS	--	V	680201	VS
SPAULDING, RICHARD	--	V	680201	VS
STARK, LAWRENCE J	--	V	680201	VS
WEAVER, EUGENE	--	V	680201	VS
WILLIS, CHARLES E	--	V	680201	VS
ANDERSON, JOHN THOMAS	E7	A	680203	VS
DEERING, JOHN ARTHUR	E4	M	680203	VS
DIBERNARDO, JAMES VINCENT	02	M	680203	VS
ETTMUELLER, HARRY L	E5	A	680203	VS
GOVIN, DONAT JOSEPH	E7	A	680203	VS
BROOKENS, NORMAN J	--	V	680204	VS
OCONNOR, MICHAEL FRANCIS	W2	A	680204	VS
UTECHT, RICHARD W	--	V	680204	VS
LASTITER, CARL WILLIAM	03	F	680205	VN
ROLLINS, JAMES U	--	V	680205	VS
BRANDE, HARVEY G	E7	A	680207	VS
MCMURRY, WILLIAM G	E4	A	680207	VS
THOMPSON, DENNIS L	E6	A	680207	VS
CHENOWETH, ROBERT PRESTON	E5	A	680208	VS
LENKER, MICHAEL ROBERT	E4	A	680208	VS
PURCELL, BENJAMIN H	05	A	680208	VS
ROSE, JOSEPH	W2	A	680208	VS

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ZIEGLER, ROY ESPER II	W1	A	680208	VS
WRITER, LAWRENCE DANIEL	03	F	680215	VN
DONALD, MYRON LEE	02	F	680223	VN
GUTTERSON, LAIRD	04	F	680223	VN
FRIESE, LAWRENCE VICTOR	03	M	680224	VN
MARVEL, JERRY WENDELL	04	M	680224	VN
RIDGEWAY, RONALD LEWIS	E3	M	680225	VS
DAVIS, THOMAS JAMES	E5	A	680311	VS
MCILLAN, ISIAH	E4	A	680311	VS
DOSS, DALE WALTER	04	N	680317	VN
SHUMAN, EDWIN ARTHUR	04	N	680317	VN
DUNN, JOHN GALBREATH	03	A	680318	VS
GUY, THEODORE WILSON	05	F	680322	VS
ARCHER, BRUCE RAYMOND	03	M	680328	VS
MONTAGUE, PAUL JOSEPH	03	M	680328	VS
STISCHER, WALTER MORRIS	04	F	680413	LA
RODRIGUEZ, FERDINAND A	E2	A	680414	VS
HELLE, ROBERT R	E3	M	680424	VS
KAVANAUGH, ABEL L	E4	M	680424	VS
SPARKS, JOHN G	E3	A	680424	VS
FINLAY, JOHN STEWART	05	F	680428	VN
NORRINGTON, GILES RODERICK	03	N	680505	VN
TANGEMAN, RICHARD GEORGE	03	N	680505	VN
BAIRD, BILL ALLEN	E4	A	680506	VS
BRANCH, MICHAEL PATRICK	E4	A	680506	VS
LEOPOLD, STEPHEN RYDER	03	A	680509	VS
LONG, JULIUS MOLLER JR	E4	A	680512	VS
JAMES, CHARLIE NEGUS	05	N	680518	VN
UYEYAMA, TERRY JUN	03	F	680518	VN
MILLER, EDWIN FRANK	02	N	680522	VN
SCHRUMP, RAYMOND CECIL	04	A	680523	VS
INGVALSON, ROGER DEAN	04	F	680528	VN
LEONARD, EDWARD W	03	F	680531	LA
WILBER, WALTER EUGENE	05	N	680616	VN
MOBLEY, JOSEPH SCOTT	02	N	680624	VN
BURNS, MICHAEL THOMAS	02	F	680705	VN
CRUMPLER, CARL BOYETTE	05	F	680705	VN
JAMES, GOBEL DALE	04	F	680715	VN
NECO-QUINONES, FELIX V	E3	A	680716	VS
BROWN, PAUL GORDON	02	M	680725	VN
FANT, ROBERT ST CLAIR	03	N	680725	VN
WINN, DAVID WILLIAM	06	F	680809	VN
SHANAHAN, JOSEPH FRANCIS	03	F	680815	VN
ELBERT, FRED	E3	M	680816	VS
HOFFSON, ARTHUR THOMAS	02	F	680817	VN
MAYHEW, WILLIAM JOHN	03	N	680817	VN
JOHNSON, BOBBY LOUIS	E4	A	680825	VS
COSKEY, KENNETH LEON	05	N	680906	VN
WOODS, BRIAN DUNSTAN	04	N	680918	VN
OSBORNE, DALE HARRISON	04	N	680923	VN
DRABIC, PETER E	E3	A	680924	VS
RUHLING, MARK JOHN	03	F	681123	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MEHRER, GUSTAV ALOIS	E2	A	681225	VS
GUGGENBERGER, GARY JOHN	E4	A	690114	VS
FRITZ, JOHN J	--	V	690208	VS
MACPHAIL, DON A	E3	A	690208	VS
NEWINGHAM, JAMES A	--	V	690208	VS
LONG, STEPHEN G	02	F	690228	LA
KERNS, GAIL M	E5	A	690327	VS
DAUGHERTY, LENARD EDWARD	E4	A	690511	VS
HORIO, THOMAS TERUO	E4	A	690511	VS
JACQUEZ, JUAN L	E4	A	690511	VS
TELLIER, DENNIS A	E3	M	690619	VS
CHIRICHIGNO, LUIS GENARDO	03	A	691102	VS
NOWICKI, JAMES ERNEST	W1	A	691102	VS
WHITE, ROBERT THOMAS	03	A	691115	VS
BEDINGER, HENRY JAMES	02	N	691122	LA
ANZALDUA, JOSE JESUS JR	E4	M	700123	VS
HEFEL, DANIEL	E4	A	700205	VS
KOBASHIGAWA, TOM Y	E5	A	700205	VS
PARSELS, JOHN WILLIAM	03	A	700205	VS
TABB, ROBERT ERNEST	E6	A	700412	VS
MILLER, ROGER ALAN	W1	A	700415	VS
ELLIOTT, ARTICE W	04	A	700426	VS
CROWSON, FREDERICK H	E4	A	700502	CB
MASLOWSKI, DANIEL F	W1	A	700502	CB
ALBERT, KEITH ALEXANDER	E4	A	700521	VS
SPRINGMAN, RICHARD	E4	A	700525	CB
KEESE, BOBBY JOE	--	V	700918	VN
GOTNER, ROBERT A	04	F	710203	LA
ALLWINE, DAVID FRANKLIN	E5	A	710304	VS
ANSHUS, RICHARD CAMERON	02	A	710308	VS
PRATHER, PHILLIP DEAN	W1	A	710308	VS
HESTAND, JAMES HARDY	W1	A	710317	CB
BUTCHER, JACK M	02	F	710324	LA
MALO, ISAACKO F	E3	A	710424	VS
CAVATANI, JON R	E5	A	710605	VS
WALDHAUS, RICHARD G	--	V	710804	VS
HILDEBRAND, LELAND	04	F	711218	VN
WELLS, KENNETH	02	F	711218	VN
JOHNSON, KENNETH	04	F	711219	VN
VAUGHN, SAMUEL R	02	F	711219	VN
GUENTHER, LYNN	03	F	711226	VN
HOFFMAN, DAVID WESLEY	04	N	711230	VN
GALATI, RALPH W	02	F	720216	VN
SCHWERTFEGER, WILLIAM R	03	F	720216	VN
CUTTER, JAMES D	03	F	720217	VN
FRASER, KENNETH J	03	F	720217	VN
HAWLEY, EDWIN A JR	03	F	720217	VN
ASTORGA, JOSE MANUEL	E4	A	720402	VS
HENDERSON, WILLIAM J	02	F	720403	VS
CARLSON, ALBERT E	04	A	720407	VS
SMITH, MARK A	03	A	720407	VS
WALLINGFORD, KENNETH	E8	A	720407	VS

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
RAY, JOHNNIE L	03	A	720408	VS
WANAT, GEORGE K JR	03	A	720408	VS
DESPIEGLER, GALE A	04	F	720415	VN
MOLINARE, ALBERT R	03	N	720427	VN
SOUDER, JAMES BURTON	04	N	720427	VN
AYRES, TIMOTHY ROBERT	03	F	720503	VN
SIENICKI, THEODORE S	02	F	720503	VN
KERNAN, JOSEPH EUGENE	02	N	720507	VN
POLFER, CLARENCE	05	N	720507	VN
REEDER, WILLIAM S	03	A	720509	VS
RUDLOFF, STEPHEN A	03	N	720510	VN
KITTINGER, JOSEPH W JR	05	F	720511	VN
PADGETT, JAMES P	04	F	720511	VN
REICH, WILLIAM J	02	F	720511	VN
TALLEY, WILLIAM H	04	F	720511	VN
MOTT, DAVID P	03	F	720519	VS
NICHOLS, AUBREY ALLEN	03	N	720519	VN
THOMAS, WILLIAM E	W2	M	720519	VS
WILLIAMS, JAMES W	03	F	720520	VN
BEAN, WILLIAM RAYMOND JR	03	F	720523	VN
BYRNS, WILLIAM G	03	F	720523	VN
BEELER, CARROLL ROBERT	03	N	720524	VN
LATENDRESSE, THOMAS B	03	N	720527	VN
MURPHY, JOHN S. JR	03	F	720608	VS
ANGUS, WILLIAM KERR	03	M	720611	VN
FULTON, RICHARD J	02	F	720613	VN
HANSON, GREGG O	02	F	720613	VN
CALLAGHAN, PETER A	02	F	720621	VN
ROSE, GEORGE A	03	F	720621	VN
BEEKMAN, WILLIAM DAVID	03	F	720624	VN
GRANT, DAVID B	03	F	720624	VN
JACKSON, CHARLES A	02	F	720624	VN
BAKER, DAVID EARLE	03	F	720627	CB
CERAK, JOHN P	03	F	720627	VN
DINGEE, DAVID B	03	F	720627	VN
FRANCIS, RICHARD L	03	F	720627	VN
HANTON, THOMAS J	03	F	720627	VN
MCDOW, RICHARD H	02	F	720627	VN
CHENEY, KEVIN J	03	F	720701	VN
ROBINSON, PAUL K	04	F	720701	VN
MARSHALL, MARION A	03	F	720703	VN
ELANDER, WILLIAM J JR	04	F	720705	VN
LOGAN, DONALD K	02	F	720705	VN
SEEK, BRIAN J	02	F	720705	VN
SPENCER, WILLIAM A	03	F	720705	VN
KROBOTH, ALAN J	02	M	720707	VS
LESENE, HENRY D	04	N	720711	VN
MASTERSON, FREDERICK J	03	N	720711	VN
RANDALL, ROBERT I	03	N	720711	VN
PAIGE, GORDON CURTIS	04	N	720722	VN
KULA, JAMES D	03	F	720729	VN
MATSUI, MELVIN K	03	F	720729	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BRECKNER, WILLIAM J JR	05	F	720730	VN
PRICE, LARRY D	02	F	720730	VN
PENN, MICHAEL GENE JR	02	N	720806	VN
GAUNTT, WILLIAM A	03	F	720813	VS
RAEBEL, DALE V	04	N	720817	VN
SHINGAKI, TAMOTSU	04	F	720819	VN
ENSCH, JOHN C	03	N	720825	VN
EVERETT, DAVID A	02	N	720827	VN
TRIEBEL, THEODORE W	04	N	720827	VN
LERSETH, ROGER G	03	N	720906	VN
HEEREN, JEROME D	03	F	720911	VN
RATZLAFF, BRIAN M	03	F	720911	VN
MC MURRAY, FREDERICK C	03	F	720912	VN
ZUBERBUHLER, RUDOLPH U	03	F	720912	VN
WALSH, JAMES P	03	M	720926	VS
ONEIL, JAMES W	05	F	720929	VN
ALPERS, JOHN HARDESTY JR	03	F	721005	VN
BATES, RICHARD LYMAN	02	F	721005	VN
LATHAM, JAMES D	03	F	721005	VN
LEWIS, KEITH H	03	F	721005	VN
LATELLA, GEORGE F.	02	F	721006	VN
BRUNSON, CECIL H	02	F	721012	VN
YOUNG, MYRON A	03	F	721012	VN
MATTIX, SAM	--	V	721027	LA
ACOSTA, HECTOR MICHAEL	02	F	721209	VN
CERTAIN, ROBERT G	03	F	721218	VN
JOHNSON, RICHARD E	04	F	721218	VN
SIMPSON, RICHARD T	03	F	721218	VN
ALEXANDER, FERNANDO	04	F	721219	VN
BARROWS, HENRY CHARLES	03	F	721219	VN
BROWN, CHARLES A JR	03	F	721219	VN
WILSON, HAL K	03	F	721219	VN
ARCURI, WILLIAM YOUL	02	F	721220	VN
GELONECK, TERRY M	03	F	721220	VN
GRANGER, PAUL L	02	F	721220	VN
KLOMANN, THOMAS J	03	F	721220	VN
MADDEN, ROY JR	E5	F	721220	VN
MARTINI, MICHAEL R	02	F	721220	VN
WIELAND, CARL T	03	N	721220	VN
BEENS, LYNN RICHARD	03	F	721221	VN
HIGDON, KENNETH H	03	N	721221	VN
LOLLAR, JAMES L	E5	F	721221	VN
NAGAHIRO, JAMES Y	05	F	721221	VN
NAKAGAWA, GORDON R	05	N	721221	VN
BERNASCONI, LOUIS HENRY	05	F	721222	VN
CAMEROTA, PETER P	03	F	721222	VN
CONLEE, WILLIAM W	05	F	721222	VN
ORUMMOND, DAVID I.	03	F	721222	VN
GIROUX, PETER J	03	F	721222	VN
LEBLANC, LOUIS E JR	E7	F	721222	VN
MAYALL, WILLIAM T	02	F	721222	VN
MORGAN, GARY L	E5	F	721222	VN

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
SPONEYBERGER, ROBERT D	03	F	721222	VN
WILSON, WILLIAM W	02	F	721222	VN
YULL, JOHN H	05	F	721222	VN
RIESS, CHARLES F	03	F	721224	LA
COOK, JAMES R	E6	F	721226	VN
HUDSON, ROBERT M	02	F	721226	VN
LABEAU, MICHAEL H	03	F	721226	VN
VAVROCH, DUANE P	02	F	721226	VN
ANDERSON, JOHN WESLEY	03	F	721227	VN
JEFCOAT, CARL H	04	F	721227	VN
TRIMBLE, JACK R	02	F	721227	VN
WARD, BRIAN H	02	F	721227	VN
AGNEW, ALFRED HOWARD	04	N	721228	VN
CONDON, JAMES C	04	F	721228	VN
CUSIMANO, SAMUEL B	03	F	721228	VN
GOUGH, JAMES W	E7	F	721228	VN
LEWIS, FRANK D	03	F	721228	VN
KIENTZLER, PHILLIP A	04	N	730127	VS

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TAB D: Unaccounted for at Completion of Homecoming, 2 April 1973.

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
COTTON, JAMES PAUL		V		VS
INGRAM, ERIC STEPHEN		V		VS
DUFFY, CHARLES J		V	610113	LA
BANKOWSKI, ALFONS ALOYZE	E5	F	610323	LA
GARSIDE, FREDERICK THOMAS	E5	F	610323	LA
MAGEE, RALPH WAYNE	02	F	610323	LA
MATTESON, GLENN (NMN)	01	F	610323	LA
SAMPSON, LESLIE VERNE	E5	F	610323	LA
WEITKAMP, EDGAR WILKEN	W1	A	610323	LA
WESTON, OSCAR BRANCH JR	02	F	610323	LA
BIBER, GERALD MACK	E5	A	610422	LA
BISCHOFF, JOHN MALCOLM	E7	A	610422	LA
MOON, WALTER HUGH	04	A	610422	LA
GERBER, DANIEL A	--	V	620530	VS
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON	--	V	620530	VS
VIETTI, ELEANOR A	--	V	620530	VS
BLEWETT, ALAN L	--	V	620714	LA
PARKS, RAYMOND F	E6	A	620714	LA
SIMPSON, ROBERT LEWIS	03	F	620828	VS
ANDERSON, THOMAS EDWARD	E4	M	621006	VS
ACOBSEN, ELLWOOD L	--	V	630304	VS
CRUZ, RAPHAEL (NMN)	E5	F	630902	VS
MCKINNEY, NEIL BERNARD	02	F	630902	VS
PURCELL, HOWARD PHILIP	03	F	630902	VS
CHENEY, JOSEPH C	--	V	630905	LA
DEBRUIN, EUGENE H	--	V	630905	LA
HERRICK, CHARLES	--	V	630905	LA
DENTON, MANUEL REYES	E4	N	631008	VS
RITCHEY, LUTHER EDMOND JR	E3	M	631008	VS
WADSWORTH, DEAN AMICK	03	F	631008	VS
VERSACE, HUMBERTO ROQUE	03	A	631029	VS
CODY, HOWARD RUDOLPH	03	F	631124	VS
RORABACK, KENNETH M	E8	A	631124	VS
GORTON, THOMAS FREDERICK	03	F	631206	VS
HILL, RICHARD DALE	E3	F	631206	VS
ANGELL, MARSHALL JOSEPH	E5	A	631212	VS
HICKMAN, VINCENT JOSEPH	03	F	640114	VS
MITCHELL, CARL BERG	04	F	640114	VS
METOYER, BRYFORD GLENN	02	A	640118	VS
STRALEY, JOHN LEROY	E3	A	640118	VS
WHITESIDES, RICHARD LEBROU	03	F	640326	VS
GREER, ROBERT LEE	E2	M	640607	VS
SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T	E2	M	640607	VS
LEDBETTER, THOMAS ISAAC	03	A	640619	VS
TALLEY, JAMES LANE	E4	A	640619	VS
SATHER, RICHARD CHRISTIAN	02	N	640805	VN
JUTRER, FRED CLAY JR	03	F	640806	VS
KASTER, LEONARD LEE	02	F	640806	VS
GRAINGER, JOSEPH W	--	V	640808	VS
WALKER, KENNETH EARL	03	F	641002	VS
WOODS, LAWRENCE (NMN)	E6	A	641024	CB
DAWSON, DANIEL GEORGE	02	A	641106	VS
BLOOM, DARL RUSSELL	03	M	641113	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
NIPPER, DAVID	E3	M	641121	VS
SANSONE, DOMINICK (NMN)	E7	A	641210	VS
VADEN, WOODROW WILSON	04	F	641210	VS
TADIOS, LEONARD MASAYON	E5	A	641211	VS
PARKS, JOE	E7	A	641222	VS
BENNETT, HAROLD GEORGE	E4	A	641229	VS
COOK, DONALD GILBERT	03	M	641231	VS
DODGE, EDWARD RAY	E7	A	641231	VS
MCDONALD, KURT CASEY	03	F	641231	VS
HERTZ, GUSTAV	--	V	650202	VS
DICKSON, EDWARD ANDREW	03	N	650207	VN
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	650209	VS
FRAKES, DWIGHT GLENN	E7	N	650224	VS
SMITH, RICHARD D	03	F	650311	VS
CLYDESDALE, CHARLES FREDRI	02	N	650315	VS
HUME, KENNETH EDWARD	04	N	650329	VN
MCINLEY, GERALD WAYNE	02	N	650331	VN
SMITH, GEORGE CRAIG	02	F	650403	VN
DRAEGER, WALTER FRANK JR	03	F	650404	VN
MAGNUSSON, JAMES A JR	03	F	650404	VN
BAKER, ARTHUR DALE	03	F	650407	LA
LEWIS, JAMES W	03	F	650407	LA
ROARK, WILLIAM MARSHALL	03	N	650407	VN
FEAGAN, RONALD JAMES	01	N	650409	CH
MURPHY, TERENCE MEREDITH	02	N	650409	CH
SWANSON, WILLIAM EDWARD	02	N	650411	LA
WOODWORTH, SAMUEL ALEXANDE	03	F	650417	VN
WHEELER, JAMES ATLEE	03	F	650418	VS
SHEA, JAMES PATRICK	02	N	650420	VN
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN	03	F	650429	LA
STUBBERFIELD, ROBERT A	03	F	650506	VN
LAHAYE, JAMES DAVID	05	N	650508	VN
KARDELL, DAVID ALLEN	03	N	650509	VN
WISTRAND, ROBERT C	03	F	650509	LA
HRDLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	03	F	650518	LA
TAVARES, JOHN R	--	V	650518	VS
DONOVAN, LEROY MELVIN	E7	A	650519	VS
HARPER, RICHARD K	03	A	650519	VS
WALKER, ORLEN J	03	A	650523	VS
LYNN, DOYLE WILMER	05	N	650527	VN
CROSBY, FREDERICK PETER	04	N	650601	VN
AMSPACHER, WILLIAM HARRY J	E4	N	650602	VN
CHRISTIAN, DAVID MARION	02	N	650602	VN
MCMICAN, M D	02	N	650602	VN
PLANTS, THOMAS LEE	E5	N	650602	VN
ROMANO, GERALD MICHAEL	02	N	650602	VN
DALE, CHARLES ALVA	02	A	650609	VS
DEMMON, DAVID STANLEY	E5	A	650609	VS
COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR	E6	A	650610	VS
CURLEE, ROBERT LEE JR	E6	A	650610	VS
DOUGHTIE, CARL LOUIS	02	N	650610	VN
HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS	E5	A	650610	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HALL, WALTER LOUIS	02	A	650610	VS
JOHNSON, BRUCE G	03	A	650610	VS
OWENS, FRED MONROE	E7	A	650610	VS
SAEGAERT, DONALD RUSSELL	W1	A	650610	VS
HOLLAND, LAWRENCE THOMAS	04	F	650612	VS
SCHUMANN, JOHN ROBERT	04	A	650616	VS
ARMOND, ROBERT LAURENCE	03	F	650618	VS
GEHRIG, JAMES M JR	04	F	650618	VS
LOWRY, TYRRELL GORDON	03	F	650618	VS
MARSHALL, JAMES ALFRED	02	F	650618	VS
NEVILLE, WILLIAM EDWARD	E6	F	650618	VS
ROBERTS, HAROLD J JR	E7	F	650618	VS
WATSON, FRANK PETER	03	F	650618	VS
VAN CAMPEN, THOMAS CHARLES	E3	A	650624	VS
MONGILARDI, PETER NMN JR	05	N	650625	VN
JACKSON, CARL EDWIN	03	F	650627	VS
ROTH, BILLIE LEROY	E5	F	650627	VS
LINSEY, MARVIN NELSON	04	F	650629	VN
EISENBRAUN, WILLIAM F	03	A	650705	VS
WILLIAMSON, DON IRA	03	F	650707	VN
BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG	E6	M	650708	VS
DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS	E7	M	650708	VS
GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH	E8	A	650713	VS
TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	650713	VS
AVORE, MALCOLM ARTHUR	03	N	650718	VS
FOBARR, ROSCOE HENRY	03	F	650724	VN
KOSKO, WALTER	03	F	650727	VN
BROWN, EDWARD DEAN JR	02	N	650729	VS
WEATHERBY, JACK WILTON	03	F	650729	VN
HALL, WILLIAM W	04	F	650802	VS
BOWER, JOSEPH EDWARD	04	F	650803	VN
GRAY, HAROLD EDWIN JR	04	N	650807	VN
MAILHES, LAWRENCE SCOTT	02	N	650810	VS
BROWN, DONALD HUBERT JR	02	N	650812	VN
GOLLAHON, GENE RAYMOND	03	N	650813	VN
MELLOR, FREDRIC M	03	F	650813	VN
THOMAS, HARRY EUGENE	05	N	650813	VN
MCWHORTER, HENRY STERLING	03	N	650829	VN
TAYLOR, EDD DAVID	03	N	650829	VN
BRANCH, JAMES ALVIN	03	F	650904	VN
JEWELL, EUGENE M	02	F	650904	VN
LAGRAND, WILLIAM JOHN	W2	A	650905	VS
MARSHALL, RICHARD CARLTON	03	F	650905	VS
SHAW, EDWARD BRENDAN	02	N	650905	VN
GOODWIN, CHARLES B	02	N	650908	VN
RUDOLPH, ROBERT DAVID	02	N	650908	VN
GREEN, GERALD (NMN)	02	N	650912	VN
MOSSHAN, JOE RUSSELL	02	N	650913	VN
TAYLOR, NEIL BROOKS	02	N	650914	VS
KLEMDA, DEAN ALBERT	02	F	650917	VS
BARBER, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	N	650918	VN
VOGT, LEONARD FREDERICK JR	05	N	650918	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HAWKINS, EDGAR L	03	F	650920	VN
MARTIN, DUANE WHITNEY	02	F	650920	VN
OSBORN, GEOFFREY HOLMES	02	N	650924	VS
GARMWOOD, ROBERT RUSSELL	E2	M	650928	VS
CHESNUTT, CHAMBLESS M	03	F	650930	VN
CHMAN, MICHAEL D	02	F	650930	VN
KILLIAN, MELVIN J	06	F	650930	VN
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J	02	F	651001	VN
OFFUTT, GARY PHELPS	02	F	651001	VS
SCHARF, CHARLES J	03	F	651001	VN
POGREBA, DEAN ANDREW	05	F	651005	VN
SCHULER, ROBERT HARRY JR	03	F	651015	VN
MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS	03	N	651017	VN
OLMSTEAD, STANLEY E	04	N	651017	VN
PYLES, HARLEY B	04	F	651018	VS
SISSON, WINFIELD WADE	03	M	651018	VS
THORNE, LARRY ALAN	03	A	651018	VS
WORCHESTER, JOHN B	02	N	651019	VN
MANH, ROBERT LEE	03	F	651022	VS
MCWEEN, JAMES ARTHUR	02	F	651022	VS
WEGER, JOHN (NMN) JR	02	F	651022	VS
ADAMS, SAMUEL	E5	F	651031	VS
DUSTING, CHARLES GALE	E5	F	651031	VS
MOORE, THOMAS	E6	F	651031	VS
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD	04	N	651031	VN
BOWLES, DWIGHT POLLARD	03	F	651103	VN
MCCLEARY, GEORGE CARLTON	05	F	651105	VN
MCCLELLAN, PAUL TRUMAN JR	03	F	651114	VS
GREEN, DONALD GEORGE	03	F	651116	VN
BOWLING, ROY HOWARD	04	N	651117	VN
HIEMER, JERRY ALLEN	E4	A	651117	VS
TAYLOR, JESSE JUNIOR	04	N	651117	VN
TOMS, DENNIS LEROY	E2	N	651121	VS
DOUGLAS, THOMAS EVAN	E4	M	651122	VS
MILLER, RICHARD ARTHUR	03	M	651122	VS
PIRKER, VICTOR J	E4	M	651122	VS
VISCONTI, FRANCIS	03	M	651122	VS
WINKLER, JOHN ANTHONY	E2	N	651122	VS
RICHARDSON, STEPHEN GOULD	02	N	651130	VS
MCCORMICK, JOHN VERN	02	N	651201	VN
REITHMAN, THOMAS E	03	F	651201	VN
AUSTIN, CARL BENJAMIN	05	N	651202	VN
LOGAN, JACOB DRUMMOND	02	N	651202	VN
ROBERTS, GERALD RAY	04	N	651202	VN
JOHNSON, STANLEY GARWOOD	02	M	651203	VS
DIBBLE, MORRIS FREDERICK	E3	A	651205	VS
EISENBERGER, GEORGE JOE BU	E5	A	651205	VS
HYDE, JIMMY DON	E4	N	651205	VS
UPNER, EDWARD CHARLES	E6	A	651205	VS
CORLE, JOHN THOMAS	E4	M	651208	VS
CLARK, JERRY PROSPER	W1	A	651215	VS
WICKHAM, DAVID WALLACE II	03	N	651216	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HUDSON, HENRY M	--	V	651220	VS
JOHNSON, GUY D	04	N	651220	VN
JONES, EDWIN D	--	V	651220	VS
MIMS, GEORGE I JR	02	F	651220	VN
NORDAHL, LEE E	02	N	651220	VN
TRIER, ROBERT D	03	F	651220	VN
WAX, DAVID J	02	F	651220	VS
CARTWRIGHT, BILLIE JACK	05	N	651222	VN
GOLD, EDWARD FRANK	03	N	651222	VN
LUKENBACH, MAX DUANE	04	N	651222	VN
PRUDHOMME, JOHN DOUGLAS	03	N	651222	VN
CHRISTIANO, JOSEPH	04	F	651224	LA
COLWELL, WILLIAM KEVIN	E6	F	651224	LA
EILERS, DENNIS LEE	03	F	651224	LA
HASSENGER, ARDEN K	E5	F	651224	LA
JEFFORDS, DERRELL B	05	F	651224	LA
THORNTON, LARRY C	E7	F	651224	LA
BAILON, RUBEN	--	V	651225	VS
GRELLA, DONALD CARROLL	E5	A	651228	VS
PHELPS, JESSE DONALD	W2	A	651228	VS
RICE, THOMAS JR (NMN)	E4	A	651228	VS
STANCIL, KENNETH LEON	W3	A	651228	VS
HILL, ARTHUR SINCLAIR JR	03	N	651229	LA
RAWSTHORNE, EDGAR ARTHUR	05	N	651229	LA
KIRKSEY, ROBERT LOUIS	E3	A	660101	VS
MAC LAUGHLIN, DONALD C JR	02	N	660102	VS
CALLANAN, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660107	VS
GREENLEY, JON ALFRED	02	F	660107	VS
SCHIMBERG, JAMES PHILIP	E4	A	660109	VS
WILLIAMS, THADDEUS EDWARD	02	A	660109	VS
GODFREY, JOHNNY HOWARD	03	F	660111	VS
HOLLINGSWORTH, HAL T	01	N	660116	VS
NETH, FRED ALBERT	04	N	660116	VS
SCHOONOVER, CHARLES DAVID	04	N	660116	VS
WOOD, DON C	03	F	660116	LA
EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR.	02	M	660121	VS
FORMAN, WILLIAM S	03	N	660122	VN
FRENEYA, EDMUND HENRY	E3	N	660122	VN
GRISSETT, EDWIN R JR	E4	M	660122	VS
SENNETT, ROBERT R	E2	N	660122	VN
TEMPLIN, ERWIN BERNARD JR	02	N	660122	VN
BOOZE, DELMAR GEORGE	01	M	660124	VS
HELBER, LAWRENCE NEAL	01	M	660124	VS
PITT, ALBERT	03	M	660124	VS
SPRICK, DOYLE ROBERT	03	M	660124	VS
MCPHERSON, FRED LAMAR	04	F	660128	VS
BADOLATI, FRANK NEIL	E6	A	660129	VS
HODGSON, CECIL J	E7	A	660129	VS
TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE	E6	A	660129	VS
HAMILTON, EUGENE D	03	F	660131	VN
ALM, RICHARD ANDREW	04	M	660201	VN
COATES, DONALD LEROY	E6	M	660201	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HUMPHREY, GALEN FRANCIS	E7	M	660201	VN
LOHEED, HUBERT B	05	N	660201	VN
LUKER, RUSSELL BURT	E6	M	660201	VN
PREVOST, ALBERT MICHAEL	02	M	660201	VN
VLAKAKOS, PETER GEORGE	E6	M	660201	VN
BROWN, WILBUR RONALD	03	F	660203	VS
CARTER, JAMES LOUIS	04	F	660203	VS
HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR	02	N	660203	VN
PARSLEY, EDWARD MILTON	E4	F	660203	VS
WALLER, THERMAN M	E4	F	660203	VS
ASMUSSEN, GLENN EDWARD	E6	N	660205	VS
MCCONNAUGHAY, DAN DAILY	E4	N	660205	VS
SPARENBERG, BERNARD J	E7	N	660205	VS
HOPPS, GARY DOUGLAS	03	N	660210	VN
HUNTER, RUSSELL PALMER JR	03	F	660210	LA
KIEFEL, ERNST PHILIP JR	03	F	660210	LA
HILLS, JOHN RUSSELL	04	F	660214	LA
MAUTERER, OSCAR	04	F	660215	LA
MURRAY, JOSEPH VAUGHN	02	N	660218	VN
RUFFIN, JAMES THOMAS	02	N	660218	VN
SCHROEFFEL, THOMAS ANTHONY	02	H	660218	VN
HETRICK, RAYMOND HARRY	03	F	660224	LA
CAUSEY, JOHN BERNARD	03	F	660225	VN
NEWTON, DONALD S	E5	A	660226	VS
WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES	E3	A	660226	VS
CHRISTENSEN, WILLIAM MURRE	02	N	660301	VN
FRAWLEY, WILLIAM D	03	N	660301	VN
WOLOSZYK, DONALD J	02	N	660301	VN
WORST, KARL EDWARD	03	F	660302	LA
ANDREWS, STUART MERRILL	04	F	660304	VS
CONLON, JOHN FRANCIS III	02	F	660304	VS
HESSOM, ROBERT CHARLES	05	N	660305	VN
PAGE, GORDON L	04	F	660307	VN
SMITH, HAROLD VICTOR	03	F	660307	VN
WRIGHT, JERDY ALBERT JR	04	F	660307	VN
COLLINS, WILLARD MARION	03	F	660309	VS
FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE	E5	F	660309	VS
PETERSON, DELBERT R	02	F	660309	VS
TAYLOR, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	660310	VS
XAVIER, AUGUSTO MARIA	02	M	660310	VS
DAVIS, GENE EDMOND	E5	F	660313	VS
DIVALL, DEAN ARNOLD	E4	F	660313	VS
HENNINGER, HOWARD W	03	F	660313	VS
MORGAN, EDWIN E	E6	F	660313	VS
OLSON, GERALD E	03	F	660313	VS
PARKER, UDON (NMN)	E4	A	660313	VS
PASEKOFF, ROBERT E	03	F	660313	VS
PAULEY, MARSHALL I	E5	F	660313	VS
HILTON, ROBERT LARIE	E4	F	660314	VN
KLUTE, KARL EDWIN	03	F	660314	VS
PLETMAN, JAMES EDWARD	E4	F	660314	VN
HOLMES, DAVID HUGH	03	F	660315	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MCELROY, GLENN DAVID	05	A	660315	LA
NASH, JOHN MICHAEL	03	A	660315	LA
SCOTT, MARTIN R	03	F	660315	VN
STEWART, PETER J	05	F	660315	VN
UNDERWOOD, PAUL G	05	F	660316	VN
DAVIS, BRENT EDEN	02	M	660318	VN
MCPHERSON, EVERETT ALVIN	02	M	660318	VN
BEACH, ARTHUR JAMES	03	M	660320	VS
COMPTON, FRANK RAY	03	N	660321	VN
TIDERMAN, JOHN MARK	04	N	660321	VN
CLARK, DONALD E JR	03	F	660323	VN
DAWSON, CLYDE DUANE	04	F	660323	VN
HEWITT, SAMUEL EUGENE	E2	M	660323	VS
TAPP, JOHN BETHEL	04	N	660323	VS
BUSH, ROBERT EDWARD	03	F	660324	VN
SHERMAN, JOHN BROOKS	02	M	660325	VS
GRAYSON, WILLIAM RONALD	05	N	660401	VS
KRECH, MELVIN THOMAS	E6	N	660401	VS
LAWS, RICHARD LEE	03	N	660403	VN
BROWN, JAMES WILLIAM	E1	M	660405	VS
COOK, DENNIS PHILIP	03	N	660406	VS
GATES, JAMES W	03	A	660406	LA
LAFAYETTE, JOHN W	03	A	660406	LA
BARNETT, ROBERT RUSSELL	03	F	660407	LA
WALKER, THOMAS TAYLOR	03	F	660407	LA
CONWAY, JAMES BENNETT	03	A	660412	VS
GLASSON, WILLIAM ALBERT JR	04	N	660412	CH
HARRIS, REUBEN BEAUMONT	E2	N	660412	CH
JORDAN, LARRY M	02	N	660412	CH
PUGH, KENNETH W	E2	N	660412	CH
MAPE, JOHN CLEMENT	05	N	660413	VN
ZERBE, MICHAEL R	02	N	660415	VS
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE	02	N	660417	VN
ADAMS, LEE AARON	02	F	660419	VN
BROWN, JOSEPH ORVILLE	03	F	660419	LA
ROBBINS, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660419	LA
AUSTIN, ELLIS ERNEST	04	N	660421	VN
KELLER, JACK ELMER	04	N	660421	VN
WICKERSON, WILLIAM BREWSTE	02	N	660422	VN
WEIMORTS, ROBERT FRANKLIN	04	N	660422	VN
DYCKZKOWSKI, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	F	660423	VN
GOSS, BERNARD J	04	F	660423	VN
COOPER, WILLIAM EARL	05	F	660424	VN
ANDERSON, WARREN LEROY	03	F	660426	VN
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR	E4	A	660426	VS
TUCKER, JAMES HALE	02	F	660426	VN
BOSTON, LEO SIDNEY	03	F	660429	VN
BROWN, THOMAS EDWARD	02	N	660429	VN
BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR	02	F	660429	VN
EGAN, WILLIAM PATRICK	04	N	660429	LA
MULLEN, WILLIAM FRANCIS	03	M	660429	LA
WOOD, WALTER SUTTON	04	N	660502	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MALONE, JIMMY M	E2	A	660504	VS
DAWES, JOHN JAMES	E7	A	660505	VS
THOMAS, KENNETH D JR	02	F	660505	VH
DEXTER, BENNIE LEE	E3	F	660509	VS
BAILEY, JOHN EDWARD	03	F	660510	VN
FENELEY, FRANCIS JAMES	03	F	660511	VN
VILLEPONTEAUX, JAMES H JR	02	M	660511	VS
KING, DONALD L	03	F	660514	VN
RALSTON, FRANK DELZELL III	03	F	660514	VN
BALCOM, RALPH CAROL	03	F	660515	VN
JENSEN, GEORGE W	04	F	660515	LA
MADISON, WILLIAM L	E5	F	660515	LA
MCKENNEY, KENNETH DEWEY	E3	F	660515	LA
PRESTON, JAMES A	E5	F	660515	LA
REILLY, LAVERN G	04	F	660515	LA
TAPP, MARSHALL L	03	F	660515	LA
THOMPSON, GEORGE W	02	F	660515	LA
WILLIAMS, JAMES E	04	F	660515	LA
DEERE, DONALD THORPE	E4	A	660517	VS
GUILLET, ANDRE R	E3	F	660518	LA
HARLEY, LEE D	03	F	660518	LA
MOORE, WILLIAM JOHN	E4	F	660518	VS
WALL, JERRY MACK	E4	F	660518	VS
BUCKLEY, LOUIS JR	E5	A	660521	VS
THACKERSON, WALTER ANTHONY	E3	A	660521	VS
GLANDON, GARY ALVEN	02	F	660526	VS
GRIFFEY, TERRENCE HASTINGS	02	F	660526	VS
ALBERTON, BOBBY JOE	E5	F	660531	VN
CASE, THOMAS FRANKLIN	04	F	660531	VN
EDMONDSON, WILLIAM ROTHROC	02	F	660531	VN
HARMORTH, ELROY E	E3	F	660531	VN
HERROLD, NED R	02	F	660531	VN
MCDONALD, EMMETT RAYMOND	03	F	660531	VN
RAGLAND, DAYTON WILLIAM	05	F	660531	VN
SHINGLEDECKER, ARMON D	02	F	660531	VN
STEEN, MARTIN W	03	F	660531	VN
STICKNEY, PHILLIP J	E3	F	660531	VN
ZOOK, HAROLD J	02	F	660531	VN
ROSATO, JOSEPH FRANK	03	F	660602	VS
KRYSZAK, THEODORE E	03	F	660603	LA
MARTIN, RUSSELL D	02	F	660603	LA
MULLINS, HAROLD E	E6	F	660603	LA
ROSE, LUTHER L	E6	F	660603	LA
SMITH, HARDING EUGENE SR	05	F	660603	LA
WARREN, ERVIN	E5	F	660603	LA
SANDNER, ROBERT LOUIS	03	F	660607	CB
BUSH, ROBERT IRA	03	F	660609	VN
SHORACK, THEODORE JAMES JR	04	F	660609	VN
HARRIS, GREGORY J	E4	M	660612	VS
BURKART, CHARLES WILLIA JR	03	F	660613	LA
GIERAK, GEORGE GREGORY JR	02	N	660613	VN
GLANVILLE, JOHN TURNER JR	04	N	660613	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
KERR, EVERETT O	03	F	660613	LA
LAMBTON, BENNIE RICHARD	E7	N	660613	VN
ADAMS, OLEY NEAL	E5	F	660617	VS
CAIRNS, ROBERT ALEXANDER	E5	F	660617	VS
COBBS, RALPH BURTON	04	N	660617	VS
COLLETTE, CURTIS DAVID	E5	N	660617	VS
DEMPSEY, JACK ISHUM	E5	N	660617	VS
FRENG, STANLEY JON	E5	N	660617	VS
GRAVITTE, CONNIE MACK	03	F	660617	VS
HESS, GENE KARL	E5	F	660617	VS
ROMIG, EDWARD LEON	02	N	660617	VS
SAVOY, H J	E2	N	660617	VS
STEGWARTH, DONALD E	02	N	660617	VS
WASHBURN, LARRY EUGENE	E3	F	660617	VS
MCDONOUGH, JOHN RICHARD	03	N	660620	VN
TUNNELL, JOHN WALLACE	04	N	660620	VN
SULLIVAN, JOHN B III	02	F	660621	VN
SMITH, WARREN PARKER JR	03	F	660622	LA
BELKNAP, HARRY JOHN	01	N	660623	VN
NYMAN, LAWRENCE FREDERICK	02	N	660623	VN
ELLIS, WILLIAM JR	E3	A	660624	VS
MARIK, CHARLES WELDON	02	N	660625	VN
SMITH, GENE ALBERT	04	N	660627	VN
CAVALLI, ANTHONY FRANK	02	F	660628	LA
DUDLEY, CHARLES GLENDON	03	F	660628	LA
WOLFE, THOMAS HUBERT	03	F	660628	LA
PETERS, CHARLES HENRY	05	N	660701	VN
WILLIAMS, ROBERT CYRIL	04	F	660701	VN
GAGE, ROBERT HUGH	E4	M	660703	VS
PHILLIPS, DAVID JOSEPH JR	03	F	660703	VS
RENO, RALPH JOSEPH	E8	A	660703	VS
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT JR	04	F	660706	VN
MORGAN, CHARLES E	03	F	660706	VN
PHARRIS, WILLIAM VALRIE	E3	A	660707	VS
LONGANECKER, RONALD LEE	E3	M	660708	VS
WILKINS, GEORGE HENRY	04	N	660711	VN
KIPINA, MARSHALL F	E4	A	660714	LA
NOPP, ROBERT G	03	A	660714	LA
DIAMOND, STEPHEN W	02	F	660719	VN
WINTERS, DARRYL GORDON	E3	F	660719	VS
DILLON, DAVID ANDREW	E4	A	660720	VS
LEWIS, MERRILL R JR	03	F	660720	VN
NELSON, WILLIAM H	06	F	660720	VN
NOBERT, CRAIG R	02	F	660720	VN
TIFFIN, RAINFORD	03	F	660721	VN
WELLS, ROBERT JAMES	E3	A	660722	VS
SMITH, WILLIAM WARD	03	F	660723	VS
BOSSIO, GALILEO, FRED	04	F	660729	VN
CAMERON, VIRGIL KING	02	N	660729	VN
CHIARELLO, VINCENT AUGUSTU	02	F	660729	VN
CONKLIN, BERNARD	03	F	660729	VN
DI TOMMASO, ROBERT JOSEPH	02	F	660729	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HALL, JAMES S	E5	F	660729	VN
HOSKINSON, ROBERT E	03	F	660729	VN
LAWS, DELMER LEE	E7	A	660729	VS
MAITYA, JOHN M	E6	F	660729	VN
SMITH, HERBERT E	E6	F	660729	VN
FINNEY, ARTHUR THOMAS	05	F	660801	VN
KWORTNIK, JOHN C	03	F	660801	VN
BURNS, JOHN ROBERT	03	F	660801	VN
FRYER, CHARLES WIGGER	03	F	660804	LA
MORAN, RICHARD ALLAN	03	N	660807	VN
GOLBERG, LAWRENCE H	04	N	660807	VS
KOMMENDANT, AADO	03	F	660808	VN
WALLING, CHARLES MILTON	02	F	660808	VS
WYNNE, PATRICK E	03	F	660808	VS
ALLINSON, DAVID JAY	02	F	660808	VN
WRYE, BLAIR C	03	F	660812	VN
EATON, CURTIS ABBOT	04	F	660812	VN
FRANKLIN, CHARLES E	03	F	660814	VN
BRAND, JOSEPH W	03	F	660814	VN
KEMP, FREDDIE (NMN)	05	F	660817	VN
SINGER, DONALD M	E2	A	660817	VS
RYKOSKEY, EDWARD JAY	04	F	660817	VN
MILIKIN, RICHARD M III	E3	M	660818	VS
JOHNSON, JAMES REED	02	F	660820	VN
BULLARD, WILLIAM HARRY	E3	A	660821	VS
BABULA, ROBERT LEO	02	N	660825	VS
BODENSCHATZ, JOHN EUGEN JR	E2	M	660828	VS
BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR	E2	M	660828	VS
CARTER, DENNIS RAY	E2	M	660828	VS
HOFF, SAMMIE DON	E2	M	660828	VS
ROBINSON, KENNETH D	02	F	660830	VN
NICHOLS, HUBERT C JR	03	F	660830	VN
TRUJILLO, JOSEPH F	04	F	660901	VS
SALZARULO, RAYMOND PAUL JR	03	M	660903	VS
BUNDY, NORMAN LEE	E2	F	660904	VN
FISCHER, JOHN RICHARD	02	N	660906	VN
TATUM, LAWRENCE B	03	M	660909	VS
SPRAGUE, STANLEY GEORGE	04	F	660910	VN
COAKLEY, WILLIAM FRANCIS	04	F	660912	VN
STODDARD, CLARENCE W JR	04	N	660913	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN L	05	N	660914	VN
LEETUN, DAREL D	04	F	660916	VN
BROWN, FRANK MONROE JR	03	F	660917	VN
HENRY, DAVID ALAN	03	N	660919	VS
PARSONS, DON BROWN JR	02	N	660919	VS
PILKINGTON, THOMAS HOLT	02	N	660919	VN
BLOOM, RICHARD MCAULIFFE	02	N	660919	VN
AMMON, GLENDON LEE	02	M	660920	VS
BAUDER, JAMES REGINALD	03	F	660921	VN
MILLS, JAMES B	04	N	660921	VN
KNOCHER, CHARLES ALLEN	02	N	660921	VN
WHITTLE, JUNIOR LEE	03	N	660922	VN
	E4	A	660924	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BOSSMAN, PETER ROBERT	E4	N	660925	VS
CUSHMAN, CLIFTON EMMET	03	F	660925	VN
DUCAT, PHILLIP ALLEN	03	M	660925	VS
REITER, DEAN WESLEY	02	M	660925	VS
TICE, PAUL DOUGLAS	E3	M	660925	VS
MOSBURG, HENRY LEE	03	A	660926	VS
PHILLIPS, MARVIN FOSTER	E4	A	660926	VS
SPILMAN, DYKE AUGUSTUS	02	F	660927	VN
STINE, JOSEPH M	04	F	660927	VN
BRASHER, JIMMY MAC	02	A	660928	VN
PITTMAN, ROBERT EDWARD	E4	A	660928	VN
TAYLOR, DANNY GENE	E6	A	660928	VS
ECHEVARRIA, RAYMOND L	E8	A	661003	LA
JONES, JAMES E	E7	A	661003	LA
WILLIAMS, EDDIE L	E7	A	661003	LA
ANDREWS, WILLIAM RICHARD	03	F	661005	VN
BEENE, JAMES ALVIN	02	N	661005	VN
GILCHRIST, ROBERT M	02	F	661007	VN
KNIGHT, LARRY D	03	F	661007	VS
PABST, EUGENE M	02	F	661007	VN
TREECE, JAMES ALLEN	03	F	661007	VS
FELDMAN, JOHN ANTHONY	03	N	661008	VN
CONFER, MICHAEL STEELE	02	N	661010	VN
ELKINS, FRANK CALLIHAN	03	N	661012	VN
BORDEN, MURRAY LYMAN	02	F	661013	VN
MEADOWS, EUGENE THOMAS	02	F	661013	VN
THOMAS, DARWIN JOEL	01	N	661014	VN
ADAMS, STEVEN HAROLD	E3	F	661018	VN
ANGSTADT, RALPH HAROLD	04	F	661018	VN
CLARK, LAWRENCE	E5	F	661018	VN
HILL, ROBERT L	E6	F	661018	VN
LONG, JOHN HENRY SOTHORON	02	F	661018	VN
RACKLEY, INZAR WILLIAM JR	04	F	661018	VN
SHONECK, JOHN R	E5	F	661018	VN
BURKE, MICHAEL JOHN	E3	M	661019	VS
LEWANDOWSKI, LEONARD J JR	E2	M	661019	VS
HISHUK, RICHARD E	E2	M	661019	VS
EDWARDS, HARRY S JR	02	N	661020	VN
WAGENER, DAVID RAYMOND	03	F	661020	LA
EARLL, DAVID JOHN	03	F	661021	VN
HARRIS, HAROLD LEE	E3	A	661022	VS
KLEINERT, WILLIAM B	02	N	661022	VN
KOLSTAD, THOMAS C	04	N	661022	VN
MCBRIDE, EARL PAUL	04	N	661022	VN
GREEN, ROBERT BAILEY	E5	F	661025	LA
LEVAN, ALVIN LEE	E3	N	661025	VS
MORRISON, GLENN R JR	03	F	661026	VS
JOHNSON, DALE ALONZO	04	F	661027	VN
WEAVER, GEORGE ROBERT JR	E5	N	661101	VS
KLINE, ROBERT E	04	F	661102	VN
BRINCKMANN, ROBERT EDWIN	04	F	661104	VN
CONNOLLY, VINCENT J	03	F	661104	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HUNT, WILLIAM B	E6	A	661104	VS
SCUNGIO, VINCENT ANTHONY	03	F	661104	VN
CARTER, WILLIAM THOMAS	02	N	661110	VN
MCATEER, THOMAS JOSEPH	03	N	661110	VS
O'BRIEN, JOHN LAWRENCE	03	F	661110	LA
RIORDAN, JOHN MICHAEL	E4	N	661110	VS
SCHODERER, ERIC JOHN	E4	N	661110	VS
BUTT, RICHARD LEIGH	02	F	661111	VN
MEARNS, ARTHUR S	04	F	661111	VN
FROSIO, ROBERT CLARENCE	05	N	661112	VS
JONES, JAMES GRADEY	02	N	661112	VS
KEIPER, JOHN CHARLES	E4	M	661115	VS
RAVENNA, HARRY M III	03	A	661115	VS
TIMMONS, BRUCE ALLEN	E4	N	661115	VS
PIITTMANN, ALAN D	E3	F	661116	LA
ARNOLD, WILLIAM TAMM	02	N	661118	VN
JOHNSTONE, JAMES MONTGOMER	03	A	661119	VS
WHITED, JAMES LAFAYETTE	04	A	661119	LA
WILSON, GORDON SCOTT	02	F	661122	VN
GARDNER, GLENN VIRGIL	E2	A	661125	VS
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LEE	--	V	661125	VS
HOEFFS, JOHN HARVEY	E4	A	661128	VS
BOTT, RUSSELL PETER	E6	A	661202	LA
DUCAT, BRUCE CHALMERS	02	F	661202	VN
DYER, IRBY III (NMN)	E5	A	661202	LA
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	E	661202	VN
MCRAE, DAVID EDWARD	02	N	661202	VN
MOORBERG, MONTE LARUE	03	F	661202	VN
HYSTROM, BRUCE AUGUST	05	N	661202	VN
STARK, WILLIE E	E7	A	661202	LA
SULANDER, DANIEL ARTHUR	W1	A	661202	LA
WORRELL, PAUL L	01	N	661202	VN
BEGLEY, BURRIS NELSON	04	F	661205	VN
WARREN, ARTHUR L	03	F	661205	VN
CARLSON, JOHN WERNER	03	F	661207	VS
ASTRE, DONALD HENRY	05	F	661208	VN
HYDE, MICHAEL LEWIS	03	F	661208	VS
ALFRED, GERALD OAK JR	02	F	661211	VN
WATERS, SAMUEL E	03	F	661213	VN
BRIGHAM, ALBERT	E3	M	661214	VS
HOLMAN, GERALD ALLAN	02	N	661214	VS
KOENIG, EDWIN LEE	04	N	661214	VS
MOMREY, RICHARD LYNN	02	N	661214	VN
NEWELL, MICHAEL THOMAS	03	N	661214	VN
WILSON, CLAUDE DAVID JR	03	N	661214	VN
LUCAS, LARRY FRANCIS	03	A	661220	LA
LUM, DAVID ANTHONY	02	F	661220	VS
KERNS, ARTHUR WILLIAM	E2	A	661223	VS
REEVES, JOHN HOWARD	E3	M	661223	VS
BULLOCK, LARRY ALAN	E3	A	670101	VS
MENGES, GEORGE B	02	F	670102	LA
GAULEY, JAMES PAUL	03	F	670110	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
STOVES, MERRITT III (NMN)	E3	A	670110	VS
KEMP, CLAYTON C JR	E4	N	670112	VN
REINECKE, WAYNE C	E4	N	670112	VN
CANUP, FRANKLIN HARLEE JR	E5	N	670114	VS
WELCH, ROBERT J	03	F	670116	VN
COGDILL, WILLIAM KEITH	03	F	670117	LA
KROGMAN, ALVA RAY	02	F	670117	LA
WOZNIAK, FREDERICK J	02	F	670117	VN
WRIGHT, GARY G	04	F	670117	VN
MAJSEN, MARLOW ERLING	02	N	670118	VS
ASHBY, DONALD ROBERTS SR	04	N	670119	VS
EHRLICH, DENNIS MICHAEL	02	N	670119	VS
YARBROUGH, WILLIAM P JR	04	N	670119	VN
CONLEY, EUGENE OGDEN	05	F	670121	VN
HOGAN, JERRY F	02	N	670121	VN
SIMPSON, MAX COLEMAN	E3	A	670124	VS
WALLACE, ARNOLD BRIAN	E2	A	670125	VS
MORGAN, THOMAS R	03	F	670126	VS
THORNTON, WILLIAM DEMPSEY	E3	A	670128	VS
BIEDIGER, LARRY WILLIAM	04	F	670129	VN
SILVA, CLAUDE ARNOLD	02	F	670129	VN
BARDEN, HOWARD LEROY	03	F	670131	LA
KUBLEY, ROY ROBERT	03	F	670131	LA
MIYAZAKI, RONALD KAZUO	E4	F	670131	LA
MULHAUSER, HARVEY	03	F	670131	LA
WALKER, LLOYD FRANCIS	04	F	670131	LA
JOHNSON, AUGUST DAVID	E3	N	670203	VS
COLLAMORE, ALLAN PHILIP JR	03	N	670204	VN
DOBY, HERB	03	F	670204	VN
POOR, RUSSELL ARDEN	03	F	670204	VN
THOMPSON, DONALD E	03	N	670204	VN
WILBURN, WOODROW HOOVER	04	F	670204	VN
HALL, DONALD J	E5	F	670206	VN
HEISKELL, LUCIUS L	03	F	670206	VN
KIBBEY, RICHARD ABBOT	03	F	670206	VN
WOOD, PATRICK HARDY	04	F	670206	VN
CARLSON, PAUL VICTOR	02	N	670212	VS
SULLIVAN, MARTIN JOSEPH	04	N	670212	VS
WEISSMUELLER, COURTNEY E	03	F	670212	LA
MARVIN, ROBERT CLARENCE	03	N	670214	VN
GOODMAN, RUSSELL CLEMENSEN	04	F	670220	VN
BORJA, DOMINGO R S	E7	A	670221	LA
WRIGHT, ARTHUR	E4	A	670221	VS
HART, JOSEPH LESLIE	05	F	670225	LA
ALWAN, HAROLD JOSEPH	04	M	670227	VS
HUIE, LITCHFIELD PATTERSON	03	N	670227	VS
LETCHWORTH, EDWARD NORMAN	02	N	670227	VS
SAUSE, BERNARD JACOB JR	E3	N	670227	VS
ZEMPEL, RONALD LEE	E3	N	670227	VS
MOORE, JAMES R	E4	M	670228	VS
RICHARDSON, FLOYD W	04	F	670303	VN
ROBY, CHARLES D	05	F	670303	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
CARLOCK, RALPH LAURENCE	04	F	670304	LA
CARPENTER, HOWARD B	E5	A	670306	LA
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR	E4	A	670306	VS
MILLER, ROBERT LESTER	03	N	670307	VN
CRAIN, CARROLL OWEN JR	04	N	670308	VN
GALVIN, RONALD E	E2	N	670308	VN
PAWLISH, GEORGE F	02	N	670308	VN
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER	05	N	670309	VN
KARINS, JOSEPH J JR	03	F	670311	VN
ADRIAN, JOSEPH DANIEL	03	F	670312	VS
GOODRICH, EDWIN R JR	03	F	670312	VN
HARRIS, PAUL WINIFORD	E2	M	670313	VS
TERWILLINGER, VIRGIL BYRON	E3	M	670313	VS
FREDERICK, PETER J	05	F	670315	VN
SMITH, DEAN (NMN) JR	02	N	670315	VN
GOEDEN, GENE WILLIAM	02	N	670317	VN
MORRILL, DAVID WHITTIER	04	M	670318	VS
PARKER, MAXIM CHARLES	01	M	670318	VS
AUSTIN, JOSEPH CLAIR	05	F	670319	VN
CHARVET, PAUL CLAUDE	03	N	670321	VN
ELLISON, JOHN C	04	N	670324	VN
HALLBERG, ROGER C	E6	A	670324	VS
PLOWMAN, JAMES EDWIN	02	N	670324	VN
STEWART, JACK T	03	A	670324	VS
HISE, JAMES HAMILTON	02	N	670325	VS
PALENSCAR, ALEXANDER J 3D	03	N	670327	VN
GOVAN, ROBERT A	04	F	670401	LA
JOURDENAIS, GEORGE HENRY	03	F	670401	VS
STANLEY, ROBERT W	02	F	670401	VS
WILLIAMS, DAVID R	04	F	670401	LA
MARTIN, DAVID EARL	01	N	670404	VN
SZEYLLER, EDWARD PHILIP	03	N	670404	VN
PARKER, THOMAS AQUINAS	E6	N	670405	VS
SCHWORE, RONALD PAUL	E4	A	670409	VS
O'GRADY, JOHN FRANCIS	04	F	670410	VN
CLAY, WILLIAM CLIFTON III	03	M	670412	VS
CARLTON, JAMES EDMUND JR	03	M	670417	VN
MCGARVEY, JAMES MAURICE	04	M	670417	VN
HAMILTON, JOHN S	04	F	670419	VN
HAMILTON, ROGER D	E3	M	670421	VS
HASENBACH, PAUL ALFRED	E3	A	670421	VS
MANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO	E4	A	670421	VS
NIDDS, DANIEL R	E3	A	670421	VS
WINTERS, DAVID M	E3	A	670421	VS
AUSTIN, CHARLES DAVID	02	F	670424	VN
KNAPP, HERMAN L	04	F	670424	VN
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON	04	N	670424	VN
DUDASH, JOHN FRANCIS	04	F	670426	VN
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN	04	N	670426	VN
MEYER, WILLIAM M	03	F	670426	VN
BENTON, JAMES AUSTIN	E3	M	670427	VS
CASTRO, REINALDO ANTONIO	E5	M	670427	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DALLAS, RICHARD HOWARD	E3	M	670427	VS
DYER, BLENN COLBY	E3	M	670427	VS
OSBORNE, SAMUEL WILLIAM JR	E2	M	670427	VS
PENNINGTON, RONALD KEITH	E3	M	670427	VS
CARAS, FRANKLIN ANGEL	03	F	670428	VN
POLLIN, GEORGE J	02	F	670429	VN
STEPHENSEN, MARK L	04	F	670429	VN
MCPHEE, RANDY NEAL	E2	M	670430	VS
BAILEY, JOHN HOWARD	E5	M	670501	VS
CORFIELD, STAN LEROY	E5	M	670501	VS
GAUGHAN, ROGER CONRAD	E4	M	670501	VS
GUAJARDO, HILARIO H	E2	M	670501	VS
SMITH, CARL ARTHUR	E3	M	670501	VS
SOULIER, DUWAYNE	E2	M	670501	VS
MOORE, RALPH EDWARD	E3	A	670503	VS
GRAHAM, JAMES SCOTT	02	N	670504	VN
ROGERS, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	670504	LA
STEINER, THOMAS JACK	02	N	670508	VS
TODD, ROBERT JACY	E1	M	670509	VS
AHLMeyer, HEINZ JR	E1	M	670510	VS
MILLER, MALCOLM THOMAS	04	N	670510	VS
NETHERLAND, ROGER M	05	N	670510	VN
SHARP, SAMUEL ARTHUR JR	E3	M	670510	VS
TYCZ, JAMES NEIL	E5	M	670510	VS
ASHLOCK, CARLOS	E4	M	670512	VS
GRENZEBACH, EARL W	04	F	670512	VN
JEFFERSON, JAMES MILTON	02	F	670512	VN
PITMAN, PETER POTTER	03	F	670512	VN
STEWART, ROBERT ALLAN	04	F	670512	VN
HILL, CHARLES DALE	02	N	670515	VN
DODGE, RONALD WAYNE	E3	N	670517	VN
LEWIS, CHARLIE GRAY	E7	A	670517	VS
DELONG, JOE LYNN	E3	A	670518	VS
HELLBACH, HAROLD JAMES	03	M	670519	VS
KNIGHT, ROY A JR	04	F	670519	LA
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY	03	N	670519	VN
RICH, RICHARD	05	N	670519	VN
KEEFE, DOUGLAS ONEIL	E2	M	670520	VS
MADDOX, NOTLEY G	04	F	670520	VN
SIMPSON, WALTER STEPHEN	E6	A	670521	VS
WROBLESKI, WALTER F	W1	A	670521	VS
BACKUS, KENNETH FRANK	02	F	670522	VN
HOLMES, LESTER E	05	F	670522	VN
PERRINE, ELTON L	03	F	670522	VN
HOWITH, RICHARD WENDAL	03	N	670523	VN
PETTIS, THOMAS EDWIN	02	N	670523	VN
SCHMITTOU, EUREKA LAVERN	E5	N	670523	VN
SOUCY, RONALD PHILIP SR	E5	N	670523	VN
GRAVES, RICHARD CAMPBELL	01	N	670525	VN
BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON	03	F	670527	VN
GARNER, JOHN HENRY	E4	N	670529	VS
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E	E3	A	670531	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW	E5	A	670531	VS
MCGAR, BRIAN KENT	E3	A	670531	VS
CARRIER, DANIEL LEWIS	O2	F	670602	VN
ROCKETT, ALTON C JR	O3	F	670602	VN
WOOD, REX STEWART	O4	N	670602	VN
BODDEN, TIMOTHY ROY	E5	M	670603	LA
DEXTER, RONALD JAMES	E8	A	670603	LA
GARDNER, JOHN G	O2	M	670603	LA
HANSON, STEPHEN PAUL	O3	M	670603	LA
KEARNS, JOSEPH T JR	O3	F	670603	VN
LANEY, BILLY R	E7	A	670603	LA
SPRINGSTON, THEODORE JR	O4	F	670603	VN
ROBINSON, LEWIS MERRITT	O5	F	670604	LA
IBANEZ, DI REYES	E5	M	670605	VS
OWENS, JOY L	O4	F	670607	VN
SALE, HAROLD R JR	O2	F	670607	VN
APODACA, VICTOR JOE JR	O3	F	670608	VN
BUSCH, JON THOMAS	O2	F	670608	VN
MYERS, DAVID GEPHART	O2	M	670608	VS
PLATT, ROBERT L JR	E3	A	670610	VS
SHERMAN, PETER W	O5	N	670610	VN
BEECHER, QUENTIN RIPPETOE	W2	A	670611	VS
BOHLSCHIED, CURTIS RICHARD	O3	M	670611	VS
CHOMEL, CHARLES DENNIS	E2	M	670611	VS
CHRISTIE, DENNIS RAY	E3	M	670611	VS
CLINTON, DEAN EDDIE	W1	A	670611	VS
FOLEY, JOHN JOSEPH III	E3	M	670611	VS
GONZALEZ, JOSE JESUS	E3	M	670611	VS
HANRATTY, THOMAS MICHAEL	E2	M	670611	VS
HAVRANEK, MICHAEL WILLIAM	E3	M	670611	VS
KLEMM, DONALD M	O4	F	670611	VN
KODI, JAMES WILLARD	E3	M	670611	VS
MOSHIER, JIM EDWIN	E4	M	670611	VS
NELSON, JAMES R	E5	A	670611	VS
OLDHAM, JOHN SANDERS	O4	M	670611	VS
PEARSON, ROBERT HARVEY	O2	F	670611	VN
RIGGS, THOMAS F	W2	A	670611	VS
UHLMANSIEK, RALPH E	E4	A	670611	VS
WIDENER, JAMES EDWARD	E2	M	670611	VS
SWANSON, JOHN W JR	O3	F	670615	VN
GUILLOREY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E7	A	670618	VS
LEMMONS, WILLIAM E	O2	A	670618	VS
MCKITTRICK, JAMES C	O3	A	670618	VS
SPINLER, DARRELL JOHN	O3	F	670621	LA
SHERMAN, ROBERT C	E4	M	670624	VS
GILBERT, CLARENCE E	E2	M	670628	VS
ALLEN, MERLIN RAYE	E3	M	670630	VS
COLE, LEGRANDE OGDEN JR	O3	N	670630	VN
HOUSE, JOHN ALEXANDER II	O3	M	670630	VS
HOWARD, LUTHER HARRIS	E4	A	670630	VS
JUDD, MICHAEL BARRY	E4	N	670630	VS
KILLEN, JOHN DEWEY III	E3	M	670630	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
RUNNELS, GLYN LINAL JR	E4	M	670630	VS
KASCH, FREDERICK MORRISON	O2	N	670702	VN
WILSON, WAYNE V	E5	M	670702	VS
SEYMOUR, LEO E	E5	A	670703	LA
CRAIG, PHILLIP CHARLES	O3	N	670704	VN
FREDERICK, WILLIAM V	O3	F	670705	VN
AVOLESE, PAUL ANDREW	O4	F	670707	VS
BITTENBENDER, DAVID FRITZ	O3	F	670707	VS
BLANKENSHIP, CHARLES HERMA	O3	F	670707	VS
CRUMM, WILLIAM JOSEPH	O8	F	670707	VS
JONES, GEORGE EMERSON	O2	F	670707	VS
MCLAUGHLIN, OLEN BURKE	E7	F	670707	VS
TRITT, JAMES FRANCIS	E5	N	670707	VN
LEE, CHARLES RICHARD	O3	N	670709	VN
ALMENDARIZ, SAMUEL (NMN)	E7	A	670712	LA
DOVE, JACK PARIS SR	O3	F	670712	VN
SCHIELE, JAMES F	E4	A	670712	VS
SQUIRE, BOYD E	O4	F	670712	VN
SULLIVAN, ROBERT JOSEPH	E7	A	670712	LA
VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE	E4	A	670712	VS
CASSELL, ROBIN BERN	O2	H	670715	VN
FRYE, DONALD PATRICK	O1	N	670719	VN
JACKSON, WILLIAM BRAXTON	E5	N	670719	VN
MCGRANE, DONALD PAUL	E5	N	670719	VN
PETERSON, DENNIS WILLIAM	O3	N	670719	VN
DAVIS, DONALD VANCE	O4	N	670725	VN
JARVIS, JEREMY M	O2	F	670725	VN
LUNSFORD, HERBERT L	O4	F	670725	VN
BRAZIK, RICHARD	O2	F	670726	VN
CLAFLIN, RICHARD AMES	O3	F	670726	VN
BARE, WILLIAM ORLAN	O2	F	670727	VN
CORBITT, GILLAND WALES	O4	F	670727	VN
HARDIE, CHARLES DAVID	E5	N	670727	VN
PATTERSON, BRUCE MERLE	O1	N	670727	VN
BENNEFELD, STEVEN HENRY	E3	M	670729	VS
JOHNSON, RICHARD HERMAN	E3	M	670729	VS
BISCAILUZ, ROBERT LYNN	E3	M	670730	VS
BYARS, EARNEST RAY	E3	M	670730	VS
FREDERICK, DAVID ADDISON	O3	M	670730	VS
WATERMAN, CRAIG HOUSTON	O2	M	670730	VS
ALLEN, THOMAS RAY	O3	F	670731	VN
PACKARD, RONALD L	O2	F	670731	VN
PREWITT, WILLIAM ROLAND	E3	M	670801	VS
WINSTON, CHARLES C III	O3	F	670801	VN
CUNNINGHAM, CAREY ALLEN	O3	F	670802	VN
HYMDS, WALLACE G JR	O6	F	670802	VS
GOPP, THOMAS ALAN	E4	M	670803	VS
MCGRATH, JAMES PATRICK	E3	N	670803	VS
NAHAM, JOHN BENEDICT III	E3	M	670803	VS
WOLPE, JACK	E4	M	670803	VS
BISZ, RALPH CAMPION	O2	N	670804	VN
KEMMERER, DONALD R	O3	F	670806	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RI	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
PAGE, ALBERT L JR	03	F	670806	VN
CHERRY, ALLEN SHELDON	03	F	670809	VN
MCRAE, WILLIAM JOSEPH	E1	A	670809	VS
BERUBE, KENNETH ALLEN	02	M	670811	VS
DION, LAURENT NORBERT	05	N	670817	VN
HOM, CHARLES DAVID	02	N	670817	VN
BUCKLEY, JIMMY LEE	04	N	670821	CH
EBY, ROBERT GINO	--	V	670821	VS
MORRILL, MERWIN LAMPHREY	03	F	670821	VN
POWELL, LYNN KESLER	02	F	670821	VN
SCOTT, DAIN V	02	N	670821	VN
TREMBLEY, J FORREST GEORGE	02	N	670821	VN
KERR, JOHN CREIGHTON GILLE	04	F	670822	LA
MORGAN, BURKE HENDERSON	03	F	670822	LA
LANE, CHARLES JR	03	F	670823	VN
MIDNIGHT, FRANCIS B	02	F	670823	VN
NESS, PATRICK LAWRENCE	01	N	670823	VN
SITEK, THOMAS WALTER	04	N	670823	VN
SITTNER, RONALD NICHOLIS	03	F	670823	VN
ALLARD, RICHARD MICHAEL	E4	A	670824	VS
GOFF, KENNETH B	E2	A	670824	VS
HOLTZMAN, RONALD LEE	04	A	670824	VS
SCHELL, RICHARD J	03	A	670824	VS
BOIS, CLAIRE RONALD ALAN	E5	N	670825	VN
JACOBS, EDWARD JAMES JR	05	N	670825	VN
ZAVOCKY, JAMES JOHN	02	N	670825	VN
FULLER, WILLIAM O	03	F	670826	VN
KILCULLEN, THOMAS M	02	F	670826	VN
BACIK, VLADIMIR HENRY	04	M	670827	VN
BOGGS, PASCHAL GLENN	03	M	670827	VN
DEGNAN, JERRY L	--	V	670828	VS
WALLACE, CHARLES FRANKLIN	04	M	670828	VN
NEWBURN, LARRY STEPHEN	E3	A	670829	VS
ALLARD, MICHAEL JOHN	03	N	670830	VN
PERRY, RICHARD CLARK	04	N	670831	VN
JOHNSON, ROBERT DENNISON	04	N	670901	VS
OTT, EDWARD LOUIS III	E6	N	670901	VS
BENNETT, WILLIAM GEORGE	04	F	670902	VN
MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR	03	F	670903	VN
DOWNING, DONALD WILLIAM	03	F	670905	VN
HANSON, THOMAS PATTERSON	02	F	670905	VN
LAPORTE, MICHAEL LOUIS	E2	N	670905	VS
MILLER, CARL D	04	F	670905	VN
PRATHER, MARTIN WILLIAM	E3	M	670905	VS
RAYMOND, PAUL D	02	F	670905	VN
ANSPACH, ROBERT ALLEN	E8	A	670911	VS
PETERSEN, GAYLORD D	03	F	670911	VN
HAWTHORNE, RICHARD W	04	M	670912	VS
KANE, RICHARD R	03	M	670912	VS
REID, HAROLD E	E3	M	670913	VS
CYAWR, ROGER A	E2	M	670915	VS
GRUBB, PETER ARTHUR	02	F	670917	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
NELLANS, WILLIAM L	E3	F	670917	VN
PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO	03	M	670921	VS
VESCELIUS, MILTON JAMES	04	N	670921	VN
GEIST, STEPHEN J	E4	A	670926	VS
HUDDLESTON, LYNN R	02	A	670926	VS
MOE, HAROLD JOHN	02	M	670926	VS
GRAHAM, GILBERT JAMES	E3	N	670928	VS
MUSETTI, JOSEPH TONY JR	E5	N	670928	VS
OTT, PATRICK LEWIS	02	M	671002	VS
KING, RONALD RUNYAN	04	F	671003	VN
LILLUND, WILLIAM ALLAN	03	F	671004	VN
MCDANIEL, MORRIS L JR	04	F	671004	VN
ZOOK, DAVID HARTZLER JR	04	F	671004	VS
ARMSTRONG, FRANK ALTON III	04	F	671006	LA
APPLEBY, IVAN DALE	04	F	671007	VN
FULLAM, WAYNE E	04	F	671007	VN
HODGES, DAVID LAWTON	03	N	671007	VN
GUERRA, RAUL ANTONIO	E3	N	671008	VS
PINEAU, ROLAND ROBERT	E7	N	671008	VS
ROGGOW, NORMAN LEE	02	N	671008	VS
WOLFE, DONALD FINDLING	02	N	671008	VS
ZISSU, ANDREW GILBERT	02	N	671008	VS
DERRICKSON, THOMAS G II	03	F	671012	VN
HARDY, JOHN K JR	02	F	671012	VN
VAUGHAN, ROBERT REDDINGTON	04	N	671014	VN
APPLEHANS, RICHARD DUANE	03	F	671016	LA
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	03	F	671016	LA
CADWELL, ANTHONY BLAKE	E2	A	671017	VS
FITZGERALD, PAUL L JR	E5	A	671017	VS
FORTNER, FREDERICK J	02	N	671017	VN
HARGROVE, OLIN JR	E3	A	671017	VS
BARR, JOHN FREDERICK	04	N	671018	VS
OGDEN, HOWARD JR	E3	M	671018	VS
WOMACK, LONNIE HERMAN JR	E3	N	671020	VS
HEMMEI, CLARENCE JOSEPH	03	F	671021	VS
DOOLEY, JAMES EDWARD	02	N	671022	VN
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP	02	N	671024	VN
KROMMENHOEK, JEFFREY M	03	N	671025	VN
CONNER, LORENZA (NMI)	02	F	671027	VN
FANNING, HUGH M	03	M	671031	VN
KOTT, STEPHEN J	03	M	671031	VN
KNAPP, FREDRIC WOODROW	02	N	671102	VN
MORROW, RICHARD D	04	N	671102	VN
WRIGHT, JAMES J	02	N	671102	VN
EGGER, JOHN CULBERTSON JR	04	F	671103	VN
GRAUERT, HANS HERBERT	02	N	671103	VS
KRUST, PETER HERMAN	04	N	671103	VS
HAGERMAN, ROBERT W	04	F	671106	VN
ADAMS, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	671108	VS
EVERT, LAWRENCE G	03	F	671108	VN
HINES, VAUGHN MAURICE	E3	A	671108	VS
WEATHERMAN, EARL CLYDE	E2	M	671108	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ARMSTRONG, JOHN WILLIAM	05	F	671109	LA
BAXTER, BRUCE RAYMOND	E8	A	671109	LA
BROWER, RALPH WAYNE	03	F	671109	LA
CLAY, EUGENE LUNSFORD	E5	F	671109	LA
KUSICK, JOSEPH GEORGE	E5	A	671109	LA
MAYSEY, LARRY WAYNE	E4	F	671109	LA
NOLAN, MCKINLEY	E2	A	671109	LA
REHN, GARY LEE	E4	M	671109	VS
COOK, KELLY FRANCIS	05	F	671110	VN
CREW, JAMES ALAN	02	F	671110	VN
HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J JR	02	F	671110	VN
MORGAN, JAMES S	04	F	671110	VN
MARTINEZ-MERCADO, EDWIN JU	E3	A	671111	VS
SHAW, GARY FRANCIS	E3	A	671111	VS
STATON, ROBERT MILTON JR	E4	A	671111	VS
STUCKEY, JOHN STEINER JR	E2	A	671111	VS
CAYCE, JOHN DAVID	E3	N	671112	VN
ROARK, JAMES DAVID	E5	N	671112	VN
KMETYK, JONATHAN PETER	E3	M	671114	VS
CAPPELLI, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	671117	VN
EMRICH, ROGER G	03	N	671117	VN
MCGRATH, WILLIAM DARREL	05	N	671117	VN
DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR	04	F	671118	VN
HAUER, LESLIE J	04	F	671118	VN
LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W	03	F	671118	VN
CROXDALE, JACK LEE II	E4	A	671119	VS
DE HERRERA, BENJAMIN DAVID	E3	A	671119	VS
ESTES, WALTER O	02	H	671119	VN
IANDOLI, DONALD (NMN)	E5	A	671119	VS
KLINCK, HARRISON HOYT	03	F	671119	VN
TEAGUE, JAMES ERLAN	02	N	671119	VN
MARTIN, JOHN M	03	F	671120	VN
REYNOLDS, DAVID RICHARD	E3	A	671121	VS
FOLEY, BRENDAN PATRICK	04	F	671124	LA
MAYERICK, RONALD M	02	F	671124	LA
ABRAMS, LEWIS HERBERT	05	M	671125	VN
HOLDEMAN, ROBERT EUGENE	02	M	671125	VN
MIDGETT, DEWEY ALLEN	E2	A	671125	VS
SEARFUS, WILLIAM HENRY	05	N	671125	VN
BRENNAN, HERBERT OWEN	06	F	671126	VN
CONDIT, DOUGLAS CRAIG	02	F	671126	VN
JONES, LOUIS F	04	F	671129	LA
MILLNER, MICHAEL	E6	A	671129	VS
CROSBY, RICHARD ALEXANDER	E4	A	671202	VS
LEEPER, WALLACE WILSON	W2	A	671202	VS
MOREIDA, MANUEL J	E4	A	671202	VS
STRANGE, FLOYD W	W1	A	671202	VS
COLLINS, ARNOLD	E4	M	671204	VS
RUSSELL, DONALD M	04	F	671205	LA
PASTVA, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	M	671206	VS
LIRA, JOSE TRINADAD	E3	A	671209	VS
GRZYB, ROBERT H	--	V	671210	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BENNETT, ROBERT ELWOOD III	02	F	671213	VS
SCURLOCK, LEE D	E6	A	671221	LA
COOK, WILMER PAUL	04	N	671222	VN
FORS, GARY HENRY	03	M	671222	LA
POWERS, VERNIE HOMER	E3	A	671224	VS
BURNS, FREDERICK JOHN	E3	M	671225	VS
KOONCE, TERRY T	03	F	671225	LA
INNES, ROGER B	02	N	671227	VN
LEE, LEONARD MURRAY	04	N	671227	VN
MARTIN, SAMMY ARTHUR	02	F	671227	VN
CLAPPER, GEAN PRESTON	E5	F	671229	VN
CLAXTON, CHARLES PETER	04	F	671229	VN
CRUZ, CARLOS RAFAEL	03	F	671229	LA
DARCY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E5	F	671229	VN
ECKLEY, WAYNE ALVIN	E5	F	671229	VN
FISHER, DONALD E	05	F	671229	VN
FOSTER, PAUL L	E5	F	671229	VN
MCCRARY, JACK	E6	F	671229	VN
OSBORNE, EDWIN HELMS JR	03	F	671229	VN
PARKER, FRANK C III	03	F	671229	VN
POTTER, WILLIAM JOSEPH JR	03	F	671229	LA
VAN BUREN, GERALD GORDON	03	F	671229	VN
WENAAS, GORDON J	03	F	671229	VN
WILLIAMS, JAMES R	E4	F	671229	VN
SWORDS, SMITH III	04	F	671230	LA
WORTHAM, MURRAY L	02	F	671230	LA
BELCHER, GLENN ARTHUR	02	F	671231	LA
PEACE, JOHN DARLINGTON III	04	N	671231	VN
PERISHO, GORDON SAMUEL	-03	N	671231	VN
DENWISON, JAMES RICHARD	04	N	680101	VN
HANLEY, TERRENCE HIGGINS	02	N	680101	VN
HERRIN, HENRY HOWARD JR	01	N	680101	VN
ELLIS, BILLY J	E4	A	680103	VS
LANCASTER, KENNETH R	E4	A	680103	VS
MINNICH, RICHARD WILLIS JR	02	N	680104	VN
BRIGGS, ERNEST FRANK JR	E5	A	680105	LA
FANTLE, SAMUEL	03	F	680105	VN
FOULKS, RALPH EUGENE JR	02	N	680105	VN
GALLAGHER, JOHN THEODORE	E6	A	680105	LA
HAMILTON, DENNIS C	W1	A	680105	LA
HARTNEY, JAMES C	04	F	680105	VN
JONES, WILLIAM E	03	F	680105	VN
SCHULTZ, SHELDON D	W1	A	680105	LA
WILLIAMSON, JAMES D	E4	A	680105	LA
STONE, JAMES MARVIN	02	A	680107	VS
TRUJILLO, ROBERT S	E3	A	680107	VS
BIFOLCHI, CHARLES LAWRENCE	02	F	680108	VS
CANNON, FRANCES EUGENE	E2	A	680108	VS
FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM	E3	M	680108	VS
SMITH, HALLIE W	03	F	680108	VS
WILLIAMS, RICHARD F	E8	A	680108	VS
GREEN, NORMAN M	05	F	680109	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
IRSCH, WAYNE C	02	F	680109	LA
NEWTON, WARREN E	E4	A	680109	VS
PHIPPS, JAMES L	W1	A	680109	VS
RAMOS, RAINIER S	W1	A	680109	VS
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND	E3	A	680109	VS
SYKES, DERRI	E3	A	680109	VS
HOPPER, EARL PEARSON JR	02	F	680110	VN
ANDERSON, DENIS LEON	02	N	680111	LA
BUCK, ARTHUR CHARLES	02	N	680111	LA
MANCINI, RICHARD MICHAEL	E5	N	680111	LA
OLSON, DELBERT AUSTIN	05	N	680111	LA
ROBERTS, MICHAEL LAND	E5	N	680111	LA
SIOW, GALE ROBERT	E4	N	680111	LA
STEVENS, PHILLIP PAUL	02	N	680111	LA
THORESEN, DONALD NELLIS	E5	N	680111	LA
WIDOM, KENNETH HARRY	E5	N	680111	LA
COHRON, JAMES DERWIN	E6	A	680112	LA
PORT, WILLIAM D	E3	A	680112	VS
HORNE, STANLEY HENRY	04	F	680114	VN
SKARMAN, ORVAL HARRY	E5	M	680115	VS
BIGGS, EARL ROGER	E7	A	680116	VS
COOLEY, ORVILLE DALE	03	N	680116	VN
GEE, PAUL S	02	M	680116	VN
MORELAND, WILLIAM D	03	M	680116	VS
REEDY, WILLIAM HENRY JR	E4	N	680116	VN
THOMPSON, WILLIAM JOSEPH	04	N	680116	VN
WILKE, ROBERT F	05	F	680117	VN
BOLES, WARREN WILLIAM	02	N	680117	VN
ROEHRICH, RONALD L	02	N	680118	VN
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D	E3	A	680119	VS
MURRAY, PATRICK PETER	03	M	680119	VN
WALLACE, HOBART M JR	04	M	680119	VN
HOLLEY, TILDEN S	03	F	680120	VN
KETTERER, JAMES ALAN	02	F	680120	VN
COALSTON, ECHOL W JR	E5	A	680121	VS
ELLIOTT, JERRY W	E2	A	680121	VS
HILL, BILLY D	E6	A	680121	VS
KIMSEY, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W2	A	680121	VN
RAMSAY, CHARLES J	03	M	680121	VN
RAMSDEN, GERALD LEE	04	N	680123	VN
DUNN, MICHAEL E	03	N	680126	VN
EIDSMOE, NORMAN EDWARD	04	N	680126	VN
CORDOVA, ROBERT JAMES	E2	N	680127	VN
MILLS, JAMES DALE	03	M	680129	VS
WHITE, CHARLES E	E7	A	680129	CB
COCHEO, RICHARD NEWELL	--	V	680131	VS
LACEY, RICHARD J	E5	A	680131	VS
BLOOD, HENRY F	--	V	680201	VS
OLSEN, BETTY ANN	--	V	680201	VS
ADKINS, CHARLES LEROY	E4	A	680202	VS
BURNHAM, DONALD DAWSON	03	A	680202	VS
PATTON, KENNETH J	E5	A	680202	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
PRINGLE, JOE HAROLD	E7	A	680202	VS
PUGGI, JOSEPH D	E5	A	680202	VS
JOHNS, VERNON Z	E3	A	680203	VS
WIGGINS, WALLACE L	02	F	680203	VN
WILSON, MARION EARL	E3	A	680203	VS
EDGAR, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	680205	LA
GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY	W1	M	680205	VS
POTTER, WILLIAM TOD	02	F	680205	LA
BURNETT, DONALD FREDERICK	E8	N	680206	VS
CHAPA, ARMANDO JR	E4	N	680206	VS
FARRIS, WILLIAM F	E4	N	680206	VS
GALLAGHER, DONALD L	E7	N	680206	VS
HUSS, ROY ARTHUR	02	N	680206	VS
JONES, THOMAS PAUL	03	N	680206	VS
MCKAY, HOMER E	E5	N	680206	VS
NEWMAN, JAMES C JR	E6	N	680206	VS
THOMPSON, MELVIN CARL	E6	N	680206	VS
TRAVIS, LYNN MICHAEL	02	N	680206	VS
HANNA, KENNETH	E7	A	680207	VS
HOLT, JAMES W	E7	A	680207	VS
LINDEWALD, CHARLES W	E7	A	680207	VS
MORELAND, JAMES L	E4	A	680207	VS
PHILLIPS, DANIEL R	E5	A	680207	VS
GEORGE, JAMES E JR	E4	A	680208	VS
HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE	E4	M	680208	VS
LAPHAM, ROBERT GRANTHAN	04	F	680208	VS
ZAWTOCKI, JOSEPH S JR	E5	M	680208	VS
BROWN, HARRY WILLIS	E5	A	680212	VS
GROTH, WADE L	E4	A	680212	VS
GUNN, ALAN W	W2	A	680212	VS
ROE, JERRY L	02	A	680212	VS
DUNN, JOSEPH PATRICK	02	N	680214	CH
ELLIOT, ROBERT MALCOLM	03	F	680214	VN
MCMAHAN, ROBERT CHARLES	02	N	680214	VN
ASHBY, CLAYBORN WILLIS JR	E5	N	680217	LA
COONS, CHESTER LEROY	E4	N	680217	LA
DAWSON, FRANK ARTHUR	E3	N	680217	LA
DONATO, PAUL NICHOLAS	E6	N	680217	LA
HAYDEN, GLENN MILLER	05	N	680217	LA
KRAVITZ, JAMES STEPHEN	02	N	680217	LA
MARTIN, JAMES EDWARD	E3	N	680217	LA
THURMAN, CURTIS FRANK	03	N	680217	LA
WONN, JAMES CHARLES	01	N	680217	LA
DYE, MELVIN C	E5	A	680219	LA
GLOVER, DOUGLAS J	E6	A	680219	LA
GRIFFITH, ROBERT S	E5	A	680219	LA
LAUREANO, LOPEZ ISMAEL	E4	A	680220	VS
HUBLER, GEORGE LAWRENCE	03	M	680223	VS
HARTZHEIM, JOHN FRANCIS	E5	N	680227	LA
MILIUS, PAUL L	05	N	680227	LA
PALMER, GILBERT S JR	04	F	680227	LA
WRIGHT, THOMAS T	03	F	680227	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
COONS, HENRY ALBERT	04	N	680228	VN
HUNT, ROBERT W	E4	A	680228	VS
STEGMAN, THOMAS	03	N	680228	VN
FITTON, CROSLLEY J	04	F	680229	VN
HARRIS, CLEVELAND SCOTT	03	F	680229	VN
LANNON, RICHARD CLIVE	02	N	680301	VN
SCHOURICH, THOMAS EDWIN	04	N	680301	VN
WELSHAN, JOHN T	02	F	680303	VS
ANSELMO, WILLIAM FRANK	E5	F	680306	VS
COLOMBO, GARY LEWIS	E4	M	680306	VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT (NMN)	05	A	680306	VS
MITCHELL, GILBERT L	03	N	680306	VN
NELSON, RICHARD C	03	N	680306	VN
RIDS, NOEL LUIS	E5	F	680306	VS
SEWARD, WILLIAM HENRY	04	M	680306	VS
BLANTON, CLARENCE FINLEY	05	F	680311	LA
BOND, RONALD DALE	04	F	680311	VS
CALFEE, JAMES HENRY	E7	F	680311	LA
CALLOWAY, PORTER EARL	E5	A	680311	VS
DAVIS, JAMES WOODROW	E5	F	680311	LA
ETCHBERGER, RICHARD LOY	E9	F	680311	LA
GISH, HENRY GERALD	E5	F	680311	LA
HALL, WILLIS ROZELLE	E6	F	680311	LA
HOLLAND, MELVIN ARNOLD	E6	F	680311	LA
KIRK, HERBERT ARTHUR	E5	F	680311	LA
OLDS, ERNEST ARTHUR	04	F	680311	VN
PRICE, DAVID STANLEY	E4	F	680311	LA
RODRIGUEZ, ALBERT E	02	F	680311	VN
SHANNON, PATRICK LEE	E6	F	680311	LA
SPRINGSTEADAH, DONALD K	E6	F	680311	LA
WORLEY, DON FRANKLIN	E5	F	680311	LA
GRIFFITH, JOHN GARY	03	N	680312	VN
KOLLMANN, GLENN EDWARD	05	N	680312	VN
ROGERS, EDWARD FRANCIS	E2	M	680312	VS
BYRNE, JOSEPH HENRY	04	F	680313	LA
COLLINS, GUY FLETCHER	05	F	680313	LA
EVANS, CLEVELAND JR	E5	M	680313	VS
HEITMAN, STEVEN W	E5	A	680313	VS
WATSON, JIMMY L	W2	A	680313	VS
WESTBROOK, DONALD E	04	F	680313	LA
HAMM, JAMES E	02	F	680314	VS
ERICKSON, DAVID W	E2	M	680316	VS
KRAUSMAN, EDWARD L	E2	M	680316	VS
BARBER, THOMAS DAVID	E3	N	680317	VN
BENSON, LEE DAVID	02	N	680317	VN
COLLAZO, RAPHAEL LORENZO	E3	A	680317	VS
HENSLEY, THOMAS TRUETT	03	F	680317	LA
HUBBS, DONALD RICHARD	05	N	680317	VN
NIGHTINGALE, RANDALL JOHN	E5	N	680317	VN
ROSS, JLYNN JR	E3	A	680317	VS
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL	E3	A	680318	VS
SWITZER, JERROLD ALLEN	E2	M	680318	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
WILLIAMS, HOWARD K	03	F	680318	VN
BLAIR, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	680319	VS
ROMERO, VICTOR	E4	F	680319	VS
FELLOWS, ALLEN E	04	F	680320	LA
SAYRE, LESLIE BERKLEY	02	A	680320	VS
HESFORD, PETER D	02	F	680321	LA
STOMERS, AUBREY E JR	02	F	680321	LA
LYON, DONAVAN L	04	F	680322	LA
FRANKS, IAN JACK	E4	A	680323	VS
HATTORI, MASAKI (NMN)	04	A	680323	VS
ALLGOOD, FRANKIE EUGENE	05	M	680326	VS
EVANCHO, RICHARD	E3	M	680326	VS
GREEN, LARRY EDWARD	E4	M	680326	VS
KERR, ERNEST CLANEY JR	E3	M	680326	VS
LOMAX, RICHARD EUGENE	E4	A	680326	VS
HOWREY, GLENN WILLIAM	E4	M	680326	VS
BADLEY, JAMES LINDSAY	02	F	680327	VN
CALHOUN, JOHNNY C	E4	A	680327	VS
WHITTEKER, RICHARD LEE	03	F	680327	VN
ROYER, ALAN LEE	E5	A	680328	LA
BROWN, GEORGE RONALD	E8	A	680328	LA
GRAHAM, DENNIS L	03	F	680328	VN
GROSSE, CHRISTOPHER A JR	E5	A	680328	VS
HUSTON, CHARLES G	E5	A	680328	LA
MACCANN, HENRY ELMER	04	F	680328	VN
WALLACE, MICHAEL WALTER	04	N	680328	LA
CICHON, WALTER ALAN	E4	A	680330	VS
MULLEAVEY, QUINTEEN EMILE	E4	A	680403	VS
REXROAD, RONALD R	03	F	680403	VN
THOMAS, JAMES CALVIN	E3	M	680403	VS
TRIVELPIECE, STEVE MAURICE	E3	A	680404	VS
MATOCHA, DONALD JOHN	01	M	680405	VS
PEPPER, ANTHONY JOHN	E2	M	680406	VS
TRIMBLE, JAMES MITCHELL	E4	M	680406	VS
MCMURRAY, FRED HOWELL JR	02	A	680407	VS
LAWSON, KARL WADE	E4	A	680409	VS
CARVER, HARRY FRANKLIN	E6	A	680410	VS
PADGETT, SAMUEL JOSEPH	E7	A	680410	VS
WHITTEMORE, FREDERICK HERB	05	N	680411	VN
METZ, JAMES HARDIN	04	F	680415	VN
HELD, JOHN WAYNE	03	F	680417	VS
BLODGETT, DOUGLAS RANDOLPH	E4	A	680419	VS
DENNIS, WILLIAM ROY	E4	A	680419	VS
GONZALEZ, JESUS ARMANDO	E5	A	680419	VS
HOUSH, ANTHONY F	E6	A	680419	VS
LORD, ARTHUR J	03	A	680419	VS
MILLARD, CHARLES WORTH	W3	A	680419	VS
SHAFER, PHILIP R	E4	A	680419	VS
WALLACE, MICHAEL J	E5	A	680419	VS
WERDEHOFF, MICHAEL R	E6	A	680419	VS
WILBURN, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	680419	VS
CESTARE, JOSEPH ANGELO	02	M	680420	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
WALKER, WILLIAM JOHN	04	M	680420	VS
ZUTTERMAN, JOSEPH A JR	E5	M	680420	VS
CREAMER, JAMES EDWARD JR	E5	A	680421	VS
JAMERSON, LARRY C	E4	A	680421	VS
JOHNSON, FRANKIE B JR	E5	A	680421	VS
LINK, ROBERT C	W2	A	680421	VS
MACKEDANZ, LYLE E	E6	A	680421	VS
OLSEN, FLOYD WARREN	03	A	680421	VS
SPINDLER, JOHN GATES	01	M	680421	VS
CHOMYK, WILLIAM (NMN)	03	F	680422	VS
COOLEY, DAVID LEO	04	N	680422	VN
PALMGREN, EDWIN D	05	F	680422	VN
RIGGINS, ROBERT PAUL	04	F	680422	VS
PARKER, WOODROW WILSON II	02	F	680424	VN
VINSON, BOBBY G	05	F	680424	VN
CROSSMAN, GREGORY JOHN	02	F	680425	VN
GUILLORY, HUBIA JUDE	E3	A	680425	VS
KELLEY, DANIEL MARTIN	E4	A	680425	VS
MITCHELL, ALBERT C	04	F	680425	VN
SCOTT, DAVID LEE	E4	A	680425	VS
MCDANIEL, JOHN LEWIS	04	F	680426	VS
STOW, LILBURN RAY	04	F	680426	VS
TODD, LARRY RICHARD	E4	F	680426	VS
BORS, JOSEPH CHESTER	04	F	680428	VS
COOK, WILLIAM RICHARD	05	F	680428	VS
SAAVEDRA, ROBERT	04	N	680428	VN
GUILLEMIN, LOUIS F	03	F	680430	LA
PIETSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	680430	LA
STAEHLI, BRUCE WAYNE	E3	M	680430	VS
GERVAIS, DONALD PETER	E5	A	680501	VS
MARTIN, RICHARD D	E4	A	680501	VS
WHITMIRE, WARREN T JR	W1	A	680501	VS
ENGLANDER, LAWRENCE J	E5	A	680502	VS
AVERY, ROBERT DOUGLAS	02	M	680503	VN
CHANEY, ARTHUR FLETCHER	W1	A	680503	VS
CLARK, STEPHEN WILLIAM	03	M	680503	VS
CLEM, THOMAS DEAN	02	M	680503	VN
MCKAIN, BOBBY LYN	W2	A	680503	VS
TERRY, ORAL R	E3	A	680503	VS
KING, PAUL CHESTER JR	E3	A	680504	LA
KUSTIGAN, MICHAEL J	E7	N	680505	VN
MITCHELL, HARRY E	E8	N	680505	VN
ALDRICH, LAWRENCE LEE	E4	A	680506	VS
CONDREY, GEORGE THOMAS III	W1	A	680508	VS
DAYTON, JAMES LESLIE	W1	A	680508	VS
JENNE, ROBERT EARL	E4	A	680508	VS
JURECKO, DANIEL EDWARD	E4	A	680508	VS
VAN ARTSDALEN, CLIFFORD DA	E4	A	680509	VS
BLACKMAN, THOMAS JOSEPH	E2	M	680510	VS
COOK, JOSEPH FRANCIS	E3	M	680510	VS
CZERWONKA, PAUL STEVEN	E2	M	680510	VS
FLEMING, HORACE H III	02	M	680510	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
FRITSCH, THOMAS WILLIAM	E3	M	680510	VS
HEMPEL, BARRY LEE	E2	M	680510	VS
HEYNE, RAYMOND THOMAS	E3	M	680510	VS
KING, GERALD EUGENE	E4	M	680510	VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT CHARLES	E2	M	680510	VS
MCGONIGLE, WILLIAM DEE	E2	M	680510	VS
MILLER, GLENN EDWIN	E5	A	680510	VS
MITCHELL, DONALD WAYNE	E3	M	680510	VS
PERRY, THOMAS HEPBURN	E4	A	680510	VS
SARGENT, JAMES RAY	E3	M	680510	VS
JIMENEZ, JUAN MACIAS	E4	A	680511	VS
BUCHER, BERNARD LUDWIG	04	F	680512	VS
COEN, HARRY BOB	E3	A	680512	VS
CRAVEN, ANDREW JOHNSON	E3	A	680512	VS
HEPLER, FRANK MONROE	E5	F	680512	VS
LONG, GEORGE WENDELL	E3	F	680512	VS
MCELROY, JOHN LEE	04	F	680512	VS
MOORE, MAURICE HENRY	E4	A	680512	VS
HORELAND, STEPHEN CRAIG	02	F	680512	VS
ORR, WARREN ROBERT JR	03	A	680512	VS
RANSBOTTOM, FREDERICK J	01	A	680512	VS
SANDS, RICHARD EUGENE	E3	A	680512	VS
SIMPSON, JOSEPH L	E5	A	680512	VS
SKIVINGTON, WILLIAM E JR	E3	A	680512	VS
STULLER, JOHN CHARLES	E6	A	680512	VS
WIDDISON, IMLAY SCOTT	E4	A	680512	VS
WIDNER, DANNY L	E3	A	680512	VS
WILLIAMS, ROY C	E3	A	680512	VS
COTA, ERNEST KENO	E5	N	680514	VS
KARGER, BARRY EDWIN	02	N	680514	VN
CROSSON, GERALD JOSEPH JR	02	F	680516	VN
RICKEL, DAVID J	03	F	680516	VN
YOUNG, CHARLES L	E3	A	680517	VS
GIST, TOMMY E	03	F	680518	VN
MONROE, VINCENT DUNCAN	04	N	680518	VN
PADILLA, DAVID ESEQUIEL	E3	M	680518	VS
DAVIES, JOSEPH EDWIN	03	F	680519	VN
MCCUBBIN, GLENN DEWAYNE	02	F	680519	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN HARTLEY	E7	A	680520	LA
LEMCKE, DAVID EARL	E4	A	680521	VS
ADAM, JOHN QUINCY	E3	F	680522	LA
CHAMBERS, JERRY LEE	04	F	680522	LA
CREWS, JOHN HUNTER III	02	F	680522	VN
GLOVER, CALVIN C	E5	F	680522	LA
KNEBEL, THOMAS E	E3	F	680522	LA
MASON, WILLIAM HENDER	05	F	680522	LA
MCPHAIL, WILLIAM THOMAS	03	F	680522	LA
MITCHELL, THOMAS B	03	F	680522	LA
PATE, GARY	E4	F	680522	LA
RASH, MELVIN D	E3	F	680522	LA
STPIERRE, DEAN PAUL	03	F	680522	VN
COCHRAN, ISOM CARTER JR	E3	A	680523	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
LANE, GLEN O	E7	A	680523	LA
OWEN, ROBERT D	E6	A	680523	LA
RUCKER, EMMETT JR	05	F	680524	VS
SHANKS, JAMES LEE	04	F	680524	VS
HILL, JOSEPH ARNOLD	E3	M	680528	VS
SMITH, LEWIS PHILIP II	02	F	680530	LA
BERESIK, EUGENE PAUL	04	F	680531	VN
GATEWOOD, CHARLES HUE	E3	M	680531	VS
BRICE, ERIC PARKER	03	N	680604	VN
MCMAHUS, TRUMAN J	E3	M	680605	VS
HARPER, RALPH LEWIS	E3	M	680606	VS
LAPLANT, KURT ELTON	E3	M	680606	VS
PALACIOS, LUIS FERNANDO	E3	M	680606	VS
SANCHEZ, JOSE RAMON	E2	M	680606	VS
SPENCER, DEAN CALVIN III	E4	A	680607	VS
HOLDEN, ELMER LARRY	E5	F	680609	VS
LOCKER, JAMES D	E4	F	680609	VS
RITTICHER, JACK COLUMBUS	03	P	680609	VS
SCHMIDT, WALTER R JR	02	M	680609	VS
YEEND, RICHARD CAROLINUS J	03	F	680609	VS
FORD, RANDOLPH WRIGHT	04	N	680611	VN
CARTER, JAMES DEVRIN	W1	A	680613	VS
BOWMAN, FRANK (NMN)	E5	N	680616	VN
CHANDLER, ANTHONY GORDON	E5	N	680616	VS
RUPINSKY, BERNARD FRANCIS	02	N	680616	VN
WADLEIGH, CARL DENNIS	E4	A	680621	VS
BOOTH, JAMES ERVIN	02	F	680623	VN
CASEY, DONALD FRANCIS	05	F	680623	VN
CARPENTER, NICHOLAS MALLOR	03	N	680624	VN
CORNELIUS, JOHNNIE CLAYTON	02	F	680626	VN
WOODS, ROBERT FRANCIS	04	F	680626	VN
GIAMMERINO, VINCENT F	E3	A	680627	VS
JOHNS, PAUL F	04	F	680628	LA
OWEN, TIMOTHY S	E3	A	680629	VS
TIPPING, HENRY ALBERT	04	F	680702	VS
DEWBERRY, JERRY DON	E4	M	680705	VS
LAWRENCE, BRUCE E	02	F	680705	VN
SILVER, EDWARD D	04	F	680705	VN
MAHONEY, THOMAS PATRICK 3D	E3	M	680706	VS
BIRD, LEONARD ADRIAN	02	M	680713	VS
HURST, JOHN CLARK	03	M	680713	VS
MARTIN, LARRY E	03	F	680715	VN
CROSS, ARIEL LINDLEY	02	M	680717	VS
PARRA, LIONEL	03	M	680717	VS
SEABLOM, EARL FRANCIS	E3	A	680718	VS
FLAMAGAN, SHERMAN E JR	05	F	680721	VS
WILLING, EDWARD ARLO	E3	M	680721	VS
GOSEN, LAWRENCE DEAN	04	N	680723	VS
BUSH, JOHN ROBERT	02	F	680724	VN
GREILING, DAVID SCOTT	04	N	680724	VN
HACKETT, HARLEY B III	03	F	680724	VN
PARISH, CHARLES C	03	N	680725	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
FULLERTON, FRANK EUGENE	04	N	680727	VN
PATTON, WARD KARL	E6	N	680727	VS
AUXIER, JERRY EDWARD	E6	A	680729	VS
BEYER, THOMAS JOHN	03	F	680730	VS
BROMS, EDWARD JAMES JR	02	N	680801	VN
FOWLER, DONALD R	E4	A	680801	VS
HASTINGS, STEVEN M	E5	A	680801	VS
ROSS, JOSEPH S	02	F	680801	VN
RUSSELL, PETER J	02	A	680801	VS
THOMPSON, WILLIAM J	04	F	680801	VN
WOLFKEL, WAYNE B	04	F	680809	LA
HICKS, TERRIN D	03	F	680815	VN
GRANIELA, JOSE ANTONIO JR	E3	A	680816	VS
MCLEHON, MICHAEL OWENS	04	F	680816	VN
OVERLOCK, JOHN F	04	F	680816	VN
POWELL, WILLIAM E	02	F	680817	VN
COLLINS, THEOTHIS	E3	M	680819	VS
HOFFMAN, TERRY ALAN	E4	M	680819	VS
LINDBLOM, CHARLES DAVID	E6	N	680820	VS
ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO	E3	A	680822	VS
BERGEVIN, CHARLES LEE	02	F	680823	VN
FERGUSON, WALTER JR	E6	A	680823	VS
SETTERQUIST, FRANCIS L	02	F	680823	VN
HEEP, WILLIAM ARTHUR	03	N	680824	VN
LADIEWIG, MELVIN E	02	F	680824	VN
READ, CHARLES HAROLD W JR	04	F	680824	VN
PICK, DONALD WILLIAM	04	F	680827	VS
MILLER, ROBERT CHARLES	04	F	680828	LA
PHILLIPS, ELBERT AUSTIN	E6	F	680828	LA
ASHALL, ALAN FREDERICK	02	N	680829	VN
DUNCAN, ROBERT RAY	02	N	680829	VN
BARTOCCI, JOHN EUGENE	04	N	680831	VS
IRWIN, DOUGLAS	E2	M	680901	VS
KINKADE, WILLIAM L	02	F	680901	VN
FRAZIER, PAUL REID	E5	A	680903	VS
POSEY, GEORGE RAY	E3	N	680905	VS
DEICHELHANN, SAMUEL MACKAL	03	F	680906	VS
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE	E6	A	680908	VS
VAN DYKE, RICHARD HAVEN	02	F	680911	VN
MAXWELL, SAMUEL C	04	F	680912	VN
SHARK, EARL E	E5	A	680912	VS
DAVIS, EDGAR FELTON	03	F	680917	LA
CAPLING, ELWYN R	04	F	680919	VN
HOLT, ROBERT ALAN	03	M	680919	VN
LAVOO, JOHN ALLEN	03	M	680919	VN
KUHLMANN, CHARLES F	04	F	680922	LA
CALLAHAN, DAVID FRANCIS JR	04	N	680923	VN
BREINER, STEPHEN EUGENE	E2	M	680924	VS
MCCONNELL, JERRY (NMI)	E2	A	680924	VS
OLSON, BARRY ALLEN	E3	A	680926	VS
SMITH, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W1	A	680927	VS
DIXON, DAVID LLOYD	E4	N	680928	VS

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HALPIN, DAVID PAUL	E3	N	680928	VS
NEWBERRY, WAYNE ELLSWORTH	03	F	680929	LA
FIESZEL, CLIFFORD W	03	F	680930	VN
SMITH, HOWARD HORTON	04	F	680930	VN
SPINELLI, DOMENICK ANTHONY	03	N	680930	VN
VANRENSELAAR, LARRY JACK	02	N	680930	VN
ERWIN, DONALD EDWARD	05	N	681002	VN
SMITH, ROGER LEE	E4	A	681003	VS
LAWRENCE, GREGORY PAUL	E4	F	681005	LA
STRIDE, JAMES DANIEL JR	E6	A	681005	LA
WESTER, ALBERT DWAYNE	04	F	681005	LA
WARRELL, MARK V	E3	M	681009	VS
HANDRAHAN, EUGENE ALLEN	E4	A	681010	VS
HERREID, ROBERT D	E5	A	681010	VS
HUNT, JAMES D	03	N	681013	VN
MASTERSON, MICHAEL JOHN	03	F	681013	LA
ORELL, QUINLAN ROBERTS	05	N	681013	VN
MASON, JAMES PHILIP	E5	A	681017	VS
BRIDGES, JERRY GLEN	E5	A	681020	VS
DEITSCH, CHARLES EDWARD	W3	A	681020	VS
KNIGHT, HENRY C	W1	A	681020	VS
MELDAHL, CHARLES H	E5	A	681020	VS
STANTON, RONALD	E4	A	681020	VS
FINLEY, DICKIE W	E3	A	681021	VS
KNABB, KENNETH KEITH JR	03	N	681021	VN
TYLER, GEORGE E	04	F	681024	VN
THOMPSON, BENJAMIN ARTHUR	E6	A	681025	VS
EDMUNDS, ROBERT CLIFTON JR	02	F	681027	VN
CONNOR, CHARLES RICHARD	03	M	681028	VS
RICKER, WILLIAM ERNEST	03	N	681028	VS
STONEBRAKER, KENNETH ARNOLD	03	F	681028	VN
STROVEN, WILLIAM HARRY	03	F	681028	VN
BEZOLD, STEVEN NEIL	02	A	681029	VN
HARRISON, DONALD L	03	A	681029	VN
HUNTER, JAMES D	E3	A	681029	VS
SWANSON, ROGER W	E3	A	681031	VS
KENNEY, HARRY JOHN	E4	N	681101	VS
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD	--	V	681105	VS
TURNER, FREDERICK RAY	E3	M	681106	VS
ERSKINE, JACK D	--	V	681113	VS
BIRCHIM, JAMES DOUGLAS	02	A	681115	VS
COPLEY, WILLIAM MICHAEL	E4	A	681116	LA
KARST, CARL F	04	F	681116	VS
WIECHERT, ROBERT CHARLES	04	F	681116	VS
DERBY, PAUL DAVID	03	M	681117	VS
CORRIVEAU, ROBERT D	E4	M	681118	VS
LUTHBERT, BRADLEY GENE	03	F	681123	VN
FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE	02	F	681125	VN
MORRISON, JOSEPH C	04	F	681125	VN
THUM, RICHARD COBB	02	N	681125	VN
HARTNESS, GREGG	03	F	681126	LA
STUIFBERGEN, GENE PAUL	E5	F	681127	CB

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FULLNAME	LOSS_R#	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BADER, ARTHUR EDWARD JR	E5	A	681130	LA
FITTS, RICHARD A	E5	A	681130	LA
LABOHN, GARRY RUSSEL	E4	A	681130	LA
MEIN, MICHAEL HOWARD	E4	A	681130	LA
SCHOLZ, KLAUS D	E6	A	681130	LA
STACKS, RAYMOND C	02	A	681130	LA
TOOMEY, SAMUEL K III	04	A	681130	LA
BERRY, JOHN ALVIN	W1	A	681205	VS
EVANS, BILLY KENNEDY JR	E5	A	681205	VS
MORALES, FRANK ADRIAN	--	V	681206	VS
PIRRUCELLO, JOSEPH S JR	03	F	681208	LA
REX, ROBERT A	02	F	681208	LA
FORD, EDWARD (NMN)	E5	A	681209	VS
MINOR, CARROL WILLIAM	E3	N	681209	VS
SHIMEK, SAMUEL DALE	E4	A	681209	VS
GALBRAITH, RUSSELL D	03	F	681211	LA
ALBRIGHT, JOHN SCOTT II	02	F	681213	LA
CLARKE, FRED LEE	E6	F	681213	LA
DAILEY, DOUGLAS VINCENT	E5	F	681213	LA
DONAHUE, MORGAN JEFFERSON	02	F	681213	LA
DUGAN, THOMAS WAYNE	04	F	681213	LA
FANNING, JOSEPH PETER	02	F	681213	LA
MCGOULDRIK, FRANCIS J JR	04	F	681213	LA
WALKER, SAMUEL F JR	E5	F	681213	LA
BARRAS, GREGORY INMAN	04	F	681218	LA
PAYNE, NORMAN	E5	A	681219	LA
BOUCHARD, MICHAEL LORA	03	N	681220	LA
KENT, ROBERT D	03	M	681220	LA
MORIN, RICHARD G	02	M	681220	LA
ALLEE, RICHARD KENNETH	03	F	681221	LA
BROWNLEE, CHARLES RICHARD	04	F	681224	LA
KING, CHARLES D	E4	F	681225	LA
SCHERDIN, ROBERT F	E3	A	681229	CB
MCCANTS, LELAND S III	02	A	681230	VS
CLACK, CECIL JAMES	E3	A	690101	VS
LANE, MITCHELL S	03	F	690104	VS
NEELD, BOBBY G	04	F	690104	VS
WELSH, LARRY DON	E5	A	690107	VS
BYRD, HUGH MCNEIL JR	03	A	690109	VS
O'BRIEN, KEVIN	02	A	690109	VS
SPROTT, ARTHUR ROY JR	04	F	690110	VS
EATON, NORMAN DALE	05	F	690113	LA
GETCHELL, PAUL E	03	F	690113	LA
FICKLER, EDWIN JAMES	03	M	690117	VS
KUHLMAN, ROBERT J JR	02	M	690117	VS
SMITH, VICTOR A	03	F	690117	LA
COADY, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	F	690118	LA
ROSS, DOUGLAS ALAN	E5	A	690122	VS
SINGLETON, DANIEL E	02	F	690126	LA
UTLEY, RUSSEL K	04	F	690126	LA
CONGER, JOHN EDWARD JR	E3	A	690127	VS
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM EDWARD	04	F	690129	LA

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HOLTON, ROBERT E	03	F	690129	LA
LUNA, DONALD A	03	F	690201	LA
SWIGART, PAUL EUGENE JR	02	N	690205	VS
BRIGGS, RONALD DANIEL	02	A	690206	VS
CHRISTIANSEN, EUGENE F	E3	A	690206	VS
O'HARA, ROBERT CHARLES	E5	A	690206	VS
PADGETT, DAVID E	02	A	690206	VS
PARKER, DAVID WAYNE	E4	A	690206	VS
PARSONS, DONALD E	05	A	690206	VS
STANLEY, CHARLES I	W1	A	690206	VS
DELEIDI, RICHARD AUGUSTINE	03	M	690207	VS
CLARK, THOMAS EDWARD	03	F	690208	LA
KALIL, TANOS E	--	V	690208	VS
WILKINS, CALVIN WAYNE	E3	M	690208	VS
MEYERS, ROGER ALLEN	04	N	690209	VN
KROSKE, HAROLD W JR	02	A	690211	CB
ZUKOWSKI, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	690211	LA
CLARK, STANLEY SCOTT	05	F	690214	LA
STEVENS, LARRY JAMES	02	N	690214	LA
NIEDECKEN, WILLIAM CLINTON	02	N	690215	LA
WALSH, RICHARD A III	05	F	690215	LA
MOORE, JERRY L	E3	A	690216	VS
WOGAN, WILLIAM M	E4	A	690216	VS
BRUCHER, JOHN MARTIN	03	F	690218	VN
CHAPMAN, RODNEY MAX	04	N	690218	VN
JEROME, STANLEY MILTON	E6	N	690218	VN
SCHIMMELS, EDDIE RAY	E6	N	690218	VN
NEISLAR, DAVID PHILLIP	02	N	690220	VN
MACKO, CHARLES	04	F	690222	LA
PAXTON, DONALD E	05	F	690222	LA
PEARSON, WAYNE E	03	F	690222	LA
CAMPBELL, CLYDE WILLIAM	03	F	690301	LA
KELLER, WENDELL R	04	F	690301	LA
LOVEGREN, DAVID EUGENE	E4	A	690301	VS
MERONEY, VIRGIL K III	02	F	690301	LA
BOGIAGES, CHRISTOS C JR	04	F	690302	LA
EVANS, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E5	A	690302	CB
MAY, MICHAEL FREDERICK	E4	A	690302	CB
SMITH, WILLIAM M	E3	A	690303	VS
COLEMAN, JIMMY LEE	E3	A	690306	VS
MCDONNELL, JOHN TERRENCE	03	A	690306	VS
REX, ROBERT F	03	F	690309	LA
WALTERS, TIM LEROY	E6	A	690309	LA
LUNA, CARTER PURVIS	05	F	690310	LA
ROBINSON, FLOYD HENRY	E5	A	690312	VS
BARNES, CHARLES RONALD	03	A	690316	VS
BATT, MICHAEL LERO	E4	A	690316	VS
BOBE, RAYMOND EDWARD	E3	A	690316	VS
FOSTER, MARVIN L	04	A	690316	VS
SMITH, DAVID R	03	A	690316	VS
ARMITSTEAD, STEVEN RAY	02	M	690317	LA
DINAN, DAVID THOMAS III	02	F	690317	LA

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FINNEY, CHARLES E	03	M	690317	LA
MURPHY, BARRY DANIEL	E5	A	690318	CB
DAVIS, RICARDO GONZALES	E7	A	690320	LA
DAVIS, ROBERT CHARLES	03	F	690323	LA
WIDDIS, JAMES W JR	03	F	690323	LA
ARROYO-BAEZ, GERASIMO	E6	A	690324	VS
BOWERS, RICHARD LEE	03	A	690324	VS
HERRERA, FREDERICK D	E3	A	690325	VS
HICKS, PRENTICE W	E3	A	690325	VS
ROBERTS, RICHARD D	E5	A	690327	VS
CZERWIEC, RAYMOND GEORGE	04	F	690328	VS
BELCHER, ROBERT ARTHUR	02	F	690328	VS
MILLER, MICHAEL ANDREW	02	F	690329	LA
HESS, FREDERICK WILLIAM JR	E4	A	690330	VS
LATIMER, CLARENCE ALBERT	03	N	690331	LA
CARPENTER, RAMEY LEO	05	N	690331	LA
WHITE, DANFORTH ELLITHORNE	W1	A	690402	VS
POWERS, LOWELL S	02	A	690403	VS
ECKLUND, ARTHUR G	03	F	690403	VS
JEFFERSON, PERRY HENRY	04	F	690412	VS
DE SOTO, ERNEST LEO	02	F	690412	VS
HALL, FREDRICK M	03	F	690412	VS
LAMP, ARNOLD WILLIAM JR	W2	A	690413	VS
PIERSON, WILLIAM C III	W1	A	690416	VS
KOHYU, WILLIAM MICHAEL	E4	A	690417	VS
DAHILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD	E6	A	690417	VS
NEWTON, CHARLES V	E5	A	690417	VS
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F	02	F	690417	LA
WILLETT, ROBERT VINCENT JR	E4	A	690418	VS
ELLIS, RANDALL S	02	F	690422	LA
SCOTT, VINCENT CALVIN JR	05	F	690422	LA
VAN CLEAVE, WALTER SHELBY	E7	A	690424	CB
SHRIVER, JERRY M	04	F	690426	LA
EAST, JAMES BOYD JR	02	N	690428	VS
REARDON, RICHARD JOHN	02	F	690502	LA
MASCARI, PHILLIP LOUIS	03	M	690506	VS
BILLIPP, NORMAN KARL	02	M	690506	VS
HAGAN, JOHN ROBERT	04	F	690508	LA
BRASHEAR, WILLIAM JAMES	02	F	690508	LA
MUNDT, HENRY G II	E3	A	690510	VS
WALTERS, WILLIAM (NMN)	02	M	690511	VS
RYAN, WILLIAM C JR	02	A	690513	LA
BESSOR, BRUCE CARLETON	E4	A	690513	VS
BROOKS, JOHN HENRY RALPH	E4	A	690513	VS
MASUDA, ROBERT S	E3	A	690513	VS
MUNOZ, DAVID LOUIE	E7	A	690513	LA
SCOTT, MIKE JOHN	E1	M	690515	VS
WASHINGTON, BOBBY	02	F	690517	LA
STEWART, VIRGIL GRANT	E4	A	690518	VS
CUDLIKE, CHARLES JOSEPH	E2	M	690523	VS
BENTON, GREGORY REA JR	E5	A	690523	CB
RAMIREZ, ARMANDO (NMN)				

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MANSKE, CHARLES JEROME	03	F	690524	VS
MONTEZ, ANASTACIO (NMN)	E7	A	690524	VS
WEITZ, MONEK	E1	M	690525	VS
WILLIAMS, LEROY CHRISTOPHE	E2	M	690525	VS
BEANE, DOUGLAS G.	E1	M	690601	VS
LEMCOOL, ERNEST F	E2	M	690612	VS
STORY, JAMES CLELLON	E2	A	690613	VS
WARD, NEAL C	02	F	690613	LA
GRACE, JAMES W	03	F	690614	LA
KAHLER, HAROLD	04	F	690614	LA
SPARKS, DONALD L	E3	A	690617	VS
EVERETTE, EDWARD LOVE, JR.	E2	M	690618	VS
ROBERSON, JOHN WILL	E3	A	690622	VS
CONDIT, WILLIAM HOWARD JR	04	F	690623	VS
REED, TERRY MICHAEL	02	F	690623	VS
SAGE, LELAND CHARLES COOKE	02	N	690623	LA
JABLONSKI, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	A	690627	VS
FRANSEN, ALBERT M JR	E4	N	690702	VS
FALLON, PATRICK M	06	F	690704	LA
ANDRE, HOWARD VINCENT JR	04	F	690708	LA
SIZEMORE, JAMES ELMO	04	F	690708	LA
BANNON, PAUL WEDLAKE	04	F	690712	LA
PIKE, PETER X	02	F	690712	LA
BUTLER, DEWEY RENEE	E3	A	690714	VS
POLSTER, HARMON	02	F	690715	LA
WALKER, MICHAEL S	03	F	690715	LA
DAWSON, JAMES VERNON	03	F	690716	VS
SMILEY, STANLEY KUTZ	03	N	690720	LA
BRENNING, RICHARD DAVID	03	N	690726	VN
BURNS, MICHAEL PAUL	E4	A	690731	LA
NEAL, DENNIS PAUL	E3	A	690731	LA
BURD, DOUGLAS GLENN	02	F	690801	VS
CALLIES, TOMMY LEON	03	F	690801	VS
TALKEN, GEORGE FRANCIS	04	N	690802	VN
BECK, EDWARD EUGENE JR	E2	M	690809	VS
DOTSON, JEFFERSON SCOTT	02	F	690809	LA
GOURLEY, LAURENT LEE	03	F	690809	LA
JANOUSEK, RONALD JAMES	02	M	690809	VS
KANE, BRUCE EDWARD	E4	M	690809	VS
MICKELSEN, WILLIAM EMIL JR	03	N	690810	VN
HANSEN, LESTER ALAN	W2	A	690813	VS
DAVIS, DANIEL RICHARD	02	F	690818	LA
BOHLIG, JAMES RICHARD	02	M	690819	VS
FLANIGAN, JOHN NORLEE	03	M	690819	VN
MORRISSEY, RICHARD THOMAS	03	M	690819	VS
SMITH, ROBERT NORMAN	05	M	690819	VN
GRAF, ALBERT STEPHEN	02	M	690829	VS
ZIMMER, JERRY ALLEN	03	M	690829	VS
ESCOBEDO, JULIAN JR	E3	M	690901	VS
HELVIG, ROGER DANNY	03	F	690911	LA
STEARNS, ROGER HORACE	03	F	690911	LA
TRAMPSKI, DONALD JOSEPH	E2	A	690916	VS

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CLINE, CURTIS ROY	E2	A	690918	VS
CECIL, ALAN BRUCE	E5	A	690921	LA
JACKSON, JAMES W JR	E3	M	690921	VS
HUNTLEY, JOHN NORMAN	E3	A	690927	LA
CURRAN, PATRICK ROBERT	02	M	690929	LA
LONO, LUTHER A	04	M	690929	LA
BECK, TERRY LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
BELL, RICHARD WILLIAM	E4	N	691002	VN
BOWMAN, MICHAEL LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
DAYAO, ROLANDO CUEVA	E6	N	691002	VN
DEAN, DONALD CHESTER	E5	N	691002	VN
DILGER, HERBERT HUGH	03	N	691002	VN
ELLERD, CARL J	E5	N	691002	VN
FOWLER, JAMES JEWEL	E2	N	691002	VN
FOWLER, ROY G	E4	N	691002	VN
GAN, LEONARDO M	E7	N	691002	VN
GORE, PAUL EDWIN	E6	N	691002	VN
GORSUCH, WILLIAM D	E4	N	691002	VN
HILL, RAYFORD J	E4	N	691002	VN
KOHLER, DELVIN LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
KOSLOSKY, HOWARD M	E3	N	691002	VN
LEONARD, ROBERT B	E5	N	691002	VN
LIVINGSTON, RICHARD ALLEN	03	N	691002	VN
MONTGOMERY, RONALD WAYNE	E5	N	691002	VN
MOORE, WILLIAM R	E5	N	691002	VN
MOSER, PAUL KIERSTAD	E4	N	691002	VN
PRENTICE, KENNETH M	E5	N	691002	VN
SALAZAR, FIDEL G	E5	N	691002	VN
TERRELL, KEAVIN LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
TYE, MICHAEL JAMES	E4	N	691002	VN
VIADO, REYNALDO ROCILLO	E3	N	691002	VN
CUNNINGHAM, KENNETH LEROY	E2	A	691003	VS
GRAFFE, PAUL L	02	A	691003	VS
BOWER, IRVIN LESTER JR	E3	M	691006	VS
ALTIZER, ALBERT HAROLD	E3	A	691008	VS
WATKINS, ROBERT JAMES JR	W2	A	691008	VS
DRIVER, DALLAS ALAN	E4	A	691009	VS
GARBETT, JIMMY RAY	E4	A	691009	VS
MOORE, RAYMOND GREGORY	E4	A	691009	VS
SUYDAM, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	691009	VS
TURNER, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	691009	VS
MAXWELL, CALVIN WALTER	03	A	691010	VS
WEISNER, FRANKLIN LEE	02	A	691010	VS
BOOTH, LAWRENCE RANDOLPH	03	A	691016	LA
RATTIN, DENNIS M	E4	A	691016	LA
STUBBS, WILLIAM WENTWORTH	E5	A	691020	LA
COOK, GLENN RICHARD	02	F	691021	VS
ESPENSHIED, JOHN L	04	F	691021	VS
BYNUM, NEIL STANLEY	02	F	691026	LA
WARREN, GRAY D	03	F	691026	LA
HERRICK, JAMES W JR	02	F	691027	LA
GAUTHIER, DENNIS L	E3	A	691031	VS

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ADVENTIO, RUODOLPHO ANDRES	E3	N	691101	VS
BAILEY, DANIAL T	E3	A	691101	VS
PARTINGTON, ROGER DALE	03	M	691101	VS
CARROLL, PATRICK HENRY	02	F	691102	LA
WHITFORD, LAWRENCE W JR	05	F	691102	LA
BROWN, WILLIAM THEODORE	E6	A	691103	LA
NORTON, MICHAEL ROBERT	E2	A	691103	VS
SHUE, DONALD MONROE	E4	A	691103	LA
WALD, GUNTHER HERBERT	E5	A	691103	LA
ALFORD, TERRY LANIER	W1	A	691104	VS
CAVENDER, JIM RAY	W1	A	691104	VS
HANLEY, LARRY JAMES	03	F	691104	LA
KLIMO, JAMES ROBERT	E4	A	691104	VS
WARE, JOHN ALAN	E4	A	691104	VS
ECHANIS, JOSEPH YGNACIO	03	F	691105	LA
LEFEVER, DOUGLAS PAUL	03	F	691105	LA
BODAHL, JON KEITH	03	F	691112	LA
DENNANY, JAMES EUGENE	04	F	691112	LA
HELMICH, GERALD ROBERT	04	F	691112	LA
SMITH, HARRY W	03	F	691112	LA
TUCCI, ROBERT L	03	F	691112	LA
RAY, RONALD E	E6	A	691113	LA
SUBER, RANDOLPH BOTHWELL	E5	A	691113	LA
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE	04	N	691115	VS
BALDRIDGE, JOHN ROBERT JR	02	F	691120	LA
RENELT, WALTER A	05	F	691120	LA
COLLINS, RICHARD FRANK	04	N	691122	LA
DEUTER, RICHARD CARL	02	N	691122	LA
QUINN, MICHAEL EDWARD	03	N	691122	LA
JONES, GRAYLAND (NMN)	E3	A	691123	VS
BALAMOTI, MICHAEL DIMITRI	04	F	691124	LA
BROWN, EARL CARLYLE	03	F	691124	LA
COMER, HOWARD BRISBANE JR	W2	A	691124	VS
DEVISPALAERE, REXFORD JOHN	E4	F	691124	LA
FELLENZ, CHARLES R	E5	F	691124	LA
GANLEY, RICHARD O	03	F	691124	LA
GREWELL, LARRY I	E5	F	691124	LA
MATTHES, PETER R	02	F	691124	LA
WHITE, JAMES B	03	F	691124	LA
WRIGHT, DONALD L	E5	F	691124	LA
ROGERS, BILLY LEE	E3	N	691201	VN
DUNLAP, WILLIAM C	W2	A	691202	VS
SANDERLIN, WILLIAM D	E5	A	691202	VS
SHANLEY, MICHAEL HENRY JR	E5	A	691202	VS
VANDEN EYKEL, MARTIN D II	W2	A	691202	VS
CLARK, JOHN CALVIN II	03	F	691205	LA
DANIELSON, BENJAMIN FRANKL	03	F	691205	LA
HARROLD, PATRICK K	02	F	691205	LA
SCHUMACHER, JAMES K	E2	A	691215	VS
BUCKLEY, VICTOR PATRICK	03	N	691216	VN
LONG, CARL EDWIN	03	M	691220	VS
BURRIS, DONALD DEANE JR	W2	A	691222	LA

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KENNEDY, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	691222	CB
TROWBRIDGE, DUSTIN COWLES	02	N	691226	VS
FEATHERSTON, FIELDING W 3D	03	F	691230	LA
FERGUSON, DOUGLAS D	02	F	691230	LA
BROOKS, NICHOLAS GEORGE	03	N	700102	LA
FRYAR, BRUCE C	03	N	700102	LA
LINDSTROM, RONNIE G	02	F	700102	LA
WEST, JOHN THOMAS	03	F	700102	LA
WALTON, WILBERT	E2	A	700103	VS
BURNES, ROBERT WAYNE	02	M	700105	LA
ROBINSON, LARRY WARREN	04	M	700105	LA
HOFF, MICHAEL G	04	N	700107	LA
OCHAB, ROBERT (NMN)	03	F	700107	VS
ALLEN, WAYNE CLOUSE	E5	A	700110	VS
CROSBY, HERBERT CHARLES	03	A	700110	VS
GRAZIOSI, FRANCIS GEORGE	E4	A	700110	VS
HOWES, GEORGE ANDREWS	W3	A	700110	VS
CHORLINS, RICHARD DAVID	02	F	700111	LA
TUBBS, GLENN E	E5	A	700113	VS
ALCORN, MICHAEL E	E4	M	700127	VS
ANDERSON, GREGORY LEE	E4	F	700128	VN
BELL, HOLLY GENE	04	F	700128	VN
LEESER, LEONARD CHARLES	03	F	700128	VN
MALLON, RICHARD J	03	F	700128	VN
PANEK, ROBERT J SR	03	F	700128	VN
PRUETT, WILLIAM DAVID	E8	F	700128	VN
SHINN, WILLIAM CHARLES	E5	F	700128	VN
SUTTON, WILLIAM CARL	E7	F	700128	VN
LYON, JAMES MICHAEL	03	A	700205	VS
STEPHENSON, RICHARD CHARLE	02	N	700205	VN
KIEFFER, WILLIAM L JR	05	F	700211	LA
BRADSHAW, ROBERT SAMUEL 3D	02	M	700212	VS
BREEDING, MICHAEL HUGH	02	M	700212	VS
DAFFRON, THOMAS CARL	03	F	700218	LA
GILLEN, THOMAS ELDON	04	F	700218	LA
MORLEY, CHARLES FRANK	02	F	700218	LA
MOORE, SCOTT FERRIS JR	E4	N	700220	VS
SABOG, MATEO	E8	A	700225	VS
BOYLE, WILLIAM (NMN)	E7	A	700228	LA
MCVEY, LAVOY DON	03	M	700302	VS
SKIBBE, DAVID WILLIAM	01	M	700302	VS
PARKER, JOHN JACKSON	03	N	700304	VN
ROSENBAUGH, ROBERT PAGE	03	F	700305	VS
GATES, ALBERT HENRY JR	03	M	700307	VS
COTTEN, LARRY WILLIAM	02	F	700309	LA
PARCELS, REX LEWIS JR	02	N	700309	VN
ROBINSON, EDWARD (NMN)	E6	A	700309	VS
SCHOEPFNER, LEONARD JOHN	03	N	700309	VN
TERLA, LOTHAR GUSTAV T	03	F	700309	LA
SCULL, GARY BERNARD	01	A	700312	VS
AYERS, DARRELL EUGENE	E6	M	700319	VS
PUGH, DENNIS GERARD	02	F	700319	LA

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BUTLER, JAMES EDWARD	W1	A	700320	VS
COZART, ROBERT GORDON JR	03	A	700320	VS
GONZALES, DAVID	E5	M	700321	LA
HUDGENS, EDWARD MONROE	04	F	700321	LA
UNDERWOOD, THOMAS WAYNE	E6	M	700321	LA
BECCERRA, RUDY MORALES	E4	A	700324	CB
BORONSKI, JOHN ARTHUR	E6	A	700324	CB
GANDE, BERMAN JR	E4	A	700324	CB
HARNED, GARY ALAN	E5	A	700324	CB
HOSKEN, JOHN CHARLES	W1	A	700324	CB
ODONNELL, MICHAEL DAVIS	03	A	700324	CB
POOL, JERRY LYNN	02	A	700324	CB
ALLEN, HENRY LEWIS	02	F	700326	LA
ELZINGA, RICHARD G	03	F	700326	LA
DUFFY, JOHN EVERETT	02	F	700404	VS
YOUNG, JEFFREY JEROME	E3	A	700404	VS
CROPPER, CURTIS HENRY	03	N	700405	VN
BRASSFIELD, ANDREW THOMAS	E6	A	700406	LA
FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE	--	V	700406	CB
KLINGNER, MICHAEL LEE	03	F	700406	LA
STONE, DANA	--	V	700406	CB
BUSHNELL, BRIAN LEE	E3	N	700409	VN
HORCHAR, ANDREW ANTHONY J	E3	N	700409	VN
KNIGHT, LARRY COLEMAN	03	N	700409	VN
PPAFFMANN, CHARLES BROOKS	02	N	700409	VN
NELSON, JAN HOUSTON	02	M	700411	VS
BIVENS, HERNDON ARRINGTON	E4	A	700415	VS
AYERS, RICHARD LEE	04	F	700416	LA
RAUSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	700416	LA
WHEELER, EUGENE LACY	04	M	700421	VS
ADACHI, THOMAS YUJI	E5	F	700422	LA
BROOKS, WILLIAM LESLIE	04	F	700422	LA
DAVIS, CHARLIE BROWN JR	05	F	700422	LA
FISHER, DONALD G	04	F	700422	LA
GOLZ, JOHN BRYAN	02	N	700422	LA
HARRIS, STEPHEN W	E5	F	700422	LA
HENSLEY, RONNIE L	E5	F	700422	LA
IRELAND, ROBERT NEWELL	E7	F	700422	LA
LINT, DONALD M	E2	F	700422	LA
ROWLEY, CHARLES S	05	F	700422	LA
TOWLE, JOHN C	02	F	700422	LA
EADS, DENNIS KEITH	W1	A	700423	VS
GOMEZ, ROBERT A	02	F	700423	LA
LITTLE, DANNY LEONARD	E6	A	700423	VS
LUCKI, ALBIN E	03	F	700423	VS
MURPHY, LARRON D	03	A	700423	VS
CROSS, JAMES EMORY	03	F	700424	LA
REESE, GOMER DAVID III	03	F	700424	LA
HILL, JOHN RICHARD	03	A	700427	VS
SNIDER, HUGHIE FRANKLIN	E4	A	700428	VS
BISHOP, EDWARD JAMES JR	E3	A	700429	VS
GRIFFIN, RODNEY L	E4	A	700502	CB

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PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT	E4	A	700502	CB
RICHARDSON, DALE W	03	A	700502	CB
VARNADO, MICHAEL B	W1	A	700502	CB
YOUNG, ROBERT M	03	A	700502	CB
CHURCHILL, CARL RUSSELL	03	F	700503	LA
CONAWAY, LAWRENCE YERGES	05	F	700503	LA
HERNANDEZ, FRANK SANCHEZ	E5	A	700506	VS
KIER, LARRY GENE	E3	A	700506	VS
TERAN, REFUGIO THOMAS	E3	A	700506	VS
WORTHINGTON, RICHARD CHARL	W2	A	700506	VS
HAIGHT, STEPHEN HAROLD	E4	A	700509	VS
PREISS, ROBERT FRANCIS JR	E6	A	700512	LA
HUBERTH, ERIC J	02	F	700513	CB
TRENT, ALAN ROBERT	03	F	700513	CB
CONNER, EDWIN RAY	E8	N	700516	VS
SKEEN, RICHARD ROBERT	05	N	700516	VS
WESTWOOD, NORMAN PHILIP JR	03	N	700517	VN
LEE, GLENN HUNG NIN	02	F	700527	CB
DUKE, CHARLES R	--	V	700530	VS
MARK, KIT T	--	V	700530	VS
HANGEN, WELLES	--	V	700531	CB
HUGGINS, BOBBY GENE	04	F	700604	VS
WILSON, HARRY TRUMAN	E5	M	700604	LA
ALLOWAY, CLYDE DOUGLAS	E5	F	700607	VS
WILBRECHT, KURT MICHAEL	02	M	700607	VS
ELLIOTT, ANDREW JOHN	W2	A	700609	VS
HILBRICH, BARRY W	03	A	700609	VS
RYDER, JOHN L	02	F	700609	VS
PIERCE, WALTER MELVIN (MI	E3	A	700610	CB
COCHRANE, DEVERTON C	E6	A	700617	CB
LAKER, CARL JOHN	E4	A	700617	CB
DRAKE, CARL WILSON	04	F	700618	CB
GREEN, JAMES ARVIL	E3	A	700618	CB
MCLAMB, HARRY LAWRENCE	04	F	700618	CB
EARLE, JOHN STILES	03	N	700622	VS
GUMBERT, ROBERT WILLIAM JR	E3	A	700622	VS
PEDERSON, JOE PALMER	E7	A	700623	VS
PHILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL	E2	A	700623	VS
ROZO, JAMES MILAN	E4	A	700623	VS
ALDERN, DONALD DEANE	05	N	700629	LA
BELL, MARVIN EARL	E5	F	700630	LA
BURGESS, JOHN LAWRENCE	E5	A	700630	VS
DEAN, MICHAEL FRANK	E5	F	700630	LA
GOEGLEIN, JOHN WINFRED	04	F	700630	LA
HILL, GORDON C	02	F	700630	LA
JENKINS, PAUL LAVERNE	E7	F	700630	LA
SADLER, MITCHELL O JR	03	F	700630	LA
SANDERS, WILLIAM STEPHEN	03	F	700630	LA
SCHANEBERG, LEROY CLYDE	03	F	700630	LA
HARBER, STEPHEN J	E4	A	700702	VS
BOOKOUT, CHARLES FRANKLIN	E7	A	700704	LA
BEALS, CHARLES ELBERT	E4	A	700707	VS

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HOWARD, LEWIS JR.	E4	A	700707	VS
SCHULTZ, RONALD JAMES	E3	A	700721	VS
BLOODWORTH, DONALD BRUCE	O2	F	700724	LA
REED, JAMES WILLIAM	O3	F	700724	LA
GREGORY, PAUL ANTHONY	O3	N	700725	VN
BARTON, ALAN KEITH	E3	A	700728	VS
BROWN, DONALD ALAN	O3	F	700730	LA
CHAVEZ, GARY ANTHONY	O3	F	700730	LA
CROWLEY, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	700810	LA
BROWN, JAMES AUSTON	E4	A	700812	VS
BECKER, JAMES CHRISTOF	O2	A	700815	LA
SCHMIDT, PETER ALDEN	E4	A	700815	LA
HARRIS, HENRY A.	--	V	700816	VS
WELLONS, PHILLIP ROGERSON	O4	F	700817	VS
ROGERS, LYLE DOUGLAS	E3	A	700827	VS
PERALTA, BENJAMIN ROMANE	E4	A	700830	VS
HAUER, ROBERT D	O2	F	700905	VS
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBER	O2	M	700911	VS
MILLER, WYATT JR (NMN)	E2	A	700913	VS
DAVIDSON, DAVID ARTHUR	E6	A	701005	LA
GASSMAN, FRED ALLEN	E5	A	701005	LA
OTT, WILLIAM A	O3	F	701008	LA
SHAY, DONALD EMERSON JR	O3	F	701008	LA
CHESTNUT, JOSEPH LYONS	O4	F	701013	LA
MARTIN, JOHN BERNARD II	O3	N	701016	VS
STRAIT, DOUGLAS F	E4	A	701018	VS
WILSON, PETER JOE	E6	A	701019	LA
HEIDEMAN, THOMAS EDWARD	E7	F	701024	LA
DAY, DENNIS IRVIN	E4	A	701103	VS
DORITY, RICHARD CLAIR	E4	A	701103	VS
GINN, DAVID LANDRELL	E3	A	701103	VS
MANGUS, ARLIE ROBERT	E4	A	701103	VS
MARTIN, JERRY DEAN	E3	A	701103	VS
NORRIS, CALVIN ANDREW	E5	A	701103	VS
PANTALL, JAMES ROBERT	E3	A	701103	VS
SHEWMAKE, JOHN DANIEL SR	E6	A	701103	VS
WOODS, DAVID WALTER	E4	A	701103	VS
HUMPHREY, LARRY D	E5	A	701104	CB
MCKAY, CLYDE WILLIAM	--	V	701104	CB
CORONA, JOEL (NMN)	E3	A	701108	VS
BANCROFT, WILLIAM W JR	O2	F	701113	VN
WRIGHT, DAVID IRVIN	O4	F	701113	VN
KLUGG, JOSEPH RUSSELL	O3	N	701114	VN
MCINTOSH, IAN (NMI)	W1	A	701124	VS
SMITH, RONALD EUGENE	E7	A	701128	CB
STRINGER, JOHN CURTIS II	O2	A	701130	VS
GREEN, GEORGE CURTIS JR	E5	A	701204	LA
TAYLOR, WALTER JOSEPH JR	E3	A	701206	VS
DUCKETT, THOMAS ALLEN	O2	F	701212	LA
SKINNER, OWEN G	O4	F	701212	LA
DEUSO, CARROLL JOSEPH	E9	N	701215	VN
MCCOY, MERIL OLEN JR	O3	N	701215	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
OWEN, CLYDE C	E4	N	701215	VN
PIERSANTI, ANTHONY J JR	O2	N	701215	VN
BOOTH, GARY PRESTON	E4	A	701223	VS
MCANDREWS, MICHAEL WILLIAM	W1	A	701223	VS
WISEMAN, BAIN WENDELL JR	W1	A	701223	VS
LUNDY, ALBRO LYNN JR	O4	F	701224	LA
BUNKER, PARK GEORGE	O3	F	701230	LA
AYRES, JAMES HENRY	O4	F	710103	LA
HOLGUIN, LUIS GALLEGOS	W1	A	710103	VS
MAGEE, PATRICK JOSEPH	E6	A	710103	VS
OKERLUND, THOMAS RICHARD	W1	A	710103	VS
OMELIA, DENNIS WILLIAM	W1	A	710103	VS
PALEN, CARL ANTHONY	E5	A	710103	VS
PARSONS, MICHAEL D	O2	A	710103	VS
RHODES, FERRIS ANSEL JR	O3	A	710103	VS
STRATTON, CHARLES W	O3	F	710103	LA
BURTON, NIEL	E2	M	710104	VS
CRAMER, DONALD MARTIN	W2	A	710105	VS
MILLER, CARLETON PIERCE JR	O2	N	710106	VN
CULLEY, KEITH ROYAL WILSON	O5	N	710108	VN
HARWOOD, JAMES ARTHUR	E5	A	710115	VS
KINSMAN, GERALD FRANCIS	O2	A	710115	VS
MIRRE, ROBERT HENRY	O4	F	710117	VS
CARTER, GERALD LYNN	O2	N	710126	VN
LINEBERGER, HAROLD B	O4	F	710129	CB
MIXTER, DAVID IVES	E5	A	710129	LA
CARTWRIGHT, PATRICK G	E4	N	710131	VS
STANDERWICK, ROBERT L	O5	F	710203	LA
PAUL, JAMES LEE	W1	A	710205	VS
STEWART, PAUL CLARK	W2	A	710208	LA
PIETRZAK, JOSEPH RAY	E5	A	710210	VS
ROBERTSON, MARK JOHN	W1	A	710210	VS
MCLEOD, ARTHUR EDWARD	W1	A	710212	VS
WILKINSON, CLYDE DAVID	O3	A	710212	VS
CREAR, WILLIS CALVIN	E4	A	710215	LA
CRONE, DONALD EVERETT	E4	A	710215	LA
FIVELSON, BARRY FRANK	W1	A	710215	LA
LEONARD, MARVIN MAURICE	W2	A	710215	LA
POWERS, JOHN LYNN	E4	A	710215	LA
TAYLOR, JAMES HARRY	O1	A	710215	LA
HOSKINS, CHARLES L	O2	F	710216	LA
PATTILLO, RALPH NATHAN	O4	F	710216	LA
BERG, GEORGE PHILLIP	W1	A	710218	LA
CRANDALL, GREGORY STEPHEN	W1	A	710218	LA
DEMSEY, WALTER EDWARD JR	E4	A	710218	LA
ENGEN, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	A	710218	LA
JOHNSON, GARY LEE	E4	A	710218	LA
LEWELLEN, WALTER EDWARD	E4	A	710218	LA
LLOYD, ALLEN RICHARD	E5	A	710218	LA
WATSON, RONALD LEONARD	O3	A	710218	LA
WOODS, GERALD ERNEST	W1	A	710218	LA
HULL, JAMES LARRY	O2	F	710219	LA

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ACALOTTO, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	A	710220	LA
JOHNSON, RANDOLPH L	E5	A	710220	LA
MAY, DAVID M	O2	A	710220	LA
REID, JOHN ERIC	W1	A	710220	LA
HARRISON, LARRY GENE	E6	A	710226	CB
SWANSON, JON EDWARD	O3	A	710226	CB
BABCOCK, RONALD LESTER	O3	A	710227	LA
LEWIS, LARRY GENE	O2	N	710227	VS
MOONEY, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	710227	LA
BLACK, PAUL VERNON	W1	A	710301	CB
ZUBKE, DELAND DWIGHT	E5	A	710301	VS
DUBBELD, ORIE JOHN JR	O2	A	710303	VS
DUNCAN, JAMES EDWARD	E7	A	710303	VS
ALGAARD, HAROLD LOWELL	W1	A	710304	VN
HENTZ, RICHARD JAY	E5	A	710304	VN
HARKER, MICHAEL WAYNE	O3	A	710304	VN
OSBORNE, RODNEY DEE	E5	A	710304	VN
STRAWN, JOHN THOMAS	E6	A	710304	VN
HATLEY, JOEL CLINTON	E4	A	710305	LA
KING, MICHAEL ELI	E4	A	710305	LA
MOREIRA, RALPH ANGELO JR	W1	A	710305	LA
NELSON, DAVID LINDFORD	O3	A	710305	LA
HUMMEL, JOHN F	W1	A	710306	LA
MILLINER, WILLIAM PATRICK	W1	A	710306	LA
ARD, RANDOLPH JEFFERSON	W1	A	710307	LA
BURNETT, SHELDON JOHN	O5	A	710307	LA
GRANTHAM, ROBERT EUGENE	E4	A	710308	VS
HALE, JOHN DOUGLAS	O2	A	710308	VS
SMOOT, CURTIS R	E5	A	710310	CB
JEFFS, CLIVE G	O2	F	710312	VS
CREED, BARTON SHELTON	O3	N	710313	LA
SEXTON, DAVID MASON	E5	A	710315	VS
SCRIVENER, STEPHEN RUSSELL	O2	F	710316	LA
SEELEY, DOUGLAS MILTON	O3	F	710316	LA
BAUMAN, RICHARD LEE	W2	A	710317	CB
DIX, CRAIG MITCHELL	E4	A	710317	CB
HARRIS, BOBBY GLENN	E4	A	710317	CB
LILLY, LAWRENCE EUGENE	O2	A	710317	CB
BOFFMAN, ALAN BRENT	O2	A	710318	LA
BRANDT, KEITH ALLAN	O3	A	710318	LA
CRISTMAN, FREDERICK LEWIS	W1	A	710319	LA
GARCIA, RICARDO MARTINEZ	E5	A	710319	LA
SPARKS, JON M	W1	A	710319	LA
BARKER, JACK LAMAR	O4	A	710320	LA
CHUBB, JOHN JACOBSEN	E3	A	710320	LA
DILLENDER, WILLIAM EDWARD	E4	A	710320	LA
DUGAN, JOHN FRANCIS	O3	A	710320	LA
CLEVE, REGINALD DAVID	W1	A	710322	LA
HALL, WALTER RAY	E4	A	710322	LA
KNUTSEN, DONALD PAUL	E4	A	710322	LA
MORIARTY, PETER GIBNEY	O3	F	710322	LA
TRAYER, JOHN GROVE III	W1	A	710322	LA

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BECKWITH, HARRY MEDFOR III	E5	A	710324	VS
MCDONELL, R D (NFM/NMN)	E6	A	710325	VS
PUNTES, MANUEL RAMERIZ	E3	A	710325	VS
ROSSANO, RICHARD JOSEPH	E3	A	710325	VS
SALLEY, JAMES JR	E7	A	710331	VS
TERRILL, PHILIP B	E4	A	710331	VS
SMITH, JOSEPH STANLEY	O1	F	710404	CB
LILLY, CARROLL B	O3	F	710409	LA
BUERK, WILLIAM CARL	O3	F	710411	VS
CHAMPION, JAMES ALBERT	E3	A	710424	VS
LEMON, JEFFREY C	O3	F	710425	LA
ODOM, CHESTER RANDY II	E1	A	710425	VS
SIGAFOS, WALTER HARRI III	O2	F	710425	LA
KRUPA, FREDERICK	O6	A	710427	VS
BINGHAM, KLAUS JURGEN	E6	A	710510	VS
LUTTRELL, JAMES M	E6	A	710510	VS
WALTON, LEWIS C	E6	A	710510	VS
CROOK, ELLIOTT	E4	A	710516	VS
FARLOW, CRAIG L	W1	A	710516	VS
JACOBSEN, TIMOTHY J	E4	A	710516	VS
NOLAN, JOSEPH PAUL JR	O2	A	710516	VS
PEARCE, DALE ALLEN	W1	A	710517	VS
SOYLAND, DAVID PECOR	W1	A	710517	VS
ENTRICAN, DANNY D	O2	A	710518	VS
KNUCKEY, THOMAS WILLIAM	O2	A	710527	CB
TAYLOR, PHILLIP CHARLES	E5	A	710527	CB
CHAVIRA, STEPHEN (NMN)	E4	A	710528	VS
URQUHART, PAUL DEAN	O3	A	710528	VS
BRUNSON, JACK WALTER	W2	A	710531	LA
MUSIL, CLINTON ALLAN SR	O3	A	710531	LA
MAGERS, PAUL GERALD	O2	A	710601	VS
WANN, DONALD LYNN	W2	A	710601	VS
JONES, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	710605	VS
WILSON, RICHARD JR (NMN)	E3	A	710614	VS
BIDWELL, BARRY ALAN	E5	N	710618	VN
DEBLASIO, RAYMOND VINCE JR	O2	N	710618	VN
PAINTER, JOHN ROBERT JR	O3	N	710618	VN
METZLER, CHARLES D	O5	N	710621	VN
STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXAND	E5	A	710622	VS
BRIDGES, PHILIP WAYNE	E4	A	710630	VS
CARR, DONALD GENE	O3	A	710706	LA
THOMAS, DANIEL W	O2	F	710706	LA
TAYLOR, TED JAMES	O3	A	710715	VS
ASTON, JAY STEVEN	W1	A	710718	VS
ANTUNIANO, GREGORY ALFRED	E5	A	710724	CB
DALTON, RANDALL DAVID	E4	A	710724	CB
BERG, BRUCE ALLAN	E5	A	710807	VS
BATES, PAUL JENNINGS JR	O3	A	710810	VS
DOLAN, THOMAS ALBERT	E5	A	710810	VS
KENNEDY, JOHN W	O2	F	710816	VS
KUYKENDALL, WILLIE CLYDE	E3	A	710818	VS
WEAKS, MELVIN LEE	E3	A	710818	VS

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VENNIK, ROBERT NICHOLAS	E6	A	710826	VS
CORNWELL, LEROY JASON III	03	F	710910	LA
IVAN, ANDREW JR	03	F	710910	LA
BOND, RONALD LESLIE	02	F	710930	LA
DONOVAN, MICHAEL LEO	03	F	710930	LA
GARRETT, MAURICE EDWIN JR	03	A	711022	VS
EVELAND, MICKEY EUGENE	E4	A	711026	VS
FINGER, SANFORD IRA	E6	A	711026	VS
GREEN, THOMAS FREDERICK	E2	A	711026	VS
LAUTZENHEISER, MICHAEL (NM)	E5	A	711026	VS
NICKOL, ROBERT ALLEN	E5	A	711026	VS
TRUDEAU, ALBERT RAYMOND	W1	A	711026	VS
OAKLEY, LINUS LABIN	E4	F	711029	VS
DECAIRE, JACK LEONARD	E6	A	711103	VS
ALTUS, ROBERT WAYNE	03	F	711123	LA
PHELPS, WILLIAM	02	F	711123	LA
THOMAS, JAMES R	E6	F	711125	VS
BEUTEL, ROBERT DONALD	02	F	711126	LA
STEADMAN, JAMES E	03	F	711126	LA
MCINTIRE, SCOTT WINSTON	05	F	711210	LA
BOYANOWSKI, JOHN GORDON	05	A	711214	VS
BREMER, DWIGHT AMOS	E4	A	711214	VS
CALDWELL, FLOYD DEAN	E6	A	711214	VS
HOLLINGER, GREGG NEYMAN	03	A	711214	VS
PERKINS, CECIL CARRINGTON	03	A	711214	VS
PERRY, OTHA LEE	W2	A	711214	VS
FORAME, PETER CHARLES	02	A	711219	CB
POYNOR, DANIEL ROBERTS	02	F	711219	LA
SKILES, THOMAS WILLIAM	W1	A	711219	CB
THOMAS, LEO TARLTON JR	03	F	711219	LA
FINN, WILLIAM ROBERT	02	F	711224	LA
TUCKER, TIMOTHY M	02	F	711224	LA
KOONS, DALE F	02	F	711226	VN
STOLZ, LAWRENCE G	03	F	711226	VN
RITTER, GEORGE L	--	V	711227	LA
TOWNLEY, ROY F	--	V	711227	LA
WEISSENBACK, EDWARD J	--	V	711227	LA
HOLMES, FREDERICK LEE	04	N	711230	VN
DUGGAN, WILLIAM YOUNG	04	F	711231	LA
SUTTER, FREDERICK JOHN	03	F	711231	LA
BERDAHL, DAVID DONALD	E3	A	720120	VS
EDWARDS, HARRY JEROME	E4	A	720120	VS
COOPER, DANIEL DEAN	03	N	720204	VN
LEE, ALBERT EUGENE	E6	N	720216	VS
IRWIN, ROBERT HARRY	04	F	720217	VN
MORGAN, WILLIAM J	04	F	720225	VS
HOWELL, CARTER A	02	A	720307	LA
RUSCH, STEPHEN A	02	F	720307	LA
HARDY, ARTHUR HANS	02	F	720314	LA
JACKSON, JAMES TERRY	03	F	720323	LA
PIKE, DENNIS STANLEY	03	N	720323	LA
WHITT, JAMES EDWARD	04	F	720323	LA

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CROW, RAYMOND JACK JR	E3	F	720327	CB
DREHER, RICHARD E	03	F	720327	CB
MANOR, JAMES (NMN)	E4	F	720327	CB
PANNABECKER, DAVID ERIC	03	F	720327	CB
WAGNER, RAYMOND ANTHONY	E3	F	720327	CB
WONG, EDWARD PUCK KOW JR	E4	A	720327	VS
BRAUNER, HENRY PAUL	04	F	720329	LA
CANIFORD, JAMES KENNETH	E5	F	720329	LA
CASTILLO, RICHARD	03	F	720329	LA
HALPIN, RICHARD C	03	F	720329	LA
MILLER, CURTIS D	03	F	720329	LA
PAULSON, MERLYN L	E5	F	720329	LA
PEARCE, EDWIN JACK	E5	F	720329	LA
RAMSOWER, IRVING B II	04	F	720329	LA
SIMMONS, ROBERT E	E3	F	720329	LA
SMITH, EDWARD D JR	E5	F	720329	LA
STEPHENSON, HOWARD D	04	F	720329	LA
TODD, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E3	F	720329	LA
WANZEL, CHARLES J III	02	F	720329	LA
YOUNG, BARCLAY B	03	F	720329	LA
CROSBY, BRUCE ALLEN JR	E4	A	720330	VS
FINCH, MELVIN W	03	A	720330	VS
WESTCOTT, GARY PATRICK	E5	A	720330	VS
WORTH, JAMES F	E4	M	720401	VS
BOLTE, WAYNE LOUIS	04	F	720402	VS
FRINK, JOHN W	W1	A	720402	VS
GATWOOD, ROBIN F JR	02	F	720402	VS
GIANNANGELI, ANTHONY ROBER	05	F	720402	VS
KULLAND, BYRON K	02	A	720402	VS
LEVIS, CHARLES ALLEN	05	F	720402	VS
PASCHALL, RONALD PAGE	E5	A	720402	VS
SEREX, HENRY MUIR	04	F	720402	VS
CHRISTENSEN, ALLEN DUANE	E5	A	720403	VS
MUREN, THOMAS R	E2	N	720403	VN
ONEILL, DOUGLAS LEE	W2	A	720403	VS
WILLIAMS, EDWARD W	W1	A	720403	VS
ZICH, LARRY ALFRED	W2	A	720403	VS
SPENGLER, HENRY MERSHON 3D	03	A	720405	VS
WINDELER, CHARLES CARL JR	W2	A	720405	VS
ALLEY, JAMES HAROLD	E4	F	720406	VS
AVERY, ALLEN JONES	E6	F	720406	VS
CALL, JOHN HENRY III	02	F	720406	VS
CHAPMAN, PETER HAYDEN II	03	F	720406	VS
DUNLOP, THOMAS EARL	05	N	720406	VN
PEARSON, WILLIAM ROY	E4	F	720406	VS
PRATER, ROY DEWITT	E6	F	720406	VS
LULL, HOWARD B JR	E7	A	720407	VS
POTTS, LARRY FLETCHER	02	M	720407	VS
SCHOTT, RICHARD S	05	A	720407	VS
WALKER, BRUCE C	02	F	720407	VS
KETCHIE, SCOTT DOUGLAS	02	M	720409	LA
CHRISTENSEN, JOHN MICHAEL	02	M	720413	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
LEET, DAVID LEVERETT	03	M	720413	VN
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G	03	N	720414	VS
MCKINNEY, CLEMIE	03	N	720414	VS
TRIMBLE, LARRY ALLEN	02	F	720415	VN
JONES, ORVIN C JR	03	F	720416	VN
MATEJA, ALAN PAUL	03	F	720416	VN
AMOS, THOMAS HUGH	03	F	720420	VS
BURNHAM, MASON IRWIN	03	F	720420	VS
CARTER, GEORGE WILLIAMS	04	A	720424	VS
ELLEN, WADE LYNN	W1	A	720424	VS
HUNSICKER, JAMES EDWARD	02	A	720424	VS
JONES, JOHNNY MACK	02	A	720424	VS
YONAH, KENNETH JOSEPH	03	A	720424	VS
ZOLICOFFER, FRANKLIN	E4	A	720424	VS
BROWNLEE, ROBERT WALLACE	05	A	720425	VS
AMESBURY, HARRY ARLO JR	04	F	720426	VS
COOKE, CALVIN C JR	E5	F	720426	VS
DUNN, RICHARD EDWARD	E6	F	720426	VS
HOSKINS, DONALD RUSSELL	E6	F	720426	VS
REYNOLDS, TERRY L	--	V	720426	CB
RUSSELL, RICHARD LEE	02	F	720426	VS
SEAGRAVES, MELVIN D	E3	N	720430	VN
MCDONALD, JOSEPH WILLIAM	02	M	720503	VN
WILLIAMS, DAVID BERYL	03	M	720503	VN
WILES, MARVIN BENJAMIN C	03	N	720506	VN
CONSOLVO, JOHN WADSWORTH JR	03	M	720507	VS
LEAVER, JOHN MURRAY JR	05	N	720508	VN
TAYLOR, EDMUND BATTLE JR	06	N	720508	VN
BLACKBURN, HARRY LEE JR	05	N	720510	VN
HARRIS, JEFFREY L	03	F	720510	VN
LODGE, ROBERT A	04	F	720510	VN
WILKINSON, DENNIS E	04	F	720510	VN
BLASSIE, MICHAEL JOSEPH	02	F	720511	VS
STROBRIDGE, RODNEY L	03	A	720511	VS
WILLIAMS, ROBERT J	03	A	720511	VS
BOGARD, LONNIE PAT	03	F	720512	LA
OSTERMEYER, WILLIAM HENRY	02	F	720512	LA
BEDNAREK, JONATHAN BRUCE	02	F	720518	VN
RATZEL, WESLEY D	02	F	720518	VN
BARNETT, CHARLES EDWARD	05	N	720523	VN
HENN, JOHN ROBERT JR	W2	A	720524	VS
STRONG, HENRY HOOKER JR	05	N	720525	VN
MORROW, LARRY K	E4	A	720529	VS
KRANER, DAVID S	E3	N	720605	VN
PAYNE, KYLIS THEROD	E2	N	720605	VN
FOWLER, JAMES ALAN	04	F	720606	VN
SEVELL, JOHN W	03	F	720606	VN
BIBBS, WAYNE (NMN)	E3	A	720611	VS
HACKETT, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	720611	VS
HOLM, ARNOLD EDWARD JR	03	A	720611	VS
MCQUADE, JAMES RUSSELL	02	A	720611	VS
WILSON, ROGER E	03	M	720611	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
YEAKLEY, ROBIN RAY	E4	A	720611	VS
WILEY, RICHARD DENNIS	E4	A	720612	VS
DAVIS, FRANCIS JOHN	04	N	720614	VN
AYRES, GERALD FRANCIS	04	F	720618	VS
COLE, RICHARD MILTON JR	E6	F	720618	VS
DANIELSON, MARK GILES	03	F	720618	VS
GILBERT, PAUL F	02	F	720618	VS
HARRISON, ROBERT HEERMAN	04	F	720618	VS
HUNT, LEON ANDREW	E7	F	720618	VS
KILPATRICK, LARRY R	03	N	720618	VN
KLINKE, DONALD HERMAN	E5	F	720618	VS
LEHRKE, STANLEY L	E4	F	720618	VS
MERCER, JACOB E	E7	F	720618	VS
NEWMAN, LARRY J	E5	F	720618	VS
NYHOF, RICHARD E	E5	F	720618	VS
WILSON, ROBERT ALLAN	03	F	720618	VS
MCCARTY, JAMES L	02	F	720624	VN
SHUMWAY, GEOFFREY RAYMOND	03	N	720625	VN
SULLIVAN, FARRELL JUNIOR	05	F	720627	VN
CUTHBERT, STEPHEN HOWARD	03	F	720703	VN
ROBERTSON, LEONARD	03	M	720707	VS
GREEN, FRANK CLIFFORD JR	05	N	720710	VN
CRODY, KENNETH LLOYD	E4	M	720711	VS
HENDRIX, JERRY WAYNE	E6	M	720711	VS
HUARD, JAMES L	02	F	720712	VN
ODONNELL, SAMUEL JR	03	F	720712	VN
SHIMKIN, ALEX	--	V	720712	VS
BROWN, WAYNE GORDON II	03	F	720717	VS
HAAS, LEON FREDERICK	03	N	720717	VN
SHANK, GARY LESLIE	02	N	720723	VN
SANSONE, JAMES J	E3	N	720810	VN
THOMPSON, DAVID MATHEW	03	N	720812	VN
TOWNSEND, FRANCIS WAYNE	02	F	720813	VN
PENDER, ORLAND JAMES JR	03	N	720817	VN
PITZEN, JOHN RUSSELL	05	N	720817	VN
BEHNFELDT, ROGER ERNEST	03	F	720819	VN
LESTER, RODERICK B	02	N	720820	VN
MOSSMAN, HARRY SEEBER	03	N	720820	VN
CROCKETT, WILLIAM JAMES	02	F	720822	VS
TIGNER, LEE MORROW	04	F	720822	VS
DOYLE, MICHAEL WILLIAM	04	N	720825	VN
CORDOVA, SAM GARY	02	M	720826	LA
GREENWOOD, ROBERT R JR	04	F	720902	LA
HEROLD, RICHARD WALTER	03	F	720902	LA
WOOD, WILLIAM C JR	03	F	720902	LA
LINDLAND, DONALD FREDERICK	04	N	720906	VN
GERSTEL, DONALD ARTHUR	04	N	720908	VN
MUSSELMAN, STEPHEN O	02	N	720910	VN
BUELL, KENNETH RICHARD	04	N	720917	VN
DONNELLY, VERNE GEORGE	05	N	720917	VN
GOETSCH, THOMAS AUGUST	E2	N	720917	VN
TUROSE, MICHAEL STEPHEN	02	F	720917	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ZORN, THOMAS ONEAL JR	03	F	720917	VN
CARROLL, ROGER WILLIAM JR	04	F	720921	LA
COOK, DWIGHT WILLIAM	02	F	720921	LA
BORAH, DANIEL VERNOR JR	03	N	720924	VS
CHAN, PETER	E2	N	720925	VS
BOSILJEVAC, MICHAEL JOSEPH	03	F	720929	VN
BRETT, ROBERT ARTHUR JR	02	F	720929	VN
COLTMAN, WILLIAM CLARE	04	F	720929	VN
ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE	05	F	721006	VN
BAKER, VETO HUAPILI	E5	A	721006	VS
BOLTZE, BRUCE EDWARD	W2	M	721006	VS
MCCORMICK, CARL OTTIS	05	F	721006	VS
CLEARY, PETER MCARTHUR	03	F	721010	VN
LEONOR, LEONARDO C	03	F	721010	VN
PEACOCK, JOHN ROBERT II	03	M	721012	VN
PRICE, WILLIAM MARSHALL	02	M	721012	VN
GRAHAM, ALAN U	02	F	721017	VN
HOCKRIDGE, JAMES ALAN	03	F	721017	VN
BIXEL, MICHAEL SARGENT	02	N	721024	VN
HALL, JAMES WAYNE	04	N	721028	VN
SULLIVAN, JAMES EDWARD	04	N	721029	VN
TOLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD	06	N	721106	VN
BROWN, ROBERT MACK	04	F	721107	VN
CARROLL, JOHN LEONARD	04	F	721107	LA
MORRISSEY, ROBERT D	04	F	721107	LA
WRIGHT, FREDERICK WILLISTO	04	N	721110	VN
BREUER, DONALD CHARLES	03	M	721120	LA
CAFFARELLI, CHARLES JOSEPH	03	F	721121	VS
STAFFORD, RONALD DEAN	03	F	721121	VS
EARNEST, CHARLES M	05	N	721128	VN
HARVEY, JACK ROCKWOOD	02	F	721128	VS
JONES, BOBBY M	03	F	721128	VS
SHINE, ANTHONY C	03	F	721202	VN
WILLIAMS, BILLIE J	04	F	721209	VN
FERGUSON, WALTER L	E7	F	721218	VN
MCELVAIN, JAMES RICHARD	04	F	721218	VN
RISSI, DONALD L	05	F	721218	VN
THOMAS, ROBERT J	02	F	721218	VN
WARD, RONALD J	05	F	721218	VN
COOPER, RICHARD WALLER JR	03	F	721219	VN
POOLE, CHARLIE S	E6	F	721219	VN
LERNER, IRWIN S	03	F	721220	VN
MCLAUGHLIN, ARTHUR V JR	E7	F	721220	VN
PAUL, CRAIG A	03	F	721220	VN
PERRY, RANDOLPH ALLEN JR	04	F	721220	VN
SPENCER, WARREN R	03	F	721220	VN
TUART, JOHN F	04	F	721220	VN
BEBUS, CHARLES JAMES	E3	F	721221	VN
CRADDOCK, RANDALL JAMES	03	F	721221	VN
DARR, CHARLES EDWARD	02	F	721221	VN
DICKENS, DELMA ERNEST	02	F	721221	LA
ELLIOTT, ROBERT THOMAS	E6	F	721221	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
FENTER, CHARLES FREDERICK	E3	F	721221	LA
FULLER, JAMES R	E6	F	721221	LA
GOULD, FRANK ALTON	04	F	721221	LA
GRAUSTEIN, ROBERT S	04	N	721221	VN
HART, THOMAS TRAMMELL III	03	F	721221	LA
JOHNSON, EDWARD HARVEY	04	F	721221	VN
KIRBY, BOBBY ALEXANDER	04	F	721221	VN
KROBOTH, STANLEY NEA	03	F	721221	LA
LAGERWALL, HARRY R	03	F	721221	LA
LILES, ROBERT L JR	03	F	721221	LA
LOCKHART, GEORGE B	03	F	721221	VN
LYNN, ROBERT R	03	F	721221	VN
MACDONALD, GEORGE DUNCAN	01	F	721221	LA
MEDER, PAUL OSWALD	04	F	721221	LA
PERRY, RONALD D	03	F	721221	VN
REATO, ROLLIE K	E3	F	721221	LA
WADE, BARTON SCOTT	04	N	721221	VN
WALSH, FRANCIS A JR	04	F	721221	LA
WALTERS, DONOVAN K	03	F	721221	VN
WINNINGHAM, JOHN Q	E6	F	721221	LA
ALLEY, GERALD WILLIAM	05	F	721222	VN
BENNETT, THOMAS WARING JR	03	F	721222	VN
COPACK, JOSEPH BERNARD JR	02	F	721222	VN
CLARK, PHILLIP SPRATT JR	03	N	721224	VN
JACKSON, PAUL VERNON III	03	F	721224	LA
RICKMAN, DWIGHT G	02	M	721225	VS
MORRIS, ROBERT J JR	03	F	721226	VN
WIMBROW, NUTTER J	03	F	721226	VN
CHIPMAN, RALPH JIM	03	M	721227	VN
FORRESTER, RONALD W	02	M	721227	VN
FRYER, BEN L	02	F	721228	VN
HAIFLEY, MICHAEL F	03	N	721228	VN
JOHNSON, ALLEN L	04	F	721228	VN
SCAIFE, KENNETH D	E2	N	730103	VS
JOHNSTON, STEVEN BRYCE	03	F	730104	LA
LINDAHL, JOHN CARL	03	N	730106	VN
BUSH, ELBERT WAYNE	E6	A	730108	VS
DEANE, WILLIAM LAWRENCE	04	A	730108	VS
KNUTSON, RICHARD ARTHUR	W1	A	730108	VS
LAUTERIO, MANUEL ALONZO	E5	A	730108	VS
STINSON, WILLIAM SHERRILL	E5	A	730108	VS
WILSON, MICKEY ALLEN	W1	A	730108	VS
CLARK, ROBERT ALAN	02	N	730110	VN
MCCORMICK, MICHAEL T	03	N	730110	VN
CHRISTOPHERSEN, KEITH ALLE	02	N	730121	VN
PARKER, CHARLES LESLIE JR	04	N	730121	VN
WIEHR, RICHARD DANIEL	E5	N	730121	VN
HALL, HARLEY HUBERT	05	N	730127	VS
MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	03	F	730127	VS
PETERSON, MARK ALLEN	02	F	730127	VS

Number of Records Output: 2547

TAB E: Missing between 30 March 1973 and 15 May 1973, and body not recovered by U.S. forces and subsequently identified.

FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
JAMES, SAMUEL L	03	F	730418	CB
MARTIN, DOUGLAS K	03	F	730418	CB
MCLEOD, DAVID VANCE JR	E7	F	730614	CB
CORNELIUS, SAMUEL BLACKMAR	03	F	730616	CB
SMALLWOOD, JOHN J	03	F	730616	CB
DEAN, CHARLES	--	V	740910	LA
RAWLINGS, JAMES	--	V	750103	VS
DOLAN, EDWARD V	--	V	750312	VS
MILLER, GEORGE C	--	V	750312	VS
SEIDL, ROBERT	--	V	750312	VS
WALSH, BRIAN	--	V	750425	CB
YIM, JOHN SUNG	--	V	750425	CB
GOUGELMANN, TUCKER P E	--	V	750429	VS
JUDGE, DARWIN LEE	E3	M	750429	VS
LECORNEC, JOHN GILBERT	--	V	750429	VS
MCMAHON, CHARLES JR	E4	M	750429	VS
NYSTUL, WILLIAM CRAIG	03	M	750429	VS
SHEA, MICHAEL JOHN	02	M	750429	VS
BENEDETT, DANIEL ANDREW	E2	M	750515	CB
BLESSING, LYNN	E2	M	750515	CB
BOYD, WALTER	E2	M	750515	CB
COPENHAVER, GREGORY SCOTT	E3	M	750515	CB
GARCIA, ANDRES	E3	M	750515	CB
GAUSE, BERNARD JR	E5	N	750515	CB
HALL, GARY LEE	E2	M	750515	CB
HARGROVE, JOSEPH N	E3	M	750515	CB
JACQUES, JAMES J	E2	M	750515	CB
LONEY, ASHTON N	E3	M	750515	CB
MANNING, RONALD JAMES	E3	N	750515	CB
MARSHALL, DANNY G	E1	M	750515	CB
MAXWELL, JAMES R	E2	M	750515	CB
RIVENBURGH, RICHARD W	E2	M	750515	CB
RUMBAUGH, ELWOOD EUGENE	E5	F	750515	CB
SANDOVAL, ANTONIO RAMOS	E2	M	750515	CB
TURNER, KELTON RENA	E2	M	750515	CB
VANDEGEER, RICHARD (NMI)	01	F	750515	CB

Number of Records Output: 36

TAB F: Americans accounted for post-Homestead, 15 May 1973 to 15 May 1973.

NAMES	L/RANK	SERVICE	STATUS	CTRY	R-DATE
BURDETT, EDWARD BONNE	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
CAMERON, KENNETH ROBBINS	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	740306
COBEIL, EARL GLENN	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
CONNELL, JAMES JOSEPH	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	740306
DENNISON, TERRY ARDEN	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	740306
DIEHL, WILLIAM C	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
HARTMAN, RICHARD DANNER	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	740306
NEWSOM, BENJAMIN B	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
PEMBERTON, GENE T	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
SCHMIDT, NORMAN	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
STORZ, RONALD EDWARD	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
WESKAMP, ROBERT L	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740306
ABBOTT, JOHN	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	740313
ATTERBERRY, EDWIN LEE	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740313
DODGE, WARD K	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740313
FREDERICK, JOHN WILLIAM	W4	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VN	740313
GRIFFIN, JAMES LLOYD	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	740313
GRUBB, WILMER N	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740313
HEGGEN, KEITH R	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	740313
SIJAN, LANCE P	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA VN	740313
SMITH, HOMER LEROY	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	740313
STAMM, ERNEST ALBERT	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	740313
WALTERS, JACK	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	740313
BUCKLEY, JIMMY LEE	04	US NAVY	NR	CH	751216
PUGH, KENNETH W	E2	US NAVY	NR	CH OW	751216
FITTON, CROSLLEY J	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	751221
PERRY, RONALD D	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	751221
TAYLOR, JESSE JUNIOR	04	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	751221
JUDGE, DARWIN LEE	E3	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VS	760222
MCMAHON, CHARLES JR	E4	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VS	760222
BOWLING, ROY HOWARD	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	770318
CAPLING, ELWYN R	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
DIAMOND, STEPHEN W	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
DUCAT, BRUCE CHALMERS	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
JOHNSON, GUY D	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	770318
KLENERT, WILLIAM B	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	770318
KOLSTAD, THOMAS C	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	770318
METZ, JAMES HARDIN	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
ROARK, WILLIAM MARSHALL	03	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	770318
WATERS, SAMUEL E	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
WYNNE, PATRICK E	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770318
BRAND, JOSEPH W	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
CLARK, DONALD E JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
DAWSON, CLYDE DUANE	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
DOBY, HERB	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
ESTES, WALTER O	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	770930
FANTLE, SAMUEL	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
FRYER, BEN L	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
GOLBERG, LAWRENCE H	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
GOUGELMANN, TUCKER P E	--		NR	VS	770930
GRAHAM, ALAN U	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
HOCKRIDGE, JAMES ALAN	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
LODGE, ROBERT A	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
HEARNS, ARTHUR S	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930

NAME	I/RANK	SERVICE	STATUS	CTRY	R-DATE
MORRIS, ROBERT J JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
NELSON, WILLIAM H	06	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
PAUL, CRAIG A	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
SINGER, DONALD M	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
SPENCER, WARREN R	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
TEAGUE, JAMES ERLAN	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	770930
THUM, RICHARD COBB	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	770930
WIMBROW, NUTTER J	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
WINSTON, CHARLES C III	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	770930
AMMON, GLENDON LEE	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
FERGUSON, WALTER L	E7	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
GOSS, BERNARD J	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
MONROE, VINCENT DUNCAN	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	780823
MORROW, RICHARD D	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	780823
PETERSEN, GAYLORD D	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
RISSE, DONALD L	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
THOMAS, ROBERT J	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
WEATHERBY, JACK WILTON	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
WILKINSON, DENNIS E	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	780823
WRIGHT, JAMES J	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	780823
WIGGINS, WALLACE L	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	780824
MENGES, GEORGE B	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	8009
DODGE, RONALD WAYNE	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	810708
MUSSELMAN, STEPHEN O	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	810708
VAN DYKE, RICHARD HAVEN	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	810708
BROOKS, NICHOLAS GEORGE	03	US NAVY	NR	LA	820203*
FRYE, DONALD PATRICK	01	US NAVY	NR	VN	821014
JACKSON, WILLIAM BRAXTON	E5	US NAVY	NR	VN	821014
MCGRANE, DONALD PAUL	E5	US NAVY	NR	VN	821014
TRIER, ROBERT D	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	821014
BIEDIGER, LARRY WILLIAM	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	830603
DUDASH, JOHN FRANCIS	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	830603
LEE, CHARLES RICHARD	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	830603
LINDLAND, DONALD FREDERICK	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	830603
MORRILL, MERWIN LAMPHREY	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	830603
POWELL, LYNN KESLER	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	830603
RUFFIN, JAMES THOMAS	02	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	830603
SULLIVAN, FARRELL JUNIOR	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	830603
HARDY, ARTHUR HANS	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	830920*
CONNOLLY, VINCENT J	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	840717
FANNING, HUGH M	03	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VN	840717
KOTT, STEPHEN J	03	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VN	840717
NELSON, RICHARD C	03	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	840717
SANSONE, DOMINICK (NMN)	E7	US ARMY	NR	VS	840717
SHANK, GARY LESLIE	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	840717
DICKENS, DELMA ERNEST	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
ELLIOTT, ROBERT THOMAS	E6	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
FENTER, CHARLES FREDERICK	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
FULLER, JAMES R	E6	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
HART, THOMAS TRAMMELL III	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
KROBOTH, STANLEY NEA	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
LAGERWALL, HARRY R	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
LILES, ROBERT L JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
MACDONALD, GEORGE DUNCAN	01	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221

NAMES	L/RANK	SERVICE	STATUS	CTRY	R-DATE
MEDER, PAUL OSWALD	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
READ, ROLLIE K	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
WALSH, FRANCIS A JR	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
WINNINGHAM, JOHN Q	E6	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	850221
ARROYO-BAEZ, GERASIMO	E6	US ARMY	KR	VS	850320
CHESNUTT, CHAMBLESS M	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850320
CHWAN, MICHAEL D	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850320
HARRIS, CLEVELAND SCOTT	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850320
KILLIAN, MELVIN J	06	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850320
SHERMAN, ROBERT C	E4	US MARINE CORPS	KR	VS	850320
BROWN, DONALD HUBERT JR	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
CANNON, FRANCES EUGENE	E2	US ARMY	KR	VS	850814
DOYLE, MICHAEL WILLIAM	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
FINCH, MELVIN W	03	US ARMY	NR	VS VN	850814
FINNEY, ARTHUR THOMAS	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
FORD, RANDOLPH WRIGHT	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
GOODRICH, EDWIN R JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
GRAHAM, JAMES SCOTT	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
HAIFLEY, MICHAEL F	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
JONES, WILLIAM E	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
KLINCK, HARRISON HOYT	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
KWORTNIK, JOHN C	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
LECORNEC, JOHN GILBERT	--		NR	VS	850814
MECKINNEY, CLEMIE	03	US NAVY	NR	VS	850814
MAYER, WILLIAM M	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
MOORBERG, MONTE LARUE	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
PORT, WILLIAM D	E3	US ARMY	KR	VS	850814
SATHER, RICHARD CHRISTIAN	02	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	850814
SULLIVAN, JAMES EDWARD	04	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	850814
THOMAS, KENNETH D JR	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	850814
VESCELIUS, MILTON JAMES	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
WILLIAMS, RICHARD F	E8	US ARMY	KR	VS	850814
WORRELL, PAUL L	01	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
YARBROUGH, WILLIAM P JR	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	850814
ZANTOCKI, JOSEPH S JR	E5	US MARINE CORPS	KR	VS	850814
GRAUSTEIN, ROBERT S	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	851204
HAGERMAN, ROBERT W	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	851204
JOHNSON, ALLEN L	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	851204
MCGRATH, WILLIAM DARREL	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	851204
MINNICH, RICHARD WILLIS JR	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	851204
POWELL, WILLIAM E	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	851204
WADE, BARTON SCOTT	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	851204
CASTILLO, RICHARD	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
HALPIN, RICHARD C	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
PAULSON, MERLYN L	E5	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
PEARCE, EDWIN JACK	E5	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
RAMSOWER, IRVING B II	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
SIMMONS, ROBERT E	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
SMITH, EDWARD D JR	E5	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
TODD, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
WANZEL, CHARLES J III	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	LA	860301
BLACKBURN, HARRY LEE JR	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	860410
BUTT, RICHARD LEIGH	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860410
CASE, THOMAS FRANKLIN	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860410

NAME	U	S	S	N	V	R	DATE
CHAMBERLAIN, DAVID MARION	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	860410		
HARKWORTH, ELROY E	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860410		
MCWHORTER, HENRY STERLING	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	860410		
MURRAY, PATRICK PETER	03	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VN	860410		
NESS, PATRICK LAWRENCE	01	US NAVY	NR	VN	860410		
WILSON, GORDON SCOTT	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860410		
ZOOK, HAROLD J	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860410		
WARREN, ARTHUR L	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	860917		
CRAIG, PHILLIP CHARLES	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	861126		
PERRY, RICHARD CLARK	04	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	861126		
BEHNFELD, ROGER ERNEST	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	870924		
BOSILJEVAC, MICHAEL JOSEPH	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	870924		
FULLAM, WAYNE E	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	870924		
CARAS, FRANKLIN ANGEL	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	871125		
DARDEAU, OSCAR MOISE JR	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	871125		
LEHNHOFF, EDWARD W	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	871125		
POWERS, TRENT RICHARD	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	871125		
TUCKER, EDWIN BYRON	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	871125		
CHIARELLO, VINCENT AUGUSTU	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
CONKLIN, BERNARD	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
GREGORY, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
HALL, JAMES S	E5	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
MAMIYA, JOHN M	E6	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
SMITH, HERBERT E	E6	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880302		
BLAIR, CHARLES EDWARD	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VS	880406		
KARINS, JOSEPH J JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880406		
KOONS, DALE F	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880406		
MCCORMICK, JOHN VERN	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	880406		
STEPHENSEN, MARK L	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880406		
STOLZ, LAWRENCE G	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880406		
YONAN, KENNETH JOSEPH	03	US ARMY	NR	VS	880406		
EDMUNDS, ROBERT CLIFTON JR	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880605		
AMSPACHER, WILLIAM HARRY J	E4	US NAVY	NR	VN	880713		
BUSCH, JOHN THOMAS	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880713		
FRANKLIN, CHARLES E	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880713		
MCCLEARY, GEORGE CARLTON	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880713		
MCHICAN, M D	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	880713		
PEARSON, ROBERT HARVEY	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	880713		
PETERS, CHARLES HENRY	05	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	880713		
ROMANO, GERALD MICHAEL	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	880713		
WILSON, ROGER E	03	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VN	880713		
BARNETT, CHARLES EDWARD	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
CLARK, PHILLIP SPATT JR	03	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	881103		
COLE, LEGRANDE OSDEN JR	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
FORTNER, FREDERICK J	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
HANSON, ROBERT TAFT JR	02	US NAVY	NR	VN OW	881103		
HUNEYCUTT, CHARLES J JR	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881103		
KASCH, FREDERICK MORRISON	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
PUTNAM, CHARLES LANCASTER	05	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
TOLBERT, CLARENCE ORFIELD	06	US NAVY	NR	VN	881103		
ALLEY, GERALD WILLIAM	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
BEBUS, CHARLES JAMES	E3	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
BEDNAREK, JONATHAN BRUCE	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
BELL, HOLLY GENE	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		

NAME	U	S	S	N	V	R	DATE
BUSH, ROBERT EDWARD	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
CAPPELLI, CHARLES EDWARD	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
COAKLEY, WILLIAM FRANCIS	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	881215		
COOK, WILMER PAUL	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	881215		
COPACK, JOSEPH BERNARD JR	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
CORDOVA, SAM GARY	02	US MARINE CORPS	NR	LA VN	881215		
CRADDOCK, RANDALL JAMES	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
DARR, CHARLES EDWARD	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
HOFF, SAMMIE DON	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
JOHNSON, EDWARD HARVEY	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
KIRBY, BOBBY ALEXANDER	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
LOCKHART, GEORGE B	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
LYNN, ROBERT R	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
MALLON, RICHARD J	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
PANEK, ROBERT J SR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
PLEIMAN, JAMES EDWARD	E4	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN OW	881215		
RATZEL, WESLEY D	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
RICHARDSON, FLOYD W	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
ROBINSON, KENNETH D	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
ROBY, CHARLES D	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
RODRIGUEZ, ALBERT E	02	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
RUDDOLPH, ROBERT DAVID	02	US NAVY	NR	VN	881215		
SMITH, GENE ALBERT	04	US NAVY	NR	VN	881215		
STUBBERFIELD, ROBERT A	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
WALTERS, DONOVAN K	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	881215		
WILSON, CLAUDE DAVID JR	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	881215		
WALLACE, MICHAEL WALTER	04	US NAVY	NR	LA	881216		
ALLEN, WAYNE CLOUSE	E5	US ARMY	NR	VS	89012		
DUNLAP, WILLIAM C	W2	US ARMY	NR	VS	890123		
ESPENSHIED, JOHN L	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VS	890123		
GRISSETT, EDWIN R JR	E4	US MARINE CORPS	NR	VS	890123		
SANDERLIN, WILLIAM D	E5	US ARMY	NR	VS	890123		
SHANLEY, MICHAEL HENRY JR	E5	US ARMY	NR	VS	890123		
VANDEN EYKEL, MARTIN D II	W2	US ARMY	NR	VS	890123		
WILLIAMSON, DON IRA	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890123		
BADER, ARTHUR EDWARD JR	E5	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
FITTS, RICHARD A	E5	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
LABORN, GARRY RUSSEL	E4	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
MEIN, MICHAEL HOWARD	E4	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
SCHOLZ, KLAUS D	E6	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
STACKS, RAYMOND C	02	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
TOOMEY, SAMUEL K III	04	US ARMY	NR	LA	890326		
BIGGS, EARL ROGER	E7	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
BLACKWOOD, GORDON BYRON	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890427		
COZART, ROBERT GORDON JR	03	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
JOHNS, VERNON Z	E3	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
REILLY, EDWARD DANIEL JR	E4	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
SPENGLER, HENRY MERSHON 3D	03	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
VARNADO, MICHAEL B	W1	US ARMY	NR	CB	890427		
WINDELER, CHARLES CARL JR	W2	US ARMY	NR	VS	890427		
ASIRE, DONALD HENRY	05	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621		
ELKINS, FRANK CALLIHAN	03	US NAVY	NR	VN	890621		
HARTNEY, JAMES C	04	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621		
LEWIS, MERRILL R JR	03	US AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621		

NAME	MO	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621
MAXWELL, SAMUEL E	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621
TRIMBLE, LARRY ALLEN	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621
WILBURN, WOODROW HOOVER	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621
WILLIAMS, DAVID BERYL	03	US	MARINE CORPS	NR	VN OW	890621
WRIGHT, JEROY ALBERT JR	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890621
BRINCKMANN, ROBERT EDWIN	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
CARRIER, DANIEL LEWIS	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
ERWIN, DONALD EDWARD	05	US	NAVY	NR	VN OW	890731
FREDERICK, WILLIAM V	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
IRWIN, ROBERT HARRY	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
KARDELL, DAVID ALLEN	03	US	NAVY	NR	VN	890731
MARTIN, LARRY E	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
MORGAN, CHARLES E	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	890731
VANRENSELAAR, LARRY JACK	02	US	NAVY	NR	VN	890731
HATLEY, JOEL CLINTON	E4	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900110
KING, MICHAEL ELI	E4	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900110
MOREIRA, RALPH ANGELO JR	W1	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900110
NELSON, DAVID LINDFORD	03	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900110
BOFFMAN, ALAN BRENT	02	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900113
BRANDT, KEITH ALLAN	03	US	ARMY	NR	LA	900113
HORNE, STANLEY HENRY	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900409
STEARNS, ROGER HORACE	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	LA	900522
DONNELLY, VERNE GEORGE	05	US	NAVY	NR	VN	900911
HAUER, LESLIE J	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900911
ANDREWS, WILLIAM RICHARD	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
CARPENTER, NICHOLAS MALLOR	03	US	NAVY	NR	VN	900913
CUTHBERT, STEPHEN HOWARD	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
HYDE, MICHAEL LEWIS	03	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VS	900913
MCMAHAN, ROBERT CHARLES	02	US	NAVY	NR	VN	900913
POLLIN, GEORGE J	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
SALZARULO, RAYMOND PAUL JR	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
SPRAGUE, STANLEY GEORGE	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
SULLIVAN, JOHN B III	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
WILLIAMS, BILLIE J	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
WRIGHT, FREDERICK WILLISTO	04	US	NAVY	NR	VN	900913
WRYE, BLAIR C	04	US	AIR FORCE	NR	VN	900913
GREER, ROBERT LEE	E2	US	MARINE CORPS	NR	VS	901120
SCHRECKENGOST, FRED T	E2	US	MARINE CORPS	NR	VS	901120
SHERMAN, PETER W	05	US	NAVY	NR	VN	910116
PLANTS, THOMAS LEE	E5	US	NAVY	NR	VN	910306
LEWELLEN, WALTER EDWARD	E4	US	ARMY	NR	LA	910411
ENGEL, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	US	ARMY	NR	LA	910411
MAGEE, RALPH WAYNE	02	US	AIR FORCE	NR	LA	910711
GARSDIE, FREDERICK THOMAS	E5	US	AIR FORCE	NR	LA	910711
MATTESON, GLENN (NMN)	01	US	AIR FORCE	NR	LA	910711
SAMPSON, LESLIE VERNE	E5	US	AIR FORCE	NR	LA	910711

* -REMAINS RETURNED BY INDIGENOUS ELEMENTS
 -R-DATE: DATE REMAINS RETURNED TO USG

TOTAL PERSONNEL: 316

TAB G: Unaccounted-for Americans, as of 11 December 1991

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DUFFY, CHARLES J	--	V	610113	LA
BANKOWSKI, ALFONS ALOYZE	E5	F	610323	LA
WEITKAMP, EDGAR WILKEN	W1	A	610323	LA
WESTON, OSCAR BRANCH JR	02	F	610323	LA
BIBER, GERALD MACK	E5	A	610422	LA
BISCHOFF, JOHN MALCOLM	E7	A	610422	LA
MOON, WALTER HUGH	04	A	610422	LA
GERBER, DANIEL A	--	V	620530	VS
MITCHELL, ARCHIE EMERSON	--	V	620530	VS
VIETTI, ELEANOR A	--	V	620530	VS
BLEWETT, ALAN L	--	V	620714	LA
PARKS, RAYMOND F	E6	A	620714	LA
SIMPSON, ROBERT LEWIS	03	F	620828	VS
ANDERSON, THOMAS EDWARD	E4	M	621006	VS
CRUZ, RAPHAEL (NMN)	E5	F	630902	VS
MCKINNEY, NEIL BERNARD	02	F	630902	VS
PURCELL, HOWARD PHILIP	03	F	630902	VS
CHENEY, JOSEPH C	--	V	630905	LA
DEBRUIN, EUGENE H	--	V	630905	LA
HERRICK, CHARLES	--	V	630905	LA
DENTON, MANUEL REYES	E4	N	631008	VS
RICHEY, LUTHER EDMOND JR	E3	M	631008	VS
WADSWORTH, DEAN AMICK	03	F	631008	VS
VERSACE, HUMBERTO ROQUE	03	A	631029	VS
COOY, HOWARD RUDOLPH	03	F	631124	VS
RORABACK, KENNETH M	E8	A	631124	VS
GORTON, THOMAS FREDERICK	03	F	631206	VS
HILL, RICHARD DALE	E3	F	631206	VS
ANGELL, MARSHALL JOSEPH	E5	A	631212	VS
HICKMAN, VINCENT JOSEPH	03	F	640114	VS
MITCHELL, CARL BERG	04	F	640114	VS
METOYER, BRYFORD GLENN	02	A	640118	VS
STRALEY, JOHN LEROY	E3	A	640118	VS
WHITESIDES, RICHARD LEBROU	03	F	640326	VS
LEDBETTER, THOMAS ISAAC	03	A	640619	VS
TALLEY, JAMES LANE	E4	A	640619	VS
CUTLER, FRED CLAY JR	03	F	640806	VS
KASTER, LEONARD LEE	02	F	640806	VS
GRAINGER, JOSEPH W	--	V	640808	VS
WALKER, KENNETH EARL	03	F	641002	VS
WOODS, LAWRENCE (NMN)	E6	A	641024	CB
DAWSON, DANIEL GEORGE	02	A	641106	VS
BLOOM, DARL RUSSELL	03	M	641113	VS
NIPPER, DAVID	E3	M	641121	VS
VADEN, WOODROW WILSON	04	F	641210	VS
TADJOS, LEONARD MASAYON	E5	A	641211	VS
PARKS, JOE	E7	A	641222	VS
BENNETT, HAROLD GEORGE	E4	A	641229	VS
COOK, DONALD GILBERT	03	M	641231	VS
DODGE, EDWARD RAY	E7	A	641231	VS
MCDONALD, KURT CASEY	03	F	641231	VS
HERTZ, GUSTAV	--	V	650202	VS
DIYEVAN, EDWARD ANDREW	03	N	650207	WN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RI	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MCLEAN, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	650209	VS
FRANKS, DWIGHT GLENN	E7	N	650224	VS
SMITH, RICHARD D	03	F	650311	VS
CLYDESDALE, CHARLES FREDRI	02	N	650315	VS
HUME, KENNETH EDWARD	04	N	650329	VN
MCKINLEY, GERALD WAYNE	02	N	650331	VN
SMITH, GEORGE CRAIG	02	F	650403	VN
DRAEGER, WALTER FRANK JR	03	F	650404	VN
MAGNUSSON, JAMES A JR	03	F	650404	VN
BAKER, ARTHUR DALE	03	F	650407	LA
LEWIS, JAMES W	03	F	650407	LA
FEAGAN, RONALD JAMES	01	N	650409	CH
MURPHY, TERENCE MEREDITH	02	N	650409	CH
SWANSON, WILLIAM EDWARD	02	N	650411	LA
WOODWORTH, SAMUEL ALEXANDE	03	F	650417	VN
WHEELER, JAMES ATLEE	03	F	650418	VS
SHEA, JAMES PATRICK	02	N	650420	VN
SHELTON, CHARLES ERVIN	03	F	650429	LA
LAHAYE, JAMES DAVID	05	N	650508	VN
WISTRAND, ROBERT C	03	F	650509	LA
HRDLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	03	F	650518	LA
TAVARES, JOHN R	--	V	650518	VS
DONOVAN, LEROY MELVIN	E7	A	650519	VS
HARPER, RICHARD K	W3	A	650519	VS
WALKER, ORLEN J	03	A	650523	VS
LYNN, DOYLE WILMER	05	N	650527	VN
CROSBY, FREDERICK PETER	04	N	650601	VN
DALE, CHARLES ALVA	02	A	650609	VS
DEMMON, DAVID STANLEY	E5	A	650609	VS
COMPA, JOSEPH JAMES JR	E6	A	650610	VS
CURLEE, ROBERT LEE JR	E6	A	650610	VS
DOUGHTIE, CARL LOUIS	02	N	650610	VN
HAGEN, CRAIG LOUIS	E5	A	650610	VS
HALL, WALTER LOUIS	02	A	650610	VS
JOHNSON, BRUCE G	03	A	650610	VS
OWENS, FRED MONROE	E7	A	650610	VS
SAEGAERT, DONALD RUSSELL	W1	A	650610	VS
HOLLAND, LAWRENCE THOMAS	04	F	650612	VS
SCHUMANN, JOHN ROBERT	04	A	650616	VS
ARMOND, ROBERT LAURENCE	03	F	650618	VS
GEHRIG, JAMES M JR	04	F	650618	VS
LOWRY, TYRRELL GORDON	03	F	650618	VS
MARSHALL, JAMES ALFRED	02	F	650618	VS
NEVILLE, WILLIAM EDWARD	E6	F	650618	VS
ROBERTS, HAROLD J JR	E7	F	650618	VS
WATSON, FRANK PETER	03	F	650618	VS
VAN CAMPEN, THOMAS CHARLES	E3	A	650624	VS
MONGILARDI, PETER NMN JR	05	N	650625	VN
JACKSON, CARL EDWIN	03	F	650627	VS
ROTH, BILLIE LEROY	E5	F	650627	VS
LINDSEY, MARVIN NELSON	04	F	650629	VN
ETTERDAIN, WILLIAM F	03	A	650705	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RI	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BRAM, RICHARD CRAIG	E6	M	650708	VS
DINGWALL, JOHN FRANCIS	E7	M	650708	VS
GALLANT, HENRY JOSEPH	E8	A	650713	VS
TAYLOR, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	650713	VS
AVORE, MALCOLM ARTHUR	03	N	650718	VS
FOBAIR, ROSCOE HENRY	03	F	650724	VN
KOSKO, WALTER	03	F	650727	VN
BROWN, EDWARD DEAN JR	02	N	650729	VS
HALL, WILLIAM W	04	F	650802	VS
BOWER, JOSEPH EDWARD	04	F	650803	VN
GRAY, HAROLD EDWIN JR	04	N	650807	VN
MAILLES, LAWRENCE SCOTT	02	N	650810	VS
GOLLAHON, GENE RAYMOND	03	N	650813	VN
MELLOR, FREDRIC M	03	F	650813	VN
THOMAS, HARRY EUGENE	05	N	650813	VN
TAYLOR, EDD DAVID	03	N	650829	VN
BRANCH, JAMES ALVIN	03	F	650904	VN
JEWELL, EUGENE M	02	F	650904	VN
LAGRAND, WILLIAM JOHN	W2	A	650905	VS
MARSHALL, RICHARD CARLTON	03	F	650905	VS
SHAW, EDWARD BRENDAN	02	N	650905	VN
GOODWIN, CHARLES B	02	N	650908	VN
GREEN, GERALD (NMN)	02	N	650912	VN
MOSSMAN, JOE RUSSELL	02	N	650913	VN
TAYLOR, NEIL BROOKS	02	N	650914	VS
KLENDIA, DEAN ALBERT	02	F	650917	VN
BARBER, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	N	650918	VN
VOGT, LEONARD FREDERICK JR	05	N	650918	VN
HAWKINS, EDGAR L	03	F	650920	VN
MARTIN, DUANE WHITNEY	02	F	650920	VN
OSBORN, GEOFFREY HOLMES	02	N	650924	VN
MASSUCCI, MARTIN J	02	F	651001	VN
OFFUTT, GARY PHELPS	02	F	651001	VS
SCHARF, CHARLES J	03	F	651001	VN
POGREBA, DEAN ANDREW	05	F	651005	VN
SCHULER, ROBERT HARRY JR	03	F	651015	VN
MAYER, RODERICK LEWIS	03	N	651017	VN
OLMSTEAD, STANLEY E	04	N	651017	VN
PYLES, HARLEY B	04	F	651018	VS
SISSON, WINFIELD WADE	03	M	651018	VS
THORNE, LARRY ALAN	03	A	651018	VS
WORCHESTER, JOHN B	02	N	651019	VN
MANN, ROBERT LEE	03	F	651022	VS
MCEWEN, JAMES ARTHUR	02	F	651022	VS
WEGER, JOHN (NMN) JR	02	F	651022	VS
ADAMS, SAMUEL	E5	F	651031	VS
DUSING, CHARLES GALE	E5	F	651031	VS
MOORE, THOMAS	E6	F	651031	VS
BOWLES, DWIGHT POLLARD	03	F	651103	VN
MCCLELLAN, PAUL TRUMAN JR	03	F	651114	VS
GREEN, DONALD GEORGE	03	F	651116	VN
WHEMED, TERRY ALLEN	F4	A	651117	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
TOMS, DENNIS LEROY	E2	N	651121	VS
DOUGLAS, THOMAS EVAN	E4	M	651122	VS
MILLER, RICHARD ARTHUR	03	M	651122	VS
PIRKER, VICTOR J	E4	M	651122	VS
VISCONTI, FRANCIS	03	M	651122	VS
WINKLER, JOHN ANTHONY	E2	N	651122	VS
RICHARDSON, STEPHEN GOULD	02	N	651130	VS
REITMANN, THOMAS E	03	F	651201	VN
AUSTIN, CARL BENJAMIN	05	N	651202	VN
LOGAN, JACOB DRUMMOND	02	N	651202	VN
ROBERTS, GERALD RAY	04	N	651202	VN
JOHNSON, STANLEY GARWOOD	02	M	651203	VS
DIBBLE, MORRIS FREDERICK	E3	A	651205	VS
EISENBERGER, GEORGE JOE BU	E5	A	651205	VS
HYDE, JIMMY DON	E4	N	651205	VS
UPNER, EDWARD CHARLES	E6	A	651205	VS
CORLE, JOHN THOMAS	E4	M	651208	VS
CLARK, JERRY PROSPER	W1	A	651215	VS
WICKHAM, DAVID WALLACE II	03	N	651216	VS
MIMS, GEORGE I JR	02	F	651220	VN
NORDAHL, LEE E	02	N	651220	VN
WAX, DAVID J	02	F	651220	VS
CARTWRIGHT, BILLIE JACK	05	N	651222	VN
GOLD, EDWARD FRANK	03	N	651222	VN
LUKENBACH, MAX DUANE	04	N	651222	VN
PRUDHOMME, JOHN DOUGLAS	03	N	651222	VN
CHRISTIANO, JOSEPH	04	F	651224	LA
COLWELL, WILLIAM KEVIN	E6	F	651224	LA
EILERS, DENNIS LEE	03	F	651224	LA
HASSENGER, ARDEN K	E5	F	651224	LA
JEFFORDS, DERRELL B	05	F	651224	LA
THORNTON, LARRY C	E7	F	651224	LA
BATLON, RUBEN	--	V	651225	VS
GRELLA, DONALD CARROLL	E5	A	651228	VS
PHELPS, JESSE DONALD	W2	A	651228	VS
RICE, THOMAS JR (NMN)	E4	A	651228	VS
STANCIL, KENNETH LEON	W3	A	651228	VS
HILL, ARTHUR SINCLAIR JR	03	N	651229	LA
RAWSTHORNE, EDGAR ARTHUR	05	N	651229	LA
KIRKSEY, ROBERT LOUIS	E3	A	660101	VS
MAC LAUGHLIN, DONALD C JR	02	N	660102	VS
CALLANAN, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660107	VS
GREENLEY, JON ALFRED	02	F	660107	VS
SCHIMBERG, JAMES PHILIP	E4	A	660109	VS
WILLIAMS, THADDEUS EDWARD	02	A	660109	VS
GODFREY, JOHNNY HOWARD	03	F	660111	VS
HOLLINGSWORTH, HAL T	01	N	660116	VS
NETH, FRED ALBERT	04	N	660116	VS
SCHOONOVER, CHARLES DAVID	04	N	660116	VS
WOOD, DON C	03	F	660116	LA
EGAN, JAMES THOMAS JR.	02	M	660121	VS
EDMAN, WILLIAM C	03	N	660122	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
FRENEYA, EDMUND HENRY	E3	N	660122	VN
SENNETT, ROBERT R	E2	N	660122	VN
TEMPLIN, ERWIN BERNARD JR	02	N	660122	VN
BOOZE, DELMAR GEORGE	01	M	660124	VS
HELBER, LAWRENCE NEAL	01	M	660124	VS
PITT, ALBERT	03	M	660124	VS
SPRICK, DOYLE ROBERT	03	M	660124	VS
MCPHERSON, FRED LAMAR	04	F	660128	VS
BADOLATI, FRANK NEIL	E6	A	660129	VS
HODGSON, CECIL J	E7	A	660129	VS
TERRY, RONALD TERRANCE	E6	A	660129	VS
HAMILTON, EUGENE D	03	F	660131	VN
ALM, RICHARD ANDREW	04	M	660201	VN
COATES, DONALD LEROY	E6	M	660201	VN
HUMPHREY, GALEN FRANCIS	E7	M	660201	VN
LOHEED, HUBERT B	05	N	660201	VN
LUKER, RUSSELL BURT	E6	M	660201	VN
PREVOST, ALBERT MICHAEL	02	M	660201	VN
VLAKAKOS, PETER GEORGE	E6	M	660201	VN
BROWN, WILBUR RONALD	03	F	660203	VS
CARTER, JAMES LOUIS	04	F	660203	VS
PARSLEY, EDWARD HILTON	E4	F	660203	VS
WALLER, THERMAN M	E4	F	660203	VS
ASHUSSEN, GLENN EDWARD	E6	N	660205	VS
MCCONNAUGHAY, DAN DAILY	E4	N	660205	VS
SPARENBERG, BERNARD J	E7	N	660205	VS
HOPPS, GARY DOUGLAS	03	N	660210	VN
HUNTER, RUSSELL PALMER JR	03	F	660210	LA
KIEFFEL, ERNST PHILIP JR	03	F	660210	LA
HILLS, JOHN RUSSELL	04	F	660214	LA
MAUTERER, OSCAR	04	F	660215	LA
MURRAY, JOSEPH VAUGHN	02	N	660218	VN
SCHROEFFEL, THOMAS ANTHONY	02	N	660218	VN
HETRICK, RAYMOND HARRY	03	F	660224	LA
CAUSEY, JOHN BERNARD	03	F	660225	VN
NEWTON, DONALD S	E5	A	660226	VS
WILLS, FRANCIS DESALES	E3	A	660226	VS
CHRISTENSEN, WILLIAM MURRE	02	N	660301	VN
FRAWLEY, WILLIAM D	03	N	660301	VN
WOLOSZYK, DONALD J	02	N	660301	VN
WORST, KARL EDWARD	03	F	660302	LA
ANDREWS, STUART MERRILL	04	F	660304	VS
CONLON, JOHN FRANCIS III	02	F	660304	VS
HESSOM, ROBERT CHARLES	05	N	660305	VN
PAGE, GORDON L	04	F	660307	VN
SMITH, HAROLD VICTOR	03	F	660307	VN
COLLINS, WILLARD MARION	03	F	660309	VS
FOSTER, ROBERT EUGENE	E5	F	660309	VS
PETERSON, DELBERT R	02	F	660309	VS
TAYLOR, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	660310	VS
XAVIER, AUGUSTO MARIA	02	M	660310	VS
DAVIS, GENE EDWARD	E5	F	660311	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DUVALL, DEAN ARNOLD	E4	F	660313	VS
HENNINGER, HOWARD W	03	F	660313	VS
MORGAN, EDWIN E	E6	F	660313	VS
OLSON, GERALD E	03	F	660313	VS
PARKER, UDON (NMN)	E4	A	660313	VS
PASEKOFF, ROBERT E	03	F	660313	VS
PAULEY, MARSHALL I	E5	F	660313	VS
HILTON, ROBERT LARIE	E4	F	660314	VN
KLUTE, KARL EDWIN	03	F	660314	VS
HOLMES, DAVID HUGH	03	F	660315	LA
MCCELROY, GLENN DAVID	05	A	660315	LA
NASH, JOHN MICHAEL	03	A	660315	LA
SCOTT, MARTIN R	03	F	660315	VN
STEWART, PETER J	05	F	660315	VN
UNDERWOOD, PAUL G	05	F	660316	VN
DAVIS, BRENT EDEN	02	M	660318	VN
MCPHERSON, EVERETT ALVIN	02	M	660318	VN
BEACH, ARTHUR JAMES	03	M	660320	VS
COMPTON, FRANK RAY	03	N	660321	VN
TIDERMAN, JOHN MARK	04	N	660321	VN
HEWITT, SAMUEL EUGENE	E2	M	660323	VS
TAPP, JOHN BETHIEL	04	N	660323	VS
SHERMAN, JOHN BROOKS	02	M	660325	VS
GRAYSON, WILLIAM RONALD	05	N	660401	VS
KRECH, MELVIN THOMAS	E6	N	660401	VS
LAWS, RICHARD LEE	03	N	660403	VN
BROWN, JAMES WILLIAM	E1	M	660405	VS
COOK, DENNIS PHILIP	03	N	660406	VS
GATES, JAMES W	03	A	660406	LA
LAFAYETTE, JOHN W	03	A	660406	LA
BARNETT, ROBERT RUSSELL	03	F	660407	LA
WALKER, THOMAS TAYLOR	03	F	660407	LA
CONWAY, JAMES BENNETT	03	A	660412	VS
GLASSON, WILLIAM ALBERT JR	04	N	660412	CH
HARRIS, REUBEN BEAUMONT	E2	N	660412	CH
JORDAN, LARRY M	02	N	660412	CH
MAPE, JOHN CLEMENT	05	N	660413	VN
ZERBE, MICHAEL R	02	N	660415	VS
TROMP, WILLIAM LESLIE	02	N	660417	VN
ADAMS, LEE AARON	02	F	660419	VN
BROWN, JOSEPH ORVILLE	03	F	660419	LA
ROBBINS, RICHARD JOSEPH	03	F	660419	LA
AUSTIN, ELLIS ERNEST	04	N	660421	VN
KELLER, JACK ELMER	04	N	660421	VN
NICKERSON, WILLIAM BREWSTE	02	N	660422	VN
WEIMORTS, ROBERT FRANKLIN	04	N	660422	VN
DYCKOWSKI, ROBERT RAYMOND	03	F	660423	VN
COOPER, WILLIAM EARL	05	F	660424	VN
ANDERSON, WARREN LEROY	03	F	660426	VN
TUCKER, JAMES HALE	02	F	660426	VN
BOSTON, LEO SIDNEY	03	F	660429	VN
ROBINSON, THOMAS EDWARD	02	N	660429	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BRUCH, DONALD WILLIAM JR	02	F	660429	VN
EGAN, WILLIAM PATRICK	04	N	660429	LA
MULLEN, WILLIAM FRANCIS	03	M	660429	LA
WOOD, WALTER SUTTON	04	N	660502	VN
MALONE, JIMMY M	E2	A	660504	VS
DAMES, JOHN JAMES	E7	A	660505	VS
DEXTER, BENNIE LEE	E3	F	660509	VS
BAILEY, JOHN EDWARD	03	F	660510	VN
FENELEY, FRANCIS JAMES	03	F	660511	VN
VILLEPONTEAUX, JAMES H JR	02	M	660511	VS
KING, DONALD L	03	F	660514	VN
RALSTON, FRANK DELZELL III	03	F	660514	VN
BALCOM, RALPH CAROL	03	F	660515	VN
JENSEN, GEORGE W	04	F	660515	LA
MADISON, WILLIAM L	E5	F	660515	LA
MCKENNEY, KENNETH DEWEY	E3	F	660515	LA
PRESTON, JAMES A	E5	F	660515	LA
REILLY, LAVERN G	04	F	660515	LA
TAPP, MARSHALL L	03	F	660515	LA
THOMPSON, GEORGE W	02	F	660515	LA
WILLIAMS, JAMES E	E4	F	660515	LA
DEERE, DONALD THORPE	E4	A	660517	VS
GUILLET, ANDRE R	E3	F	660518	LA
HARLEY, LEE D	03	F	660518	LA
MOORE, WILLIAM JOHN	E4	F	660518	VS
WALL, JERRY MACK	E4	F	660518	VS
BUCKLEY, LOUIS JR	E5	A	660521	VS
THACKERSON, WALTER ANTHONY	E3	A	660521	VS
GLANDON, GARY ALVEN	02	F	660526	VS
GRIFFEY, TERENCE HASTINGS	02	F	660526	VS
ALBERTON, BOBBY JOE	E5	F	660531	VN
EDMONDSON, WILLIAM ROTHROC	02	F	660531	VN
HERROLD, NED R	02	F	660531	VN
MCDONALD, EMMETT RAYMOND	03	F	660531	VN
RAGLAND, DAYTON WILLIAM	05	F	660531	VN
SHINGLEDECKER, ARMON D	02	F	660531	VN
STEEN, MARTIN W	03	F	660531	VN
STICKNEY, PHILLIP J	E3	F	660531	VN
ROSATO, JOSEPH FRANK	03	F	660602	VS
KRYSAK, THEODORE E	03	F	660603	LA
MARTIN, RUSSELL D	02	F	660603	LA
MULLINS, HAROLD E	E6	F	660603	LA
ROSE, LUTHER L	E6	F	660603	LA
SMITH, HARDING EUGENE SR	05	F	660603	LA
WARREN, ERVIN	E5	F	660603	LA
SANDNER, ROBERT LOUIS	03	F	660607	CB
BUSH, ROBERT IRA	03	F	660609	VN
SHORACK, THEODORE JAMES JR	04	F	660609	VN
HARRIS, GREGORY J	E4	M	660612	VS
BURKART, CHARLES WILLIA JR	03	F	660613	LA
GIERAK, GEORGE GREGORY JR	02	N	660613	VN
GRANT, JOHN TURNER JR	04	N	660613	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_PK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
KERR, EVERETT O	03	F	660613	LA
LAMBTON, BENNIE RICHARD	E7	N	660613	VN
ADAMS, OLEY NEAL	E5	F	660617	VS
CAIRNS, ROBERT ALEXANDER	E5	F	660617	VS
COBBS, RALPH BURTON	04	N	660617	VS
COLLETTE, CURTIS DAVID	E5	N	660617	VS
DEMPSEY, JACK ISHUM	E5	N	660617	VS
FRENG, STANLEY JOHN	E5	N	660617	VS
GRAVITTE, CONNIE MACY	03	F	660617	VS
HESS, GENE KARL	E5	F	660617	VS
ROMIG, EDWARD LEON	02	N	660617	VS
SAVOY, M J	E2	N	660617	VS
SIEGWARTH, DONALD E	02	N	660617	VS
WASHBURN, LARRY EUGENE	E3	F	660617	VS
MCDONOUGH, JOHN RICHARD	03	N	660620	VN
TUNNELL, JOHN WALLACE	04	N	660620	VN
SMITH, WARREN PARKER JR	03	F	660622	LA
BELKNAP, HARRY JOHN	01	N	660623	VN
NYMAN, LAWRENCE FREDERICK	02	N	660623	VN
ELLIS, WILLIAM JR	E3	A	660624	VS
MARIK, CHARLES WELDON	02	N	660625	VN
CAVALLI, ANTHONY FRANK	02	F	660628	LA
DUDLEY, CHARLES GLENDON	03	F	660628	LA
WOLFE, THOMAS HUBERT	03	F	660628	LA
WILLIAMS, ROBERT CYRIL	04	F	660701	VN
GAGE, ROBERT HUGH	E4	M	660703	VS
PHILLIPS, DAVID JOSEPH JR	03	F	660703	VS
RENO, RALPH JOSEPH	E8	A	660703	VS
HESTLE, ROOSEVELT JR	04	F	660706	VN
PHARRIS, WILLIAM VALRIE	E3	A	660707	VS
LONGANECKER, RONALD LEE	E3	M	660708	VS
WILKINS, GEORGE HENRY	04	N	660711	VN
KIPINA, MARSHALL F	E4	A	660714	LA
NOPP, ROBERT G	03	A	660714	LA
WINTERS, DARRYL GORDON	E3	F	660719	VS
DILLON, DAVID ANDREW	E4	A	660720	VS
NOBERT, CRAIG R	02	F	660720	VN
TIFFIN, RAINFORD	03	F	660721	VN
WELLS, ROBERT JAMES	E3	A	660722	VS
SMITH, WILLIAM WARD	03	F	660723	VS
BOSSIO, GALILEO, FRED	04	F	660729	VN
CAMERON, VIRGIL KING	02	N	660729	VN
DI TOMMASO, ROBERT JOSEPH	02	F	660729	VN
HOSKINSON, ROBERT E	03	F	660729	VN
LAWS, DELMER LEE	E7	A	660729	VS
BURNS, JOHN ROBERT	03	F	660804	LA
FRYER, CHARLES WIGGER	03	N	660807	VN
MORAN, RICHARD ALLAN	04	N	660807	VS
KOMMENDANT, AADO	02	F	660808	VS
WALLING, CHARLES MILTON	03	F	660808	VS
ALLINSON, DAVID JAY	03	F	660812	VN
CATTON, FRIDTIS ADRIAN	04	F	660814	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
KEMP, FREDDIE (NMN)	E2	A	660817	VS
RYKOSKEY, EDWARD JAY	E3	M	660818	VS
MILIKIN, RICHARD M III	02	F	660820	VN
JOHNSON, JAMES REED	E3	A	660821	VS
BULLARD, WILLIAM HARRY	02	N	660825	VS
BABULA, ROBERT LEO	E2	M	660828	VS
BODENSCHATZ, JOHN EUGEN JR	E2	M	660828	VS
BORTON, ROBERT CURTIS JR	E2	M	660828	VS
CARTER, DENNIS RAY	E2	M	660828	VS
NICHOLS, HUBERT C JR	04	F	660901	VN
TRUJILLO, JOSEPH F	E3	M	660903	VS
BUNDY, NORMAN LEE	02	N	660906	VN
FISCHER, JOHN RICHARD	03	M	660909	VS
TATUM, LAWRENCE B	04	F	660910	VN
STODDARD, CLARENCE W JR	05	N	660914	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN L	04	F	660916	VN
LEETUN, DAREL D	03	F	660917	VN
BROWN, FRANK MONROE JR	03	N	660919	VS
HENRY, DAVID ALAN	02	N	660919	VS
PARSONS, DON BROWN JR	02	N	660919	VN
PILKINGTON, THOMAS HOLT	02	N	660919	VN
BLOOM, RICHARD MCAULIFFE	02	M	660920	VS
BAUDER, JAMES REGINALD	04	N	660921	VN
MILLS, JAMES B	02	N	660921	VN
KNOCHEL, CHARLES ALLEN	03	N	660922	VN
WHITTLE, JUNIOR LEE	E4	A	660924	VS
BOSSMAN, PETER ROBERT	E4	N	660925	VS
CUSHMAN, CLIFTON EMMET	03	F	660925	VN
DUCAT, PHILLIP ALLEN	03	M	660925	VS
REITER, DEAN WESLEY	02	M	660925	VS
TICE, PAUL DOUGLAS	E3	M	660925	VS
MOSBURG, HENRY LEE	03	A	660926	VS
PHILLIPS, MARVIN FOSTER	E4	A	660926	VS
SPILMAN, DYKE AUGUSTUS	02	F	660927	VN
STINE, JOSEPH M	04	F	660927	VN
BRASHER, JIMMY MAC	02	A	660928	VN
PITTMAN, ROBERT EDWARD	E4	A	660928	VN
TAYLOR, DANNY GENE	E6	A	660928	VS
ECHAVARRIA, RAYMOND L	E8	A	661003	LA
JONES, JAMES E	E7	A	661003	LA
WILLIAMS, EDDIE L	E7	A	661003	LA
BEEHE, JAMES ALVIN	02	N	661005	VN
GILCHRIST, ROBERT M	02	F	661007	VN
KNIGHT, LARRY D	03	F	661007	VS
PABST, EUGENE M	02	F	661007	VN
TREECE, JAMES ALLEN	03	F	661007	VS
FELDHaus, JOHN ANTHONY	03	N	661008	VN
CONFER, MICHAEL STEELE	02	N	661010	VN
BORDEN, MURRAY LYMAN	02	F	661013	VN
MEADOWS, EUGENE THOMAS	02	F	661013	VN
THOMAS, DARWIN JOEL	01	N	661014	VN
ADAMS STEVEN HARDIN	E3	F	661018	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ANGSTADT, RALPH HAROLD	04	I	661018	VN
CLARK, LAWRENCE	E5	F	661018	VN
HILL, ROBERT L	E6	F	661018	VN
LONG, JOHN HENRY SOTHORON	02	F	661018	VN
RACKLEY, INZAR WILLIAM JR	04	F	661018	VN
SHONECK, JOHN R	E5	F	661018	VN
BURKE, MICHAEL JOHN	E3	M	661019	VS
LEWANDOWSKI, LEONARD J JR	E2	M	661019	VS
MISHUK, RICHARD E	E2	M	661019	VS
EDWARDS, HARRY S JR	02	N	661020	VN
WAGEHER, DAVID RAYMOND	03	F	661020	LA
EARLL, DAVID JOHN	03	F	661021	VN
HARRIS, HAROLD LEE	E3	A	661022	VS
MCBRIDE, EARL PAUL	04	N	661022	VN
GREEN, ROBERT BAILEY	E5	F	661025	LA
LEVAN, ALVIN LEE	E3	N	661025	VS
MORRISON, GLENN R JR	03	F	661026	VS
JOHNSON, DALE ALONZO	04	F	661027	VN
WEAVER, GEORGE ROBERT JR	E5	N	661101	VS
KLINE, ROBERT E	04	F	661102	VN
HUNT, WILLIAM B	E6	A	661104	VS
SCUNGIO, VINCENT ANTHONY	03	F	661104	VN
CARTER, WILLIAM THOMAS	02	N	661110	VN
MCATEER, THOMAS JOSEPH	03	N	661110	VS
O'BRIEN, JOHN LAWRENCE	03	F	661110	LA
RIORDAN, JOHN MICHAEL	E4	N	661110	VS
SCHODERER, ERIC JOHN	E4	N	661110	VS
FROSIO, ROBERT CLARENCE	05	N	661112	VS
JONES, JAMES GRADEY	02	N	661112	VS
KEIPER, JOHN CHARLES	E4	M	661115	VS
RAVENNA, HARRY M III	03	A	661115	VS
TIMMONS, BRUCE ALLEN	E4	N	661115	VS
PIITTMANN, ALAN D	E3	F	661116	LA
ARNOLD, WILLIAM TAMM	02	N	661118	VN
JOHNSTONE, JAMES MONTGOMER	03	A	661119	VS
WHITED, JAMES LAFAYETTE	04	A	661119	LA
GARDNER, GLENN VIRGIL	E2	A	661125	VS
NIEHOUSE, DANIEL LEE	--	V	661125	VS
HOEFFS, JOHN HARVEY	E4	A	661128	VS
BOTT, RUSSELL PETER	E6	A	661202	LA
DYER, IRBY III (NMN)	E5	A	661202	LA
MCRAE, DAVID EDWARD	02	N	661202	VN
NYSTROM, BRUCE AUGUST	05	N	661202	VN
STARK, WILLIE E	E7	A	661202	LA
SULANDER, DANIEL ARTHUR	W1	A	661202	LA
BEGLEY, BURRISS NELSON	04	F	661205	VN
CARLSON, JOHN WERNER	03	F	661207	VS
ALFRED, GERALD OAK JR	02	F	661211	VN
BRIGHAM, ALBERT	E3	M	661214	VS
HOLMAN, GERALD ALLAN	02	N	661214	VS
KOENIG, EDWIN LEE	04	N	661214	VS
MCRAE, DAVID EDWARD	02	N	661214	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
NEWELL, MICHAEL THOMAS	03	N	661214	VN
LUCAS, LARRY FRANCIS	03	A	661220	LA
LUM, DAVID ANTHONY	02	F	661220	VS
KERNS, ARTHUR WILLIAM	E2	A	661223	VS
REEVES, JOHN HOWARD	E3	M	661223	VS
BULLOCK, LARRY ALAN	E3	A	670101	VS
GAULEY, JAMES PAUL	03	F	670110	LA
STOVES, MERRITT III (NMN)	E3	A	670110	VS
KEMP, CLAYTON C JR	E4	N	670112	VN
REINECKE, WAYNE C	E4	N	670112	VN
CANUP, FRANKLIN HARLEE JR	E5	N	670114	VS
WELCH, ROBERT J	03	F	670116	VN
COGDELL, WILLIAM KEITH	03	F	670117	LA
KROGMAN, ALVA RAY	02	F	670117	LA
WOZNIAK, FREDERICK J	02	F	670117	VN
WRIGHT, GARY G	04	F	670117	VN
MAOSEN, MARLOW ERLING	02	N	670118	VS
ASHBY, DONALD ROBERTS SR	04	N	670119	VS
EHRLICH, DENNIS MICHAEL	02	N	670119	VS
CONLEY, EUGENE OGDEN	05	F	670121	VN
HOGAN, JERRY F	02	N	670121	VN
SIMPSON, MAX COLEMAN	E3	A	670124	VS
WALLACE, ARNOLD BRIAN	E2	A	670125	VS
MORGAN, THOMAS R	03	F	670126	VS
THORNTON, WILLIAM DEMPSEY	E3	A	670128	VS
SILVA, CLAUDE ARNOLD	02	F	670129	VN
BARDEN, HOWARD LEROY	03	F	670131	LA
KUBLEY, ROY ROBERT	03	F	670131	LA
MIYAZAKI, RONALD KAZUO	E4	F	670131	LA
MULHAUSER, HARVEY	03	F	670131	LA
WALKER, LLOYD FRANCIS	04	F	670131	LA
JOHNSON, AUGUST DAVID	E3	N	670203	VS
COLLAMORE, ALLAN PHILIP JR	03	N	670204	VN
POOR, RUSSELL ARDEN	03	F	670204	VN
THOMPSON, DONALD E	03	N	670204	VN
HALL, DONALD J	E5	F	670206	VN
HEISKELL, LUCIUS L	03	F	670206	VN
KIBBEY, RICHARD ABBOT	03	F	670206	VN
WOOD, PATRICK HARDY	04	F	670206	VN
CARLSON, PAUL VICTOR	02	N	670212	VS
SULLIVAN, MARTIN JOSEPH	04	N	670212	VS
WEISSMUELLER, COURTNEY E	03	F	670212	VS
MARVIN, ROBERT CLARENCE	03	N	670214	VN
GOODMAN, RUSSELL CLEMENSEN	04	F	670220	VN
BORJA, DOMINGO R S	E7	A	670221	LA
WRIGHT, ARTHUR	E4	A	670221	VS
HART, JOSEPH LESLIE	05	F	670225	LA
ALWAN, HAROLD JOSEPH	04	M	670227	VS
HUIE, LITCHFIELD PATTERSON	03	N	670227	VS
LETCHMORTH, EDWARD NORMAN	02	N	670227	VS
SAUSE, BERNARD JACOB JR	E3	N	670227	VS
TEMPER, RONALD IFF	F1	N	670227	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MOORE, JAMES R	E4	M	670228	VS
CARLOCK, RALPH LAURENCE	04	F	670304	LA
CARPENTER, HOWARD B	E5	A	670306	LA
SMALL, BURT CHAUNCEY JR	E4	A	670306	VS
MILLER, ROBERT LESTER	03	N	670307	VN
CRAIN, CARROLL OWEN JR	04	N	670308	VN
GALVIN, RONALD E	E2	N	670308	VN
PAWLISH, GEORGE F	02	N	670308	VN
ADRIAN, JOSEPH DANIEL	03	F	670312	VS
HARRIS, PAUL WINIFORD	E2	M	670313	VS
TERWILLINGER, VIRGIL BYRON	E3	M	670313	VS
FREDERICK, PETER J	05	F	670315	VN
SMITH, DEAN (NMN) JR	02	N	670315	VN
GOEDEN, GENE WILLIAM	02	N	670317	VN
MORRILL, DAVID WHITTIER	04	M	670318	VS
PARKER, MAXIM CHARLES	01	M	670318	VS
AUSTIN, JOSEPH CLAIR	05	F	670319	VN
CHARVET, PAUL CLAUDE	03	N	670321	VN
ELLISON, JOHN C	04	N	670324	VN
HALLBERG, ROGER C	E6	A	670324	VS
PLOWMAN, JAMES EDWIN	02	N	670324	VN
STEWART, JACK T	03	A	670324	VS
HISE, JAMES HAMILTON	02	N	670325	VS
PALENSCAR, ALEXANDER J 3D	03	N	670327	VN
GOVAN, ROBERT A	04	F	670401	LA
JOURDENAIS, GEORGE HENRY	03	F	670401	VS
STANLEY, ROBERT W	02	F	670401	VS
WILLIAMS, DAVID R	04	F	670401	LA
MARTIN, DAVID EARL	01	N	670404	VN
SZEYLLER, EDWARD PHILIP	03	N	670404	VN
PARKER, THOMAS AQUINAS	E6	N	670405	VS
SCHWORE, RONALD PAUL	E4	A	670409	VS
O'GRADY, JOHN FRANCIS	04	F	670410	VN
CLAY, WILLIAM CLIFTON III	03	M	670412	VS
CARLTON, JAMES EDMUND JR	03	M	670417	VN
MCGARVEY, JAMES MAURICE	04	M	670417	VN
HAMILTON, JOHN S	04	F	670419	VN
HAMILTON, ROGER D	E3	M	670421	VS
HASENBACH, PAUL ALFRED	E3	A	670421	VS
MANGINO, THOMAS ANGELO	E4	A	670421	VS
NIDDS, DANIEL R	E3	A	670421	VS
WINTERS, DAVID M	E3	A	670421	VS
AUSTIN, CHARLES DAVID	02	F	670424	VN
KNAPP, HERMAN L	04	F	670424	VN
ESTOCIN, MICHAEL JOHN	04	N	670426	VN
BENTON, JAMES AUSTIN	E3	M	670427	VS
CASTRO, REINALDO ANTONIO	E5	M	670427	VS
DALLAS, RICHARD HOWARD	E3	M	670427	VS
DYER, BLENN COLBY	E3	M	670427	VS
OSBORNE, SAMUEL WILLIAM JR	E2	M	670427	VS
PENNINGTON, RONALD KEITH	E3	M	670427	VS
MCPHEE, RANBY NFAI	F2	M	670430	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BAILEY, JOHN HOWARD	E5	M	670501	VS
CORFIELD, STAN LEROY	E5	M	670501	VS
GAUGHAN, ROGER CONRAD	E4	M	670501	VS
GUAJARDO, HILARIO H	E2	M	670501	VS
SMITH, CARL ARTHUR	E3	M	670501	VS
SOULIER, DUWAYNE	E2	M	670501	VS
MOORE, RALPH EDWARD	E3	A	670503	VS
ROGERS, CHARLES EDWARD	04	F	670504	LA
STEIMER, THOMAS JACK	02	N	670508	VS
TODD, ROBERT JACY	E1	M	670509	VS
AHLMAYER, HEINZ JR	01	M	670510	VS
MILLER, MALCOLM THOMAS	E4	N	670510	VS
NETHERLAND, ROGER M	05	N	670510	VN
SHARP, SAMUEL ARTHUR JR	E3	M	670510	VS
TYCZ, JAMES NEIL	E5	M	670510	VS
ASHLOCK, CARLOS	E4	M	670512	VS
GRENZEBACH, EARL W	04	F	670512	VN
JEFFERSON, JAMES MILTON	02	F	670512	VN
PITMAN, PETER POTTER	03	F	670512	VN
STEWART, ROBERT ALLAN	04	F	670512	VN
HILL, CHARLES DALE	E2	N	670515	VN
LEWIS, CHARLIE GRAY	E7	A	670517	VS
DELONG, JOE LYNN	E3	A	670518	VS
HELLBACH, HAROLD JAMES	03	M	670519	VS
KNIGHT, ROY A JR	04	F	670519	LA
PATTERSON, JAMES KELLY	03	N	670519	VN
RICH, RICHARD	05	N	670519	VN
KEEFE, DOUGLAS ONEIL	E2	M	670520	VS
MADDOX, NOTLEY G	04	F	670520	VN
SIMPSON, WALTER STEPHEN	E6	A	670521	VS
WROBLESKI, WALTER F	W1	A	670521	VS
BACKUS, KENNETH FRANK	02	F	670522	VN
HOLMES, LESTER E	05	F	670522	VN
PERRINE, ELTON L	03	F	670522	VN
HOMUTH, RICHARD WENDAL	03	N	670523	VN
PETTIS, THOMAS EDWIN	02	N	670523	VN
SCHMITTOU, EUREKA LAVERN	E5	N	670523	VN
SOUCY, RONALD PHILIP SR	E5	N	670523	VN
GRAVES, RICHARD CAMPBELL	01	N	670525	VN
GARNER, JOHN HENRY	E4	N	670529	VS
FITZGERALD, JOSEPH E	E3	A	670531	VS
JAKOVAC, JOHN ANDREW	E5	A	670531	VS
MCGAR, BRIAN KENT	E3	A	670531	VS
ROCKETT, ALTON C JR	03	F	670602	VN
WOOD, REX STEWART	04	N	670602	VN
BODDEN, TIMOTHY ROY	E5	M	670603	LA
DEXTER, RONALD JAMES	E8	A	670603	LA
GARDNER, JOHN G	02	M	670603	LA
HANSON, STEPHEN PAUL	03	M	670603	LA
KEARNS, JOSEPH T JR	03	F	670603	VN
LAWEY, BILLY R	E7	A	670603	LA
SPRINGSTON, THOMAS R JR	04	F	670603	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
ROBINSON, LEWIS MERRITT	05	F	670604	LA
IBANEZ, DI REYES	E5	M	670605	VS
OWENS, JOY L	04	F	670607	VN
SALE, HAROLD R JR	02	F	670607	VN
APODACA, VICTOR JOE JR	03	F	670608	VN
MYERS, DAVID GEPHART	02	M	670608	VS
PLATT, ROBERT L JR	E3	A	670610	VS
BEECHER, QUENTIN RIPPETOE	W2	A	670611	VS
BOHLSCHIED, CURTIS RICHARD	03	M	670611	VS
CHOMEL, CHARLES DENNIS	E2	M	670611	VS
CHRISTIE, DENNIS RAY	E3	M	670611	VS
CLINTON, DEAN EDDIE	W1	A	670611	VS
FOLEY, JOHN JOSEPH III	E3	M	670611	VS
GONZALEZ, JOSE JESUS	E3	M	670611	VS
HANRATTY, THOMAS MICHAEL	E2	M	670611	VS
HAVRANEK, MICHAEL WILLIAM	E3	M	670611	VS
KLEMM, DONALD M	04	F	670611	VN
KOOI, JAMES WILLARD	E3	M	670611	VS
MOSEIER, JIM EDWIN	E4	M	670611	VS
NELSON, JAMES R	E5	A	670611	VS
OLDHAM, JOHN SANDERS	04	M	670611	VS
RIGGS, THOMAS F	W2	A	670611	VS
UHLMASTIEK, RALPH E	E4	A	670611	VS
WIDENER, JAMES EDWARD	E2	M	670611	VS
SWANSON, JOHN W JR	03	F	670615	VN
GUILLORY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E7	A	670618	VS
LEMMONS, WILLIAM E	02	A	670618	VS
MCKITTRICK, JAMES C	03	A	670618	VS
SPINLER, DARRELL JOHN	03	F	670621	LA
ALLEN, MERLIN RAYE	E3	M	670630	VS
HOUSE, JOHN ALEXANDER II	03	M	670630	VS
HOWARD, LUTHER HARRIS	E4	A	670630	VS
JUDD, MICHAEL BARRY	E4	N	670630	VS
KILLEN, JOHN DEWEY III	E3	M	670630	VS
RUNNELS, GLYN LINAL JR	E4	M	670630	VS
WILSON, WAYNE V	E5	M	670702	VS
SEYMOUR, LEO E	E5	A	670703	LA
AVOLESE, PAUL ANDREW	04	F	670707	VS
BITTENBENDER, DAVID FRITZ	03	F	670707	VS
BLANKENSHIP, CHARLES HERMA	03	F	670707	VS
CRUMM, WILLIAM JOSEPH	08	F	670707	VS
JONES, GEORGE EMERSON	02	F	670707	VS
MCLAUGHLIN, OLEN BURKE	E7	F	670707	VS
TRITT, JAMES FRANCIS	E5	N	670707	VN
ALMENDARIZ, SAMUEL (NMN)	E7	A	670712	LA
DOVE, JACK PARIS SR	03	F	670712	VN
SCHIELE, JAMES F	E4	A	670712	VS
SQUIRE, BOYD E	04	F	670712	VN
SULLIVAN, ROBERT JOSEPH	E7	A	670712	LA
VANBENDEGOM, JAMES LEE	E4	A	670712	VS
CASSELL, ROBIN BERN	02	N	670715	VN
PETERSON, DENNIS WILLIAM	03	N	670719	VN

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DAVIS, DONALD VANCE	04	N	670725	VN
JARVIS, JEREMY M	02	F	670725	VN
LUNSFORD, HERBERT L	04	F	670725	VN
BRAZIK, RICHARD	02	F	670726	VN
CLAFLIN, RICHARD AMES	03	F	670726	VN
BARE, WILLIAM ORLAN	02	F	670727	VN
CORBITT, GILLAND WALES	04	F	670727	VN
HARDIE, CHARLES DAVID	E5	N	670727	VN
PATTERSON, BRUCE MERLE	01	N	670727	VN
BENNEFELD, STEVEN HENRY	E3	M	670729	VS
JOHNSON, RICHARD HERMAN	E3	M	670729	VS
BISCAILLIZ, ROBERT LYNN	E3	M	670730	VS
BYARS, EARNEST RAY	E3	M	670730	VS
FREDERICK, DAVID ADDISON	03	M	670730	VS
WATERMAN, CRAIG HOUSTON	02	M	670730	VS
ALLEN, THOMAS RAY	03	F	670731	VN
PACKARD, RONALD L	02	F	670731	VN
PREWITT, WILLIAM ROLAND	E3	M	670801	VS
CUNNINGHAM, CAREY ALLEN	03	F	670802	VN
HYNDS, WALLACE G JR	06	F	670802	VN
GOPP, THOMAS ALAN	E4	M	670803	VS
MCGRATH, JAMES PATRICK	E3	N	670803	VS
MAHAN, JOHN BENEDICT III	E3	M	670803	VS
WOLPE, JACK	E4	M	670803	VS
BISZ, RALPH CAMPION	02	N	670804	VN
KEMMERER, DONALD R	03	F	670806	VN
PAGE, ALBERT L JR	03	F	670806	VN
CHERRY, ALLEN SHELDON	03	F	670809	VN
BERUBE, KENNETH ALLEN	02	M	670811	VS
DION, LAURENT NORBERT	05	N	670817	VN
HOM, CHARLES DAVID	02	N	670817	VN
EBY, ROBERT GINO	--	V	670821	VS
SCOTT, DAIN V	02	N	670821	VN
TREMBLEY, J FORREST GEORGE	02	N	670821	VN
KERR, JOHN CREIGHTON GILLE	04	F	670822	LA
MORGAN, BURKE HENDERSON	03	F	670822	LA
LANE, CHARLES JR	03	F	670823	VN
MIDNIGHT, FRANCIS B	02	F	670823	VN
SITEK, THOMAS WALTER	04	N	670823	VN
SITTNER, RONALD NICHOLIS	03	F	670823	VN
ALLARD, RICHARD MICHAEL	E4	A	670824	VS
GOFF, KENNETH B	02	A	670824	VS
HOLTZMAN, RONALD LEE	E4	A	670824	VS
SCHELL, RICHARD J	03	A	670824	VS
BOIS, CLAIRE RONALD ALAN	E5	N	670825	VN
JACOBS, EDWARD JAMES JR	05	N	670825	VN
ZAVOCKY, JAMES JOHN	02	N	670825	VN
FULLER, WILLIAM O	03	F	670826	VN
KILGULLEN, THOMAS M	02	F	670826	VN
BACIK, VLADIMIR HENRY	04	M	670827	VN
BOGGS, PASCHAL GLENN	03	M	670827	VN
NEWMAN, JEFFREY I	--	V	670828	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
WALLACE, CHARLES FRANKLIN	04	M	670828	VN
NEWBURN, LARRY STEPHEN	E3	A	670829	VS
ALLARD, MICHAEL JOHN	03	N	670830	VN
JOHNSON, ROBERT DENNISON	04	N	670901	VS
OTT, EDWARD LOUIS III	E6	N	670901	VS
BENNETT, WILLIAM GEORGE	04	F	670902	VN
MOORE, HERBERT WILLIAM JR	03	F	670903	VN
DOWNING, DONALD WILLIAM	03	F	670905	VN
HANSON, THOMAS PATTERSON	02	F	670905	VN
LAPORTE, MICHAEL LOUIS	E2	N	670905	VS
MILLER, CARL D	04	F	670905	VN
PRATHER, MARTIN WILLIAM	E3	M	670905	VS
RAYMOND, PAUL D	02	F	670905	VN
ANSPACH, ROBERT ALLEN	E8	A	670911	VS
HAWTHORNE, RICHARD W	04	M	670912	VS
KANE, RICHARD R	03	M	670912	VS
REID, HAROLD E	E3	M	670913	VS
GRUBB, PETER ARTHUR	02	F	670917	VN
NELLANS, WILLIAM L	03	F	670917	VN
PLUMADORE, KENNETH LEO	E3	M	670921	VS
GEIST, STEPHEN J	E4	A	670926	VS
HUDDLESTON, LYNN R	02	A	670926	VS
MOE, HAROLD JOHN	02	M	670926	VS
GRAHAM, GILBERT JAMES	E3	N	670928	VS
MUSETTI, JOSEPH TONY JR	E5	N	670928	VS
OTT, PATRICK LEWIS	02	M	671002	VS
KING, RONALD RUNYAN	04	F	671003	VN
LILLUND, WILLIAM ALLAN	03	F	671004	VN
MCDANIEL, MORRIS L JR	04	F	671004	VN
ZOOK, DAVID HARTZLER JR	04	F	671004	VS
ARMSTRONG, FRANK ALTON III	04	F	671006	LA
APPLEBY, IVAN DALE	04	F	671007	VN
HODGES, DAVID LAWTON	03	N	671007	VN
GUERRA, RAUL ANTONIO	E3	N	671008	VS
PINEAU, ROLAND ROBERT	E7	N	671008	VS
ROGGON, NORMAN LEE	02	N	671008	VS
WOLFE, DONALD FINDLING	02	N	671008	VS
ZISSU, ANDREW GILBERT	02	N	671008	VS
DERRICKSON, THOMAS G II	03	F	671012	VN
HARDY, JOHN K JR	02	F	671012	VN
VAUGHAN, ROBERT REDDINGTON	04	N	671014	VN
APPLEHANS, RICHARD DUANE	03	F	671016	LA
CLARKE, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	03	F	671016	LA
CADWELL, ANTHONY BLAKE	E2	A	671017	VS
FITZGERALD, PAUL L JR	E5	A	671017	VS
HARGROVE, OLIN JR	E3	A	671017	VS
BARR, JOHN FREDERICK	04	N	671018	VN
OGDEN, HOWARD JR	E3	M	671018	VS
HEMHEL, CLARENCE JOSEPH	03	F	671021	VS
DOOLEY, JAMES EDWARD	02	N	671022	VN
CLARK, RICHARD CHAMP	02	N	671024	VN
KROMMENHOFK, JIFFREY M	03	N	671025	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
CONNER, LORENZA (NM1)	02	F	671027	VN
KNAPP, FREDRIC WOODROW	02	N	671102	VN
EGGER, JOHN CULBERTSON JR	04	F	671103	VN
GRAUERT, HANS HERBERT	02	N	671103	VS
KRUST, PETER HERMAN	04	N	671103	VS
ADAMS, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	671108	VS
EVERT, LAWRENCE G	03	F	671108	VN
HINES, VAUGHN MAURICE	E3	A	671108	VS
ARMSTRONG, JOHN WILLIAM	05	F	671109	LA
BAXTER, BRUCE RAYMOND	E8	A	671109	LA
BROWER, RALPH WAYNE	03	F	671109	LA
CLAY, EUGENE LUNSFORD	E5	F	671109	LA
KUSICK, JOSEPH GEORGE	E5	A	671109	LA
MAYSEY, LARRY WAYNE	E4	F	671109	LA
REHN, GARY LEE	E4	M	671109	VS
COOK, KELLY FRANCIS	05	F	671110	VN
CREW, JAMES ALAN	02	F	671110	VN
MORGAN, JAMES S	04	F	671110	VN
MARTINEZ-MERCADO, EDWIN JU	E3	A	671111	VS
SHAW, GARY FRANCIS	E3	A	671111	VS
STATON, ROBERT MILTON JR	E4	A	671111	VS
STUCKEY, JOHN STEINER JR	E2	A	671111	VS
CAYCE, JOHN DAVID	E3	N	671112	VN
ROARK, JAMES DAVID	E5	N	671112	VN
KMETYK, JONATHAN PETER	E3	M	671114	VS
EMRICH, ROGER G	03	N	671117	VN
CRODALE, JACK LEE II	E4	A	671119	VS
DE HERRERA, BENJAMIN DAVID	E3	A	671119	VS
IANDOLI, DONALD (NMN)	E5	A	671119	VS
MARTIN, JOHN M	03	F	671120	VN
REYNOLDS, DAVID RICHARD	E3	A	671121	VS
FOLEY, BRENDAN PATRICK	04	F	671124	LA
MAYERCIK, RONALD M	02	F	671124	LA
ABRAMS, LEWIS HERBERT	05	M	671125	VN
HOLDEMAN, ROBERT EUGENE	02	M	671125	VN
MIDGETT, DEWEY ALLEN	E2	A	671125	VS
SEARFUS, WILLIAM HENRY	05	N	671125	VN
BRENNAN, HERBERT OWEN	06	F	671126	VN
CONDIT, DOUGLAS CRAIG	02	F	671126	VN
JONES, LOUIS F	04	F	671129	VS
MILLNER, MICHAEL	E6	A	671129	VS
CROSBY, RICHARD ALEXANDER	E4	A	671202	VS
LEEPER, WALLACE WILSON	W2	A	671202	VS
MOREIDA, MANUEL J	E4	A	671202	VS
STRANGE, FLOYD W	W1	A	671202	VS
COLLINS, ARNOLD	E4	M	671204	VS
RUSSELL, DONALD M	04	F	671205	LA
PASTVA, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	M	671206	VS
GRZYB, ROBERT H	--	V	671210	VS
BENNETT, ROBERT ELWOOD III	02	F	671213	VS
SCURLOCK, LEE D	E6	A	671221	LA
ENDS GARY HENDY	01	M	671222	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
POWERS, VERNIE HOMER	E3	A	671224	VS
BURNS, FREDERICK JOHN	E3	M	671225	VS
KOONCE, TERRY T	03	F	671225	LA
INNES, ROGER B	02	N	671227	VN
LEE, LEONARD MURRAY	04	N	671227	VN
MARTIN, SAMMY ARTHUR	02	F	671227	VN
CLAPPER, GEAN PRESTON	E5	F	671229	VN
CLAXTON, CHARLES PETER	04	F	671229	VN
CRUZ, CARLOS RAFAEL	03	F	671229	LA
DARCY, EDWARD JOSEPH	E5	F	671229	VN
ECKLEY, WAYNE ALVIN	E5	F	671229	VN
FISHER, DONALD E	05	F	671229	VN
FOSTER, PAUL L	E5	F	671229	LA
MCCRARY, JACK	E6	F	671229	VN
OSBORNE, EDWIN NELMS JR	03	F	671229	VN
PARKER, FRANK C III	03	F	671229	VN
POTTER, WILLIAM JOSEPH JR	03	F	671229	LA
VAN BUREN, GERALD GORDON	03	F	671229	VN
WENAAS, GORDON J	03	F	671229	VN
WILLIAMS, JAMES R	E4	F	671229	VN
SWORDS, SMITH III	04	F	671230	LA
WORTHAM, MURRAY L	02	F	671230	LA
BELCHER, GLENN ARTHUR	02	F	671231	LA
PEACE, JOHN DARLINGTON III	04	N	671231	VN
PERISHO, GORDON SAMUEL	03	N	671231	VN
DENNISON, JAMES RICHARD	04	N	680101	VN
HANLEY, TERRENCE HIGGINS	02	N	680101	VN
HERRIN, HENRY HOWARD JR	01	N	680101	VN
ELLIS, BILLY J	E4	A	680103	VS
LANCASTER, KENNETH R	E4	A	680103	VS
BRIGGS, ERNEST FRANK JR	E5	A	680105	LA
FOULKS, RALPH EUGENE JR	02	N	680105	VN
GALLAGHER, JOHN THEODORE	E6	A	680105	LA
HAMILTON, DENNIS C	W1	A	680105	LA
SCHULTZ, SHELDON D	W1	A	680105	LA
WILLIAMSON, JAMES D	E4	A	680105	LA
STONE, JAMES MARVIN	02	A	680107	VS
TRUJILLO, ROBERT S	E3	A	680107	VS
BIFOLCHI, CHARLES LAWRENCE	02	F	680108	VS
FISCHER, RICHARD WILLIAM	E3	M	680108	VS
SMITH, HALLIE W	03	F	680108	VS
GREEN, NORMAN M	05	F	680109	LA
IRSCH, WAYNE C	02	F	680109	LA
NEWTON, WARREN E	E4	A	680109	VS
PHIPPS, JAMES L	W1	A	680109	VS
RAMOS, RAINIER S	W1	A	680109	VS
REHE, RICHARD RAYMOND	E3	A	680109	VS
SYKES, DERRI	E3	A	680109	VS
HOPPER, EARL PEARSON JR	02	F	680110	VN
ANDERSON, DENIS LEON	02	N	680111	LA
BUCK, ARTHUR CHARLES	02	N	680111	LA
MANNING, RICHARD MITCHELL	E5	N	680111	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
OLSON, DELBERT AUSTIN	05	N	680111	LA
ROBERTS, MICHAEL LAND	E5	N	680111	LA
SIOW, GALE ROBERT	E4	N	680111	LA
STEVENS, PHILLIP PAUL	02	N	680111	LA
THORESEN, DONALD NELLIS	E5	N	680111	LA
WIDON, KENNETH HARRY	E5	N	680111	LA
COHRON, JAMES DERWIN	E6	A	680112	LA
SKARMAN, ORVAL HARRY	E5	M	680115	VS
COOLEY, ORVILLE DALE	03	N	680116	VN
GEE, PAUL S	02	M	680116	VS
MORELAND, WILLIAM D	03	M	680116	VS
REEDY, WILLIAM HENRY JR	E4	N	680116	VN
THOMPSON, WILLIAM JOSEPH	04	N	680116	VN
WILKE, ROBERT F	05	F	680117	VN
BOLES, WARREN WILLIAM	02	N	680118	VN
ROEHRICH, RONALD L	02	N	680118	VN
JOHNSON, WILLIAM D	E3	A	680119	VS
WALLACE, HOBART M JR	04	M	680119	VN
HOLLEY, TILDEN S	03	F	680120	VN
KETTERER, JAMES ALAN	02	F	680120	VN
COALSTON, ECHOL W JR	E5	A	680121	VS
ELLIOTT, JERRY W	E2	A	680121	VS
HILL, BILLY D	E6	A	680121	VS
KIMSEY, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W2	A	680121	VN
RAMSAY, CHARLES J	03	M	680121	VN
RAMSDEN, GERALD LEE	04	N	680123	VN
DUNN, MICHAEL E	03	N	680126	VN
EIDSMOE, NORMAN EDWARD	04	N	680126	VN
CORDOVA, ROBERT JAMES	E2	N	680127	VN
MILLS, JAMES DALE	03	M	680129	VS
WHITE, CHARLES E	E7	A	680129	CB
COCHEO, RICHARD NEWELL	---	V	680131	VS
LACEY, RICHARD J	E5	A	680131	VS
BLOOD, HENRY F	---	V	680201	VS
OLSEN, BETTY ANN	---	V	680201	VS
ADKINS, CHARLES LEROY	E4	A	680202	VS
BURNHAM, DONALD DAWSON	03	A	680202	VS
PATTON, KENNETH J	E5	A	680202	VS
PRINGLE, JOE HAROLD	E7	A	680202	VS
PUGGI, JOSEPH D	E5	A	680202	VS
WILSON, MARION EARL	E3	A	680203	VS
EDGAR, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	680205	LA
GODWIN, SOLOMON HUGHEY	W1	M	680205	VS
POTTER, WILLIAM TOD	02	F	680205	LA
BURNETT, DONALD FREDERICK	E8	N	680206	VS
CHAPA, ARMANDO JR	E4	N	680206	VS
FARRIS, WILLIAM F	E4	N	680206	VS
GALLAGHER, DONALD L	E7	N	680206	VS
HUSS, ROY ARTHUR	02	N	680206	VS
JONES, THOMAS PAUL	03	N	680206	VS
MCKAY, HOMER E	E5	N	680206	VS
NEWMAN, JAMES C JR	E6	N	680206	VS

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THOMPSON, MELVIN CARL	E6	N	680206	VS
TRAVIS, LYNN MICHAEL	02	N	680206	VS
HANNA, KENNETH	E7	A	680207	VS
HOLT, JAMES W	E7	A	680207	VS
LINDEWALD, CHARLES W	E7	A	680207	VS
MORELAND, JAMES L	E4	A	680207	VS
PHILLIPS, DANIEL R	E5	A	680207	VS
GEORGE, JAMES E JR	E4	A	680208	VS
HAMMOND, DENNIS WAYNE	E4	M	680208	VS
LAPHAM, ROBERT GRANTHAN	04	F	680208	VS
BROWN, HARRY WILLIS	E5	A	680212	VS
GROTH, WADE L	E4	A	680212	VS
GUHN, ALAN W	W2	A	680212	VS
ROE, JERRY L	02	A	680212	VS
DUNN, JOSEPH PATRICK	02	N	680214	CH
ELLIOT, ROBERT MALCOLM	03	F	680214	VN
ASHBY, CLAYBORN WILLIS JR	E5	N	680217	LA
COONS, CHESTER LEROY	E4	N	680217	LA
DAWSON, FRANK ARTHUR	E3	N	680217	LA
ONATO, PAUL NICHOLAS	E6	N	680217	LA
HAYDEN, GLENN MILLER	05	N	680217	LA
KRAVITZ, JAMES STEPHEN	02	N	680217	LA
MARTIN, JAMES EDWARD	E3	N	680217	LA
THURMAN, CURTIS FRANK	03	N	680217	LA
WONN, JAMES CHARLES	01	N	680217	LA
DYE, MELVIN C	E5	A	680219	LA
GLOVER, DOUGLAS J	E6	A	680219	LA
GRIFFITH, ROBERT S	E5	A	680219	LA
LAUREANO, LOPEZ ISMAEL	E4	A	680220	VS
HUBLER, GEORGE LAWRENCE	03	M	680223	VS
HARTZHEIM, JOHN FRANCIS	E5	N	680227	LA
MILIUS, PAUL L	05	N	680227	LA
PALMER, GILBERT S JR	04	F	680227	LA
WRIGHT, THOMAS T	03	F	680227	LA
COONS, HENRY ALBERT	04	N	680228	VN
HUNT, ROBERT W	E4	A	680228	VS
STEGMAN, THOMAS	03	N	680228	VN
LANNOM, RICHARD CLIVE	02	N	680301	VN
SCHEURICH, THOMAS EDWIN	04	N	680301	VN
WELSHAM, JOHN T	02	F	680303	VS
ANSELMO, WILLIAM FRANK	E5	F	680306	VS
COLOMBO, GARY LEWIS	E4	M	680306	VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT (NMN)	05	A	680306	VS
MITCHELL, GILBERT L	03	N	680306	VN
RIOS, NOEL LUIS	E5	F	680306	VS
JEWARD, WILLIAM HENRY	04	M	680306	VS
BLANTON, CLARENCE FINLEY	05	F	680311	LA
BOND, RONALD DALE	04	F	680311	VS
CALFEE, JAMES HENRY	E7	F	680311	LA
CALLOWAY, PORTER EARL	E5	A	680311	VS
DAVIS, JAMES WOODROW	E5	F	680311	LA
GISH, HENRY GRAFID	E5	F	680311	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HALL, WILLIS ROZELLE	E6	F	680311	LA
HOLLAND, MELVIN ARNOLD	E6	F	680311	LA
KIRK, HERBERT ARTHUR	E5	F	680311	LA
OLDS, ERNEST ARTHUR	04	F	680311	VN
PRICE, DAVID STANLEY	04	F	680311	LA
SHANNON, PATRICK LEE	E6	F	680311	LA
SPRINGSTEADAH, DONALD K	E6	F	680311	LA
WORLEY, DON FRANKLIN	E5	F	680311	LA
GRIFFITH, JOHN GARY	03	N	680312	VN
KOLLMANN, GLENN EDWARD	05	N	680312	VN
ROGERS, EDWARD FRANCIS	E2	M	680312	VS
BYRNE, JOSEPH HENRY	04	F	680313	LA
COLLINS, GUY FLETCHER	05	F	680313	LA
EVANS, CLEVELAND JR	E5	M	680313	VS
HEITMAN, STEVEN W	E5	A	680313	VS
WATSON, JIMMY L	W2	A	680313	VS
WESTBROOK, DONALD E	04	F	680313	LA
HAMM, JAMES E	02	F	680314	VS
ERICKSON, DAVID W	E2	M	680316	VS
RAUSMAN, EDWARD L	E2	M	680316	VS
BARBER, THOMAS DAVID	E3	N	680317	VN
BENSON, LEE DAVID	02	N	680317	VN
COLLAZO, RAPHAEL LORENZO	E3	A	680317	VS
HENSLEY, THOMAS TRUETT	03	F	680317	LA
HUBBS, DONALD RICHARD	05	N	680317	VN
NIGHTINGALE, RANDALL JOHN	E5	N	680317	VN
ROSS, JLYNN JR	E3	A	680317	VS
RAY, JAMES MICHAEL	E3	A	680318	VS
SWITZER, JERROLD ALLEN	E2	M	680318	VS
WILLIAMS, HOWARD K	03	F	680318	VN
ROMERO, VICTOR	E4	F	680319	VS
FELLOWS, ALLEN E	04	F	680320	LA
SAYRE, LESLIE BERKLEY	02	A	680320	VS
HESFORD, PETER D	02	F	680321	LA
STOWERS, AUBREY F JR	02	F	680321	LA
LYON, DONAVAN L	04	F	680322	LA
FRANKS, IAN JACK	E4	A	680323	VS
HATTORI, MASAKI (NMN)	04	A	680323	VS
ALLGOOD, FRANKIE EUGENE	05	M	680326	VS
EVANCHO, RICHARD	E3	M	680326	VS
GREEN, LARRY EDWARD	E4	M	680326	VS
KERR, ERNEST CLANEY JR	E3	M	680326	VS
LOMAX, RICHARD EUGENE	E4	A	680326	VS
MOWREY, GLENN WILLIAM	E4	M	680326	VS
RADLEY, JAMES LINDSAY	02	F	680327	VN
ALHOUN, JOHNNY C	E4	A	680327	VS
WHITTEKER, RICHARD LEE	03	F	680327	VN
BOYER, ALAN LEE	E5	A	680328	LA
BROWN, GEORGE RONALD	E8	A	680328	LA
GRAHAM, DENNIS L	03	F	680328	VN
GROSSE, CHRISTOPHER A JR	E5	A	680328	VS
HUSTON, CHARLES C	F5	A	680328	LA

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MACCANN, HENRY ELMER	04	F	680328	VN
CICHON, WALTER ALAN	E4	A	680330	VS
MULLEAVEY, QUINTEN EMILE	E4	A	680403	VS
REXROAD, RONALD R	03	F	680403	VN
THOMAS, JAMES CALVIN	E3	M	680403	VS
TRIVELPIECE, STEVE MAURICE	E3	A	680404	VS
MATOCHA, DONALD JOHN	01	M	680405	VS
PEPPER, ANTHONY JOHN	E2	M	680406	VS
TRIMBLE, JAMES MITCHELL	E4	M	680406	VS
MCURRAY, FRED HOWELL JR	02	A	680407	VS
LAWSON, KARL WADE	E4	A	680409	VS
CARVER, HARRY FRANKLIN	E6	A	680410	VS
PADGETT, SAMUEL JOSEPH	E7	A	680410	VS
WHITTEMORE, FREDERICK HERB	05	N	680411	VN
HELD, JOHN WAYNE	03	F	680417	VS
BLOGGETT, DOUGLAS RANDOLPH	E4	A	680419	VS
DENNIS, WILLIAM ROY	E4	A	680419	VS
GONZALEZ, JESUS ARMANDO	E5	A	680419	VS
HOUSH, ANTHONY F	E6	A	680419	VS
JORD, ARTHUR J	03	A	680419	VS
MILLARD, CHARLES WORTH	W3	A	680419	VS
SHAFER, PHILIP R	E4	A	680419	VS
WALLACE, MICHAEL J	E5	A	680419	VS
WERDEHOFF, MICHAEL R	E6	A	680419	VS
WILBURN, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	680419	VS
CESTARE, JOSEPH ANGELO	02	M	680420	VS
WALKER, WILLIAM JOHN	04	M	680420	VS
ZUTTERMAN, JOSEPH A JR	E5	M	680420	VS
CREAMER, JAMES EDWARD JR	E5	A	680421	VS
JAMERSON, LARRY C	E4	A	680421	VS
JOHNSON, FRANKIE B JR	E5	A	680421	VS
LINK, ROBERT C	W2	A	680421	VS
MACKEDANZ, LYLE E	E6	A	680421	VS
OLSEN, FLOYD WARREN	03	A	680421	VS
SPINDLER, JOHN GATES	01	M	680421	VS
CHOMYK, WILLIAM (NMN)	03	F	680422	VS
COOLEY, DAVID LEO	04	N	680422	VN
PALMGREN, EDWIN D	05	F	680422	VN
RIGGINS, ROBERT PAUL	04	F	680422	VS
PARKER, WOODROW WILSON II	02	F	680424	VN
VINSON, BOBBY G	05	F	680424	VN
CROSSMAN, GREGORY JOHN	02	F	680425	VN
GUILLORY, HUBIA JUDE	E3	A	680425	VS
KELLEY, DANIEL MARTIN	E4	A	680425	VS
MITCHELL, ALBERT C	04	F	680425	VN
SCOTT, DAVID LEE	E4	A	680425	VS
MCDANIEL, JOHN LEWIS	04	F	680426	VS
STOW, LILBURN RAY	04	F	680426	VS
TODD, LARRY RICHARD	E4	F	680426	VS
BORS, JOSEPH CHESTER	04	F	680428	VS
COOK, WILLIAM RICHARD	05	F	680428	VS
CAWVERA, ROBERT	04	N	680428	VN

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GUILLERMIN, LOUIS F	03	F	680430	LA
PIETSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	680430	LA
STAEHLI, BRUCE WAYNE	E3	M	680430	VS
GERVAIS, DONALD PETER	E5	A	680501	VS
MARTIN, RICHARD D	E4	A	680501	VS
WHITMIRE, WARREN T JR	W1	A	680501	VS
ENGLANDER, LAWRENCE J	E5	A	680502	VS
AVERY, ROBERT DOUGLAS	02	M	680503	VN
CHANEY, ARTHUR FLETCHER	W1	A	680503	VS
CLARK, STEPHEN WILLIAM	03	M	680503	VS
CLEM, THOMAS DEAN	02	M	680503	VN
MCKAIN, BOBBY LYN	W2	A	680503	VS
TERRY, ORAL R	E3	A	680503	VS
KING, PAUL CHESTER JR	E3	A	680504	LA
KUSTIGAN, MICHAEL J	E7	N	680505	VN
MITCHELL, HARRY E	E8	N	680505	VN
ALDRICH, LAWRENCE LEE	E4	A	680506	VS
CONDREY, GEORGE THOMAS III	W1	A	680508	VS
DAYTON, JAMES LESLIE	W1	A	680508	VS
JENNE, ROBERT EARL	E4	A	680508	VS
JURECKO, DANIEL EDWARD	E4	A	680509	VS
VAN ARTSDALEN, CLIFFORD DA	E2	M	680510	VS
BLACKMAN, THOMAS JOSEPH	E3	M	680510	VS
COOK, JOSEPH FRANCIS	E2	M	680510	VS
CZERWONKA, PAUL STEVEN	02	M	680510	VS
FLEMING, HORACE H III	E3	M	680510	VS
FRITSCH, THOMAS WILLIAM	E2	M	680510	VS
HEMPER, BARRY LEE	E3	M	680510	VS
HEYNE, RAYMOND THOMAS	E4	M	680510	VS
KING, GERALD EUGENE	E2	M	680510	VS
LOPEZ, ROBERT CHARLES	E2	M	680510	VS
MCGONIGLE, WILLIAM DEE	E5	A	680510	VS
MILLER, GLENN EDWIN	E3	M	680510	VS
MITCHELL, DONALD WAYNE	E4	A	680510	VS
PERRY, THOMAS HEPBURN	E3	M	680510	VS
SARGENT, JAMES RAY	E4	A	680511	VS
JIMENEZ, JUAN MACIAS	04	F	680512	VS
BUCHER, BERNARD LUDWIG	E3	A	680512	VS
COEN, HARRY BOB	E3	A	680512	VS
CRAVEN, ANDREW JOHNSON	E5	F	680512	VS
HEPLER, FRANK MONROE	E3	F	680512	VS
LONG, GEORGE WENDELL	04	F	680512	VS
MCLEROY, JOHN LEE	E4	A	680512	VS
MOORE, MAURICE HENRY	02	F	680512	VS
MORELAND, STEPHEN CRAIG	03	A	680512	VS
ORR, WARREN ROBERT JR	01	A	680512	VS
RANSBOTTOM, FREDERICK J	E3	A	680512	VS
SANDS, RICHARD EUGENE	E5	A	680512	VS
STIMPSON, JOSEPH L	E3	A	680512	VS
SKIVINGTON, WILLIAM E JR	E6	A	680512	VS
STULLER, JOHN CHARLES	F4	A	680512	VS
WINTONSON, THOMAS SCOTT				

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
WIDNER, DANNY L	E3	A	680512	VS
WILLIAMS, ROY C	E3	A	680512	VS
COTA, ERNEST KENO	E5	N	680514	VS
KARGER, BARRY EDWIN	02	N	680514	VN
CROSSON, GERALD JOSEPH JR	02	F	680516	VN
RICKEL, DAVID J	03	F	680516	VN
YOUNG, CHARLES L	E3	A	680517	VS
GIST, TOMMY E	03	F	680518	VN
PADILLA, DAVID ESEQUIEL	E3	M	680518	VS
DAVIES, JOSEPH EDWIN	03	F	680519	VN
MCCUBBIN, GLENN DEWAYNE	02	F	680519	VN
ROBERTSON, JOHN HARTLEY	E7	A	680520	LA
LEMCKE, DAVID EARL	E4	A	680521	VS
ADAM, JOHN QUINCY	E3	F	680522	LA
CHAMBERS, JERRY LEE	04	F	680522	LA
CREWS, JOHN HUNTER III	02	F	680522	VN
GLOVER, CALVIN C	E5	F	680522	LA
KNEBEL, THOMAS E	E3	F	680522	LA
MASON, WILLIAM HENDER	05	F	680522	LA
OPHAIL, WILLIAM THOMAS	03	F	680522	LA
MITCHELL, THOMAS B	03	F	680522	LA
PATE, GARY	E4	F	680522	LA
RASH, MELVIN D	E3	F	680522	LA
STPIERRE, DEAN PAUL	03	F	680522	VN
COCHRAN, ISOM CARTER JR	E3	A	680523	VS
LANE, GLEN O	E7	A	680523	LA
OWEN, ROBERT D	E6	A	680523	LA
RUCKER, EMMETT JR	05	F	680524	VS
SHANKS, JAMES LEE	04	F	680524	VS
HILL, JOSEPH ARNOLD	E3	M	680528	VS
SMITH, LEWIS PHILIP II	02	F	680530	LA
BERESTK, EUGENE PAUL	04	F	680531	VN
GATEWOOD, CHARLES HUE	E3	M	680531	VS
BRICE, ERIC PARKER	03	N	680604	VN
MCMAHON, TRUMAN J	E3	M	680605	VS
HARPER, RALPH LEWIS	E3	M	680606	VS
LAPLANT, KURT ELTON	E3	M	680606	VS
PALACIOS, LUIS FERNANDO	E3	M	680606	VS
SANCHEZ, JOSE RAMON	E2	M	680606	VS
SPENCER, DEAN CALVIN III	E4	A	680607	VS
HOLDEN, ELMER LARRY	E5	F	680609	VS
LOCKER, JAMES D	E4	F	680609	VS
RITTICHER, JACK COLUMBUS	03	P	680609	VS
SCHMIDT, WALTER R JR	02	M	680609	VS
YEEND, RICHARD CAROLINUS J	03	F	680609	VS
JARTER, JAMES DEVRIN	W1	A	680613	VS
BOWMAN, FRANK (NMN)	E5	N	680616	VN
CHANDLER, ANTHONY GORDON	E5	N	680616	VS
RUPINSKY, BERNARD FRANCIS	02	N	680616	VN
BOOTH, JAMES ERVIN	02	F	680623	VN
CASEY, DONALD FRANCIS	05	F	680623	VN
CORNELIUS, JOHN WIF CAYTON	02	F	680626	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
WOODS, ROBERT FRANCIS	04	F	680626	VN
GIAMMERINO, VINCENT F	E3	A	680627	VS
JOHNS, PAUL F	04	F	680628	LA
OWEN, TIMOTHY S	E3	A	680629	VS
TIPPING, HENRY ALBERT	04	F	680702	VS
DEWBERRY, JERRY DON	E4	M	680705	VS
LAWRENCE, BRUCE E	02	F	680705	VN
SILVER, EDWARD D	04	F	680705	VN
MAHONEY, THOMAS PATRICK 3D	E3	M	680706	VS
BIRD, LEONARD ADRIAN	02	M	680713	VS
HURST, JOHN CLARK	03	M	680713	VS
CROSS, ARIEL LINDLEY	02	M	680717	VS
PARRA, LIONEL	03	M	680717	VS
SEABLOM, EARL FRANCIS	E3	A	680718	VS
FLANAGAN, SHERMAN E JR	05	F	680721	VS
WILLING, EDWARD ARLO	E3	M	680721	VS
GOSEN, LAWRENCE DEAN	04	N	680723	VS
BUSH, JOHN ROBERT	02	F	680724	VN
GREILING, DAVID SCOTT	04	N	680724	VN
JACKETT, HARLEY B III	03	F	680724	VN
PARISH, CHARLES C	03	N	680725	VN
FULLERTON, FRANK EUGENE	04	N	680727	VN
PATTON, WARD KARL	E6	N	680727	VS
AUXIER, JERRY EDWARD	E6	A	680729	VS
BEYER, THOMAS JOHN	03	F	680730	VS
BROMS, EDWARD JAMES JR	02	N	680801	VN
FOWLER, DONALD R	E4	A	680801	VS
HASTINGS, STEVEN M	E5	A	680801	VS
ROSS, JOSEPH S	02	F	680801	VN
RUSSELL, PETER J	02	A	680801	VS
THOMPSON, WILLIAM J	04	F	680801	VN
WOLFKEIL, WAYNE B	04	F	680809	LA
HICKS, TERRIN D	03	F	680815	VN
GRANTIOLA, JOSE ANTONIO JR	E3	A	680816	VS
MELHANON, MICHAEL OWENS	04	F	680816	VN
OVERLOCK, JOHN F	04	F	680816	VN
COLLINS, THEOTHIS	E3	M	680819	VS
HOFFMAN, TERRY ALAN	E4	M	680819	VS
LINDBLOOM, CHARLES DAVID	E6	N	680820	VS
ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO	E3	A	680822	VS
BERGEVIN, CHARLES LEE	02	F	680823	VN
FERGUSON, WALTER JR	E6	A	680823	VS
SETTERQUIST, FRANCIS L	02	F	680823	VN
KEEP, WILLIAM ARTHUR	03	N	680824	VN
ADWIG, MELVIN E	02	F	680824	VN
HEAD, CHARLES HAROLD W JR	04	F	680824	VN
PICK, DONALD WILLIAM	04	F	680827	VS
MILLER, ROBERT CHARLES	04	F	680828	LA
PHILLIPS, ELBERT AUSTIN	E6	F	680828	LA
ASHALL, ALAN FREDERICK	02	N	680829	VN
DUNCAN, ROBERT RAY	02	N	680829	VN
RASTON, JOHN EUGENE	04	N	680831	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_R#	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
KINKADE, WILLIAM L	02	F	680901	VN
FRAZIER, PAUL REID	E5	A	680903	VS
POSEY, GEORGE RAY	E3	N	680905	VS
DEICHELMAH, SAMUEL MACKAL	03	F	680906	VS
PRIDEMORE, DALLAS REESE	E6	A	680908	VS
SHARK, EARL E	E5	A	680912	VS
DAVIS, EDGAR FELTON	03	F	680917	LA
HOLT, ROBERT ALAN	03	M	680919	VN
LAVOO, JOHN ALLEN	03	M	680919	VN
KUHLMAH, CHARLES F	04	F	680922	LA
CALLAHAN, DAVID FRANCIS JR	04	N	680923	VN
BREINER, STEPHEN EUGENE	E2	M	680924	VS
MCCONNELL, JERRY (NMI)	E2	A	680924	VS
OLSON, BARRY ALLEN	E3	A	680926	VS
SMITH, WILLIAM ARTHUR JR	W1	A	680927	VS
DIXON, DAVID LLOYD	E4	N	680928	VS
HALPIN, DAVID PAUL	E3	N	680928	VS
NEWBERRY, WAYNE ELLSWORTH	03	F	680929	LA
FIESZEL, CLIFFORD W	03	F	680930	VN
SMITH, HOWARD HORTON	04	F	680930	VN
SPINELLI, DOMENICK ANTHONY	03	N	680930	VN
SMITH, ROGER LEE	E4	A	681003	VS
LAWRENCE, GREGORY PAUL	E4	F	681005	LA
STRIDE, JAMES DANIEL JR	E6	A	681005	LA
WESTER, ALBERT DWAYNE	04	F	681005	LA
HANDRAHAN, EUGENE ALLEN	E4	A	681010	VS
HERREID, ROBERT D	E5	A	681010	VS
HUNT, JAMES D	03	N	681013	VN
MASTERTSON, MICHAEL JOHN	03	F	681013	LA
ORELL, QUINLAN ROBERTS	05	N	681013	VN
MASON, JAMES PHILIP	E5	A	681017	VS
BRIDGES, JERRY GLEN	E5	A	681020	VS
DEITSCH, CHARLES EDWARD	W3	A	681020	VS
KNIGHT, HENRY C	W1	A	681020	VS
MELDAHL, CHARLES H	E5	A	681020	VS
STANTON, RONALD	E4	A	681020	VS
FINLEY, DICKIE W	E3	A	681021	VS
KNABB, KENNETH KEITH JR	03	N	681021	VN
TYLER, GEORGE E	04	F	681024	VN
THOMPSON, BENJAMIN ARTHUR	E6	A	681025	VS
CONNOR, CHARLES RICHARD	03	M	681028	VS
RICKER, WILLIAM ERNEST	03	N	681028	VS
STONEBRAKER, KENNETH ARNOLD	03	F	681028	VN
STROVEN, WILLIAM HARRY	03	F	681028	VN
MEZOLD, STEVEN NEIL	02	A	681029	VN
HARRISON, DONALD L	03	A	681029	VN
HUNTER, JAMES D	E3	A	681029	VS
SWANSON, ROGER W	E3	A	681031	VS
KENNEY, HARRY JOHN	E4	N	681101	VS
SIMPSON, JAMES EDWARD	--	V	681105	VS
TURNER, FREDERICK RAY	E3	M	681106	VS
FRANKLIN, JACK D	--	V	681113	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_R#	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
BIRCHIM, JAMES DOUGLAS	02	A	681115	VS
COPLEY, WILLIAM MICHAEL	E4	A	681116	LA
KARST, CARL F	04	F	681116	VS
WIECHERT, ROBERT CHARLES	04	F	681116	VS
DERBY, PAUL DAVID	03	M	681117	VS
CUTHBERT, BRADLEY GENE	03	F	681123	VN
FRANCISCO, SAN DEWAYNE	02	F	681125	VN
MORRISON, JOSEPH C	04	F	681125	VN
HARTNESS, GREGG	03	F	681126	LA
STUIFBERGEN, GENE PAUL	E5	F	681127	CB
BERRY, JOHN ALVIN	W1	A	681205	VS
MORALES, FRANK ADRIAN	E5	A	681205	VS
PIRUCCELLO, JOSEPH S JR	--	V	681206	VS
REX, ROBERT A	03	F	681208	LA
FORD, EDWARD (NMN)	02	F	681208	LA
MINOR, CARROL WILLIAM	E5	A	681209	VS
SHIMEK, SAMUEL DALE	E3	N	681209	VS
GALBRAITH, RUSSELL D	E4	A	681209	VS
ALBRIGHT, JOHN SCOTT II	03	F	681211	LA
CLARKE, FRED LEE	02	F	681213	LA
DAILEY, DOUGLAS VINCENT	E6	F	681213	LA
DONAHUE, MORGAN JEFFERSON	E5	F	681213	LA
DUGAN, THOMAS WAYNE	02	F	681213	LA
FANNING, JOSEPH PETER	04	F	681213	LA
MCGOULDRIK, FRANCIS J JR	02	F	681213	LA
WALKER, SAMUEL F JR	04	F	681213	LA
BARRAS, GREGORY INMAN	E5	F	681218	LA
PAYNE, NORMAN	04	F	681218	LA
BOUCHARD, MICHAEL LORA	E5	A	681219	LA
KENT, ROBERT D	03	N	681220	LA
MORIN, RICHARD G	03	M	681220	LA
ALLEE, RICHARD KENNETH	02	F	681220	LA
BROWNLEE, CHARLES RICHARD	03	M	681221	LA
KING, CHARLES D	04	F	681224	LA
SCHERDIN, ROBERT F	E4	F	681225	LA
MCCANTS, LELAND S III	E3	A	681229	CB
CLACK, CECIL JAMES	02	A	681230	VS
LANE, MITCHELL S	E3	A	690101	VS
NEELD, BOBBY G	03	F	690104	VS
WELSH, LARRY DON	04	F	690104	VS
BYRD, HUGH MCNEIL JR	E5	A	690107	VS
O'BRIEN, KEVIN	03	A	690109	VS
SPROTT, ARTHUR ROY JR	02	A	690109	VS
EATON, NORMAN DALE	04	F	690110	VS
GETCHELL, PAUL E	05	F	690113	LA
FICKLER, EDWIN JAMES	03	F	690113	LA
KUHLMAN, ROBERT J JR	03	M	690117	VS
SMITH, VICTOR A	02	M	690117	VS
COADY, ROBERT FRANKLIN	03	F	690117	LA
ROSS, DOUGLAS ALAN	03	F	690118	LA
SIMPSON, DANIEL F	E5	A	690122	VS
	02	F	690126	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
UTLEY, RUSSEL K	04	F	690126	LA
CONGER, JOHN EDWARD JR	E3	A	690127	VS
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM EDWARD	04	F	690129	LA
HOLTON, ROBERT E	03	F	690129	LA
LUNA, DONALD A	03	F	690201	LA
SWIGART, PAUL EUGENE JR	02	N	690205	VS
BRIGGS, RONALD DANIEL	02	A	690206	VS
CHRISTIANSEN, EUGENE F	E3	A	690206	VS
O'HARA, ROBERT CHARLES	E5	A	690206	VS
PADGETT, DAVID E	02	A	690206	VS
PARKER, DAVID WAYNE	E4	A	690206	VS
PARSONS, DONALD E	05	A	690206	VS
STANLEY, CHARLES I	W1	A	690206	VS
DELETOI, RICHARD AUGUSTINE	03	M	690207	VS
CLARK, THOMAS EDWARD	03	F	690208	LA
KALIL, TANOS E	--	V	690208	VS
WILKINS, CALVIN WAYNE	E3	M	690208	VS
MEYERS, ROGER ALLEN	04	N	690209	VN
KROSKE, HAROLD W JR	02	A	690211	CB
UKOWSKI, ROBERT JOHN	02	F	690211	LA
CLARK, STANLEY SCOTT	05	F	690214	LA
STEVENS, LARRY JAMES	02	N	690214	LA
NIEDECKEN, WILLIAM CLINTON	02	N	690215	LA
WALSH, RICHARD A III	05	F	690215	LA
MOORE, JERRY L	E3	A	690216	VS
WOGAN, WILLIAM M	E4	A	690216	VS
BRUCHER, JOHN MARTIN	03	F	690218	VN
CHAPMAN, RODNEY MAX	04	N	690218	VN
JEROME, STANLEY MILTON	E6	N	690218	VN
SCHIMMELS, EDDIE RAY	E6	N	690218	VN
NEISLAR, DAVID PHILLIP	02	N	690220	VN
MACKO, CHARLES	04	F	690222	LA
PAXTON, DONALD E	05	F	690222	LA
PEARSON, WAYNE E	03	F	690222	LA
CAMPBELL, CLYDE WILLIAM	03	F	690301	LA
KELLER, WENDELL R	04	F	690301	LA
LOVEGREN, DAVID EUGENE	E4	A	690301	VS
MERONEY, VIRGIL K III	02	F	690301	LA
BOGIAGES, CHRISTOS C JR	04	F	690302	LA
EVANS, WILLIAM ANTHONY	E5	A	690302	CB
MAY, MICHAEL FREDERICK	E4	A	690302	CB
SMITH, WILLIAM M	E3	A	690303	VS
COLEMAN, JIMMY LEE	E3	A	690306	VS
MCDONNELL, JOHN TERENCE	03	A	690306	VS
REX, ROBERT F	03	F	690309	LA
WALTERS, TIM LEROY	E6	A	690309	LA
LUNA, CARTER PURVIS	05	F	690310	LA
ROBINSON, FLOYD HENRY	E5	A	690312	VS
BARNES, CHARLES RONALD	03	A	690316	VS
BATT, MICHAEL LERO	E4	A	690316	VS
BOBE, RAYMOND EDWARD	E3	A	690316	VS
ROBERTO, MADUIN I	04	A	690316	VS

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SMITH, DAVID R	03	A	690316	VS
ARMITSTEAD, STEVEN RAY	02	M	690317	LA
DINAN, DAVID THOMAS III	02	F	690317	LA
FINNEY, CHARLES E	03	M	690317	LA
MURPHY, BARRY DANIEL	E5	A	690318	CB
DAVIS, RICARDO GONZALES	E7	A	690320	LA
DAVIS, ROBERT CHARLES	03	F	690323	LA
WIDDIS, JAMES W JR	03	F	690323	LA
BOWERS, RICHARD LEE	03	A	690324	VS
HERRERA, FREDERICK D	E3	A	690325	VS
HICKS, PRENTICE W	E3	A	690325	VS
ROBERTS, RICHARD D	E5	A	690325	VS
CZERWIEC, RAYMOND GEORGE	E5	A	690327	VS
BELCHER, ROBERT ARTHUR	04	F	690328	VS
MILLER, MICHAEL ANDREW	02	F	690328	VS
HESS, FREDERICK WILLIAM JR	02	F	690329	LA
LATIMER, CLARENCE ALBERT	E4	A	690330	VS
CARPENTER, RAMEY LEO	03	N	690331	LA
WHITE, DANFORTH ELLITHORNE	05	N	690331	LA
OWERS, LOWELL S	W1	A	690402	VS
ECKLUND, ARTHUR G	02	A	690403	VS
JEFFERSON, PERRY HENRY	03	F	690403	VS
DE SOTO, ERNEST LEO	04	F	690412	VS
HALL, FREDRICK M	02	F	690412	VS
LAMP, ARNOLD WILLIAM JR	03	F	690412	VS
PIERSON, WILLIAM C III	W2	A	690413	VS
KONYU, WILLIAM MICHAEL	W1	A	690416	VS
DAHILL, DOUGLAS EDWARD	E4	A	690417	VS
NEWTON, CHARLES V	E6	A	690417	VS
PREVEDEL, CHARLES F	E5	A	690417	VS
WILLETT, ROBERT VINCENT JR	02	F	690417	LA
ELLIS, RANDALL S	E4	A	690418	VS
SCOTT, VINCENT CALVIN JR	02	F	690422	LA
VAN CLEAVE, WALTER SHELBY	05	F	690422	LA
SHRIVER, JERRY M	E7	A	690424	CB
EAST, JAMES BOYD JR	04	F	690426	LA
REARDON, RICHARD JOHN	02	N	690428	VS
MASCARI, PHILLIP LOUIS	02	F	690502	LA
BILLIPP, NORMAN KARL	03	M	690506	VS
HAGAN, JOHN ROBERT	02	M	690506	VS
BRASHEAR, WILLIAM JAMES	04	F	690508	LA
MUNDOT, HENRY G II	02	F	690508	LA
WALTERS, WILLIAM (MMN)	E3	A	690510	VS
RYAN, WILLIAM C JR	02	M	690511	VS
YESSOR, BRUCE CARLETON	02	A	690513	LA
JROOKS, JOHN HENRY RALPH	E4	A	690513	VS
MASUDA, ROBERT S	E4	A	690513	VS
MUNOZ, DAVID LOUIE	E3	A	690513	VS
SCOTT, MIKE JOHN	E7	A	690513	VS
STEWART, VIRGIL GRANT	02	F	690517	LA
CUDLIKE, CHARLES JOSEPH	E4	A	690518	VS
RENTON, ROBERT DE A	E2	M	690521	VS

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RAMIREZ, ARMANDO (NMN)	E5	A	690523	CB
MANSKE, CHARLES JEROME	O3	F	690524	VS
MONTEZ, ANASTACIO (NMN)	E7	A	690524	VS
WEITZ, MONEK	E1	M	690525	VS
WILLIAMS, LEROY CHRISTOPHE	E2	M	690525	VS
STORY, JAMES CLELLON	E2	A	690613	VS
WARD, NEAL C	O2	F	690613	LA
GRACE, JAMES W	O3	F	690614	LA
KAHLER, HAROLD	O4	F	690614	LA
SPARKS, DONALD L	E3	A	690617	VS
ROBERSON, JOHN WILL	E3	A	690622	VS
CONDIT, WILLIAM HOWARD JR	O4	F	690623	VS
REED, TERRY MICHAEL	O2	F	690623	VS
SAGE, LELAND CHARLES COOKE	O2	N	690623	LA
JABLONSKI, MICHAEL JAMES	E3	A	690627	VS
FRANSEN, ALBERT M JR	E4	N	690702	VS
FALLON, PATRICK M	O6	F	690704	LA
ANDRE, HOWARD VINCENT JR	O4	F	690708	LA
SIZEMORE, JAMES ELMO	O4	F	690708	LA
JANNON, PAUL WEDLAKE	O4	F	690712	LA
PIKE, PETER X	O2	F	690712	LA
BUTLER, DEWEY RENEE	E3	A	690714	VS
POLSTER, HARMON	O2	F	690715	LA
WALKER, MICHAEL S	O3	F	690715	LA
DAWSON, JAMES VERNON	O3	F	690716	VS
SMILEY, STANLEY KUTZ	O3	N	690720	LA
BRENNING, RICHARD DAVID	O3	N	690726	VN
BURNS, MICHAEL PAUL	E4	A	690731	LA
NEAL, DENNIS PAUL	O3	A	690731	LA
BURD, DOUGLAS GLENN	O2	F	690801	VS
CALLIES, TOMMY LEON	O3	F	690801	VS
TALKEN, GEORGE FRANCIS	O4	N	690802	VN
BECK, EDWARD EUGENE JR	E2	M	690809	VS
DOTSON, JEFFERSON SCOTT	O2	F	690809	LA
GOURLEY, LAURENT LEE	O3	F	690809	LA
JANOUSEK, RONALD JAMES	O2	M	690809	VS
KANE, BRUCE EDWARD	E4	M	690809	VS
MICKELSEN, WILLIAM EMIL JR	O3	N	690810	VN
HANSEN, LESTER ALAN	W2	A	690813	VS
DAVIS, DANIEL RICHARD	O2	F	690818	LA
BOHLIG, JAMES RICHARD	O2	M	690819	VS
FLANIGAN, JOHN NORLEE	O3	M	690819	VN
MORRISSEY, RICHARD THOMAS	O3	M	690819	VS
SMITH, ROBERT NORMAN	O5	M	690819	VN
GRAF, ALBERT STEPHEN	O2	M	690829	VS
ZIMMER, JERRY ALLEN	O3	M	690829	VS
ESCOBEDO, JULIAN JR	E3	M	690901	VS
HELWIG, ROGER DANNY	O3	F	690911	LA
TRAMPSKI, DONALD JOSEPH	E2	A	690916	VS
CLINE, CURTIS ROY	E2	A	690918	VS
CECIL, ALAN BRUCE	E5	A	690921	LA
TAFFSON, JAMES W JR	E2	M	690921	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
HUNTLEY, JOHN NORMAN	E3	A	690927	LA
CURRAN, PATRICK ROBERT	O2	M	690929	LA
LONO, LUTHER A	O4	M	690929	LA
BECK, TERRY LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
BELL, RICHARD WILLIAM	E4	N	691002	VN
BOWMAN, MICHAEL LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
DAYAO, ROLANDO CUEVA	E6	N	691002	VN
DEAN, DONALD CHESTER	E5	N	691002	VN
DILGER, HERBERT HUGH	O3	N	691002	VN
ELLERD, CARL J	E5	N	691002	VN
FOWLER, JAMES JEWEL	E2	N	691002	VN
FOWLER, ROY G	E4	N	691002	VN
GAN, LEONARDO M	E7	N	691002	VN
GORE, PAUL EDWIN	E6	N	691002	VN
GORSUCH, WILLIAM D	E4	N	691002	VN
HILL, RAYFORD J	E4	N	691002	VN
KOHLER, DELVIN LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
KOSLOSKY, HOWARD M	E3	N	691002	VN
LEONARD, ROBERT B	E5	N	691002	VN
LIVINGSTON, RICHARD ALLEN	O3	N	691002	VN
MONTGOMERY, RONALD WAYNE	E5	N	691002	VN
MOORE, WILLIAM R	E5	N	691002	VN
MOSER, PAUL KIERSTEAD	E4	N	691002	VN
PRENTICE, KENNETH M	E5	N	691002	VN
SALAZAR, FIDEL G	E5	N	691002	VN
TERRELL, KEVIN LEE	E4	N	691002	VN
TYE, MICHAEL JAMES	E4	N	691002	VN
VIADO, REYNALDO ROCILLO	E3	N	691002	VN
CUNNINGHAM, KENNETH LEROY	E2	A	691003	VS
GRAFFE, PAUL L	O2	A	691003	VS
BOWER, IRVIN LESTER JR	E3	M	691006	VS
ALTIZER, ALBERT HAROLD	E3	A	691008	VS
WATKINS, ROBERT JAMES JR	W2	A	691008	VS
DRIVER, DALLAS ALAN	E4	A	691009	VS
GARBETT, JIMMY RAY	E4	A	691009	VS
MOORE, RAYMOND GREGORY	E4	A	691009	VS
SUYDAM, JAMES LAWRENCE	E5	A	691009	VS
TURNER, JAMES HENRY	E4	A	691009	VS
MAXWELL, CALVIN WALTER	O3	A	691010	VS
WEISNER, FRANKLIN LEE	O2	A	691010	VS
BOOTH, LAWRENCE RANDOLPH	O3	A	691016	LA
RATTIN, DENNIS M	E4	A	691016	LA
STUBBS, WILLIAM WENTWORTH	E5	A	691020	LA
COOK, GLENN RICHARD	O2	F	691021	VS
TYNUM, NEIL STANLEY	O2	F	691026	LA
WARREN, GRAY D	O3	F	691026	LA
HERRICK, JAMES W JR	O2	F	691027	LA
GAUTHIER, DENNIS L	E3	A	691031	VS
PARTINGTON, ROGER DALE	O3	M	691101	VS
CARROLL, PATRICK HENRY	O2	F	691102	LA
WHITFORD, LAWRENCE W JR	O5	F	691102	LA
BOWMAN, WILLIAM THOMAS JR	E6	A	691103	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
NORTON, MICHAEL ROBERT	E2	A	691103	VS
SHUE, DONALD MONROE	E4	A	691103	LA
WALD, GUNTHER HERBERT	E5	A	691103	LA
ALFORD, TERRY LANIER	W1	A	691104	VS
CAVENDER, JIM RAY	W1	A	691104	VS
HANLEY, LARRY JAMES	03	F	691104	LA
KLIMO, JAMES ROBERT	E4	A	691104	VS
WARE, JOHN ALAN	E4	A	691104	VS
ECHANIS, JOSEPH YGNACIO	03	F	691105	LA
LEFEVER, DOUGLAS PAUL	03	F	691105	LA
BODAH, JON KEITH	03	F	691112	LA
DENNANY, JAMES EUGENE	04	F	691112	LA
HELMICH, GERALD ROBERT	04	F	691112	LA
SMITH, HARRY W	03	F	691112	LA
TUCCI, ROBERT L	03	F	691112	LA
RAY, RONALD E	E6	A	691113	LA
SUBER, RANDOLPH BOTHWELL	E5	A	691113	LA
GRAF, JOHN GEORGE	04	N	691115	VS
BALDRIDGE, JOHN ROBERT JR	02	F	691120	LA
KENELT, WALTER A	05	F	691120	LA
COLLINS, RICHARD FRANK	04	N	691122	LA
DEUTER, RICHARD CARL	02	N	691122	LA
QUINN, MICHAEL EDWARD	03	N	691122	LA
JONES, GRAYLAND (NMN)	E3	A	691123	VS
BALAMOTI, MICHAEL DIMITRI	04	F	691124	LA
BROWN, EARL CARLYLE	03	F	691124	LA
COMER, HOWARD BRISBANE JR	W2	A	691124	VS
DEWISPELAERE, REXFORD JOHN	E4	F	691124	LA
FELLENZ, CHARLES R	E5	F	691124	LA
GANLEY, RICHARD O	03	F	691124	LA
GREWELL, LARRY I	E5	F	691124	LA
MATTHES, PETER R	02	F	691124	LA
WHITE, JAMES B	03	F	691124	LA
WRIGHT, DONALD L	E5	F	691124	LA
ROGERS, BILLY LEE	E3	N	691201	VN
CLARK, JOHN CALVIN II	03	F	691205	LA
DANIELSON, BENJAMIN FRANKL	03	F	691205	LA
HARROLD, PATRICK K	02	F	691205	LA
BUCKLEY, VICTOR PATRICK	03	N	691216	VN
LONG, CARL EDWIN	03	M	691220	VS
BURRIS, DONALD DEANE JR	W2	A	691222	LA
KENNEDY, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	691222	CB
TROMBRIDGE, DUSTIN COMLES	02	N	691226	VS
FEATHERSTON, FIELDING W 3D	03	F	691230	LA
FERGUSON, DOUGLAS D	02	F	691230	LA
FRYAR, BRUCE C	03	N	700102	LA
LINDSTROM, RONNIE G	02	F	700102	LA
WEST, JOHN THOMAS	03	F	700102	LA
WALTON, WILBERT	E2	A	700103	VS
BURNES, ROBERT WAYNE	02	M	700105	LA
ROBINSON, LARRY WARREN	04	M	700105	LA
WIFE, MICHAEL R	04	N	700107	LA

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
OCHAB, ROBERT (NMN)	03	F	700107	VS
CROSBY, HERBERT CHARLES	03	A	700110	VS
GRAZIOSI, FRANCIS GEORGE	E4	A	700110	VS
HOMES, GEORGE ANDREWS	W3	A	700110	VS
CHORLINS, RICHARD DAVID	02	F	700111	LA
TUBBS, GLENN E	E5	A	700113	VS
ANDERSON, GREGORY LEE	E4	F	700128	VN
LEESER, LEONARD CHARLES	03	F	700128	VN
PRUETT, WILLIAM DAVID	E8	F	700128	VN
SHINN, WILLIAM CHARLES	E5	F	700128	VN
SUTTON, WILLIAM CARL	E7	F	700128	VN
LYON, JAMES MICHAEL	03	A	700205	VS
STEPHENSON, RICHARD CHARLE	02	N	700205	VN
KIEFFER, WILLIAM L JR	05	F	700211	LA
BRADSHAW, ROBERT SAMUEL 3D	02	M	700212	VS
BREEDING, MICHAEL HUGH	02	M	700212	VS
DAFFRON, THOMAS CARL	03	F	700218	LA
GILLEN, THOMAS ELDON	04	F	700218	LA
MORLEY, CHARLES FRANK	02	F	700218	LA
DORE, SCOTT FERRIS JR	E4	N	700220	VS
SABOG, MATEO	E8	A	700225	VS
BOYLE, WILLIAM (NMN)	E7	A	700228	LA
MCVEY, LAVOY DON	03	M	700302	VS
SKIBBE, DAVID WILLIAM	01	M	700302	VS
PARKER, JOHN JACKSON	03	N	700304	VN
ROSENBAUGH, ROBERT PAGE	03	F	700305	VS
GATES, ALBERT HENRY JR	03	M	700307	VS
COTTEN, LARRY WILLIAM	02	F	700309	LA
PARCELS, REX LEWIS JR	02	N	700309	VN
ROBINSON, EDWARD (NMN)	E6	A	700309	VS
SCHOEPPNER, LEONARD JOHN	03	N	700309	VN
TERLA, LOTHAR GUSTAV T	03	F	700309	LA
SCULL, GARY BERNARD	01	A	700312	VS
AYERS, DARRELL EUGENE	E6	M	700319	VS
PUGH, DENNIS GERARD	02	F	700319	LA
BUTLER, JAMES EDWARD	W1	A	700320	VS
GONZALES, DAVID	E5	M	700321	LA
HUGGINS, EDWARD MONROE	04	F	700321	LA
UNDERWOOD, THOMAS WAYNE	E6	M	700321	LA
BECERRA, RUDY MORALES	E4	A	700324	CB
BORONSKI, JOHN ARTHUR	E6	A	700324	CB
GANDE, BERMAN JR	E4	A	700324	CB
HARNED, GARY ALAN	E5	A	700324	CB
HOSKEN, JOHN CHARLES	W1	A	700324	CB
MONNELL, MICHAEL DAVIS	03	A	700324	CB
MOOL, JERRY LYNN	02	A	700324	CB
ALLEN, HENRY LEWIS	02	F	700326	LA
ELZINGA, RICHARD G	03	F	700326	LA
DUFFY, JOHN EVERETT	02	F	700404	VS
YOUNG, JEFFREY JEROME	E3	A	700404	VS
CROPPER, CURTIS HENRY	03	N	700405	VN
BRASSFIELD, ANDREW THOMAS	E6	A	700406	LA

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FLYNN, SEAN LESLIE	--	V	700406	CB
KLINGNER, MICHAEL LEE	03	F	700406	LA
STONE, DANA	--	V	700406	CB
BUSHNELL, BRIAN LEE	E3	N	700409	VN
HORCHAR, ANDREW ANTHONY J	E3	N	700409	VN
KNIGHT, LARRY COLEMAN	03	N	700409	VN
PPAFFMANN, CHARLES BROOKS	02	N	700409	VN
NELSON, JAN HOUSTON	02	M	700411	VS
BIVENS, HERMOND ARRINGTON	E4	A	700415	VS
AYERS, RICHARD LEE	04	F	700416	LA
RAUSCH, ROBERT E	03	F	700416	LA
WHEELER, EUGENE LACY	04	M	700421	VS
ADACHI, THOMAS YUJI	E5	F	700422	LA
BROOKS, WILLIAM LESLIE	04	F	700422	LA
DAVIS, CHARLIE BROWN JR	05	F	700422	LA
FISHER, DONALD G	04	F	700422	LA
GOLZ, JOHN BRYAN	02	N	700422	LA
HARRIS, STEPHEN W	E5	F	700422	LA
HENSLEY, RONNIE L	E5	F	700422	LA
RELAND, ROBERT NEWELL	E7	F	700422	LA
LINT, DONALD M	E2	F	700422	LA
ROWLEY, CHARLES S	05	F	700422	LA
TOWLE, JOHN C	02	F	700422	LA
EADS, DENNIS KEITH	W1	A	700423	VS
GOMEZ, ROBERT A	02	F	700423	LA
LITTLE, DANNY LEONARD	E6	A	700423	VS
LUCKI, ALBIN E	03	F	700423	LA
MURPHY, LARON D	03	A	700423	VS
CROSS, JAMES EMORY	03	F	700424	LA
REESE, GOMER DAVID III	03	F	700424	LA
HILL, JOHN RICHARD	03	A	700427	VS
SNIDER, HUGHIE FRANKLIN	E4	A	700428	VS
BISHOP, EDWARD JAMES JR	E3	A	700429	VS
GRIFFIN, RODNEY L	E4	A	700502	CB
PRICE, BUNYAN DURANT	E4	A	700502	CB
RICHARDSON, DALE W	03	A	700502	CB
YOUNG, ROBERT M	03	A	700502	CB
CHURCHILL, CARL RUSSELL	03	F	700503	LA
CONAWAY, LAWRENCE YERGES	05	F	700503	LA
HERNANDEZ, FRANK SANCHEZ	E5	A	700506	VS
KIER, LARRY GENE	E3	A	700506	VS
TERAN, REFUGIO THOMAS	E3	A	700506	VS
WORTHINGTON, RICHARD CHARL	W2	A	700506	VS
HAIGHT, STEPHEN HAROLD	E4	A	700509	VS
PREISS, ROBERT FRANCIS JR	E6	A	700512	LA
HUBERTH, ERIC J	02	F	700513	CB
TRENT, ALAN ROBERT	03	F	700513	CB
CONNER, EDWIN RAY	E8	N	700516	VS
SKEEN, RICHARD ROBERT	05	N	700516	VS
WESTWOOD, NORMAN PHILIP JR	03	N	700517	VN
LEE, GLENN HUNG NIN	02	F	700527	CB
NIKE CHARLES D	--	V	700530	VS

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
MARK, KIT T	--	V	700530	VS
HANGEN, WELLES	--	V	700531	CB
HUGGINS, BOBBY GENE	04	F	700604	VS
WILSON, HARRY TRUMAN	E5	M	700604	LA
ALLOWAY, CLYDE DOUGLAS	E5	F	700607	VS
WILBRECHT, KURT MICHAEL	02	M	700607	VS
ELLIOTT, ANDREW JOHN	W2	A	700609	VS
HILBRICH, BARRY W	03	A	700609	VS
RYDER, JOHN L	02	F	700609	VS
PIERCE, WALTER MELVIN (MI	E3	A	700610	CB
COCHRANE, DEVERTON C	E6	A	700617	CB
LAKER, CARL JOHN	E4	A	700617	CB
DRAKE, CARL WILSON	04	F	700618	CB
GREEN, JAMES ARVIL	E3	A	700618	CB
MCLAMB, HARRY LAWRENCE	04	F	700618	CB
EARLE, JOHN STILES	03	N	700622	VS
GUMBERT, ROBERT WILLIAM JR	E3	A	700622	VS
PEDERSON, JOE PALMER	E7	A	700623	VS
HILLIPS, ROBERT PAUL	E2	A	700623	VS
MOZO, JAMES MILAN	E4	A	700623	VS
ALDERN, DONALD DEANE	05	N	700629	LA
BELL, HARVIN EARL	E5	F	700630	LA
BURGESS, JOHN LAWRENCE	E5	A	700630	VS
DEAN, MICHAEL FRANK	E5	F	700630	LA
GOEGLEIN, JOHN WINFRED	04	F	700630	LA
HILL, GORDON C	02	F	700630	LA
JENKINS, PAUL LAVERNE	E7	F	700630	LA
SADLER, MITCHELL O JR	03	F	700630	LA
SANDERS, WILLIAM STEPHEN	03	F	700630	LA
SCHANEBERG, LEROY CLYDE	03	F	700630	LA
HARBER, STEPHEN J	E4	A	700702	VS
BOOKOUT, CHARLES FRANKLIN	E7	A	700704	LA
BEALS, CHARLES ELBERT	E4	A	700707	VS
HOWARD, LEWIS JR.	E4	A	700707	VS
SCHULTZ, RONALD JAMES	E3	A	700721	VS
BLOODWORTH, DONALD BRUCE	02	F	700724	LA
REED, JAMES WILLIAM	03	F	700724	LA
GREGORY, PAUL ANTHONY	03	N	700725	VN
BROWN, DONALD ALAN	03	F	700730	LA
CHAVEZ, GARY ANTHONY	03	F	700730	LA
CROWLEY, JOHN EDWARD	E4	A	700810	LA
BROWN, JAMES AUSTON	E4	A	700812	VS
BECKER, JAMES CHRISTOF	02	A	700815	LA
SCHMIDT, PETER ALDEN	E4	A	700815	LA
FELLOWS, PHILLIP ROGERSON	04	F	700817	VS
HAUER, ROBERT D	02	F	700905	VS
PLASSMEYER, BERNARD HERBER	02	M	700911	VS
MILLER, WYATT JR (NMN)	E2	A	700913	VS
DAVIDSON, DAVID ARTHUR	E6	A	701005	LA
GASSMAN, FRED ALLEN	E5	A	701005	LA
OTT, WILLIAM A	03	F	701008	LA
SHAY, DONALD EMERSON JR	03	F	701008	LA

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CHESTNUT, JOSEPH LYONS	04	F	701013	LA
MARTIN, JOHN BERNARD II	03	N	701016	VS
STRAIT, DOUGLAS F	E4	A	701018	VS
WILSON, PETER JOE	E6	A	701019	LA
HEIDEMAN, THOMAS EDWARD	E7	F	701024	LA
DAY, DENNIS IRVIN	E4	A	701103	VS
DORITY, RICHARD CLAIR	E4	A	701103	VS
GINN, DAVID LANDRELL	E3	A	701103	VS
MANGUS, ARLIE ROBERT	E4	A	701103	VS
MARTIN, JERRY DEAN	E3	A	701103	VS
NORRIS, CALVIN ANDREW	E5	A	701103	VS
PANTALL, JAMES ROBERT	E3	A	701103	VS
SHEWMAKE, JOHN DANIEL SR	E6	A	701103	VS
WOODS, DAVID WALTER	E4	A	701103	VS
CORONA, JOEL (NMN)	E3	A	701108	VS
BANCROFT, WILLIAM W JR	02	F	701113	VN
WRIGHT, DAVID IRVIN	04	F	701113	VN
KLUGG, JOSEPH RUSSELL	03	N	701114	VN
CINTOSH, IAN (NMI)	W1	A	701124	VS
JMITH, RONALD EUGENE	E7	A	701128	CB
STRINGER, JOHN CURTIS II	02	A	701130	VS
GREEN, GEORGE CURTIS JR	E5	A	701204	LA
TAYLOR, WALTER JOSEPH JR	E3	A	701206	VS
DUCKETT, THOMAS ALLEN	02	F	701212	LA
SKINNER, OWEN G	04	F	701212	LA
DEUSO, CARROLL JOSEPH	E9	N	701215	VN
MCCOY, MERIL OLEN JR	03	N	701215	VN
OWEN, CLYDE C	E4	N	701215	VN
PIERSANTI, ANTHONY J JR	02	N	701215	VN
BOOTH, GARY PRESTON	E4	A	701223	VS
MCANDREWS, MICHAEL WILLIAM	W1	A	701223	VS
WISEMAN, BAIN WENDELL JR	W1	A	701223	VS
LUNDY, ALBRO LYNN JR	04	F	701224	LA
BUNKER, PARK GEORGE	03	F	701230	LA
AYRES, JAMES HENRY	04	F	701013	LA
HOLGUIN, LUIS GALLEGOS	W1	A	701013	VS
MAGEE, PATRICK JOSEPH	E6	A	701013	VS
OKERLUND, THOMAS RICHARD	W1	A	701013	VS
OMELIA, DENNIS WILLIAM	W1	A	701013	VS
PALEN, CARL ANTHONY	E5	A	701013	VS
PARSONS, MICHAEL D	02	A	701013	VS
RHODES, FERRIS ANSEL JR	03	A	701013	VS
STRATTON, CHARLES W	03	F	701013	LA
CRAMER, DONALD MARTIN	W2	A	701015	VS
HILLER, CARLETON PIERCE JR	02	N	701016	VN
CURRY, KEITH ROYAL WILSON	05	N	701018	VN
HARMWOOD, JAMES ARTHUR	E5	A	701015	VS
KINSMAN, GERALD FRANCIS	02	A	701015	VS
MIRNER, ROBERT HENRY	04	F	701017	VS
CARTER, GERALD LYNN	02	N	701026	VN
LINEBERGER, HAROLD B	04	F	701029	CB
MITTED, DAVID TUCK	F5	A	701029	IA

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CARTWRIGHT, PATRICK G	E4	N	710131	VS
STANDERWICK, ROBERT L	05	F	710203	LA
PAUL, JAMES LEE	W1	A	710205	VS
STEWART, PAUL CLARK	W2	A	710208	LA
PIETRZAK, JOSEPH RAY	E5	A	710210	VS
ROBERTSON, MARK JOHN	W1	A	710210	VS
MCLEOD, ARTHUR EDWARD	W1	A	710212	VS
WILKINSON, CLYDE DAVID	03	A	710212	VS
CREAR, WILLIS CALVIN	E4	A	710215	LA
CRONE, DONALD EVERETT	E4	A	710215	LA
FIVELSON, BARRY FRANK	W1	A	710215	LA
LEONARD, MARVIN MAURICE	W2	A	710215	LA
POWERS, JOHN LYNN	E4	A	710215	LA
TAYLOR, JAMES HARRY	01	A	710215	LA
HOSKINS, CHARLES L	02	F	710216	LA
PATILLO, RALPH NATHAN	04	F	710216	LA
BERG, GEORGE PHILLIP	W1	A	710218	LA
CRANDALL, GREGORY STEPHEN	W1	A	710218	LA
EMSEY, WALTER EDWARD JR	E4	A	710218	LA
JOHNSON, GARY LEE	E4	A	710218	LA
LLOYD, ALLEN RICHARD	E5	A	710218	LA
WATSON, RONALD LEONARD	03	A	710218	LA
WOODS, GERALD ERNEST	W1	A	710218	LA
HULL, JAMES LARRY	02	F	710219	LA
ACALOTTO, ROBERT JOSEPH	E4	A	710220	LA
JOHNSON, RANDOLPH L	E5	A	710220	LA
MAY, DAVID M	02	A	710220	LA
REID, JOHN ERIC	W1	A	710220	LA
HARRISON, LARRY GENE	E6	A	710226	CB
SWANSON, JON EDWARD	03	A	710226	CB
BABCOCK, RONALD LESTER	03	A	710227	LA
LEWIS, LARRY GENE	02	N	710227	VS
MOONEY, FRED (NMN)	E7	A	710227	LA
BLACK, PAUL VERNON	W1	A	710301	CB
ZUBKE, DELAND DWIGHT	E5	A	710301	VS
DUBBELD, ORIE JOHN JR	02	A	710303	VS
DUNCAN, JAMES EDWARD	E7	A	710303	VS
ALGAARD, HAROLD LOWELL	W1	A	710304	VN
HENTZ, RICHARD JAY	E5	A	710304	VN
MARKER, MICHAEL WAYNE	03	A	710304	VN
OSBORNE, RODNEY DEE	E5	A	710304	VN
STRAMM, JOHN THOMAS	E6	A	710304	VN
HUMMEL, JOHN F	W1	A	710306	LA
MILLINER, WILLIAM PATRICK	W1	A	710306	LA
RD, RANDOLPH JEFFERSON	W1	A	710307	LA
BURNETT, SHELDON JOHN	05	A	710307	LA
GRANTHAM, ROBERT EUGENE	E4	A	710308	VS
HALE, JOHN DOUGLAS	02	A	710308	VS
SMOOT, CURTIS R	E5	A	710310	CB
JEFFS, CLIVE G	02	F	710312	VS
CREED, BARTON SHELDON	03	N	710313	LA
SEXTON, DAVID MASON	F5	A	710315	VS

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SCRIVENER, STEPHEN RUSSELL	02	F	710316	LA
SEELEY, DOUGLAS MILTON	03	F	710316	LA
BAUMAN, RICHARD LEE	W2	A	710317	CB
DIX, CRAIG MITCHELL	E4	A	710317	CB
HARRIS, BOBBY GLENN	E4	A	710317	CB
LILLY, LAWRENCE EUGENE	02	A	710317	CB
CRISTMAN, FREDERICK LEWIS	W1	A	710319	LA
GARCIA, RICARDO MARTINEZ	E5	A	710319	LA
SPARKS, JON M	W1	A	710319	LA
BARKER, JACK LAMAR	04	A	710320	LA
CHUBB, JOHN JACOBSEN	E3	A	710320	LA
DILLENDER, WILLIAM EDWARD	E4	A	710320	LA
DUGAN, JOHN FRANCIS	03	A	710320	LA
CLEVE, REGINALD DAVID	W1	A	710322	LA
HALL, WALTER RAY	E4	A	710322	LA
KNUTSEN, DONALD PAUL	E4	A	710322	LA
MORIARTY, PETER GIBNEY	03	F	710322	LA
TRAYER, JOHN GROVE III	W1	A	710322	LA
HECKWITH, HARRY MEDFOR III	E5	A	710324	VS
EDONELL, R D (NFM/NMN)	E6	A	710325	VS
PUNTES, MANUEL RAMERIZ	E3	A	710325	VS
ROSSANO, RICHARD JOSEPH	E3	A	710325	VS
SALLEY, JAMES JR	E7	A	710331	VS
TERRILL, PHILIP B	E4	A	710331	VS
SMITH, JOSEPH STANLEY	01	F	710404	CB
LILLY, CARROLL B	03	F	710409	LA
BUERK, WILLIAM CARL	03	F	710411	VS
CHAMPION, JAMES ALBERT	E3	A	710424	VS
LEMON, JEFFREY C	03	F	710425	LA
SIGAFOOS, WALTER HARRI III	02	F	710425	LA
KRUPA, FREDERICK	06	A	710427	VS
BINGHAM, KLAUS JURGEN	E6	A	710510	VS
LUTTRELL, JAMES M	E6	A	710510	VS
WALTON, LEWIS C	E6	A	710510	VS
CROOK, ELLIOTT	E4	A	710516	VS
FARLOW, CRAIG L	W1	A	710516	VS
JACOBSEN, TIMOTHY J	E4	A	710516	VS
NOLAN, JOSEPH PAUL JR	02	A	710516	VS
PEARCE, DALE ALLEN	W1	A	710517	VS
SOYLAND, DAVID PECOR	W1	A	710517	VS
ENTRICAN, DANNY D	02	A	710518	VS
KNUCKEY, THOMAS WILLIAM	02	A	710527	CB
TAYLOR, PHILLIP CHARLES	E5	A	710527	CB
CHAVIRA, STEPHEN (NMN)	E4	A	710528	VS
ROUHART, PAUL DEAN	03	A	710528	VS
BRUNSON, JACK WALTER	W2	A	710531	LA
MUSIL, CLINTON ALLAN SR	03	A	710531	LA
MAGERS, PAUL GERALD	02	A	710601	VS
WANN, DONALD LYNN	W2	A	710601	VS
JONES, JOHN ROBERT	E5	A	710605	VS
WILSON, RICHARD JR (NMN)	E3	A	710614	VS
RTDWELL, BARRY ALAN	E5	N	710618	VN

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FULLNAME	LOSS_RK	SERVICE	IDATE	CTRY_ORIG
DEBLASIO, RAYMOND VINCE JR	02	N	710618	VN
PAINTER, JOHN ROBERT JR	03	N	710618	VN
METZLER, CHARLES D	05	N	710621	VN
STROHLEIN, MADISON ALEXAND	E5	A	710622	VS
BRIDGES, PHILIP WAYNE	E4	A	710630	VS
CARR, DONALD GENE	03	A	710706	LA
THOMAS, DANIEL W	02	F	710706	LA
TAYLOR, TED JAMES	03	A	710715	VS
ASTON, JAY STEVEN	W1	A	710718	VS
ANTUNIANO, GREGORY ALFRED	E5	A	710724	CB
DALTON, RANDALL DAVID	E4	A	710724	CB
BERG, BRUCE ALLAN	E5	A	710807	VS
BATES, PAUL JENNINGS JR	03	A	710810	VS
DOLAN, THOMAS ALBERT	E5	A	710810	VS
KENNEDY, JOHN W	02	F	710816	VS
KUYKENDALL, WILLIE CLYDE	E3	A	710818	VS
WEAKS, MELVIN LEE	E3	A	710818	VS
VENNIK, ROBERT NICHOLAS	E6	A	710826	VS
ORHWELL, LEROY JASON III	03	F	710910	LA
IVAN, ANDREW JR	03	F	710910	LA
BOND, RONALD LESLIE	02	F	710930	LA
DONOVAN, MICHAEL LEO	03	F	710930	LA
GARRETT, MAURICE EDWIN JR	03	A	711022	VS
EVELAND, MICKY EUGENE	E4	A	711026	VS
FINGER, SANFORD IRA	E6	A	711026	VS
GREEN, THOMAS FREDERICK	E2	A	711026	VS
LAUTZENHEISER, MICHAEL (NM)	E5	A	711026	VS
HICKOL, ROBERT ALLEN	E5	A	711026	VS
TRUDEAU, ALBERT RAYMOND	W1	A	711026	VS
OAKLEY, LYNUS LABIN	E4	F	711029	VS
DECATRE, JACK LEONARD	E6	A	711103	VS
ALTUS, ROBERT WAYNE	03	F	711123	LA
PHELPS, WILLIAM	02	F	711123	LA
THOMAS, JAMES R	E6	F	711125	VS
BEUTEL, ROBERT DONALD	02	F	711126	LA
STEADMAN, JAMES E	03	F	711126	LA
MCINTIRE, SCOTT WINSTON	05	F	711210	LA
BOYANOWSKI, JOHN GORDON	05	A	711214	VS
BREHMER, DWIGHT AMOS	E4	A	711214	VS
CALDWELL, FLOYD DEAN	E6	A	711214	VS
HOLLINGER, GREGG NEYMAN	03	A	711214	VS
PERKINS, CECIL CARRINGTON	03	A	711214	VS
PERRY, OTHA LEE	W2	A	711214	VS
FORAME, PETER CHARLES	02	A	711219	CB
POYNOR, DANIEL ROBERTS	02	F	711219	LA
SKILES, THOMAS WILLIAM	W1	A	711219	CB
THOMAS, LEO TARLTON JR	03	F	711219	LA
FINN, WILLIAM ROBERT	02	F	711224	LA
TUCKER, TIMOTHY M	02	F	711224	LA
RITTER, GEORGE L	--	V	711227	LA
TOWNLEY, ROY F	--	V	711227	LA
WITZENRACK, FIMWARD J	--	V	711227	LA

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HOLMES, FREDERICK LEE	04	N	711230	VN
DUGGAN, WILLIAM YOUNG	04	F	711231	LA
SUTTER, FREDERICK JOHN	03	F	711231	LA
BERDAHL, DAVID DONALD	E3	A	720120	VS
EDWARDS, HARRY JEROME	E4	A	720120	VS
COOPER, DANIEL DEAN	03	N	720204	VN
LEE, ALBERT EUGENE	E6	N	720216	VS
MORGAN, WILLIAM J	04	A	720225	VS
HONELL, CARTER A	02	F	720307	LA
RUSCH, STEPHEN A	02	F	720307	LA
JACKSON, JAMES TERRY	03	F	720323	LA
PIKE, DENNIS STANLEY	03	N	720323	LA
WHITT, JAMES EDWARD	04	F	720323	LA
CROW, RAYMOND JACK JR	E3	F	720327	CB
DREHER, RICHARD E	03	F	720327	CB
MANOR, JAMES (NMN)	E4	F	720327	CB
PANNABECKER, DAVID ERIC	03	F	720327	CB
WAGNER, RAYMOND ANTHONY	E3	F	720327	CB
YONG, EDWARD PUCK KOW JR	E4	A	720327	VS
RAUNER, HENRY PAUL	04	F	720329	LA
CANIFORD, JAMES KENNETH	E5	F	720329	LA
MILLER, CURTIS D	03	F	720329	LA
STEPHENSON, HOWARD D	04	F	720329	LA
YOUNG, BARCLAY B	03	F	720329	LA
CROSBY, BRUCE ALLEN JR	E4	A	720330	VS
WESTCOTT, GARY PATRICK	E5	A	720330	VS
WORTH, JAMES F	E4	M	720401	VS
BOLTE, WAYNE LOUIS	04	F	720402	VS
FRINK, JOHN W	W1	A	720402	VS
GATWOOD, ROBIN F JR	02	F	720402	VS
GIANNANGELI, ANTHONY ROBER	05	F	720402	VS
KULLAND, BYRON K	02	A	720402	VS
LEVIS, CHARLES ALLEN	05	F	720402	VS
PASCHALL, RONALD PAGE	E5	A	720402	VS
SEREX, HENRY MUIR	04	F	720402	VS
CHRISTENSEN, ALLEN DUANE	E5	A	720403	VS
MUREN, THOMAS R	E2	N	720403	VN
ONEILL, DOUGLAS LEE	W2	A	720403	VS
WILLIAMS, EDWARD W	W1	A	720403	VS
ZICH, LARRY ALFRED	W2	A	720403	VS
ALLEY, JAMES HAROLD	E4	F	720406	VS
AVERY, ALLEN JONES	E6	F	720406	VS
CALL, JOHN HENRY III	02	F	720406	VS
CHAPMAN, PETER HAYDEN II	03	F	720406	VS
MUNLOP, THOMAS EARL	05	N	720406	VN
PEARSON, WILLIAM ROY	E4	F	720406	VS
PRATER, ROY DEWITT	E6	F	720406	VS
LULL, HOWARD B JR	E7	A	720407	VS
POTTS, LARRY FLETCHER	02	M	720407	VS
SCHOTT, RICHARD S	05	A	720407	VS
WALKER, BRUCE C	02	F	720407	VS
KETCHIE, SCOTT DOUGLAS	02	M	720409	LA

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CHRISTENSEN, JOHN MICHAEL	02	M	720413	VN
LEET, DAVID LEVERETT	03	M	720413	VN
GREENLEAF, JOSEPH G	03	N	720414	VS
JONES, ORVIN C JR	03	F	720416	VN
MATEJA, ALAN PAUL	03	F	720416	VN
AMOS, THOMAS HUGH	03	F	720420	VS
BURNHAM, MASON IRWIN	03	F	720420	VS
CARTER, GEORGE WILLIAMS	04	A	720424	VS
ELLEN, WADE LYNN	W1	A	720424	VS
HUNSICKER, JAMES EDWARD	02	A	720424	VS
JONES, JOHNNY MACK	02	A	720424	VS
ZOLLIFFER, FRANKLIN	E4	A	720424	VS
BROWNLEE, ROBERT WALLACE	05	A	720425	VS
AMESBURY, HARRY ARLO JR	04	F	720426	VS
COOKE, CALVIN C JR	E5	F	720426	VS
DUNN, RICHARD EDWARD	E6	F	720426	VS
HOSKINS, DONALD RUSSELL	E6	F	720426	VS
REYNOLDS, TERRY L	--	V	720426	CB
RUSSELL, RICHARD LEE	02	F	720426	VS
LAGRAVES, MELVIN D	E3	N	720430	VN
MCDONALD, JOSEPH WILLIAM	02	M	720503	VN
WILES, MARVIN BENJAMIN C	03	N	720506	VN
CONSOLVO, JOHN WADSWORTH JR	03	M	720507	VS
LEAVER, JOHN MURRAY JR	05	N	720508	VN
TAYLOR, EDMUND BATTELLE JR	06	N	720508	VN
HARRIS, JEFFREY L	03	F	720510	VN
BLASSIE, MICHAEL JOSEPH	02	F	720511	VS
STROBRIDGE, RODNEY L	03	A	720511	VS
WILLIAMS, ROBERT J	03	A	720511	VS
BOGARD, LONNIE PAT	03	F	720512	LA
OSTERMEYER, WILLIAM HENRY	02	F	720512	LA
HENN, JOHN ROBERT JR	W2	A	720524	VS
STRONG, HENRY HOOKER JR	05	N	720525	VN
MORROW, LARRY K	E4	A	720529	VS
KRANER, DAVID S	E3	N	720605	VN
PAYNE, KYLIS THEROD	E2	N	720605	VN
FOWLER, JAMES ALAN	04	F	720606	VN
SEVELL, JOHN W	03	F	720606	VN
BIBBS, WAYNE (NMN)	E3	A	720611	VS
HACKETT, JAMES EDWARD	E4	A	720611	VS
HOLM, ARNOLD EDWARD JR	03	A	720611	VS
MCQUADE, JAMES RUSSELL	02	A	720611	VS
YEAKLEY, ROBIN RAY	E4	A	720611	VS
WILEY, RICHARD DENNIS	E4	A	720612	VS
AVIS, FRANCIS JOHN	04	N	720614	VN
AYRES, GERALD FRANCIS	04	F	720618	VS
COLE, RICHARD MILTON JR	E6	F	720618	VS
DANIELSON, MARK GILES	03	F	720618	VS
GILBERT, PAUL F	02	F	720618	VS
HARRISON, ROBERT HEERMAN	04	F	720618	VS
HUNT, LEON ANDREW	E7	F	720618	VS
KILPATRICK, LARRY R	03	N	720618	VN

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KLINKE, DONALD HERMAN	E5	F	720618	VS
LEHRKE, STANLEY L	E4	F	720618	VS
MERCER, JACOB E	E7	F	720618	VS
HEWMAN, LARRY J	E5	F	720618	VS
NYHOF, RICHARD E	E5	F	720618	VS
WILSON, ROBERT ALLAN	03	F	720618	VS
MCCARTY, JAMES L	02	F	720624	VN
SHUMWAY, GEOFFREY RAYMOND	03	N	720625	VN
ROBERTSON, LEONARD	03	M	720707	VS
GREEN, FRANK CLIFFORD JR	05	N	720710	VN
CRODY, KENNETH LLOYD	E4	M	720711	VS
HENDRIX, JERRY WAYNE	E6	M	720711	VS
HUARD, JAMES L	02	F	720712	VN
ODONNELL, SAMUEL JR	03	F	720712	VN
SHIMKIN, ALEX	--	V	720712	VS
BROWN, WAYNE GORDON II	03	F	720717	VS
HAAS, LEON FREDERICK	03	N	720717	VN
SANSONE, JAMES J	E3	N	720810	VN
THOMPSON, DAVID MATHEW	03	N	720812	VN
JENSEN, FRANCIS WAYNE	02	F	720813	VN
PENDER, ORLAND JAMES JR	03	N	720817	VN
PITZEN, JOHN RUSSELL	05	N	720817	VN
LESTER, RODERICK B	02	N	720820	VN
MOSSMAN, HARRY SEEBER	03	N	720820	VN
CROCKETT, WILLIAM JAMES	02	F	720822	VS
TIGNER, LEE MORROW	04	F	720822	VS
GREENWOOD, ROBERT R JR	04	F	720902	LA
HEROLD, RICHARD WALTER	03	F	720902	LA
WOOD, WILLIAM C JR	03	F	720902	LA
GERSTEL, DONALD ARTHUR	04	N	720908	VN
BUELL, KENNETH RICHARD	04	N	720917	VN
GOETSCH, THOMAS AUGUST	E2	N	720917	VN
TUROSE, MICHAEL STEPHEN	02	F	720917	VN
ZORN, THOMAS ONEAL JR	03	F	720917	VN
CARROLL, ROGER WILLIAM JR	04	F	720921	LA
COOK, DWIGHT WILLIAM	02	F	720921	LA
BORAH, DANIEL VERNOR JR	03	N	720924	VS
CHAM, PETER	E2	N	720925	VS
BRETT, ROBERT ARTHUR JR	02	F	720929	VN
COLTMAN, WILLIAM CLARE	04	F	720929	VN
ANDERSON, ROBERT DALE	05	F	721006	VN
BOLTZE, BRUCE EDWARD	W2	M	721006	VS
MCCORMICK, CARL OTTIS	05	F	721006	VS
CLEARY, PETER MCARTHUR	03	F	721010	VN
EDMOND, LEONARDO C	03	F	721010	VN
PEACOCK, JOHN ROBERT II	03	M	721012	VN
PRICE, WILLIAM MARSHALL	02	M	721012	VN
BIXEL, MICHAEL SARGENT	02	N	721024	VN
HALL, JAMES WAYNE	04	N	721028	VN
BROWN, ROBERT MACK	04	F	721107	VN
CARROLL, JOHN LEONARD	04	F	721107	LA
MORRISSEY, ROBERT D	04	F	721107	LA

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BREUER, DONALD CHARLES	03	M	721120	LA
CAFFARELLI, CHARLES JOSEPH	03	F	721121	VS
STAFFORD, RONALD DEAN	03	F	721121	VS
EARNEST, CHARLES M	05	N	721128	VN
HARVEY, JACK ROCKWOOD	02	F	721128	VS
JONES, BOBBY M	03	F	721128	VS
SHINE, ANTHONY C	03	F	721202	VN
MCELVAIN, JAMES RICHARD	04	F	721218	VN
WARD, RONALD J	05	F	721218	VN
COOPER, RICHARD WALLER JR	03	F	721219	VN
POOLE, CHARLIE S	E6	F	721219	VN
LERNER, IRWIN S	03	F	721220	VN
MCLAUGHLIN, ARTHUR V JR	E7	F	721220	VN
PERRY, RANDOLPH ALLEN JR	04	F	721220	VN
STUART, JOHN F	04	F	721221	LA
GOULD, FRANK ALTON	03	F	721222	VN
BENNETT, THOMAS WARING JR	03	F	721224	LA
JACKSON, PAUL VERNON III	02	M	721225	VS
TICKMAN, DWIGHT G	03	M	721227	VN
SHIPMAN, RALPH JIM	02	M	721227	VN
FORRESTER, RONALD W	E2	N	730103	VS
SCAIFE, KENNETH D	03	F	730104	LA
JOHNSTON, STEVEN BRYCE	03	N	730106	VN
LINDAHL, JOHN CARL	E6	A	730108	VS
BUSH, ELBERT WAYNE	04	A	730108	VS
DEANE, WILLIAM LAWRENCE	W1	A	730108	VS
KNUTSON, RICHARD ARTHUR	E5	A	730108	VS
LAUTERIO, MANUEL ALONZO	E5	A	730108	VS
STINSON, WILLIAM SHERRIL	W1	A	730108	VS
WILSON, MICKEY ALLEN	02	N	730110	VN
CLARK, ROBERT ALAN	03	N	730110	VN
MCCORMICK, MICHAEL T	02	N	730121	VN
CHRISTOPHERSEN, KEITH ALLE	04	N	730121	VN
PARKER, CHARLES LESLIE JR	E5	N	730121	VN
WIEHR, RICHARD DANIEL	05	N	730127	VS
HALL, HARLEY HUBERT	03	F	730127	VS
MORRIS, GEORGE WILLIAM JR	02	F	730127	VS
PETERSON, MARK ALLEN	03	N	730130	VN
DUENSING, JAMES ALLYN	02	N	730130	VN
HAVILAND, ROY ELBERT	E4	N	730203	VS
STRINGHAM, WILLIAM S	03	F	730205	LA
BOLLINGER, ARTHUR RAY	E4	F	730205	LA
BRANDENBURG, DALE	E4	F	730205	LA
CRESSMAN, PETER RICHARD	E4	F	730205	LA
ATEJOV, JOSEPH A	E5	F	730205	LA
MELTON, TODD M	01	F	730205	LA
PRIMM, SEVERO J III	03	F	730205	LA
SPITZ, GEORGE R	--	V	730307	LA
ACKLEY, JAMES H	--	V	730307	LA
DRIVER, CLARENCE N	03	F	730418	CB
JAMES, SAMUEL L	03	F	730418	CB
MARTIN, DOUGLAS K	03	F	730418	CB

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MCLEOD, DAVID VANCE JR	E7	F	730614	CB
CORNELIUS, SAMUEL BLACKMAR	03	F	730616	CB
SMALLWOOD, JOHN J	03	F	730616	CB
DEAN, CHARLES	--	V	740910	LA
RAWLINGS, JAMES	--	V	750103	VS
DOLAN, EDWARD V	--	V	750312	VS
MILLER, GEORGE C	--	V	750312	VS
SEIDL, ROBERT	--	V	750312	VS
WALSH, BRIAN	--	V	750425	CB
YIM, JOHN SUNG	--	V	750425	CB
NYSTUL, WILLIAM CRAIG	03	M	750429	VS
SHEA, MICHAEL JOHN	02	M	750429	VS
BENEDETT, DANIEL ANDREW	E2	M	750515	CB
BLESSING, LYNN	E2	M	750515	CB
BOYD, WALTER	E2	M	750515	CB
COPENHAVER, GREGORY SCOTT	E3	M	750515	CB
GARCIA, ANDRES	E3	M	750515	CB
GAUSE, BERNARD JR	E5	N	750515	CB
"ALL, GARY LEE	E2	M	750515	CB
MARGROVE, JOSEPH N	E3	M	750515	CB
JACQUES, JAMES J	E2	M	750515	CB
LONEY, ASHTON N	E3	M	750515	CB
MANNING, RONALD JAMES	E3	N	750515	CB
MARSHALL, DANNY G	E1	M	750515	CB
MAXWELL, JAMES R	E2	M	750515	CB
RIVENBURGH, RICHARD W	E2	M	750515	CB
RUMBAUGH, ELWOOD EUGENE	E5	F	750515	CB
SANDOVAL, ANTONIO RAMOS	E2	M	750515	CB
TURNER, KELTON RENA	E2	M	750515	CB
VANDEGEER, RICHARD (NMI)	01	F	750515	CB

Number of Records Output: 2267

CILMI AND RELATED

MODIFIED

OBJECTION TO IDENTIFICATION PREPARED BY TERRILL DANNIS, BROTHER

ALTHOUGH MUCH INFORMATION IS PRESENTED, HEIGHT IS THE IMPOSSIBILITY

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IT IS MY VIEW THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN UP COMPLICATING DOCUMENTATION INTO A SHORT REPORT DISPUTING THE CIL-HI CONCLUSIONS. THEREFORE, I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT TO GIVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE "OFFICIAL" STAND OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND MY CONCLUSIONS.

THE U. S. GOVERNMENT POSITION IS BASED ON FACTS OF MISINFORMATION WHICH WERE NOT ONLY DEVELOPED IN 1966 THROUGH THE EARLY 1970'S, BUT WERE PRESENTED TO AND USED BY CIL-HI TO CONCLUDE THAT THE REMAINS IN QUESTION ARE THOSE OF MR. MARK W. DENNIS. THE FACTS WHICH I PRESENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOW THAT THE REMAINS IN QUESTION COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE THOSE OF DENNIS.

THE MISTAKES, INTENTIONAL MANUFACTURING OF FALSE EVIDENCE, MISINFORMATION GENERATED, AND USE OF ONLY SELECTED EVIDENCE BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAS PRODUCED A STORY THAT READS LIKE A FAIRY TALE. THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN DEVASTATING TO THE FAMILY OF MARK DENNIS. THE FINANCIAL COSTS HAVE BEEN HIGH AND CONTINUE TO RISE. ABOVE ALL THAT, THE REAL ISSUE IS THE DAMAGE DONE TO MARK DENNIS. HE PRESENTLY HAS NO RIGHTS. HE WAS ABANDONED BY THE COUNTRY HE MAY STILL BE SERVING. HE HAS NEVER BEEN ASKED FOR BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BUT PERHAPS WORST OF ALL, HE HAS NO ONE TO REPRESENT OR SPEAK FOR HIM BUT ME.

PRIOR TO PRESENTING THE FACTS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PRESENT THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OF WHAT REALLY HAPPENED ON JULY 15, 1966. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GIVE BOTH VERSIONS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE AND FOLLOWED WITH MY REASONING AND DISAGREEMENT RESPONSE TO CIL-HI'S REPORT.

POSITION OF THE U. S. NAVY

THE U. S. NAVY DETERMINED THAT ON JULY 15, 1966, A NUMBER OF CHINOOK HELICOPTERS (THE NUMBER VARIES IN NUMEROUS REPORTS) SET DOWN AT DONG HA TO PICK UP A GROUP OF MARINES AND FLY THEM TO A LANDING ZONE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE TO SUPPORT A GROUP OF MARINES ALREADY THERE WHO WERE SURROUNDED AND PINNED DOWN. AS THE HELICOPTER GROUP STARTED THEIR APPROACH TO THE LZ, A HELICOPTER (FIRST OR SECOND IN THE FORMATION) WAS HIT IN A FUEL CELL BY AN INCENDIARY SHELL. THE HELICOPTER CRASHED AND BURNED. THE PILOT, THOMAS MC ALLISTER, THE CO-PILOT, RICHEY, AND THE GUNNER, LUCAS, SURVIVED. THE REMAINDER OF THE PERSONNEL ON BOARD WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH (11 OF 13 IN VARIOUS REPORTS). THE REMAINING HELICOPTERS IN THE FLIGHT RETURNED TO DONG HA AND MUSTERED ON THE FIELD IMMEDIATELY AFTER LANDING. THE LIST OF THOSE KILLED IN ACTION WAS OBTAINED FROM THOSE MISSING THE MUSTER. ALL THE KILLED WERE "POSITIVELY" IDENTIFIED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE CADAVRER AND ONLY MARK DENNIS REMAINED UNACCOUNTED FOR. THEREFORE, THE REMAINING CADAVRER WAS IDENTIFIED AS DENNIS.

POSITION OF JERRY DENNIS

SINCE NOVEMBER OF 1971, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DENNIS FAMILY, I HAVE RECEIVED MANY INCIDENTS WHICH CONFLICT WITH THE ABOVE VERSION OF THE INCIDENT. IT IS MY OPINION, AS AN EXPERIENCED INVESTIGATOR, THAT THE FACTS PRESENT A TOTALLY DIFFERENT PICTURE. ON JULY 15, 1966 TEN (10) CHINOOK HELICOPTERS SET DOWN AT DONG HA AND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MARINES AND OTHER SUPPORT TROOPS WERE LOADED ON BOARD. NO ROSTER WAS TAKEN TO DETERMINE WHO OR HOW MANY WERE ON EACH AIRCRAFT. WHILE APPROACHING THE LZ, THE SECOND AIRCRAFT IN THE FORMATION WAS STRUCK BY ENEMY FIRE AND IMMEDIATELY DROPPED TO TREE-TOP LEVEL. WHILE HOVERING OVER A SANDY CREEK BED APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 30 FEET ABOVE THE GROUND, MEN BEGAN JUMPING OUT. THEY WOULD HAVE LANDED IN THE MIDST OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS. THE HELICOPTER THEN ROSE AND ATTEMPTED TO LAND AT THE LZ. IT HIT HARD ON A HILLSIDE, BURNED AND EXPLODED. THE REMAINING NINE AIRCRAFT HAD LEFT THE AREA DUE TO INTENSE GROUND FIRE PRIOR TO THE CRASH. THEY RETURNED TO DONG HA AND WERE IMMEDIATELY REDEPLOYED TO "MOTHER'S RIDGE" WITHOUT TAKING MUSTER.

LATER, WHEN THE INTENSE GROUND FIRE LET UP AND THE HELICOPTER HAD COOLED, THE REMAINS OF A NUMBER OF PERSONS WERE RECOVERED BUT THERE WERE NOT THIRTEEN. THE MARINES WAITED ONE WEEK AND WHEN NO ONE RETURNED, ALL THIRTEEN WERE LISTED KILLED. THE RECOVERED REMAINS WERE LATER PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED AND 'UNKNOWN' REMAINS WERE BLOWN UP AND SUBSTITUTED FOR THE MISSING. EVIDENCE WAS MANUFACTURED AND PLACED IN THE CABINET(S).

FACTS PRESENTED TO/USED BY CIL-HI

IN THE YEARS TO FOLLOW, ONE FALSE REPORT AFTER ANOTHER WAS FURNISHED TO ME TO COVER UP THE INCIDENT. WHEN CIL-HI WAS PRESENTED THE "BACKGROUND INFORMATION" ON THE INCIDENT AND MARK DENNIS' PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, THEY WERE GIVEN MUCH OF THE 'MISINFORMATION' WHICH HAS BEEN GENERATED. IN ADDITION, WHILE CERTAIN FACTS WERE USED FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS (WHICH SUPPORTED THE IDENTIFICATION), OTHER FACTS IN THOSE SAME REPORTS (WHICH DISPUTED THE IDENTIFICATION) WERE WITHHELD FROM THE BACKGROUND INFORMATION USED BY CIL-HI INVESTIGATORS.

THE FACTS GENERATED BY CIL-HI AND OTHER GOVERNMENT EXPERTS SHOW BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT, WHEN COMPARED WITH THE RECORDS AND CORRECT PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MARK DENNIS, THAT THE REMAINS IN QUESTION COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE THOSE OF DENNIS.

MAJOR FACTS IN DISPUTE

FACTS	NAVY	FAMILY
HEIGHT (OF REMAINS)	CILMI = PINKES = 57.4 +/- 1.3" BIRKBY = 56.7 +/- 1.3" 66.9 +/- 1.3" 67.4 +/- 1.3" 67.9 +/- 1.94" MAPLES = OVER 47" 66.6 +/- 1.7" ANGEL = 57" TO 60" PALESTON = 69"	CHARNEY = 66.6 +/- 1.3" (AS CORRECTED) BABY = 63.5" TO 64"
HEIGHT (OF DENNIS)	CILMI = 67 1/4" PALESTON = 69" NIS = 72"	CHARNEY = 72" +/- 1/2" FAMILY = 71" TO 72 1/4"
INCIDENT	PERSONNEL KILLED IN CH46 HELICOPTER CRASH. CH46 USES NON-LEADED KEROSENE; JP-4 OR JP-5.	LAB REPORTS SHOW BODY BLOWN UP WITH AMERICAN GRENADES AND BURNED WITH REGULAR GASOLINE.
ID TAGS	NAVY REPORTS NO ID TAGS WERE FOUND ON DENNIS IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS. NAVY STATES THEY HAVE NO IDEA HOW THE ID TAGS CAME TO BE PLACED IN THE CASKET OR WHERE THEY HAD COME FROM.	ID TAGS WERE FOUND IN THE CASKET PINNED TO THE BLANKET WRAPPED AROUND THE REMAINS. ID TAGS WERE BURNED BY SMOKE FROM PAPER AND NEVER EXCEEDED 250 DEG F. THE SIMULATED BURNING COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY SIMPLY HOLDING THE TAGS OVER BURNING PAPER.
SUPPLIES ABOARD	THE PILOT, THOMAS MC ALLISTER, STATES IN HIS AFFIDAVIT THAT NO CASES OF SUPPLIES WERE BEING CARRIED BY THE TROOPS BOARDING.	LAB REPORTS SHOW THAT BURNED PAPER IMBEDDED IN THE REMAINS IS THAT OF A PAPER USED ONLY IN THE PACKAGING OF AMUNITION AT THE FACTORY. A CASE OF GRENADES WOULD HAVE TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE EXPLOSION WHICH DAMAGED THE REMAINS.

MAJOR FACTS IN DISPUTE (Cont)

FACTS	NAVY	FAMILY
MURDER KILLED IN INCIDENT	ORIGINALLY IT WERE LISTED KILLED IN 1966. IN 1970 THE NAVY HAD STATED ONLY 11 WERE KILLED AND RECOVERED. THE 1981 NIS INQUEST DETERMINED ONLY 11 WERE KILLED AND RECOVERED. THE NAVY TODAY CLAIMS 13 WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH. THE 1971 INQUEST REPORT STATES ALL 13 DEATH CERTIFICATES WERE COMPALED WITH THE REMAINS. THIS WAS BEFORE THE 1970 STATEMENT THAT ONLY 11 WERE KILLED.	IT SEEMS THAT THE WERE RECOVERED AS A RESULT OF THE CRASH. CILMI WAS IDENTIFIED WITH RECORDS THAT ALL 13 REMAINS WERE RECOVERED FROM THE CRASH. EVEN THOUGH THE STATEMENT OF LUCAS THE GUNNER, WAS ALSO GIVEN TO THEM AND ONLY SEEMED TO TOTALLY IGNORE THE STATEMENT OF TWO OTHER EYE WITNESSES OF THE PASSENGERS ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT. LUCAS STATES THAT AT LEAST TWO MEN HAD JUMPED BEFORE THE CRASH INTO ENEMY TERRITORY. IT IS APPARENT THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE BODIES COULD NOT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN THE CRASH.
RECOVERY PROCESS	NAVY STATES ALL THE REMAINS WERE REMOVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT AT QUANG TRI; FLOWN TO DONG HAI; FLOWN TO DA NANG AND TENTATIVELY PROCESSED; FLOWN TO SAIGON; AND THEN FLOWN TO THE U.S.	STATEMENT OF MEDIC JOHN LAY SHOWS THE REMAINS OF AT LEAST TWO WERE FLOWN FROM DONG HAI TO PHU SAI AND TENTATIVELY PROCESSED THERE. HE WAS ASSIGNED TO DO THE INITIAL ID ON THE TWO MEDICS INVOLVED. HE WAS A CLOSE FRIEND OF DENNIS IN VIETNAM.
PROCESS OF ELIMINATION	THE NAVY NAMED N FORM ON DENNIS STATES THAT COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE ON ALL OF THE OTHER DECEASED WITH ONLY DENNIS REMAINING ID WAS ESTABLISHED IN THAT MANNER.	THE NAMED N FORM ON DENNIS WAS COMPLETED BEFORE SIX (6) OF THE OTHER DECEASED WERE IDENTIFIED. CULLEN'S WAS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL 19 DAYS AFTER DENNIS. THE DENNIS' FAMILY WAS NOTIFIED OF THE DEATH THREE DAYS BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE ID.

MAJOR FACTS IN DISPUTE

FACTS	Maple	Charney
AGE OF REMAINS	MAPLES = 24 - 24 HINKES = 20.4 - 29.0 ANGEL = 20 - 21 CHARNEY = 24 - 26 22 - 24 22-29 RIPKEY = 24.4 - 29.0	STANDARDS ARE SET IN FORENSIC MEDICINE TO ALLOW FOR VARIANCES IN AGE AS WE DO NOT ALL PHYSICALLY MATURE AT THE SAME RATE. THOSE VARIANCES ARE THE EXTREMES. DENNIS WAS 19.8 YEARS OLD. IN EACH CASE THE GOVERNMENT EXPERTS CAME UP WITH AN AGE OUTSIDE THE EXTREMES BUT THEN DETERMINED IT WAS CLOSE ENOUGH FOR DENNIS. YOU DO NOT USE KNOWN VARIANCES AND THEN ADD TO IT!

CAUCASIAN VS MONSOLOID

IN A MEETING BETWEEN DR. MAPLES, JOHN ROBERTS, DR. CHARNEY AND MYSELF IN NOVEMBER OF 1989. BOTH DR. MAPLES AND DR. CHARNEY AGREED THAT, ALTHOUGH BOTH HAD DIFFERING OPINIONS ON RACE, NEITHER HAD ENOUGH EVIDENCE FROM THE REMAINS TO BE ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE IN THEIR OPINION. THEREFORE, BOTH AGREED THE ARGUMENT WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT THE MEETING. I ONLY BRING UP THE POINT AS THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHERE THESE REMAINS COULD HAVE COME FROM.

TEETH

DR. MAPLES AND DR. CHARNEY AGREED AT THE ABOVE MEETING THAT THE TEETH NEITHER PROVE NOR DISPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION. ANY FURTHER RESEARCH IN THIS AREA WOULD BE FRUITLESS AS THE FILLED TOOTH HAS NOW BEEN DESTROYED BY CILHI.

MAJOR FACTS IN DISPUTE

FACTS	Maple	Charney
AGE OF REMAINS	MAPLES = 24 - 24 HINKES = 20.4 - 29.0 ANGEL = 20 - 21 CHARNEY = 24 - 26 22 - 24 22-29 RIPKEY = 24.4 - 29.0	STANDARDS ARE SET IN FORENSIC MEDICINE TO ALLOW FOR VARIANCES IN AGE AS WE DO NOT ALL PHYSICALLY MATURE AT THE SAME RATE. THOSE VARIANCES ARE THE EXTREMES. DENNIS WAS 19.8 YEARS OLD. IN EACH CASE THE GOVERNMENT EXPERTS CAME UP WITH AN AGE OUTSIDE THE EXTREMES BUT THEN DETERMINED IT WAS CLOSE ENOUGH FOR DENNIS. YOU DO NOT USE KNOWN VARIANCES AND THEN ADD TO IT!

FORMAT OF THIS REPORT

IN AS MUCH AS I AM A LAYMAN IN PRODUCING A REPORT SUCH AS THIS, I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WILL BE AS EASY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE READER TO UNDERSTAND QUOTES AND THE REFERENCES FROM WHICH THEY ARE TAKEN. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT I HAVE REFERRED TO A REPORT CONSISTING OF A NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS THAT MAY NOT BE IN THE SAME SEQUENCE AS THE SAME DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY OTHER SOURCES. THIS RESPONSE IS NUMBERED IN THE CENTER OF EACH PAGE, THE NUMBERING OF PAGES FOR A SPECIFIC REPORT ARE DONE ON THE LOWER RIGHT OF EACH PAGE, SUCH AS PAGE 1 of 3. THE ADDENDUMS ARE NUMBERED ON THE UPPER RIGHT OF EACH PAGE AND ARE PRECEDED BY AN 'A', SUCH AS A-B7.

Quotes are presented in this way. References are given for quotes, such as (see SECNAV Ltr dtd 01-07-88, page A-B7).

THIS RESPONSE TO CIL-HI REPORT 0055-88 IS INTENDED TO DEAL ONLY WITH THE IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER MARK DENNIS IS ALIVE TODAY OR WAS, AT SOME DETERMINED POINT IN TIME. HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THESE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES AND IS THEREFORE, OMITTED.

THIS RESPONSE WAS PRODUCED BY RESPONDING TO ITEMS WITHIN THE CIL-HI AND OTHER INDEPENDENT AND GOVERNMENT REPORTS. SINCE MORE THAN ONE PERSON MAY HAVE USED THE SAME INFORMATION IN FORMULATING THAT REPORT, THERE IS A DUPLICATION WHICH CANNOT BE HELPED. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GROUP THOSE QUOTES TOGETHER WITH ONE RESPONSE WHERE POSSIBLE.

AFTER RESPONDING TO CIL-HI 0055-88, I HAVE RESPONDED TO OTHER DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE NAVY OVER THE YEARS. AGAIN, THERE IS SOME DUPLICATION BECAUSE CIL-HI USED ONLY PARTS OF THE OTHER DOCUMENTS AND A RESPONSE IS NECESSARY ON THE REMAINDER OF THE DOCUMENT(S). PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS ARE KEPT AT A MINIMUM EXCEPT WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED BY THE NAVY OR CIL-HI PERSONNEL (MOST OF WHICH ARE INCORRECTLY STATED).

AFTER COMPLETING THE ABOVE RESPONSE, I HAVE COMPLETED A SUMMARY WHICH IS MY OPINION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BASED ON THE FACTS PROVIDED IN THIS RESPONSE.

I THEN 'HIGH-LIGHTED' THE PARAGRAPHS AND STATEMENTS I HAVE QUOTED AND/OR DISPUTED IN THE RESPONSE. WHEN THE READER LOOKS AT THE DISPUTED AREAS WHICH ARE MARKED, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND WHY I CANNOT ACCEPT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE REMAINS AS THOSE OF MARK V. DENNIS.

DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

TWO ITEMS OF EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF REMAINS IN THE CASSET RECEIVED BY THE FAMILY IN 1981 HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR POINT OF DISPUTE IN THE IDENTIFICATION.

FIRST, A TOOTH WITH TWO FILLINGS REMAINED IN THE SKULL. TWO OTHER IMPACTED TEETH WERE ALSO PRESENT WHICH WERE LESS OF A DISPUTE. THE CIL-HI LAB, ALONG WITH THE LIFE CODES CORPORATION, CHOSE TO DESTROY THE FILLED TOOTH TO OBTAIN PULP FOR DNA TESTS. THE TWO COMPLETE IMPACTED TEETH WERE MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE THE NEEDED MATERIAL AS THEY WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY DRILLED OUT. INSTEAD, THE ONE TOOTH IN DISPUTE WAS DESTROYED.

SECONDLY, THE LEFT FEMUR WAS BROKEN TOTALLY INTO TWO PIECES. ONE END OF THE FEMUR HAD BEEN BURNED BUT NOT THE COMPLETE SURFACE. BY PLACING THE TWO PIECES TOGETHER, A PERFECT FIT WAS AVAILABLE TO GET A COMPLETE MEASUREMENT. AGAIN, CIL-HI, ALONG WITH LIFE CODES CORPORATION, CHOSE TO DESTROY THAT PIECE OF EVIDENCE BY CUTTING A SECTION OUT OF THE BONE, AS NOTED BY DR. MAPLES. THE SECTION WAS THEN NEVER USED, THAT BONE MAY NOW NEVER BE MEASURED WITH THE ACCURACY IT ONCE WAS. MANY OTHER BONES WERE AVAILABLE FROM THE REMAINS.

ALTHOUGH THE REMAINS WERE RECEIVED BY CILHI ON 1 APRIL 1988 (PAGE 26 OF 121A-079) AND THE LEFT FEMUR WAS NOT SECTIONED UNTIL 11 MAY 1988, CILHI DID NOT SEE FIT TO MEASURE THE LEFT FEMUR BEFORE IT WAS SECTIONED BY LIFE CODES.

THE ABOVE ACTS WERE EITHER LACK OF EXPERT CAPABILITY, STUPIDITY, OR AN INTENTIONAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE. AFTER READING THE REMAINDER OF THIS RESPONSE, YOU BE THE JUDGE.

MISSING RECORDS AND FILES

THROUGHOUT THIS RESPONSE I HAVE ADDRESSED NUMEROUS REPORTS WHICH WERE USED BY THE USN OVER THE YEARS, TO DOCUMENT STATEMENTS IN CORRESPONDENCE, WHICH NOW DO NOT EXIST AND NEVER DID EXIST ACCORDING TO PERSONNEL AT NMPC. IN ADDITION, THE ENTIRE ORIGINAL FILE ON MARK DENNIS WAS REMOVED FROM THE ST. LOUIS ARCHIVES IN DECEMBER OF 1982 AND NEVER RETURNED UNTIL IT MYSTERIOUSLY ARRIVED IN THE MAIL IN ST. LOUIS IN DECEMBER OF 1987. NO ONE SEEMS TO KNOW BY WHO OR WHY THE RECORDS WERE REMOVED EXCEPT THAT IT WAS SOMEONE WITHIN NMPC. NO REQUESTS WERE PENDING EITHER FROM MYSELF OR MY CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE AT THE TIME THE FILES WERE REMOVED. WHEN I REVIEWED MARK'S RECORDS IN THE PRESENCE OF MR. JOHN ROGERS IN NOVEMBER OF 1988, I FURNISHED HIM MANY COPIES OF PRIOR CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE NAVY WHICH WERE MISSING FROM THE FILE. THE FILES, EITHER THROUGH DESIGN OR NEGLIGENCE, HAD BEEN PURGED. NMPC ASSUMES SOME STATEMENTS MADE BY THE NAVY IN THE PAST WERE BASED ON 'MISINFORMATION' AND NOT FACTS SINCE NO RECORDS CAN BE FOUND TODAY TO SUPPORT SUCH STATEMENTS. THE QUESTION REMAINS: "WHY WAS SUCH 'MISINFORMATION' PRESENTED TO AND USED BY CILHI?"

SINCE I NUMBERED THE PAGES IN THE CILHI REPORT IN THE SEQUENCE I RECEIVED THEM, THE NUMBERING OF THE 121 PAGES ARE NOT IN DATE SEQUENCE.

RECORD DATA: Deceased and Missing Personnel
(PAGE 35 OF 121; A-088)

PAGE 35 GIVES A HEIGHT OF 67 1/4" AND BROWN EYES. BOTH WERE OBTAINED FROM THE FORM 88, REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION (PAGES 58, 59 OF 121; A-111, 112) AND BOTH ARE WRONG. MARK HAD BLUE EYES AND WAS IN EXCESS OF 6' TALL. WHERE THE INFORMATION CAME FROM OR WHO IT PERTAINS TO IS A MYSTERY, BUT IT IS NOT CORRECT FOR DENNIS YET WAS USED IN EVERY COMPARISON OF HEIGHT IN THE CILHI REPORT.

THE HEIGHT OF MARK DENNIS IS THE MOST DISPUTED INFORMATION IN THE RECORDS AND REPORTS PRODUCED BY THE NAVY AND CILHI SINCE THE 1966 INCIDENT. THE CILHI REPORT DISAGREES WITH THE NAVY AND THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE REPORT BY DR. LAWRENCE ANGEL COMPLETED IN 1971. THE NIS INVESTIGATION COMPLETED IN 1981 DISAGREES WITH ALL THE OTHER REPORTS. THE HEIGHT DISCREPANCIES ARE PARTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

1. SP88 DATED 2/4/64 LISTS A HEIGHT OF 67 1/4" OF 69 1/4". THE PEN APPEARS TO HAVE 'SKIPPED' WHEN WRITING 69 1/4 MAKING IT APPEAR AS 67 1/4. A SECOND POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE INFORMATION IS ON SOMEONE OTHER THAN DENNIS AS THE EYES ARE LISTED AS BROWN RATHER THAN BLUE AND THE BUILD IS LISTED AS MEDIUM RATHER THAN SLENDER. (PAGE 59 OF 121; A-112)

2. THE FAMILY DOCTOR'S RECORDS SHOW MARK DENNIS' HEIGHT AT 5'9 1/2" ON 9/19/63 AT THE AGE OF 17. (A-273)

3. THE MIAMISBURG HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL ROSTER FOR THE 63-64 SCHOOL YEAR LISTS DENNIS AS 5'10". THAT MEASUREMENT WAS ALSO AT THE AGE OF 17 AND TAKEN A MONTH OR TWO AFTER THE ABOVE DOCTOR'S MEASUREMENT. THE 1/2" DIFFERENCE IN THE TWO SIMPLY SHOW DENNIS WAS GROWING. (A-029)

4. THE 5 AUG 71 REPORT BY ROBERT W. RALSTON, IDENTIFICATION SPECIALIST, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, STATES

This height measurement is comparable with that of Dennis at time of death applying the Mildred Trotter-Goldine C. Gleason Scale (re: Estimates of Stature from Maximum Lengths of the Sum of Measurements of Long Bones, 1956). The scale allows for an anticipated growth of 1.2 cm in American males from age 17 to 19.5 years. The recorded height of Dennis, 4 Feb 64, was 67 1/4" (45.4 cm). Since death occurred 15 July 66 or about 2 1/2 years after the 4 Feb 64 measurement, the height of 68.6" (46.8 cm) is established.

14. THE 67 1/4" HEIGHT OF THE FOOTBALL MEASUREMENT LISTED IN THE ABOVE FORMULA, THE HEIGHT OF 3' 11 1/4" IS ESTABLISHED FOR DENNIS. THIS IS WITHIN LINE OF THE ESTIMATED HEIGHT OF THE FAMILY AND FRIENDS (PAGES A-248 THROUGH A-273); THE NIS STATEMENT (A-200) AND THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVALUATION OF THE COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY (PAGES A-041 THROUGH A-047).

5. THE NIS INVESTIGATION REPORT DATED 1981 STATES

Subject was a Caucasian 70" tall (THIS IS MADE AS A STATEMENT OF FACT).

IN ADDITION, THE REPORT STATES

....wherein height was estimated at 69.... (PAGE 84 OF 121; A-139).

6. THE REPORT OF DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY, DATED 29 JULY 1989, STATES

Mark must have been 6 feet tall or within a half inch of that height. (A-042)

DR. CHARNEY MADE THAT STATEMENT AFTER REVIEWING THE MANY PHOTOGRAPHS OF FAMILY MEMBERS WITH MARK. THE HEIGHT OF THE OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS IS NOT ONLY KNOWN. DR. CHARNEY HAS PERSONALLY MET MOST OF THEM PRIOR TO COMPLETING HIS REPORT.

7. CILHI CHOSE TO IGNORE ALL THE ABOVE AND DETERMINE THAT THE 67 1/4" HEIGHT COULD NOT BE A MISTAKE AND, FURTHER, THAT MARK DENNIS DID NOT GROW IN HEIGHT FROM AGE 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS TO 19 YEARS, 10 MONTHS.

SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

PAGE 40 OF 121; A-093

ANOTHER 'MISINFORMATION' QUOTED IS CONTAINED IN THE "SUMMARY OF INCIDENT" WHICH STATES

....but ultimately all remains were recovered (from the crash).... (PAGE 40 OF 121; A-093)

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REMOVE THIRTEEN (13) REMAINS FROM THE CRASH WHEN AT LEAST TWO (2) HAD JUMPED IN ENEMY TERRITORY PRIOR TO THE CRASH. THE GUNNER, GARY ALAN LUCAS, WAS INTERVIEWED BY NIS ON 2 OCTOBER 1981 AND STATED

I saw an individual run off the aft ramp of the helicopter and his clothing was smoking.... I saw a second man jump from the aircraft.... (PAGE 107 OF 121; A-156)

ALTHOUGH LUCAS THOUGHT THE AIRCRAFT WAS STILL AT 1200 FEET, HE WOULD HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY SEEING AS THE PILOT STATED THE AIRCRAFT WAS FULL OF SMOKE AND NO ONE COULD SEE TO LAND THE HELICOPTER. THE PILOT, MC CALLISTER, ALSO STATED HE "DROPPED LIKE A ROCK" WHEN FIRST HIT AND RUBBED THE TREETOPS. NIS ALSO INTERVIEWED MARVIN A. WEENICK, A WITNESS ON THE GROUND, AND

**CERTIFICATE OF DEATH, NAVMED N
#685 11, 30 OF 1211 A-112.119**

MANY QUESTIONS REMAIN ON THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. TIME OF DEATH ORIGINALLY WAS LISTED AS 17 JULY 1966 FOR THE REMAINS IN QUESTION; THE "HEIGHT" IS LISTED AS 5' 11" WHEN MARK WAS OVER 72"; THE "DATE BORNED" IS LISTED AS 25 JULY 1944 WHEN THE FAMILY HAD ALREADY BEEN NOTIFIED ON 22 JULY 1965 OF HIS "DEATH" ON 13 JULY 1964.

THE MOST UNCONVINCING STATEMENT IS THE "SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATING TO DEATH" WHICH STATES:

Identification was established by a thorough check with all units concerned in regards to the actual passengers aboard the aircraft. Complete identification was made on all of the other deceased with only DENNIS remaining and one cadaver. Identity was established in that manner.

IF THE ABOVE IDENTITY WAS MADE BY "PROCESS OF ELIMINATION", HOW COULD MARK DENNIS BE IDENTIFIED BEFORE OTHER IDENTIFICATIONS WERE COMPLETE? PASSENGER RONALD KENNETH CULLERS WAS NOT IDENTIFIED UNTIL 12 AUGUST 1966 (NAVMED N. CULLERS, PAGE A-010), WHICH WAS 18 DAYS AFTER THE DENNIS IDENTIFICATION. IN FACT, SIX(6) OF THE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE MADE AFTER THE FAMILY WAS NOTIFIED OF A "POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION" OF DEATH OF MARK DENNIS (NAVMED N. # ON DECEASED PASSENGERS, PAGES 2 THROUGH 27 OF 47 PAGES, NAVMED 14 DEC 66 LTR, PAGES A-001 THROUGH A-026).

F0RENSIC CONSULTANTS

THE MAJOR QUESTION WERE TO HOW CILHI ELIMINATED THE FACTS WHO MOST COMPLETE INFORMATION AVAILABLE. THE STATEMENT OF THE F0RENSIC ODONTOLOGY REPORT: CILHI 0055-88, THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TEETH AND WERE IN THE HANDS OF CILHI. THE FIRST AS TAKEN IN JANUARY 1964 JUST PRIOR TO THE EXTRACTION OF TEETH. THE SECOND WAS TAKEN ON 2/24/65 (PAGE 17 OF 101, NAVMED N. # 010).

WHEN FURTHER QUESTIONS AROSE DUE TO THE FACTS WHO STATEMENT OF THE POSTMORTEM X-RAY. THESE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED BY DR. ELLIS REELEY, BY PHONE ON MAY 10, 1968. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WAS: Are there any more impressions and postmortem teeth available for comparison (PAGE 9 OF 1211 A-062)?

THE 2/24/65 POSTMORTEM X-RAY WAS NOT PROVIDED TO THE F0RENSIC ODONTOLOGIST. BETTER YET, WHY WAS THE ENTIRE SMALL MOUTH TEETH PRESENT NOT SENT TO THE F0RENSIC SPECIALISTS?

THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE REPORT IS WELL STATED:

There are no areas of individuality present that would allow this fragment to be positively identified based upon X-ray comparison only. (PAGE 9 OF 1211 A-062)

AN ADDITIONAL LETTER OF CORRESPONDENCE WAS SUBMITTED TO MR. JOHN ROGERS FROM DR. EBERT DATED DECEMBER 16, 1968. THE LETTER STATES, IN PART:

I do think we would like to do some more work with the radiographs. If Bill Macle's can get some on the reconstructed teeth. The slightly different angles between the ante- and the original postmortem radiographs is quite noticeable. (UNDERLINE MINE) (SEE PAGE A-106)

THIS DOES NOT SOUND LIKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD IDENTIFICATION FROM AN EXPERT.

**F0RENSIC ODONTOLOGY REPORT: CILHI 0055-88
BRIGON C. SMITH, MAJ, DE USA
(PAGES 12 THROUGH 19 OF 1211A-062 THROUGH A-072)**

THE CONCLUSIONS, SUCH AS, MARKEDLY SIMILAR, NO IRRESOLVABLE DISCREPANCIES AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH DO NOT MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION.

THE INTERESTING STATEMENTS MADE BY SMITH AGREE WITH MY STATEMENTS MADE ABOVE WHEN HE SAYS:

[illegible]

AGAIN. WHY WASN'T THE LATEST AVAILABLE FILM PROVIDED TO
FOREIGN CONSULTANTS?

RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING

MADELINE J. HINES
(PAGES 20 THROUGH 23 OF 124; A-071 THROUGH A-074)

MS. WINKLES SHOWS THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE LEFT FEMUR MISSING ON HER CHARTING OF THE REMAINS. YET REFERS TO THE PORTION ON PAGE 21 AS THE "anterior left femur has been longitudinally sectioned, from the lesser trochanter through the distal tubercle". IN ADDITION, ALL OTHER REPORTS REFER TO THE LENGTH OF THE LEFT FEMUR, WHICH WAS IN TWO PIECES BEFORE CILMI CUT A SECTION OUT, BUT THE PIECES FIT TOGETHER TO FORM A COMPLETE BONE.. DR. CHARNEY MEASURED THE COMPLETE LENGTH AT 45.3 CM. AND DR. MAPLES STATES "I repeatedly obtained a measurement of 45.3 cm for the maximum length of this left femur (case 0055-28 case reviewed by Dr. Maples, page 2 of 3, paragraph 4, (4-17-77))".

MS HINKER THEN MEASURED THE LENGTH OF SEGMENT 1 OF THE RIGHT FEMUR. AS STATED ON PAGE 21 OF 121, WHY WAS A SMALL PORTION OF THE RIGHT FEMUR MEASURED WHEN A COMPLETE LEFT FEMUR WAS AVAILABLE? EVEN AFTER THE LEFT FEMUR WAS SECTIONED FOR DNA TESTS BY LIFE CODES. THE REMAINING SECTION WAS MUCH LARGER THAN THE RIGHT FEMUR SECTION USED. THE DIFFERENCE IN MEASURING THE SEGMENT 1 AND THE ENTIRE FEMUR IS THE PLUS OR MINUS FACTOR OF ERROR. MS HINKER USED SEGMENT 1 WHICH GIVES A PLUS OR MINUS FACTOR OF 1.3". IN OTHER WORDS, THE REMAINS CAN BE FROM 67.0" TO 70.3". THAT RANGE COVERS MOST OF OUR BECHTOLDMEN. THE PLUS OR MINUS FACTOR OF THE ENTIRE FEMUR MEASUREMENT IS 1.3". IN OTHER WORDS, DR. CHARNEY AND DR. MAPLES PUT THE REMAINS AT 65.3" TO 67.9". AGAIN, MARK BECHTOLD IS 70" TALL.

MS HINKER ESTIMATED THE AGE AT 24.7 YEARS PLUS OR MINUS 0.7 YEARS. THIS GIVES AN AGE BETWEEN 20.4 AND 25. MARK WAS 19.8 YEARS
212

NO OTHERS LISTED THE REMAINS OF BARRY FORD AND BRADLEY
STANLEY. FORD WAS TWIN.

USING THE EXTREMES OF MR. WINKER'S ESTIMATES, THE REMAINS ARE

REGARDS THE MOST TRUTHFUL STATEMENT MADE BY MS. WINNIE IS
"though nothing is definite."

STAFF REVIEW SUMMARY

PAGES 24 THROUGH 38 OF 121; D-277 THROUGH A-121

THE REPORT IS NOT POSITIVE WITH STATEMENTS SUCH AS "falsely...concluded"; "none consistent with"; AND "nothing...that would preclude"; AS DOCUMENTED EARLIER. THE BIOLOGICAL DETERMINATIONS WERE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF WHO DENNIS!

THE "STATEMENT OF IDENTIFICATION", BEGINNING ON PAGE 26 OF 101, IS FILLED WITH ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS. THE "BACKGROUND" STATES
..... of 15 casualties of a 15 July 1966 helicopter
evacuation....

AS DOCUMENTED EARLIER, PERSONS JUMPED PRIOR TO THE CRASH AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABOARD (SEE LUCAS, PAGE A-154).

AGAIN. THE BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION USED FOR DENNIS WAS
ERRONEOUS.

THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS SPORADIC. THERE WAS NO COMPANY MUSTER IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ACCIDENT. THE INCLUSION OF ".....witness statements. leaves no doubt that MARK V. DENNIS was aboard the helicopter when it crashed." IS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE EYE WITNESS REPORT OF LUCAS (A-136). IN FACT, THE REMAINS IN QUESTION DID NOT COME FROM THE HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED, WHICH IS DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE IN THIS RESPONSE.

DENTAL REPORT

DR. LOWELL J. LEVINE, D.O.S.
PAGES 29, 30 OF 121 A-082, A-083

DR. LEVINE'S REPORT APPEARS TO BE MORE OF A REVIEW OF OTHER PEOPLE'S REPORTS. EACH OF THE OTHER REPORTS IS ADDRESSED HEREIN. THEREFOR, I HAVE ADDRESSED THEIR REPORTS SEPARATELY.

ONE THING IS OF IMPORTANCE IN THIS REPORT. DR. LEVINE STATES
I HAVE CONSIDERED THE CIRCUMSTANCES....
THESE "CIRCUMSTANCES" ARE QUESTIONED THROUGHOUT THIS ENTIRE
RESPONSE.

FORENSIC REPORT

DR. WALTER H. BIRKBY
PAGES 31 THROUGH 34 OF 121: A-094 THROUGH A-097

AGREED. DR. CHAPNEY'S LENGTH OF THE LEFT FEMUR READ 44.3 CM.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. SUBJECT: MARK V. DENNIS, DECEASED. REPORT OF DR. RALSTON, ID SPECIALIST, CONCERNING THE PHYSICAL IDENTIFICATION OF MARK DENNIS WITH THE REMAINS. AS DID ALL CILHI EXPERTS.

1971 WPAFB/SMITHSONIAN REPORT

PAGES 85 THROUGH 88 OF 121; A-102 THROUGH A-141

VOESLER-TABBITAND

THE REPORT SAYS IT ALL:

We cannot say that this skull was not that of Mark V. Dennis. THEN FOLLOW BY STATING We can say this skull could be that of Mark V. Dennis....

DR. J. LAWRENCE ANGEL

IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY DR. ANGEL STATES A ...Humerus length over 32 cm suggests... WHEN ALL OTHER PARTIES AGREE THE HUMERUS IS NOT WHOLE AND PARTS ARE BURNED AWAY (PAGE 20 OF 121; A-073).

THE FEMUR LENGTH IS QUITE VARIABLE. DR. ANGEL STATES Approximate femur length of 46-47 cm.... HE DOES GIVE A STATURE BETWEEN 5'7" AND 5'8" WHICH IS TOO SHORT FOR A PERSON 6' TALL.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT STATEMENT BY DR. ANGEL, WHO WAS CONSIDERED BY MOST TO BE THE TOP EXPERT IN HIS FIELD, IS THE STATEMENT Through the dental X-rays taken in life and insufficient to reveal identity by comparison... (PAGE 68 OF 121; A-141)

ROBERT W. RALSTON, ID SPECIALIST

ON PAGE 84 OF 121. MR. RALSTON ESTIMATED THE HEIGHT OF MARK DENNIS AT 69" WITH A FEMUR LENGTH OF 41.8 cm. EVEN THOUGH HE STARTED WITH 67 1/4" IN HIS CALCULATIONS RATHER THAN THE 69 1/2" TO 70" MARK WAS AT AGE 17. THE HEIGHT ESTIMATE AND FEMUR LENGTH CALLED OUT JUST DO NOT MATCH THE REMAINS IN QUESTION. AT LEAST HE GAVE MARK AN ESTIMATED GROWTH FROM 17 TO 20 WHICH ALL CILHI EXPERTS IGNORED. ALTHOUGH HINKES STATES MARK WOULD HAVE GROWN. HAD RALSTON USED 70" IN HIS CALCULATIONS, WHICH MARK MEASURED IN HIS LAST YEAR OF HIGH SCHOOL. THE ESTIMATED HEIGHT FOR MARK WOULD BE 71 3/4". WITHIN 1/4" OF DR. CHARNEY'S ESTIMATE.

PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT STATEMENTS MADE BY RALSTON ARE HIS SUMMARY. HE HAS COMPARED ALL STATISTICAL DATA ON THE 13 PERSONS BECOMING RECOVERED. 13 WERE NOT ABOARD AT THE TIME OF THE CRASH AS DOCUMENTED EARLIER IN THIS RESPONSE. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT HE IMPLIES THIS WAS NECESSARY, WHICH ALSO IMPLIES HE WAS NOT POSITIVE OF THE IDENTIFICATION.

JOINT MESSAGE DTD 07 MAY 77

THIS MESSAGE IS IN REPLY TO A REQUEST FOR NEW INFORMATION ON THE CRASH. AS THE MESSAGE STATES. Results provide all info concerning loss of aircraft. THE ENTIRE CILHI REPORT IS BASED ON INFORMATION THAT A MUSTER WAS TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER WHILE OTHER AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN. IN SUCH INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN 1971 CIL FILE. WHERE DID IT MAGICALLY APPEAR FROM?

NIS INVEST OF 1981

PAGES 85 THROUGH 104 OF 121; A-148 THROUGH A-157

ALTHOUGH THE ENTIRE NIS INVESTIGATION IS CALLED OUT EARLIER IN THIS RESPONSE. IT IS OF IMPORTANCE TO NOTE THAT THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND STATEMENTS OF PERSONS SURVIVING THE CRASH WERE FURNISHED TO CILHI AND BECAME A PORTION OF THEIR REPORT. IT IS EVIDENT THE INFORMATION WAS TOTALLY IGNORED.

DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY REPORT, 16 FEB 88

PAGES 105 THROUGH 110 OF 121; A-161 THROUGH A-168

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE CALCULATIONS OF HEIGHT OF THE REMAINS ON THIS ORIGINAL REPORT. THE HEIGHT OF MARK DENNIS WAS DOCUMENTED AS 5'10" IN THE MIAMISBURG, OHIO HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL ROSTER SUBMITTED BY CHARNEY. THAT HEIGHT WAS ALSO TOTALLY IGNORED BY CILHI.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN CASE OF MARK V. DENNIS, DECEASED (UNDATED AND UNSIGNED)

PAGES 111 THROUGH 121 OF 121; A-164 THROUGH A-174

THIS APPEARS TO BE A PROPAGANDA RELEASE OF PRIOR U. S. NAVY CHIEF OF DECEDENT AFFAIRS. FRANK ESKRIDGE. IT ALSO APPEARS TO BE THE SOURCE OF MANY STATEMENTS DOCUMENTED ON THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE. ALTHOUGH NO EVIDENCE HAS EVER BEEN OBTAINED THROUGH THE 'FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT' TO SUPPORT THIS DOCUMENT. IN FACT, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION I HAVE OBTAINED DISPUTES STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DOCUMENT. THIS 'SUMMARY' WAS SUBMITTED TO AND USED BY CILHI. IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN SUBMITTED TO NIS AND APPARENTLY WAS USED AS SOURCE INFORMATION BY THEM IN 1981. IT IS NO WONDER THAT THIS CASE HAS BEEN SO 'BOTCHED' WHEN EACH REVIEW IS SUBMITTED THE SAME 'MISINFORMATION'!

THE 'SUMMARY' STATES ...but ultimately all remains were recovered. (PAGE 111 OF 121; A-164) THAT STATEMENT IS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE GUNNER, LUCUS, WHO STATED AT LEAST TWO PERSONS RYED IN ENEMY TERRITORY PRIOR TO THE CRASH. (PAGE 102 OF 121; A-155) THIS SUMMARY STATES ...helicopters provided... (PAGE 111 OF 121; A-164). THE 1981 NIS REPORT STATES ...an entire USMC helicopter airlift was being

SECNAV LETTER DTD MARCH 15, 1972

(A-251 THROUGH A-257)

FOR THE FIRST TIME, DISCREPANCIES ARE LISTED. SECNAV, A NAVY LAB INVESTIGATION DETERMINED SEVERAL FACTS WERE INVOLVED IN THE CRASH. SECNAV ADMITTED MARY'S MEDICAL RECORD IS EQUIVOCAL AS TO WHETHER HIS HEIGHT IN FEBRUARY 1964, WHEN HE WAS SOME 17 AND YEARS OF AGE, WAS 67 1/4 INCHES OR 68 1/4 INCHES. SECNAV ADMITTED THAT NO RECOGNIZABLE IDENTIFICATION TAG FOR MARK WAS FOUND IN DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH THE BODY RECOVERED FROM THE HELICOPTER WRECKAGE. SECNAV ACKNOWLEDGES NO EXPLANATION EXISTS FOR A SECTION OF ALUMINUM TUBING FOUND IN THE CABINET.

PAGE TWO STATES IT LANDED WITHIN 100 YARDS OF ITS INTENDED LANDING POINT. IT WAS WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF FRIENDLY FORCES. NIS INTERVIEWED NEENICK WHO STATED THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT THE PERIMETER AND PERSONS EXITING ONE DIRECTION WOULD HAVE COME TO FRIENDLY FORCES; PERSONS EXITING THE OTHER DIRECTION WOULD HAVE ENTERED ENEMY TERRITORY.

SECNAV STATES NO ONE ON BOARD THE HELICOPTER LEFT PRIOR TO THE TIME IT TOUCHED THE GROUND. (A-254) ON 10-02-61, NIS OBTAINED A STATEMENT FROM THE SURVIVOR, LUCUS, THAT PERSONS HAD LEFT IT PRIOR TO THE CRASH. (A-208 TO 210)

SECNAV LETTER DTD JULY 24, 1972

(A-255 THROUGH A-259)

THIS ENTIRE LETTER IS BASED ON INFORMATION SUPPOSEDLY RECEIVED FROM MAJOR ROBERT A. LARSEN. THE ONLY INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MAJOR LARSEN PRIOR TO THIS LETTER IS CALLED OUT ON PAGE 2-251. THE DISCREPANCIES ARE:

1. NO STATEMENT WAS MADE BY LARSEN THAT MARK WAS PRESENT AT MORNING MUSTER OF E COMPANY ON JULY 15, 1966. IN FACT, MAJOR LARSEN FURTHER ADVISED HE DID NOT RECALL KNOWING MARK PERSONALLY OR HIS WHEREABOUTS ON 15 JULY.

2. MAJOR LARSEN MADE NONE OF THE OTHER STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

3. WHEN I SPOKE TO MAJOR LARSEN, RETIRED, AT HIS HOME IN CALIFORNIA IN 1990, HE STATED HE COULD NOT FIND OUT WHO OR HOW MANY WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH FOR THREE DAYS AFTER THE CRASH. HE FURTHER STATED NO MUSTER WAS TAKEN ON THE FIELD WHEN THEY RETURNED TO DONG HA. RATHER, THE GROUP WAS SENT IMMEDIATELY INTO COMBAT AT MOTHER'S RIDGE.

SECNAV DOES STATE THEREFORE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT MARK WAS 69 INCHES UPON ENLISTMENT, AS SEEMS LIKELY.....

SECNAV LETTER DTD JULY 24, 1972

IN THE SECNAV LETTER OF MARCH 15, 1972 (A-252 - A-254), IT STATES IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT NO RECOGNIZABLE IDENTIFICATION TAG FOR MARK WAS FOUND. THE SECNAV LETTER OF JULY 24 (A-255 - A-259), 1972 ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE LAP ANALYSIS ON THE TAGS AND EXPLAINS THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN FOUND IN THE CRASH. THE NAMED IN FORMS ON THE VICTIMS SHOWS SOME IDs WERE MADE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF DOG TAGS FOUND. (A-001 THROUGH A-025)

THE LETTER GIVES AN FBI OPINION ON NORMAL LEAD LEVELS IN BONE (A257) WHEN THE LAP ANALYSIS DONE BY PAPUCCI LABS WAS BASED ON RESIDUAL TREATED SURFACE (A-262). IN OTHER WORDS, THE LAB TESTS WERE BASED ON THE SMOKE RESIDUE ON THE SURFACE AND THE FBI STATEMENT IS BASED ON MARROW OF THE BONE.

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES

(A-259 THROUGH A-267)

THE RESULTS OF THE LABORATORY TESTS ARE SHOCKING ! THE RESULTS SHOW:

1. THE BODY WAS LOADED WITH GRENADE SCHRAPPNEL THROUGHOUT WITH METALIC PARTICLES APPROXIMATELY 2 TO 3 INCHES APART. SUCH PARTICLES WERE IN THE UPPER LEGS, TORSO, ARMS, NECK AND SKULL. (A-259)

2. A PARTIALLY CORRODED ALUMINUM TUBING APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET (2') LONG WAS FOUND IN THE CHEST AND ABDOMINAL CAVITY LYING VERTICALLY TO THE BODY TRUNK. SUCH A FOREIGN OBJECT HAD NO BUSINESS IN THE CABINET. THE ALUMINUM WAS NOT A PART OF THE HELICOPTER, ALTHOUGH IT APPARENTLY WAS PLACED THERE TO REPRESENT THE AIRCRAFT. (A-260 & A-267)

3. THE ID TAG WAS NEVER IN A HELICOPTER FIRE. IT WAS NEVER SUBJECTED TO OVER 200 DEG F. THE RESIDUE ON THE SURFACE INDICATES IT WAS BURNED WITH SIMPLE PAPER. (A-261)

4. THE SKULL AND OTHER BONE SURFACES SHOW THE REMAINS WERE BURNED WITH REGULAR GASOLINE AS THE TETRO ETHYL LEAD CONTENT INDICATES. THE CHINOOK, CH-46 USES JP-4 OR JP-5, NON-LEADED KEROSENE. (A-262, 263 & A-265)

AFFIDAVIT (A-269 THROUGH A-277)

THE AFFIDAVITS FROM MARK'S RELATIVES AND SERVICE BUDDIES INCLUDE THOSE PERSONS NEAREST TO HIM WHO NOT ONLY MAKE STATEMENTS ON MARK'S HEIGHT, BUT SUPPORT THOSE STATEMENTS WITH PHOTOGRAPHS. THE MAJORITY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE THOSE USED BY DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY IN HIS REPORTS ON PAGES A-027 THROUGH A-047.

ALSO INCLUDED ARE THE RECORDS FROM MARK'S FAMILY DOCTOR GIVING HIS HEIGHT IN 1963 AS 5' 9 1/2". (A-277) THIS HEIGHT CORRESPONDS TO A MEASUREMENT APPROXIMATELY TWO TO THREE MONTHS LATER, WHICH SHOWED HIS HEIGHT AT 5' 10" IN HIS HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL ROSTER. (A-C20)

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH REVISED 8 (REV. 4-16) FORM

See BARRED 10 for instructions to A-00

3581-66

A CO 3RD ICD BY 3RD IAR DIV (JCS) 2ND

1. NAME
MURPHY, Mark, JR. V10

2. SEX
☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

3. AGE
2 yrs. 1 mo. 10

4. STATUS
☒ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ OTHER (Specify)

5. PLACE OF BIRTH
701145 OH

6. DATE OF BIRTH
21 September 1946

7. PLACE OF BIRTH CITY AND STATE OF BIRTH
Piquette, Ohio

8. DATE OF DEATH
19 Nov. 1948

9. PLACE OF DEATH CITY AND STATE OF DEATH
Piquette, Ohio

10. CAUSE OF DEATH
SIDS

11. MANNER OF DEATH
Natural

12. SIGNATURE OF DECEASED
None

13. SIGNATURE OF WITNESSES
None

14. SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN
None

15. SIGNATURE OF CLERK
None

16. SIGNATURE OF REGISTRAR
None

17. SIGNATURE OF JUDGE
None

18. SIGNATURE OF NOTARY
None

19. SIGNATURE OF CLERK
None

20. SIGNATURE OF REGISTRAR
None

21. SIGNATURE OF JUDGE
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97. SIGNATURE OF JUDGE
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98. SIGNATURE OF NOTARY
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99. SIGNATURE OF CLERK
None

100. SIGNATURE OF REGISTRAR
None

6 of 67
TUBES 12

1136

Rec'd 10-55

A-306

REPORT OF DEATH (REV. 6-56) (PAGE 1)

STUDGARD Gerald Edward

10. NUMBER OF PAGES RELATIVE TO DEATH

Decedent was a passenger in a aircraft, which crashed and burned, while on a combat mission

Identified by dental chart at this activity

Last Rites were given by the Regimental Chaplain

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

9 August 1966

* Pursuant to U. S. Marine Corps records, decedent's rate should be: **ETC**Branch of Service - **USMC**, Status, **RESERVE ACTIVE*** Pursuant to DTG Message #180328Z, dated July 1966 received from C. C., Third MarDiv., the Date of Death should be: **15 JULY 1966**

J. J. ARISMAN

Lieutenant Commander, MSC, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
By direction of the Surgeon General

11. INFORMATION OF BUREAU

TRANS TO C CO 3RD MND BY 3RD MAR DIV FLD HOSP DURING
EFT TO COMUS

DATE SIGNED July 23 1966

James H. Lugo

S. LUGO LCDR MC USNR

APPROVED: CHIEF OF BUREAU OR AUTHORITY TO SIGN

DATE SIGNED 24/Jul/66

F. C. L. Lugo

7.6.17

1137

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
REVISED 6 (REV. 6-56) (PAGE 1)

NAME OF DECEASED

NAME OF DECEASED

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Bureau HEAD (V) 9148 Marion Ave., Philadelphia, Pa.

11. ADMITTED TO DEATH LIST (If no return date, last date status before return admission to death list)

1. DO YOU KNOW THE DEATH LIST (DATE) FOR

12. PLACE OF DEATH

Dong Ha Republic of Viet Nam

July 17 1966 0900 hours

13. CAUSE OF DEATH

14. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the cause of death)

15. SIGNATURE OF DECEASED

16. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

17. SIGNATURE OF DECEASED

18. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

19. SIGNATURE OF DECEASED

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38. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

8-67

1138

A-008

while a passenger in a aircraft, that was engaged in a combat operation against the enemy (fired, the aircraft crashed, blew up and the deceased was thrown out by the explosion and was fatally burned.

Identification was made by ID Card and ID Tags.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 August 1966

- Pursuant to DTG Message #180643Z dated July 1966 received from CG, Third Marine Division, the Date of Death should be:

July 16, 1966

D. J. BRIDEAU
LCDR, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
By direction of the Surgeon General

1139

NAME: DEPT. OF THE NAVY		BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY	
NUMBER OF COPIES AND SUBSIDIARY		A-008	
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.			
CULLERS, Ronald Kenneth			
1. STATUS		2. GRADE OR RANK	
☐ REGULAR ☒ RESERVE ☐ RETIRED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ NA ☐ OTHER		☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD ☐ 4TH ☐ 5TH ☐ 6TH ☐ 7TH ☐ 8TH ☐ 9TH ☐ 10TH ☐ 11TH ☐ 12TH	
3. DATE OF SERVICE		4. DATE OF BIRTH (City and State of Birth)	
02198 2ND LT		USMC Shalbine, Missouri	
5. DATE OF DEATH (Month, day and year)		6. AGE (Years, months) (Days, if under 1 year)	
25 July 1962		23 yrs. 11 mos.	
7. COLOR OF EYES		8. COLOR OF HAIR	
HAZEL		BROWN	
9. COMPLEXION		10. HEIGHT	
		72"	
11. WEIGHT		12. BUILD	
175		PROT	
13. MARKS AND SCARS (Print in English and Chinese)		14. FINGERPRINTS - STATE WHICH HAND (Right, Left, Both)	
BHK 4" D Mid Abdomen S 4" Cornea Lt. eye S 1" Base Lt Thumb S 4" D Base Lt Thumb VSULA		NOT OBTAINABLE	
15. NAME OF AND ADDRESS (Institution, name and address)			
WIFE: Barbara C. CULLERS, 2501 W. Street, Apt. 403, Lincoln, Nebraska			
16. ADMITTED TO SERVICE (Date)		17. DATE ADMITTED TO SERVICE (Month, day, year)	
2 CO 3RD ENG BN, 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FMF		15 July 1966	
18. PLACE OF BIRTH		19. TIME OF BIRTH (Month, day, year, hour)	
Dong Ha Republic of South Viet Nam		15 July 1966 1800	
20. CAUSE OF DEATH		21. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS (Conditions contributing to death but not related to the cause of death)	
1. DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY LEADING TO DEATH (This does not mean the mode of dying, i.e., heart failure, asphyxiation, etc., it means the disease, injury or complication which caused death.) BURNS ENTIRE BODY DUE TO (a) DUE TO (b)		APPROXIMATE INTERVAL BETWEEN DEATH AND REPORT 10-167	
22. SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER		23. SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER	
NAME: Paul B. Connor DATE SIGNED: 14 July 1966 SIGNATURE: P. B. CONNOR (Medical Officer)		NAME: P. B. CONNOR DATE SIGNED: 14 July 1966 SIGNATURE: P. B. CONNOR (Commanding Officer)	

A-010

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OF THE FBI

Identified by ID Tags.

Cullers F. A.

15. disposition of remains

DATE SIGNED 12 August 1966 SIGNATURE JOHN W. FLYNN (Official Signature) GRADE CDR (Rank) UNIT USCIB

APPROVED: CHIEF OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION _____

DATE SIGNED _____ SIGNATURE _____ (Commanding Officer) _____ (Rank) _____

11 Feb 67

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A-011

▲ CO 3:00 PM 3:00 PM 3:00 PM (3:00) PM

CLADE, Michael Anthony

1. NAME (Last, first, middle) 2127958	2. SEX M	3. RACE W	4. DATE OF BIRTH (mm/dd/yyyy) 7/20/1926	5. HEIGHT (inches) 73	6. WEIGHT (pounds) 178
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (city, state) Long Beach, California	8. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 4-123456789	9. MARITAL STATUS Married	10. EDUCATION High School	11. OCCUPATION Police Officer	12. RELIGION Cath

Burned remains

NOT AVAILABLE

11. NEXT OF KIN OR PRIOR RELATION, NAME AND ADDRESS:

FATHER, Elwood O. GOODIN 10326 Rosecrans Ave., Apt 5, Bellflower, California

1. NAME OF DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY E CO 2ND BN 1ST MARINES, 1ST MAR DIV (REIN) PNF 2. PLACE OF BIRTH: Dong Ha, Republic of South Viet Nam		3. DATE ADMITTED TO U.S.A. CIVIL STATUS, NAT. (MM/DD/YYYY) 17 July 1966
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CAUSE OF DEATH	51. DISEASE OR CONDITION DIRECTLY CAUSING DEATH (THIS FIELD MUST BE COMPLETED BY THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL.)												52. IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF DEATH BURIED DEATH REMARKS												APPROXIMATE INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH											
	ANTECEDENT CAUSES (MORBID CONDITIONS, IF ANY GIVING RISE TO ABOVE CAUSE (51), STATING THE UNDERLYING CAUSE LAST)												NONE												NONE											
	53. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS (CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH BUT NOT RELATED TO THE DISEASE OR CONDITION CAUSING DEATH.)																																			

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE	54. TIME												55. DATE												56. GRADE											
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57. **REPORTING OFFICER'S NAME**
 58. **REPORTING OFFICER'S GRADE**
 59. **REPORTING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE**
 60. **REPORTING OFFICER'S TITLE**
 61. **REPORTING OFFICER'S ORGANIZATION**
 62. **REPORTING OFFICER'S ADDRESS**
 63. **REPORTING OFFICER'S PHONE**
 64. **REPORTING OFFICER'S FAX**
 65. **REPORTING OFFICER'S E-MAIL**
 66. **REPORTING OFFICER'S WEBSITE**
 67. **REPORTING OFFICER'S OTHER INFORMATION**

12 Feb 67

1142

A-012

A-012

DECEASED (REV. 4-54) (MAG)

1. NAME

GOODIN, Michael Anthony

2. SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATIVE TO DEATH

Deceased was a passenger aboard an airplane which crashed and burned while on a combat mission.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

22 September 1966

3. CO 3RD MED BN 3RD MAR DIV (REIB) FPO

Pursuant to USN message 1806412 of July 1966 rec'd from CG 3rd Mar Div date of death should be 12 July 1966 and cause of death should be: **THIRD DEGREE BURNS-ENTIRE BODY**.

D. A. Brink
D. A. BRINK, LCDR, MSC, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
By direction of the Surgeon General

4. DISPOSITION OF REMAINS

TRANS TO C CO 3RD MED BN 3RD MAR DIV FPO HOSP DALLAS
FPO TO CORUS

DATE ISSUED: 23 July 1966
SIGNATURE: *James D. Carls* LTJG, USN
TITLE: MEDICAL RECORDS MANAGER

5. APPROVED FOR IN LIEU OF SIGNATURE

6. DATE OF DEATH

1143

DECEASED (REV. 4-54) (MAG)

3-11-66, 197, for instructions regarding
number of medical and dental visits
number of visits

A CO 3RD MED BN 3RD MAR DIV (REIB) FPO

1. NAME

GRANAJ, Andrew Peter

2. SEX

3. RACE

4. DATE OF BIRTH

5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State of Country)

6. GRADE OR RATE

7. SERVICE NUMBER

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. PLACE OF DEATH

11. GRADE OR RATE

12. DATE OF DEATH

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GRAMAY Andrew Peter

Summary of Death Relative to Mission

While on a combat operation against the enemy, the deceased was a Passenger in a aircraft that crashed and caused his death.

Identified by dental chart at this activity

Last Rites were given by the Regimental Chaplain

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20340

1 August 1966

* PURSUANT TO DTG MESSAGE 180538Z AFMAY 1966 received from CG THIRD MARDIV,

Date of Death should be:

15 JULY 1966

CG 3RD MARDIV 400 KYNLICK 400 700 1111 (RETN) 200

YALON (CHINA)
1000000

BY: 100 700 1111 1111 1111

D. J. BRIDMAN, LCDR, MSC, USN

Head, Medical Records Management Branch

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

By direction of the Surgeon General

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

SERIES 8 (REV. 4-55) FRONT

See REVERSE: DEPT. for instructions and
number of copies and submission

Form (Copy or Serial)

A CG 3RD MARDIV 400 KYNLICK 400 700 1111 (RETN) 200

1. NAME: SCHLOMER Gary Wayne

2. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

3. RACE: ☒ WHITE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 mos

5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country): St. Louis, Mo.

6. DATE OF DEATH: 6 February 1947

7. TIME OF DEATH (Hour, day and year): 19 yrs 6 mos

8. CAUSE OF DEATH: Brown

9. COLOR OF EYES: Brown

10. HEIGHT: 70"

11. WEIGHT: 142 lbs

12. SIGNATURE: Not Obtainable

Edward Francis SCHLOMER Jr. (F) 1137 Phalen Drive, Ballfontaine Heights, Mo.

13. ADMITTED TO SERVICE (If in active duty last day stated before present condition of death): 14. DATE ADMITTED TO SERVICE (If in active duty last day stated before present condition of death):

15. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 16. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

17. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 18. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

19. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 20. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

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57. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 58. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

59. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 60. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

Form (Copy or Serial)

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2. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

3. RACE: ☒ WHITE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 mos

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6. DATE OF DEATH: 6 February 1947

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59. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State or Country): 60. DATE OF DEATH: 17 July 1966

A-016

During a combat operation against the enemy, the deceased was a passenger in a aircraft that crashed and burned.

Identification was made by dental chart at this activity.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25700, D.C.
3 August 1966

3 August 1966
11 0000Z
* Pursuant to U. S. Marine Corps records, decedent's Rate should be... PFC

3. Pursuant to DIC Message #1823412 dated July 1966 received from C. G., Third
 Party, the date of Death should be 15 JUL 1966.

(S) 1128 0-10-67

[Signature]
BRIDEAU
Lieutenant Commander, MSC, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
By direction of the Surgeon General

21 DISPOSITION OF REMAINS
TRANS TO C CO 3RD MED BN 3RD MAR DIV FLD HOSP DAKAHO
FFT TO: CONUS

DATE SIGNED July 10 1966 SIGNATURE R. GELIE LT MC USNR (Medical Officer) (Rank)

APPROVED: COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 1964

BY: C. E. Blythe, Jr. BY: D. R. 1964

on: **A-0**

REPRODUCTION OF U.S. AIR FORCE FORM NO. 104 (Rev. 4-54) FRONT

1. NAME
A. A. 3RD MKD BN 3RD MAR DIV (RKN) PVT

2. SEX ☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE

3. RACE ☐ CHUCK ☐ NEGRO ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

4. STATUS ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ SEPARATED

5. GRADE ☐ 1ST LT ☐ 2ND LT ☐ 3RD LT ☐ 4TH LT ☐ 5TH LT ☐ 6TH LT ☐ 7TH LT ☐ 8TH LT ☐ 9TH LT ☐ 10TH LT ☐ 11TH LT ☐ 12TH LT ☐ 13TH LT ☐ 14TH LT ☐ 15TH LT ☐ 16TH LT ☐ 17TH LT ☐ 18TH LT ☐ 19TH LT ☐ 20TH LT ☐ 21TH LT ☐ 22TH LT ☐ 23TH LT ☐ 24TH LT ☐ 25TH LT ☐ 26TH LT ☐ 27TH LT ☐ 28TH LT ☐ 29TH LT ☐ 30TH LT ☐ 31TH LT ☐ 32TH LT ☐ 33TH LT ☐ 34TH LT ☐ 35TH LT ☐ 36TH LT ☐ 37TH LT ☐ 38TH LT ☐ 39TH LT ☐ 40TH LT ☐ 41TH LT ☐ 42TH LT ☐ 43TH LT ☐ 44TH LT ☐ 45TH LT ☐ 46TH LT ☐ 47TH LT ☐ 48TH LT ☐ 49TH LT ☐ 50TH LT ☐ 51TH LT ☐ 52TH LT ☐ 53TH LT ☐ 54TH LT ☐ 55TH LT ☐ 56TH LT ☐ 57TH LT ☐ 58TH LT ☐ 59TH LT ☐ 60TH LT ☐ 61TH LT ☐ 62TH LT ☐ 63TH LT ☐ 64TH LT ☐ 65TH LT ☐ 66TH LT ☐ 67TH LT ☐ 68TH LT ☐ 69TH LT ☐ 70TH LT ☐ 71TH LT ☐ 72TH LT ☐ 73TH LT ☐ 74TH LT ☐ 75TH LT ☐ 76TH LT ☐ 77TH LT ☐ 78TH LT ☐ 79TH LT ☐ 80TH LT ☐ 81TH LT ☐ 82TH LT ☐ 83TH LT ☐ 84TH LT ☐ 85TH LT ☐ 86TH LT ☐ 87TH LT ☐ 88TH LT ☐ 89TH LT ☐ 90TH LT ☐ 91TH LT ☐ 92TH LT ☐ 93TH LT ☐ 94TH LT ☐ 95TH LT ☐ 96TH LT ☐ 97TH LT ☐ 98TH LT ☐ 99TH LT ☐ 100TH LT

6. SERVICE NO. **167072**

7. PLACE OF BIRTH AND STATE OR COUNTRY **Johnstown, New York**

8. DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY AND YEAR) **24 FEB 1942**

9. AGE (YEARS, MONTHS AND DAYS, IF UNDER 2 YEARS) **12 YRS**

10. RELIGION **Prot.**

11. COLOR OF HAIR **Brown**

12. COMPLEXION **74"**

13. HEIGHT **180**

14. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN **USA**

15. PLACE OF ORIGIN (CITY, STATE AND COUNTRY) **Johnstown, New York, USA**

16. DATE OF ORIGIN (MONTH, DAY AND YEAR) **24 FEB 1942**

17. AGE (YEARS, MONTHS AND DAYS, IF UNDER 2 YEARS) **12 YRS**

18. RELIGION **Prot.**

19. COLOR OF HAIR **Brown**

20. COMPLEXION **74"**

21. HEIGHT **180**

22. NAMES AND GRADES LISTED IN PREVIOUS RECORDS

23. FINGERPRINTS - STATE WHICH HANDS WERE TAKEN (LEFT, RIGHT, BOTH)

Not obtainable

22. NEXT OF KIN OR PERSON RELATING, NAME AND ADDRESS: DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
 Wife: Mrs. Barbara A. Telfer, 5 Franklin St., Fulconville, New York 12072

23. ADMITTED TO BIRTH LIST FROM (IF ON ACTIVE DUTY, LAST DUTY STATION BEFORE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT TO BIRTH LIST)	24. DATE ADMITTED TO BIRTH LIST (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
25. PLACE OF BIRTH	26. TIME OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)
John W. Smith of South York Pa	July 17, 1945

Dong Ha Republic of South Viet Nam	July 11, 1966
------------------------------------	---------------

1	1. DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DECEASED WAS NOT AWARE OF THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 2. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.	3. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 4. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.	5. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 6. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.
	7. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 8. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.	9. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 10. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.	11. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH. 12. ANY OTHER FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES, OR EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE USED TO INFER THE CAUSE OF DEATH.

[illegible]

18.467

1148

TELFER, Robert Ray

The deceased was a crewmember on an aircraft involved in a combat operation with the enemy. The aircraft was shot down and burned as a result of enemy gunfire.

Identification was made by Dental Check

Last Rites were given by the Regimental Chaplain

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25 August 1966

*Pursuant to DTG Message 160620Z dated July 1966, received from MARATHON - ONE SIX,
date of death should be 15 July 1966

Handwritten: Major, R.R.
Lieutenant Commander, MSO, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
By direction of the Surgeon General

21. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
22. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
23. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

24. DATE SIGNED: 25 AUG 1966
25. SIGNATURE: [Signature]
26. MEDICAL OFFICER: [Signature]

27. APPROVED: [Signature]
28. DATE: 25 AUG 1966
29. SIGNATURE: [Signature]
30. MEDICAL OFFICER: [Signature]

19467

1149

DECLASED

NAME: (REV. 4-10) FRONT

A CO 3RD MAR DIV 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

CHECKRICK, James Weston

1. STATUS: ☒ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE ☐ RETIRED ☐ DEPARTMENT ☐ NAVY ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)
2. DATE OF SERVICE: 280706
3. GRADE: 10
4. BRANCH: USMC
5. PLACE OF BIRTH: Staten Island, N.Y.
6. DATE OF BIRTH: 1946
7. AGE: 19 yrs 7 mos
8. HEIGHT: 71"
9. WEIGHT: 150 lbs

10. NEXT OF KIN OR PERSON (LOCATION, NAME AND ADDRESS):
Father: Bernard CHECKRICK 369 Van Ruler St., Staten Island, N.Y.

11. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
12. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
13. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

14. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
15. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
16. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

17. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
18. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
19. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

20. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
21. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
22. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

23. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
24. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
25. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

26. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
27. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
28. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

29. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
30. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
31. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

32. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
33. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
34. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

35. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
36. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
37. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

38. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
39. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
40. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

41. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
42. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
43. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

44. DATE OF DEATH: 15 JUL 1966
45. TIME OF DEATH: 0600
46. PLACE OF DEATH: 3RD MAR DIV (REIN) FFW

30467

1152

A-022

During a combat operation, the decedent was a passenger in a aircraft that crashed and burned.

Identification was made by dental chart at this activity.

Last Rites were given by the Regimental Chaplain.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 August 1966

- Pursuant to U. S. Marine Corps records, decedent's last name should be: **STURSON, Michael Alfred**, Rate should be: **FTT**, Branch of Service - **USMC**, Status - **RESERVE ACTIVE**.

- Pursuant to DTG Message #1806422 dated July 1966, received from C. G. 3rd MARDIV, the date of death should be: **15 JULY 1966**.

D. J. BRIDEAU
Lieutenant Commander, MSC, USN
Head, Medical Records Management Branch
By direction of the Surgeon General

Commissioner, Michael

11. DISPOSITION OF REMAINS: **REMAINS TO C CO 3RD MEB BN 3RD MAR DIV-2ND HOSP BANGALAY FTT TO COMUS**

12. DATE SIGNED: **July 16 1966** SIGNATURE: **P. B. COMER** (Medical Officer) (Print)

13. APPROVED: COURT OF INQUIRY OR BOARD OF INVESTIGATION: **20 July 66** SIGNATURE: **E. J. CHALKER** (Commanding Officer) (Print)

23467

1153

Rec'd 12-22-99

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH DA Form 2 (REV. 6-54) FORM 1

See BARRED DEPT. for instructions
Number of copies and Subseries

A-023

1. NAME (Last, first, middle initial)
STURSON, Michael Alfred

2. SEX: ☒ Male ☐ Female

3. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
190705

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State of Country)
DOUGLAS, MISSOURI

5. DATE OF DEATH (Month, day, year)
15 JUL 1966

6. TIME OF DEATH (Hour, minute, second)
1900

7. PLACE OF DEATH (City and State of Country)
3RD MAR DIV

8. CAUSE OF DEATH (State with detail)
Not obtainable

11. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

12. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

13. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

14. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

15. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

16. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

17. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

18. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

19. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

20. NAME OF VESSEL OR FLEET (Including name and number)
3RD MAR DIV

24667

26 of 67
CHAPTER

27467

—635 peterson, fort collins, colorado 80524 ph (303) 491-1486 (days) or 493-4107 (evenings)

The Dental Scene

There is no mandible and the alveolar ridge of the maxilla is mostly missing.

From what is left of the maxillary alveolar ridge it would appear that teeth numbers 2, 3 and 4 were missing antemortem.

It is also possible that #1 was either missing or had moved over into the space of #2 when it was removed.

The area at #14 is open and spongy, but it would appear that the tooth had been removed antemortem.

Tooth number 15 that shows two occlusal restorations is not well-matched with a dental radiograph of that tooth in a 1964 antemortem of Mark Dennis. This radiograph shows decay in the distal pit and possibly in the central pit, but it is not positive. The central occlusal restoration is not a "pit" but far more extensive. Would recording?

The 1964 antemortem radiograph of Mark shows #14 with a large decay and the radiograph of 1965 shows this tooth had been removed.

The angling of the antemortem radiographs make the root morphology not good for matching.


In all, what is left of the dentition of this case and its matching with the antemortem picture does not help to either include or exclude a positive identification.

Summation

Mark Dennis at 16 years is listed as being 5feet10 inches and 154 pounds from the high school records. Photographs of Mark alongside his sister Eileen in flats standing at 5feet10 inches, show Mark to be taller. It is almost certain that some growth would have taken place from this to his age at almost 25 years when he is presumed to have died. It is not easy to determine if Mark was bow-legged from the two photographs I have as he is standing with feet spread apart, but he does not appear to be bow-legged. One in his Marine uniform shows the trousers hanging straight. The family says he was not bow-legged. The person represented by these remains is most decidedly bow-legged and too far off the height and weight of Mark.

All measurements and observations are on file and available upon request.

faithfully,



michael charney

OUR ADVERTISERS APPRECIATE YOUR PATRONAGE

1963 Miamisburg High School Football Roster

No.	Name	Position	Weight	Height	Age	Grade
8	Fred Calberly	FB	151	5-9	15	10
9	Larry Maloney	G	152	5-9	15	10
10	Tim Wagner	QB	159	5-9	11	10
12	Tom Winesett	HB	150	5-7	17	12
14	Dick Weidner	QB	111	5-1	11	10
15	Danny Stansbury	HB	118	5-1	11	10
16	Mike Palmer	HB	120	5-4	17	12
17	Ronnie Glass	C	145	5-9	16	10
18	Steve Schultz	QB	125	5-6	15	10
20	Randy Botts	HB	114	5-8	16	11
22	Don Aregood	C	176	5-10	17	12
24	Mick Sorrell	HB	153	5-9	17	12
25	Tom Schneider	E	111	6-1	15	10
26	Dave Parkhurst	FB	140	5-9	16	11
27	Dan Davis	G	132	5-8	15	10
28	Ron Freeman	G	150	5-9	16	11
29	Ed McAttee	E	150	5-11	15	10
30	John Turner	G	165	5-8	17	12
32	Dennis Thompson	HB	156	5-7	16	10
34	Ed Nurney	HB	145	5-7	16	11
36	Dutch Schenburger	G	149	5-10	16	11
37	Ray Lynch	G	118	5-7	15	10
38	Bob Brooks	FB	125	5-6	14	10
40	Mike Schneider	QB	141	5-10	17	12
41	Chuck Oberer	G	128	5-5	15	10
42	Rick Kirtwell	HB	137	5-8	14	10
44	Steve Wagner	FB	142	5-7	16	12
46	Art Buchanan	T	152	5-11	16	11
47	Don Webb	G	145	5-8	15	10
48	Virgil Zink	G	133	5-5	14	10
50	Joe Fite	T	156	5-11	17	12
52	Doug Franklin	T	166	5-7	15	9
54	Joe Davis	G	138	5-7	15	10
56	Jim Bailey	G	123	5-6	14	10
58	Tim Davis	G	159	5-9	16	12
60	Paul Smith	T	188	5-11	17	11
62	Gary McClellan	T	161	5-10	16	11
64	Ron Napier	T	191	5-10	17	12
*66	Mark Dennis	T	156	5-10	16	12
70	Gary Smith	E	146	5-11	16	11
72	John Anderson	E	143	5-8	15	10
74	Tom Nicholas	E	200	6-4	17	12
76	Ed Stafford	E	189	6-2	16	12
78	Steve Gohlart	E	148	5-10	16	11
80	Gary Robinson	E	155	5-11	16	11

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

A-030

CORRECTION TO DR. CHARNEY REPORT OF 14 FEB 88
(SEE PAGES A-031 TO A-033)

THE FOLLOWING TWO MISTAKES WERE MADE IN CALCULATIONS BY DR. CHARNEY. FIRST, 2.30 WAS ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED INTO THE HEIGHT FORMULA WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 2.38. DR. CHARNEY EXPLAINS THIS ERROR ON PAGES A-032 & A-033.


SECONDLY, A MEASUREMENT OF 45.3 cm WAS TYPED AS 44.3 cm WHEN THE REPORT WAS TRANSCRIBED FROM DR. CHARNEY'S NOTES. PAGE A-031 SHOWS THE ACTUAL MEASUREMENT OF 45.3 cm TAKEN BY DR. CHARNEY AT THE TIME OF HIS ACTUAL RESEARCH IN HIS LAB.

WITH BOTH ERRORS CORRECTED, THE HEIGHT FORMULA IS:

$2.38 \times 45.3 + 61.41 = \text{HEIGHT IN cm} \pm 3.27 \text{ cm}$
 $\times 0.3937 = \text{HEIGHT IN INCHES} \pm 1.3 \text{ in.}$
 $= 66.6 \pm 1.3 \text{ INCHES}$
 OR 65.3" MINIMUM TO 67.9" MAXIMUM

A-031

TAKEN IN DR. CHARNEY'S LAB, CSU 29 AUG 1981



CSU

Rev. 3-16-90

A-03

forensic science laboratory

Michael Charney, Ph.D., Director
303/491-8425/1486
OAI/CO - 0350300

Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
80523

8 March 1990

Mr Jerry Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, Florida 34644

Dear Mr Dennis:


Some explanation of my error in calculating the stature from the left femur of the remains identified by CILHI as that of Mark Dennis is in order.

The accompanying sheet is from my 54-page laboratory manual I give to my students in my Fall semester class in forensic anthropology. This table is taken from that of Trotter and Gleser, 1958 as appears in all publications dealing with stature reconstruction. You will note that the second line under Male Caucasoids, the regression formula for the femur, reads, "2.30 (femur) + 61.41 ± 3.27 (cm)". Here is the error. In the preparation of this page I made the error in the transcription and unfortunately my students who have this will be plagued. It should read 2.38.

I have made the necessary correction and it is ironic that the day I did the measurement of the bone in question and calculated the resulting stature, you taped me and on the video tape I can clearly be heard saying 2.38 and not 2.30. You have my apologies.

As for any significance of this error in the identification of the skeletal remains, it has none. The stature of the person of these remains is some 5.5 inches below that of Mark Dennis and given the complete length of the left femur with a plus-or-minus figure of 1.3 inches, it cannot be stretched to fit Mark. It passes all understanding of proper procedure why this femur was ignored by CILHI in its recent study.

faithfully,



michael charney, ph d, d-abfa

Rev. 3-16-90

A-033

Stature EstimationMale Caucasoids

1.30 (femur + tibia)	+ 63.29 ± 2.99 cm
2.30 (femur)	+ 61.41 ± 3.27
2.68 (fibula)	+ 71.78 ± 3.29
2.52 (tibia)	+ 78.62 ± 3.37
3.08 (humerus)	+ 70.45 ± 4.05
3.78 (radius)	+ 79.01 ± 4.32
3.70 (ulna)	+ 74.05 ± 4.32

Female C-caucasoids

1.39 (femur + tibia)	+ 53.20 ± 3.55
2.93 (fibula)	+ 59.51 ± 3.57
2.90 (tibia)	+ 61.53 ± 3.66
2.47 (femur)	+ 54.10 ± 3.72
4.74 (radius)	+ 54.93 ± 4.24
4.27 (ulna)	+ 57.76 ± 4.30
3.36 (humerus)	+ 57.97 ± 4.45

Male Negroids

1.15 (femur + tibia)	+ 71.04 ± 3.63
2.19 (tibia)	+ 86.02 ± 3.78
2.11 (femur)	+ 70.35 ± 3.94
2.19 (fibula)	+ 85.65 ± 4.08
3.42 (radius)	+ 81.56 ± 4.30
3.26 (ulna)	+ 79.29 ± 4.42
3.26 (humerus)	+ 72.10 ± 4.43

Female Negroids

1.26 (femur + tibia)	+ 59.72 ± 3.28
2.28 (femur)	+ 59.76 ± 3.41
2.45 (tibia)	+ 72.65 ± 3.70
2.49 (fibula)	+ 70.90 ± 3.80
3.08 (humerus)	+ 64.67 ± 4.25
3.67 (radius)	+ 71.79 ± 4.59
3.31 (ulna)	+ 75.38 ± 4.83

Male Mongoloids

1.22 (femur + tibia)	+ 70.37 ± 3.24
2.40 (fibula)	+ 80.56 ± 3.24
2.39 (tibia)	+ 81.45 ± 3.27
2.15 (femur)	+ 72.57 ± 3.80
2.68 (humerus)	+ 83.19 ± 4.25
3.54 (radius)	+ 82.00 ± 4.60
3.48 (ulna)	+ 77.45 ± 4.66

Male Mexicans

2.44 (femur)	+ 58.67 ± 2.99
2.50 (fibula)	+ 75.44 ± 3.62
2.36 (tibia)	+ 80.62 ± 3.73
3.55 (radius)	+ 80.71 ± 4.04
3.56 (ulna)	+ 74.56 ± 4.05
2.91 (humerus)	+ 73.94 ± 4.25

Female Mexicans

2.59 (femur)	+ 49.72 ± 3.82
2.72 (tibia)	+ 63.78 ± 3.51
-8.66 (radius) + 7.37 (ulna) + 1.26 (tibia) + 0.93 (femur)	+ 96.67 ± 2.81

A paper on stature of the Americans by Santiago Caves is in AMJA, 26:67-78, 1967.

2nd

Rec'd 3/16/90

CSU

A-034

forensic science laboratory

Michael Charney, Ph.D., Director
303/491-0423/1466
OAI/CO - 0380500

Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
80523

8 March 1990

Mr Jerry Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, Florida 34644

Dear Mr Dennis:

In his report of 16 April 1989, Dr Maples says he was able to superimpose the vertebrae in the skeletal remains CILHI 0055-88 onto the the first three thoracic vertebrae of the chest X-ray of Mark Dennis taken 4 February 1964. The results, however, he said were "very consistent", verbiage which is not scientific and negates any confidence in his study. His report did not include any photography as supporting evidence, merely a written one. This has necessitated a study done here with such supporting photographic evidence.

The original chest X-ray of Mark Dennis was received from CILHI and the first attempt at enhancement was done at the X-ray laboratory of the University Student Health facility. Photographs 1,2,3 and 4 show the enhancement attempt. The duplicator dial setting does not show exposure time and this I checked and noted on each print. Enhancement of the thoracic vertebrae if any is negligible.

The four radiographs were then taken to Michael L Dewey of the video studio of Instructional Services of the University. Glossy print #5 is the result as told in Dewey's report. Instead of the macro video lens as used by Maples, Dewey used a zoom lens, a "Canon J13x9B3-11 zoom lens with X2 tele-extender". The difference between the two is the distance of the lens from the object under study, the macro lens being up close, the zoom lens further back but the magnification of the image the same.

The radiographs were then taken to Dr Fitzhorn of the Department of Mechanical Engineering for further study by digitization with the image processing system.

The reports of Dewey and Fitzhorn point out that it is impossible to bring out the thoracic vertebrae of the chest X-Ray of Dennis to the sharpness necessary for superimposition of the actual vertebrae from the remains, CILHI 0055-88. The resolution is just not there, it being far too low. The cathode tube of the X-ray is not designed like the lens of a camera where the depth of focus can be adjusted by the lens opening. The function of the chest X-ray is to examine the lungs for disorders such as infection (pneumonia, tuberculosis, etc) malignancies. It is not designed to bring out the whole chest from front to back in sharp focus.

Unless Dr Maples' study does show the vertebrae in sharp total outline, his attempt at superimposition has no validity. Nor can this chest X-ray of Mark Dennis be of any aid in the identification of the skeletal remains.

faithfully,

Michael Charney
Michael Charney

The Center is a combined service operation of the CSU Forensic Science Laboratory and the CSU Police Department for education, research and investigation in human identification.

1006

Rec'd 3/16/90

Colorado
State
University

Office of Instructional Services
Fort Collins, Colorado 80521
(303) 491-1125

February 20, 1990

On December 6, 1989, I set up the following equipment in an attempt to enhance the chest X-ray of Mark Dennis dated February 4, 1964, that I received from Dr. Michael Charney. I adjusted the camera for maximum sensitivity and enhancement of detail, however, the resolution of the chest X-ray is too low to produce a detailed outline of the vertebrae. I do not believe it is possible to obtain any more detail than I have done with this equipment. I have the results of our tests recorded on one inch video tape.

- Ikgami SC-500 professional video camera with detail enhancement
- Canon J13x9B3-11S-11 zoom lens with X2 tele-extender for enlargement
- Videocraft Detailer 2 video enhancer
- Ikgami PM9-5 Monochrome Monitor
- Tektronix 650HR Color Monitor

Michael L. Dewey
Electronic Specialist (Television)
Colorado State University
A6B Clark Building
Fort Collins, CO 80523

1166

Rec'd 3-16-90

**Colorado
State
University**

A-03

Department of
Mechanical Engineering
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523
(937) 491-6534

February 22, 1990

Dr. Michael Charney, Director
Forensic Science Laboratory
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO 80523

Dear Dr. Charney:


As you requested, we examined the chest x-ray labelled 236 and dated 2/4/64. After digitization with our TRAPIX 5500 image processing system, we applied several filtering and enhancing algorithms to the region containing the neck vertebrae. We first performed a histogram equalization since the area largely contains very bright pixels, and then high-pass filtered the region to try to bring out as much detail as possible.

After performing these operations, the resulting region still had very little definition. The outlines of each vertebra were somewhat difficult to locate. In order to further refine these outlines, we performed a 3x3 Laplacian filter as well as variants of the Laplacian, with little success. I believe several factors contributed to this lack of success.

1. the size of the region of interest in the x-ray (a little over 1 square cm)
2. the state of the x-ray (scratched)
3. the medium resolution of the digitizing camera used (512x512)
4. a non-optimal lens on the camera (a macro-zoom lens would be ideal)

Given an optimal digitization (1024x1024 camera with a macro-zoom lens and an optically fine x-ray) more information could possibly be obtained from the x-ray than we were able to reveal. I suspect however, that even an optimal digitization may not reveal the amount of outline information necessary to perform a photographic superimposition of the vertebrae with any degree of confidence.

Sincerely:




Patrick A. Fitzhorn, PhD
Assistant Professor

1167


Rec'd
3-16-90
8

A-037

Auto-Exposure Duplicator #355
dial setting 10 - 2 seconds exp.




U From the original Chest X-ray
of Mark Dennis



4 of 6

1168




Auto-Exposure Dupliicator #355
dial setting 25 - 3.5 seconds exp/

Rec'd
3-16-90
J

A-038


46



Auto-Exposure Dupliicator #355
dial setting 45 - 5.5 seconds exp.

5 of 6

1169



Video Enhancement of Mark Dennis
Chest X-ray by Michael Denev, CSU



DON EDDY

A-040

2201 STANFORD RD. FT. COLLINS, COLORADO 80528 (303) 494-7649

IDENTS

INTERESTS
and a subsidiary
to H. Johnson
n. Combs & Smith
to, Brown, Breckner
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Army, Kautner & Kapp
and E. Johnson

PORTATIONS
ran USA, Inc.
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Catholic National Bank
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formation Agency

AZINES
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allies Magazine
an's Day

ELLANEOUS
clubs of America
de Base University
ble Records/CBS
an Theatre
y Valley Hospital
vision
ry Publications
ster Philharmonic
veston
rally of Rochester

February 13, 1990

Subject: Several cervical vertebra.

Object: To determine if these vertebra can be identified as those of submitted chest x-ray, number 220 R, 2/4/84.

Submitted items: Original x-ray; 3 duplicate x-rays each made from the original and each exposed progressively more; 1 television enhanced (contrast of light and dark areas expanded) photographic print. Several original cervical vertebra.

The chest x-ray was made specifically for, I'm assuming, disease diagnostics of the lungs. The skeletal features are poorly depicted with the vertebrae being amongst the worst. A single frontal view of x-rayed vertebra, specifically for bone features, would in itself be extremely difficult to compare and identify to original vertebra.

Possibly several views including diagonals, back and front might allow a proximity of identification.

The placement of an external photograph of a skull with a photograph of the actual skull lends itself to very remarkable identification because of the large number of dimensions which can specifically be pointed to relative to both photographs: teeth, jaw height and width, eye sockets, special dimensions between ears, bridge of the nose, slope of the cranium in several areas, etc. All of these areas can, if carefully done, be fitted, photo to photo. It becomes quite obvious if the two photos do not match and quite obvious also if they do match.

With the extremely poor quality and quantity of information within the x-rays, enhanced or not, I would say it is impossible to even suggest an identification.

Respectfully submitted,

Don Eddy
Photographer

A-041

Michael Charney, Ph.D., D-ABFA
Diplomate, American Board of Forensic Anthropology

29 July 1989

Mr. John G. Rogers, Director
Decedent Affairs Program
Naval Medical Command (Code 332)
23rd and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20372

Dear Mr. Rogers:

The finalization of the troublesome case, "Mark Dennis," CIHI 0055-88, will come down to one trait, that of height.

The remainder of traits learned from the skeletal remains—sex, age at time of death, race, weight—can be accepted as consistent with Mark's. In the matter of the sex, some 95% or more of our military personnel in Vietnam were male, 85% or more in his age bracket, 75% or more racially caucasoid. All these traits are consistent, but what is not consistent is the height, nor is it even close.

As though this case is not involved enough, several factors, some initiated by CIHI, have made it more so.

(1) Mark Dennis's medical records list his height differently—67-1/4 inches on one and 69-1/2 inches on the enlistment form.

(2) CIHI anthropologist Dr. Hinkes used the right femur fragment to estimate the probable length of the bone and then entered the regression formulas for stature based on this estimated length, making for an error factor of 3.5 inches, plus or minus. The left femur, though broken in two, was complete in length when the two ends were abutted. The use of the left femur for the height would give an error factor of 1.3 inches, plus or minus. Why was the left femur not used? Dr. Hinkes in his depiction of the skeletal remains on the diagram on Form DD892 shows the left femur as missing the lower part, in black. This is not true, as an examination of the left femur will show. A portion of the anterior aspect is gouged out, but not totally. This bone is complete in length and it is the only long bone of the upper and lower limbs that is.

(3) Dr. Maples in his 27 November 1988 report states that the left femur measures 45.3 cm rather than the 44.3 cm I got. Dr. Hinkes would have the right femur estimated at 46.1 cm. If we accept the 45.3 cm of Maples (and I shall not argue on this here), this makes the height 169.24 cm or 66.623 inches +/- 1.3 inches. These bones are of a man 5feet6.6inches +/- 1.3 inches. Thus, on the higher scale it could be as tall as almost 5feet8inches. This is close to the one for Mark on his medical record.

(4) CIHI decided to have a DNA fingerprint done by Lifecodes of New York. With all the bones they had to choose from (after samples from the teeth gave no results), the one long bone that was complete—the left femur—was chosen. A sample was taken from the broken end.

We come now to the question of Mark's true height. Photograph Number 1, taken in September 1963 when Mark was seventeen years, shows: brother Jerry at picture's left, standing at 5feet11inches (six feet in shoes); Sister Eileen at 5feet10inches (in flats); and sister Anne at 5feet9inches (in 3-inch heels).

A-042

page 2 of 3
charney-rogers

Mark is taller than both sisters, and at the same height as brother Jerry.

Photograph Number 2 shows Mark and his brother-in-law Nova Lee Curtis. This was taken in March 1966, just before Mark left for Vietnam. Curtis's height is given at 6feet3inches on his Army discharge identification card issued in May 1985 and at 6feet2inches on his Ohio driver's license.

Photograph Number 3 shows myself and my son Jared, taken on 26 July 1989 as indicated, and notarized by the attached letter.

The relationship of Mark to Nova clearly indicates a height greater than that shown by me alongside my son. I measured at 5feet11inches alongside Jared's 6feet2inches. Mark must have been 6feet tall or within a half inch of that height.

The short left femur for so tall a person could have been due to a disproportioned person. That is, short legs going with a long trunk. However, Photograph 4 of Mark alongside his sister Anne taken at the same time as that with Curtis shows this not to be so. Mark was in what one would call a normal proportion of limbs and trunk. In this photograph with Anne at 5feet9inches (in her 3-inch heels), Mark is clearly 2-1/2 to 3 inches taller.

It is unreasonable to accept as remotely possible that a bone, complete in length, giving a height of 5feet6.6inches, with +/- 1.3 inches can be that of a person 5.4 inches taller.

I said at the beginning of this report that the identification must come down to a question of height. - CIIHI and Dr. Maples and Kirby should not totally shun the left femur and accept, as they do, the height as gotten from the fragment of the right femur.

Dr. Maples has made argument for the consistency of the dental picture. He neglects to mention that the dental experts could do no better than say the teeth were consistent. This does not denote a positive identification. If the teeth did so indicate, the reports would be unequivocal, and they are not. Dr. Maples uses such terms as "good consistency" and the former dental officer at CIIHI used terms such as "uniquely consistent." Such attempts to enrich the word "consistent" are out of order. They are not scientific; they have no meaning whatsoever beyond just plain "consistent."

On the dental remains, Dr. Campbell in his report of 30 June 1988 states in his summation, "it is the opinion of both Dr. Ebert and myself that the maxillary fragment shown in the postmortem X-ray is consistent with that of Mark V. Dennis, however, positive identification, utilizing only the documents received is not possible." Consistent is not positive identification.

Dr. Brian C. Smith, dental officer at CIIHI, in his report of 16 September 1988, states in conclusion that the dental evidence is not inconsistent with the identification of Dennis, Mark V. Not inconsistent! Dr. Maples would have one accept this as proof of positive, individual identification. Where the match is perfect one says so, and not just "consistent."

A-043

page 3 of 3
charney-rogers

Dr. Maples also refers to the report of Dr. Angel of the Smithsonian, claiming that Dr. Angel found "good consistency" between the remains and Dennis's traits. What Dr. Maples fails to mention is that Dr. Angel, when questioned by TV reporter John Quinones on the ABC "World News Tonight" show of Peter Jennings in early October of 1985 said in answer to Quinones's question:

"Dr. were you able to positively identify these remains as those of Mark Dennis?"

Dr. Angel replied:

"Ah, not absolutely, positively."

Dr. Angel has made clear by this short statement the very real difference between consistency and positive identification.

We have now the report of Dr. Maples dated 16 April 1989, of the superimposition study of the antemortem chest radiograph of Mark Dennis taken at his enlistment. It deals with the dental aspect as well, but the teeth were so cut to pieces by the search for DNA as to render them worthless for such study, given their small size to start with. Let us treat, rather, with the superimposition of the chest radiograph and the cervical vertebrae. Again, the best Dr. Maples can do is to show consistency with the added emphasis "very consistent." I submit that this is not scientific reporting, it is not scholarly reporting. I have made several positive, individual identifications using the technique of superimposition of skulls and photographs, employing various instruments—digitizing skull by laser-computer and 2-D camera, two video cameras and two 35-mm projectors. Enhancement of photographs is no mysterious process, as Dr. Maples would appear to imply. If he meant otherwise, why cannot he furnish me with a copy of the videotape he has made, so that I can study it? My university (Colorado State) has a large body of scientists engaged in well-funded research. I have all this expertise at my command whenever I so need.

Dr. Maples in this enhancement study can do no more than claim consistency as he has throughout all his reports. Consistency is not enough, when to make this identification stick as that of Mark V. Dennis, you must stretch the stature some five to six inches.

faithfully,

Michael Charney
michael charney

1174

A-04

**Colorado
State
University**

Police Department
Fort Collins, Colorado 80521
(911) 491-4425

July 26, 1989

To Whom It May Concern:


On this date at 1200 hours Jared Kirk Charney was measured by this notary and shown to be 74 inches. His father, Michael Charney was also measured by this notary and found to be 71 inches tall.

Accompanying photographs taken by CSUPD Officer
Jerald W. Hinde.


Comm. Expiration
My Commission Expires January 11, 1992

1175

A-045



2 JAN 42 205 75" BPM BLUE
Curtis Nova Lee 28 MAY 85
31 DEC 2006
780302



1176

A-046



Photograph #3
The four people
from the left: John, Mary, Jane, and John

Photograph #4
The four people
from the left: John, Mary, Jane, and John



1177

A-0-



Photograph #3
The two people
from the left: John, Mary, Jane, and John



Photograph #4
The two people
from the left: John, Mary, Jane, and John

A-04

Michael Charney, Ph.D., D-ABFA

Diplomat, American Board of Forensic Anthropology

8 September 1989

Mr Jerry Dennis
14437 Josephine Road
Largo, Florida 34644

Dear Mr Dennis:

Please include this report with that of 29 July 1989 when submitting to the AFIRB, Washington, D C on the case of the identification of the human remains, CILHI 0055-88.

In the July report I took issue with the effort of CILHI and Dr Maples in claiming consistency of traits found on the remains with details from the medical record of Mark as proof of positive, individual identification.

What follows are two reports of the identification procedure, one where all traits gleaned from the remains showed a consistency with the missing person and one where the traits were individual and could not be anyone but that individual.

Case 1

A pilot left Denver in 1971 in a single-engine plane headed for Salt Lake City. The plane disappeared over the front range of the Rocky Mountains and was not found till ten years later, in 1981 just outside of Estes Park in Larimer County about 50 miles from Denver. Photo #1: the skeletal remains collected in and about the wreckage of the plane.

Working "blind", the few fragmented remains gave following results:

Sex: male. Iliac fragment of the innominate (pelvic bone) is large. The scapulae glenoid fossae are in the male range, measuring 4.4 and 4.0 cm respectively (greater than 3.7 cm is male).

Age: Photo #2 shows a lumbar vertebra that is juxtaposed to that of a young person. The degree of arthritic lipping along the border of the vertebra is typical of a person in the mid-sixties.

Height: Photo #3 is that of the fragment of the left femur. Landmarks 1 and 2 according to Steele (1969) were present; the head and lesser trochanter. This yielded a stature of 5feet10.7 inches with a error factor of 3.5 inches.

Weight: Insurance tables give a suggested weight of 170 pounds for such a person, but the long bones were slight and muscle markings not pronounced. The weight, hence, was put at 150 + 5 pounds.

Race: Photo #4 shows a badly worn upper central incisor. This with a small segment of the right mandible was all left of the skull. The tooth shows marked build-up of enamel on the edges of the tooth, a condition known as sphenoidal. When this person was twenty years of age, the sphenoidal had to be much more pronounced. This is a mongoloid trait, American Indian for the most part here. This individual had to have some Indian in his immediate ancestry.

Summation: These remains are those of a male, in mid-sixties, 5feet 10.5 inches + 3.5 inches, 150 + 5 pounds, with American Indian probably as part of his racial identity.

- 2 -

charney-dennis

A-04

Mr Drummond, the pilot who took off in the plane, was: male, 65 years, 5feet11inches, 150 pounds, caucasoid with a mother who was French-Canadian of the Metis ethnic group. His father was Scots. The Metis are a separate ethnic breeding population descended from the mixture of the french fur trappers and Indian women of the 18th and 19th Centuries.

The skeletal remains were, thus, in agreement with those of Drummond, but nothing on the bones yielded information that these were those of Drummond and only Drummond. There are others with the same traits. The question of course is what would just such another be doing in that plane just there. This is not the decision for the forensic anthropologist to make. His task is the analysis of the remains. These remains were consistent the traits of Drummond and that is all the scientist can say here. It was now up to the family to accept or reject the bones as identified. In this case they accented.

Case #2
Body #129 of the Big Thompson Flood, 31 July 1976, Larimer County, Colorado. Photo #1, the skull in frontal view. Photo #2, the skull in lateral or profile view. This is the skull of a male, old age, caucasoid. The post-cranial remains gave a height of 5feet10inches + 1.2 inches, a weight of 150 + 5 pounds.

Two old men had been reported missing and one had fallen down 22 steps some 9 years earlier. The Weld County Hospital in Greeley had sent over X-rays on one of the missing, Claude Allen Schell. Photo #3 shows the frontal sinus of Schell. It has three lobes, the one on the photo's right, divided into three with indentations on the superior surfaces. The next two are individual lobes. Photo #4, that of the skull of Body #129, shows exactly the same sinus morphology; three lobes, the right with three separate sections with the indentations on the superior surfaces and then the two individual lobes. All sinuses are individual, no two people will have the same sinus patterns, regardless of which sinus and I am not certain if this is not applicable to identical twins. Claude Allen Schell was 96 years old, 5feet10inches, 150 pounds. There is no question here of the individual, personal identification.

These two cases I trust will demonstrate the difference between an identification based on consistency of findings as against an identification based on personal, individual traits such as sinus patterns, cranial suture patterns, bone anomalies, dental restorations where the antemortem X-rays are available for comparison and so forth.

faithfully,


Michael Charney
Michael Charney

copy: John G Rogers, Naval Medical Command

1181


A-051

LARIMER COUNTY CORONER
Case # C-81-365
Photo # 3
FRAGMENT OF LEFT FEMUR
MICHAEL CHANEY



CASE #1

LARIMER COUNTY CORONER
Case # C-81-365
Photo # 4
GLASS CORONAL INCISOR
SHOWN STRONG SPINULOUS
IN A 65 YEAR-OLD
MICHAEL CHANEY



1180

1-050

LARIMER COUNTY CORONER
Case # C-81-365
Photo # 1
SKELETAL REMAINS
MICHAEL CHANEY



CASE #1

LARIMER COUNTY CORONER
Case # C-81-365
Photo # 2
LUMBARS: VERTEBRAE
RIGHT: SCISSOR APPROXIMATE
LEFT: NO REMAINS OF A
HAND PERSON
MICHAEL CHANEY




Photo #3
Big Thompson Flood 7/31/76
Lawrence County, Colorado
Radiogram of head of
Claude Allen Schell, Sr.
taken at Weld County Hospital
9/14/76 in Greeley, CO
Michael Cliney




CASE #2

Photo #4
Big Thompson Flood 7/31/76
Lawrence County, Colorado
Skull fragment - Body #129
showing fracture surfaces
taken at Thompson's machine
Lewards, CO.
Michael Cliney



Photo #1
Big Thompson Flood 7/31/76
Lawrence County, Colorado
Skull fragment of Body #129
Frontal view
Michael Cliney



CASE #2

Photo #2
Big Thompson Flood 7-31-76
Lawrence County, Colorado
Skull of Body #129
Lateral view
Michael Cliney




CONFIDENTIAL

NAME : Dr. Kerley
 ADDRESS: Central Identification Lab (Army)
Honolulu, HAWAII
 TELEPHONE: _____

CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT OF SAMPLES

WE RECEIVED 3 SAMPLES ON May 15, 1988.
 LIFECODES WILL PROCEED WITH THE TEST(S) AS REQUESTED. FOR
 INFORMATION REGARDING THESE SAMPLES, PLEASE REFER TO LIFECODES
 CASE #: F10400. LIFECODES PERSONNEL WILL NOT REFER
 TO, OR ACKNOWLEDGE, THIS CASE OTHER THAN BY THIS CASE #, AND
 THEN, ONLY ON A CALL-BACK BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, ONLY THIS CASE #
 SHOULD BE USED AND IT SHOULD ONLY BE DISCLOSED TO AUTHORIZED
 PERSONNEL. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS TO THIS
 PROCEDURE. PLEASE CALL IF YOUR NAME, ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE #
 ARE INCORRECT.

THANK YOU,

CLIENT RELATIONS

A-055

DATE: June 23, 1988
 CASE #: _____

CONFIDENTIAL

NAME : Commanding Officer
 ADDRESS: U. S. Army
Central Identification Lab
Fort Shafter, HI 96858
Attn: Dr. Kerley
 TELEPHONE: _____

CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT OF SAMPLES

WE RECEIVED 2 SAMPLES ON June 20, 1988.
 LIFECODES WILL PROCEED WITH THE TEST(S) AS REQUESTED. FOR
 INFORMATION REGARDING THESE SAMPLES, PLEASE REFER TO LIFECODES
 CASE #: F10400. LIFECODES PERSONNEL WILL NOT REFER
 TO, OR ACKNOWLEDGE, THIS CASE OTHER THAN BY THIS CASE #, AND
 THEN, ONLY ON A CALL-BACK BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, ONLY THIS CASE #
 SHOULD BE USED AND IT SHOULD ONLY BE DISCLOSED TO AUTHORIZED
 PERSONNEL. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS TO THIS
 PROCEDURE. PLEASE CALL IF YOUR NAME, ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE #
 ARE INCORRECT.

THANK YOU,

CLIENT RELATIONS

1186

LIFECODES
CORPORATION

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: July 11, 1988

CASE #:

NAME : Commanding Officer

ADDRESS: U. S. Army

Central Identification Lab

Fort Shafter, HI 96858

Attn: Lt. Col Johnie Webb

TELEPHONE:

CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT OF SAMPLES

WE RECEIVED 2 SAMPLES ON July 11, 1988

LIFECODES WILL PROCEED WITH THE TEST(S) AS REQUESTED. FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THESE SAMPLES, PLEASE REFER TO LIFECODES CASE #: F10400. LIFECODES PERSONNEL WILL NOT REFER TO, OR ACKNOWLEDGE, THIS CASE OTHER THAN BY THIS CASE #, AND THEN, ONLY ON A CALL-BACK BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, ONLY THIS CASE # SHOULD BE USED AND IT SHOULD ONLY BE DISCLOSED TO AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS TO THIS PROCEDURE. PLEASE CALL IF YOUR NAME, ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE # ARE INCORRECT.

THANK YOU,

CLIENT RELATIONS

cc: Naval Medical Command
Attn: John RogersOLD SAW MILL RIVER ROAD
VALHALLA NEW YORK 10595
(914) 382-4122

1187

LIFECODES
CORPORATION

Date: August 10, 1988

Commanding Officer
Attn: Lt. Col. Johnie Webb
U.S. Army
Central Identification Lab
Fort Shafter, HI 96858

Re: Lifecodes Case #: FI10400

I. Evidence Receipt

The following evidence was received on May 3, 1988 from Dr. Joseph R. Bennett, St. Petersburg, FL in a sealed container via Federal Express.

Accession #	Sample
FB10111	Blood - Dennis, Vera

Additional evidence was received on May 15, 1988 from Dr. Kerley, Honolulu, HI in a sealed container via Dr. Robert Shaler, Valhalla, NY.

Accession #	Sample
FI10400	Distal part of femur
FI10401	Broken end of right rib
FI10402	2 teeth

Additional evidence was received on June 20, 1988 from Dr. Kerley, Honolulu, HI in a sealed container via Dr. Robert Shaler, Valhalla, NY.

Accession #	Sample
FI11452	Bone scrapings; Left femur
FI11453	Bone scrapings; Left tibia

Additional evidence was received on July 11, 1988 from Dr. Kerley, Honolulu, HI in a sealed container via Express Mail.

Accession #	Sample
FI11966	Tissue - Dennis, Mark
FI11967	Bone chips - Dennis, Mark

II. DNA Narrative

An insufficient amount of high molecular weight human DNA was isolated for DNA-PRINT™ analysis from samples FI10400, FI10401, FI10402, FI11452, FI11453, FI11966 and FI11967.

Since an insufficient amount of high molecular weight human DNA was isolated for DNA-PRINT™ analysis from samples FI10400, FI10401, FI10402, FI11452, FI11453, FI11966 and FI11967, no comparisons could be made with sample FB10111.

Rec'd 11/26/88

A-058

Page 2
U.S. Army
Lifecodes Case #: FI10400

IV. Disposition of Evidence

The evidence will be repackaged and returned under separate cover by UPS unless notified about special handling instructions.

Michael T. Baird
Michael T. Baird, Ph.D.
Director, Paternity & Forensics

Ivan Balazs
Ivan Balazs, Ph.D.
Director, Clinical Laboratory

Kevin C. McElfresh
Kevin C. McElfresh, Ph.D.
Asst. Mgr. Paternity & Forensics

Lisa Bennett
Lisa Bennett
Forensic Scientist

cc: John Rogers



A-058

November 9, 1988

Saw Mill River Road
Valhalla, NY 10595
914-992-4122
SOL-LIFECODES

Dr. Kerley
U.S. Army
Central Identification Lab
Fort Shafter
Honolulu, Hawaii 96858

Dear Dr. Kerley,

I am responding to your request for an explanation of why the Lifecodes' RFLP DNA-PRINTTM test was unsuccessful on the bone samples submitted under our case number FI10400.

From my understanding of the case, there are two reasons for the DNA obtained to be of such a poor quality that the RFLP test would give negative results. First, the age of the samples and the humid conditions present in Vietnam would work against preserving the DNA so that the RFLP test could not be done. Second, my understanding of the treatment the bones received in order to remove the tissue, i.e., heated, would in itself destroy the DNA for RFLP analysis.

Since both of these conditions exist in this case, it would be expected that the DNA present in these samples would be degraded to the extent that the RFLP test would be negative.

When we met in New York a few weeks ago we discussed another DNA test that Lifecodes has been validating. In this second test samples of degraded DNA can sometimes be analyzed for the presence of genetic polymorphisms found on the HLA DQ α region of the DNA.

We tested the bones in this case using the second DNA system and compared them with the blood of Mrs. Dennis. In every instance where results were obtained, the bones showed HLA DQ α type 1. The HLA DQ α type of Mrs. Dennis also contains the HLA DQ α type 1.

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A-060

These test results indicate that Mrs. Dennis is genetically consistent with being the mother of the individual whose bones were submitted. This genetic comparison does not constitute an absolute biological identification. Also, because this is still a research technique, a probability of maternity cannot be calculated.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

LIFECODES CORPORATION

Robert C. Shaler
Robert C. Shaler, Ph.D.
Director, Forensic Science

RCS:g

Rec'd 11-26-88

H.R. CAMPBELL, JR., D.D.S.

KAREN T. CAMPBELL B.S., M.F.

FORENSIC CONSULTANTS

P.O. Box 133
TJERAS, NM 87059
(505) 281-9121

A-06

June 30, 1988

Lt. Col. Johnnie E. Webb, Jr.
USA CILHI
Fort Shafter, Hawaii 96858-5480

Re: CILHI 0055-88 (Dennis, Mark V.)

Dear LCol. Webb:

The materials examined, in the original submission, consisted of the following:

1. One Periapical x-ray's labeled-" Antemortem, Mark V. Dennis, SN- 778-91-45 USN ". There was no date present.
2. Two periapical x-ray's labeled-" CILHI 0055-88, Remains of Mark V. Dennis, SN- 778-91-45 ". There was no date present.

The quality of the antemortem x-ray was good and that of the postmortem x-ray excellent, however, there was a difference in angulation between the two.

The significant features of the x-ray's are as follows:

1. Antemortem- #12-virgin, #13-virgin, #14-extensively carious, #15-virgin, and #16-impacted.
2. Postmortem- #15-two separate occlusal restorations or one occlusal and one occlusal-lingual restoration, and #16-impacted. #14-has been extracted and the alveolus has healed.

Visual comparison of the antemortem/postmortem x-ray's revealed the following:

1. Overall crown and root formation of #15 is similar, with the exception of the restorations present in the postmortem films.
2. Overall crown and tooth position of #16 is similar. only a small portion of the root structure is present in the antemortem film therefore no comparison could be made.
3. The pulp chambers of #'s 15 & 16 are similar; as are the pulp canals.
4. The position of #16 appears to be similar, however, difficulty arises, when comparing the two, due to improper angulation of the postmortem x-ray.

Side by side enhancement was then performed resulting in no change of the findings from the visual comparison. several questions did arise at this point, as follows:

1. What was the time frame between the taking of the

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A-062

- antemortem x-ray and the MIA report on Mark V. Dennis?
2. What is the date of the antemortem film?
 3. Are there any more antemortem and postmortem films available for comparison?
 4. May we have a copy of the Dental Standard Form 603?
 5. Can the postmortem x-ray be redone to more closely approximate the angle present in the antemortem film?

These questions were conveyed, to Dr. Ellis Kerley, by phone on May 19, 1988. the following documents were received, from Dr. Kerly, May 26, 1988:

1. Copy of the Dental Standard Form 603 for Mark V. Dennis, dated 10 June 84.
2. Dental Identification Chart, AF Form 697A for Mark V. Dennis, dated 21 August 71.
3. A letter, dated 21 July 71, signed by Col. John J. Tarsitano and Lt. Col. Gilbert L. Koehler, summarizing their findings.
4. Six(6) postmortem periapical x-ray's and three(3) occlusal film periapical x-ray's, dated 11 May 88 and labeled CILHI 0055-88.

These documents and x-ray's were reviewed on 1 June 88 and the restorations in #15 and the extraction of #14 were confirmed (see SF 603). Further enhancement was carried out on 13 June 88, on all x-ray's submitted and photographs taken for side-by-side comparison utilizing an enlargement projection technique.

The side-by side comparison, of the enhanced x-ray's, was completed on June 27, 1988 by simultaneously projecting the enhanced photographs enlarged to approximately the same size. There were no morphological discrepancies noted; the area of tooth #14 showed healed alveolar bone; the root contour, pulp chamber, and pulp canal configuration of tooth #15 were similar; and the coronal contour, viewable, of tooth #16 was similar however, the entire coronal portion was not present on the antemortem x-ray.

Conclusions:

1. There are many areas of consistency present.
2. There are no unexplainable or undocumented discrepancies present.
3. There are no areas of individuality present that would allow this fragment to be positively identified based upon x-ray comparison only.

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Opinion:

It is the opinion of both Dr. Ebert and myself that the maxillary fragment, shown in the postmortem x-ray, is consistent with that of Mark V. Dennis, however; positive identification, utilizing only the documents received, is not possible.

Respectfully submitted,

H.R. Campbell, Jr.
H.R. Campbell, Jr., D.D.S.

James I. Ebert
James Ian Ebert, Ph.D.

- Attachments: 1. Enhanced photographs of antemortem and post-mortem X-ray's.
2. Image Analysis technical data.

Enclosures: All antemortem and postmortem x-ray's received.

Rec'd 11-26-88
ATTACHMENT TO REPORT

A-064

EBERT & ASSOCIATES

Anthropology, Archaeology, Forensics and Environmental Sciences
Remote Sensing, Photogrammetric, and Geographic Information Systems Applications

3100 Ninth Street, N.W. • Albuquerque, New Mexico 87107 • (505) 344-9676

07 July 1988

**ENHANCEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF X-RAY IMAGES
FOR THE CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII:
MARK DENNIS CASE**

Image Analysis Method and Photogrammetric Assessment

Electronic image analysis was performed on both the antemortem and postmortem x-rays using an analog image analysis system at Ebert & Associates' laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This system was designed to facilitate the inspection of minute details of x-rays through the enhancement of such images. Electronic image enhancement, through the extreme magnification of x-rays, and the emphasis of their contrast and the areas where the gray scale of such images changes, rather than simply their absolute value (edge enhancement), allows the forensic scientist to assess subtle patterning in an x-ray or other photographic image which would not otherwise be apparent on the original film. It does not add anything to the image, but rather simplifies it so that the forensic scientist can see very subtle patterning in the images being compared.

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In the case of the antemortem and postmortem remains inspected here, the details of the internal structure of the second molar [No. 15] are remarkably similar. First, in a gross sense, the pulp cavity of the two images of the tooth are quite consistent, with a "horn" or protrusion to the left of the pulp cavity, as it appears on the x-ray images, and another to the right side (less apparent on the antemortem image, but still there).

It must be borne in mind that the post-mortem x-ray is not exposed at the exact angle of the antemortem x-ray. When this is the case, it can always be contended that the patterning of the internal structure of the tooth does not appear "exactly" the same. Taking into account the slight angular discrepancy between the x-rays, however, the root canal configurations are of the same shape. At the extreme left (forward) edge of the second molar as it appears on both of the x-ray images, a denser portion of the tooth forms a crescentic pattern that is virtually identical in the two x-rays. A similar, denser area at the left side of the crown of the second molar is less distinct, but is still of consistent shape on both of the two x-rays. A very small internal inconsistency near the top and to the right of this right (posterior) denser area is also apparent on both x-rays.

Details of the central root canal are also consistent between the two images, particularly with respect to two "bulges" in the canal immediately above the pulp cavity. These dual

bulges appear clearly on both of the images.

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A-066

Given the forensic evidence provided by the antemortem and postmortem x-rays available here, and my experience in interpreting such electronically enhanced x-ray images, my conclusion is that by virtue of the evidence at hand the two teeth (second molars) are remarkably similar and consistent. Details of the third molar, though it has not fully developed in the antemortem x-ray, are also consistent. There is no photogrammetric reason to believe that these two x-rays do not represent the same two teeth.


Sincerely,

James Ian Ebert


James Ian Ebert, Ph.D.
Certified Photogrammetrist (ASPRS)
Director

Rec'd 11-26-58

A-0



Antemortem X-Ray (Electronic Analysis)



Postmortem X-Ray (Electronic Analysis)

CILHI 0055-88				RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING				DENTAL CHART				15 September 1988			
LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL (for unknown numbers)								GRADE		SERVICE NO./SOCIAL SECURITY ACT NO.					
NAME OF CEMETERY, EVACUATION NUMBER, OR SEARCH AND RECOVERY NUMBER								PLOT		ROW		GRAVE			
MARKING ABBREVIATIONS:										A-068					
F-Facial		O-Oral		D-Distal		M-Medial		A-Anal		P-Pit		S-Sil			
L-Lingual		U-Ul		I-Incisor		C-Crown		P-Plaque		S-Sil		S-Sil			
C-Caries		I-Impacted		S-Segment		T-Tooth		R-Recovered		N-Not		R-Recovered			
UPPER RIGHT		UPPER LEFT		LOWER RIGHT		LOWER LEFT									
1		2		3		4		5		6		7			
8		9		10		11		12		13		14			
15		16		17		18		19		20		21			
22		23		24		25		26		27		28			
29		30		31		32		33		34		35			
36		37		38		39		40		41		42			
43		44		45		46		47		48		49			
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DAPC-PED-H

16 September 1988

A-07

FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY REPORT: CILHI 0055-88

FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY SECTION
U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII

POSTMORTEM EVIDENCE: The dental remains of CILHI 0055-88 consist of partially intact maxillae with three teeth (Universal System #1, #15, and #16). The maxillary alveolar process exhibits widespread loss of mid-arch and anterior alveolar bone. The condition of the remaining bone indicates that teeth #2, #11, and #13 were lost postmortem and that tooth #14 was missing antemortem. See DD Form 891 dated 15 September 1988 for a graphic description of the dental remains. All teeth were radiographed in duplicate with Size 2 dental film at 10 MA, 80 KVP, and 18/60 seconds. The results are the five periapical films dated 15 September 1988.

ANTEMORTEM EVIDENCE: Dental records: One SF 603 dated "JUN 10 1964" and labeled "DENNIS, MARK V." with a last entry of "10/20/65". Dental radiographs: One frame of bitewing dental films dated "initial films" and labeled "Dennis, M. V.". A second frame of bitewing dental films dated "8/26/65" and labeled "Dennis, M. V.". One envelope labeled "Dental X-Rays for Mark V Dennis", containing one periapical film dated "1964", and two other periapical films and one occlusal film labeled "Postmortem radiographs accomplished 21 JUL 1971 Medical Center Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio".

NOTES: The "initial films", although undated, show tooth #3 to be present and must have been produced prior to the documented extraction date of tooth #3 on 27 November 1964.

The SF 603 indicates that tooth #14 was extracted in January 1964. This procedure follows a series of treatments provided in November 1964. Therefore, it is most probable that tooth #14 was actually removed in January 1965, and recorded incorrectly with the past year's date of 1964.

The SF 603, Section III, Part 17 indicates that teeth #2 and #3 were restored with O-AM in September 1965. However, tooth #3 was extracted earlier and is missing in radiographs dated August 1965. It is most probable that Section III, Part 15 is correct as it shows tooth #3, not #3, as being restored.

The SF 603 indicates that tooth #14 was restored with O-AM, O-AM in October 1965. Since tooth #14 was extracted and is missing in radiographs dated August 1965, it is most probable that the tooth actually restored was #15. This correction would be consistent with the SF 603 documentation that all other second molars were being treated for similar lesions during the same series of appointments.

COMPARISON: The dental remains were received in poor condition, missing a root tip visible in earlier postmortem radiographs.


Clinical examination of the remains resulted in the following findings:
(1) Impacted teeth #1 and #16 (2) Antemortem presence of teeth #2, #11, and #13 (3) Antemortem absence of tooth #14 (4) Presence of O-AM, O-AM

Rec'd 11-26-88

A-L

restorations on tooth #15. These findings are not inconsistent with the known dental features of P03 DENNIS as described in the NOTES paragraph above. Radiographic examination of the dental remains and comparison with the antemortem periapical film dated "1964" results in several consistencies. Specifically, the pulp chamber of tooth #15 and coronal anatomy of tooth #16 are very similar. These antemortem and postmortem radiographs were submitted to Dr. Ebert and Dr. Campbell for electronic enhancement and analysis. See Forensic Consultant Reports dated 30 June 1988 and 7 July 1988. Note: These reports allude to the improper angulation of the postmortem radiographs of teeth #15 and #16 as compared to the antemortem "1964" film. However, examination of the antemortem bitewing radiographs, taken before and after the extraction of tooth #14, shows clearly that tooth #15 had drifted mesially. Therefore, exact postmortem duplication of the angle and relationship pictured in the "1964" periapical film, which was taken before the loss of #14 and drifting of #15, would not be possible. DNA-PRINT™ analysis was attempted on teeth #15 and #16. Both teeth were removed for that purpose on 11 May 1988. See Lifecodes Corporation report and Accession #F110402. The results of this analysis were noncontributory.

OPINION: I have compared the dental remains of CILHI 0055-88 with the dental records and radiographs of P03 DENNIS, and find that the radiographic appearance of teeth #15 and #16 to be markedly similar. There are no irresolvable discrepancies and the preponderance of available dental evidence is not inconsistent with the identification of DENNIS, Mark V, ID# 778-91-45, HM-3, USN.



BRIAN C. SMITH
MAJ, DE, USA

PHYSICAL AND DENTAL COMPARISON CHART

For use of this form, see AFM 600-8-1, the originating agency is MILPERCEN 15 September 1968

REMAINS OF	NAME
CILHI 0055-88	DEWIS, Mark V IDN 778-91-45, HM-3, USN
1 IMPACTED	1 IMPACTED
2 PX	2 10-AM
3	3 MISSING (Est. 27 JAN 1966)
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10	10
11 PX	11
12	12
13	13
14	14
15	15
16	16
17	17
18	18
19	19
20	20
21	21
22	22
23	23
24	24
25	25
26	26
27	27
28	28
29	29
30	30
31	31
32	32
ESTIMATED HEIGHT 67.4" S.E. 3.5"	HEIGHT 67.25" (Feb 64)
ESTIMATED WEIGHT	WEIGHT
Average build and muscle markings	152 lbs., medium build (Feb 64)
ESTIMATED AGE 24.7 yr S.D. 4.3 yr	AGE 19 yr, 9 m, 25 d 001 15 July 1966 DOB 21 September 1946
HAIR N.A.	HAIR N.A.
REMARKS	
SEX: Male RACE: Caucosoid TRAUMA: Poss. perimortem crash Fx PATHOLOGIES: None observed ANOMALIES: Sacrum has six segments	SEX: Male RACE: Caucosian TRAUMA: None noted PATHOLOGIES: None noted ANOMALIES: None noted

MH 21 Sep 68

19
AF 13RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING
SKELETAL CHART

CILHI 0055-88

A-073

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL (or a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h-i-j-k-l-m-n-o-p-q-r-s-t-u-v-w-x-y-z)

ALL BUT PORTIONS NOT RECOVERED

GRADE

SERVICE NUMBER / ASN

NAME OF CEMETERY, EVACUATION NUMBER, OR SEARCH AND RECOVERY NUMBER

TSN 3581-66

PLAT

AND

GRAVE

ESTIMATED AGE (Years)

24.7 S.D. 4.3

ESTIMATED HEIGHT

57.4" S.E. 3.5"

SKELETAL MEASUREMENTS (Centimeters)

SKELETAL MEMBER	METHOD	RIGHT	LEFT
SKULL			
HUMERUS			
ULNA			
RADIUS			
FOREARM	Calculated	46.1	
TIBIA			
FIBULA			

REMARKS OR STATEMENT BY ANTHROPOLOGIST (Continue on reverse if more space is required)

CONDITION OF REMAINS: Recently skeletonized; incomplete; patches of charring

SEX: Male

RACE: Caucosoid

PHYSIQUE: Average build and muscle markings

TRAUMA: Poss. perimortem crash Fx

PATHOLOGIES: None observed

ANOMALIES: Sacrum has six segments

THE PARTS PRESENT AS INDICATED ON THIS SKELETAL CHART REPRESENT ONE AND THE SAME INDIVIDUAL

POSITIVE ANTHROPOLOGIST (Name)

Madeleine J. Hinkes, Ph.D., D.A.B.F.A.

SIGNATURE

Madeleine J. Hinkes

24 Sept 68

STOOTS
MISSING
BONESFRACTURES
SHATTERED

DD FORM 892

REPLACES DD FORM 1046, 10 MAR 47, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963-621-044-0111

Rec'd 11-16-88 9

A-07

FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY REPORT
CILHI 0055-88

4 April 1988

The remains as received appear recently skeletonized, judging by the presence of cartilage, oil, and a characteristic odor. Present are the basicranium, nearly complete axial skeleton, and appendicular portions of a single individual. Small charred areas are noted on the cranium, elbows, and lower limbs, especially the left anterior tibia. The letters "MD" have been hand-printed on the right scapula, humerus, and radius, the left scapula, and the sacrum. The posterior left femur has been longitudinally sectioned, from the lesser trochanter through the gluteal tuberosity. The pubes have been excised but are present.

BIOLOGICAL DETERMINATIONS

SEX

Pelvic, occipital, and temporal morphology are masculine.

AGE

The pubes are aged at Suchey-Brooks Phase II, 24.7 years (S.D. 4.3 yr). The iliac crest, auricular surface, annular rings, and sacrum are all consistent with an age in the early 20's.

RACE

Morphology of the cranial base and palate is consistent with Caucasoid ancestry.

STATURE & PHYSIQUE

The measured length of segment 1 of the right femur was used to calculate femoral length. This length was used in Trotter's formula for White males to calculate a stature estimate of 67.4" (S.E. 3.5"). Muscle markings and build are of average development.

TRAUMA

The fracture pattern observed on cranium, shoulders, forearms, legs, and sacrum is consistent with crash trauma. These are not thermally-induced fractures.

PATHOLOGIES

No osseous pathologies are observed.

ANOMALIES

There are six segments to the sacrum, a variant more commonly seen in males. It is probably due to sacralization of the first coccygeal vertebra, since fusion is incomplete on the right side (hemisacralization). However, the (rest of the) coccyx was not received with the remains.

Rec'd 11-26-88 9

A-075

CILHI 0055-88, page 2

COMPARISON WITH ANTEMORTEM RECORDS OF MARK V DENNIS

According to his military medical file, Mark DENNIS is described as a male Caucasoid who would have been nearly 20 years old at time of death. His statistics from 1964 are: height 67.25", weight 152 lb, medium build. Since DENNIS was just 17.5 yr at that time, there was undoubtedly some additional growth afterwards. All of these data are consistent with the biological determinations derived from CILHI 0055-88 skeletal remains, though nothing is definitive. There are no inconsistencies.

To avoid confusion, it must be noted that previous re-processing reports refer to body parts not received with the remains at CILHI, including soft tissue (organs and musculature), a complete thorax (7 ribs, 2 cervical vertebrae, and both clavicles are not present now), head and shaft of right fibula, and possibly more of the facial skeleton. A portion of left radius shaft that was not mentioned in a previous inventory was received with the remains. Apparently, it was during these previous examinations that bone sectioning took place and the remains were reduced to a skeleton, although these actions are not well documented in the available paperwork.

Maureen J. Hinkes
Maureen J. Hinkes, Ph.D.
Diplomate, A.B.F.A.

1206

NOT FOR RELEASE OR DISSEMINATION
EXCEPT TO THE PERSONS WHOSE NAMES ARE
CONTAINED ON THE SPECIAL TAG.

Rec'd 11-26-88

RECORD OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING (Efforts and Physical Data)		DATE 21 SEPT 1988 A-076	
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE INITIAL (If any) GRADE SERVICE NO. (If any)		CILHI CASE NUMBER (If applicable) CILHI 0055-88	
NAME OF COUNTRY EVACUATION NUMBER OR SEARCH AND RESCUE NUMBER TSN 3581-66		PLAT REG GRADE	
RECEIVED FROM U.S. Army Mortuary, Oakland AB, California		IMPRINT OF IDENTIFICATION TAG	
OFFICIAL IDENTIFICATION FOUND WITH REMAINS (Include personnel efforts using identified name) None received			
ITEMS OF CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOUND WITH REMAINS (Indicate type, color, size, markings, source, etc. If laundry items, are submitted, follow procedures outlined in TM 10-200) Service Dress Blue Jumper (rank HM3) laid over remains in casket			
FINGERPRINTS TAKEN ☐ YES ☐ NO		FINGERPRINT STATEMENT ATTACHED ☐ YES ☐ NO	
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN ☐ YES ☐ NO		CHEMICAL STATEMENT ATTACHED ☐ YES ☐ NO	
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION			
ESTIMATED HEIGHT 67.4" S.E. 3.5"	IRREGULARITY Average	AGE 24.7 yr S.D. 4.3 yr	RACE OR NATIVITY Caucasoid
TATTOOS, SCARS OR MARKS ON BODY N.A.			
EVIDENCE OF HEALED FRACTURES AND BONE MALFORMATIONS None observed			
WOUNDS OR INJURIES Possible perimortem crash trauma			
I HAVE PERSONALLY VIEWED THE REMAINS OF THIS DECEASED AND ALL RESULTING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECORDED TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE			
NAME, GRADE, AND ORGANIZATION Madeleine J. Hinkes, Ph.D., D.A.B.F.A.		SIGNATURE Madeleine J. Hinkes	

DD FORM 890

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

US ARMY PUBLICATIONS CENTER
BALTIMORE - 1984

1207

Rec'd 11-26-88

A-07

STAFF REVIEW SUMMARY

CILHI 0055-88

The scientific staff of the US Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii reviewed on 20 Oct 1988 the recommendation that the remains of CILHI 0055-88 be identified as those of HM3 MARK V DENNIS. There was unanimous support for this recommendation on the following grounds.

1. There was a favorable comparison between the remains and antemortem dental records of HM3 Dennis.
2. The biological determinations of the CILHI anthropologist were consistent with the physical descriptions of HM3 Dennis.
3. There is nothing in the CILHI processing case file that would preclude these remains being those of HM3 Dennis.
4. The available dentition can be excluded as belonging to anyone known to have been in the helicopter other than HM3 Dennis.

20 OCT 1988

Ellis R. Karley
Ellis R. Karley, Ph.D.
Diplomate, American Board
of Forensic Anthropology

Staff Present:

LTC Johnie Webb, Commander
Dr. Ellis Karley, Scientific Director
LTC Collie M. Trent, MC, Forensic Pathologist
Mr. Thorne Helgesen, Laboratory Administrator
Dr. Madeleine Hinkes, Forensic Anthropologist
Mr. Jason Ota, Anthropologist
MAJ Brian C. Smith, DC, Dentist
SSO Deborah Blacknell, Casualty Analyst

Assigned: Dr. Hinkes
Peer Review: Sara Collins

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of 121



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY (HAWAII)
FORT SHAFTER HAWAII 96858-1400



DAPC-PED-H (600-8-1m)

14 November 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDER, U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY,
ATTN: DAPC-PED-F, ALEXANDRIA, VA 22331-04R2

SUBJECT: Remains CILHI 0055-88

1. Forwarded for your review is the case file containing the record or examination and analysis for the remains in CILHI 0055-88.

2. Based upon the dental, skeletal, and circumstantial evidence, it is recommended that these remains be identified as DENNIS, Mark V, 282-42-1904, HM3, USN.

3. Upon completion of the AFIRB action, it is requested that this office be notified of the identification decision and disposition instructions.

4. Enclosed are HM3 DENNIS's original medical and dental records for appropriate disposition by the parent service.

3 Encls

1. Staff Review Summary,
20 Oct 88
2. DA Form 2773-R w/encls,
14 Nov 88
3. Orig Med and Den Records

John E. Werd, Jr.
JOHNIE E. WERD, JR.
LTC, OM
Commanding

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A-0

STATEMENT OF IDENTIFICATION				
For use of this form, see AR 600-6-1, the appropriate agency in MILPERCEN				
CILHI 0055-88	GRADE HM3/E4	ASN 282-42-1904	BRANCH OF SERVICE USN	DATE OF INCIDENT 15 JULY 1966
ORGANIZATION AND BASE H&S 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MAR DIV (REIN) FMF			PLACE OF DEATH/INCIDENT QUANG TRI PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM	
CONDITION OF REMAINS (Choose exactly as Narrative below)				
Recognizable	☒ Not Recognizable	Complete	☒ Unaltered	
Burned	☒ Decomposed	Identical	☒ Skeletal	
MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION (Check all appropriate boxes. Specify supporting data in Narrative below)				
Fingerprint Comparison	☒ Fingerprint Comparison	☒ Dental Comparison	☒ Anthropological Comparison	
☒ Skeletal Comparison	☒ Personal Effects	☒ Visual Recognition	☒ Identification Tags	
Other (Specify in Narrative) ☒ Circumstantial Info				
ENCLOSURES				
DD Form 888			DD Form 888	
DD Form 889			ID Card	
DD Form 300			BF 803	
Dental X-Rays			DD Form 2084	
BF 801				

SEE CONTINUATION SHEET

NARRATIVE AND EXAMINATION (Continue on reverse or use additional sheets, if required)

BACKGROUND

These remains were received from the U.S. Army Mortuary, Oakland AB, on 1 April 1989. They were believed to be the remains of MARK V DENNIS, one of 13 casualties of a 15 July 1966 helicopter explosion in South Vietnam (MSG 210305Z JUL 66, CG THIRD MAR DIV). The remains were originally processed at Tan Son Nhut Mortuary (TSN 3591-66). Identification was achieved through exclusion: After 12 remains were identified through dentition and/or ID tags, the only unidentified remains were matched with the only unassociated name, DENNIS. These remains have been exhumed and re-analyzed several times since their initial processing. This is the first time they have been examined by CILHI forensic scientists.

CONDITION OF REMAINS

The remains are incomplete and only recently skeletonized. There are small areas of charring. A portion of the left femur and the pubes have been sectioned. Some bones are labeled with a hand-printed "MOD". During examination at CILHI, portions of dental and skeletal material were excised for use in DNA testing.

MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION

Identification was attempted through three avenues: dental, skeletal, and genetic. The dental remains of CILHI 0055-88 were compared with the dental records and radiographs of Mark V DENNIS, and all findings proved consistent with DENNIS. A computer enhancement of antenatal and postmortem dental radiographs also proved consistent with DENNIS. Biological information derived from the skeletal remains is consistent with the information in DENNIS's military medical file. Seven dental/skeletal samples were submitted for DNA-PRINT analysis; the results were inconclusive. (See body of case file for all pertinent reports.)

(continued)

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TAB *Rec'd 11-26-88*
NARRATIVE AND SUMMARY CONTINUE

A-0.
Circumstantial evidence, in the form of company muster reports immediately before and after the incident and eye witness statements, leaves no doubt that Mark V DENNIS was aboard the helicopter when it exploded. Therefore, based on the dental and skeletal evidence, there is no reason to believe that these are the remains of anyone other than MARK V DENNIS.

Summary prepared by M. J. Hinkes, 21 Sep 88

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the anthropologist and odontologist, the general agreement of all available evidence, and the absence of any conflicting evidence, it is recommended that these remains be identified as those of
MARK V DENNIS -
282-42-1904 HM3 USN -

This recommendation is based on circumstances of the incident as well as biologic determinations made during processing by the anthropologist and odontologist at the US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii.

RECOMMENDATIONS PRESENTED

TYPED NAME OF IDENTIFICATION SPECIALIST ELLIS R. KERLEY, PH.D., D.A.B.F.A.	NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSTALLATION U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LAB Fort Shafter, Hawaii 96858-5480
TITLE OF IDENTIFICATION SPECIALIST Scientific Director	
SIGNATURE OF IDENTIFICATION SPECIALIST <i>Ellis R. Kerley</i>	DATE 20 October 1988

RECOMMENDATIONS APPROVED

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made herein are correct and true		
TYPED NAME OF APPROVING OFFICER JOHNIE E. WEBB, JR.	GRADE LTC	NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSTALLATION U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LAB Fort Shafter, Hawaii 96858-5480
TITLE OF APPROVING OFFICER Commanding		
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER <i>John E. Webb, Jr.</i>	DATE 14 November 1988	27 OF 121

REVERSE OF DA FORM 2773-R, APR 88


DA FORM 2773-R, Continuation Sheet
CILHI 0055-88

ENCLOSURES

DD Form 890 Record of Identification Processing, 21 Sept 88
DD 891 Dental Chart, 15 Sept 88
Forensic Odontology Report, 16 Sept 88
DA 5520-R Physical & Dental Comparison Chart, 15 Sept 88
DD 892 Skeletal Chart, 20 Sept 88
Forensic Anthropology Report, 4 April 88
LIFECODES CORP. Confirmation of Receipt of Samples (3),
26 May 88, 23 June 88, 11 July 88
LIFECODES CORP. Report, 10 Aug 88 A Letter, 9 Nov 88
Forensic Consultants Report, 30 June 88, w/attachment 7 July 88

Envelope: Dental Radiographs (AM & PM), Photographs (2)

DD 898 Record Data, 28 Aug 88
Biographic Data Sheet, 2 pp.
Information Concerning Plane Crash
Summary of Incident
Summary of all Available Facts/Information
JD 1300, 25 July 66
NAVVED N, 25 July 66
Medical and Dental Records



NEW YORK STATE POLICE
BUREAU 11
SIXTH FLOOR
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12242

TELETYPE TRANSMISSION INFORMATION LINE:

TO: Mr. John Rogers - Rm 300 Holiday Inn

813-441-6161 11-2-132

FROM: Dr. Levine - FSU

NOTE: _____

NUMBER OF SHEETS INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 2

IF THERE IS A QUESTION CALL (518) 457-6811

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS TELEPHONE NUMBER IS (518) 457-2237



LOWELL J. LEVINE D.D.S.
DENTIST A.B.D.O.
1 RINGOLD COURT
HUNTINGTON STATION, N. Y. 11746
(516) 367-6788

A-023

November 15, 1988

Lt. Colonel James Cole
US Army
DAPC PED ASGRO
2461 Eisenhower Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22331-0482

Re: CILMI 055-88

Dear Colonel Cole:

I have examined the available evidence in the above case including a portion of the skull and dental x-ray films taken with teeth in position.

It is my opinion that the dental chart dated 15 September 1988 is a correct description as the remains existed on that date based upon that examination.

It is my opinion that the dentition of CILMI 055-88 is totally consistent with the dental record (SP 603) of MARK V. DENNIS dated June 10, 1964 and that my interpretation of the dental record (SP 603) agrees with that of the dental officers (Tarsitano and Koehler in 1971, Smith in 1988).

It is my opinion that the periapical dental x-ray of the upper left molar area reveals characteristics that are interpreted as completely consistent with the postmortem film of the same area in the morphology of the two remaining teeth. Electronic image enhancement of these radiographs is quite valuable in that comparison.

I have considered the circumstances, the reports of competent forensic anthropologists as well as the dental evidence and it is my opinion that the above case is the remains of RM3 MARK V. DENNIS, USN.

Sincerely,

Lowell J. Levine
Lowell J. Levine, DDS

1214

Rec'd 11-26-88

A-084

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS TO:

MR. JOHN ROGERS

(NAME)

(COMPANY)

(STREET)

(CITY, STATE, ZIP)

202-653-1280

(FAX)

(PHONE)

DATE: 11-22-88NUMBER OF PAGES: 4 (INCLUDING THIS PAGE)FROM: WALTER H. BIRKBYFORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGIST

FAX NUMBER: 602-791-9168

IF ANY PORTION OF THIS TRANSMISSION IS NOT CLEAR,

PLEASE CALL: 602-884-0177

noted
1230,
20 Nov 88
31
05 12

1215

Rec'd 11-26-88

A-085



ARIZONA STATE MUSEUM

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

TUCSON, ARIZONA 85721

Human Identification Laboratory

November 22, 1988

Lt. Col. James G. Cole
US Total Army Personnel Agency
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332-0400

Re: CILHI 0055-88

On 8 November 1988, while serving as consultant to the Chief, Armed Services Graves Registration Office, Washington, D.C., I am requested by Dr. Ellis A. Kerley, Scientific Director of the CILHI Laboratory to evaluate the incomplete, partially burned and recently skeletonized remains of an individual designated by the above cited case number. The remains reputedly are those of HNS Mark V. DENNIS (282-42-1904) USA.

The observed skeletal materials are essentially consistent with the CILHI anthropology inventory of 4 April 1988 and the drawing on Form DD892 dated 20 September 1988, both produced by Dr. Madeleine J. Hinkes.

The remains are those of a young adult male with a mean age of 24.7 years (S.D. 4.3 years) based on public symphysis changes consistent with Phase II of Suchey-Brooks.

The cranium, although badly damaged, is morphologically consistent with Caucasian males based on the shape of the cranial base, the width of the right and left temporal pores, and the sharp and elevated left nasal sill.

On this same date Dr. William Maples and I jointly measured the fragmentary femur using an osteometric board. The fragment comprising the distal one-fourth of the femur does not articulate with the femoral shaft because an approximately 0.5 cm section has been removed from the most proximal projecting edge of this distal portion. For this reason, three different measurements are taken for comparison with previous reports on this case:

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05/12

Lt. Col. James G. Cole
CILNI 0055-88
November 22, 1988
Page 2

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A-086

1. Physiological length, cut surface of distal fragment and proximal fragment in contact = (44.8) cm;
2. Morphological length, cut surface of distal fragment and proximal fragment in contact = (45.0) cm;
3. Morphological length, with distal fragment and proximal fragment placed in their approximate anatomical relationship = (45.3) cm.

An independent measurement of Segment 1 using the technique of Steele (1970) for the proximal right femur is approximately 8.0 cm in length. A Segment 1 length of 8.0 cm yields an estimated femoral length of 46.11 cm $\pm$ 2.32 cm (s.e.) for White Males.

Mean staturel estimations based on the three measurements above give heights of 66.7 inches, 66.9 inches, and 67.4 inches respectively. The mean staturel estimation using Steele's Segment 1 produces a height of 67.9 inches ($\pm$ 3.94 s.e.). All staturel are computed using the formulae of Trotter and Gleser (1958) for White Males.

Discussion

My anthropological evaluation of the remains (CILNI 0055-88) are consistent with the known biological data given by the military for RM3 Mark V. DENNIS and is also consistent with the Forensic Anthropology report produced at the CILNI Laboratory and dated 4 April 1988.

In addition, I have examined the postmortem dental radiographs produced on this above cited case and the antemortem dental charts and radiographs labeled Mark V. DENNIS plus the electronic enhancement of the antemortem and postmortem X-rays and conclude that there are no inconsistencies between the antemortem and postmortem records and the Forensic Odontology report produced on 16 September 1988 at the CILNI Laboratory.

The findings of Dr. Michael Charney in his report of 16 February 1988, especially with regard to the estimated living stature and the racial assessment of these remains are not consistent with the observed facts. Dr. Charney determined a left femoral length of 44.3 cm which is shorter than any of the measurements made by Dr. Maples and me. Even our shortest measurement (1) which has the cut distal fragment in contact with the proximal fragment measure more than the 44.3 cm he obtained.

Dr. Charney's staturel computation using the formulae of Trotter and Gleser (1952) for White Males is in error by approximately 3.5 cm because he

Lt. Col. James G. Cole
CILNI 0055-88
November 22, 1988
Page 3

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used only a factor of 2.3 rather than the required 2.38 times his femur length estimation.

Dr. Charney's race estimation on the remains seems to be based solely on the anterior femoral bow which he perceives to be more characteristic of the "Mongoloid racial stock". I find this to be less reliable than the cranial and dental observations which support, in the above cited case, that the remains are those of a basically Caucasian Male. The determination of anterior femoral bow in fragmentary remains must be viewed as spurious at best. (Also, perhaps it would have been well for Dr. Charney to have applied the Mongoloid stature regression formulae to his obtained femoral length instead of using the formulae of White Males).

And, lastly, anterior femoral bow must NOT be construed as the same physical feature as "bow-legged" (i.e., genu varus).

Walter H. Birky, Ph.D.
Walter H. Birky, Ph.D., D-ABFA
Forensic Anthropologist

WHB/ar

RECORD DATA (DECEASED AND MISSING PERSONNEL)		HECK ONE ☒ DEAD ☐ MISSING	DATE 28 Aug 88
STATUS			
LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL DENNIS, Mark "V"		GRADE HM3/E4	SERVICE NUMBER 7789145
ORGANIZATION H & S 2nd BN 1st MAR 1st MAR DIV (REIN) FMF		JPMR SERVICE NUMBER SSN: 282-42-1904	
DATE OF DEATH - 15 Jul 66 CAUSE OF DEATH		PLACE OF DEATH - South Vietnam	
DATE OF BIRTH 21 Sep 46		South Vietnam Quang Tri Province	
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS			
RACE Caucasian	CREED Protestant	HEIGHT 67 1/4"	WEIGHT 152 lb
COLOR *EYES *Brown	COLOR *HAIR Brown	SHOE SIZE Junk	BLOOD TYPE A Neg
FRACTURES AND/OR BURNS None listed in medical records		TATTOOS AND SCARS None listed in Medical records	
DENTAL RECORDS			
DENTAL DATA ☐ NONE OF RECORD ☒ INCLUDED (License by Form Number and Date of Record) SF 603 dtd 10 Jun 64 (date of last entry 20 Oct 65) X-Rays - BW's 26 Aug 65 and one set undated			
CASUALTY DATA ☐ CASUALTY REPORT ☐ STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES ☐ MISSING PERSONS SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT (AF Form 600) ☒ OTHER (Specify)			
DD Form 1300 dtd 25 Jul 66			
ADDITIONAL DATA			
Service: U. S. Navy File No.: TSN 3587-66 SF 88: (1) dtd 04 Feb 64 SF 89: (1) dtd 04 Feb 64 NAVMED Form "N": dtd 25 Jul 66 Chest X-Ray: dtd 04 Feb 64 *Note, NAVMED Form "N" dtd 25 Jul 66 indicated color of eyes as blue.			

DD FORM 898

REPLACE DD FORM 898, 24 JAN 67, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

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OF 121

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

A-089

NAME: DENNIS, Mark "V"

GRADE: HM3/E4

SSN: 282-42-1904

SERVICE NO: 7789145

SERVICE: U.S. Navy

BIRTH DATE: 21 Sep 46

DATE OF DEATH: 15 Jul 66

RACE: Caucasian

SEX: Male

HAIR: Brown

HEIGHT: 67 1/4"

WEIGHT: 152 lb

BLOOD TYPE: A-Neg

BUILD: Medium

ABNORMALITIES: None listed on medical records

MEDICAL RECORDS: Yes

DENTAL RECORDS: Yes

DENTAL X-RAYS: Yes

MEDICAL X-RAYS: Yes

PHOTOGRAPHS: No

CASUALTY REPORTS/INCIDENT REPORTS: None

DIA FILE NO: None Listed

DD FORM 1300: Yes

DATE OF MISSION: 15 Jul 66

TYPE OF MISSION: Troop Reinforcement

TYPE OF INCIDENT: Hostile Action

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OF 121

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CURRENT STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL: KIA
 UNIT ASSIGNED TO: H & S 2ND BN, 1ST MAR 1ST MAR DIV (REIN) FMC
 DUTY POSITION: Passenger
 NUMBER OF KIA: 13 (KIA)
 NAME OF POW CAMP: None Listed
 TYPE OF LOCATION OF SITE: Incident Location (crash site)
 INCIDENT LOCATION:
 LAST KNOWN LOCATION:
 COUNTRY: South Vietnam
 PROVINCE: Quang Tri
 MILITARY REGION:
 VEHICLE: CH-46A

YEAR OF VEHICLE: Not Listed
 TAIL NO./SERIAL NO. OF VEHICLE: Not Listed

MISSION CODE NAME/NO: Operation Hasting

CALL SIGN: Not Listed

TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPON: Not Listed

INDIVIDUAL WEAPON SERIAL NO: Not Listed

REMARKS: Date of incident is certified to be 15 July 1966 per C.G. THIRD MARDIV
 message DTG 210305Z JUL 66

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INFORMATION CONCERNING PLANE CRASH

AIRCRAFT: CH-46A Unknown
 TYPE AIL NO.
 TIME & DATE: 1800 15 Jul 66
 TIME DATE
 GRID COORD: South Vietnam Quang Tri
 COORDINATES COUNTRY PROVINCE

REASON FOR CRASH: Aircraft was hit by .50 cal machine-gun fire, capsized
 upon making a hard emergency landing and burned.

ABOARD	16	0	13	3	0
	NO. ABOARD	NO. MIA/BNR	NO. KIA	NO. RESCUED	NO. CAPTURED/ RELEASED
POSITION ON AIRCRAFT	NAME AND RANK	SN/SSN	UNIT		
Pilot	Capt/03 USMC MCALISTER, Thomas C.	SN: 005394	UNK		
Co-Pilot	1stLt/01 USMC RICHEY, George C.	SN: 008665	UNK		
Crew Chief	SGT/E5 USMC TELFER, Robert R.	SN: 1071372	HMM 265 MAG 16 3RD MARDIV (REIN)		
Door Gunner	SGT/E5 USMC LUCAS, Gary A.	SN: 1959141	UNK		
Passenger	HM3/E4 USN DENNIS, Mark "V"	SN: 7789145 SSN: 292-42-1304	H & S 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MAR DIV (REIN) FMC		
Passenger	PFC/E2 USMC GOODIN, Michael A.	SN: 2127938	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)		
Passenger	PFC/E2 USMC SCHLOEMER, Carl W.	SN: 2149732	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)		
Passenger	2ndLt/01 USMC CULLERS, Ronald K.	SN: 092158	CO A 1ST ENG BN 1ST MARDIV (REIN)		
Passenger	PFC/E2 USMC CHERRICK, James W.	SN: 2205708	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)		

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A-09: 11-26-80

A-09:

POSITION ON AIRCRAFT	NAME/GRADE/RANK/BRANCH	SN/SSN	UNIT
Passenger	PFC/E2 USMC STUBSTAD, Gerald E.	SN: 2179223	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)
Passenger	CPL/E4 USMC CHAMBERS, Paul R.	SN: 2056522	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MAR DIV (REIN)
Passenger	PFC/E2 USMC CUNNUION, Michael A.	SN: 2170734	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 3RD MARDIV (REIN)
Passenger	CPL/E4 USMC REID, James M.	SN: 2050762	CO A 1ST ENGR BN 1ST MARDIV (REIN)
Passenger	CPL/E4 USMC CASE, Orson H.	SN: 1994238	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)
Passenger	SSGT/E6 USMC SIMMONS, Herold T.	SN: 1900256	CO E 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV (REIN)
Passenger	HM3/E4 USN CHAMAJ, Andrew P.	SN: 6979759	H&S CO 2ND BN 1ST MAR 1ST MARDIV

1223

A-093

SUMMARY OF INCIDENT

On 15 July 1966, Capt MCALLISTER, Pilot, 1stLt RICHEY, Co-pilot, SGT LUCAS, Door Gunner, and SGT TELFER, Crew Chief were the crew of a CH-46A helicopter participating in "Operation Hasting" troop reinforcement.

After being hit by hostile ground fire (probably from a .50 cal machine-gun), the helicopter made an emergency landing in a mortar emplacement area manned by friendly troops just north of Quang Tri Province, North Vietnam. The troops in the area immediately converged to assist in the rescue efforts, however, the explosions occurring aboard the helicopter precluded an immediate recovery, but ultimately all remains were removed.

Summary of all Available Facts/Information

A-094

1. NIS Report of Investigation dtd 10-23-81 indicated it was considered possible but not likely that an individual could have been flying aboard a helicopter and not listed as a passenger. It was also noted that upon final review of the crash circumstances/operation, no information to support any discrepancies regarding the specific helicopter DENNIS was travelling and the passengers aboard had ever surfaced.

a. Background information:

On 15 July 1966 P03 DENNIS' company was designated to provide support for other military units in Quang Tri Province. Ten helicopters provided transportation to the designated area. A company muster was made prior to departing Dong Ha, the Marine base camp location. Immediately after the incident, the helicopters transporting other company "E" members returned to Dong Ha for re-muster, thus personnel aboard the downed helicopter were known by name and certified as being aboard by the Commander of Company "E". The Commanding Officer of CO. "E" transmitted a letter of condolence dtd 28 July 1966, only after ascertaining Mark Dennis' whereabouts and determining beyond all reasonable doubt that he was aboard the helicopter which crashed.

2. Crash was witnessed by Martin ("Mike") WEENICK a scout for HQ Company, 3rd Battalion. Reference NIS Report of Investigation dtd 08-27-81 (WEENICK's interview).

3. The helicopter made an emergency landing in a mortar emplacement area manned by friendly troops who immediately converged to assist in rescue efforts. However, the explosions occurring aboard the helicopter precluded an immediate recovery, but ultimately all remains were removed. During WEENICK's interview by NIS he indicated "later when volunteers were solicited to remove the bodies, he volunteered along with 6-10 others". (No information available indicates how much "later" S/R efforts began).

4. Subsequent to removal of remains from the Dong Ha area to the division field hospital at Da Nang processing for individual identification and preparation of the certificates of death was accomplished. The reverse side of certificates prepared for each individual, recorded data regarding circumstances and the method of identification (majority by dental comparison) made at Da Nang. U.S.A. Mortuary TSN confirmed identifications made by use of all ID media available including a comparison of physical characteristics (see attached sheet).

5. Date of Incident is certified to be 15 July 1966 per C.G. THIRD WARDIV message DTG 210305Z JUL 66

FORM 100 (1-66)

Let 11/26/82

SHIP OR STATION	DIAGNOSIS, DIAGNOSIS NUMBER AND REMARKS	DATE	
		FROM	TO
USNS, KINROSS CINCINNATI, OHIO		JUN - 8 1964	JUN - 8 1964
USMC, GREAT LAKES, ILL.		JUN 8 1964	AUG 12 1964
USS WASH, CV-16	duty	21 JUL 65	5 FEB 65
USC, GREAT LAKES, ILL.		8 FEB 65	8 JUN 1965
U. S. Navy Hosp, Camp Lejeune, N.C.	DUTY	21 JUL 65	2-11-66
FLORIANSEN, MCB, CAMP LEJEUNE, NC		26 FEB 66	1 APR 66
HKS C-242B, 1st MARS	DeTy	11 APR 66	
3d U.S. Marine Division	Health record terminated this	27 July 1966	
4th U.S. Marine Division	Arts by reason of death.		
NAME (Last, first and middle)			
DENNIS, Mark V.		BIRTH DATE	IDENTIFICATION NO.
		21 SEP 46	7789145

1226

6. The crew and passenger's were identified by the following method:

A-09:

NAME	File No.	Identification By
TELFER, Robert R.	3531-66	Dental Records
DENNIS, Mark "V"	3581-66	Elimination Process
CHERRICK, James W.	3578-66	Dental Records
CULLERS, Ronald K.	3599-66	ID Tags
CHAMBERS, Paul R.	3475-66	Dental/Health Records
STUDSTAD, Gerald E.	3520-66	Dental Records/ID Tags
CASE, Orson H.	3457-66	Dental Records
CONNIVON, Michael A.	3466-66	Dental Records
SIMMONS, Harolin T.	3456-66	Dental Records
SCHLOMER, Carl W.	3455-66	ID Card/Tags
REID, James M.	3458-66	ID Tags
GOODIN, Michael A.	3513-66	Dental Records
CHAMAJ, Andrew P.	3451-66	

1227

Revised 10-1-66
Form 10-1-66

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962-0-1 A-097

CLINICAL RECORD		CONSULTATION SHEET	
TO: ENT	FROM: (Requester's name, rank, or service)	DATE OF REQUEST	
REASON FOR REQUEST (Complete and legible)			
<i>Chronic Rheumatoid Arthritis of the left hand. Has had some relief in the past. A.S.M. work used to be.</i>			
PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS			
DATE OF EXAMINATION	APPROVED	PLACE OF CONSULTATION	☐ OUTPATIENT ☐ INPATIENT
CONSULTATION REPORT			

PROPERTY ROOMS
U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C.

SIGNATURE AND TITLE		IDENTIFICATION NO.		ORGANIZATION	
DATE		REGISTER NO.		WARD NO.	
PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (If in record or where patient is: Name-date, rank, number, grade, date, hospital or medical facility)					
<i>Dennis, Mark V</i>					
CONSULTATION SHEET Standard Form 513 1-3-196-02					

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OF 121

42
OF 121

SICK CALL TREATMENT RECORD
NUMBER 19 (REV. 5-55) FIRST

STATUS	ALIVE	TYPE OF FIRST BELOW IDENTIFICATION LABEL	DATE OF BIRTH	21 SEPT. 49	10	A-09
DATE	NAME OF TREATING FACILITY, COMPLAINT, TREATMENT ADMINISTERED, SIGNATURE AND NAME/DATE OF PERSON ADMINISTERING TREATMENT	FILE NUMBER	7789149			

U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CAMP LEBRON, E. O.
BROOK AFB TEXAS

1-7-66

Completed nasal passage & sinus
T-9874

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

EMERGENCY ROOM
U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CAMP LEBRON, E. O.

0800 Completed nasal passage

T-978

Pl. nasal congestion - severe

Pl. nasal congestion

(Over)

45
of 121

Standard Form 600
Prescribed Form 600
by Special Form 600
Control A-12

A-09

HEALTH RECORD	CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
DATE	SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)

6-10-66

U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL

CAMP LEBRON, E. O.

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

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Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

Pl. nasal congestion

APR 7 1968

MEDICAL SECTION

CAMP SMEDLEY D. BUTLER

FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 96872

EXAMINED THIS DATE AND

WAS FOUND PHYSICALLY

QUALIFIED FOR TRANSFER.

DEFECTS NOTED: none

REMARKS:

27 July 1966

Medical Section

San Francisco

by reason of death,

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

Ref. MED 24-9

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

M. V. WATKINS Jr.

SEX	RACE	GRADE, RATING, OR POSITION	ORGANIZATION UNIT	COMPONENT OR BRANCH	SERVICE, DEPT., OR AGENCY
M	CHI	EN	EN	EN	EN
PATIENT'S LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE NAME			DATE OF BIRTH (MM-DD-YY)		IDENTIFICATION NO.
DENNIS, Mark V			21 Sep 46		778 91 35 151

10-070-1

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
Standard Form 600

11-26-58

A-101

OTHER IMMUNIZATIONS					
DATE	TYPE	DOSE	REACTION	REMARKS	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1				HAMU # 4	
2				SPECIAL PROTECTIVE	
3	11-1-58	INFLUENZA		NR005.02.1203 18	D.O. COFFMAN
4	11-1-58	POLIO VIRUS, ORAL	Type I gtt. 11		D.O. COFFMAN
5	11-1-58	POLIO VIRUS, ORAL	Type II gtt. 11; Type III gtt. 11		D.O. COFFMAN
6	11-1-58	POLIO VIRUS, ORAL	Type I gtt. 11; Type II gtt. 11		D.O. COFFMAN
7	11-1-58	POLIO VIRUS, ORAL	Type III gtt. 11		D.O. COFFMAN
8	11-1-58	100			
9	11-1-58	100			
10	11-1-58	100			
11	11-1-58	100			
12	11-1-58	100			

SENSITIVITY TESTS (Tuberculin, etc.)

DATE	TYPE	DOSE	ROUTE	RESULTS	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	USMC, CLARKS, III				
2	TUBERCULIN PPD	0.0001 mg	INTRADERMAL	None	D.O. COFFMAN
3	PHOSPHATIDIN M2	1:1000 U.M.L.	"	"	D.O. COFFMAN
4	PPD ATYPICAL B	0.0001 mg	"	"	D.O. COFFMAN
5	PPD ATYPICAL	0.0001 mg	"	"	D.O. COFFMAN
6	9-9-55 PPD	.0001	"	NEG	F.W. RICHARDSON

REACTIONS (To transfusions, drugs, sera, foods, allergens, etc.)

DATE	AGENT	TYPE OF REACTION	SEVERITY	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	11-1-58 SULFA drugs	None	Severe, Nausea	16 SA Thompson

BLOOD TYPING

DATE	TYPE (International)	RH FACTOR	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	"A"	NEG	

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Including history of diseases for which any of the above immunizing agents were given with past and place of origin)

11-26-58

A-101

Presented at Nov. 1958
By Bureau of the Station
Control A-101

HEALTH RECORD				IMMUNIZATION RECORD			
VACCINATION AGAINST SMALLPOX (Number of previous vaccination doses)				All entries in this to be made in block letters			
DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NUMBER	REACT*	DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NUMBER	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	11-1-58	MAJ. DRUG	408000-12	1	USMC, CLARKS, ILL.		D.O. COFFMAN
2	11-1-58	MAJ. DRUG	408000-12	2	USMC, CLARKS, ILL.		D.O. COFFMAN
3				3			
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
*ENTER RESULTS AS: IMMEDIATE REACTION (or immunity); ACCELERATED REACTION (Painful); TYPICAL PRIMARY VACCINE							
TRIPLE TYPHOID VACCINE							
DATE	DOSE	UNTOWARD REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	DOSE	UNTOWARD REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
TETANUS TOXOID (DIPHTHERIA)							
DATE	DOSE	UNTOWARD REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	DOSE	UNTOWARD REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
SCHICK TESTING AND DIPHTHERIA IMMUNIZATION							
DATE	DOSE	REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	DOSE	REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1				1			
2				2			
3				3			
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
TYPHOID VACCINE							
DATE	DOSE	REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	DOSE	REACTION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	1	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	2	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN	3	0.500	NONE	D.O. COFFMAN
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
CHOLERA VACCINE							
DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NO.	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NO.	PHYSICIAN'S NAME
1	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN	1	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN
2	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN	2	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN
3	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN	3	11-1-58	11-1-58	D.O. COFFMAN
4				4			
5				5			
6				6			
7				7			
8				8			
9				9			
10				10			
11				11			
12				12			
YELLOW FEVER VACCINE							
DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NO.	STATION	PHYSICIAN'S NAME	DATE	ORIGIN	BATCH NO.
1	11-1-58	11-1-58	USMC, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS	D.O. COFFMAN	1	11-1-58	11-1-58
2	11-1-58	11-1-58	USMC, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS	D.O. COFFMAN	2	11-1-58	11-1-58
3	11-1-58	11-1-58	USMC, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS	D.O. COFFMAN	3	11-1-58	11-1-58
4					4		
5					5		
6					6		
7					7		
8					8		
9					9		
10					10		
11					11		
12					12		
B. RACE, GRADE, RATING OR POSITION							
B. RACE		GRADE, RATING OR POSITION		ORGANIZATION UNIT		COMPONENT OR BRANCH	
M		SR		USMC, CLARKS		U. S. NAVY	
PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME				DATE OF BIRTH (MM-DD-YY)		IDENTIFICATION NO.	
11-1-58				11-1-58		11-1-58	

1282

Standard Form 213
Rev. August 1964
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
Circular A-33

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-5555

CLINICAL RECORD

CONSULTATION SHEET

1480 HN was recently referred
that he was exposed to...

PROVISIONAL DIAGNOSIS

DOCTOR'S SIGNATURE _____ APPROVED _____ PLACE OF CONSULTATION _____
☐ HOME ☐ ON CALL ☐ EMERGENCY ☐ ROUTINE

CONSULTATION REPORT

SIGNATURE AND TITLE _____ DATE _____ IDENTIFICATION NO. _____ ORGANIZATION _____

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION (For typed or written address given Home, Apt., etc., usually given after hospital or medical facility) REGISTER NO. _____ WARD NO. _____

CONSULTATION SHEET
Standard Form 213
515-105-02

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OF 121

1283

NAME PIERCE, RICHARD V. RATE/RANK 1/A
DEPARTMENT PHYSICIAN DIVISION 1 TELEPHONE 177

- | | YES | NO |
|---|----------|----------|
| 1. Have you had any recent illness? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 2. Are you taking any medicine now? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 3. Are you at the present time or have you in the past year been under the care of a physician? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 4. Have you ever had hay fever, asthma, or any allergy? | <u>X</u> | ___ |
| 5. Do you have any heart trouble? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 6. Have you ever had rheumatic fever? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 7. Have you been on a diet? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 8. (a) Have you ever taken penicillin or other antibiotics? | <u>X</u> | ___ |
| (b) If yes, did you have rash, nausea, vomiting etc. from the use of these drugs? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 9. Have you been given a local anesthetic (Novocaine, procaine, lidocaine, etc.) by a dentist or physician? | <u>X</u> | ___ |
| 10. Has a dentist or physician warned you against taking any specific medicine? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 11. Do you bleed for a long period of time when you cut yourself? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 12. Do you have any kidney ailment? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 13. Have you had diabetes? | ___ | <u>X</u> |
| 14. Do you have shortness of breath or swollen ankles? | ___ | <u>X</u> |

Richard V. Pierce
Signature

1234

Standard Form 100
Prescribed Form 100
By Bureau of the Budget
Circular 5-62

A-104 11-26-80

HEALTH RECORD		CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE	
DATE		SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)	
JUN 28 1960		U. S. NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS Examined this date upon reporting for recruit training and found to be physically qualified to perform active duty at sea and/or on foreign service.	
		PHOTOFLUOROGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF CHEST: 70 mm FILM NUMBER: 94701 X-RAY ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE VISION: Right Eye 20/20 Corrected to 20/ Left Eye 20/20 Corrected to 20/ VERL: 1.5 BLOOD TYPE "A" BLOOD PRESSURE: 116/72 URINE: SUGAR: OTHER:	
		PALANT: PASSED/PASSED DEFECTS NOTED:	
		H. L. RIPLE LT MC USN	
		USNHC, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS Examined this date in accordance with art. 15-50, 15-51 MHD and found physically qualified for transfer. DD 737 (IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATE) ISSUED THIS DATE.	
		D. O. COFFMAN CAPT MC USN	
SER		PATIENT'S LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE NAME	
M		DE HIR, MARK, W.	
GRADE, RATING, OR POSITION		ORGANIZATION UNIT	
S2		USNHC, CLARKS	
COMPONENT OR BRANCH		SERVICE, DEPT., OR AGENCY	
		U. S. NAVY DEFENSE	
DATE OF BIRTH (day-month-year)		IDENTIFICATION NO.	
70-9-6		7-8-21-46 728-26-75	

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE

Standard Form 100
1A-8100-201-0000

51


1235

A-105 11-26-80

DATE		SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)	
AUG 15 1960		USNHC, GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS Examined this date in accordance with art. 15-50, 15-51 MHD and found physically qualified for transfer. DD 737 (IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATE) ISSUED THIS DATE.	
		D. O. COFFMAN CAPT MC USN <i>bo Coffman</i>	
		(CYS-10) Post Office New York FEB 4 1965	
		Examined this date and found to be physically qualified for release from active duty.	
		H. L. RIPLE LT MC USN	
7 DEC 65		U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL, CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA CHEST X-RAY: FILM # 10717 DATED 8 NOV 65: RESULTS: PA CHEST: Is within normal limits. However, in view of the history I would suggest a lordotic film to check the apical area. (Richardson) CHEST X-RAY: FILM # 10717 DATED 14 NOV 65: RESULTS: LORDOTIC VIEW OF THE CHEST: Normal Study. (Warrander)	
		H. L. RIPLE, LOOK MC USN	
		J. A. HOWELL, LOOK MC USN CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION	

Standard Form 600
Prescribed Nov. 1961
By Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-53

A-106

HEALTH RECORD		CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE																									
DATE	SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT, TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)																										
JUN - 8 1964	U. S. NAVAL RECRUITING STATION, CINCINNATI, OHIO																										
	Examination done at the ARMED FORCES EXAMINING STATION, FORT THOMAS, KENTUCKY, within the past one hundred and eighty (180) days, and found to physically qualified for ENLISTMENT in the U.S. Navy and to perform all the duties of his rate at sea and on foreign shores.																										
	CHEST X-RAY: A. F. E. S., FT. THOMAS, KY.																										
	RESULTS: NEGATIVE	Number: 236	Date: 4 FEB 64																								
	CARDIOLIPIN FLUIDINGS: NEGATIVE																										
	DEFECTS NOTED:	NONE.																									
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>P</td> <td>U</td> <td>L</td> <td>R</td> <td>E</td> <td>S</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>A</td> <td>B</td> <td>C</td> <td>E</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>XXX</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>				P	U	L	R	E	S	1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	E			XXX					
P	U	L	R	E	S																						
1	2	3	4	5	6																						
A	B	C	E																								
XXX																											
 W. D. LARGWORTHY LT MC USNR																											

SEX	RACE	GRADE, RATING, OR POSITION	ORGANIZATION UNIT	COMPONENT OR BRANCH	SERVICE, DEPT., OR ASSIST
MALE	CAUC.	SR			U. S. NAVY
PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME				DATE OF BIRTH (mm-dd-yyyy)	IDENTIFICATION NO.
DENNIS. Mark V.				21 SEP 46	7789145

11

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
Standard Form 900

53.

Standard Form 600
Prescribed Nov. 1972
By Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-43

Rec'd 11-26-0

[illegible]

SEX M	RACE C	GRADE, RATING, OR POSITION (HS)HA	ORGANIZATION UNIT USS WASP	COMPONENT OR BRANCH U.S. NAVY	SERVICE, DEPT. OR AGENCY DEFENSE
PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME LENNIS, MARK N YN				DATE OF BIRTH (DD-MON-YY) 21 SEP 46	
				IDENTIFICATION NO. 778 91 45	

Keywords:

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MED
Standard Form 600

54

DD FORM 1300

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) **DENNIS, Mark V.** 2. GRADE OR RATE **778 91 85, 1B1, USN** 3. DATE OF BIRTH **0 June 1964** 4. SERVICE NUMBER **0122** 5. FIRST NAME **MARK V.**

6. RACE **WHITE** 7. ETHNIC ORIGIN **ASIAN** 8. RELIGION **PROTESTANT**

9. DATE OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE **21 September 1966** 10. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE **Pima, Ohio; Civilians**

11. DATE AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CURRENT STATUS AND HOME OF RECORD AT TIME **8 June 1964; Cincinnati, Ohio; Miami, Montgomery, Ohio**

12. DUTY STATION **282 42 1004, E-4; Over 2 yrs; \$211.50**

13. DUTY STATUS **Active Duty**

14. NAME OF COMMANDING OFFICER **Charles Russell Dennis** 15. ADDRESS **703 South Riverview Avenue, Miami, Ohio** 16. FATHER **None**

17. NAME OF COMMANDING OFFICER **Vern Alice Dennis** 18. ADDRESS **Same** 19. MOTHER **None**

20. REPORT FOR VA **CO THIRD MANDY 21 July 1966**

21. SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER, LOCAL BOARD, AND LOCATION **N.A. 8 June 1964; Cincinnati, Ohio**

22. FARM SERVICE DATA **YES**

23. REMARKS

24. FOOTNOTES

25. CERTIFICATION

26. SIGNATURE

27. DATE

28. TITLE

29. SIGNATURE

30. DATE

31. TITLE

32. SIGNATURE

33. DATE

34. TITLE

35. SIGNATURE

36. DATE

37. TITLE

38. SIGNATURE

39. DATE

40. TITLE

41. SIGNATURE

42. DATE

43. TITLE

44. SIGNATURE

45. DATE

46. TITLE

47. SIGNATURE

48. DATE

49. TITLE

50. SIGNATURE

51. DATE

52. TITLE

53. SIGNATURE

54. DATE

55. TITLE

56. SIGNATURE

57. DATE

58. TITLE

59. SIGNATURE

60. DATE

61. TITLE

62. SIGNATURE

63. DATE

64. TITLE

65. SIGNATURE

66. DATE

67. TITLE

68. SIGNATURE

69. DATE

70. TITLE

71. SIGNATURE

72. DATE

73. TITLE

74. SIGNATURE

75. DATE

76. TITLE

77. SIGNATURE

78. DATE

79. TITLE

80. SIGNATURE

81. DATE

82. TITLE

83. SIGNATURE

84. DATE

85. TITLE

86. SIGNATURE

87. DATE

88. TITLE

89. SIGNATURE

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Rev. November 1953
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-33 (Rev.)

11-26-58

HEALTH RECORD

DENTAL

A-109

SECTION I. DENTAL EXAMINATION

1. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION

2. TYPE OF EXAM.

3. DENTAL CLINICAL

4. INITIAL

5. SEPARATION

6. OTHER (Specify)

7. MISSING TEETH AND EXISTING RESTORATIONS

8. REMARKS

9. DISEASES, ABNORMALITIES, AND X-RAYS

10. CALCULUS

11. PERIODONTITIS

12. GINGIVITIS

13. VINCENT'S

14. DENTURES NEEDED

15. FULL

16. PARTIAL

17. ABNORMALITIES OF OCCLUSION-REMARKS

18. INDICATE X-RAYS USED IN THIS EXAMINATION

19. FULL MOUTH PERIAPICAL

20. POSTERIOR BITING

21. OTHER (Specify)

22. DATE

23. PLACE OF EXAMINATION

24. GREAT LAKES

25. SECTION II. PATIENT DATA

26. SEX

27. RACE

28. GRADE, RATING, OR POSITION

29. ORGANIZATION UNIT

30. COMPONENT OR BRANCH

31. SERVICE, DEPT., OR AGENT

32. USN

33. PATIENT'S LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE NAME

34. DATE OF BIRTH (DAY-MONTH-YEAR)

35. IDENTIFICATION NO.

36. DENTAL

37. STANDARD FORM 100

38. 56

SECTION III. ATTENDANCE RECORD

12. RESTORATIONS AND TREATMENTS (Completed during service)

13. SUBSEQUENT DISEASES AND ABNORMALITIES

A-11

REMARKS

REMARKS

17. SERVICES RENDERED

DATE	DIAGNOSIS-TREATMENT	CLASS	OPERATOR AND DENTAL FACILITY	INITIALS
11/1/46	Fluorine Fluoride Dental Application		HEWLE, Great Lakes, MI.	
2/24/47	17 UPPER 13. 12. 11. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 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11-26-54

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A-112

MEASUREMENTS AND OTHER FINDINGS

1. HEIGHT 67 1/2	2. WEIGHT 154	3. HAIR COLOR Brn	4. COMPLEXION Brn	5. BUILD (Check one) ☒ SLIM ☐ HEAVY ☐ OBESE	6. TENDENCIES 98.6
7. BLOOD PRESSURE (Left or Right arm) 110/70			8. PULSE (Left or Right arm) 72		
9. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN	10. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN	11. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN	12. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN	13. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN	14. EYES L. BROWN R. BROWN
15. EARS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		16. EARS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		17. EARS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
18. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		19. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		20. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
21. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		22. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		23. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
24. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		25. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		26. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
27. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		28. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		29. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
30. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		31. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		32. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
33. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		34. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		35. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
36. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		37. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		38. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
39. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		40. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		41. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
42. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		43. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		44. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
45. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		46. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		47. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
48. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		49. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		50. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
51. LARGE INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		52. LARGE INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		53. LARGE INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
54. RECTUM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		55. RECTUM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		56. RECTUM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
57. UTERUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		58. UTERUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		59. UTERUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
60. VAGINA L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		61. VAGINA L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		62. VAGINA L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
63. PENIS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		64. PENIS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		65. PENIS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
66. TESTES L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		67. TESTES L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		68. TESTES L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
69. PROSTATE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		70. PROSTATE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		71. PROSTATE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
72. BLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		73. BLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		74. BLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
75. URETERS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		76. URETERS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		77. URETERS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
78. KIDNEYS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		79. KIDNEYS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		80. KIDNEYS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
81. ADRENAL GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		82. ADRENAL GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		83. ADRENAL GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
84. THYROID GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		85. THYROID GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		86. THYROID GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
87. PARATHYROID GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		88. PARATHYROID GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		89. PARATHYROID GLANDS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
90. PITUITARY GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		91. PITUITARY GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		92. PITUITARY GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
93. HYPOTHALAMUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		94. HYPOTHALAMUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		95. HYPOTHALAMUS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
96. PINEAL GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		97. PINEAL GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		98. PINEAL GLAND L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
99. SPINAL CORD L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		100. SPINAL CORD L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		101. SPINAL CORD L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
102. BRAIN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		103. BRAIN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		104. BRAIN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
105. NERVOUS SYSTEM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		106. NERVOUS SYSTEM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		107. NERVOUS SYSTEM L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
108. EYE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		109. EYE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		110. EYE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
111. EAR L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		112. EAR L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		113. EAR L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
114. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		115. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		116. NOSE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
117. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		118. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		119. MOUTH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
120. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		121. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		122. THROAT L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
123. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		124. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		125. LUNGS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
126. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		127. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		128. HEART L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
129. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		130. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		131. SPLEEN L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
132. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		133. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		134. PANCREAS L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
135. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		136. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		137. LIVER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
138. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		139. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		140. GALLBLADDER L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
141. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		142. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		143. STOMACH L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	
144. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		145. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL		146. SMALL INTESTINE L. NORMAL R. NORMAL	

AFQT 88-80-II

(Use additional sheets if necessary)

7A. SUMMARY OF DEFENSE AND DAMAGES (Leave blank space on 2nd page of report)

7A. RECOMMENDATIONS—FURTHER SPECIALIST EXAMINATIONS INDICATED (If any)	7B. A PHYSICAL PROFILE
--	------------------------

77. EXAMINEE (Check)		☒	☒	☒	☒
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76. IF NOT QUALIFIED, LIST DISQUALIFYING DEFECTS BY ITEM NUMBER	A	B	C	D

7. TYPE OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN: DENNIS A. BROWN, MD

10. TYPE OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN _____
 SIGNATURE _____

8. TYPE OR PRINTED NAME OF DENTIST OR PHYSICIAN (Address below)	SIGNATURE
---	-----------

OR PRINTED NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OR APPROVING AUTHORITY **E. L. LUTHE** SIGNATURE **E. L. LUTHE** NUMBER OF ATTACHED SHEETS

7-11-68
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFICE WASH DC-20535

59
OF 121

1248

NRBS, MIAMISBURG, OHIO

Rec'd N-236
11-26-89

A-113

Reporting Agency (Do Not Leave Blank) Central AS Activity No. 100-1181 100-1181-100-1181		REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO HISTORICAL PERSONS		Recd 11-26-55 A-1
1. NAME - LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME DEINIS, Mark (V)		2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION		3. IDENTIFICATION NO. 7789145
4. HOME ADDRESS (Street, street or R.F.D., city or town, state and zip) 703 S. Beaver Miami Beach, Ohio		5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION Enlist in USN		6. DATE OF EXAMINATION 2/4/64
7. SEX Male	8. RACE Caucasian	9. TOTAL VARIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE MILITARY None CIVILIAN None	10. AGENCY USN	
11. DATE OF BIRTH 9/21/16		12. PLACE OF BIRTH Piqua, Ohio		13. NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AND ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN Charles Russell Dennis Same as App
14. EXAMINING FACILITY OR EXAMINER, AND ADDRESS AFES, FT. THOMAS, KY		15. OTHER INFORMATION		
16. STATEMENT OF EXAMINER'S PRESENT RESULTS IN OWN WORDS (Follow by description of past history, if exceptional cases)				

GOOD

II. FAMILY HISTORY				12. HAS ANY BLOOD RELATION (Parent, brother, sister, child) OR NEARER RELATION (Uncle, aunt, cousin, etc.)			
RELATION	AGE	STATUS OF HEALTH	IF DEAD, CAUSE OF DEATH	AGE AT DEATH	YES	NO (If not, specify where)	RELATIONSHIP
FATHER	53	GOOD			✓	NO	HAD TUBERCULOSIS
MOTHER	49	F.A.S.			✓	NO	HAD STOMACH
SPOUSE	27				✓	NO	HAD BRONCHITIS
	28				✓	NO	HAD CANCER
WIFE	28				✓	NO	HAD BRONCHITIS
AND	21				✓	NO	HAD HEART TROUBLE
OTHER					✓	NO	HAD STOMACH TROUBLE
					✓	NO	HAD DIARRHEA (or other)
CHILDREN					✓	NO	HAD "STOMACH" VERY POORLY
					✓	NO	HAD BRONCHITIS (or other)
					✓	NO	COMBINED BRONCHITIS
					✓	NO	DEAD WIFE

[illegible]

PLATE NO. 60

64

YES	NO	EXPLANATION (CHECK EACH ITEM YES OR NO. EVERY ITEM CHECKED - YES MUST BE FULLY EXPLAINED IN BLANK SPACE ON RIGHT)
☒	☐	7. HAVE YOU BEEN UNABLE TO HOLD A JOB BECAUSE OF: ☒ A. INCOMPETENCY TO ACQUIRE NECESSARY SKILLS ☐ B. INABILITY TO PERFORM CERTAIN FUNCTIONS ☐ C. INABILITY TO ATTEND CERTAIN FUNCTIONS ☐ D. OTHER MEDICAL REASONS (If yes, give reasons)
☐	☐	8. HAVE YOU EVER WORKED WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS?
☐	☐	9. DO YOU HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH SCHOOL STUDIES OR TEACHING (If yes, give details)
☐	☐	10. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AWARDED A COMPENSATION INCREASE OF YOUR SALARY (If yes, state reason and give details)
☐	☐	11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED LIFE INSURANCE? (If yes, state reason and give details)
☐	☐	12. HAVE YOU HAD AN X-RAY BEEN ORDERED TO HAVE, AN X-RAYING (If yes, describe and give age at which received)
☐	☐	13. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PATIENT (convinced or hospitalized) IN A HOSPITAL, HOSPITAL OR NURSING HOME (If yes, specify when, where, why, and name of doctor, and complete address of hospital or clinic)
☐	☐	14. HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY ALLEGES OF INJURY OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY NOTED? (If yes, specify when, where, and give details)
☐	☐	15. HAVE YOU CONSULTED OR BEEN TREATED BY CLINIC PHYSICIAN REGARDING OR OTHER PRACTITIONERS WITHIN THE PAST 1 YEAR? (If yes, give complete address of doctor, hospital, clinic, and details)
☐	☐	16. HAVE YOU TREATED YOURSELF FOR ALLERGENS OTHER THAN FOOD ALLERGY (If yes, which allergen)
☐	☐	17. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN SELECTED FOR MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? (If yes, give date and reason for rejection)
☐	☐	18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? (If yes, give date, reason, and type of discharge, whether honorable, other than honorable, for address of correspondence)
☐	☐	19. HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED A THUMB PUNCTURE, HAVE YOU LOST A FINGER OR DO YOU INTEND TO LOSE A FINGER ON COMPENSATION FOR EXPOSURE INJURY? (If yes, specify when lost, how lost, by whom, and what amount, when, why)

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY ME AND THAT IT IS TRUE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
 I CERTIFY THAT IF THE PHYSICIAN, HOSPITAL, OR CLINIC REQUESTED ABOVE TO FURNISH THE GOVERNMENT A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF MY MEDICAL RECORD OR FURNISHING OF RECORDS OR REPORTS OF THIS EVALUATION OR RECORDS.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF EXAMINEE: **MARK V. DENNIS** SIGNATURE: *[Signature]*

46. PHYSICIAN'S SUMMARY AND ELABORATION OF ALL POSITIVE DATA (Physician's full signature and an entire history on form 10-70)

Allegre L. S. S. S.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF OUTPASSOR OR CARRIER
DENNIS A. BROWN, MD

DATE
FEB 4 1968

SIGNATURE
[Signature]

NUMBER OF OUTPASS PARTS
PLATE NO. 10000 FIVE
63

REF ID: A68097

DEWIS, Mary "M", DOB 01-04-1915, USA
A. CASUALTY STATUS ☒ DECEASED ☐ MISSING ☐ ANASTIC OTHER FIRST NAME LAST NAME

KILLED IN ACTION - 15 July 1966 in the vicinity of Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam. Result of third degree burns received while a passenger in a helicopter which was shot down by enemy fire while participating in an operation against hostile forces.

GIVE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, RACE, RELIGION, EMPLOYMENT
21 September 1946; Plain, Ohio; Catholic; Prisoner of War

A DATE AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CURRENT STATUS AND HOME OF RECORD AT TIME
8 June 1966; Cincinnati, Ohio; Miamiport, Montgomey, Ohio

US ARMY TRAVEL VOUCHER, PAY GRADE, NUMBER OF DEPENDENT FOR PAY, DATE PAY WAS MADE, PAY PERIOD, PAY TYPE, PAY RATE
E-4; Over 2 yrs; \$211.50 ☐ FARE ☒ NO NON-COM

B. DUTY STATUS
Active Duty

C. DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL NUMBER, ADDRESS, CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE
Charles Russell Dennis 703 South Riverview Avenue, Miamisburg, Ohio Father
Vern Alice Dennis Same Mother

D. REPORT FOR VA'S FILE-ON ☒ YES ☐ NO CO THIRD MAJORIV 21 July 1966

E. SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER, LOCAL BOARD, AND LOCATION OF EXEMPTION, ORIGINALLY AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY
N.A. 6 June 1966; Cincinnati, Ohio

F. PRIOR SERVICE DATA
☐ YES ☒ NO

G. REMARKS

H. DISTRIBUTION
1a. Confirmed to be a true Certificate of Death.
F-4WD
John Miller
by direction of Chief of Staff Personnel

DD FORM 1300

FINGERPRINT CHART

A720
Rec'd M.R. 852

NAME OF CENTRAL, EXPLANATION NUMBER, OR SEARCH AND RECORD NUMBER		LEFT HAND		RIGHT HAND	
NOTE: INSTRUCTIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE, MISSING FINGER, AND/OR DENIAL TO APPROPRIATE BLOCK		1. THUMB		1. THUMB	
		2. INDEX FINGER		2. INDEX FINGER	
		3. MIDDLE FINGER		3. MIDDLE FINGER	
		4. RING FINGER		4. RING FINGER	
		5. PINKY FINGER		5. PINKY FINGER	
		6. THUMB		6. THUMB	
		7. INDEX FINGER		7. INDEX FINGER	
		8. MIDDLE FINGER		8. MIDDLE FINGER	
		9. RING FINGER		9. RING FINGER	
		10. PINKY FINGER		10. PINKY FINGER	
IMPORTANT ATTACH TO FORM 24 (Identification Card) TO THIS FORM IF AVAILABLE		IMPRESSIONS TAKEN BY (Name)			
FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE ONLY IDENTIFIED BY FINGERPRINT COMPARISON AT: LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE INITIAL		SERVICE NUMBER			
OFFICIAL APPROVING FINGERPRINT COMPARISON (Name)		DATE			

67

(Rev. 4-20-64)

INSTRUCTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

1. USE. This form will be completed for remains prepared in Department of Army Mortuaries or in contract mortuaries.
2. COMPLETION OF ITEMS: Item 12 will be completed by the preparing and central mortuary when applicable. Item 13 will be completed by all concerned when applicable, as when additional space is required for answering when items 12 and 13 will be omitted on copy furnished the receiving central director.
3. PREPARING MORTUARY:
- (1) Prepare original and 4 copies (7 when applicable - see Note) and complete items 1 thru 11. Retain one copy and forward original and 4 copies (or 5) to central mortuary. Forward 1 copy by Air Mail to Chief of Support Services, ATTH: Mortuary Division, at the time remains are shipped to central mortuary or released for local burial.
- (2) When remains are shipped directly to POE, preparing mortuary prepare original and 4 copies (or 5), completing items 1 thru 11. Retain one copy and forward 1 copy by Air Mail to the Chief of Support Services, ATTH: Mortuary Division and forward remainder to POE.
4. CENTRAL MORTUARY:
- (1) When receiving remains from preparing mortuary, complete items 12 thru 13 on original and 4 copies (or 5). Retain one copy and forward remainder to POE.
- (2) This form will be initially prepared in contract mortuary; same procedure applies as in item 1.
- PORT OF ORIGIN:
- (1) Complete item 47 thru 49 - copies for 47. Letters item 48 blank on copy. Forward Director.
- (2) Retain one copy.
- (3) Forward copy with remains to receiving Mortuary Division.
- (4) Forward copy to Office of the Chief of Support Services, ATTH: Mortuary Division.
- (5) Retain original to receive command.
- NOTE: Additional distribution to be made by part of entry by overseas mortuary for burial overseas:
- COPY TO: Air Mortal Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 45433 (for Air Force Personnel)
- COPY TO: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 20304 (for Navy, Marine and Navy Personnel)
- Distribution to be made by mortuary making final entry on form.

1. NAME OF DEATH: **John V. ...**

2. SERVICE NUMBER: **71-714**

3. BRANCH OF SERVICE (Include civilian employee): ☐ Army ☐ Navy ☐ Marine Corps ☐ Air Force ☐ Other (Specify)

4. DATE OF DEATH: **17 July 1966**

5. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

6. DATE OF EXHUMATION: **29 July 1966**

7. LOCATION OF DEATH (Prior to exhumation): **See Note**

8. AGE IDENTIFIED (Personal comparison, Finger Prints, Identification Tags, etc.): **See Note**

9. TYPE OF CASE: ☐ Natural ☐ Autopsy ☐ Outlined

10. PRE-EXHUMATION PROCEDURES COMPLETED (Photo items 47a thru 47c): ☐ Yes ☐ No (Specify)

11. TOTAL DUNCES CONCENTRATED FINGER USED: **N/A**

12. NAME PRINTS OF IDENTIFICATION: **N/A**

13. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S COMPOUND USED (Photo): **N/A**

14. AREAS HYPODERMICALLY EMBOILED: **N/A**

15. PRE-EXHUMATION PROCEDURES COMPLETED (Photo items 47a thru 47c): ☐ Yes ☐ No (Specify)

16. IF REMAINS PREPARED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS (Photo items 47a thru 47c): ☐ Yes ☐ No (Specify)

17. DATE OF EMPLOYMENT EFFECTED (If not affected, state action being taken to affect action): **20 July 1966**

18. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

19. LOCATION OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **APC 56407**

20. PREPARING MORTUARY (Name): **TRAC 111**

21. LICENSE NO. AND DATE: **7-22- 1963**

22. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER: **7-22- 1963**

23. SUBSEQUENT RELATIVES (Remains will be conserved until order is received and record of treatment entered here. Remains to be placed in a secure and suitable container placed in a separate pack for 12 mos.)

24. PRE-EXHUMATION PROCEDURES COMPLETED (Photo items 47a thru 47c): ☐ Yes ☐ No (Specify)

25. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

26. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

27. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

28. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

29. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

30. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

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32. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

33. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

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35. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

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88. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

89. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

90. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

91. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

92. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

93. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

94. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

95. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

96. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

97. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

98. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

99. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

100. DATE OF RECEIPT OF MORTUARY: **20 July 1966**

4-722

15470

1254

A-124

ACTIVITY		DIVISION		DATE OF BIRTH	
1. PULL UPS or PUSH UPS		1ST QUARTER SCORE	2ND QUARTER SCORE	3RD QUARTER SCORE	4TH QUARTER SCORE
2. SIT UPS		20	17	20	
3. REACH or BROAD JUMP		35	26	30	
4. SHUTTLE RUN or STATIONARY RUN		19	17 1/2	20	
CHECKED BY		52	5 1/2"	200	
DATE		Aug 65	7/11/1	Jan 66	

PROGRESS RECORD OF PHYSICAL FITNESS - BARBERS 2000 (REV 11-60) 1A-0108-403-8295

NAME (Last, First, Middle) _____ RANK/RATE _____ FILE/SERVICE NO. _____

1255

A-1.

ACTIVITY		DIVISION		DATE OF BIRTH	
1. PULL UPS or PUSH UPS		1ST QUARTER SCORE	2ND QUARTER SCORE	3RD QUARTER SCORE	4TH QUARTER SCORE
2. SIT UPS		20	19	20	
3. REACH or BROAD JUMP		30	19 1/2	30	
4. SHUTTLE RUN or STATIONARY RUN		19	19 1/2	20	
CHECKED BY		32	5 1/2"	200	
DATE		Aug 65	7/11/1	Jan 66	

PROGRESS RECORD OF PHYSICAL FITNESS - BARBERS 2000 (REV 11-60) 1A-0108-403-8295

NAME (Last, First, Middle) _____ RANK/RATE _____ FILE/SERVICE NO. _____

1256

A-726

NNNNIEP591
DDK-88
99 473131
SS 47-111 2271D 2020305
ZNY EEEEE
O 210305Z ZFGWZAAAK
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO RUECV/SECNAV
INFO RUECEN/CNC
RUECEF/BUHED
RUMKHL/CINCPACFLT
RUEKDA/WMCC VASHDC
RUMSHA/COMUSMACV
RUMKBP/CG FRFPAC
ZEN/CG III MAF
RUEQFG/COMFOUR
ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
ZEN/CG TASK FORCE DEL A
RUEQFG/DIR FOURTH MARCORVIST
RUMSPH/NAVDISP SFRA
RUMSBJ/CHDR SECOND AIRDIV
RUMABA/USAFSHOSP CLARKSAB PHIL
RUABOL/CAMP BUTLER
RUABBR/HANDS BN THIRD FORSERZOT
ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

DECP

1257

0 W
7/27/66
A-1

PAGE TWO RUMFKP 2271D UNCLAS E F T O (FOUO)

ZEN/FIRST MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN FIRST MARINES

RUEQFY/NAVFAC CTR CLEVE

RUMDAF/EPDOPAC

BT

UNCLAS E F T O (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

REPORT OF DEATH - HOSTILE (TFD) (4-66)

A. BUPERSHAN, PAR C-3801

1. IAW REF A FOLLOWING INFO SUBMITTED

A. MARK "V" DENNIS, MMS, 7789145/8404 USN, 415 03, SECOND BN, FIRST MAR, FIRST MARDIV

B. ACQU

C. DEAD

D. APPROX 1800H, 19JUL66 VIC OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE RVN. REC. THIRD DEGREE BURNS ENTIRE BODY WHILE A PASSENGER IN A HELICOPTER WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN BY ENEMY FIRE WHILE PARTICIPATING IN AN OPERATION AGAINST HOSTILE FORCES

E. COMPANY A, THIRD MEDBN, THIRD MARDIV. TO BE FURTHER TRANSFERRED TO TAN SON NHUT MORTUARY SAIGON

F. CHARLES RUSSELL DENNIS (FATHER) AND VERO ALICE (SMLEY) DENNIS

1258

Rec'd 11/26/88

PAGE THREE RUNPKF 2271D UNCLAS E F T J (FCJ0)

A-128

(MOTHER) 703 SOUTH RIVERVIEW AVE, MIAMISBURG, OHIO

B. NO

M. YES, IN LINE OF DUTY

I. 12APR66

J. (12 SAME AS FOXTROT ABOVE

(2) NO

(3) CHARLES RUSSELL DENNIS (FATHER) 703 SOUTH RIVERVIEW AVE,
MIAMISBURG, OHIO

K. COMFOUR

L. CAUCASIAN/PROTESTANT

M. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ADDRESS UNKNOWN

N. (1) E-4

(2) \$204.90 BP, \$65.00 SPHF, \$15.00 FORDJ

(3) EIGHT DAYS ONE MONTH AND TWO YEARS SERVICE

(4) HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARDIV. WILL FORWARDED ASAP

O. (A) \$10,000.00 SGLI

(B) SAME AS FOXTROT ABOVE/ 50 PERCENT EACH. LUMP SUM

2. BENEFICIARY AND SETTLEMENT OPTION LISTED PAR O ABOVE WRITTEN
DESIGNATION MADE BY MEMBER

BT

BUTLER

READER/HANDS BN THIRD FORSERGET

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

D.A.

1259

*Rec'd 11/26/88**A-129*

BUNNIEP234

ECC134

OO RUECEP

DE RUNPKF 2271D 2020305

ZNY EEEEE

O 210305Z

FM 3RD THIRD MARDIV

TO RUECV/SECNAV

INFO RUEOEN/CNC

RUECEP/DUMED

RUEHML/CINCPACFLT

RUEKDA/INCC VARIOUS

RUEHMA/COMUSMACV

RUEHML/CS PNTTAC

ZEN/CS III MAF

RUEOEN/COMFOUR

ZEN/CS FIRST MARDIV

ZEN/CS TASK FORCE DELTA

RUEOEN/DIR FOURTH MARCORDIST

RUEOEN/NAVJAGSP SPAN

RUEHMA/CSG2 SECOND AIRDIV

RUEHMA/USAF ROEP CLARK AB PHIL

RUEHML/CAMP BUTLER

RUEOEN/HANDS BN THIRD FORSERGET

ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

*Mary D**11/26/88*

1260

PAGE TWO RUMFEP 227715 KLAS EP T O (FOUO)

ZEN/FIRST MARINES

ZEN/SECOND BN FIRST MARINES

RUSBY/NAVY CTR CLEVE

RUSBY/EPDOPAC

BT *DATA*

SENORS RPTDEASH(PONOSTITUALF008(0468)

A. SUPERMAN, PAR C-9801

1. IAV REP A FOLLOWING INFO SUBMITTED

A. NAME "V" DENNIS, MNS, 7789149/8404 USN, M45 CO, SECOND BN,
FIRST MAR, FIRST MARDIV

B. ACU

C. DEAD

D. APPROX 1800H, 15JUL66 VIC OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE RVN. RECD THIRD
DEGREE BURNS ENTIRE BODY WHILE A PASSENGER IN A HELO WHICH WAS SHOT
DOWN BY ENEMY FIRE WHILE PARTICIPATING IN AN OPERATION AGAINST
HOSTILE FORCESE. COMPANY A, THIRD MEDBN, THIRD MARDIV, TO BE FURTHER TRANSFERRED
TO TAN SON NHUT MORTUARY SAIGON

F. CHARLES RUSSELL DENNIS (FATHER) AND VERO ALICE (SISTER) DENNIS

1261

PAGE THREE RUMFEP 227715 KLAS EP T O (FOUO)

(MOTHER) 703 SOUTH RIVERVIEW AVE, NIANISSBURG, OHIO

G. NO

H. YES, IN LINE OF DUTY

I. 12AP66

J. (1) SAME AS FOXTROT ABOVE

(2) NO

(3) CHARLES RUSSELL DENNIS (FATHER) 703 SOUTH RIVERVIEW AVE,
NIANISSBURG, OHIO

K. COMFOUR

L. CAUCASIAN/PROTESTANT

M. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ADDRESS UNKNOWN

N. (1) E-4

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(4) HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MARDIV. WILL FORWARDED ASAP

O. (A) \$10,000.00 SGLI

(B) SAME AS FOXTROT ABOVE. 0 PERCENT BAKH. LUMP SUM

2. BENEFICIARY AND SETTLEMENT OPTION LISTED PAR O ABOVE WRITTEN
DESIGNATION MADE BY MEMBER

BT

NCH 11/26/58g

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20306

A-132

21 July 1971

MED GEN/DX

Clinical and radiographic examination of skull, allegedly of Mark V. Dennis, deceased.

The clinical and radiographic examination of the alleged skull of Mark V. Dennis, deceased, revealed the following:

1. Tooth #1 (upper right 3rd Molar) is in the alveolus in an unerupted position, i.e., impacted.
2. Tooth #2 (upper right 2nd Molar) only root fragments remain.
3. Tooth #3 (upper right 1st Molar) is absent but the alveolar process in this area is healed over indicating pre-mortem extraction of this tooth. (At least six months prior to time of death.)
4. Teeth #4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 are missing and so is the alveolar process normally surrounding their roots. No information can be gained here.
5. Tooth #14 (upper left 1st Molar) is missing, however, like tooth #1 (upper right first Molar) there is some healed alveolar bone present indicating pre-mortem extraction of this tooth. (At least six months prior to time of death.)
6. Tooth #15 (upper left second Molar) is in place and has present two occlusal amalgam fillings.
7. Tooth #16 (upper left 3rd Molar) is in the alveolus in an unerupted position, i.e., impacted.

Correlation of examination findings with Pre-Mortem dental record and dental radiographs of Mark V. Dennis, deceased:

Mark V. Dennis's records and radiographs reveal that he had teeth #1 and 16 in unerupted positions (impacted) as did the remains.

Mark V. Dennis had had teeth #3 and 14 extracted in 1964 which correlates with the findings of the skull examination.

According to Mark V. Dennis's dental record, he had two occlusal amalgam fillings placed in tooth #14 on 8 October 1963. This is obviously a mistake in charting for tooth #14 had been extracted a year before. Further, his radiographs reveal that tooth #14 was so

NCH 11/26/58g

A-13

broken down with caries that if it had been restored it would have taken a very large restoration, possibly a crown. What probably happened was that tooth #15, a molar tooth which had drifted towards the space where tooth #14 had been, was mistaken for tooth #14 and so recorded. That this is a common mistake and often encountered in dental identification problems we refer you to a recent article appearing in the Journal of the American Dental Association (p. 166-169, July 1971) where a similar set of circumstances prevailed.

Conclusions:

1. We cannot say that this skull was not that of Mark V. Dennis.
2. We can say that this skull could be that of Mark V. Dennis for the following reasons:
 - a. Both had impacted 3rd molars (Teeth #1 and 16).
 - b. Both had had upper first molars extracted (teeth #3 and 14) at least six months prior to 1966.
 - c. Both had had two amalgam fillings placed in tooth #15.

CHARLES E. WATKINS, Lt Colonel, USAF, DC
 Chairman, Department of Oral Surgery

JOHN G. HARRIS, Colonel, USAF, DC
 Director, Dental Services Division

1284

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
UNITED STATES NATIONAL MUSEUM
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20560

July 26, 1971

A-134

Captain N. B. Curtis
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
U.S. Department of the Navy, Code 39
23rd and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20380

Dear Captain Curtis:

The remains studied in the laboratory of the Montgomery County Coroner at Dayton, Ohio during the morning of 7/22/71 included a torso and calvarium showing burn markings, fragmentation of bones and actual loss of bone on the ventral thorax, face (jaw, nasal, and cheek bones missing), and top frontal and right side of skull; there were also large parts of both humeri, the right elbow, both femora with thigh muscles, but fractures and burn damage, and the upper ends of the tibiae. There was some staining possibly from oxides from metal fragments.

Sex criteria are all male. Approximate femur length of 46-47 cm and humerus length over 32 cm suggests stature between 5'7 and 5'9"; trunk length, hard to estimate on the pelvis vertebral column and head, was well over 90 cm., suggesting a long trunk. Shoulders may have been broad, hips average, not narrow. The bones are quite thick. Weight might have been average or just above since muscles seemed well developed.

Race criteria are White.

Age criteria range between about 18 (third molars erupting) and 25 (front part of pubic symphysis); epiphyses are closed but there are no signs of ageing at joints or on vertebrae: 20-21 is the physiological age appearance.

The skull, badly broken, was clearly rather high and not broad, the face also. Remnants of the lower left side of the nose clearly show it to have been high-bridged and quite narrow. The jaw is missing (burnt?).

The front tooth alveolar border of the upper jaw is broken away, leaving only the molar area on each side, and even this is damaged on the right with only the lingual root remaining of the 2nd molar.

1265

Smithsonian Institution
July 26, 1971
Captain N. B. Curtis

A-135

Alveoli of the 1st molars are closed over, indicating extraction some time before death. The right second molar has two crown fillings, is 4-cusped, average in size (10 x 11 mm). The right third molar is unerupted though clearly visible; the left third molar is in process of erupting; I can't tell if the wisdom teeth would have remained "impacted" or completed their eruption.

There are no signs of old healed injuries on the bones available; the only exostoses are small ones on the posterior clinoid processes behind the pituitary fossa.

Except that age criteria suggest a man in his beginning 20s agreement with the available data on Mark Dennis seems to me perfect. Though the dental X-rays taken in life are insufficient to prove identity by superimposition, the preserved teeth agree with the appearance of the X-rays (except for the 2nd molar filling done apparently after the X-rays were taken). The photographs of Mark Dennis fit deductions from the fragmentary skull and also in my opinion look more mature than the average 17-year old. Probably his development was a little ahead of his actual age.

Sincerely yours,

J. Lawrence Angel
J. Lawrence Angel
Curator
Division of Physical Anthropology

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO 45433

A-136

REF ID: A620

5 AUG 72

Report #511 - H-3 Mark "V" Dennis

1. BUREAU & Surgery/Case 351
33rd and 4th Squadrons, 3d
Washington DC 20330

1. Report #511 attached, covers the reprocessing of the remains of H-3 Mark "V" Dennis.

2. The conclusions demonstrate that the remains exhumed 21 Jul 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue are those of H-3 Mark "V" Dennis.

FOR THE COMMANDER

THOMAS H. HARRIS
Chief, Memorial Affairs Division
Dir of Personnel Support Services

1. H-3
Report #511, H-311 1000

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO 45433

A-137

5 AUG 72

REF ID: A620

Report #511 - Report of Reprocessing at Montgomery County Morgue, Dayton, OH, 21-22 Jul 71.

1. BUREAU

1. BUREAU

1. At the request of the Dept of Army, the Memorial Affairs Div, AFM, reprocessed a remains buried at Hill Grove Cemetery in Hill Grove Cemetery, Washington, Ohio, 4 Aug 66. The remains were a passenger in a helicopter which crashed 21 Jul 66 in the vicinity of Long Ford Province, RVN. (Log 3 August 66 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 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1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 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2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085

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5. On 21 Oct 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue the Air Force Identification Specialist, in the presence of Frank A. Hefling, met given history of a metal casket. The casket contained an enlisted Navy uniform and remains wrapped in an OD woolen blanket, white sheet and polyethylene.

6. There follows extracts from SF 88 (Mark "D" Dennis, 7769145) dated 2/4/64:

Age	Height	Weight	Build	Complexion	Other
27 yrs. - 28, 13 days	5' 10"	175	Slender	Light	None

NOTES: (1) At time of death decedent's age would be 27 yrs, 9 mos, 4 days.
(2) At time of death decedent's height could be about 59.0".

7. Identification Processing:

1. The remains removed from the casket disclosed the following:

Specimen 1 - Fractured skull with C-1 articulated to the occipital condyles. The greater portion of the frontal is in 2 portions and the temporal, a small portion of the is temporal articulating. The entire mandible, except the is mandibular condyle the neck which is shattered, is missing. There is a traumatic fracture of C-1 and C-2.

Specimen 2 - The left arm and hand were found, a small portion of the humerus, the radius, ulna, and the hand. The hand is articulated with the proximal 3/4 of the radius and ulna. There is a heavy musculature development over the hips and upper thigh areas. The proximal 3/4 of the is humerus is articulated at the shoulder. All ribs are present and articulated. The distal extremities of rib bodies are missing. The chest cavity contains the heart and a portion of lung. A portion of liver is noted in the abdominal cavity. The stomach and all abdominal contents are open. The is humerus consisting of the head and 3/4 of the shaft is articulated to the torso.

Specimen 3 - Fractured distal 3/4 of the humerus and extremity.

Specimen 4 - Fractured proximal is radius measured 4 cm.

Specimen 5 - Fractured is knee joint consists of distal is femur (measures 12.6 cm); head and shaft of is tibia (measures 11.5 cm); the head and shaft of is fibula (measures 7.3 cm) and the patella.

Specimen 6 - Fractured is knee consists of the distal is femur (measures 8.5 cm); head and proximal shaft of is tibia (measures approximately 9.5 cm) and the proximal shaft and head of is fibula (measures approximately 8.5 cm).

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A-13

8. Identification Findings:

Specimen 1 - The skull to which is articulated C-1, articulated very well with C-2 which is articulated to cervical spine. The maxilla, housing tooth #1, the lingual root of #2, #10 and #16 is present with #1 and #16 impacted. There is evidence that tooth #3 and #14 are surgically extracted and the alveolar processes are broken over. There are two occlusal enamel fillings on tooth #13. The alveolar process which houses tooth #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #11, #12, and #15 has been burned away. A small portion of a root apex, either #4 or #7 is present in the broken alveolar process.

2. The dental record completed for Mark Dennis shows two occlusal restorations on tooth #14, completed 10 Oct 57, which is extracted, and since tooth #14 is recorded as having been extracted it can be, 1 yr and 1 mo prior to the time the restorations were alleged to have been placed in tooth #14. The two occlusal restorations are in fact on #15. This error is commonly seen in dental identification because of the extraction of #14, tooth #15 has drifted mesially, and to a degree now occupies the alveolar area formerly retaining tooth #14.

(3) The post mortem dental analysis of the remains is in favorable agreement with SF88, Dental Health Record and the dental radiographs prepared for Mark "D" Dennis.

(4) See page 40, Dental Findings, Col John B. Tarantino, DC, and Lt Col J. L. Koehler, DC, Dental Services Div, USAF Medical Center, HAFB, 11 Feb 71.

(5) The left arm, as seen above, was identified as follows:

Specimen 2 - That specimen 1 (C-1 articulated to the skull) demonstrates good articulation with specimen 2 (C-2 articulated to the spine) proving that specimen 1 and 2 (the torso) are of one individual.

1. The is femur complex associated with the is femur condyles disclose a height measurement of 59.0" (46.8 cm).

(2) This height measurement is comparable with that of Dennis at time of death applying the M'Farlane Trotter-Jeldine G. Gleaser Scale (Height Estimates of Stature from Maximum Lengths of the Sum of Measurements of Long Bone, 1958). The scale allows for an anticipated growth of 1.0 cm in maximum stature from age 17 to 19.5 years. The recorded height on Dennis, 2 Feb 64, was 57" (45.8 cm). Since death occurred 15 Jul 65 or about 2 1/2 years after the 2 Feb 64 measurement, the height of 59.0" (46.8 cm) is established.

(3) From the is femur a specimen of good quality cancellous tissue was extracted. Two separate tests, using the Dr. P. B. Canella absorption techniques, were accomplished on the cancellous bone. Results of these tests disclosed post mortem blood group A. SF88 and SF601 prepared for Mark Dennis list his ante mortem ABO blood group type A. See stch 11.

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6. Four separate tests, using the Dr. P. B. Canella absorption techniques, were accomplished on good quality muscle, and lung tissue, and brain matter and blood cells contained in a small vein within the lung tissue (all from the torso) disclosed post mortem blood group A. SP68 and SP601 prepared for H-3 Dennis lists his ante mortem ABO blood group type A. See attach 11.

7. The denture Rt. Mm. 12 prob. symphyseal facet demonstrates an estimation age of 20-25 yrs. Although entire teeth were in place, the inferior symphyseal facets which appear at this in high position. Greater surface of the symphyseal facet shows an age ranging from 20 to 25 yrs. Therefore, the ossicles grown must be judged premature because of these factors observed.

Specimen 3 - The scapulae, manubrium proximal Rt humerus morphologically compared very favorably with the articulated Rt humerus, specimen 1.

Specimen 4 - Proximal proximal Rt humerus morphologically in development compares favorably with structure of the distal Rt humerus.

Specimen 5 - Rt knee joint, consisting of the distal Rt femur shaft, condyles, patella and tibia and proximal shaft of fibula morphologically in the opposite member of specimen 1. The Rt knee joint articulation of the distal and proximal shaft of Rt femur is not possible because of the structure of the joint.

Specimen 6 - In knee joint is the opposite member of specimen 5 morphologically and the distal shaft can be demonstrated to articulate accurately with the proximal which is articulated to the torso.

9. Conclusions:

1. That the high and rather narrow nasal bridge; the high nasal bridge; and narrow nasal aperture with minute-like sharpness of the lateral borders are indicative of the Caucasian race. The deceased was Caucasian.

2. That the post mortem dental characteristics of the remains are in very favorable agreement with the ante mortem dental radiographs and SP601, Dental Health Record (beginning date to Jan 64) for H-3 Dennis.

3. That the six Canella absorption tests established the ABO group as type A. Dennis' SP68 and SP601 recorded his ABO group as A.

4. That the established height of 69.0" predicated on the normal growth factor of the late "teens" is in agreement with the projected deceased's height at time of death.

5. That the skeletal and musculature development are those of an individual of medium build, although the hip and thigh region reveals heavy muscle development. SP68 on H-3 Dennis shows his build to be medium.

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1. That specimens numbered 1 thru 6 (which were applied for the purpose of this report) are the remains of one individual.

10. Summary:

The findings established in this report were directly compared with all statistical data collected on the 43 persons becoming victims in the 15 Jul 68 helicopter disaster in the vicinity of Quang Tri Province, RVN. The conclusion arrived after comprehensive study demonstrated that the remains examined in this report at the Montgomery County Morgue can only be those of H-3 Dennis, 77121-5.

This report was prepared and submitted to the 25 Jul 80 by S. Lugo, 12700 W. 100.

Robert H. Lugo
Identification Specialist

This report has been reviewed and is approved.

Chief, Montague Airfield Station
Dr. of Personnel Support Services

- 1. ADAMS
- 2. 10 Jan 80
- 3. Identification of Death
- 4. Health Identification
- 5. H-3 Dennis H-3 Dennis C 210000
- 6. 27 11
- 7. 27 11
- 8. 27 11
- 9. 27 11
- 10. Dental Radiographs
- 11. Dental Radiographs
- 12. Dental Radiographs

A-142

A-142

BUPED:334:EER:JJF

Armistead W. Gilliam, Jr., Esquire
Smith and Schnacke
Talbott Tower
Dayton, Ohio 45402

Dear Mr. Gilliam:

Your request for information concerning the service medical record of the late Hospital Corpsman Third Class Mark V. Dennis, U. S. Navy has been forwarded to this Bureau by the Honorable John W. Warner.

Petty Officer Dennis' service medical record fails to show that x-rays were taken of his teeth during October 1965; that he was admitted to the medical facilities at the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, Republic of Viet Nam for treatment of a virus infection; or that x-ray studies were made of his spine during his period of naval service. Additionally, a search of the organizational files for the Station Hospital, Naval Support Activity, Da Nang has failed to find a record of his having been admitted to that facility during the period of time in question. There is no information in this Bureau to indicate that a DD Form 567 (Record of Recovery of Remains) was prepared in the case of Petty Officer Dennis.

It is regretted we could not be of more assistance to you in this matter. If you would provide us with more definitive information concerning the date and place where Petty Officer Dennis was admitted for treatment of the virus infection or the date and place where x-ray studies were made of his spine we will cause additional searches to be made.

Sincerely,

M. S. MYERS
Captain, MC, USN
Director, Physical Qualifications
and Medical Records Division
By direction of the Surgeon General

11 December 1972
packet returned to
BCNR this date

Copy to Code 39

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1 LEO TUCKER			
2 MAJ CALTON	HC	10/4/73	
3 CPT DICKSON	ADD	2 May 72	
LT PROCTOR			
LT BOSLEY			
4 MR. HELGENSEN	H	3 MAY	
First Sergeant			
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ORGANIZATION USA OIL, THAI			

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NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)		DATE	
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1 LEO TUCKER			
MAJ CALTON			
CPT DICKSON			
LT PROCTOR			
LT BOSLEY			
MR. HELGENSEN			
First Sergeant			
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CHECK ACTION DESIRED			
INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	DATE AND DIVISION	
REPLICATE	NECESSARY ACTION	DATE OF	
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S/DENNIS, MARK V (IO)/RMO USN (DECEASED)							
INTERVIEW OF PILOT							
1. On 10 Oct 81, Thomas Christopher MCALLISTER, [REDACTED] Civilian, was interviewed at his residence, [REDACTED]. MCALLISTER furnished a Sworn Statement; Attachment (1), wherein he advised that he was the pilot of the CH46 helicopter that was shot down by hostile forces 15 July 66 near Quang Tri, Republic of Vietnam. MCALLISTER advised that he did not know the individual identities of his passengers at any time, and that after the crash incident, accounting for the casualties was done by persons other than himself. He said he did not know Subj. He also provided three photographs taken by news service photographer Horst FASS (PHONETIC) showing various stages of the descent and subsequent fire. MCALLISTER did not see how it was possible that Subj could have survived the crash. He said they landed within the perimeter defense, and he saw no enemy forces anytime during the incident. In addition to FASS' photographs, MCALLISTER said, he was told that a Japanese cameraman had filmed the entire descent, and that it was later shown on Japanese television news.							
DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE							
2. Photographs are being maintained in NISRA Louisville evidence locker until request for release from appropriate authority.							
NIS FILES							
3. Files of NISO New York are negative concerning this investigation.							
ATTACHMENT							
(1) Statement of MCALLISTER/10-10-81...(Orig 05DC/Copy all)							
NIS ACTION/LEAD							
A.05DC... Apprise Requester							
CLASSIFICATION				WARNING			
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NON 1 LAST SET CTC [initials]				SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR OFFICIALS USE ONLY. NO OTHER DISSEMINATION OR REPRODUCTION IS AUTHORIZED WITHOUT EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.			
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE							

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OF 12195
OF 121

Rec'd 11-26-83

STATEMENT

PLACE: [REDACTED]

DATE: 17 OCT 81

A-150

I, Thomas Christopher WALLIVER, make the following free and voluntary statement to Charles T. GABLER Jr. whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events surrounding the death of Mark V. DENNIS, RMJ USN, on 15 Jul 66 in Quang Tri, RVN.

I was the pilot on a UH1H CS-46 helicopter that was shot down by hostile forces on 15 Jul 66 near Quang Tri, RVN. There were four members of the crew: myself, co-pilot RICHIE, crew chief TELFER (who was killed that day) and side gunner LUCAS.

A group of marines had called for reinforcement. They were surrounded by a division of North Vietnamese soldiers. The marines were in a valley and the enemy were on the ridges surrounding it. They were probably 4 to 5 miles away. There were at least four aircraft in my flight. I was the second one in. We picked up a group of marines at Dong Ha. I think there were 12 altogether. I cannot be sure of this number. I was only concerned with the weight and the fuel load. I never knew who the passengers were individually. It was necessary to leave the rear ramp partially descended in flight, because it took too long to lower on the ground, increasing our vulnerability.

As we started our descent to the landing zone (LZ) I was approximately 1000 to 1500 feet of altitude when we were hit, probably by .50 cal machine-gun fire. This was almost simultaneous with the squadron commander's order to leave the area. In just a few seconds, our stubbing fuel tank was hit and ruptured, probably by tracer bullets. Burning fuel was immediately sucked into the passenger compartment, probably through the partially-open rear ramp. The fire and smoke came all the way forward to the cockpit, injuring my eyes and temporarily depriving me of my sight. I still had control of the aircraft, and immediately decided to land and try to evacuate. The descent took about 30 to 60 seconds. The gunner LUCAS stood in the opening of the cockpit and blocked most of the fire with his back. The guys in the compartment were trapped and could not escape.

We landed hard on a gentle hillside and the aircraft capsized on its right side, in so doing, it killed TELFER, who had jumped out. I was momentarily pinned in the cockpit but managed to free myself and exit. RICHIE exited by the co-pilot's emergency hatch, followed by me. LUCAS went back into the compartment to see if anyone there could be helped. He told me later he saw no one alive, so he got out. We walked a short distance up the hill and within 1 to 3 minutes the aircraft exploded and burned for several hours. I saw no one else exit the aircraft. In all likelihood, they were already dead when the craft hit the ground.

We landed within the marines' perimeter. I did not see any enemy forces during

REFORM 8186-81

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CHRISTOPHER WALLIVER OF 10 OCTOBER 1981

the entire ordeal. We were immediately taken to the aid station. A-151 The balance of the flight returned to Dong Ha and there the accounting of the casualties took place. I never had a direct part of this accounting.

While I cannot state that it was impossible for DENNIS to survive, I can say that the possibility is extremely remote. He had no chance to escape after the crash because LUCAS would have seen him. If he had fallen or jumped from the craft before the crash, either he would have been killed in the fall or the fall would have been photographed. Horst FAHS of UPI took still photos of the entire descent. I have lent my copies of these photos to Mr. GABLER today. The negatives probably still exist. Also, I was also told at the time that a Japanese newsmen had taken movie film of the descent and crash. I was told it was shown on Japanese television.

All I can say is that if Mark DENNIS was in that aircraft, I do not see how he could have survived. I have no explanation for the discrepancies in the autopsies. LUCAS was the one who had direct contact with the passengers during the flight and the crash incident. I understand that RICHIE was killed several years ago in an accident.

I can provide no further information pertinent to this investigation.

I have read, understood, and initialled all corrections in the above statement, and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Thomas Christopher Walliver
Time: 1505 Date: 10/06/1981

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of October, 1981,

Charles T. Gabler Jr.
Special Agent, NIS

AUTH: RECORDING 5520-1A OF 10 SEP 73

98

OF 121

RECEIVED BY THE NIS UNIT INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

VIS REPORT OF INVESTIGATION		02-27-71		2111267	
OSRL	COMINT	STAND	RUC	SPECIAL INQUIRY	
ORL-19-31005-0049-7MA		RUC		A-152	
/EN-100023/EC-10500/EF-10500/EA-10500//					
ORLANDO FL		D. A. LARSON S/A			
09-10-91/440C		DUSTA: "E" CO 2/1 1ST MAR DIV			
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		MILITARY SERVICE NO.		DATE	
[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	
S/DENNIS, MARK V (10)/4403 USN (DECEASED)					

INTERVIEW OF CRASH WITNESS

1. MARTIN ("MIKE") A. WEENICK, [REDACTED] WHO RESIDES AT [REDACTED], WAS INTERVIEWED AT HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT, [REDACTED].

ON 26 AUG 1971, WEENICK SERVED A 15-MONTH TOUR OF DUTY IN VIETNAM IN 1965-66 AS A SCOUT FOR M2 COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION, 4TH MARINES, 3RD MARINE DIVISION.

2. WHILE PARTICIPATING IN "OPERATION HASTINGS" IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, RVN, IN MID-JULY 1965, WEENICK'S BATTALION WAS HEAVY IN ON ALL SIDES BY THE ENEMY, HAD TAKEN HEAVY LOSSES, AND WAS WAITING FOR A REINFORCEMENT BATTALION TO BE FLOWN IN. WEENICK SAID HE HAD DUG A HOLE FOR HIMSELF AT THE END OF A GULLEY WHERE NUMEROUS OTHER PERSONNEL HAD ALSO DUG IN TO AVOID MORTAR FIRE BEING DIRECTED AT THEM FROM ALL DIRECTIONS. IN THE DISTANCE, WEENICK COULD SEE AND HEAR ABOUT FIVE OR SIX HELICOPTERS COMING UP THE VALLEY TOWARD THEM, PRESUMABLY WITH REINFORCEMENTS. HE OPINED THEY WERE FLYING 300-350 FEET ABOVE TREE TOP LEVEL, WHEN ONE OF THE FRONT HELOS WAS STRUCK BY ENEMY FIRE. WEENICK NOTED THAT IT WAS EASY FOR HIM TO FOLLOW THE LINE OF SILVER TRACERS AND MACHINE GUN FIRE BACK TO THE ENEMY GUN EMPLACEMENT ON THE SIDE OF THE HILL. AS A RESULT OF THE HEAVY FIRE AND THE HIT SCORED ON ONE OF THEIR CRAFT, THE REMAINING HELICOPTERS TURNED BACK.

3. WEENICK RECALLED THAT WHEN HE SAW THE HELICOPTER GET HIT, IT IMMEDIATELY FELL TO TREE-TOP LEVEL (40') AT ABOUT 1/3 MILE FROM WEENICK'S POSITION. SOMETHING APPEARED TO FLY OUT OF THE CRAFT WHEN IT SETTLED AT TREE TOP ALTITUDE, BUT WEENICK OPINED IT WAS A PIECE OF THE PLANE RATHER THAN A PERSON. THE CRAFT STILL SEEMED TO BE UNDER CONTROL BY THE PILOT WHO APPEARED TO SPOT THE AREA WHERE WEENICK AND OTHERS WERE DUG IN AS A POSSIBLE PLACE TO SET THE CRAFT DOWN. AS THE HELO GOT CLOSER, WEENICK BECAME AFRAID THAT IT WOULD SETTLE RIGHT ON TOP OF HIM. HE WAS ABLE TO SEE THE PILOT LEANING OUT THE WINDOW, AS IF FROM A SMOKE FILLED COCKPIT, IN ORDER TO JUDGE HIS LANDING. HE ALSO NOTED THAT FLAMES APPEARED TO BE HEAVY IN THE REAR SECTION OF THE CRAFT ALTHOUGH HAD NOT YET BROKEN THROUGH THE SKIN OF THE HELO. AS THE CRAFT HOVERED TO ITS POSITION IN THE AREA OF WEENICK, HE SAID HE COULD SEE IT WAS WEENICK/YAING FROM SIDE TO SIDE. HE SCRAMBLED OUT OF HIS HOLE AS THE CRAFT GOT CLOSER TO HIS POSITION AND RAN DOWN THE SIDE OF THE HILL, HEARING A MINOR IMPACT BEHIND HIM AS HE RAN. WEENICK SAID PROP PARTS FLEW PAST HIM AND HE SHORTLY HEARD A LARGE EXPLOSION. BEFORE THE EXPLOSION HE WAS

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VIS REPORT OF INVESTIGATION		02-27-31		2111267	
OSRL	COMINT	STAND	RUC	SPECIAL INQUIRY	
ORL-19-31005-0049-7MA		RUC		A-153	
/EN-100023/EC-10500/EF-10500/EA-10500//					
ORLANDO FL		D. A. LARSON S/A			
09-10-91/440C		DUSTA: "E" CO 2/1 1ST MAR DIV			
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		MILITARY SERVICE NO.		DATE	
[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]	
S/DENNIS MARK V					

ABLE TO SEE AT LEAST ONE PERSON, NOT IN COMBAT DRESS, BADLY BURNED, EXITING THE FRONT END OF THE CRAFT. LATER, WHEN VOLUNTEERS WERE SOLICITED TO REMOVE THE BODIES, WEENICK VOLUNTEERED ALONG WITH 5-10 OTHERS. PROBABLY ONLY TWO OF THE VICTIMS WERE RECOGNIZABLE, ONE OF THOSE BEING A LIGHT-SKINNED BLACK MALE WHOSE BODY FROM THE WAIST DOWN WAS GONE. THAT WAS THE ONLY PERSON WEENICK COULD RECALL WHO WAS WEARING DOG-TAGS. FURTHERMORE, THE HELICOPTER WAS FROM A DIFFERENT USMC BATTALION THAN HIS OWN SO HE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF THOSE ABOARD, OR HOW MANY WERE ABOARD.

4. A SHORT TIME AFTER "OPERATION HASTINGS" AND WEENICK'S DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM, AN ARTICLE ON THAT OPERATION WAS PUBLISHED IN "STARS AND STRIPES." ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARTICLE WAS A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING A DAMAGED HELICOPTER SETTLING TO A LANDING, WITH THREE PERSONS BURNING FROM THE AREA. WEENICK SAID ONE OF THOSE PERSONS WAS HIM; HE DID NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER TWO. HE KEPT THE ARTICLE AND HAS IT IN A SCRAPBOOK OF VIETNAM WAR REMOIRS.

5. ON SATURDAY, 2 MAY 1931, WEENICK WAS STRUCK BY AN ARTICLE ON PAGE 12A OF THAT DAY'S EDITION OF THE ST. PETERSBURG EVENING INDEPENDENT. THE ARTICLE TOLD OF THE SEARCH BY JERRY DENNIS OF PALM HARBOR, FL FOR EYEWITNESSES TO A HELICOPTER CRASH IN VIETNAM IN WHICH HIS BROTHER (SUBJ) WAS KILLED. THE SAME PHOTO OF THE HELICOPTER THAT HAD APPEARED IN STARS AND STRIPES SOME FIFTEEN YEARS EARLIER WAS PART OF THE ARTICLE AND IMMEDIATELY CAUGHT WEENICK'S EYE. HE TELEPHONED JERRY DENNIS, AND SINCE THAT TIME THEY HAVE MET PERSONALLY SEVERAL TIMES. WEENICK'S SCRAPBOOK IS PRESENTLY ON LOAN TO JERRY DENNIS.

6. WEENICK WAS OF THE OPINION THAT TWO OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED FOR A PERSON TO EXIT THE HELICOPTER AFTER IT WAS STRUCK BY ENEMY FIRE. HE FIRST WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER THE CRAFT HAD FALLEN TO TREE TOP LEVEL; SOMEONE, ESPECIALLY A CORPSMAN WHOSE POSITION IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE EXIT, COULD HAVE JUMPED FROM THAT 30 OR 40 FOOT ALTITUDE. WEENICK ACKNOWLEDGED HE DID NOT SEE ANYONE JUMP, BUT DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE HAD. IF THAT IN FACT HAD HAPPENED, HE PERSON WOULD HAVE LANDED IN A DRY CREEK BED IN ABOUT A FOOT OF SOFT SAND. INJURY WAS POSSIBLE, BUT FOREMOST WEENICK SAID THAT AREA WAS ALL UNDER CONTROL OF THE ENEMY AND THE JUMPER WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY BEEN KILLED OR CAPTURED. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY OF DEPARTURE FROM THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER THE PLANE SETTLED TO ITS LANDING POSITION. ALTHOUGH WEENICK SAID ONLY THE ONE PERSON, HE DEEMED IT POSSIBLE THAT A PERSON COULD HAVE EXITED ONE OF THE HELICOPTER DOORS SEEN TO HIM AND WANDERED THROUGH DISORIENTATION OR CONFUSION INTO

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THIS REPORT OF INVESTIGATION		03-27-71	213125Z
RE	03-19-91003-0039-7XMA	RUC	SPECIAL INQUIRY
ACTION		COPIES	
DATE		MADE BY	
CLASS		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE	
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	MILITARY SERVICE NO.	DATE	(RANK) (GRADE) (PLACE)

1/DEHNIS, MARK V

HE HANDS OF THE ENEMY WHO WERE AS CLOSE AS 25 FEET AWAY AND OFTEN IN HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT WITH MARINES IN WEENICK'S BATTALION. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, WEENICK SAID THE REMAINDER OF HIS BATTALION ALPEL AWAY FROM THE SCENE VIA A DRY RIVER BED, LOSING ABOUT HALF THEIR REMAINING COMPLEMENT ON THE WAY OUT.

WEENICK IS MOVING TO GATLINBURG, TENN IN EARLY SEPT 1981 WITH A FORWARDING ADDRESS KNOWN AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, HIS CURRENT EMPLOYER WILL BE APPRISED BY HIM OF THAT INFORMATION WHEN IT BECOMES KNOWN AND MADE AVAILABLE TO HIS IF NECESSARY. WEENICK EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH HIS IN ANY WAY FURTHER IN THIS INQUIRY.

IS FILES

FILES OF NISO CHARLESTON CONTAIN NO OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.

ACTION/LEAD

03DC...APPRISE REQUESTER.

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LDR-13		SOS-DC-3-17MA		SPECIAL INQUIRY	
DEFINITION //NHS-00023/MC-N03HQ/NA-N03DC/MI-N11HQ//					
MADE AT		MADE BY			
INQUIRY		F. F. FIEGER SPECIAL AGENT			
RE-13-01/0002		SUPPLEMENTAL DATE			
ALL SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		MILITARY SERVICE NO.		DATE	
M		M		M	

1/DEHNIS, MARK V. (10)/NHS, TENN. (DECEASED)

INTERVIEW OF CAPT G. A. LUCAS

1. CAPT Gary Alan LUCAS (Vice LUCAS), [REDACTED], MHS Supply, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, AZ was interviewed on 2 October 1981 in an effort to obtain additional details of Subj's reported demise in a helicopter crash in Vietnam on 15 July 1966. He said the incident occurred during an operation identified as "HASTINGS" when additional troops were being taken into an area just north of Quang Tri Province to reinforce troops there that had been overrun. He stated that he was part of a four (4) man crew on the helicopter which was shot down by hostile ground forces, and he identified the other three members of the crew as: Thomas C. MCALISTER (pilot); George C. RICHIEY (Co-pilot); and the crewchief (NFI). In addition, there were twelve (12) combat-ready troops on the helicopter, whose names were unknown to the crew, or a total of sixteen persons. The pilot, co-pilot, and himself were the only survivors to the best of his knowledge, and a total of thirteen (13) persons perished as opposed to eleven (11) as previously reported. CAPT LUCAS said that he saw two (2) individuals jump from the aircraft, on fire, prior to the crash and assumed they were killed. He did not know Subj and indicated he had no way of knowing if he was one of the twelve troops they were carrying when the helicopter was shot down. He further advised that an article covering the incident had later appeared in the 1 August 1966 edition of Newsweek Magazine with pictures captioned by the name "Horse FAAS" - Associated Press. He provided a copy of the article (Atch (1)) and was of the opinion that possibly FAAS or Newsweek Magazine could provide additional photographs or data that might be of assistance. CAPT LUCAS said he had been knocked unconscious for a period of time when the helicopter crashed. His statement is Atch (2).

NHS FILES

2. NISO San Diego, CA files contain no additional pertinent information regarding this investigation.

ATTACHMENTS

- (1) Copy of Newsweek Report/08-01-66...(COPY ALL)
- (2) Witness statement, LUCAS/10-02-81...(Orig Reqr/COPY ALL)

NHS ACTION/LEAD

A.03DC...Apprise Requester.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE			

NISRA Yuma, Az.
2 Oct. 1981

A-56

I, CAPT Gary Alan LUCKS, USMC, hereby make the following voluntary statement to Mr. Frank E. FIEGER who has identified himself to me as a Special Agent of the U. S. Naval Investigative Service:

I, enlisted in the USMC in May 1959 and I am presently assigned to HENS Supply, MCAS Yuma, Arizona. Mr. FIEGER has asked me to provide details and what information I can regarding a an incident that occurred in Vietnam in an area just north of Quang Tri Province and south of the DMZ on 15 Jul 1966 when the USMC CH-46 helicopter I was in was shot down by hostile forces ground fire. I understand that one of the persons who perished as a result of the incident was 1st Mark V. DENNIS, 282-42-1904; however, I did not specifically know that person by name. On the day in question, I was assigned to the CH-46 helicopter in question as a door gunner with MW-265 attached to MAG-16 operating out of Marble Mountain in Danang. We were involved in operations Hastings and we were moving combat troops to engage North Vietnamese regulars which was the first encounter with these troops in the Vietnam War. At around 1600 that day, we were advised that there was a company being overrun and that we were going to take in additional troops to reinforce the troops that were there. The CH-46 was loaded with twelve (12) combat ready troops in addition myself, the crewchief, the pilot and copilot. There were sixteen individuals on the helicopter. After we departed, we were in the air for about thirty (30) minutes on our way to the landing zone, when the pilot informed the crewchief and myself that the zone was coming up and it was "hot". About this time we were hit in the starboard fuel cell with an incendiary round and immediately caught fire. The flames were about waist high moving forward and aft in the cabin and the smoke was so bad no one could see. The pilot was notified that we had been hit and he immediately started to descend to the landing zone. When we were about 1500 - 1800 feet, I overheard conversation between the pilot and copilot indicating that they were unable to see. I unhooked my safety harness and glanced toward the rear of the aircraft. I saw an individual run off the aft ramp of the helicopter and his clothing was smoking. I assume he ran out of the aircraft because of the intense heat and was killed upon impact with the ground as we were still around 1200 feet in the air. As the helicopter progressed toward the landing zone and was at an elevation of about three-hundred feet (300), we were still on fire and went into a hard right bank and I saw a second man jump from the aircraft. He was on fire at the time. Shortly after that, we hit the ground and I always felt the aircraft probably fell on that man. As far as I know, his body was never found. We hit the ground with the helicopter on it's starboard side. I was knocked unconscious on impact. When I came to, I noticed that the pilot and copilot had exited the aircraft. I found out later that some of our forces on a nearby hill rescued from the aircraft. I then checked to see if there were any other survivors in the aircraft. I found that the crewchief was still alive but his leg from the knee down was pinned between the aircraft and ground and he had also been hit by a round. When I was attempting to pull him free, he was hit by other rounds in the back and died. Some ammunition from our own aircraft was exploding. Everyone else on the helicopter was still strapped in their seats and their bodies were burned beyond recognition. They were sitting right over the fuel tanks and the rear third of the aircraft was like an incinerator. I left the aircraft and the landing zone and moved into the bush toward our troops. Around thirty minutes later, I came to an outpost and they took me to the top of the hill and administered emergency first aid. Around noon the next day, I was medicated out.

Page 1 of 2 HXK

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OF 121

ATTACHMENT (2)

-2-

KSC 11-11-11-11

A-55

That is all the recollection I have of the incident except that later in the hospital, I met an individual whose name I do not know that told me he had been with the troops on the hill nearby and saw one of the men jump from the helicopter. In this type operation, we were just moving troops and we were only concerned about the number of people on the aircraft. We had no knowledge of who they were individually. I have no way of knowing if 1st Mark DENNIS was in our helicopter when this incident occurred or not. I can specifically say that there was a four (4) man crew and twelve (12) passengers on the helicopter at the time. I found out later that there was a Newsweek magazine correspondent at the scene identified as Horst FAAS and an article covering the incident with our helicopter later appeared in the 1 August 1966 edition of the magazine. In the article, pictures taken at the scene have the name Horst FAAS-Associated Press inscribed underneath the pictures. Possibly FAAS or Newsweek magazine could provide additional data or photographs that might be of assistance. If 1st Mark DENNIS was in fact on the aircraft, and if he was one of the two individuals that jumped out, it is highly unlikely that he would have survived. This is what I recall of the incident to the best of my recollection. I have read the completed statement and corrected all errors.

H. Adkins

Subscribed and sworn to before me at NISRA Yuma, Az. on 2 Oct 1981

F. E. Fieger
Special Agent, NIS

AUTHORITY:

SECNAVINST 5520.1A of 10 Sept 1973

Page 2 of 2 HXK

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OF 121

QUANTITIES ON
BOMBING, MINING AND
UNLAWFUL
QUANTITIES ON
THE JUDICIAL
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE CONSPIRACY
AMONG TRANSACTIONS
1914-1918

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

March 8, 1988

John Rodgers
COMNAVHEDCOM
MEDCOM 332
Washington, D.C. 20372-5120

Dear Mr. Rodgers:

It has been brought to my attention that new evidence has been uncovered with regards to the identification of Mark V. Dennis.

It is because of this and the family's concern as well as their endless determination that I feel obligated to ask the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy in particular to comply with the requested action as indicated in the attached correspondence.

If there are questions or if additional information is needed, please do not hesitate to contact me at my Winter Park office.

Not included in the correspondence is the request for copies of all photographs and x-rays.

I will appreciate any effort the Department of the Navy can provide to resolve this matter and I will cooperate in any way appropriate.

Sincerely,



BILL MCCOLLUM
Member of Congress

BMCC/ew

Enclosures

ROOM 332-3117
OFFICE SPACE
Room 332-3117
1801 Lee Road
Winter Park, Florida 32789
(800) 814-3100
FROM LAST COUNTY THE FILE
332-3117

February 22, 1988
Jerry L. Dennis
14457 Josephine Rd.
Largo, FL 34644
(813) 596-2810

A-1.

Congressman Bill McCollum
1801 Lee Road
Winter Park, FL 32789

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your continued interest in obtaining the facts surrounding the disappearance of my brother, Mark V. Dennis, and the identity of the remains we received.

Dr. Michael Charney has completed his report (copy enclosed). The report basically agrees with the report completed by Dr. Raymond Bony from the Ohio State University in 1971. Both reports indicate the remains cannot be those of Mark.

Mr. John Rogers, of the Naval Medical Command (201-655-1343), has indicated to me that after reviewing Dr. Charney's report he will call me and probably recommend that I request the Navy pick up the remains to reprocess them through CIL HT. There is no indication, at this time, that the remains will be processed as anything other than Mark Dennis.

I do not intend to allow the U.S. Government to regain control of these remains and bury them as Mark Dennis in Arlington. I do want to cooperate with them in hopes, after all these years, that the Navy will admit the misidentification.

I am asking, once again, for your assistance. The remains have been reduced to skeleton and are presently at CSU in Ft. Collins, Colorado. Mr. Rogers visited Dr. Charney's lab and has viewed the remains. The skeleton was destroyed due to the decaying of the remains. I request your office request me to arrange the following:

1. Request the U.S. Navy reprocess the remains through CIL HT lab.
2. The Navy may transport such remains as they choose; no casket is required by me.

Dennis - McCullum, page 2

3. The Navy shall package the remains in such a way to prevent any further damage to them as the skull is in a delicate condition.
 4. Your office, and I, shall receive a copy of all identification papers, notes and final results from CIL HI.
 5. The remains shall be returned to me at the above address. All expenses shall be the Navy's.
- A. In the event CIL HI determines the remains are identified as a missing U.S. serviceman, the Navy shall notify me, via your office, for determination of disposition of such remains but shall not assume possession of such remains until the status of Mark V. Dennis is resolved to my satisfaction.

I contacted Congressman C.W. "Bill" Young's office to notify them of my request to you since I now live in Bill's District. I talked to both Harry Glen (202-225-59610 in D.C. and George Cretakos (813-381-0980) in Larko. Congressman Young's office stated he definitely wanted to assist you and would contact you directly. Since Bill is on the Appropriations Committee for the Secretary of the Navy and meets with him on a regular basis, his office feels he will receive an open ear to any discussion on this case. His office is also a few blocks from my home. He did state they would honor my request that you handle the case with their assistance.

Thank you for your continued interest, once again:

Sincerely,

Jerry L. Dennis

cc: Congressman C.W. "Bill" Young
Dr. Michael Charney, CSU

Michael Charney, Ph.D., D-Abia
Diplomat, American Board of Forensic Anthropology

16 February 1988

Mr. Jerry Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, Florida 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

Please accept this report on the decomposed, partial human remains with the Number TU 3 Army 3581-66", identified as those of one Mark V. Dennis, U.S. Navy. The remains were received 29 August 1987.

Abstract: A male, 24 ± 3 years, 5 feet 4.5 ± 1.3 inches, 185 ± 5 pounds. The facial affinity cannot be determined. No anomalies are to be seen. The large degree of pathology due to violence and burning will not be included in this report. One tooth of African descent shows restoration.

Summary Data for the Above

Sex: the sub-public angle is 66° (less than 90° is considered male). The skull is badly destroyed but shows a large mastoid process (left) and the nuchal area of the occipital bone is rough indicating heavy neck musculature. The osseum is long, narrow and highly curved. All the teeth are big, heavy, dense.

Age: The faces of the pubic symphysis yield the following ages by three pubic symphysis age scale:

Shelagh T. Brooks: Phase IV - 24 to 26 years
T. Wingate Todd: Phase 3 - 22 to 24 years
McKern-Stewart: 4-3-1 - 22 to 28 years

The centrum of the vertebral bones are completely fused - 25 years
The scapula is dense indicating an age in the early 20's

Height: all the long bones that serve for estimating height are broken with only one, the left femur, having the broken parts present. From the stature regression formulas of Trotter and Gleser: (Femur = 44.3 cm)

$2.3 \times \text{Femur} + 61.41 \pm 3.27 = \text{height in cm}$
 $2.3 \times 44.3 + 61.41 = 163.3 \text{ cm}$
 $= 64.29 \text{ inches} \pm 1.3 \text{ inches}$
 $= 5 \text{ feet } 4.5 \text{ inches} \pm 1.3 \text{ inches}$

Weight: an estimate of 185 ± 5 pounds is based on the size, density of the bones and the muscle markings.

Race: what is left of the skull is not enough to reach any definite conclusion as to race. The extreme fore-and-aft bowing of the femur (L1) height of the curve is 4.7 cm to the posterior surface with the two condyles on the table. This occurred 10 cm from the distal end. 3.0 to 3.5 cm would appear to be average for caucasoid femurs. This degree of bowing of the femur is more characteristic of people of mongoloid race and with the short stature might indicate one of mongoloid racial affinity. However, this is not enough to draw such a conclusion. Extra bowing, making for a "bow-legged" person is not unknown in tall caucasoid even those 6 feet 2 and 6 feet 3 inches.

Pathology: tooth #18 two separate occlusal restorations-analogs.

635 Peterson, Fort Collins, Colorado 80524 Ph (303) 497-1400 (days) or 497-1107 (evenings)

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The Dental Scene

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There is no mandible and the alveolar ridge of the maxilla is mostly missing. From what is left of the maxillary alveolar ridge it would appear that teeth numbers 2, 3 and 4 were missing antemortem. It is also possible that #1 was either missing or had never even into the space of #2 when it was removed. The area at #14 is open and spongy, but it would appear that the tooth had been removed antemortem. Tooth number 15 that shows two occlusal restorations is not well-matched with a dental radiograph of that tooth in a 1964 antemortem of Mark Dennis. This radiograph shows decay in the distal pit and possibly in the central pit, but it is not positive. The central occlusal restorat is not a "pit" but far more extensive. B & recording?

The 1964 antemortem radiograph of Mark shows #14 with a large decay are. The radiograph of 1965 shows this tooth had been removed.

The angling of the antemortem radiographs make the root morphology not good for matching.


In all, what is left of the dentition of this case and its matching with the antemortem picture does not help to either include or exclude a positive identification.

Summation

Mark Dennis at 16 years is listed as being 5feet10 inches and 154 pounds from the high school records. Photographs of Mark alongside his sister Eileen in plate standing at 5feet10 inches, show Mark to be taller. It is almost certain that some growth would have taken place from this to his age at almost 20 years when he is presumed to have died. It is not easy to determine if Mark was bow-legged from the two photographs I have as he is standing with feet spread apart, but he does not appear to be bow-legged. One in his Marine uniform shows the trouser hanging straight. The family says he was not bow-legged. The person represented by these remains is most definitely bow-legged and too far off the height and weight of Mark.

All measurements and observations are on file and available upon request.

faithfully,



Michael Sharney

OUR ADVERTISERS APPRECIATE YOUR PATRONAGE

Rec'd 11-26-88, A-1

1963 Miami High School Football Roster

No.	Name	Position	Weight	Height	Age	Grade
8	Frud Couterly	FB	101	5-8	15	10
9	Larry Maloney	C	142	5-8	15	10
10	Tim Wagner	QB	150	5-8	14	10
12	Ted Winsett	HB	180	6-0	17	12
14	John Weidner	QB	141	5-7	17	12
15	Danny Stansbury	HB	118	5-4	14	10
16	Mike Palmer	HB	108	5-8	17	12
17	Tommy Glue	C	112	5-6	15	10
18	Steve Schultz	QB	128	5-6	15	10
20	Timmy Bates	HB	144	5-8	14	11
21	Don Argood	C	176	6-10	17	12
24	Mick Sorrell	HB	158	5-8	17	12
25	Tom Schneider	E	141	5-4	14	10
26	David Parkhurst	FB	100	5-8	16	11
27	Benny Davis	G	112	5-8	15	10
28	Ken Freeman	G	139	5-8	14	11
29	Ed McAfee	E	180	5-11	15	10
30	John Turner	G	103	5-8	17	12
32	Dennis Thompson	HB	160	5-7	16	10
34	Ed Nunery	HB	145	5-7	16	11
36	Patrick Schenberger	G	120	5-10	16	11
37	Ray Lynch	G	148	5-7	15	10
38	Bob Brinks	FB	123	5-6	14	10
40	Mike Schneider	QB	141	5-10	17	12
41	Chuck Oberer	G	126	5-5	15	10
42	Rick Kidwell	HB	137	5-8	14	10
44	Steve Wagner	FB	112	5-7	16	12
46	Art Buchanan	T	182	5-11	16	11
47	Don Webb	G	146	5-8	16	10
48	Virgil Zink	C	133	5-5	15	10
50	Joe Pitt	T	150	5-11	17	12
52	Doug Franklin	T	160	5-7	15	9
54	Joe Davis	G	138	5-7	15	10
56	Jim Dailly	G	125	5-6	14	10
58	Tim Davis	G	130	5-8	16	12
60	Paul Smith	T	183	5-11	17	11
62	Gary McEllis	T	161	5-10	16	11
64	Ben Napier	T	191	5-10	17	10
66	Mark Dennis	T	160	5-10	16	12
70	Gary Smith	E	150	5-11	16	11
72	John Anderson	E	143	5-5	15	10
74	Tom Nicholas	E	200	5-3	17	12
76	Ed Mafford	E	180	5-2	16	12
78	Steve Gubhart	K	118	5-10	16	11
80	Gary Robinson	E	153	5-11	16	11

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Page Twenty-Two

SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN CASE OF
MARK V. DENNIS, DECEASED

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I. Background information - Vietnam 1966

Mark, at his demise, was a Navy corpsman assigned to the 1st platoon, Co. E, 2nd BN, 1st MAR, 1st MARDIV, for duty. His transfer to this assignment was effective 25 May 1966. On 15 JULY 1966, his company was designated to provide support for other military units in an operation of large proportions in Quang Tri Province. Ten helicopters provided Co. E transportation to a valley destination near the DMZ. A company muster was made prior to departing Dong Ha, the marine base camp location. The helicopter in question was known to carry sixteen personnel, as verified by the pilot. The pilot, co-pilot, and gunner survived, the crew and the twelve passengers were fatally injured. The combat troops aboard were fully equipped for their mission, which included carrying live hand grenades. On approach to the destination landing zone at approx. 1/2 mi distant and at 1000 - 1500 ft altitude (information provided by pilot) the helicopter received enemy anti-aircraft fire and commenced burning. The only object known to depart the aircraft was an emergency escape hatch jettisoned by the co-pilot. The sloping terrain at point of landing, even though landing in upright position, caused the helicopter to overturn. In this position, the aircraft was located in a mortar emplacement area manned by friendly troops, who immediately converged to assist in rescue efforts. However, the explosions occurring aboard the helicopter precluded an immediate recovery, but ultimately all remains were removed. Immediately after the incident, helicopters transporting

other company "E" members returned to Dong Ha for re-muster, thus personnel aboard the downed helicopter were known by name. And certified as being aboard by C.O. of Co. E. Subsequent to removal of remains from the Dong Ha area to the division field hospital at Da Nang, processing for individual identification and preparation of the certificates of death was accomplished. The reverse side of certificates, prepared for each individual, recorded data regarding circumstances and the method of identification (A majority by dental comparison) made at Da Nang. USA mortuary TSNA Saigon confirmed identifications made by use of all ID media available including a comparison of physical characteristics. After identity was confirmed, the remains were (embalmed) prepared for movement to CONUS. The Commanding Officer, Co. E transmitted a letter of condolence dtd 28 JULY 1966, only after ascertaining Mark's whereabouts and determining beyond all reasonable doubt he was aboard the helicopter which crashed, providing briefly the circumstances of death to the Dennis family.

II. Inquiries received - from the Dennis family - 1970-1971

The initial inquiry made to BUNAVPERS concerned the Dennis family's identification of a POW picture which appeared in 30 NOV 1970, issue of Newsweek magazine, as Mark. BUNAVPERS letter dated 19 JAN 71 to Mr. and Mrs. Charles R. Dennis identified the subject in the photograph by name and further provided information that he had written to his family on numerous occasions as prisoner of the NVA. On 10 MAY 1971, Naval Personnel (OLA - BUREAU - BUPERS) met with Mr. Jerry Dennis to discuss POW picture identification and to assist by providing other information requested. POW picture identification discussion was terminated by Mr. Dennis in

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apparent acceptance of identity as provided by BUMAVPERS. Discussion was readressed to circumstances of the crash and information provided to him, by unidentified persons, inconsistent with Navy reports, were briefly as follows:

- a. the burning aircraft was being abandon in flight by passengers
- b. two persons were missing
- c. none of the remains could be identified
- d. the aircraft exploded in mid-air prior to crash
- e. that because of the circumstances indicated above Mark could be a POW

BUMED provided to Mr. Dennis the following information:

- a. the only object observed and known to have departed the helicopter prior to landing was an emergency hatch, intentionally released by the co-pilot for easy exit.
- b. no personnel were reported missing, three aircraft crew members survived.
- c. all remains were recovered, name associations provided at Dong Ha and identified at Div. field hospital at DaNang. Identification was confirmed at USA mortuary, TSN, AB, Saigon. Mark was ID at DaNang, according to annotations made, by a process of elimination. In a aircraft incident this may be considered as good circumstantial evidence, since an immediate accounting provided the names of personnel aboard. However, TSN mortuary records indicate identification by (ID procedures) comparison of physical characteristics, was accomplished.
- d. the pilot reported that no major explosions occurred aboard the helicopter until after landing and the time required for he and

the co-pilot to exit the aircraft and evacuate the immediate area.

The proposal made to Mr. Dennis at the conclusion of the meeting was that BUMED would direct and fund exhumation and re-identification of Mark's remains on presentation of competent evidence which would rebut identification made following Mark's death. No evidence was presented therefore, no action was taken.

III. BUMED ACTION

We were advised by OLA on 12 July 1971, that Jerry Dennis had exhumed Mark's remains on the previous Friday and had re-buried them. However, the skull was detached and retained at the coroners office. Examination of the remains reportedly was made by the coroners physician and three coroner, non medical, investigative personnel. Conclusions made by them relate to an appearance of the skull and vertebral column as being small for Mark. This observation may account for assumptions made by Jerry, in his call made to the White House, reporting that the remains in casket were Vietnamese, not Mark. A request for Mark's dental records was received by Congr Powell's letter dtd 14 July. The BUMED representative hand carried Mark's records to Dayton, Ohio on 20 July for possible comparison with dental criteria remaining in the skull. Upon receiving Mr. Dennis' statement that identification by dental comparison would be unacceptable without BUMED locating an x-ray, showing restorations made on 10-8-65 which supposedly was taken at Camp Lejeune during Mark's assignment to that activity; and our inability to produce such radiographic evidence, if indeed an x-ray was made, resulted in arrangements for exhumation of

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the remains. BUMED scheduled HQ AFLC identification specialists to examine the remains on Wednesday 21 July and ^{by Angel Curator of} the Physical Anthropologist, Smithsonian Institution to examine the remains on Thursday 22 July 1971. Since the skull was available, having been retained at the coroners office, dental criteria was clinically and radiographically examined by dentists at WPAFB medical center on Wednesday morning, a report of their findings was provided.

IV. Tests and examination conclusions released to news media

Tests were conducted on three metal specimens, found in Mark's casket, by the Papucci Laboratories, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio and copies of these reports were provided. The metal specimen tested and comments made by report are as follows:

- a. a metal identification tag for Mark found on his remains in the casket. Comments made appear to disprove it's association with the helicopter fire. Under report conclusions the following statement was made, "the surface of the tag could have been prepared merely by igniting a match with some cellulose (paper) present to indicate a surface action of the material".
- b. a metal fragment identified as part of the firing mechanism of a hand grenade. Comment made, "it is difficult to understand how a grenade fragment was exploded on an above ground surface helicopter"
- c. a metal specimen identified as a piece of corroded aluminium tubing.

No pertinent comments made.

Statements of Roland A. Papucci, PHD, Papucci Testing Laboratories, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio, and Raymond Baby, Archeologist, Ohio State University, are as follows:

- a. "the dog tags on the body which bear Dennis' name could not have

been in the same fire which consumed the body." A-167

- b. References made to information released by Navy indicating Mark's identification was made by fingerprint comparisons, encouraged such statements as-how is this possible when only the upper forearm was left and "there are no hands in the casket." "You can't take fingerprints without the hand tissue."
- c. "The two scientists said there also are just too many other discrepancies in the body size and details of the crash to believe the body is Mark's." A height of between 5' 3-1/2" and 5' 4" was concluded.
- d. Dr. Papucci reported "I have found traces of tetraethyl lead in the femur (thigh bone) and the skull that could have come only from gasoline". Helicopters use what is called JP-4 or jet fuel and it does not contain any lead.
- e. A newspaper article quoting Dr. Papucci, referred to his comment as follows: "He speculated that the body was killed in ground action because he found a firing mechanism from a hand grenade in the skull and grenade fragments in the body."
- f. Dr. Papucci stated "I want to make it clear that I have had no contact with Baby, yet we have arrived at the same conclusion; the body is not that of Mark Dennis."

V. Comments in rebuttal

It is believed that the tests conducted on the three metal specimens were made primarily to justify a statement made in Dennis family ltr dtd 29 Jan 71, as follows: "It is our feeling that all the boys in this explosion whose dog tags were not recovered should be put on the MIA list."

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as no bodies could be identified." Comments made on the report of test appear to disprove its association with the fire. We do not consider presence of the "dog tag" as conclusive evidence of ID of the remains and have stated this viewpoint in letters which the Dennis' have received.

Statements of Dr. R. Papucci, and Dr. R. Baby, are designated alphabetically. Our response is so designated.

- a. BUMED ltr to Congr Powell dtd 18 Mar 71 commented that the presence of the metal identification tag on a remains constitutes supportive, not conclusive evidence of identity.
- b. The letter of 1st March 71, also advised that no fingerprint impressions were obtainable and identification could not be confirmed by this method.
- c. We are not aware of receipt of a report made on Exam of remains from Dr. Papucci or Dr. Baby. Therefore, we do not know procedures they used to determine Mark's height. We are aware that in reports received from the experts we retained that the bone measured is identified, the length of that bone is given in centimeters and inches and the conversion scale used is identified. The Physical-anthropologist determined stature at between 5' 7" and 5' 9" qualified by a report of trunk length at well over 90 cm suggesting a long trunk. The Hg. AFLC report indicated height was calculated at 69.0".
- d. We do not question the feasibility of such test and results he may have attained but without knowledge of specific location of lead residue which may have been found in the bone we are unable to comment. However, we do not feel this test has any bearing on

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the identification of the remains performed at Dayton, Ohio.

- e. Reports of Marks Death, verified by C. O., reports of a company muster and re-muster placed Mark aboard the helicopter. Therefore, we agree with the news reporter, this is speculation. Also, live hand grenades were carried by combat troops aboard the helicopter and it is feasible to assume that anti-aircraft fire, burning of the aircraft or subsequent explosions may have detonated the grenades.
- f. Without knowledge of military procedures used in accountability of personnel and of the methods employed to identify the other personnel who expired in this accident; and unaware of the USA mortuary procedures utilized to confirm the ID made at Division Field Hospital DaNang, it is difficult to understand how a negative determination concerning Mark's identification can be so conclusively stated. It appears, without benefit of Navy circumstance reports and medical records to serve as a basis for comparisons made, their conclusions may be based on hear-say or presumptive evidence. Therefore, we cannot seriously consider "speculations" made concerning circumstances of Mark's death or identification and conclude that circumstantial evidence is so overwhelming as to overcome presumptive evidence presented in news articles.

VI. Conclusive observations

It has been noted in review of this case that there is a persistent request which has appeared in every letter received from the Dennis family, an insistence to change Mark's status to MIA, which by efforts expended and

non-acceptance of Navy information provided, they appear to support. This ^{A-16} is not totally evident however, since they have not relinquished Mark's remains to Navy, but have re-buried his remains under their custody. The numerous inquiries received after publication of articles, before receipt of our letter by family, concerning the identification of Mark from reporters to counter definitive points made by Dr. Papucci and Dr. Baby, put us in a very difficult position. Therefore, information was provided in generalities, confirming Mark's identification which may have been less than desired by them and may have appeared, at that time, to be detrimental to the Navy image. However, it was our desire that the Dennis family receive our correspondence via their Congressman and respond amiably to us. We did not desire that disagreements be aired ^{with} family through the press media. We would consider such discussions highly inappropriate, unethical and not conducive to continuing efforts to assist them. However, by accounts appearing in a Dayton newspaper dtd 20 Aug 71, it appears the family may have failed to exercise the same type restraint and consideration. In the overall picture information obtained regarding circumstances by report and in telecon with C.O.'s of Co. E, and the C.O. of the aircraft, support circumstance reports of the incident involving Mark. The identification made at Dayton recently support the findings made in 1966, concerning identification of Mark. Information which compares with Mark's medical record data is as follows:

- a. Dental comparison - very favorably - a distinctive impacted (unerupted), extraction and restoration pattern of maxillary molars
- b. HT - 69" Record indicates height at 67 1/4" on 2-4-64 (DOB 9-21-46) at induction into Naval service. The growth factor from age 17-1/3 yrs to 19-3/4 yrs (at his demise) is considered feasible and acceptable.
- c. Race - caucasian - confirmed on both reports.

- d. Blood type "A" - confirmed.
- e. Medium build - medium build determined except for long vertebral column and, as acknowledged by Jerry, heavy hiped. ^{A-17}

VII. BUMED Conclusions and position

BUMED conclusions and position concerning the identification of Mark V. Dennis, were submitted to Congressman Powell in ltr dtd 20 Aug 71, with signed reports of the independent examinations made, as enclosures. Excerpts are provided for information and emphasis as follows; in view of comparisons made of Mark's remains to his medical records, the opinions of the identification experts, and the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is the conclusion of this office that the remains in question are indeed those of Mark V. Dennis. It is our position that proper identification was made in July 1966, and that this most recent effort serves only to substantiate the view held by this office since the date of Mark's initial identification. We would urge that the evidence be viewed as objectively as possible in that there is a conclusiveness in the findings which would be most difficult to overcome. Should Mark's parents desire to persist in a denial that the remains are not their son's we will upon a written, notarized request, remove the remains to a National Cemetery for re-interment. The grave, we must insist, will bear a marker, identifying it as the resting place of Mark V. Dennis.

VIII. Other Action

We are aware that BuNavPers is preparing a response to a request the Dennis family submitted to Senator Saxby for convening a board of inquiry to review Mark's case. It appears the request will be declined based on the

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assumption that proposals which may be made will be unacceptable to the family, if it concerns their acceptance of Mark's death.

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Final Layout



CILHI 0055-88



THE FLORIDA STATE MUSEUM, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
WILLIAM K. MARPLES, PH.D., CURATOR, 191-C, GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA 32611

CILHI 0055-88 CASE REVIEW

I have reviewed the documentation on CILHI 0055-88 and have examined the skeletal remains presently associated with that case. These remains have been identified as those of HPM MARK V DENNIS. The first identification was made by exclusion at the USA mortuary, TSN, AB, Saigon. Roll calls immediately before the flight and immediately after the crash clearly identified the man of the unit who were lost. HPM DENNIS was the only casualty not identified by dental and/or identification tags at the initial investigation.

The remains were exhumed in July 1971 for an examination by a coroner's physician and other personnel. No written report by that examination is present in the file. The remains were exhumed again (the cranial remains had been retained by the coroner's office) that same month when they were examined by HQ AFPC identification specialists and dentists at the WPAFB medical center. At that time, they were independently examined by J. Lawrence Angel, Ph.D., curator at the USNH.

Comments by Raymond Baby, Ph.D. (an archeologist who has worked with Amerindian burials and cremated bone), contained in the file material, suggested the remains were too short (they noted a range of around 63.5 to 64 inches). This reviewer has no confidence in stature estimates obtained from a burned body, still fleshed, that was lacking the lower portions of the arms and legs, and where all other long bones were fractured.

The identification specialists and Dr. Angel found good consistency between the known information on HPM DENNIS and the human remains. It is interesting to note that Dr. Angel apparently thought that HPM DENNIS was 17 years old at the time of his death, but found, correctly, that the remains were at the beginning of the twenties.

The remains were examined by Michael Charney, Ph.D. and, presumably, macerated (this is not properly documented by Dr. Charney). This reviewer found several areas of errors and confusion in this report.

(1) Dr. Charney's age estimate is too narrow, a point of some criticism by him in other cases. Most others would estimate the age a bit younger, but Dr. Charney's estimate is quite reasonable, if too narrow and, perhaps, high. Dr. Charney notes that the centrum of the vertebral bones are completely fused, but that is not the case. I also believe that the McKern and Stewart scores are somewhat lower than those recorded by Dr. Charney, but that is, indeed, subjective.

(2) The length of the left femur as measured by Dr. Charney is incorrect and impossible to duplicate, even by departing from the maximum length protocol. Dr. Charney reported that he measured the bone at 44.3 cm. Dr. Walter Birkby and I, working together, were unable to reproduce such a short measurement with the proximal and distal ends of the bone in contact even when departing from all the normal measuring techniques. By that time, a cortical sample had been cut from

CILHI 0055-88

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The left femur was not DNA analyzed. Dr. Charney's measurement was not even close to the maximum length of the fragmented left femur of CILHI 0055-88. The shortest possible measurement that Dr. Birkby and I recorded for the left femur, lacking the bone sample that was cut for DNA submission, was 44.8 cm. That was achieved by placing the cut surface of the distal fragment against the inferior end of the shaft of the proximal portion. Thus, even with a fragment of bone cut away, we were still unable to achieve the measurement of Dr. Charney. On 26 November 1988 when I examined these remains in Largo, Florida, I was able to examine the sample of the left femur that had been removed for DNA analysis, but not used. I found that this sample articulated along its broken superior margin with the inferior margin of the proximal portion. There was solid indication that the korf of the saw blade was only about 1 mm, thus, a good measurement of the total femoral length was possible. I repeatedly obtained a measurement of 45.3 cm for the maximum length of this left femur. When the osteometric board was positioned on 44.3 cm (Dr. Charney's reported measurement), the three pieces of the femur (proximal and distal fragments as well as the cut sample) had to be arranged with anterior/posterior bowing beyond the normal range for any human race.

(3) Dr. Charney reported that he used the formula $2.3 \times \text{femur} + 61.41 \pm 3.27 = \text{height in cm}$. The correct formula is $2.38 \times \text{femur} + 61.41 \pm 3.27 = \text{height in cm}$. By dropping the .08 x femur, Dr. Charney achieved an estimate 1.4 inches less than what the correct formula would have yielded. One simply does not change formulas. If this was done accidentally, it demonstrates a shocking lack of care. Taken together, Dr. Charney's impossible measurement and his incorrect formula result in a stature estimate several inches below what should be the result. Working independently, Dr. Hinkes, Dr. Birkby, and I all found the best estimate (using Steele's segment 1 formula for the right femur) to be within a quarter inch of the stature reported in the military health records of HPM DENNIS. Using the correct formula and when the maximum length of the femur and the lowest possible measured maximum length of the left femur (even after the removal of the DNA sample) the best estimate is within one half standard error of the last recorded height for HPM DENNIS.

(4) The remaining portions of the palate are adequate to determine that the remains were those of a Caucasoid with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. It is surprising that someone with Dr. Charney's experience was unable to reach a conclusion.

(5) Dr. Charney, not for the first time, confuses anterior femoral curvature with bowlegs. In the former, the femur is slightly bowed anteriorly. In the latter, the leg is bowed laterally. It is incomprehensible to this reviewer why Dr. Charney is unable to understand this basic difference. I would refer him to the articles by Stewart, Malensky, and Gilbert for an elementary grasp of anterior femoral bowing.

These remains were not DNA analyzed. Dr. Charney's measurement was not even close to the maximum length of the fragmented left femur of CILHI 0055-88. The shortest possible measurement that Dr. Birkby and I recorded for the left femur, lacking the bone sample that was cut for DNA submission, was 44.8 cm. That was achieved by placing the cut surface of the distal fragment against the inferior end of the shaft of the proximal portion. Thus, even with a fragment of bone cut away, we were still unable to achieve the measurement of Dr. Charney. On 26 November 1988 when I examined these remains in Largo, Florida, I was able to examine the sample of the left femur that had been removed for DNA analysis, but not used. I found that this sample articulated along its broken superior margin with the inferior margin of the proximal portion. There was solid indication that the korf of the saw blade was only about 1 mm, thus, a good measurement of the total femoral length was possible. I repeatedly obtained a measurement of 45.3 cm for the maximum length of this left femur. When the osteometric board was positioned on 44.3 cm (Dr. Charney's reported measurement), the three pieces of the femur (proximal and distal fragments as well as the cut sample) had to be arranged with anterior/posterior bowing beyond the normal range for any human race.

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Dr. Smith, dentist at CILHI, made a reasonable interpretation of the dental records. His report, along with that of Dr. Hinkins, leads one to conclude that these are the remains of HM3 DENNIS. When the enhancements by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Ebert of dental radiographs are considered, there can be no reasonable doubt.

I find that these remains were from a white male who died in his early twenties, most likely around 20 to 24 years. He was most likely over 57 inches in stature. I confirmed that tooth numbers 1 and 16 were not fully erupted at death, that number 15 had two occlusal amalgam restorations, and that number 14 had been extracted during life. All of this information was consistent with the proper interpretation of the military health records of HM3 DENNIS which have been examined by me. His reported blood type, common in American Whites, but not very common in Southeast Asian Mongoloids, was the same as that found in the remains in 1971. The morphology in two teeth seen in an antemortem and postmortem radiographs was extremely similar.

The events of the incident, helicopter fire and accompanying explosions, are consistent with the condition of the skeletal remains.

If these remains were part of a turnover from another country with no provenience or other information, this identification might not be strong enough to make an absolute identification. To imagine, however, that another body with those remarkable similarities could have come from the same crash is beyond any reasonable probability.

William R. Maples

William R. Maples, Ph.D.
Diplomate, American Board of
Forensic Anthropology
Dated: 27 November 1988

A-1



THE C.A. FORD Human Identification Laboratory

WILLIAM R. MAPLES, PH.D. • CURATOR • FBI CHARGE • (904) 392-1721

CILHI 0055-88 ANALYSIS

At the request of Mr. John Rogers of the Department of the Navy and Mr. Jerry Dennis, brother of HM3 Mark V DENNIS, I brought the upper five thoracic vertebrae and cranial remains from the above referenced case to this laboratory for further analysis. Fragments of two teeth (#15 and 16) that had been used for DNA analysis were also present. I also brought an antemortem 1964 periapical film of HM3 DENNIS and a PA chest radiograph identified as that of HM3 DENNIS which was made at the time of his induction into service.

The two teeth were reconstructed and radiographed. The first three thoracic vertebrae, the only distinctive thoracic vertebrae seen in the chest film, were also radiographed. The resulting dental and vertebral radiographs were compared with those of HM3 DENNIS. The comparisons were done with magnification and macro video equipment.

As previously noted in previous reports (Lowell J. Levine, D.D.S. on 15 November 1988 and H. R. Campbell, D.D.S. and James Ian Ebert, Ph.D. on 30 June 1988), the antemortem and postmortem comparisons of #15 and 16 showed consistent dental morphology.

The antemortem chest film which has not been used in any previous comparisons in this case showed many consistent morphological areas when compared with the postmortem vertebral radiographs. The three spinous processes, the shapes of the laminae of the three vertebrae, and the spaces between the laminae of the three vertebrae were very consistent.

This additional radiographic comparison demonstrates once again that CILHI 0055-88 and the known biological information on HM3 DENNIS are consistent in each and every comparison that can be made.

Based on the above, the inescapable conclusion must be made that the remains designated as CILHI 0055-88 are indeed those of DENNIS, Mark V, 222-42-1904, HM3, USN.

William R. Maples

William R. Maples, Ph.D.
Diplomate, American Board of
Forensic Anthropology
Dated: 16 April 1989

1810

NAVSO 5216/5 (7-66) S/N 0104.904.1750

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY A-180

Memorandum

DATE: 19 Apr 89

FROM : John Rogers
 TO : Jerry Dennis
 SUBJECT : Dr. Maples' additional input to AFIRB

Hi Jerry:

Please call me collect after you receive this to discuss our next step.

Sincerely,



1811

April 24, 1989 A-18
 14457 Josephine Rd.
 Largo, FL 34644

COM NAV MED COM
 Attn: MED COM 332
 Mr. John Rogers
 Washington, D.C. 20372-5120

Dear Mr. Rogers,

On Saturday, April 22, I received your Memo attached to the 16 April 1989 CILHI 0055-88 ANALYSIS completed by Dr. Maples. I called your office collect today as you requested. I was informed you would not be available until Thursday.

By the time you return, I may have had throat surgery which will cause paralysis of my vocal cords. The paralysis may last for as little as a few days or as long as six months. As I may not be able to talk to you, I am making my request in writing.


Dr. Maples's report addresses:

- a. reconstructed teeth
- b. radiographs of the teeth
- c. magnification
- d. macro video

Please forward the above and the entire remains to Dr. Charney at CSU. I will get ahold of you and Mike when I am able.

Thank you for your continued interest.

Sincerely,



Jerry L. Dennis

cc: Dr. Michael Charney, CSU

1312



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20372-5120

A-182

5360
Ser 332/0184
19 May 1989

Mr. Jerry L. Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, FL 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

This is in response to your recent letter to Mr. John Rogers, a member of my staff, concerning Doctor William Maples' additional analysis on the remains of CILHI 0055-88.

After a complete review of the case, this Command is offering the following alternatives:

1. Doctor Maples is still willing to present and explain his superimposition evaluation findings to you and Doctor Michael Charney at your earliest convenience. Doctor Charney may ask any questions he desires, or make no comments at all.

2. If Doctor Charney is unavailable to attend, I have enclosed a current list of Diplomates of the American Board of Forensic Anthropologists, so that you may select another expert to represent you for a second opinion.

If neither choice listed above is acceptable to you, then I request you submit any rebuttal documents or evidence in your possession, to the Armed Services Graves Registration Office, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331, no later than 31 July 1989. The Armed Forces Identification Review Board will review the entire investigation/identification of the remains of CILHI-0055-88 in early August.

My point of contact in this matter is Mr. John Rogers. You may call him collect at (202) 653-1345.

Sincerely,

H. M. Koenig
H. M. KOENIG
Rear Admiral (sel), Medical Corps
United States Navy
Deputy Commander for
Health Care Operations

Enclosure

1318

July 16, 1989 A-183
14457 Josephine Rd.
Largo, FL 34644

COM NAV MED COM
Attn: MED COM 532
Mr. John Rogers
Washington, D.C. 20372-5120

Dear Mr. Rogers,

This letter is in response to my letter to you of April 24, 1989, Admiral Koenig's certified letter to me dated 19 May, 1989 and my telephone conversation with you on July 14, 1989.

Before making my comments, I will quote some of the statements made by Dr. Michael Charney in his many communications with me:

"This work of enhancement and superimposition is a task for experts from fields other than that of the forensic anthropologist. I use such scientific experts here on campus in all my work. In a case such as this I want several such experts with me; colleagues of mine on campus in the departments of mechanical engineering, radiology (the health service), instructional media (photography). Rogers knows of the great job that last crew did with the McKinney case."

"You list a date of 31 July on the deadline. That gives us very little leeway - certainly not the time it will take to do all the above."

The remains in question were picked up for transportation to CILHI the end of March, 1968. Their initial report was delivered to me on the 26th of November, 1968. A period of eight months. During the November meeting with you, I became aware that a chest X-ray I have been requesting for years was in Mark's file. Until that time, the Navy had denied that such an X-ray existed. Rather than allow me to have a copy of the X-ray, Dr. William Maples determined he was going to do the analysis I wanted to have done. It was not done at my request as stated by Maples in his report. I still have not been given access to the X-ray or a copy of same. Dr. Maples' report was received by me on April 22, 1989; an additional five months after the initial CILHI report.

The total time used by CILHI and Dr. Maples was eighteen (18) months. You have given me only a few weeks to reply to their reports. I not only must give Dr. Charney ample time to complete his study of the 'new' information developed by Dr. Maples, I must complete the documentation of my response to the AFIB after Dr. Charney is completed with his report. He cannot complete the report without the information I requested from you in my April 24, 1989 letter. He will not be able to address Dr. Maples' latest report until that request is honored by you.

Much earlier in this investigation, I requested documentation from you on past correspondence and on Mr. Invest. You stated you were referring me to Cdr. Bill Reed, MEDCOM, as they must furnish the information I requested. My request to Cdr. Reed was dated February 27, 1989. I have received no reply since then. Since the information

1814

June 25, 1989 A-184
Jerry L. Dennis

furnished to OLC-III for comparative analysis from the earlier reports, communications and the AIA report, the information is a necessary part of my reply. Since this is one of your comments, I do not understand why I should receive a response on an early August review of the case before all the information is available.

The "Procedures for Consideration of Identification of Remains by the Armed Forces Identification Review Board" which you furnished to me state "The AIA will be notified of their opportunity to: (b) Have, in the case of recommended individual identification of remains, an independent professional examination of the remains..." I submit that you have not complied with that section since the 'new' information was developed by Dr. Rogers. I also submit that paragraph (2) has not been met as Dr. Rogers has not provided the such information as required.

Due to the above and other matters we have discussed, I request you extend the period in which I may submit matters to ninety (90) days after the remains and information on Dr. Maples' report reach the office of Dr. Charney. Further, I request the information I requested in my letter to you of April 24, 1989 concerning Dr. Maples' report now be furnished under the Freedom of Information Act.

Thank you for your involvement in these matters.

Sincerely,
Jerry L. Dennis
Jerry Lee Dennis

1815



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON, DC 20315

A-185

5360
Ser 332/034
10 Aug 89

Mr. Jerry L. Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, FL 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

This is in response to your recent letter to Mr. John Rogers, a member of my staff.

In my letter to you of 19 May 89, I stated that Doctor Maples is still willing to present and explain his superimposition evaluation findings to you and Doctor Charney.

After Mr. Rogers received your latest letter, he called Doctor Richard C. Froese, Chief Medical Examiner at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), Washington, D.C. who volunteered his conference room at AFIP to host a meeting between you, Doctor Charney, Doctor Maples, Mr. Rogers, and any forensic expert (pathologist or odontologist) on the AFIP staff, that you or Doctor Charney may wish to consult.

If you agree to the meeting, this Bureau will pay your and Doctor Charney's transportation and per diem expenses, in accordance with current Joint Travel Regulations.

The earliest date Mr. Rogers and Doctor Maples will be available for the meeting will be on 11 Oct 89.

After the meeting, Doctor Charney will welcome to take a copy of Doctor Maples' video, the chest x-ray, vertebrae and reconstructed teeth back to his University in Colorado. At that time, we will determine how much of an extension is needed by you to submit your documentation to the Armed Forces Identification Review Board.

Mr. Rogers passed your concerns regarding your letter to Commander Reed, to his successor, Commander Larry W. Caplinger, who can be reached toll free at, 1 (800) 368-3283.

Your questions requested under the Freedom of Information Act, will be addressed separately by our legal division.

A-186

Mr. Rogers departs on leave Friday, 11 August and will be back in the office on 28 August.

If you wish further information during Mr. Rogers' absence, please feel free to contact his supervisor, Lieutenant Commander Harry C. Coffey, toll free at, 1 (800) 842-1668.

I hope this meets with your approval and that a solution to this case can be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.

Sincerely,

W. M. Korniz
 W. M. KORNIZ
 Rear Admiral (MC) Medical Corps
 United States Navy
 Assistant Chief for
 Healthcare Operations

A-187

LTCDE W. F. MOOREMURDER
 JACE 1001
 BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1001

DEAR COM MOOREMURDER,

I HAVE BEEN REVIEWING YOUR LETTER OF 28 AUGUST AND MY NOTES ON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND OCTOBER 17 OF THIS YEAR. I EXPECTED A REPLY ON THE STATUS OF THE DR. WM. MAPLES REPORT BY NOW. INSTEAD, I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY TELLING ME OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN ROBERTS IN WHICH JOHN ALLEGEDLY STATED THAT THE ONLY HOLD ON MY BROTHER'S CASE IS THAT JOHN IS WAITING ON DR. CHARNEY'S REPORT ON SUPERIMPOSITION, NOT ON MAPLES' SUPPORT MATERIAL. FROM THAT CONVERSATION IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE HOLD INTENDS TO DO NOTHING WITH MAPLES. PLEASE CONTACT ME IF ANY WORDS. PLEASE DO SO BY DECEMBER 15 AS I HAVE A NUMBER OF PERSONS TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH DURING THE CONFESSIOANAL CHRISTMAS BREAK IF YOU ARE TAKING NO ACTION.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE CONVEPRATION BETWEEN DR. CHARNEY AND JOHN ROBERTS, I HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT AIRFORCE MORTUARY PEOPLE FROM TYNDALL BASE HAVE STATED THAT DR. MAPLES MAY BE SUCCEEDING DR. HERLEY AT GILMI. DO YOU HAVE THE IDEA OF A MAN DOING "PERSONAL RESEARCH" ON ALL OUR MIA'S BEING RETURNED? I DO NOT.

IF I HAVE NOT HEARD FROM YOU BY MID DECEMBER DR. IN THE INTERIM I HEAR DR. MAPLES IS IN A PROBABLE MOVE TO GILMI. MY AGREEMENT TO "LAY LOW" AND LET YOU HANDLE THINGS IS REINFORCED. I'M SURE YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION AND DETERMINATION.

I SINCERELY WISH YOU AND YOURS A HAPPY HOLIDAY SEASON. I REALIZE WE ARE ON DIFFERENT SIDES OF A VERY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. BUT I HOLD NO GRUDGES WHEN YOU MUST DO WHAT YOU ARE SAID TO DO WHEN ADVISED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

SINCERELY,

JERRY DENNIS

CC: DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY

1318



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

5720/F9-067
Ser OODJ2:RES/9U233402
18 Dec 89

A-189

Mr. Jerry Dennis
14457 Josephine Rd.
Largo, FL 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 25, 1989 which was received in this office on December 15, 1989.

I apologize for not getting back to you sooner. Mr. Rogers was on the road quite a bit in October and I was out of the office for most of November. I am afraid that the matter of Doctor Maples' video tape fell through the cracks. After being reminded by your most recent letter, I have reviewed the matter and discussed it with Mr. Rogers. As I stated in one of our earlier conversations, under the Freedom of Information Act the government is obligated to release materials which are in its possession. It is my understanding that all such documents have been released. Doctor Maples' video tape is not in our possession and it is not entirely clear to whom the tape belongs. According to Mr. Rogers, Doctor Maples is under contract with the Army and the Army would be the appropriate agency to determine whether Doctor Maples has violated his contract by either making the video tape or by refusing to turn it over. If it is determined that his retention of the video tape is a violation of his contract, the Army's contract representatives would be the appropriate people to demand its release.

The office within the Headquarters of the Department of the Army that has authority over the contract with Doctor Maples may be reached by writing:

Lieutenant Colonel James Cole, USA
HQDA (TAPC-PED)
Alexandria, VA 22311-0482

According to Mr. Rogers, this is also the office which has oversight authority with regard to the Casualty Identification Laboratory - Hawaii (CILHI).

I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cole so that he may be aware that you have significant concerns regarding Doctor Maples. Because I have only recent and limited involvement in this case and am not fully

1319

versed in its history, I have not attempted to more fully explain your position to him for fear of inadvertently misrepresenting it.

Again, I apologize for the delay in responding to you. I can assure that it was unintentional.

Sincerely,

K. E. Vogelhuber
K. E. VOGELHUBER
Lieutenant Commander, Judge
Advocate General's Corps
United States Navy
Assistant for Civil Law,
Medico-Legal Affairs
By direction

A-189

1322


 REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND
ALEXANDRIA, VA

22331-0482

January 17, 1990

POW/MIA Affairs Division

 Mr. Jerry Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo, Florida 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

This is in response to your letter of November 25, 1989, to Commander Vogelhuber, U.S. Navy, and his subsequent referral to this office for further comment in reference to your concerns regarding Dr. Maples.

In order to address your concerns it is necessary to go back to the meeting between you, Dr. Maples, Dr. Charney and Mr. Rogers there at Largo. At that meeting you asked Dr. Maples if anything more could be done to determine if the remains in question were those of your brother. Dr. Maples then looked at the 70mm radiographic chest film made of Mark at the time of his induction into the U.S. Navy. Dr. Maples then informed you that it might be possible to compare that film and new postmortem radiographs. At your request and with no objection from Mr. Rodgers it was agreed to proceed. Dr. Maples did not request, nor receive, payment for the superimposition analysis from the Navy or Army. It was not done under any military personal service contract, but rather as a public service as is often done under the auspices of the C.A. Pound Human Identification Laboratory, University of Florida.

In order to see the complete results of the comparison, it would be necessary to see the films compared with the equipment at the C.A. Pound Lab. The videotape that seems to be the center of misunderstanding is simply a demonstration model of what Dr. Maples did. This videotape is not the analysis. It is the same as a poster describing evidence used in court. It is simply a brief demonstration of what Dr. Maples did in the lab and requires verbal narration and explanation. His conclusion in this case were not based on that videotape but what he saw during the more elaborate comparison in the lab. The production of a videotape is not even mentioned in Dr. Maples' report. It was his examination, not a videotape of limited aspects of that examination, that provided the basis of his conclusion. Dr. Maples' offer to demonstrate all the comparisons at his lab still stands. The rather large amount of equipment needed for this presentation precludes moving it to any other location.

1823

A-193

-2-

Concerning the other points you raised, the information you received from Tyndale Air Force Base mortuary folks is not true. There has been no serious discussion about Dr. Maples replacing Dr. Kerley at CILMI. Such information properly falls in the unfounded rumor category. I do not understand your comment about Dr. Maples doing "personal research" on MIA remains. The consultant contracts state that "employment by the U.S. Government may restrict or limit private employment or business activities if they involve matters in which the United States is a party or has direct and substantial interest."

I trust this will clarify your concerns.

Sincerely,

 J. S. Cole
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff
Chief, POW/MIA Affairs

Copy Furnished:

 CDR Vogelhuber
Mr. Rogers

1324

A-194

COM NAV MED COM
ATTN: MED COM 332
MR. JOHN ROGERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20372-5120

DEAR MR. ROGERS,

AS DISCUSSED IN OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF APRIL 18th, I REQUEST YOUR ASSISTANCE ON THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

1. MY LETTER TO LTCDP VOGELHUBER OF 25 NOVEMBER, 1989 WAS REFERRED TO LTCOL COLE, USA. I WROTE AN ADDITIONAL LETTER TO COL COLE DATED 14 JAN 1990. I RECEIVED A LETTER FROM COL. COLE DATED 17 JAN 1990 WHICH DOES NOT ANSWER MY REQUEST OF 14 JAN.

2. MR. HARDING ANSWERED MY FOIA REQUEST TO DIA OF 6 MAR 89 BUT STATES ".....THREE HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR REVIEW AND DIRECT RESPONSE TO YOU." PLEASE ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHAT OTHER AGENCY IS INVOLVED AND OBTAIN A RESPONSE FOR ME.

3. ENCLOSED ARE THE RESPONSES FROM COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY ON THE "SUPERIMPOSITION" ATTEMPTS. IT HAS BEEN STATED BY DR. CHARNEY THAT OTHERS AT CSU ARE QUALIFIED FOR SUCH WORK BUT ANTHROPOLOGISTS ARE NOT. IF MAPLES AGREES TO THE AFIP MEETING, I REQUEST DR. CHARNEY SELECT THE PROPER EXPERT FROM CSU TO ATTEND (IT APPEARS TO BE DR. FITZBORN).

4. I ALSO HAVE NOT RECEIVED A REPLY FROM YOUR OFFICE TO MY REQUEST OF 2 DEC 1989.

ALL OTHER INFORMATION IS IN. I WILL AWAIT YOUR REPLY TO COMPLETE MY RESPONSE TO THE AFIRB.

I HAVE ONE ADDITIONAL REQUEST. I WOULD LIKE TO SEND YOU MY RESPONSE FOR THE AFIRB AND HAVE YOU DELIVER IT. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU CAN HONOR SUCH A REQUEST.

SINCERELY,

JERRY L. DENNIS

CC: DR. MICHAEL CHARNEY

1325

A-195

COM NAV MED COM
ATTN: MED COM 332
MR. JOHN ROGERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20372-5120

COM NAV MED COM
ATTN: MED COM 332
MR. JOHN ROGERS
WASHINGTON, DC 20372-5120

DEAR MR. ROGERS,

I AM ENCLOSED A COPY OF MY DECEMBER 2, 1989 LETTER WHICH YOU STATED COULD NOT BE LOCATED IN THE FILES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM LTCOR W. C. COFFEY DATED 12 DECEMBER, 1989, BUT NO POSTMORTEM X-RAYS WERE ENCLOSED. DR. S. CAMPBELL AND SREPT REFER TO FILMS IN THEIR REPORT DATED 11 MAY 89. THE FILMS INCLUDED IN THE CILHI REPORT ARE DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 89. THE ABOVE DR. S. REPORT MENTIONS SIX (6) FILMS TAKEN IN MAY; ONLY FIVE (5) WERE TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER. WHERE ARE COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL SIX TAKEN BY CILHI?

I DO HAVE ALL THE OTHER MATERIALS I REQUESTED IN MY DECEMBER 2 LETTER.

I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE ARMY OR DIA SINCE I SPOKE TO YOU.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTINUED INTEREST AND ASSISTANCE.

SINCERELY,

JERRY DENNIS

ENCL: 2 DEC 89 REQUEST

1326

A-196

EDERT & ASSOCIATES

Anthropology, Archaeology, Forensics and Environmental Sciences
Remote Sensing, Photogrammetric, and Geographic Information Systems Applications

3100 Ninth Street, N.W. • Albuquerque, New Mexico 87107 • (505) 344-9676

December 16, 1988

Mr. John Rogers
2200 Columbia Pike
Apartment 712
Arlington, VA 22204

Dear John,


Here are two sets of the Mark V. Dennis case [CILHI 0055-88] x-ray enhancement photographs. I decided to send you 8" x 12" enlargements, rather than 4" x 6" prints as appeared in our report, and I'm glad I had these made because I think they show the detail a lot better than the small prints. Dr. Campbell and I did the major part of our analyses using a slide projector, which is even better, but I think these enlargements should help you study the enhancements and show them to others.

I do think we would like to do some more work with the radiographs, if Bill Maples can get some on the reconstructed teeth. The slightly different angles between the ante- and the original postmortem radiographs is quite unfortunate.

We're also looking forward to helping with the additional (was it 182) repatriated remains, just as soon as things get sorted out at CIL and there are radiographs to work with. Please get in touch and/or have Ellis get in touch just as soon as anyone knows about additional cases, so that we can organize our work to properly coincide with that at CIL.

Hope all is well with you and that you have a good Christmas and of course the best possible New Year.

Sincerely,




James Ian Edert, Ph.D.
Certified Photogrammetrist (ASPRS)
Director

1327



1925



1829



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE COMMANDER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

Rec'd 244-877

A-199

12 FEB 1989

5720 F89-1
00JF

31 JAN 1989

Mr. Jerry L. Dennis
14457 Josephine Road
Largo FL 34644

Dear Mr. Dennis:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in which you requested a copy of the investigation conducted by this Command relating to Mark Dennis.

The releasable documents are forwarded as enclosure (1). Deletions have been made to remove information which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. These deletions are authorized by the FOIA, Title 5, U.S. Code, Section 552(b)(7)(C).

You may appeal the deletions by writing, within 60 days from the date of this letter, to the Secretary of the Navy's designee:

The Judge Advocate General (Code 14)
Department of the Navy
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332-2400

Your letter should state the reasons for your appeal and, along with a copy of this letter, must arrive in the above office within the 60-day appeal limit.

Sincerely,
Wayne A. Coomes

WAYNE A. COOMES
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commander

Encl:
(1) Documents

[illegible]

0501		08-19-81 045-00927/A		NOCP		A-201	
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DATE		SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		MILITARY SERVICE NO.		BIRTH	
DEATH							
9/VE-119... 7000... 11/11/1944... (DECEASED) 3. MICHAEL REENICK, CIVILIAN... WAS AT THE CRASH SITE AND WAS CONSPICUOUS WITH SUBJECT'S VUC. REENICK HAS REPORTED THAT HE SAW THE HELICOPTER LANDED A SHORT DISTANCE FROM ENEMY FORCES AND SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND DIED IN THE BLAZE. VIS ACTION/LEAD: 00000... CONDUCT INVESTIGATION. 00000... INTERVIEW REENICK RE THE INCIDENTS ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF HOSTILE FORCES WERE PRESENT AND COULD HAVE TAKEN A PRISONER. IN LIGHT OF HIGH LEVEL INTEREST, EXPEDIENTIAL HANDLING REQUESTED.							
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PAGE 01
CLASSIFICATION
SUBMITTER'S DATA
DATE
DUSTAT *E* C 2/1 1ST MAR DIV
DATE DATE DATE
PIQUA, OH
S/OENYIS, MARK V (U)/MMS JSA (DECEASED)
COMMENT:
1. ATCH (1) PROVIDES BACKGROUND INFORMATION.
2. NMCI INQUIRIES IDENTIFIED THE THREE SURVIVORS OF THE HELICOPTER CRASH AS CAPT (PILOT) THOMAS C. MCALISTER, USMC (MMS 085394), LT (CO-PILOT) GEORGE C. RICHET, USMC (MMS 086665) AND SGT (GUNNER) GARY A. LUCAS. MCALISTER IS CURRENTLY A CIVILIAN REPORTEDLY RESIDING AT
CAPT LUCAS IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO HMM-42, DET "B", MAG-42, 4TH MAB, NAS WILKINSON, TN. NMCI RECORDS COULD SURFACE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE LT RICHET; HOWEVER, TWO SSAN WERE OBTAINED FOR GEORGE C. RICHET AND MAY BE USEFUL IN LOCATING/IDENTIFYING THE DECEASED INDIVIDUAL. AND LT RICHET WAS ASSIGNED TO HMM-265.
ATTACHMENT
(1) OSOGL ALB (VOCP)/08-20-81/2321010Z... (COPY ALL LESS 0023/05HU)
VIS ACTION/LEADS
LL03GL0084:...INTERVIEW MCALISTER AND CAPT LUCAS RE THE CRASH AND ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT'S DERISE, THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBJECT'S SURVIVAL AND CAPTURE BY HOSTILE FORCES AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION RE THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRASH VICTIMS WHICH MAY SUPPORT/REFUTE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBJECT'S SURVIVAL.
LL08SL...ATTEMPT TO LOCATE RECORDS RE LT RICHET PMA AND/OR ANY OTHER FAMILY INFORMATION WHICH MAY AID IN LOCATION DESIRED. DISSEMINATE LEAD FOR INTERVIEW.

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ALB 1 LAST
DISPATCH OF THE NAVY - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

[illegible]

1834

00HL
00-19-41-03-049-7A-4
SPECIAL INQUIRY
A-204

NAME: JERRY DENNIS
TITLE: JERRY DENNIS
DATE: 11/17/81
BY: JERRY DENNIS

1. JERRY DENNIS, 30, DENNIS, MARK V.

ABLE TO SEE AT LEAST ONE PERSON, NOT IN COMBAT DRESS, NAUALLY
QUINCE, EXITING THE FRONT END OF THE CRAFT. LATER, WHEN VOLUNTEERS
WERE SELECTED TO REMOVE THE BODIES, REENICK VOLUNTEERED ALONG WITH
6-10 OTHERS. PROBABLY ONLY INJURY THE VICTIMS WERE RECOGNIZABLE,
ONE OF THOSE BEING A LIGHT-SKINNED BLACK MALE WHOSE BODY FROM THE
KNEE DOWN WAS GONE. THAT WAS THE ONLY PERSON REENICK COULD RECALL
AND WAS HEARING DOD-1AUS. FURTHERMORE, THE HELICOPTER WAS FROM A
DIFFERENT USMC BATTALION THAN HIS OWN SO HE WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE
ABOUT THE IDENTIFY OF THOSE ABOARD, OR HOW MANY WERE ABOARD.

2. A SHORT TIME AFTER "OPERATION HASTINGS" AND REENICK'S DEPARTURE
FROM VIETNAM, AN ARTICLE ON THAT OPERATION WAS PUBLISHED IN "STARS
AND STRIPES." ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARTICLE WAS A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING
A DAMAGED HELICOPTER SETTLING TO A LANDING, WITH THREE PERSONS
RUNNING FROM THE AREA. REENICK SAID ONE OF THOSE PERSONS WAS HIM
RECUO VOI KNOW THE IDENTIFY OF THE OTHER TWO. HE REPT THE ARTICLE
AND HAS IT IN A SCRAPBOOK OF VIETNAM WAR MEMOIRS.

3. ON SATURDAY, 2 MAY 1981, REENICK WAS STRUCK BY AN ARTICLE ON
PAGE 12A OF THAT DAY'S EDITION OF THE ST. PETERSBURG EVERGLADE
INDEPENDENT. THE ARTICLE TOLD OF THE SEARCH BY JERRY DENNIS OF PALM
HARBOR, FL. FOR CREWMEMBERS OF A HELICOPTER CRASH IN VIETNAM IN
WHICH HIS BROTHER (BOB) WAS KILLED. THE SAME PHOTO OF THE HELICOPTER
THAT HAD APPEARED IN STARS AND STRIPES SOME FIFTEEN YEARS EARLIER
WAS PART OF THE ARTICLE AND IMMEDIATELY CAUGHT REENICK'S EYE. HE
RECEPHONED JERRY DENNIS, AND SINCE THAT TIME THEY HAVE MET PERSONALLY
SEVERAL TIMES. REENICK'S SCRAPBOOK IS PRESENTED ON LOAN TO JERRY
DENNIS.

4. REENICK HAS OF THE OPINION THAT TWO OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED FOR A
PERSON TO EXIT THE HELICOPTER AFTER IT WAS STRUCK BY ENEMY FIRE.
THE FIRST WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER THE CRAFT HAD FALLEN TO THE TOP
LEVEL OF BUNKERS, ESPECIALLY AT CORPUSAN ABOVE POSITION IN REPT. NEXT
TO THE EXIT, COULD HAVE JUMPED FROM THAT SO ON NO FURTHER ACT TO DO.
REENICK ACNOWLEDGED HE DID NOT SEE ANYONE JUMP, SOY DID NOT DISCOUNT
THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE HAD. IF THAT IS FACT, THAT HAPPENED,
THE PERSON WOULD HAVE LAYED IN A DIRT CREEK DEEP IS ABOUT A FOOT OF
SOFT SAND. (BUT) WAS POSSIBLE, BUT FORTUNATELY REENICK SAID THAT AREA
WAS ALL UNDER CONTROL OF THE ENEMY AND THE JUMPER WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY
BEEN REEED ON CAPTURED. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY OF DEPARTURE FROM
THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER THE PLANE SETTLED TO ITS LANDING
POSITION. ALTHOUGH REENICK SAW ONLY THE ONE PERSON, HE DENIED THE
POSSIBILITY THAT A PERSON COULD HAVE EXITED ONE OF THE HELICOPTER DOORS
JUMPED TO GROUND AND RAN UNDETECTED THROUGH DISORIENTATED OR CONFUSION INTO

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1835

00HL
00-19-41-03-049-7A-4
SPECIAL INQUIRY
A-205

NAME: JERRY DENNIS
TITLE: JERRY DENNIS
DATE: 11/17/81
BY: JERRY DENNIS

1. JERRY DENNIS, 30, DENNIS, MARK V.

THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY AND WERE AS CLOSE AS 25 FEET AWAY AND OFTEN
IN HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT WITH PARVIES IN REENICK'S BATTALION.
SEVERAL DAYS LATER, REENICK SAID THE REMAINDERS OF HIS BATTALION
WALKED AWAY FROM THE SCENELIAL ALONG RIVER BED, ABOUT ABOUT HALF
THEIR REMAINING COMPLEMENT ON THE WAY OUT.
7. REENICK IS MOVING TO JAYLORD, TENN IN EARLY SEPT 1981 WITH
NO FURTHER ADDRESS KNOWN AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, HIS CURRENT
EMPLOYER WILL BE APPRISED BY AIA OF THAT INFORMATION WHEN IT BECOMES
KNOWN AND MADE AVAILABLE TO HIS IF NECESSARY. REENICK EXPRESSED
HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH HIS IN ANY FURTHER IN THIS INQUIRY.

VIS FILES
5. FILES OF ALSO CHARLESTON CONTAIN NO OTHER INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE INVESTIGATION.

VIS ACTION/LEAD
A. DSOCC. APPRISE REVENIER.

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CLASSIFICATION		STATUS	
US-1		MVS	
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1	242-42-1908	778 91 45	37-21-44
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3/0E1113, MAR 4 V (10)/M13 USA (DECEASED)			
COMMENT:			
1. J4 5 SEP 1981, H445-42 UEL 3 COMMAND AUTHORITIES HERE TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED AND ADVISED THAT CAPT GARY A. LUCAS, J54C, TRANSFERRED TO H445 SUPPLY, H445 TUMA, AZ, 14 MAR 1981.			
ATTACHMENT (MAIL: ADDEED ONLY)			
(1) USJC AL5/05-25-91/23718962... (COPY 11HW/11TU)			
HIS ACTIVITY/LEAD			
L111TU...UPUT RECEIPT OF ATCH (1), INTERVIEW CAPT LUCAS.			
4.05J...APPRISE REQUESTER			
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11/11		08-19-B1N05-DK49-7XNA	REC.	SPECIAL INQUIRY
//H01-N0023/MC-N0501/MC-N05DC/M1-N1111//				A-20
NAME AT	YUMA, ARIZONA	NAME AT	SPECIAL AGENT	
ADDRESS	08-19-B1/RODC	SUPPLY	CO 2/ 1ST MARDIN'	
MT	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	DATE	11/9-21-64	YUMA, AZ
N	202-42-1904	DATE	27A-31-65	

S/DENNIS, MARK V. (10)/1043 USN. (DECEASED)

INTERVIEW OF CAPT G. A. LUCAS

1. CAPT Gary Allen LUCAS (Vice LUCAS), _____, HHSR Supply, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, AZ was interviewed on 7 October 1981 in an effort to obtain additional details of Subj's reported demise in a helicopter crash in Vietnam on 15 July 1966. He said the incident occurred during an operation identified as "LASTING" when additional troops were being taken into an area just north of Quang Tri Province to reinforce troops there. The plane had been overrun. He stated that he was part of a Huey (4) crew on the helicopter, which was shot down by hostile ground forces, and he identified the other three members of the crew as: Thomas C. MCALISTER (pilot); George C. RICHY (Co-pilot); and the crewchief (NFI). In addition, there were twelve (12) combat-ready troops on the helicopter, whose names were unknown to the crew, or a total of sixteen persons. The pilot, co-pilot, and himself were the only survivors to the best of his knowledge, and a total of thirteen (13) persons perished as opposed to eleven (11) as previously reported. CAPT LUCAS said that he saw two (2) individuals jump from the aircraft, on fire prior to the crash and assumed they were killed. He did not know Subj and indicate he had no way of knowing if he was one of the twelve troops they were carrying when the helicopter was shot down. He further advised that an article covering the incident had later appeared in the 1 August 1966 edition of Newweek Magazine with pictures captioned by the name "Horst FAAS" - Associated Press. He provided a copy of the article (ATCH (1)) and was of the opinion that possibly FAAS or Newweek Magazine could provide additional photographs or data that might be of assistance. CAPT LUCAS said he had been knocked unconscious for a period of time when the helicopter crashed. His statement is ATCH (2).

NIS FILES

2. NISO San Diego, CA files contain no additional pertinent information regarding this investigation.

ATTACHEMENTS

- (1) Copy of Newsweek Report/08-01-66... (COPY ALL.)
(2) Witness statement, LUCUS/10-02-81... (Orig. Retn/COPY ALL.)

NIS. ACTION/LEAD:

A. OSDC... Apprise Requester.

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HISPA Yuma, Ar.
 2 Oct. 1901

A-209

I, CAPT Gary Alan LUCAS, USMC, _____, hereby make the following voluntary statement to _____ who has identified himself to me as a Special Agent of the U. S. Naval Investigative Service: _____

I was born on _____ in _____ I enlisted in the USMC in May 1959 and I was born on _____ in _____ Airland.

I am presently attached to HENS Supply, HCSB Yuma, Arizona.

I was asked me to provide details and what information I can regarding a an incident that occurred in Vietnam in an area just north of Quang Tri Province and south of the DMZ on 15 July 1966 when the USMC CH-46 helicopter I was in was shot down by a hostile forces ground fire. I understand that one of the persons who perished as a result of the incident was IM3 Mark V. DEWHAUS, 207-42-1001; however, I did not specifically know that person by name.

On the day in question, I was assigned to the CH-46 helicopter in question as a door gunner with HMV-265 attached to MAG-16 operating out of Marble Mountain in Hanning. We were involved in operations Hastings and we were moving combat troops to engage North Vietnamese regulars which was the first encounter with these troops in the Vietnam War. At around 1800 that day, we were advised that there was a company being overrun and that we were going to take in additional troops to reinforce the troops that were there. The CH-46 was loaded with twelve (12) combat ready troops in addition myself, the crewchief, the pilot and copilot. There were sixteen individuals on the helicopter. After we departed, we were in the air for about thirty (30) minutes on our way to the landing zone, when the pilot informed the crewchief and myself that the zone was coming up and it was "hot". About this time we were hit in the starboard fuel cell with an incendiary round and immediately caught fire. The flames were about waist high moving forward and aft in the cabin and the smoke was so thick no one could see. The pilot was notified that we had been hit and he immediately started to descend to the landing zone. When we went about 1300 - 1800 feet, I overheard conversation between the pilot and copilot indicating that they were unable to see. I unlocked my safety harness and glanced toward the rear of the aircraft. I saw an individual run off the aft ramp of the helicopter and his clothing was smoking. I assume he ran out of the aircraft because of the intense heat and was killed upon impact with the ground as we were still around 1200 feet in the air. As the helicopter progressed toward the landing zone and was at an elevation of about three-hundred feet (300'), we were still on fire and went into a hard right bank and I saw a second man jump from the aircraft. I was on fire at the time. Shortly after that, we hit the ground and I always felt the aircraft probably fell on that man. As far as I know, his body was never found. We hit the ground with the helicopter on its starboard side. I was knocked unconscious on impact. When I came to, I noticed that the pilot and copilot had exited the aircraft. I found out later that some of our forces on a nearby hill framed from the aircraft. I then elected to see if there were any other survivors in the aircraft. I found that the crewchief was still alive but his leg from the knee down was pinned between the aircraft and ground and he had also been hit by a round. When I was attempting to pull him free, he was hit by other rounds in the back and died. Some ammunition from our own aircraft was exploding. Everyone else on the helicopter was still strewn in their seats and their bodies were burned beyond recognition. They were sitting right over the fuel tank and the rear third of the aircraft was like an incinerator. I left the aircraft and the landing zone and moved into the bush toward our troops. Around thirty minutes later, I came to an outpost and they took me to the top of the hill and administered emergency first aid. Around noon the next day, I was nadivernal out.

ATTACHMENT (2)

... as was the description I have of the incident which took place later in the hospital. I met an individual whose name I do not know that told me he had been with the troops on the hill nearby and saw one of the men jump from the helicopter. In this type operation, we were just moving troops and we were only concerned about the number of men on the aircraft. We had no knowledge of who they were individually. I have no way of knowing if Hqs Mark DENNIS was in our helicopter when this incident occurred or not. I can specifically say that there was a four (4) man crew and twelve (12) passengers on the helicopter at the time. I found out later that there was a Newsweek magazine correspondent at the scene identified as Horat 1748 and an article covering the incident with our helicopter later appeared in the 1 August 1966 edition of the magazine. In the article, pictures taken at the scene have the name Horat 1748-Associated Press inscribed underneath the pictures. Possibly GAO or Newsweek magazine could provide additional data or photographs that might be of assistance. If Hqs Mark DENNIS was in fact on the aircraft, and if he was one of the two individuals that jumped out, it is highly unlikely that he would have survived. This is what I recall of the incident to the best of my recollection. I have read the completed statement and corrected all errors.

H. A. Lucas

Subscribed and sworn to before me at HISSA Yuma, Az., on 2 Oct 1981


Special Agent, HHS

AUTHORITY:

SECNAVINST 5520.1R of 10 Sept 1971



ATTACHMENT (A)



Hit by enemy ground fire, a U.S. helicopter goes down in flat

AMERICANS AT WAR

It is hard going, hot, too. First Sgt. Warren Eichelberger's Company is 327th Battalion, First Brigade, 1st Airborne Division, moves down the slope, through the dark, green jungle of 150-foot thickets and 15-foot-high grass bounding over them, through the slippery and gunlike that is Vietnam's own peculiar version of mud. "Keep it spread out if we come in a clearing," says Eichelberger. Many of Eichelberger's men are youngsters, green replacement, and the new men always tend to cluster together. "That's dangerous," says Eichelberger. "If Charlie pops up, he'll get a helluva bunch of 'em with one grenade or one bomb, and it'll be a big loss."

Now the rain is up, and Eric John says, "I can't see the end of the Vietnam," tells such, cycling the gun and the end of white rope wrapped around his shoulders like a scarf. He slips, pitches forward, twisting his knee (his thin leg grimes with pain, but he rises and lunges about with the rest of his fellow paratroopers. He enters the mud and his weakened body is mostly he against the bright white soil of the field, against the single background. "This is more to 're' him," he says, "and when he says, 'I don't see more.' He starts to say, 'Schellenger's voice, heavy with the sorrow God gave all seignior, comes back at him.' 'Yes, absolutely, if the Army wanted you to withdraw on patrol, they'd send you a song home.' 'An' now's feature start to go last, then he says, 'Ah-hi, take it easy, Sarge,' he says but he says it under his breath.

It is another day, and some 100 miles.

away from FitzGerald's front porch, Capt. Robert Lee Gator is a 6-foot, 100-pounder in his bunker with the machine gun. "Go in there all the way to the end of it," he says, "or the rest will get it." Almost midnight, Gator has ordered the windmills that pump water to the levee. The soft light of a full moon glimmers seductively off the skin of soldiers in the machine gun. Gator is 25 and a member of K. K. K., says, Third Battalion, Third Marine Regiment. He is a Negro. "At night," he says, looking at the sanding parapet, "you must fight like a thousand miles away, like your eyes and ears are right here."

[illegible]

few of the men the U.S. lost fought in the agonizing war in Vietnam. But many of them have been there more than a year, but they remain, already arrested themselves with one of the same qualities, attitudes, contradictions that have been present and



Morino cratter as the chapter is.

of the war since it began in earnest three and a half years ago. This is not a stubbornly hard-headed army (though once individuals in it are), it is tough, it is trained to fight and it fights—succeeding well but it does its fighting with the quiet, laconic, rare-to-doggedness of professionals. No one, in particular "Ging Ma" and none of Sergeant Kowthorpe's paratroopers would ever even think of selling "Geronimo."

[illegible]

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... on a nearby hill: a crewman and twelve others aboard were killed, three badly burned.

he can, and does something else. It often annoys other soldiers when he does this. He takes the time to collect cigarettes out of his Crationals and (because he disapproves of them) tears each one into unworkable (and unattractive) shreds.

1st Sargent Eickelberger, Major, also served during the Korean War (though his duties kept him Stateside) and he feels there is a poignant difference between that war and this one. "In Vietnam, 'This is a hard war,' they said, 'emotionally hard.' We fought into the villages and try and get the enemy out of the villages. We fought in Korea. Here we have to protect what all the time 'The defense perimeter' is all around you."

One of the most astute and incisive top commanders in Vietnam points out some ideas somewhat differently. He is Maj. Gen. William E. DeFay, one of

U.S. Army's fastest rising stars (this is the first post to circumnavigate General of the U.S. First Infantry Division—the United States' largest combat division—on foot). As a leader and an officer whose grasp of the battlefield and strategy promise big things to come.

"This war," says DePuy, "is still a cat-and-mouse game. In conventional warfare, you try to capture terrain. Here our objective is to kill the enemy, is inflicting the maximum of losses. That's what it's less important. Twenty-four hours a day, it's a major battle, not troops are in the line." DePuy seems to have

ient by Alfred Thayer Mahan. "For the military historian," he goes on, "this war is more like naval warfare. The jungle is an immense ocean. Under the cover of the jungle, enemy battalions maneuver like submarines. Sometimes they submerge for a quick attack. Sometimes they stay hidden in the depth of the tropical rain forest."

"Never before in the history of war," says DePuy with quiet intensity, "have troops commanded as much in silence. The basic military unit in Vietnam is the battery, highly mobile and troop-led by air. [That] is the great novelty of this war is the helicopter. It takes the Viet Cong ten days to move three of its battalions. We can move the battalions in one day. The result is that ten American battalions can fight 50 Viet Cong battalions. Now the general runs over the battle and still he is constant contact with his units by radio."

landscape for hours, the fire raged. Then, Navy Phantom and Crusaders moved in low smothering the enemy positions with bombs and napalm, and the marines slipped out of the trap.

But they paid a price, too. Marine company was badly battered, and four prominent troop-carrying helicopters were damaged or destroyed. Three soldiers died on the tough landing zone. Two were shot down, one by a Communist incendiary bullet that sent the chopper flaming into the hills, causing twelve injuries to three deaths, and crushing almost 500 of one of the Marine units. It is the ground to produce one of the worst and most spectacular sequences of the war (see above). But of the Americans paid a price, the Communist paid a higher one: they lost more than 2000 dead, and the Marines, with fresh reinforcements, moved on in their search for the enemy as he picked off one of the Marine company's command.

All the mobility and power DeFuy brought to lightly were on display last week in Operation Hastings, a daring helicopter assault by seven Marine battalions against a regular North Vietnamese division that recently infiltrated into the rugged hills of Quang Tri Province, less than 2 miles from the North Vietnamese border. This detachment of Marines was quickly pinned down by withering enemy fire. "A beautiful two-leaf nest" said a young Marine, speaking the last automatic rifle into the hostile

express a desire to discuss the issue with the U.S.

Tenness continued to insist when, at midnight, the President scheduled a full press conference and left little doubt in anyone's mind that he intended to issue a stern warning in response to Hanoi's threats.

But before Mr. Johnson could go on the air, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh weighed in with what appeared to be a promise that, trials or no trials, the pilots would not be executed. Replying to a private appeal from the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and from U.S. Socialist leader Norman Thomas, who declared: "No doubt you know that the policy of the Government [of North Vietnam] with regard to the enemies captured in war is to humanize them."

"Humanize" image: Significantly, however, Ho did not rule out the possibility that the airmen would still be brought to trial. And in fact, one high Administration official predicted that Hanoi would probably proceed with some kind of courtroom show, perhaps even sentence the prisoners to death and then commute the sentences in a move to bolster its "humane" image abroad. Nonetheless, at his press conference, the President made it perfectly clear that the U.S. would view even purely propaganda trials of U.S. fighting men as "deplorable and repulsive." Faced to spell out possible U.S. reprisals, Mr. Johnson remained purposely vague, partly, no doubt, because of Uncle Ho's

father.

Afterward, Mr. Johnson was accused to leave himself as much room as possible for public maneuver. And to that end the U.S. announced at the week's end that it was:

"linking nineteen North Vietnamese sailors or prisoners who might become part of an effort at a prisoner exchange, a calling for a meeting of the International Red Cross Committee to discuss the application of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of prisoners of war."

Reinforcing the ties of U.S. servicemen held prisoner in "detained," "captured or intercepted," and "missing," it strengthened its argument that these men are fully entitled to the neutral protection of POWs.

One question complicating the issue was that when it comes to North Vietnam, the U.S. is dealing with a near vacuum of verifiable information. Officially, there are 45 U.S. airmen listed as prisoners in North Vietnam but that figure is a matter of speculation since Hanoi has adamantly refused to divulge a roster of prisoners. And though it is rumored that the airmen live in "plastic comfort" in a prison in Hanoi, some observers report that the Americans have been forced to march through villages with ropes tied around their wrists, and placards of the captives brought out by neutral nation photographers hardly suggest that their treatment in the North is up to anything like Geneva Convention standards.

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13-19-81, 05-3049-7X 4A		AUC		SPECIAL INQUIRY	
//EM-V0023/EC-V0542/EF-V0542/EA-V050C//				A-219	
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI		3/1		JULY 21, 1967	
22-19-81/VNPEC		JULY 21, 1967		PIQUA, OH	
22-19-81/VNPEC		JULY 21, 1967		PIQUA, OH	
3/DENNIS, MARK V (U)/MMS JUV (DECEASED)					
RECORD REVIEW					
1. BY SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE, MISS ST. LOUIS HAS REQUESTED TO ATTEMPT TO LOCATE A MILITARY SERVICE RECORD ON 131ST GEORGE C. RICHEY, EX-USMC, FILES OF THE NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECORDS CENTER, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI. DISCLOSED A MEDICAL RECORD ON GEORGE GLADEN RICHEY, (DPOB) WHO WAS RELEASED FROM ACTIVE DUTY 14 1959. RICHEY HAS A NAVAL AVIATOR AND WHEN RELEASED WAS A CAPTAIN. THERE IS A 131ST GEORGE C. RICHEY IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG TRI, JULY 1966, HE WAS WOUNDED IN ACTION IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG TRI, RVN, AND SUFFERED BURNS TO HIS FACE AND ARMS. AT THAT TIME, AS A 131ST, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO 444-265, 146-16, 1ST AAA BATT. RICHEY'S LATEST HOME ADDRESS OF 444-265, 146-16, 1ST AAA BATT, 45 OF MAY 1967, HE ALSO LISTED AN ADDRESS FOR HIS WIFE, RICHEY, AS NO OTHER ADDRESS MORE CURRENT COULD BE FOUND IN RICHEY'S MEDICAL RECORDS.					
2. VNPEC FILES DISCLOSED THAT RICHEY'S PERSONNEL RECORD HAD BEEN FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, CODE 498-20, AS OF 12 JUNE 1961 AND IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR LOCAL REVIEW.					
3. FILES OF 4189 NEW ORLEANS CONTAIN NO INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION OTHER THAN THAT SET FORTH HEREIN.					
4. ACTION/LEAD: A. 050C... APPRISE REQUESTER.					
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Street show in Hanoi: Armed North Vietnamese guards hold captured American airmen at gunpoint

Newweek, August 1.

OJCOL		CLASSIFICATION //ASI-NO023/AC-NOSHQ/AA-III/CIC/AE-NOA/IZ,		SPECIAL INQUIRY COPY TO	
REPORT AT LOUISVILLE, KY		DATE OF SUBMITTANCE DATE		OFFICIAL AGENT	
STANDARD OS-19-81 NMPG					
SUBJ LOCAL INCIDENT NO M 282-A-1904	ANALYST'S NAME AND TITLE	DATE 09-21-66	TIME	PLACE	PICQU, ON
BY/DENNIS, MARK V (IO)/BIB USN (DECEASED)					
INTERVIEW OF PILOT					
1. On 10 Oct 81, Thomas Christopher MCALLISTER, Civilian, was interviewed at his residence.					
MCALLISTER furnished a sworn statement, Attachment (1), wherein he advised that he was the pilot of the CH46 helicopter that was shot down by hostile forces 15 July 66 near Quang Tri, Republic of Vietnam. MCALLISTER advised that he did not know the individual identities of his passengers at any time, and that after the crash incident, accounting for the casualties was done by persons other than himself. He said he did not know Subj. He also provided three photographs taken by news service photographer Horat PASS (PIKNETIC) showing various stages of the descent and subsequent fire. MCALLISTER did not see how it was possible that Subj could have survived the crash. He said they landed within the perimeter defense, and he saw no enemy forces anytime during the incident. In addition to PASS' photographs, MCALLISTER said, he was told that a Japanese camera man had filmed the entire descent, and that it was later shown on Japanese television news.					
DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE					
2. Photographs are being maintained in NISMA Louisville evidence locker until request for release from appropriate authority.					
NIS FILES					
3. Files of NISO New York are negative concerning this investigation.					
ATTACHMENT					
(1) Statement of MCALLISTER/10-10-81...(Orig OSG/Copy all)					
NIS ACTION/LEAD					
A.OSDC... Apprise Requestor					
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE					

PLACE: Room 2481
DATE: 10 OCT 61 A-32

1. Thomas Christopher McALLISTER make the following free and voluntary statement to whom I know to be a Special Agent of the United States Naval Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the events surrounding the death of Mark V. DOMINICK, MCJ USN, on 15 Jul 66 in Quang Tri, RVN.

I was the pilot on a UH1H CH-46 helicopter that was shot down by hostile forces on 15 Jul 66 near Quang Tri, RVN. There were four members of the crew; myself, co-pilot RICHES, crew chief TELFER (who was killed that day) and side gunner LUCAS.

A group of marines had called for reinforcement. They were surrounded by a division of North Vietnamese leaders. The marines were in a valley and the enemy were on the ridges surrounding it. They were probably 4 to 5 miles away. There were at least four aircraft in my flight. I was the second one in. We picked up a group of marines at Dong Na. I think there were 12 altogether. I cannot be sure of this number. I was only concerned with the weight and the fuel load. I never knew who the passengers were individually. It was necessary to leave the rear ramp partially descended in flight, because it took too long to lower on the ground, increasing our vulnerability.

As we started our descent to the landing zone (LZ) Y was approximately 1000 to 1500 feet of altitude when we were hit, probably by .50 cal machine-gun fire. This was almost simultaneous with the squadron commander's order to leave the area. In just a few seconds, our stubbing fuel tank was hit and ruptured, probably by tracer bullets. Burning fuel was immediately sucked into the passenger compartment, probably through the partially-open rear ramp. The fire and smoke came all the way forward to the cockpit, injuring my eyes and temporarily depriving me of my sight. I still had control of the aircraft, and immediately decided to land and try to evacuate. The descent took about 30 to 60 seconds. The gunner LUCAS stood in the opening of the cockpit and bled out of the flames with his back to the rear. The two in the compartment were trapped and could not escape.

We landed hard on a gentle hillside and the aircraft capsized on its right side, in so doing, it killed TOLPA, who had jumped out. I was momentarily pinned in the cockpit but managed to free myself and exit. RICHIE exited by the co-pilot's emergency hatch, followed by me. LUCAS went back into the compartment to see if anyone there could be helped. He told me later he saw no one alive, so he got out. We walked a short distance up the hill and within 1 to 3 minutes the aircraft exploded and burned for several hours. I saw no one else exit the aircraft. In all likelihood, they were already dead when the craft hit the ground.

We landed within the marines' perimeter. I did not see any enemy forces during.

ATTACHMENT (1)

Thomas C McAllister
13-14

1352

the entire ordeal. We were immediately taken to the aid station. A-222
The balance of the flight returned to Dong Ha and there the accounting
of the casualties took place. I never had a direct part of this
accounting.

While I cannot state that it was impossible for DENNIS to survive,
I can say that the possibility is extremely remote. He had no chance
to escape after the crash because LUCAS would have seen him. If he
had fallen or jumped from the craft before the crash, either he
would have been killed in the fall or the fall would have been
photographed. Horst FARR of UPT took still photos of the entire
descent. I have lent my copies of these photos to today.
The negatives probably still exist. Also, I was also told at the time
that a Japanese newsmen had taken movie film of the descent and crash.
I was told it was shown on Japanese television.

All I can say is that if Mark DENNIS was in that aircraft, I do not
see how he could have survived. I have no explanation for the
discrepancies in the autopsies. LUCAS was the one who had direct
contact with the passengers during the flight and the crash incident.
I understood that RICHEY was killed several years ago in an accident.

I can provide no further information pertinent to this investigation.

I have read, understood, and initialled all corrections in the
above statement, and it is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

Thomas C. Wallis
Time: 1505 Date: 10/Oct/1981

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of October, 1981,
at Lexington, KY.

Special Agent, NIS

NOTE: NICHOLAS 5520.1A of 10 SEP 79

1353

OSDC	08-19-01N05-0049-7XHA	PLANNING SPECIAL INQUIRY	A-22
//NH-H0023/MC-N05HQ			
WASHINGTON, DC		SPECIAL AGENT	
08-19-81/NMPC		DUSTA: "E" COMPANY 211 1ST MARDIV	
M 282-42-1904		09-21-46	
S/DENNIS, MARK V(10)/NMJ USN (DECEASED)		PIQUA, OH	

REFERENCE

(A) NISRA ORLANDO, FL R01/08-27-81/23913267

SYNOPSIS

1. Investigation initiated regarding SUBJECT who is officially listed as having been killed in action (KIA) on 15 Jul 1968 in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) when a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter crashed. In light of numerous factors, see infra, SUBJECT's family had made extensive efforts to have SUBJECT's status changed to missing in action (MIA) vice KIA. 1971 exhumation of SUBJECT's remains surfaced additional information which prompted SUBJECT's next of kin (NOK) to question the positive means of identification utilized at the time of SUBJECT's death; however, a second exhumation conclusively identified the remains as SUBJECT. An individual reportedly at the RVN crash site has corresponded with SUBJECT's NOK and allegedly reported information contrary to official U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps accident reports re SUBJECT. The individual was interviewed by the NIS but did not provide any specific substantive information concerning any misidentification of SUBJECT/possibility of his survival. Investigation pending interviews of the three helicopter survivors (Pilot/Co-Pilot/Gunner) and other additional interviews as considered appropriate.

BACKGROUND

2. CDR Mable L. WALLIS, USN, Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), Retired Personnel Support Section (Code 641E) contacted the NIS regarding SUBJECT/Instant Investigation. CDR WALLIS provided Reporting Agent with a compendium of reports regarding SUBJECT whose family has made extensive efforts to have his status changed to MIA vice KIA. A review of the voluminous files regarding SUBJECT determined that SUBJECT was a passenger aboard a USMC CH-46A helicopter (Bureau #152500) assigned to HHN-265 the crew of the helicopter was CAPT MCALISTER (Pilot), 1ST LT George RICHEY (Co-Pilot) and SGT Gary A. LUCAS (Gunner). On 15 July 1966 at 1815H, approximately 12 miles from Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, RVN (298° Radial), the USMC CH-46A helicopter was shot down by hostile forces ground fire. The helicopter exploded while attempting to land and subsequently burned. In the aftermath of the crash/fire, it was determined that nine (9) USMC personnel and two (2) USN (including SUBJECT)

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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE-NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DD FORM 1-7-70-1000

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
 05DC 08-19-01N05-DC49-7XUA
 A-224

1. TITLE: S/DENNIS, MARK V(10)/HM3 USN (DECEASED)

Members perished. SUBJECT suffered extensive third degree burns caused by the explosion of the helicopter/fuel which was determined to be the cause of death of SUBJECT. Due to the combat conditions, location of the crash site and the collection of the remains, SUBJECT's NOK were not notified of SUBJECT's death until 22 Jul 1966.

3. SUBJECT's remains were transported from the crash site to the U.S. Army Mortuary, TAN SON NHUT Air Base, Saigon, RVN; the remains were embalmed on 29 Jul and transported to the United States on 30 Jul 1966. SUBJECT was buried 09 Aug 1966 in Miamisburg, OH. Due to the extent of the burns, a visual identification of SUBJECT by NOK was not effected and a closed coffin burial was strongly recommended by Department of Defense personnel; SUBJECT's NOK complied with DOD suggestion. Fingerprint identification of the remains was not possible due to the extent of the burns. It was learned that the identification of SUBJECT was made by a process of elimination when the number of cadavers found at the crash site were compared to the names of the missing from the helicopter manifest (passenger list); SUBJECT was the only one of the eleven (11) deceased personnel who was not positively identified in Vietnam through conclusive means (e.g. fingerprint/dental chart comparison), although the identification of SUBJECT as the deceased was never questioned by SUBJECT's NOK during 1966.

4. Gary L. DENNIS (SUBJECT's brother), 5175 Pine Mount Circle, Pine View Estate, Miamisburg, OH 45342, viewed a photograph of an American Prisoner of War in the 30 Nov 70 issue of "NEWSWEEK" magazine. The photograph was taken by an East German Journalist (HFI) and had also been printed in the 20 Oct 1967 issue of "LIFE" magazine although the "LIFE" magazine photograph was not noticed by SUBJECT's NOK. Upon SUBJECT's family viewing the photograph in Nov 1970, they "identified" the POW as SUBJECT and contacted the U.S. Navy regarding the possibility of SUBJECT still being alive in a POW camp. Subsequent inquiries/research by Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINTCOM) determined that the photograph appearing in the "LIFE"/"NEWSWEEK" magazines was of LT (now CDR) Paul E. GALANTI, USN. LT GALANTI was a Naval Aviator who had been shot down while on a sortie over Vietnam and has been verified as being a Prisoner of War. However,

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05DC 08-19-01N05-DC49-7XUA
 A-22

1. TITLE: S/DENNIS, MARK V(10)/HM3 USN (DECEASED)

during the intervening period pending identification of the individual in the "LIFE"/"NEWSWEEK" photograph, SUBJECT's NOK then began to question the actual process of identifying SUBJECT's remains and made extensive congressional contacts.

5. Information subsequently surfaced wherein it was alleged by SUBJECT's NOK that the passenger manifest listing of personnel assigned aboard the helicopter SUBJECT was travelling in had varying reports as to the actual number of personnel aboard at the time of the crash. However, inquiries in 1966 determined the apparent discrepancies were attributed to the combat conditions of the operation wherein an entire USMC battalion air lift was being transported via twenty-five (25) USMC CH-46A helicopters. It was considered possible but not likely that an individual could have been flying aboard a helicopter and not listed as a passenger. It is noted that upon final review of the crash circumstances/operation, no information to support any discrepancies regarding the specific helicopter SUBJECT was travelling and the passengers aboard had ever been surfaced. In addition, doubt was raised by SUBJECT's NOK when it was learned that varying reports of the actual number of persons perishing in the crash initially varied between 11 and 13 before the final death toll of eleven was established.

6. Accordingly, pursuant to persistent demands of SUBJECT's NOK, SUBJECT's remains were exhumed in May 1971 (HFI). Dr. Roland PAPUCCI, Director of PAPUCCI Laboratories, Cincinnati, OH tentatively identified the remains as apparently that of an individual approximately 67" tall, the race of the remains could not positively be determined.

AGENT's NOTE: SUBJECT was a caucasian approximately 69" tall.

Further, some question was raised regarding the presence of particles (tetraethyl lead) in traces of gasoline that reportedly caused SUBJECT's death by extensive burning; the discovery of the particles were considered by NOK to be perhaps indicative of the remains having been killed in other than a helicopter crash (e.g. in ground combat).

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S/DENNIS, MARK V(10)/HM3 USN (DECEASED)			

7. In light of the findings which SUBJECT's NOK considered somewhat alarming, the Department of the Navy considered an examination of the remains by Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP)/Smithsonian Institute.

8. SUBJECT's remains were re-exhumed with examination conducted on 21 Jul 1971 at the Montgomery County, Ohio Coroner's Office, Dayton, OH. Upon examination of the remains, the prosecutor concluded that the deceased was 6'9" tall; based on examination of "the cranial vault" and "nasal bridge," the remains were conclusively identified as a caucasian.

9. Dental record comparison with those of the remains determined "the postmortem dental Characteristics of the remains are in favorable agreement with the ante-mortem dental photographs and SF603, Dental Health Record for HM3 Mark 'V' DENNIS." Concluding, the AFIP report confirmed the 1966 RVN identification of SUBJECT established by LCDR F. LUGO (MC), USNR and reports the conclusion reached after comprehensive study demonstrates that the remains examined 21 Jul 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue can only be those of HM3 Mark 'V' DENNIS, 7789145. Atch (1) is the 05 Aug 1971 Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command (HQAFLC) report of the reprocessing of SUBJECT's remains at the Montgomery County Morgue, Dayton, OH.

10. During the course of apparently extensive research by SUBJECT's brother, Michael WINNECK, Civilian, currently residing at

reportedly advised he was at the 15 Jul 1966 QUANG TRI, RVN crash site. WINNECK reportedly provided information perhaps indicative of the possibility of SUBJECT having been captured by enemy forces vice perishing in the helicopter crash/ensuing blaze. Accordingly, HAWKILPERS, Washington, DC desired investigative assistance to interview WINNECK, as well as, any other interviews perhaps germane to the issue of SUBJECT's demise or capture at the time of the helicopter crash.

INTERVIEW OF WINNECK

11. Ref (A) reports that WINNECK (formerly assigned to

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S/DENNIS, MARK V(10)/HM3 USN (DECEASED)			

Headquarters Company, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division) was interviewed regarding the helicopter crash. WINNECK advised observing the helicopter being hit by hostile forces ground fire; before the helicopter exploded. WINNECK related he was able to see at least one person, badly burned, exiting the front end of the helicopter. WINNECK assisted in the removal of the remains of bodies from the aircraft but was unable to conclusively identify any of the victims due to the extent of the burns. WINNECK opined, although not witnessing same, that when the helicopter was hit and was descending, someone (perhaps the Corpsman who would normally be sitting in that door position) could have jumped from an approximately 30 to 40 foot altitude into the dry creek sandbed below and perhaps survived. Although injury was inevitable, survival was considered perhaps likely. WINNECK opined that if an individual had exited one of the helicopter doors he could possibly have wandered in a state of disorientation or confusion into the hands of hostile forces who were perhaps as close as approximately 25 feet away and at times in hand to hand combat with USMC personnel.

12. In summation, WINNECK was unable to provide any conclusive personal observations concerning the possibility of SUBJECT having survived the helicopter crash/fire or the possibility of capture by hostile forces or any other additional information considered germane to this investigation.

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS INQUIRIES

13. Inquiries concerning the Pilot, Co-Pilot, and Gunner of the downed helicopter determined that they were the only three survivors of the helicopter crash. The men were identified as (Pilot) CAPT Thomas C. MCALISTER, USMC, MSH: 005394, 1ST-LT (Co-Pilot) George C. RICHIEY, USMC, MSH: 008665 and (Gunner) USMC SGT Gary A. LUCUS. Review of USMC Headquarters determined CAPT MCALISTER is currently a civilian and reportedly residing at CAPT LUCUS is reportedly currently assigned to Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (HMS) 42, Detachment "B", MAG-42 4th MAW, Naval Air Station, Millington, TN.

14. HQMC records could not surface any additional information

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PENNING SPECIAL INQUIRY
A-228

DATE OF
SUBJECT
OFFICIAL SECURITY NO.
MILITARY SERVICE NO.
TITLE
S/DENNIS, MARK V (10) (HMS) USN (DECEASED)

regarding 1ST LT RICHEY, however, two social security account numbers and were obtained for a "George C. RICHEY" and are considered likely to assist identifying the desired individual.

AGENT'S NOTE: Via internal NAVINVSERY correspondence, NAVINVSERYA Memphis, TN, advised that inquiries conducted at HHS 42 determined that CAPT LUCUS, supra, was transferred to HHS (Supply), MCAS Yuma, Arizona.

STATUS OF INVESTIGATION
15. Investigation pending interviews of CAPT (now civilian) MCALISTER and CAPT LUCUS, supra, and efforts to identify 1ST LT RICHEY through Federal Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri inquiries, as well as, any additional investigative effort considered required by instant investigation.

COMMAND APPRAISAL
16. CDR WALLACE, supra, was contacted and apprised of the status of this investigation on a continual basis throughout the course of the inquiry.

ATTACHMENT
(1) HQAFLC Letter with Enclosure/OR-05-71 (Copy all)

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DAI 0167-47-000-1000 INS STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM, BUREAU OF NAVAL INVESTIGATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE POLICE COMMAND
WRIGHT PATERSON AIR FORCE BASE, AUSTRALIA

2 Aug 72

in UNITED & Surgery/Cable 374
23rd and "E" Streets, NW
Washington DC 20391

1. Report #511, attached, covers the processing of the remains of HU-3 Mark "V" Dennis.
2. The conclusions demonstrate that the remains exhumed 21 Jul 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue are those of HU-3 Mark "V" Dennis.

FOR THE COMMANDER

THOMAS W. TOY
Chief, Memorial Affairs Division
Dr of Personnel Support Services

1 Atch
Report #511, w/11 atchs

1360

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE DISTRICT
WRIGHT PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, DAYTON, OH 45433



1 Aug 71

FORM NO. 103-1

Report #511 - Report of Representative of Montgomery County Morgue,
Dayton, OH, 21-22 Jul 71

FORM NO. 103-1

Administrative Data:

1. At the request of the Dept of Navy, the Department of Defense, AFM, represented a remains buried at Hill Grove Cemetery, Mansfield, Ohio, 9 Aug 66. The deceased was a pilot in a helicopter which crashed 15 Jul 66 in the vicinity of Quang Tri Province, RVN. (Log O 210305Z Jul 66, CG THIRD MAR DIV - see Tab 4). Dept of Navy documents show 12 others killed in same accident and three (3) persons survived.

2. Papers presented on the deceased are:

DD Form 1300, Report of Casualty (dated 25 Jul 66) Tab 1
Certificate of Death (dated 25 Jul 66) Tab 2
Health Questionnaire (dated 23 Nov 64) Tab 3
Log, CG THIRD MAR DIV O 210305Z (dated 21 Jul 66) Tab 4
SF 603, Dental Health Record (beginning date 10 Jun 64) Tab 5
SF 88, Report of Medical Examination (dated 4 Feb 64) Tab 6
SF 89, Report of Medical History (dated 4 Feb 64) Tab 7
SF 601, Immunization Record (dated from 12 Jun 64, to 31 Mar 66) Tab 8

Factual Data:

3. Persons contacted were:

Mr. Frank A. Eskridge, Department of Defense, AFM, USH, Wash DC
Dr. T. K. Watson, Pathologist, Montgomery County Coroner's Office, Dayton OH
Mr. Gene V. Roberts, Assistant Chief Deputy Coroner, Montgomery County
Dr. J. Lawrence Angel, Anthropology Div, Smithsonian Institution, Wash DC
Col John J. Tarsitano, DC, USAF Med Cn, Dr Dept of Dental Services, WPAFB
Lt Col G. L. Koshler, DC, Chairman, Dept of Oral Surgery, USAF Med Cn, WPAFB
Mr. Jerry L. Dennis, deceased's brother, 431 Richard Dr, West Carrollton OH, 45449

4. Dr. Watson stated on 21 Jul 71:

a. That the remains were to be exhumed from the Hill Grove Cemetery and would be brought to the Montgomery County Coroner's office at approximately 1000 hrs, 21 Jul 71.

b. That the remains had been exhumed and re-interred approximately two month previous to the 21 Jul 71 disinterment; and.

c. That a partial skull was retained at the Montgomery County Morgue in addition to an ID tag.

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5. On 21 Jul 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue, the Air Force Identification Specialist, in the presence of Frank A. Eskridge, was given custody of a metal casket. The casket contained an unidentified Navy uniform and remains wrapped in an Old World blanket, white sheet and polyesterine.

6. There follows extracts from SF 88 (Mark "A" Dennis, 7709145) dated 2/4/64:

Age	Blood Group	Height	Hair Color	Weight	Build
17 yrs, 4 mos, 13 days	A, neg	67"	Brown	150	medium

NOTES: (1) At time of death deceased's age was 17 yrs, 4 mos, 24 days.
(2) At time of death deceased's height was about 69.0".

7. Identification Processing:

a. The remains removed from the casket disclosed the following:

Specimen 1 - Fractured skull with C-1 articulated to the occipital condyles. The greater portion of the frontal, Rt and Lt parietals and Lt temporal, a small portion of the Lt temporal are missing. The entire mandible, except the Lt mandibular condyle and neck which is charred, is missing. There is a traumatic fracture of C-7 and T-1.

Specimen 2 - The neck and torso, consisting of the spine from C-2 including the sacrum, articulated with the innominate, which in turn is articulated with the proximal 3/4 of Rt and Lt femurs. There is a heavy musculature development over the hips and upper thigh areas. The proximal 3/4 of the Lt humerus is articulated at the shoulder. All ribs are present and articulated. The distal extremities of rib bodies are missing. The chest cavity contains the heart and a portion of lung. A portion of liver is noted in the abdominal cavity. The anterior chest and abdominal cavities are open. The Lt humerus consisting of the head and 3/4 of the shaft is articulated to the torso.

Specimen 3 - Fractured distal 3/4 of Rt humerus and extremity.

Specimen 4 - Fractured proximal Rt radius measures 6 cm.

Specimen 5 - Fractured Rt knee joint consists of distal Rt femur (measures 12.6 cm); head and shaft of Rt tibia (measures 14.5 cm); the head and shaft of Rt fibula (measures 7.3 cm) and the patella.

Specimen 6 - Fractured Lt knee consists of the distal Lt femur (measures 8.5 cm); head and proximal shaft of Lt tibia (measures approximately 7.5 cm) and the proximal shaft and head Lt fibula (measures approximately 8.6 cm).

B. Identification Findings:

Specimen 1 - The skull is articulated to the maxilla, mandible with C-2 which is articulated to the maxilla, mandible, tooth #1, the lingual root of #2, #15 and #16. The maxilla, tooth #1, the lingual root of #2, #15 and #16 are impacted. There is evidence that teeth #3 and #4 are surgically extracted and the alveolar processes are healed over. There are two occlusal amalgam fillings on tooth #15. The alveolar process which supports teeth #4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 has been buried away. A small portion of a root apex, either #6 or #7 is present in the buried alveolar process.

a. The dental record complete for HM-3 Dennis shows two occlusal restorations on tooth #14, accomplished on Oct 45, which is erroneous, since tooth #14 is recovered as having been extracted 18 Jan 64, 1 yr and 9 mos prior to the date the restorations were alleged to have been placed in tooth #14. The two occlusal restorations are in fact on #15. This error is commonly seen in dental identification because of the extraction of #14, tooth #15 has drifted mesially, and as a degree now occupies the alveolar area formerly retaining tooth #14.

(1) The post mortem dental anatomy of the remains is in favorable agreement with SF603, Dental Health Record and the dental radiographs prepared for HM-3 Mark "W" Dennis.

(2) See atch #9, Dental Findings, Col John D. Tarolano, DC, and Lt Col G. L. Koehler, DC, Dental Services Div, USAF Medical Center, WPAFB, 21 Jul 71.

(3) See atch #10, AF Form 477A, Dental Identification Record.

Specimen 2 - That specimen 1 (C-1 articulated to the skull) demonstrates good articulation with specimen 2 (C-2 articulated to the spine) proving that specimen 1 and 2 (the torso) are of one individual.

a. The Rt femur condyles associated with the Lt femur condyles disclose a height measurement of 69.0" (46.8 cm).

(1) This height measurement is comparable with that of Dennis at time of death applying the Mildred Trotter-Gallup C. Gleser Scale (Ref: Estimates of Stature From Maximum Lengths of the Sum of Measurements of Long Bone, 1958). The scale allows for an anticipated growth of 1.2 cm in American males from age 17 to 19.5 years. The recorded height on Dennis, 4 Feb 64, was 67 1/2" (45.6 cm). Since death occurred 15 Jul 66 or about 2 1/2 years after the 4 Feb 64 measurement, the height of 69.0" (46.8 cm) is established.

(2) From the Lt femur a specimen of good quality cancellous tissue was extracted. Two separate tests, using the Dr. P. D. Candella absorption techniques, were accomplished on the cancellous bone. Results of these tests disclosed post mortem blood group A. SF603 and SF601 prepared for HM-3 Dennis list his ante mortem ABO blood group type A. See atch 11.

b. Four separate tests, using the Dr. P. D. Candella absorption techniques, were accomplished on good quality cancellous and long tissue, and dried packed red blood cells contained in a small vein within the lung tissue (all from the torso) disclosed post mortem blood group A. SF603 and SF601 prepared for HM-3 Dennis list his ante mortem ABO blood group type A. See atch 11.

c. The dentition and Lt pubic symphyseal faces demonstrate an estimated age of 20-24 yrs. Although there is an osseous nodule on the inferior symphyseal faces which appears at about the 25th year the greater surface of the symphyseal faces denote an age ranging from 20 to 23 yrs. Therefore, the osseous growth must be judged post mortem because of other factors observed.

Specimen 3 - The fractured, unattached proximal Rt humerus morphologically compares very favorably with the articulated Lt humerus, specimen 1.

Specimen 4 - Fractured proximal Rt radius morphologically and development compares favorably with structure of the distal Rt humerus.

Specimen 5 - Rt knee joint, consisting of the distal Rt femur shaft, condyle, patella and head and proximal shaft of fibula morphologically in the opposite member of specimen 6, the Lt knee joint. Articulation of the distal and proximal shafts of Rt femur is not possible because of the charred fracture sites.

Specimen 6 - Lt knee joint is the opposite member of specimen 5 morphologically and the distal shaft can be demonstrated to articulate accurately with the proximal which is articulated to the torso.

9. Conclusions:

a. That the high and rather narrow cranial vault; the high nasal bridge; and narrow nasal aperture with knife-like sharpness of the lower borders are indicative of the Caucasian race. The deceased was Caucasian.

b. That the post mortem dental characteristics of the remains are in very favorable agreement with the ante mortem dental radiographs and SF603, Dental Health Record (beginning date 18 Jun 64) for HM-3 Mark "W" Dennis.

c. That the six Candella absorption tests established the ABO group as type A. Dennis's SF603 and SF601 recorded his ABO group as A.

d. That the established height of 69.0" predicted on the normal growth factor of the late "teen" is in agreement with the projected deceased's height at time of death.

e. That the skeletal and muscular development of the remains are of an individual of medium build, although the hip and thigh region reveals heavy muscle development. SF603 on HM-3 Dennis shows his build to be medium.

1364

7. That specimens numbered 1 through 4 (as applied for the purpose of this report) are the remains of the deceased.

10. Summarizing:

The findings established in this report are directly compared with all statistical data collected on the 11 persons becoming deceased in the 15 Jul 66 helicopter disaster in the vicinity of Quang Tri Province, RVN. The conclusion reached after comprehensive study demonstrates that the remains examined 21 Jul 71 at the Montgomery County Morgue can only be those of 101-3 Mark "V" Dennis, 7789145.

This report confirms the identification obtained 21 Jul 66 by S. Lugo, LTJG MC 10381.

Robert M. Halston
ROBERT M. HALSTON
Identification Specialist

This report has been reviewed and in approval.

Thomas W. Toy
THOMAS W. TOY
Chief, Memorial Affairs Division
Director, Personnel Support Services

11. Items:
1. 101-3 Mark "V"
 2. Certificate of Death
 3. Health Questionnaire
 4. Mark "V" in RE BAR DIV O 210305Z
 5. SF 601
 6. SF 101
 7. SF 102
 8. SF 601
 9. Dental Finding
 10. AF Form 697A
 11. Record of Serological Techniques

1365

CO-145	09-19-81425-2279-7X1A	PE-0145
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DISPOSITION //E1-V0323/EC-V03H7/E1-N03H2/EA-V03H2/I M1-V03LV//		
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RE-TECHNICAL 1. 282-02-1904	DATE 09-21-46	PIQUA, OH
S/DE4115, MARK V (I)/MNS J51		
REFERENCE (A) 0331 101/10-15-81/2032200Z		
COMMENT: 1. REFI (A) PARA (2) REFERS. 4120 PHOTOGRAPHS NOT DESIRED BY REQUESTER AND SHOULD BE RETURNED TO MCALLISTER; HOWEVER, FOR INCLUSION IN SUBJECT DOSSIER, XEROX COPIES ARE DESIRED.		
V15 ACH104/LEAO A.0331...0331 XEROX COPIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND FORWARD TO DISTR; RETURN EVIDENCE PER REQUESTER.		
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CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	DATE 1 JUL 71	BY J51
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE - NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE		

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A-237

[illegible]



A-231

XEROX OF
MAGAZINE PHOTO
OF CRASH

TOO POOR FOR
REPRODUCTION.

1370

05DC
//MI-00023/MC-H05H1//
WASHINGTON, D.C.
08-19-01/NNDC
M 282-42-1204
S/DENRIS, MARK X (10)/NM3 USN (DECEASED)

REFERENCE

- (A) NAVINVSERVRA YUMA, AZ RO1/10-07-81/23021002
(B) NAVINVSERVRA ST. LOUIS, MO RO1/10-08-81/2811803Z
(C) NAVINVSERVRA LOUISVILLE, KY RO1/10-15-81/2882200Z
(D) NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON, D.C. RO1/10-23-81/2261302Z

SYNOPSIS

1. References report HAVINVSERV interviews of all available personnel known to have any knowledge/involvement in the 15 July 1966 crash causing SUBJECT'S death. None of the individuals contacted were able to provide any substantive information indicative of SUBJECT'S survival/capture by enemy forces. The co-pilot (RICHEY, see infra) of the helicopter was identified although interview was not effected since a current location could not be ascertained; however, information from various sources indicates that CAPT. RICHEY was killed in a car accident. Attempts at identification of next of kin (NOK), were unsuccessful and it is considered likely that CAPT. RICHEY'S parents may have passed away and Mrs. RICHEY has re-married or otherwise utilizes a different surname; further attempts have been discontinued. HAVINVSERV investigation is being closed. Requestor is remnant.

INTERVIEW OF HELICOPTER GUNNER

2. Reference (A) reports the interview of CAPT G.A. LUCUS, USMC, DUSTA: HAHS (Supply) Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, AZ. CAPT (then SGT) LUCUS was interviewed, verified his presence aboard the helicopter and confirmed that the only other survivors were the pilot and co-pilot. CAPT LUCUS was unable to provide any information supportive of SUBJECT'S possible survival in the aircraft/fire.

ATTEMPTED CONTACTS WITH CAPT RICHEY

3. Reference (B) reports identification confirmation for George Gladden RICHEY (DPOB: 05-14-39, Washington, D.C.). CAPT RICHEY (a naval aviator) was released from USMC active duty in 1968.

4. RICHEY'S listed home address was that of his father.

In addition, CAPT RICHEY'S spouse's address was listed as of May 1967.
at No other more current addresses

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1871

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CLASSIFICATION

DATE

SPECIAL INQUIRY

A-24

DDDC
Distribution

CONTROL

OR-19-NINQ5-DE49-A/A/T

CLOSED

UNIT AT

REPORT ON

REMARKS

STATUS

SECURITY SECURITY UNIT

DISPATCH SYMBOL NO.

DISCLOSURE

IN FILE

\$DENNIS, MARK V. (IO)/HMO USN (DECEASED).

were listed in CAPT RICHEY'S personnel records.

INTERVIEW OF PILOT

INTERVIEW OF PILOT
5. Thomas Christopher MCALLISTER, was interviewed at his residence, MCALLISTER confirmed his assignment as the pilot of the helicopter and related no enemy forces were within sight at any time during the incident and noted that it was not possible for SUBJECT to have survived the helicopter crash/ffire. Regarding the co-pilot (LT RICHEY), MCALLISTER advised he had learned (although unable to recall the source), that LT RICHEY had been killed "several years ago in a war accident". (Ref (C) refers).

RE-CONTACT WITH REQUESTER

RE-CONTACT WITH REQUESTER
6. CDR Mable L. WALLIS, USN, Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC), Retired Personnel Support Section (641E) was contacted regarding CAPT RICHEY. Although unable to provide the source of the information, CDR WALLIS advised that contained within SUBJECT'S NMPC (Code 641E) dossier, notations had been made regarding CAPT RICHEY'S death in an automobile accident in Norfolk, VA in 1970. CDR WALLIS advised that no additional information concerning CAPT RICHEY is contained therein. CDR WALLIS could not determine the writer of the notation and advised that numerous NMPC personnel had worked on SUBJECT'S dossier over a several year period.

INQUIRIES RE CAPT RICHEY

7. Additional inquiries conducted at CAPT RICHIE's home address in Northwest, Washington, D.C., were unsuccessful for any pertinent information. The current occupants of the building had no information regarding former occupants of the residence; moreover, they had never heard of the family name RICHIE. Subsequent inquiries conducted at local U.S. Post Office regarding a forwarding address were unsuccessful since forwarding address records are only maintained for a period of one year.

- B. Review of Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Directory for a listing for the name G.G. RICHIEY surfaced no listing. In addition, utilizing the Haines Criss-Cross Telephone Directory, similar negative results were met re surfacing the name G.G. RICHIEY.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE-NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
A/N 0007-1, 000-1000 AND STANAG SYSTEM EQUIPMENT, NAVJITCOM 0000-1112 11-001/130

1374



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511-5704

5100
Ser. 03/ 0376
20 Sep 1989

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command (N64DD)
Subj: HOSPITAL CORPSMAN THIRD CLASS MARK V. DENNIS, USN,
282-A2-1904

Ref: (a) NMPC ltr 1771 Ser N64DD/0873 of 9 Sep 89

Encl: (1) MMM-164 ltr of 17 Jul 66
(2) MMM-263 ltr of 18 Jul 66

1. In response to reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are provided. These are the only reports on file at the Naval Safety Center relative to the crash of a CH-46 helicopter, with fatalities, that occurred on 15 July 1966 in Vietnam.

H. W. Raines, Jr.
H. W. RAINES, JR.
By direction

1375

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 44, CHNAVINST 7730.41

AIR MAIL

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER

IN REPLY REFER TO:
AWARD NUMBER:
DATE: 18 JUL 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: COMMANDER
U. S. NAVY AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

1. CHNAVINST 7730.41

1. CH-46, 15700, 10N-26S, 3-87A

2. 15 JULY 1966, 1815H, 2800 RADIAL, 12 MILES LONG IN TACAN

3. THOUGHT (1966)

4. ALPHA

5. THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT 1500 FEET, 100 KNOTS OVER THE LANDING ZONE WHEN IT WAS HIT BY 12.7 MILLIMETER FIRE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED DESCENDING ON FIRE AND LANDED 75 METERS FROM THE LANDING ZONE AND EXPLODED FIFTEEN SECONDS LATER.

6. MCALLISTER, THOMAS, C., CAPT., 08534/7335, USMC, ACTIVE, UNKNOWN

7. RICHIE, ROBERT G., 1LT., 08669/7335, USMC, ACTIVE, UNKNOWN, CO-PILOT.

TELFER, ROBERT H., 2LT., 18772/418, USMC, ACTIVE, FATAL, CREW CHIEF, LUCAS.

GARY A., SGT., 189914/3071, USMC, ACTIVE, UNKNOWN, CREW. THE REMAINING TWELVE PASSENGERS (U.S. MARINE INFANTRYMEN) NAMES UNKNOWN, INJURIES, FATAL.

8. BARBARA ANN TELFER (WIFE), 3 FRANKLIN STREET, FULTONVILLE, N. Y.

9. NONE

10. DIRECT EMERGENCY ACTION.

COPIES TO: CNO (1-057) CNAVINST 7730.41 CO, 18THAV
CNO (CNSC AIP) CO, 18THAV
COMNAVINST CO, 18THAV
COMNAVINST CO, 18THAV

ADDRESS: COMNAVINST OFFICE
100-801, MAR-16, 10THAV
FTO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 94601

UNCLASSIFIED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 44, CHNAVINST 7730.41

ORIGINAL

NAVAL PRESENTATION
UNCLASSIFIEDSPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH
66 OPNAVINST P3750.62

DATE: 15 JULY 1966

To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Report of Aircraft Mishap

A. OPNAVINST P3750.62

1. 15 JUL 1966 151930 151936

2. 15 JUL 1966 0815H 2880 1200 DOWNSIDE

3. Troop Lift

4. Unknown damage. Possible strike both aircraft. On 15 JUL 1966, rotor blades on both heads sheared. Passage broke at station 10 with the complete aft pylon settling down on the ramp. Or 151936 damage same as for 151930 except forward rotor and blades undamaged. Further damage assessment impossible at this time due to tactical situation. Final damage estimate will be submitted at a later date.

5. 151930 and 151936 were part of a twenty four helicopter strike force. 151930 was the lead aircraft of a Division of four with 151936 flying the number two position. Both aircraft were loaded with four U. S. troops with combat gear. Both aircraft had ample power to take off and the flight to the landing zone proceeded normally. The approach was normal through the final leg. The approach was over a small sloping terrain although the landing zone was level. The pilot of the lead aircraft realized that he was critical and he decided to overshoot the zone unless he initiated a large flare. There was a clearing just beyond a tree line at the far edge of the zone and the leader elected to land long in that spot. He maneuvered his aircraft to that spot, and with maximum power applied and rotor RPM dropping, landed slightly hard. He lowered the ramp and started unloading his troops.

151936, the number two aircraft, was approximately four rotor diameters aft of the leader. He also recognized that the approach was a little high. However, he had been selected when the aircraft rolled in final and the pilot attempted to slow down. He saw the lead aircraft landing long and there appeared to be an area large enough to land just aft and to the left of the leader. The pilot made his approach to that spot and just prior to landing saw several troops on the ground at the intended landing spot. The troops made no attempt to move but the pilot of the way so the pilot moved slightly forward and right. The landing was made, the collective lowered, and the ramp lowered. The troops started unloading. The aircraft was on the ground.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN CONFORMANCE WITH PARAGRAPH
66 OPNAVINST P3750.62

On the ground there was a loud explosion heard by the people on the ground and both aircraft began to shake and vibrate into uncontrollable conditions. Both pilots immediately secured the engines and applied rotor brakes. All hands exited the aircraft, taking with them the machine guns and personal equipment.

An immediate damage assessment was made and the pilots saw that neither aircraft could be flown out, even with new rotor heads and blades. The aft blades of 151936 had struck the top of some eighteen to twenty feet high green bamboo covering the tops from the majority of the stalks in the rotor path.

There was no fire in either aircraft except a residual fire in the number two engine of 151936. The flames were coming out of the intake and were being blown toward some broken oil lines. These flames were extinguished with a CO₂ bottle.

The crews vacated the area and with sporadic sniper fire into the landing zone, moved the machine guns and personal equipment to another aircraft, boarded and returned to Port M.

6. Pilot THOMAS S. REAR MAJOR 068237 USMC No Injury (151930)
- Pilot WILEY J. SELLERS CAPT 072880 USMC No Injury (151936)
7. No U.S. troops injured or killed.
8. Two U.S. Marines totally injured as they disembarked aircraft. One U.S. Marine seriously injured as he disembarked aircraft.
9. Not applicable.
10. Direct result of enemy action. This mishap is classified as "Direct result of enemy action" in view of the down hill approach complicated by the slight down wind condition (2-3 knots) at the time of landing. The approach from west to east was dictated by heavy enemy sniping which prevented an approach from east to west.
11. Not applicable.
12. 2-57H.

1. 15 JUL 1966 151930 151936

2. 15 JUL 1966 0815H 2880 1200 DOWNSIDE

3. Troop Lift

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1378



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
BUNED:394:AFZ:1F

18 MAR 1971

Honorable Walter E. Powell
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Powell:

This is in further response to your recent inquiry in behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Charles A. Dennis concerning identification of their late son, Petty Officer Third Class Mark "Y" Dennis, U. S. Navy.

The Department of the Army performs the identification and preparation of all deceased service personnel in Vietnam. Information provided by the Army indicates that thirteen remains from the crash site were received at the mortuary on 28 July 1966 and identified, including Petty Officer Dennis' remains. His remains were embalmed on 29 July and prepared for transportation to the United States on 30 July 1966.

Units of the Third Marine Division reported that two Navy and eleven Marine Corps personnel manifested aboard the aircraft were killed when it crashed in the vicinity of Quang Tri Province, RVN. They were also required to perform and confirm field identifications prior to evacuation by Marine Graves Registration personnel to the Army Mortuary. Name associations for each remains was determined by personal recognition and/or location at the time of death.

The Report of Casualty indicated Petty Officer Dennis sustained third degree burns on his entire body. Thus, no fingerprint impressions were obtainable and identification could not be confirmed by this method. Army mortuary documents record that identification of Petty Officer Dennis' remains was made by definitive comparisons of his remains with health record entries, relating, but not limited to, height, weight, and color of hair. This very favorable comparison supported by information received from the activity to which he was assigned indicating his physical location at that time provided ample basis upon which to make the identification. Although Petty Officer Dennis was badly burned, hair follicles in protected body areas, such as the underarms and the perineum were available for comparison purposes.

It should be noted further that simultaneous processing of remains of personnel involved in the accident permitted Army mortuary identification specialists to cross-compare records for each remains against physical characteristics of the remains received, providing further confirmation

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BUNED:394:AFZ:1F
18 MAR 1971

of the identification. In identification of this type, processing remains by cross-comparison is a standard procedure utilized in a "contained incident" to provide the specialists a basis for conclusive confirmation.

To provide as much meaningful information as possible, which may assist in relieving the next of kin's distress, the following is submitted from official records concerning personnel aboard the helicopter at the time of the crash: ten individual remains were positively identified by dental and physical characteristics comparisons; two individual remains were identified by personal recognition, subsequently verified by fingerprint comparisons; one individual remains was identified by physical characteristics comparison. Three personnel survived and were returned to a duty status shortly after the crash.

Identification tags would not necessarily be included in personal effects returned to the next of kin. The tags, if worn by members at time of death, would normally stay with them to destination. However, the presence of the identification tags on remains is considered only as supportive, not conclusive, evidence of identification.

The certificate of death prepared for Petty Officer Dennis was completed by medical personnel at or near the location of death and indicates the cause of death as "completely burned". This cause of death is applicable to eleven out of the thirteen personnel involved. However, comments annotated on the reverse side of his death certificate, it should be noted, were made prior to receiving the remains at the Army Mortuary.

The Navy may make a recommendation concerning viewability of the remains, in consideration of the next of kin's sensibilities and of the circumstances of death. However, upon arrival at the funeral home designated by the next of kin, it is their prerogative to request an inspection be made of the remains, if desired.

The Army's identification of Petty Officer Dennis was accepted by the Navy during July 1966 as valid and conclusive. A review of information submitted by the Army Mortuary and a review of information contained in official death records and health records appears to verify information indicated above regarding individual identification.

This Bureau is in complete sympathy with the Dennis family and understands that it may be most difficult for them to accept the loss of their son. This is especially so when death occurs in a distant location and the circumstances of death deny them the opportunity to view his remains.

1880


A-250

BUMED:394:AFE:1F
19 MAR 1971

This office has been advised by Bureau of Naval Personnel officials that a photograph of LT P. E. Galanti, USN, has already been forwarded to Mr. and Mrs. Dennis. Possibly, this follow-up effort may resolve their doubts when they compare the picture of LT Galanti with the photograph appearing in NewsWeek magazine.

It is hoped that the foregoing information provides the Dennis family with a measure of reassurance to assist in alleviating their doubts and anxieties.

Sincerely,



E. N. BUCKLEY
CDR, MSC, USN
Acting Director, Patient Affairs Division
By direction of the Surgeon General

Encl:

- (1) Certificate of Death
- (2) Ltr from Mr. and Mrs. Dennis

1881

A-251

BUMED:394:1271:1J5
28 Aug 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Mark V. Dennis, Deceased

Ref: (a) Telegram Dated with Major Robert A. Larsen, who was the Company Commander of Co. H, 2nd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Marine Div in Vietnam during 1968 and signer of condolence letter provided to the Dennis Family; presently located at Quantico, Va., telephone 156-2736

1. By ref (a) Major Larsen briefly provided information that he was aboard the helicopter which followed Captain McAllister's aircraft and upon the realization that that aircraft had received enemy ground fire, the helicopter on which Major Larsen was a passenger returned to Dong Ha.

2. Major Larsen further advised he did not recall knowing Mark personally or his whereabouts on 15 July. However, a muster was made at Dong Ha prior to the Company's departure by helicopter and again immediately upon their return to Dong Ha. Therefore, occupants of Captain McAllister's aircraft were obviously known by their absence at the re-muster made upon the Company's return. Name associations for passengers in Captain McAllister's aircraft were provided in this manner.



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D C 20350

A-252

March 16, 1972

Mr. Dennis
5175 Circle
Pineview
Miami, Ohio 45342

Dear Mr. Dennis:

In my letter to you of November 12, 1971, I have given careful consideration to a new and independent review made by the Adjutant General of the Navy of all pertinent data concerning your brother, Mark "W" Dennis. This review was conducted by persons not previously connected with the circumstances and who would have no motive for repeating any prior error which might be found or suspected in connection with the processing of your brother's case.

To be totally candid with you -- as I am confident that my advisers have been with me -- I shall acknowledge at the outset that certain discrepancies of record do exist, and that it does not now appear possible to resolve them in any truly conclusive manner. These discrepancies are:

(1) The statements concerning the helicopter crash on July 15, 1966, the number of persons perishing has been variously stated as twelve and thirteen. Eleven deaths is the number indicated by the current review. The earlier mention of larger numbers of fatalities is believed to have resulted from separate statements and recombinations of crew and passenger death categories.

(2) Mark's medical record is equivocal as to whether his height in February 1966, when he was some 17½ years of age, was 67½ inches or 69½ inches. This figure of course has a bearing on the consistency of the exhumation measurements with the identification of the remains as Mark's. This record ambiguity has been taken into consideration in appraising the exhumation evidence.

(3) It seems certain that no recognizable identification tag for Mark was found in direct association with the body recovered from the helicopter wreckage, or else the body would have been more readily and immediately identifiable. It also seems likely that the identification tags which accompanied the body on its return to Ohio were not found in the heart of the wreckage and had not been burned in intense heat of the type which would be created by the burning of inflammable volatile liquids incident to the crash of a helicopter. There seems now to be no means of establishing the exact manner in which the identification

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tags were brought into association with the remains during the recovery and encasement process, or of explaining the manner in which they may have been burned to the condition revealed by your tests.

(4) There is no definite explanation for the inclusion of a piece of metal tubing with Mark's remains, and there is no basis for questioning your contention that the tubing did not come from the wrecked helicopter. It does seem quite possible that foreign objects may have been gathered in with the remains in a situation such as this, however; and there does exist a possibility that such an object might have been from a cargo item.

Despite the unresolved discrepancies I have mentioned, however, I am personally convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that Mark was in the helicopter in question when it crashed and burned at 6:15 p.m. on July 15, 1966, and that he did not survive that crash with its ensuing explosion and fire.

Included in the information which persuades me to this effect are data, which we have not previously elaborated upon, as to the nature of Mark's service and of the operations in which he played a significant role prior to his death. His correspondence with his family at the time may well have been inhibited both by modesty and by a proper concern for secrecy, but I can assure you that he was associated with units engaged in successful operations against the enemy from April 11, 1966, up until the moment of his death on July 15th. It is to the credit of all involved that those operations were conducted with relatively light casualties to our units. The operation in the course of which Mark met his death was one which continued for almost one month, in the course of which the entire Battalion with which Mark was associated suffered only eighteen deaths -- of which ten were sustained in the helicopter crash which claimed Mark's life. I am reciting these circumstances to demonstrate the basis for my own conviction that Mark was a team member whose absence was immediately noted and keenly and personally felt by all members of Echo Company, by forty-two fellow corpsmen and two medical officers of the Second Battalion, and by a substantial number of the Marine Corps officers and men of the other Battalion organizations to whom Mark was affectionately and respectfully known as "Doc."

In addition, I feel that it is particularly important to consider the area in which the helicopter crashed and burned after it was struck by enemy fire. It landed within 100 yards of its intended landing point. It was within the perimeter of friendly forces. In fact, it was described by the pilot of the helicopter, who survived the crash, as having "landed amidst a battalion of Marines." It was immediately converged upon by those troops, members of Mark's own battalion and company, who were thwarted in rescue attempts by the fire and explosions aboard the

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

Armistead W. Gilliam, Jr., Esquire
Smith and Schnacke
Talbot Tower
Dayton, Ohio 45402

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of June 27 concerning the case of Mark "V" Dennis. Also, I appreciate your good wishes and the report on your activities.

While in no way questioning the judgment previously made, I felt that because of the past history of the case, and the genuine concern and sincere doubt by the family, I must look again at the entire matter and arrive at my own independent conclusion.

I have had the extensive file of documents and correspondence reviewed and have had each point which you raised reinvestigated.

The first question is, of course, whether or not Mark can be placed with certainty aboard that fatal helicopter. To resolve this, Major (then Captain) Robert A. Larsen, United States Marine Corps, Mark's Commanding Officer while he was in Vietnam, was interviewed. From him it was learned that:

-Mark was present at Morning Muster of E Company on July 15, 1966.

-Mark was present when the various platoons of E Company assembled as a group to board the helicopter for the mission. E Company was the only group sent on the mission. It was the only group in the boarding area. The entire company boarded, no one remained behind.

-The first helicopter in the formation carrying the first platoon, Mark's platoon, was hit by enemy fire, crashed and burned within friendly lines. Major Larsen was with the second platoon in the second helicopter. He witnessed the crash and decided that the landing would be too hazardous. The remainder of the company did not land, but returned instead to Dong Ha Airfield. Immediately upon landing, the platoon was mustered on the field

helicopter. While the emergency escape hatch was jettisoned prior to the crash, no one aboard the helicopter left it prior to the time it touched the ground. In view of these facts, it must be considered impossible for your brother to have survived the crash and the fire and to have been subsequently captured by the enemy.

Due to the very nature of the circumstances under which they were recovered, I cannot assert with the same degree of conviction that the total content of the shipment of remains sent to the family consisted of the remains of Mark's body or of items personally associated with him at the time of his death. A preponderance of the available evidence satisfies me, though, that those remains have in gross been correctly identified with Mark. In reaching this conclusion, I am aware of and have considered the various data which might point toward other conclusions, such as some of the height estimates based on bone measurements. I am told that few experts in this field will urge the infallibility of any of the formulas that were used as they might be applied to a particular individual, as distinguished from their general statistical validity.

The presence of lead in the remains could well be explainable through the presence, in cargo carried by the helicopter, of gasoline containing tetraethyl lead which was used to power engines on electrical generators supplying power for field communications equipment in operations of this sort. Grenade pins and shrapnel may likewise have been found with the remains as a result of grenades being carried by Marines aboard the helicopter. It can now be neither proved nor disproved conclusively that such gasoline or grenades were aboard the particular helicopter which crashed -- but each was an item whose presence aboard the helicopter would have been entirely consistent with the conduct of an operation of the sort in which the force was engaged.

Dental X-rays of Mark "V" Dennis are now included in his Navy medical record, and they can be made available for examination by any person you may designate. The quantity of dental remains recovered in conjunction with this particular body was insufficient to permit positive identification by that means alone. Those which were recovered, however, correspond in every detail with available data on Mark's dental work with the exception of a filling in one tooth -- and that filling is indicated by other naval dental records to have been placed after the X-rays were taken.

The extinguishment of a revived hope, such as you and your family have entertained, is as unpleasant a duty and as disconcerting an experience as bearing or receiving ill tidings in the first instance. This communication to you must regrettably be of that nature. It conveys my personal convictions based on a careful review of all of the known facts. I ask that you and the other members of Mark's family accept my assurance that your distress is shared both by me and by the members of my staff who have assisted me in this unpleasant task.

Sincerely yours,

John H. Chafee

A-25

to determine the missing members. It was then that Mark and the other nine crash victims from the first platoon were reported absent.

-The only survivors from the crash were three air crewmen not assigned to E Company. All others aboard perished in the crash and fire.

Based on this evidence I can, unfortunately, only conclude that beyond any reasonable doubt Mark was aboard the helicopter and died in the crash.

The second question is whether the body returned to the family is Mark's. Here again, all of the circumstances and the reported ambiguities were reinvestigated without prejudice. I see no reason to doubt that this body is in fact that of Mark Dennis. I draw this conclusion from the following facts:

-Major Larsen stated that there were no personnel with E Company who would not be on the roster list such as Vietnamese scouts, reporters, observers, etc.

-Marine Corps Headquarters has stated that no personnel were determined to be missing in action from the entire Second Battalion, E Company's parent command, during the 27 days of Operation Hastings.

-There are no discrepancies between the physical characteristics of the body identified as Mark's and those physical characteristics recorded in Mark's file.

- Favorable dental comparison
- Same approximate build
- Same approximate age
- Same blood type
- Same race
- Same sex
- Same approximate height--I say this after the matter was discussed with Dr. J. Lawrence Angel, the expert anthropologist from the Smithsonian who examined the bone structure. Dr. Angel emphasized the extreme difficulty in getting a precise measurement from the fractured bones, but put the height between 67 and 69 inches. He further stated that the bones indicate the victim had stopped growing. Therefore, it seems to me that even assuming that Mark was 69 inches upon enlistment, as seems likely, there is a close approximation between the measurement and the known height of Mark Dennis.

A-257

-These characteristics were minutely compared with all the statistical data collected on the other crash victims to determine if there was a possible correlation. No such correlation was found; they fit only Mark Dennis. Mark Dennis does not correlate with the statistical data of any other victim.

-The analysis of the dog tags done by Papucci Laboratories reports that organic material (residue) on the surface of the metal was not completely consumed, and that the tags were therefore not subjected to more than 200 degrees. The source of that heat (match or burned paper) is mere conjecture. There is no analysis of the metal itself to determine its exposure, just the residue (smudge) on the surface. Mr. Maurice Williams, Director of the FBI Laboratory states that in a situation such as this, metallic dog tags could have been in the victim's pack or ripped off during the crash and insulated by other debris, partially burned or thrown clear. Mr. Williams, who has extensive experience in crash victim identification, has had cases where a body was burned beyond all recognition, but a portion of the hand with a ring was relatively untouched. I do not know the history of these dog tags, but the very fact that they show some degree of exposure to fire links them to the circumstances of the accident. I cannot assume that there was an attempt to deceive and there is a logical explanation for the analytical findings of Papucci Laboratory.

-The Papucci Laboratory analysis of the fragment of bone chip taken from the victim reports an "above normal" amount of lead, specifically, 42 parts per million. It does not give a reference base for normal. Mr. A. Stalman's book, Progress in Chemical Technology, (Academic Press, 1969, page 165), the reference used by the FBI Laboratory, states that normal lead levels in bone are between .67 and 3.59 mg per hundred grams; or up to 36 parts per million. We are talking then about a very minute quantity indeed, 6 parts per million. The FBI Laboratory could not make such an accurate measurement of this small sample, but assuming that Papucci Laboratory could, there are any number of sources of lead in a helicopter: storage batteries, paint, varnishes, ceramics, coloring agents, and ammunition, to name a few. Surface contact could occur from any of these sources. This presence of lead does not establish that the body was burned by gasoline. In fact, when tetraethyl gasoline is burned, the lead combines with bromide ethylene to form lead bromide. Since Papucci Laboratory did an elemental analysis only, the presence of this compound was not certified.

1888

A-258

-The presence of grenade fragments supports rather than contradicts the contention that the body was aboard a helicopter which crashed and exploded while carrying combat loaded Marines. Had there been no such fragments, it would be more difficult to assume that the individual had been trapped in a closely confined compartment with exploding ammunition and grenades.

Finally, the casualty section of Marine Corps Headquarters reports that there are cases where as many as ten victims of a single air accident, who were so mutilated and unidentifiable as to require common burial, were declared dead based on the knowledge that those personnel were aboard the aircraft. In other aircraft cases an individual is declared dead where no body is recovered but there is no possibility of his escape. A witnessed crash at sea is an example.

I share with the Dennis family their grief over the loss of a son and brother, and I deeply regret that I cannot hold out to them the hope that Mark is alive and being held as a prisoner of war. That conclusion does not comport with the known facts of the case.

Sincerely yours,

John W. Warner

1889

A-259

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45208

Phone 861-2256
July 16, 1971

ATMOSPHERIC
TEMPERATURE AND
HUMIDITY
ALLOY SPECIALISTS
CORROSION
METAL BASE
MICROSCOPY
MECHANICAL
PROPERTIES
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
GAUGING

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Gentlemen:

The following are our results on a Metallic Piece Object, removed from left maxillary sinus-- 7/9 /71, and submitted for testing and evaluation, July 13, 1971.

CHEMICAL COMPOSITION:

Si	0.051
S	0.015
P	0.030
Mn	0.53
C	0.21
Cr	0.034
Ni	0.06
Mo	0.037
V	0.005

MECHANICAL ANALYSIS:

Rockwell Hardness, "D" Scale ----- 9F

Half of the submitted sample was chemically and mechanically test. The Composition and Hardness correspond basically to a Medium Carbon Steel, SAE 1020. Under Microscopic Examination the submitted Sample was identified as part of a grenade pin. The Normal Grenade Body is typically a High Fragmentation Steel, with a Hardness Average of Rockwell "C" 35, and a possible Chemical Composition of an SAE of from 1040 to 1080 Steel. The piece involved is not a fragment, but rather a part of the Grenade Exploding Unit. It is difficult to understand how a grenade fragment was exploded on an above ground surface Helicopter.

Very truly yours,

Roland A. Papucci
Roland A. Papucci, Ph.D.
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1216

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

A-260

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 861-2250

July 16, 1971

ALUMINUM
TITANIUM AND
HIGH-TEMPERATURE
ALLOY SPECIALISTS
CORALITE BASE
MICREL BASE
MICROFIL
STAINLESS
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
SAFETY

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio (45449)

Gentlemen:

The following are our results on a Sample of
Partially corroded aluminum tubing, taken from casks
and submitted for testing and evaluation, July 13, 1971.

CHEMICAL COMPOSITION:

Mn ----- 1.1h
Cu ----- 0.12
Fe ----- 0.62
Si ----- 0.29
Zn ----- 0.04
Cr ----- 0.00h
Mg ----- 0.02
Sn ----- 0.00h
Ni ----- 0.03
Pb ----- None
Bi ----- 0.0002

The above Chemical Composition corresponds basically to
Alloy 3003. This type of alloy is classified as having a
relatively high corrosion resistance.

The Scale residue, partially metallic was checked for
Chlorides and Alkalies, to determine in part the possible cause
of partial deterioration and oxidation of the Metal.

Heavy traces of Chlorides were found on the surface of the
Metal, a possible conclusion of Salt Water attack. No Traces of
Alkalies were found. Chloroform or other bodily preservatives
containing Chlorides could also have initiated a corrosion factor
on the Aluminum Metal. This Section of Tubing could not have
deteriorated as such for at least 10 years, unless some
accelerants as enumerated above were in contact or present
with the metal.

Very truly yours,
Roland A. Papucci
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1217

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

A-26

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 861-2250

July 16, 1971

ALUMINUM
TITANIUM AND
HIGH-TEMPERATURE
ALLOY SPECIALISTS
CORALITE BASE
MICREL BASE
MICROFIL
STAINLESS
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
SAFETY

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Gentlemen:

The following are our results on a "Dog Tag"
Identification, partially charred, submitted for
testing July 13, 1971.

SCOPE OF TESTING:

The residual washed material from the surface of the Tags, was
treated and analyzed according to Normal Laboratory Procedure and
ASTM Methods for Infrared Identification. (Reference Region of
the Electromagnetic Spectrum, including wave lengths from 0.76
micron to approximately 300 microns.) The basic identification
made, using the above procedure is similar to fingerprint identifica-
tion. Each Solvent, straight chain or aliphatic ring, aromatic or cyclic,
mixture, solvent waxes etc. has a typical ignition residue which
can be identified and in so doing, relate the residue to the
original solvent.

RESULTS:

No volatile solvent found on Tag. Partial surface ignition occurred
a residual ignition of possible non volatile material. The surface of
the Tag revealed a low temperature coefficient and indicates that
the Tag was not sustained in a temperature medium over 200°F.

CONCLUSIONS:

The surface of the Tag could have been prepared merely by igniting
match with some Cellulose (Paper) present to indicate a surface
action of the material.

Very truly yours,

Roland A. Papucci, Ph.D.
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1219

1892

A-21

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

GENERAL
TITANIUM and
HIGH-TEMPERATURE
ALLOYS SPECIALISTS
CORROSION DATA
MICROSCOPY
METALLURGY
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
SAMPLING

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45208

Phone: 861-2236

August 16, 1971

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Attention: Mr. Dennis

Gentlemen:

The following are our Certified results on a Composite Skull Bone Structure with Preservation Material submitted for testing and evaluation, August 10, 1971.

SCOPE OF TESTING:

To determine by analytical and infra-red procedure the presence and type of any possible volatile solvent, or solvent mixture utilized in the ignition of the charred fragments.

PROCEDURE FOR TESTING:

The residual treated surface exposed material was treated and analyzed according to Standard Laboratory Procedure and A.S.T.M. Methods for Infra-red identification. (Reference Region of the Electromagnetic Spectrum, including wave lengths from 0.7 to approximately 300 microns). The basic identification made, using the above infra-red procedure is similar to fingerprint identification. Each solvent, straight chain or aliphatic, ring, aromatic or cyclic mixture, solvent type, etc. has a typical ignition reaction which can be identified and in no doing relate to residue to the original solvent.

RESULTS:

The composite sample on the infra-red absorption did not prove conclusive to identify the possible initiating solvent or mixture. Quantitative Colorimetric Determination of the prepared treated sample revealed the presence of Lead, 42 Parts per million.

PTL/K-1371

Cont'd.

1893

A-263

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

RESEARCH and ANALYSIS of
TITANIUM and
HIGH-TEMPERATURE
ALLOYS SPECIALISTS
CORROSION DATA
MICROSCOPY
METALLURGY
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
SAMPLING

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45208

Phone: 861-2236

August 13, 1971

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Page No. 2.


RESEARCH and ANALYSIS of
Aluminum
Magnesium
Cast Iron
Steel
Brass and Bronze
Stainless
Titanium
Inconel
Special Alloys
Consulting
Engineering &
Design
Coal
Processing
Inspection &
Sampling

CONCLUSIONS:

No conclusive factors were evaluated from the Infra-red Analysis, primarily due to calcium absorption of any organic fuel and excessive amount of preservative which in part contained formaldehyde.

Colorimetric Determination of the residual treated material reveals a sufficient quantity of Lead in our opinion residual derived material from the ignition of Gasoline. The amount found is too great for normal cumulative surface deposit.

Very truly yours,



Roland A. Papucci, Ph.D.
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1371

2

1894

A-264

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 851 2256

August 16, 1971

ZIRCONIUM
TITANIUM and
HIGH TEMPERATURE
ALLOYS SPECIALISTS
COBALT BASE
NICKEL BASE
INCONEL
MONEL
STAINLESS
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
GAUGING

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Attention: Mr. Dennis

Gentlemen:

The following are our Certified results on
Two Samples, Charred Skin and Cavity Powder,
submitted for testing and evaluation, August 10, 1971.

RESULTS:

Due to the nature of the samples, after careful treatment and
preparation, it was found impossible to segregate or identify
any foreign material or organic solvent or mixture.

Very truly yours,

Roland A. Papucci
Roland A. Papucci, Ph.D.
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1372-1373

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS of
Aluminum
Magnesium
Cast Iron
Steel
Brass and Bronze
Electroplating
Sulphuric
Petroleum Products
Fertilizers
Food Products
Formulations on Special
Products
Refining
Synthesis of Rare and
Special Chemicals
Packaging
Soap
Cleaners

1895

A-26

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 851 2256

August 16, 1971

ZIRCONIUM
TITANIUM and
HIGH TEMPERATURE
ALLOYS SPECIALISTS
COBALT BASE
NICKEL BASE
INCONEL
MONEL
STAINLESS
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
GAUGING

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Attention: Mr. Dennis

Gentlemen:

The following are our Certified results on a
Fragment of Bone Chip, submitted for testing and
evaluation, August 10, 1971.

SCOPE OF TESTING:

To determine by analytical and infra-red procedure the presence
and type of any possible volatile solvent, or solvent mixture
utilized in the ignition of the charred fragment.

RESULTS:

Qualitative Colorimetric Determination reveals the presence of
minute quantity of Lead.

CONCLUSIONS:

The lead content on the surface of the bone had to come from
contact source, rather than an absorption of the bone marrow.
This content in our opinion was absorbed by gasoline ignition
from the Tetra Ethyl Lead Content found in Gasoline at the time
of incident.

Very truly yours,

Roland A. Papucci
Roland A. Papucci, Ph.D.
PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1374

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
Aluminum
Magnesium
Cast Iron
Steel
Brass and Bronze
Electroplating
Sulphuric
Petroleum Products
Fertilizers
Food Products
Formulations on Special
Products
Refining
Synthesis of Rare and
Special Chemicals
Packaging
Soap
Cleaners

1896

1897

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

A-266

ZIRCONIUM
TITANIUM and
HIGH-TEMPERATURE
ALLOYS SPECIALISTS
COBALT BASE
INCOCEL BASE

INCOCEL
MONEL
STAINLESS
SPECIAL ALLOYS
CONSULTING
ENGINEERING &
DESIGN
COAL
PROCESSING
INSPECTION &
GAUGING

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 861-2256

August 16, 1971

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Attention: Mr. Dennis

Gentlemen:

The following addenda based on submitted material, July 13, 1971, can be ascertained to be correct, based on the original results and evaluation.

1. Paper residuals (cellulose) of a prepared packaging type, containing a waxed surface to prevent moisture absorption, was identified from the composition and low sulfur content. Sulfur as SO₂ in P.P.M. 0.8
Wax Coating of surface (one side) in oz/Square ft. 0.005 (Average)*

CONCLUSIONS:

This type of packaging material is usually used to cover or wrap ammunition or other goods which must not absorb moisture.

*The average calculated quantity based on the relative wt. of the wax coating per square foot of surface was arrived at taking the submitted small fragment of submitted paper and calculated on the same basis at the amount found on surface. The limit of error in our opinion is not greater than 15%.

Very truly yours,

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1371a

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

A-267

2046 Florence Avenue - Cincinnati, Ohio 45206

Phone: 861-2256

August 16, 1971

Mr. Jerry Dennis
631 Upland Drive
West Carrollton, Ohio 45449

Attention: Mr. Dennis

Gentlemen:

The following addenda, based on Reports, dated July 16, 1971 and August 16, 1971, correlates our findings and evaluation on the preservative used to sustain or prevent immediate deterioration of the body of Mr. Jerry Dennis's brother who served in the Armed Forces, (Navy) as Petty Officer Mark V. Dennis.

1. The preservative was of a prepared Formaldehyde Composition, using inert matter to coat the surface of the body.
2. Traces of chlorides found at the initial stages of testing and other impurities could not have acted on the body or coffin containing the body in the state that our Laboratory tested the submitted samples.

CONCLUSIONS:

In our opinion, based on the test results, the Chemical Preservative was not responsible for the state of the body, immediate tested surroundings or parts of the sealed coffin which retained the above named Petty Officer.

Very truly yours,

PAPUCCI TESTING LABORATORIES, INC.

PTL/K-1217a and 1371b

RESEARCH and ANALYSIS of

Aluminum
Magnesium
Cast Iron
Steel
Brass and Bronze
Electroplating
Solders
Petroleum Products
Fertilizers
Food Products
Formulations on Special
Products
Refining
Synthesis of Rare and
Special Chemicals
Packaging
Soap
Chemicals
Inks

1398

A-268

William St. Mary, Indiana
 I have known Mark V. Dennis since
 he was a child. I was the first
 and before he left for Vietnam
 in March, 1966. I was the first
 to come to see him off. I was
 with him and my sister. I was
 with Mark right before he left
 was 5 ft. 6 inches tall and was
 wearing 3 inch heels making me
 5 ft 9 inches. Mark was clearly
 taller by 2 inches and the date
 was March, 1966.

Beverly Ann Phillips

My Commission expires May 24, 1992.

My Commission expires May 24, 1992.



1399

A-269

1217 William St.
 Miamisburg, Oh 45432
 February 22, 1989

To whom it may concern:

This statement is to confirm that it is my belief that Mark V. Dennis was at least 5'11" to 6 ft. tall when we last saw each other in 1966. As Mark and I were engaged to be married, I rode with he and his mother to Camp Lejeune, N.C. He was a Navy medic corpsman being assigned to the Marines to go to Vietnam and had to report for training there. I recall being 5'7½" to 5'8" tall myself then. At the time, when I dressed up, such as to go to church, I wore what were called "spiked heels" which were 2½" to 3" high. I still had to look upward to look into Mark's eyes. Today I was measured at 5'7½" tall.

Sincerely,

Linda L. (Mullins) McClure

Sworn to before me this 27th day of Feb

Frank Dickerson, Jr.

FRANK DICKERSON, JR., NOTARY PUBLIC
 IN AND FOR THE STATE OF OHIO
 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES JANUARY 27, 1991



HAMPTON MEDICAL GROUP

220 EAST 100TH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10029

90-251

J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.
J. G. SEVER, M.D.

November 22, 1990

To: J. G. SEVER, M.D.

Re: Eileen Brady

Ms. Eileen Brady has been a patient in this office for the past 20 years.

Review of our office records shows a documented height on July 5th of 1978 of 5 ft 9-1/2 in. Patient's current height is 5 ft 8-1/2 inches.

Sincerely,

J. G. Sever, M.D.

JGS:ew

cc: file

Signed before me this 30th day of November, 1990.

My commission expires 9-15-1990.



My name is Eileen Brady,
sister of Mark Brady.
In 1965, I was 5 ft 9 1/2 in. tall.
Mark was at least as much and a
half taller than I. I remember
clearly because it was a "big
hat" to Mark and one where
"little brother" got to be taller
than "big sister".

I have had back problems
for many years and am now
7 ft 6 in. tall. I am attaching
proof that in 1965 I was 5 ft
9 1/2 in. tall.

Eileen Brady
Sister of Mark Brady

My Commission expires May 24, 1992

Notary Public



6:15 AM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH. GUNNER OF MARK'S HELICOPTER (GARY LEWIS) AFTER
ESCAPE FROM BURNING AIRCRAFT. NOTE BURNED SKIN HANGING FROM HANDS.



6:15 PM JULY 15, 1966 CRASH MARK'S HELICOPTER

1410



1411



8:00 AM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH. MARINES DIGGING OUT MAN WHO HELICOPTER LANDED ON. HE LIVED AND SAVED IN COMBAT WITH EYE INJURY



9:00 AM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH. TWO KILLED.
ONE--HAIR OF BODY IN FOREGROUND. BODY OF MEDIC ALSO KILLED LYING AT REAR OF
AIRCRAFT.



9:00 AM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH. THREE TWO HELICOPTERS STUCK EACH OTHER AND DROPPED
WHILE TRYING TO LAND. MAN PINNED UNDER HELICOPTER.

1414

8:00 AM, July 15, 1966 eastern. Cinnamon (?) covering midline.



1415



8:00 AM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH.

1416



1417



6:15 PM, JULY 15, 1966 CRASH. MARK'S HELICOPTER BURNING AND, 1/2 HR.
SOMETIME AFTER CRASH.
MARVIN "MIKE" WEEVICK, IN SCENE OF PHOTO WITHOUT SHIRT.

1418

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOL CENTER AND FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON
FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON, INDIANA 46218

ALBJ-AGPA

LETTER ORDERS NUMBER 8-141

24 August 1971

SUBJECT: Survivor Assistance to the Next of Kin

See Distribution

TC 405. Following individual will proceed on TEMPORARY DUTY as indicated and will return to permanent station upon completion of temporary duty.

LONESKI, RONALD B., 312-34-7544, MAJ, US Army Sub Op (USAR) USARC
3510 West 15th St., Gary, Indiana 46404 IN

ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTING DATA

Auth: AR 600-10

Act Cls: 2122020 65-1007 818096-2190 812-102 N1620.00000

Soc Cls: N/A

FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Temporary Duty at: 5524 Wegg, E. Chicago, Indiana

Will proceed date: 9 July 1971

Period: Approximately 180 days

Purpose: To provide Survivor Assistance to the Next of Kin of CARR, Donald G., 311-36-4274,
CPT (BROTHER-Matthew W. Carr)

Report date: N/A

Leave date: N/A

Special Instructions: (a) Comply with the following numbered items of DA Supplemental Instructions
(Appendix B, AR 310-10): 4, 9, 12, Repeated Travel

(b) Travel auth IAW M203 and/or M4502 JTR. Reimbursement auth for act cost for ferry, bridges, roads, and tunnels when official vehicles are used. Bugler is auth if required.

(c) A report WB Furnished to this HQ, IAW 600-10 in three copies

ATTN: ALBJ-AGPA, monthly

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Stephen H. Mortenson
STEPHEN H. MORTENSON
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

A-5,6,10,11 Plus
2-ALBJ-AGPA

1419

western union

Telegram

821P EST JUL 10 71 DEAT79

SSAO90 DE COB039 (SF 19100228039)PD ARMY CAS USH A 0852P

EDT07/10/71

1971 JUL 10 PM 3

2020 1 GOVT PD WASHINGTON DC

MR MATHEW W CARR, MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY CERTIFIED

5524 WEDGE STREET EAST CHICAGO INDIANA

BT

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY HAS ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT YOUR BROTHER, CAPTAIN DONALD G. CARR, HAS BEEN REPORTED MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SINCE 6 JULY 1971. HE WAS LAST SEEN WHILE A PASSENGER ON A MILITARY AIRCRAFT ON A MILITARY MISSION WHEN RADIO CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT WAS LOST. SEARCH IS IN PROGRESS. YOU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS RECEIVED. IN ORDER TO PROTECT ANY INFORMATION THAT MIGHT BE USED TO YOUR BROTHER'S DETRIMENT, YOUR COOPERATION IS REQUESTED IN MAKING PUBLIC ONLY INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS

5P-1071 (70-00)

western union

Telegram

NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH. PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY DURING THIS MOST TRYING PERIOD. THIS CONFIRMS PERSONAL NOTIFICATION MADE BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

VERNE L BOVERS MAJOR GENERAL USA THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON DC
NNNN(0857P EDT)

5P-1071 (70-00)

1420



Telegram

352P EST JUL 15 71 DEAB98 450128
DE CCR284 (NY 1960228284) PD ARMY CAP WSH A 0444P EDT 7/15/71
ZCZC 1 30VT PD WASHINGTON DC
MR MATHEW W CARR, MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY CERTIFIED
5524 WEDGE STREET EAST CHICAGO INDIANA

BT

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE OVERSEA
COMMAND CONCERNING THE INCIDENT IN WHICH YOUR BROTHER,
CAPTAIN DONALD J. CARR, WAS REPORTED MISSING. THIS INFORMATION
REVEALS THAT AT APPROXIMATELY THE TIME OF THE LAST RADIO
CONTACT WITH THE AIRCRAFT, AN EXPLOSION OR CRASH OF UNKNOWN
ORIGIN WAS HEARD BY A RECONNAISSANCE TEAM WHICH WAS OPERATING
ON THE GROUND. DONALD WAS BELIEVED TO BE THE ONLY AMERICAN
ARMY PERSON ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. THE SEARCH IS CONTINUING.
YOU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS
RECEIVED. THIS CONFIRMS PERSONAL NOTIFICATION MADE BY A

BT-1201 (10-40)



Telegram

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.
VERNE L BOWEN MAJOR GENERAL USA THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON DC
NNNN(0444P EDT)

BT-1201 (10-40)

1421



Telegram

1201P EST JUL 15 71 DEAB97 450128
DE CCR090 (NY 19700421090) PD ARMY CAP WSH A 23P EDT 7/15/71
ZCZC 1 30VT PD WASHINGTON DC
MR MATHEW W CARR, MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY CERTIFIED
5524 WEDGE STREET EAST CHICAGO INDIANA

BT

I REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING
OUR BROTHER, CAPTAIN DONALD J. CARR,
HAS BEEN OBTAINED. THE SEARCH IS CONTINUING. IN THOSE INSTANCES
WHERE A MEMBER'S FATE IS NOT DEFINITELY ASCERTAINED, THE CIRCUM-
STANCES SURROUNDING HIS DISAPPEARANCE ARE THOROUGHLY INVESTI-
GATED. OUR REGULATIONS REQUIRE THE ORGANIZATION COMMANDER TO
CONVENE A BOARD OF OFFICERS TO CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION WITHIN
TEN DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT. THE BOARD WILL EXAMINE ALL AVAIL-
ABLE EVIDENCE AND INTERROGATE ASSOCIATES AND THOSE WHO CAN
CONTRIBUTE INFORMATION WHICH WILL ASSIST THEM IN ARRIVING AT A

BT-1201 (10-40)



Telegram

SOUND AND LOGICAL CONCLUSION. THE BOARD MAY RECOMMEND A CHANGE
IN DONALD'S STATUS TO DECEASED SHOULD THE
EVIDENCE BE ADEQUATELY CONCLUSIVE TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING;
HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, IT IS NORMAL THAT
HE BE CONTINUED AS MISSING. THE REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THIS BOARD OF OFFICERS SHOULD BE IN YOUR OFFICE WITHIN SIXTY
DAYS. I WILL CORRESPOND WITH YOU AFTER THE BOARD HAS BEEN
REVIEWED. NATURALLY SHOULD ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT OCCUR, I WILL
INFORM YOU IMMEDIATELY.

VERNE L BOWEN MAJOR GENERAL USA
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON DC.
NNNN(1240P EDT)

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1423

- 2 -

Telegram

IDE025(0903)(1-003150030)PD 01/30/73 0900

TWX ARMY CAS WSH 8

ZCZ0001 XV GOVT PD WASHINGTON DC JAN 30 1973

PYS MR MATHEW W CARR, DLR DONT PHONE, IF MOVED FWD ALSO WIRE COLL NEW
ADD, 5524 WEGG, EAST CHICAGO IN

DEAR MR CARR

ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, IT IS MY UNPLEASANT DUTY
TO INFORM YOU THAT THE NAME OF YOUR BROTHER, CAPTAIN DONALD G. CARR,
LISTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AS MISSING IN ACTION
HAS NOT APPEARED ON A LIST OF CAPTURED US SERVICEMEN AND CIVILIANS
PRESENTED TO THE PARIS NEGOTIATORS. I REGRET THAT THIS INFORMATION
WHICH I MUST PROVIDE TO YOU AT THIS TIME ADDS TO YOUR STRESS AND
EMOTIONAL STRAIN. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT EVERY EFFORT IS CONTINUING
TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS STATUS. YOU
WILL BE ADVISED PROMPTLY WHEN ANY ADDITIONAL FACTUAL INFORMATION IS

western union

Telegram

RECEIVED OR A CHANGE IN STATUS IS MADE. THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS THE
PRIOR PERSONAL NOTIFICATION WHICH WAS MADE TO YOU.

VERNE L. BOVERS MAJOR GENERAL USA THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON DC

PER U.S. AIR FORCE FIXED-WING, IN-COMBAT LOSSES IN S.E. ASIA:

LOSS #1399

D.O.I.: 5 JULY 1971

TIME: 2030: NIGHT MISSION

AIRCRAFT: OV-10A

NUMBER: 6714634

OP. CODE.: SL

SQDN: UNKNOWN

BASE: UNKNOWN

CALL SIGN: UNKNOWN

MISSION/WEAPON: UNKNOWN

TARGET/OBJECTIVE: UNKNOWN

CEIL/VIS: UNKNOWN

JCS NO.: UNKNOWN

RT. PKG.: UNKNOWN

MANVR: UNKNOWN

PASS/ANGLE: UNKNOWN

MISSION PHASE: UNKNOWN

WHERE HIT: UNKNOWN

FIRE OBSERVED: UNKNOWN

HIT: LAOS (NO SPECIFICS)

LOSS: LAOS (NO SPECIFICS)

CREW: ONLY THOMAS, D.W. LISTED

STATUS: MIA

PILOT HIT: UNKNOWN

CARR, DONALD GENE "BUTCH"
U.S. ARMY, O-3

U.S. ARMY, O-3

311 36 4274

D.O.I.: 6 JULY '71

CATEGORY: 4

LAOS

144700N, 1071700E

UTM:YB 460352

ACC#1953

ID: C-140

AIRCRAFT: CV-10A

D.O.B.: 10 DECEMBER 1938

BRIGHT LIGHT STATUS: DEAD (F) - CARRIED BY SERVICE AS KILLED IN
ACTION, BY PRESUMPTIVE FINDING. BODY NOT RECOVERED.
OTHERS INVOLVED IN INCIDENT.

THOMAS, DANIEL WAYNE

DANIEL WAYNE

U.S. A.F., O-2

SSN: 506 58 7354

ACC# 1952

ID: T-053

BRIGHT LIT

RIGHT LIGHT STATUS: DEAD (8) - CARRIED BY SERVICE AS
KILLED IN ACTION, BUT JCRC ANALYSIS INDICATES STATUS TO BE
MISSING.

SUMMARY: WHILE SERVING AS ASSISTANT LAUNCH OFFICER, MOBILE LAUNCH TEAM 3, TASK FORCE 1, ADVISORY ELEMENT, CAPT. CARR WAS FLYING A VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN AN A1R FORCE OV-10A (TAIL #634) FROM THE 23RD TACTICAL AERIAL SURVEILLANCE SQUADRON WHEN HE DISAPPEARED 15 MILES INTO LAOS, WEST OF BENHET.

[illegible][illegible]

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STATUS: MISSING
NAME: THOMAS, Daniel W.
PNO. PROB. NO.: 7-014



PERSONAL DATA

ORGANIZATION: 23 TASS	NEW POSITION: PILOT	GRADE: O2	ISSUED NO.: 100-59-7354P
DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Sep 48; McCook, MO	HEIGHT: 5'10"	WEIGHT: 150	HAIR: BRN
RELIGION: Catholic	EDUCATION: HS	STATUS: 1	SSAN: 506-59-7354P
ADDRESS: 1000 Pine St	ZIP CODE: 46337-5	STATE: IN	

MISSION DATA

DATE/TIME OF DEPARTURE: 06/1320L Jul 71, Nakhon Phanom Apt	DATE/TIME MISSING: 06/1910L Jul 71
TYPE AIRCRAFT: OV-10	REPORT CASE NO: 101
LOCATION: Hill 48	TELEPHONE NO: 67-14634
NO. OF PERSONS ON BOARD: One	MISSION: Visual Recon
MISSION: Visual Recon	100% LOCATION: LAOS 1447N/10718E
100% LOCATION: LAOS 1447N/10718E	100% LOCATION: LAOS 1447N/10718E

SUMMARY

1/Lt Thomas departed Nakhon Phanom Airport 6 Jul 71 at 1320L hours on a Forward Air Control mission over Central Laos within a ten mile radius of VN 4736 (1447N/10718E). He requested and received flight following from local ground stations and reached the target area without incident. At 1530L, Hill 48 (Lt Thomas) radioed to the Army Support Facility that he was in the area and the weather was unfavorable. This was his last known transmission. He was scheduled to depart the target area at 1700L and should have made contact with the Army Support Facility at this time. Hill 48 and Imphabon attempted to contact Hill 48 on UHF guard frequency throughout the late afternoon and night but no contact was made. Visual and cross-unications searches by FAC aircraft began at first light on 7 July and continued through 10 known to contain hostile enemy activity. No chieft was sighted and no voice or beeper contact was established. Search efforts were officially terminated 11 Jul 71 with negative results.

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HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

REPORT OF CASUALTY		1. REPORT NUMBER AND TYPE: A 0198, FINDING OF DEATH	2. DATE PREPARED: 22 Dec 76
3. SERVICE IDENTIFICATION (Name, Social Security Number, Grade or Rate, Component, Branch and Organization, UIC, etc.): CARR, DONALD GENE; 31L-36-4274; MAJ; USAR; INF; USARV TAG TFLAN TSH, VIETNAM 31542			
4. CASUALTY STATUS: a. DATE: 4 March 1976		b. PLACE: Laos	
5. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 10 December 1938; East Chicago, IN			
6. RACE: Caucasian		7. SEX: Male	8. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE: Roman Catholic
9. DATE AND PLACE OF LAST ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CURRENT STATUS AND HOME OF RECORD AT TIME: 20 February 1964, Ft. Sennings, GA			
10. PAY GRADE: O-4		11. INCENTIVE/ADDITIONAL PAY: \$1543.50	
12. DUTY STATUS: ACTIVE: ON DUTY			
13. INTERESTED PERSONS (Name, Address, Relationship): DATE OF RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA FORM: 7 Dec 70 Donald E. Carr, 234 Fillmore Street, Gary, IN 46402, Father 1 Mary A. Dillon, c/o Matthew Carr, 5531 Wegg Street, East Chicago, IN 46312, Mother 3 Donald G. Carr, Jr., c/o Carol C. Colhine, 7123 Thrushview 447, San Antonio, TX 78202, Son			
14. REPORT FOR VA TO FOLLOW: YES ☒ NO ☐		15. REPORTING COMMAND AGENCY AND DATE REPORT RECEIVED IN DEPARTMENT: HQ DA 4 March 1976	
16. PRIOR SERVICE DATA: YES ☒ NO ☐		US 55 722 461; C5-321 640	
17. REMARKS: Ref 4L: Under the provisions of Section 355, Title 37, United States Code, and upon direction and delegation of authority by the Secretary of the Army, The Adjutant General finds Major Donald G. Carr, to be dead. He was officially reported as missing in action on 6 July 1971, while a passenger on a military aircraft when contact was lost. As provided by, and for the purposes of Sections 551-558, Title 37, United States Code, death is presumed to have occurred on 4 March 1976. Remains not recovered. Replaces 6th Corrected Missing In Action Report issued 1 Oct 75. Officer was a CPT O-3 with base pay of \$938.70 when he became missing. Replaces FINDING OF DEATH REPORT issued 9 March 1976. LAOS-YB 460 352			
FOOTNOTES: 1. Adult next of kin. 2. Beneficiary for gratuity pay in event there is no surviving wife or child-as designated on record of emergency data. 3. Beneficiary for unpaid pay and allowances-as designated on record of emergency data.			
18. DISTRIBUTION: A-2-4-6 SHERIDAN		19. SIGNATURE ELEMENT: BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: W.F. England Adjutant General	

C. 2 FORM 100 FEB 70

REPLACES DD FORM 1300, 1 MAR 60, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.